Factors Affecting Voter Reactions to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
MAY 1962
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Wm. G. Colman, Executive Director
AN INFORMATION REPORT

FACTORS AFFECTING VOTER REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

May 1962
M-15
PREFACE

Under Public Law 86-380 the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has the duty, among others, to "encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation."

One such problem relates to the structure of local government in metropolitan areas, and means for its adaptation to meet new conditions. Growing awareness of this issue is evidenced by studies made in various parts of the country, some authorized by State legislation and others under local governmental or private sponsorship.

A previous report of the Advisory Commission, Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas, described various difficulties pertaining to local government structure in metropolitan areas, and offered a number of recommendations for legislative and administrative action by State and National governments.

The present report makes no recommendations. Its principal purpose is to provide information about reactions of the electorate to proposals for governmental change which have recently been subject to referendum in 18 metropolitan areas. The report offers several conclusions and inferences, based on the record of those proposed reorganizations.

It should be made clear that in the report which follows, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is neither advocating nor disparaging the concept of "metropolitan government." The purpose of this document is to report on and analyze the manner in which proposals for local government reorganization in metropolitan areas are being presented to, and reacted upon by the people living in these areas.

This report was approved for publication at a meeting of the Commission held on May 4-5, 1962.

Frank Bane
Chairman

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The staff work for this report was conducted by Allen D. Manvel and Sally Oleon Shames. They were generously aided by more than 30 individuals who provided information about efforts toward local government reorganization in 18 metropolitan areas. An initial draft of the report was reviewed by representatives of the American Municipal Association, Council of State Governments, National Association of County Officials, and the United States Conference of Mayors. George Deming, consultant to the Commission, William N. Cassella, Jr., George H. Esser, Jr., Delphis C. Goldberg, Norton E. Long, Estal E. Sparlin, and Paul G. Steinbicker also reviewed draft material.

The Commission and its staff express appreciation for this assistance but of course assume responsibility for the staff work reflected herein.

Wm. G. Colman
Executive Director
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION -- THE NATURE OF THIS STUDY

From 1950 through 1961, proposals for significant change in local government structure were subjected to popular referendum within 18 of the Nation's 212 standard metropolitan statistical areas. In six instances the proposal and the related referendum involved all of a single-county metropolitan area. In the other 12 cases something less than the entire area was involved—generally, the one most populous county.

For the present report, these 18 reorganization efforts have been reviewed to determine the extent to which common patterns appear concerning the kinds of issues involved, the role of various community elements, and the promotional methods used for and against the reorganization plans. The purpose of this inquiry has been to throw some light on the question: "What factors seem to affect voter reaction toward plans for local government reorganization in metropolitan areas?"

Eight of the 18 surveyed plans passed the referendum hurdle, while the other 10 failed of adoption at the polls—including two which received a favorable majority in the overall vote but did not meet a legal requirement for approval by various component portions of the total area involved. From this diverse background, it is hoped, some lessons may be drawn about factors that contribute to the success or failure of referendum-based efforts to change local government in major urban areas.

It should not be inferred that the reorganization plans surveyed have been considered "desirable," so that the proponents were "right" and the opponents "wrong." As has been emphasized in an earlier report of the Advisory Commission 1/ as well as in numerous other writings, there probably is no one ideal pattern of local government structure for metropolitan communities.

Furthermore, each of the reorganization proposals covered in this survey was evolved locally by a process of compromise and selection from among alternative approaches. In all or most instances, no doubt, a part of the electorate was ready to concede the need for some change but opposed these particular proposals on the ground that something different would be better.

The question being explored is nonetheless of great importance. Inherited patterns of local government which fail to meet new conditions and needs must somehow be subject to considered review and alteration. Furthermore, changes in local government structure need to have the consent of the governed. To the ordinary run of legislation and operations of State, county, and municipal governments, the consent of the governed is exercised mainly through the voters' power to choose at the polls from among alternative candidates for membership in legislative or governing bodies and for key executive positions. But since commonly there is no one elective body broadly representative of an entire metropolitan area, and since major elements of the local government pattern may have long-range effects, the direct expression of public consent through a popular referendum is typically a condition for significant structural changes in metropolitan local government. From recent experience in nearly a score of areas, we may observe some of the challenges and opportunities involved in seeking such consent.

Coverage

Reviewed here are proposals subject to popular referendum, from 1950 through 1961, which aimed at significant change in the structure or powers of local governments within any of the 212 metropolitan areas in the United States. The study does not extend, even where a referendum vote occurred, to proposals involving only annexation of territory by municipalities, 2/

2/ The phrase "involving only annexation of territory by municipalities" is not intended to minimize the importance or potential value of this means for adapting local government to metropolitan development, but to distinguish it from the kinds of structural change which were sought in the proposals reviewed in this study. (It may be noted that two of these—the Atlanta and Louisville proposals—contemplated some annexation of territory by the central city as part of a "package" of related actions.) As pointed out in the earlier Commission report on metropolitan areas which is cited in footnote 1, some major cities accomplished sizable annexations during the past decade. However, the variety of annexation methods precluded review of these actions in the present study.
incorporation of new municipalities, school district consolidation or reorganization, municipal charter adoptions and amendments, county charter proposals that involve only one county of a multi-county metropolitan area, 3/ or only tax and debt propositions. Also excluded are changes in local government structure that were accomplished directly by State legislation (such as the establishment of some new special districts), or by action of local governing bodies (for example, through intergovernmental contract arrangements). While most of the reorganization proposals studied were to affect more than a single unit of government, four of them were county charter propositions that directly involved only the county government. Each of the latter, however, concerned a county that comprises an entire metropolitan area, so that these particular efforts at restructuring of the county government were considered relevant for inclusion in the present study.

The particular reorganization efforts subject to review, in accordance with these criteria, were as follows: 4/

Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Consolidation, October 1959: Defeated
Atlanta-Fulton County "Plan of Improvement", June 1950: Adopted
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) Home Rule Charter, November 1959: Defeated
Denver Metropolitan Capital Improvements District, September 1961: Adopted (Declared unconstitutional, February 13, 1962, see p. 41.)

3/ There were 7 such proposals subject to referendum during the 11-year period covered in this study. Of these, 4 were adopted (St. Louis County, Mo., 1950; Baltimore County, 1956; Jefferson Parish, La., 1957; and Suffolk County, N. Y., 1958). The other 3 failed of adoption, all in 1958: Jackson County, Mo.; Marin County, Calif.; and Riverside County, Calif.

4/ It was also decided that reporting here should be limited to one reorganization effort per area. Accordingly, no separate analysis has been made of additional referenda pertaining to local government structure which occurred at other times during this period in three of these areas. These involved establishment of the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District in 1954; defeat of a proposal for a Metropolitan St. Louis Transit District in 1955; an unsuccessful "Metropolitan Seattle" referendum in the spring of 1958; and an unsuccessful effort to cut back the Dade County metropolitan system in 1961. However, each of these other referenda is mentioned briefly in Appendix A.
Durham-Durham County - "Durham County Unified", January 1961: Defeated
Erie County (Buffalo) Home Rule Charter, November 1959: Adopted
Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Charter--Consolidation, April 1959: Defeated
Lucas County (Toledo) Home Rule Charter, November 1959: Defeated
Macon-Bibb County Consolidation, June 1960: Defeated
Miami-Dade County Metropolitan Federation, May 1957: Adopted
Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Charter--Consolidation, June 1958: Defeated
Newport News-Warwick Consolidation, July 1957: Adopted
Oneida County (Utica) Home Rule Charter, November 1961: Adopted
Onondaga County (Syracuse) Home Rule Charter, November 1961: Adopted
Richmond City-Henrico County Merger, December 1961: Defeated
Saint Louis "Greater Saint Louis City-County District", November 1959: Defeated
Seattle Special Purpose District, "Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle", September 1958: Adopted

Of these 18 reorganization efforts, only one came to a vote before 1956 (Atlanta-Fulton County, 1950), and only 5 others from 1956 through 1958; the 12 remaining fall within the past three years, 1959-1961. Half of all these proposals involved a metropolitan area in the South, with the remainder scattered among other parts of the country.

The metropolitan areas where these reorganization plans came to a vote altogether include about one-ninth of the population of all metropolitan areas in the Nation. Of the 10 most populous metropolitan areas--each having at least 2 million inhabitants in 1960--only the St. Louis area was involved in a significant reorganization effort as defined for study here. Of the 14 next-ranking areas, each with between one and two million inhabitants, there were four with a reorganization effort during this period--Cleveland, Buffalo, Seattle, and Atlanta. Of the 29 metropolitan areas having a 1960 population of 500,000 to a million, only four--Miami, Denver, Louisville, and Syracuse--were involved. Taking these several groups altogether, then, half of the 18 reorganization efforts covered in this study related to a metropolitan area with a population of at least a half-million
inhabitants, while the others concerned 9 of the 159 less populous metropolitan areas.

Methodology

Three main steps have been involved in this study.

1. A list was prepared of metropolitan reorganization efforts meeting the criteria for coverage which have been summarized above, and information was gathered from available printed sources concerning each of the proposals. A summary description of each reorganization effort was then drafted, for presentation in Appendix A of this report.

2. Information and comments were solicited from one or more individuals who had locally observed the campaigns for and against each of these reorganization proposals. In most instances, this involved an extended personal interview, but in some cases it was necessary to rely upon mail reporting. The observations reported for each reorganization effort were recorded on a standard worksheet covering its various characteristics. Where differing answers appeared for a particular reorganization effort, an attempt was made to reconcile the apparent inconsistency. The resulting sets of observations are summarized in Chapter 2.

3. The foregoing materials were analyzed to derive the "Conclusions and Inferences" stated in Chapter 3. This process was aided by reference also to other recent studies which have attempted to explore, more deeply and intensively than has been possible in this broad survey, the history of certain recent reorganization efforts.

Limitations

As will be evident from the foregoing description of methodology, "facts" gathered in this survey are not wholly or measurably objective. They are influenced in some degree by the perspective of individual observers and their interpretation of survey inquiries. Mainly because of this limitation, most of the findings are summarized in an across-the-board fashion, rather than specifically for the individual reorganization efforts involved. It is believed, however, that the broad picture which emerges from the study would not be sharply altered if some other set of competent observers had been consulted. Considerable agreement was found where two or more persons reported on a single area, and where the mail or interview record could be checked against published information about a particular reorganization effort.
In 6 of the 18 areas the person reporting (or the main one, where two or more observers were contacted) had served as a member of the group preparing the reorganization plan that was submitted to referendum; in 5 areas he had participated in the research which antedated the reorganization effort; in 4 areas the reporting observer was a local official who did not fill either of the two foregoing kinds of role; and for the other 3 areas some other type of observer reported. To classify the group in another way: 11 had favored the proposal that was submitted to referendum; 2 had been opposed; and the other 5 were neutral or not directly involved. Altogether, such a group might hardly be expected to give a "neutral" expression of the desirability of the various propositions with which they were associated. However, this is not what was expected in the present study, which pertains to the issues, participants, and methodology of the referendum campaigns. It is believed that the observers have reported as accurately as the nature of the subject matter allowed, but each of them, no doubt, would emphasize the limited exactness of his answers to some portions of the inquiry.

This has not been a study in depth and, therefore, does not afford information in detail about any one particular effort at local government reorganization. Rather, it represents a summary comparative review of selected data about a group of such efforts. For this reason, care should be taken not to generalize beyond the data presented. The Commission would hope that additional and more intensive research on the various aspects of voter approval will be undertaken by scholars working in this field.
Chapter 2

SURVEY FINDINGS

No attempt has been made here to analyze critically or in detail the 18 reorganization plans subject to survey. However, a brief description of each of the proposals has been prepared, and that information appears in Appendix A.

Scope of Proposals

The reorganization plans which have been covered reflect a considerable variety of approaches, and do not lend themselves to detailed classification. They may be grouped rather broadly, however, in terms of their prospective effects upon the powers of pre-existing local governments within the several areas involved.

On this basis, 7 of the proposals would have had the greatest impact, in that each of them contemplated the consolidation of two previously independent governments, with the substitution of a single governing body for previously separate governing bodies. These 7 proposals involved:

Albuquerque-Bernalillo County
Durham-Durham County
Knoxville-Knox County
Macon-Bibb County
Nashville-Davidson County
Newport News-Warwick
Richmond-Henrico County

In the two Virginia situations, the proposed merger involved two neighboring areas, while each of the other 5 proposals would have brought together geographically overlying jurisdictions.

At the other extreme were 5 plans which involved no impairment of the power and autonomy of existing local governments. Four of these were charter proposals which called for change in the structure—but not in the powers—of particular county governments (Lucas County, Ohio, and Erie, Oneida, and Onondaga Counties in New York). The proposal for a Denver Metropolitan Capital Improvements District has been similarly classified, on the ground that its authorization to impose a four-county sales tax for financing of public improvements was a supplement to rather than a substitute for financing powers of the pre-existing county and municipal governments in the area.
Between these two groups of proposals, in severity of impact, were 6 propositions which would not have eliminated any existing units of government but would have reduced the range of authority of some existing governments with regard to certain functions. In Seattle and St. Louis, this was to result from establishment of a new special district government, while in the other four areas (Atlanta, Cuyahoga County, Louisville, and Miami), functional adjustments between county and municipal governments were contemplated.

Of the 7 most "drastic" plans, only that involving Newport News-Warwick was adopted, although another (Richmond-Henrico County) also received a favorable reception in terms of the total areawide vote. Of the 6 "intermediate" proposals, 3 were adopted--Atlanta, Miami, and Seattle. Of the 5 "limited impact" proposals, 4 were adopted--the three New York county charters and the Denver Improvements District proposal--and only the Lucas County charter proposal met defeat.

The Background of Proposals

Each of these 18 reorganization efforts was pursuant, of course, to some authorization granted by State constitutional or statutory provisions. Some of these provisions had potentially Statewide application (for example, the Ohio and New York provisions for new county charters); in other instances, they were limited in their availability to certain kinds of local areas or were even specifically focused at the area where a particular effort toward reorganization was contemplated or under way (for example, Atlanta and Miami). Notably, however, with but one possible exception, all of the authorizing State provisions under which structural change was attempted had been either newly enacted or materially amended at some time since 1950. As a minimum, this record suggests the importance of having appropriate legal authority available for efforts at local government reorganization in metropolitan areas. There has been no inventory made to see how the 12 States where these 18 reorganization efforts occurred may compare with other States in respect to such authorizing provisions.

It is difficult to generalize about the time span of the various local studies and reorganization efforts. Even where the particular plan which was subjected to referendum was in process of development for only a few months, there was usually a background of earlier studies, investigations, and proposals. More commonly, the particular proposal which was voted on had gone through a rather extended period of preparation. The formal plan-preparing groups, generally known as "charter commissions", were designated in various ways, with the most common method involving
appointment of members by officials of the local government or
governments affected. However, in Ohio the commission members
were elected and in Florida and Georgia they were designated
legislatively or by the Governor.

Variety appears also in the extent and sources of re-
search information available to the plan-preparing group. In
some instances, such as Cleveland and St. Louis, background
information could be drawn from large-scale, independently
financed metropolitan-area studies which had begun considerably
before the particular reorganization effort got underway. More
commonly, it was necessary to begin specific research of fact-
gathering after the charter group was set up. The services of
out-of-city professional management groups were engaged for this
purpose in some instances, while in other cases research help was
obtained from local sources, such as a planning agency or
university personnel.

The Issues Involved

Local observers were asked to indicate, from a detailed
listing, the "issues or considerations that were of major impor-
tance in this reorganization effort." In spite of the diversity
of proposals, as summarized above, the issues raised for and
against them show much similarity among the several areas.

In nearly every instance, the proponents of reorganiza-
tion are reported to have focused strongly on two topics--the
faultiness of existing local government structure or operations,
and the need for urban-type services in outlying areas. The
latter issue often specially involved particular functions, most
commonly sewers and water supply, but with fire protection, rural
zoning, police protection, and traffic control also mentioned.
Financial implications are reported as important "pro-reorganiza-
tion" factors for 10 of the 18 areas, with emphasis in some
instances upon areawide totals of local government costs or taxes,
and in other instances upon the geographic allocation of govern-
mental costs. Few other main issues are reported on the "pro-
reorganization" side for more than one or two areas. However,
observers referred in varying ways to a common attitude which
apparently encouraged several reorganization efforts: "The need
for area leadership"; "A desire for more unity of purpose by the
area as a whole"; "The need for a more cohesive and harmonious
community"; "Desire to make more and better use of the 'leadership'
available to the metropolitan area as a whole."

Opposition to reorganization proposals also concentrated
heavily on a few key points. Financial implications are cited as
an important basis for "anti" arguments in all but two of the 18
areas, with concern for geographic allocation of costs at least
partly involved in most instances. In two-thirds of the 18 areas, opponents urged that the proposal was "too drastic or too sweeping." (Interestingly, this charge was encountered by most of the modest-effect county charters as well as by the other more drastic reorganization plans.) In about half of the 18 areas, observers considered that the prospective effect of reorganization upon local government employees or present elective officials was a major opposition factor. In five instances, the possible implication of the reorganization proposal for a colored racial minority concentrated mainly in the central city is cited as an important negative factor. In at least two or three areas, opponents argued against the particular plan proposed on the ground that some particular alternative approach would be a better way for meeting the local situation.

One of the issues listed on the survey worksheet was "The importance of independence for small communities in the area." However, observers reported this as a major issue against the reorganization plan in only 7 of the 18 areas. This seems rather surprising in view of the emphasis which scholarly studies and casual observers alike have placed upon the desire for autonomy for existing units of government as a barrier to structural change in metropolitan areas. Much more explicit evidence than this limited set of observations would be needed to discount the presumption that such is the case. Perhaps the reported observations may be explained on the ground that the opponents' concern for localized autonomy was put before the voters mainly in terms of the possible effect of the reorganization proposal on governmental costs and their geographic allocation--issues which as noted above, were of major importance in most of the areas subject to survey.

The Role of Various Community Elements

Observers of these reorganization efforts were asked to indicate, from a detailed listing, those community elements whose position on the proposed reorganization could be identified, and to describe the role of each interested element in terms of a numbering system ranging from "Plus 3--a leading, active, united element for the plan" to minus 3, at the other end of the spectrum. 5/ Following is a summary of the observations reported concerning the 38 community elements listed on the survey worksheet. Appendix B is a tabular record of information reported for each community element.

5/ It should be emphasized that the distinctions pertain to observable aspects of the intensity of effort of various community elements in the referendum campaign, rather than to the intensity of the attitudes of various groups. It is recognized that information on the latter score is extremely difficult to obtain or evaluate.
Interest in reorganization proposals may be roughly gauged by the number of areas where particular elements reportedly had any kind of role or attitude. As would be expected, such evidence appears for "metropolitan newspapers" in every instance. Nearly as widespread, being reported for all but one or two of the 18 areas, is interest of the following community elements:

Central city officials
County officials
League of Women Voters
Suburban newspapers
Central city commercial interests
Suburban commercial interests
Central city Chamber of Commerce
Central city real estate interests

At the other extreme, only limited or scattered evidence of interest appears for certain community elements. In fewer than 6 areas was any attitude or role reported for:

Parent-Teachers Association
Church groups or leaders
State political leaders
Government suppliers

Others of the 38 listed elements fall between these two extremes in frequency of mention. Surprisingly near the bottom of the range, being reported for only 6 to 8 of the 18 areas, are the following:

Central city neighborhood improvement groups
Suburban neighborhood improvements groups
Taxpayer group(s)
Civic research agency
Suburban Chambers of Commerce
Employees of fringe local governments

The activity of various community elements with regard to these reorganization efforts can also be roughly gauged from observers' reports. For 16 of the 18 areas, metropolitan newspapers appear as "A leading, active, united element for the plan." A similar role is indicated for the League of Women Voters in 11 of the 18 areas, and for the central city Chamber of Commerce in 8 of the 18 areas. Also cited as leading reorganization proponents in 5 or 6 areas each are the following:

Central city commercial interests
Radio and TV stations
Civic research agency
Banks
Central city officials

Active leadership of the opposition to the reorganization efforts was relatively scattered. Only two community elements are classed as "A leading active, united element against the plan" in as many as 5 of the 18 areas--namely, suburban newspapers and county government employees.

The attitude or position of various community elements toward local government reorganization in metropolitan areas is likely to depend, of course, upon the kind of change being proposed, and the nature of the original conditions sought to be altered. There was enough diversity among the 18 proposals surveyed that certain groups found in opposition in some particular areas were reportedly backing the prospective change in other areas. Nonetheless, the various proposals had one important common characteristic, in that each contemplated in one way or another the development or strengthening of a local government entity concerned with a relatively large geographic area--in most instances, an entire metropolitan county. It has therefore seemed worthwhile to construct a sort of composit index to measure the "typical" position of various community elements regarding these 18 reorganization efforts, which would give weight to the intensity and unanimity of their attitudes as well as to the number of areas where they played some role. A relatively crude index was therefore developed from observers' reports, with findings as summarized below.

6/ The index merely sums the "role" indicator reported for particular community elements in each of the 18 areas. With "plus 3" standing for a strong favorable role, any element so reported in all 18 areas would have a summary index of 54; any so reported for 9 areas, without a negative indicator elsewhere, would have a summary index of 27. Any element shown as "plus 2" in 6 areas but "minus 2" in the other 12 would end with a summary index of minus 12. In the reporting pattern, zero was an indicator for "strong but opposed positions" by important components of the community element involved, and any such reported instances cancel out of the calculation.
Predominantly favoring these reorganization efforts were the following community elements, which are listed in descending order of the attitude index:

Metropolitan newspapers
League of Women Voters
Central city Chamber of Commerce
Central city commercial interests
Central city real estate interests
Radio and TV stations
Banks
Central city officials
Academic groups or spokesmen
Manufacturing industry
Utilities
Civic research agency
Central city homeowners

A smaller number of elements appear as having been commonly and strongly opposed to the reorganization proposal. In rank order, beginning with the most commonly opposed element, they were:

Farmers
Rural homeowners
County government employees
Suburban newspapers
Employees of fringe local governments
Farm organizations
Officials of fringe local governments
Suburban commercial interests

The other 17 of the 38 listed community elements ranged closely around the "zero" position, indicating considerable variation or splitting of attitude, or their inactivity or lack of interest in most areas. No doubt this finding partly reflects the range in kinds of reorganization being sought in various areas. For example, in 17 of the 18 areas there is some attitude reported for "county government officials" (as distinct from county government employees, mentioned above)—in 6 instances favoring, in 6 against, and in 5 a mixed or divergent position, altogether yielding a summary index figure of minus 2. It seems likely also, however, that some opposition elements were less evident or openly "visible," at least to the observers reporting on these reorganization efforts, than were community elements which took a favoring attitude. Subject to these important reservations, it may still be worthwhile to note that no widespread, strong, and generally consistent position appears, either for or against these reorganization proposals, for such
potentially important elements as labor unions, taxpayer groups, neighborhood improvement groups, or minority racial elements.

Each observer was also asked to indicate which particular community elements participated actively at early stages of the reorganization effort, promoting or sharing in preliminary studies or in the development of the actual plan subject to referendum. Such an initiating role was exercised most commonly by the League of Women Voters (reported for 12 of the 18 areas), central city officials (11 areas), metropolitan newspapers (10 areas), the Chamber of Commerce (9 areas), county officials (8 areas), and the Municipal League or some similar research group (7 areas). No other community element is so reported for more than 4 of the 18 areas.

Promotional Methods and Media

In most of these 18 areas, as has been indicated above, the proponents of reorganization had the potential advantage of an interested and "favorable" metropolitan press, while opponents generally had the backing of suburban newspapers. An effort has been made to ascertain what other media for information and promotion were used for and against these reorganization plans. Observations may be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion method</th>
<th>Number of areas where this method was reportedly used EXTENSIVELY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special meetings and forums</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of a &quot;speakers' bureau&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of radio and TV</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of detailed educational materials</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of promotional-type materials</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and use of an ad hoc vote-seeking organization</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the ward/district organization of either political party</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication through labor union locals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication through Negro churches and/or social groups</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition of cliches, slogans, gross exaggerations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumor-spreading (&quot;grapevine&quot;) techniques</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On behalf of the proposal</th>
<th>Against the proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The foregoing record seems to indicate:

Greater formal organization and use of "mass media" by the proponents of reorganization than by opponents;

Only a limited number of areas where either proponents or opponents managed extensive face-to-face promotional efforts;

Extensive use by anti-reorganization forces of slogans and rumors, as distinct from more formal and detailed argumentation.

This record is supplemented by observers' replies to another set of questions, specifically asking whether a localized get-out-the-vote effort was waged widely and effectively on either or both sides of the referendum campaign. The answers are no doubt influenced by differing interpretations of the word "effectively," and perhaps to some degree by the observers' after-the-fact knowledge of the referendum outcome in various areas. Nonetheless, the findings seem to indicate the crucial importance of this phase of reorganization efforts:

A strong, localized get-out-the-vote effort by plan proponents is reported for six areas--Atlanta, Denver, Louisville, Newport News, Richmond, and Seattle. Four of these referendum efforts were successful, and the other two (Louisville and Richmond) received an overall majority though not the concurrent majorities required.

For the other four areas where reorganization proposals obtained a favorable majority vote (Miami, Erie, Oneida, and Onondaga), observers' comments indicate less intensive vote-getting efforts by proponents than in the six areas mentioned above. In each of these instances, however, the opposition effort was reportedly even less fully organized.

Of the eight areas where reorganization plans failed to receive a favorable majority, there were four (Durham, Macon, Nashville, and Lucas County, Ohio) where localized vote-getting efforts by the opposition were regarded by observers as being clearly more vigorous and widespread than those of the plan's supporters.
In the four other "losing" areas (Albuquerque, Cuyahoga, Knoxville, and St. Louis), according to observers, neither proponents nor opponents mounted a vigorous localized vote-getting effort.

**Influential Factors**

From observers' comments and other sources, it is possible to identify a number of factors which apparently had an important bearing upon the success or failure of these various efforts at reorganization. Some of these are briefly listed below, together with relevant quotations. (Published sources are cited; other quotations are from interviews, letters or unpublished sources.)

It might go without saying, of course, that all of the reorganization efforts studied had the benefit of concern, interest, and effort by some important community leaders and elements. Following are certain other favorable factors observable only in some of the areas:

1. A sympathetic and cooperative attitude by State legislators from the area.

"The Dade County delegation to the state legislature, . . . was responsible for inducing the legislature to pass both the enabling resolution for the Home Rule amendment and the acts creating the first and second charter boards which were responsible for drafting Miami's Home Rule Charter. The Charter Board acts . . . provided that funds be appropriated by the county to support Charter Board activities until such time as a home rule charter had been adopted." 7/

2. The use of locally knowledgeable individuals as staff to conduct background research and to develop recommendations.

". . . there was some talk of bringing in an outside firm to do an area-wide study with a view toward developing some solutions. However, in the end it was

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decided to make use of the local planning facilities. . . . This seems to be important in terms of the rather realistic study that was developed, the relatively easy massing of top community leadership behind the proposed program, and the overcoming of the many political barriers that arise naturally in the process of implementation . . . It seems that these things could be accomplished by a local group that understood and had the confidence of the community it served far more easily than by outsiders." 8/ 

"The Commission was composed of well-known and respected citizens who approached the job with open minds and a sincere desire to render a worthwhile community service. Local consultants were retained . . ." 9/ 

And, on the other hand, according to one commentator, the "outside" group of experts 7/ " . . . is often in grave doubt as to whether its main objective is to make a contribution to knowledge or a contribution to practical politics . . . The nature of the study group process tends to bias its results toward a doctrinaire and comprehensive program rather than a modest and piecemeal set of proposals."

3. The conduct of extensive public hearings by the responsible plan-preparing group.

"All meetings of the charter commission were open to the public . . . and the press . . . The discussions were thorough and little was missed in the way of possible objections to a fundamental document of government. Both the mayor and county judge participated in these discussions, and there were enough practical politicians on


9/ J. Forsythe Gordy, Plan of Improvement for the Governments of Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia, July 1952, Mimeographed paper.
the commission and its subcommittees to view the attempt with an eye toward practical realities." 10/

"The Cleveland procedure ensured the existence of a large nucleus of influential community leaders who were wholly or partially committed to the findings and push for action once the work was completed. The St. Louis study, on the other hand, was conducted with no formal public participation or citizen committees. Under this arrangement, the scholar was relieved of the task of educating and guiding a lay committee and bringing about consensus among its members . . . That the research in the St. Louis venture profited and the subsequent action program suffered as a consequence is a likely hypothesis." 11/

4. Careful concern, in the design of the reorganization proposal, for problems involving representation of various districts and population elements.

"Minority groups present another potential source of opposition . . ., depending on their position under the existing governmental structure and political system. If they have achieved a measure of influence in the community, they may be quite hesitant about risking it through a change in government. This is particularly true if the new government will embrace a larger population that will reduce them to even a smaller minority . . . The campaign discussed above illustrates that it is possible to obtain some Negro support for such a plan if their problems are understood and their needs met." 12/

/ In another area, however: "Obviously the Negro leadership, while officially in favor of the plan because they had official representation on the


12/ Elazar, op. cit., p. 110.
Commission, felt that the plan for representation . . . did not give them as much influence in selecting governing board members or as much assurance of a sympathetic hearing as the existing city form of government."

Following are some of the unfavorable factors emphasized by observers, and which probably were of telling influence in several areas:

1. Absence of a critical situation to be remedied--or of widespread popular recognition of such a situation.

"The proponents failed to interest the voters; the crisis was in the minds of the participants only."

"The county has not reached the point of crisis which would make the public aware of the present antiquated system."

"There was no emergency . . . In the absence of any overwhelming reason for making a change, I think that the majority of the voters decided that the status quo was well known, that the change was questionable, and that in the absence of an emergency the status quo was preferable to change."

"Experienced observers of the metropolitan scene may be acutely aware of the defects and potential dangers that lie in the present system, but the average citizen has little such consciousness. He may be dissatisfied with the performance of certain functions, he may desire better or additional services, he may wonder at times where all this explosive growth is leading and what it means in terms of his daily living, but he is not deeply troubled. He feels no impelling need, no urgency, for any major restructuring of the governmental pattern of the area." 13/

2. Vagueness of specification as to some important aspects or implications of the reorganization proposal.

"When the Committee was set up, the first thing it did was to draw up a charter, and not until

... later did anyone attempt to organize a study of the problems created by such a charter, or more importantly, to study the implementation of city-county consolidation on existing organizations. As a citizen taxpayer I could not vote for the proposal since too much important detail was left completely unanswered.

3. Active or covert opposition by some leading political figures in the area.

"The opposition of the mayors in the two central cities of two areas considering a reorganization proposal was probably decisive. In each case, they represented the image of good government and independence. They both enjoyed the support of the press and the big business community, yet in each case they bucked their sponsors..."

"The mayor did not do much himself against the charter but he gave his department heads... full rein to work against it... and several councilmen worked against it."

"While the support of the chief administrative officers of the area in question will not necessarily guarantee victory for a proposed governmental change, absence of such support will virtually guarantee its defeat." 14/

"The most important factor in determining direction of the vote is political support or opposition. No metropolitan plan can pass over the active opposition of the political parties. No such plan is likely to pass without active partisan support." 15/

4. Discontinuity or lack of vigor in promotion of the reorganization proposal.

"... The campaign was a curious phenomenon characterized more by inactivity and apathy

14/ Elazar, op. cit., p. 54

15/ Schmandt, Steinbicker, and Wendel, op. cit., p. 59.
than by vigor and action . . . It was as though the proponents were not seriously committed to winning . . . "16/

"The proponents were poorly organized, poorly informed, and not very deeply motivated. The Commission placed a great deal of reliance on a paid public relations adviser, but he started out ineffectively and then became ill . . . "

". . . An inadequate campaign without financing, 'attractive' promotional materials, or detailed answers to questions."

5. Popular suspicion of the substantial unanimity expressed for the proposal by metropolitan mass media (newspapers, TV, and radio).

". . . When . . . both newspapers united in support of an issue, and did so vociferously, a good deal of public suspicion was aroused . . . /This/ made their coverage a handicap to the proposal by increasing an already existing antagonism toward the press and, by extension, toward metropolitan government."17/

"I never saw so many good people get behind something and really work hard; but when big people get behind something, little people may pause and run the other way."

6. Inability of the proponents to allay popular fear of the effects of the proposed reorganization upon local taxes.

"Taxpayers are strangely immune to arguments /explaining tax provisions/, and many voters were convinced that adoption of the district would mean a substantial tax increase."18/

16/ Ibid., p. 44.


18/ Schmandt, Steinbicker, and Wendel, op. cit., p. 50.
"People were afraid of higher taxes . . . Lack of trust in the proponent's promise coupled with information given them by the charter's opponents, whom they trusted, led them to believe that taxes would go up without corresponding benefits . . . They were just not convinced that it would not happen that way." 19/

"... There was fear on the part of outside-city residents that county-wide taxes would increase and that the major cost of urban development outside the city would be supported from the county tax rate, rather than from taxes or assessments or other contributions from persons specially benefitted."

"Opposition in the city reportedly was based on fear of the cost of extending city services to unincorporated areas, while rural opposition stemmed from fear of higher taxes . . . . 20/

7. Failure by the plan proponents to communicate broadly, in a manner to reach relatively unsophisticated voters as well as others.

"Some . . . urged that a grass roots organization be developed to work with people in every precinct and block in the Nashville area. With the exception of individual efforts on the part of some of these people, nothing in the nature of precinct work was done . . . The failure of the proponents of the plan was a failure to communicate with over half of the population. 21/

"The campaign by the proponents had a very narrow base of support. There was virtually no 'native' strength or leadership other than some charter commission members. Proponents had no 'grass roots' organization."


"What appears ... is the incapacity of the notables to effectively reach the public through expenditure of funds on public relations firms and a heavy campaign in the metropolitan dailies."

8. Failure by the proponents to anticipate and prepare for late-stage opposition efforts in the referendum campaign.

"Opponents organized a blitz campaign in the last ten days before the referendum, which was effective if not completely truthful."

"... The opposition campaign was largely confined to the two weeks immediately preceding the vote. This was a well-conceived strategic move that was extremely successful in befuddling the proponents and reaching the voters without allowing the former to counteract their statements." 22/

"One of the factors contributing to the defeat was a last minute opposition campaign ... In the five days before election, several large newspaper ads and radio spot announcements were run on the theme 'the proposed county charter is loaded with expensive, unworkable gimmicks proposed by an out-of-state consultant,' which were intended to fool and mislead the people."

"Late anti-merger emphasis on the theme, 'if in doubt vote no' apparently decided many voters." 23/

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22/ Ibid., p. 84.

recommended by a city-county study commission that had been created by the General Assembly in 1957.

A single majority referendum vote of the county as a whole was required for adoption. The plan was defeated, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total vote</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>4,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>14,355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
This proposal dealt primarily with reorganization of the structure of Erie County government.

It provided for an elected county executive with broad administrative authority, to supervise, direct and control administration of departments of the county government. Broad legislative power was vested in the board of supervisors, composed of persons elected from the constituent towns and cities.

The creation of a department of finance under the control of the county executive resulted in abolishing the office of elected treasurer. Also created was the department of public works. The previously appointed comptroller was made elective from the county at large. The elected offices of sheriff, district attorney, and county clerk were left untouched. The civil service rights and benefits of all employees were protected.

The charter stated that local government functions, facilities, and powers were not to be transferred, altered, or impaired. There was provision for contracting for services between municipal and county governments.

The charter was prepared by the Erie County Survey Committee composed of nine members of the board of supervisors, with the executive director of the county planning board as executive secretary. Three attorneys served as consultants. The committee was established by the board of supervisors in 1953 to survey municipal functions and services in the area. In 1958, in anticipation of new State enabling legislation, it was authorized to prepare a county charter.

Adoption required a referendum vote of concurrent majorities in the three major cities and 25 towns that altogether comprise Erie County. The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3 Cities</th>
<th>25 Towns</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>60,304</td>
<td>58,384</td>
<td>118,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>24,750</td>
<td>35,808</td>
<td>60,558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Reorganization efforts should not be undertaken lightly, but with full recognition of obstacles to their success.**

One kind of problem has been widely noted—the difficulty of obtaining concurrence on desirable change from a majority of voters in various parts of the entire area concerned. The requirements of concurrent majorities has often been cited as a major barrier to local government reorganization.

It is frequently averred that proposals for local government reorganization in metropolitan areas are likely to carry in the central city but lose in the suburbs, giving rise to arguments against requirements for "concurrent majorities." The following tabulation shows how each plan fared in this respect:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal</th>
<th>Area-wide</th>
<th>Central City</th>
<th>Outside C. C.</th>
<th>Net Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque-Bernalillo Co.</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta-Fulton Co.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuyahoga Co. (Cleveland)</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham-Durham Co.</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erie Co. (Buffalo) N. Y.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville-Knox Co.</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville, Ky.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucas Co. (Toledo)</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macon-Bibb Co.</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami-Dade Co.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville-Davidson Co.</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport News-Warwick</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oneida Co., N. Y.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onondaga Co., N. Y.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond-Henrico Co.</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Defeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Adopted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 18 proposals surveyed here, only 2 of the 10 which failed of adoption owed their defeat directly to the demand for concurrent majorities--i.e., the Louisville "Plan for Improvement," and the Richmond-Henrico merger proposal. Of the reorganization efforts adopted, there were two, Denver and Miami, which depended only upon an areawide majority and would have lost if concurrent majorities within subareas had also been legally necessary. And there were two defeated plans which received a favorable majority in a central city but lost in outlying territory as well as in total (Macon-Bibb County, and Nashville-Davidson County). In the other 12 of the 18 reorganization efforts studied, pluralities ran parallel in the central and outlying parts of the area concerned, favorably in six instances and unfavorably in the other six. Altogether, this record suggests a somewhat less forbidding cleavage of public attitudes, geographically, than some discussions of metropolitan problems might suggest. Nonetheless, the common requirement for multiple majorities for adoption of a large-area reorganization proposal must be recognized as a difficult hurdle to surmount.

But there is an even more troublesome problem which has not been widely emphasized. Any particular reorganization plan submitted to referendum is typically competing for public favor not merely against the status quo ("this particular change versus no change at all"), but potentially also against alternative ways of dealing with the problems that gave rise to the proposal. The difficulty of this assignment may be suggested by analogy: it is as if, in order to replace the incumbent of an elective office, some one opposing candidate had to obtain more votes than the total cast for the incumbent and all other candidates combined, in a single election open to any number of candidates and without any primary or run-off arrangement.

In several of the reorganization efforts surveyed, some of the most effective and telling opposition emphasized the limitations of the change that was being urged as compared with a different kind of structural adjustment. For example, the St. Louis proposal was attacked on the ground that it contemplated the creation of an additional layer of local government, which might be avoided by another kind of change; and some of the proposals elsewhere for city-county combination met the charge that the fixity of county boundaries made this a less desirable reform than extensive use of the municipal annexation approach. Perhaps in certain instances the preference expressed for "something else" is not entirely sincere, but the variety of problems commonly involved in a restructuring of local government in metropolitan areas makes this a plausible basis for opposing any particular proposition.
Thus, the task of the would-be reorganizer is not merely to arouse public concern with existing conditions that are undesirable, nor even besides this to provide a convincing case that his particular plan would provide a reasonable remedy, but also to be prepared to demonstrate that his proposal is better than any available alternative.

3. Any consequential local government reorganization in a metropolitan area will inevitably involve "political" issues.

It is folly to expect that some proposal or approach will have such overwhelming logic from the standpoint of equity or "economy and efficiency" that it can avoid or readily withstand attack from individuals, groups, neighborhoods, or population elements whose position in the area it may seem to jeopardize. Herein, perhaps, lies the most serious limitation of the "outside" adviser, however technically knowledgeable he may be, in developing a reorganization proposal sufficiently oriented to the political facts of life of a particular area that popular acceptability may reasonably be expected.

The 18 efforts which have been reviewed for this study offer numerous illustrations of various kinds of political issues likely to be encountered. For example:

1. The status of individual elective officials and other communities is usually involved. This is obvious where two or more independent governments are proposed to be consolidated, but it is inherent even in a proposal to change the size of a governing body, to eliminate or combine existing offices, or to subordinate some officials or agencies more fully to a governing body or a chief executive, as may be sought in a single-government charter plan. The incumbents affected and at least some of their subordinates are understandably likely to have reservations about such proposed changes.

2. Another difficult political problem pertains to the size and nature of constituencies for members of governing bodies, and for other elective officers. In general, metropolitan reorganization looks toward the development or strengthening of some large-area instrumentality. If the governing body is to be reasonably limited in size, the issue of its members' remoteness or limited accessibility to the public automatically arises. Where the proposed change involves some
shift of responsibility from other bodies which have previously served areas of differing population characteristics, an especially difficult problem may exist. Some of the reorganization plans reviewed took explicit account of this kind of situation, and included provisions that were designed to safeguard the future representation interests of diverse subareas.

3. Numerous other groups in the area are likely to have some attachment to existing arrangements which might be affected by the proposed change in the status quo--local government employees, contractors, suppliers, and the like. Several of the reorganization plans reviewed had certain provisions to minimize this prospective issue insofar as local government personnel were concerned--for example, explicit protection of their employment and retirement rights, in the event of intergovernmental or interagency transfers. Defeat of at least one or two of the proposals studied has been attributed by observers to the vigorous opposition of firms and organizations supplying certain urban-type services (such as refuse collection) on a contract basis in suburban areas.

As the foregoing paragraphs may suggest, the reference here to "political" issues does not mainly involve partisan politics. Among the 18 reorganization efforts reviewed, there was only one (Lucas County, Ohio) where, according to observers, opposing positions by the major political parties played a highly significant part in the referendum campaign. It should be noted, however, that 9 of the 18 areas involved are in the South, where major controversial issues are often fought out within a dominant party rather than between two closely matched parties. Where there is strong divergence in prevailing party loyalty, among various portions of the total area involved in a particular reorganization effort (for example, between a central city and outlying areas), the chance is increased that pro and con attitudes may be taken locally by the opposing parties, or at least by certain of their recognized leaders.

4. One condition for success in metropolitan reorganization is an intensive and deliberate effort to develop a broad consensus on the best attainable alternative to the status quo.

This point follows obviously from those stated above, concerning the many barriers to accomplishment of change. It
points toward the application of time and effort not only to assemble information about problems which need solution but also to develop a particular plan which has some reasonable prospect of predominant area support. This does not necessarily dictate a willingness to settle for such a low common denominator approach that most of the problems involved are left untouched, although there undoubtedly are situations where a realistic preliminary appraisal will suggest that efforts at desirable change should be postponed.

The record reviewed here tends to support the understandable presumption that a proposal for major structural change has less chance of popular acceptance than would something less extensive. As already pointed out, only 1 of the 5 least drastic reorganization proposals subject to survey was defeated, as compared with 3 of the "intermediate" proposals and 6 of the 7 proposals involving the greatest structural change. On the other hand, some proposals were attacked in local referendum campaigns on the ground that they were inadequate or palliative in nature. Perhaps one important consideration as to a "best" approach involves looking beyond immediate effects to consider the question: Would the accomplishment of this particular change tend to facilitate--or, on the other hand, to prevent or hamper--adaptations likely to be needed in the future?

It is not to be expected that all elements of potential opposition to reorganization can be avoided or mollified. But it is important: that there be an early, realistic, and hard-headed consideration of the implications of structural change for key groups and leaders in the area; that these implications enter into the choice among possible alternatives in the development of a particular reorganization proposal; and that the process by which a specific proposal is developed be such as to enlist the interest and expression of views by a diverse range of community elements.

Some of the successful reorganization efforts studied, and some others which approached success, were relatively unusual in the degree to which the plan-preparing body was able to obtain expressions of opinion and attitude from a wide spectrum of groups and citizens. In numerous instances elsewhere, however, shortage of time or other factors severely limited the opportunity for advisory civic participation in the design of the reorganization proposal later submitted to referendum.

At least three important purposes may be served by a deliberate effort, through hearings or otherwise, to enlist the views of potential opponents as well as probable supporters of metropolitan reorganization: this should provide further insight
on the political feasibility of alternative kinds of structural change; it is likely to develop certain of the arguments that will arise in the subsequent referendum campaign, on issues not subject to compromise or adjustment in the proposal as finally developed; and it may serve to win potential backing or at least neutrality from some individuals and groups that might otherwise be hostile through lack of information or through suspicion of the motives of the plan-preparing body.

An alternative point of view might be urged—that the development of a particular reorganization proposal should be handled "close to the chest", to avoid "advance warning" to prospective opponents—if it appeared that the attitudes of various elements are fixed in a rigid and predictable pattern. Fortunately, the record of the various reorganization efforts which have been surveyed tend to discount such a presumption. With due allowance for the variety of proposals involved, it is possible to find examples of differing reactions by some kinds of community elements from one area to another, and many examples of cleavage of opinion within particular groups.

Encouragement as to the adjustability of attitudes comes also from a recent detailed study of the Nashville-Davidson County reorganization effort. 25/ The author of that study found a marked divergence of instinctive attitudes as between two general types of people—"locals" who are involved very largely with their own neighborhoods, and "cosmopolitans" who have more widespread contacts and interests—but he also found an admixture of these two types among businessmen, government employees, Negroes, organized labor, and other population groupings in the area studied. Even more important, he found marked departures from "typical" voting patterns where trusted leaders of particular elements assumed an active role in the referendum campaign.

5. Enlistment of popular support for governmental change in a metropolitan area calls for the use of a variety of promotional methods, suited to the diverse composition of the electorate.

This point sounds like a truism, but failure to take it adequately into account was apparently a major limiting factor in several of the reorganization efforts which have been reviewed. Findings which have been reported in detail about the referendum campaign in Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee resemble the impression one may gather for various other areas. In Davidson

County, as mentioned above, the reorganization plan was developed and promoted by individuals with a strong areawide identification—"cosmopolitans"—who did not manage to communicate effectively with that large part of the population lacking such an identification. 26/

Facts summarized above in Chapter 2, under "Promotional Methods and Media," suggest that a similar story might commonly be told about the proponents of reorganization in other areas: overconfidence due to predominantly favorable press coverage; heavy reliance upon mass media of communication; little or no development of a precinct or neighborhood system for enlisting popular interest and backing; and only limited use of other face-to-face methods of recruiting voter support.

It is easy to see why these tendencies should exist. The problems of local government structure in a metropolitan area are complex and the design of feasible improvements is an arduous task which calls for analysis and judgment, rather than emotion. Individuals have the capacity and temperament to wrestle with such problems, and individuals who identify themselves with areawide rather than localized interests—i.e., those

26/ To quote (Elazar, op. cit., pp. 35-36):

The locals had a set of ideals and areas of self-interest that substantially differed from those of the cosmopolitans . . . The cosmopolitans did not recognize these differences and based their campaigns on the promotion of cosmopolitan ideals and interests under the assumption that they were universally accepted in the community. By doing so, they did not reach the majority of the population . . .

. . .This was a campaign directed to the type of people who read the newspapers; attend meetings of organizations that have speakers as part of their programming; who can read through rather complex legal material; and who are sufficiently close to the major economic, social, and cultural activities of the area to know, or at least know of, and trust the "community leaders" as their leaders.

. . .But those people who distrusted the newspapers or do not read them; do not belong to or participate in "educational" organizations; do not bother to follow political developments on an abstract level; do not have many ties outside their own neighborhoods; and lack enough firsthand knowledge of the "community leaders" to place real trust in them were just not reached, much less won over.
commonly in the forefront of efforts toward metropolitan reorganization--are unlikely also to comprehend the attitudes of many rank-and-file voters having a markedly different background and exposure. It is not reasonable to expect the initial instigators of "reform" to be skillful also in the strategy and tactics of enlisting broad-based popular support.

This suggests, in turn, how important it is for efforts at metropolitan reorganization to have the active participation of experienced politicians. Less generally than civic "amateurs" are such individuals likely to underestimate the need to summarize issues simply for many voters; to fall into the error of overconfidence; or to overlook the importance of localized and face-to-face methods of enlisting popular support.
APPENDIX A

SUMMARY DESCRIPTIONS OF EFFORTS AT LOCAL

GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION IN 18 METROPOLITAN

AREAS, 1950 - 1961
The proposed charter provided for incorporation of the city-county of Albuquerque, which would have the limits of Bernalillo County, and the powers granted to municipalities, cities, and counties by the constitution and laws of New Mexico.

The governing body was to be a seven-member commission elected at large, with two of the members required to be residents of the rural area of the city-county. "Rural area" was defined as the area outside the city of Albuquerque at the time of the adoption of the charter. Interim transition period arrangements were specified. The commission was to employ a city-county manager to serve as chief executive and administrative officer.

Other officers designated by the charter were: director of finance to perform acts and duties required of county treasurers and assessors; city-county clerk to perform acts and duties required of county clerks; city-county police chief to perform acts and duties of county sheriffs; director of public works to assume acts and duties of county surveyors; city-county municipal court to have jurisdiction and to perform acts and duties required of county small claims court; and, the probate judge of the city-county to have the same powers, jurisdiction and duties as provided by law for county probate judges.

The charter also provided for a pattern of taxation to take account of differential service levels. For this reason, the Commission was to have power to apportion taxes according to benefits derived from the following services: water, sewer, and garbage services; fire protection; public health and sanitary inspection; recreational facilities; flood protection; highways and roads; and any other service primarily for the benefit of a limited area. Bonded debt of the two jurisdictions at the time of adoption was to remain the separate debt of the incurring jurisdictions which would retain their identity for debt service purposes.

The proposed charter was prepared by a 14-member City-County Charter Committee which was appointed in 1952 by the commission of Albuquerque and the board of commissioners of
Bernalillo County, under State enabling legislation of 1951. The committee had the cooperation of various organizations for its study.

The plan was put before the voters as two questions: (1) city-county consolidation per se; and (2) adoption of a charter providing for incorporation of the whole of Bernalillo County as the city-county of Albuquerque. Each question required concurrent majorities from the city and the area outside the city. Each question failed to receive a favoring vote in either of these areas, as indicated by the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Outside City</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal (1)</td>
<td>5,626</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>5,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal (1)</td>
<td>10,212</td>
<td>3,292</td>
<td>13,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For proposal (2)</td>
<td>5,122</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal (2)</td>
<td>10,265</td>
<td>3,368</td>
<td>13,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Atlanta-Fulton County, Georgia
"Plan of Improvement"
June 1950: Adopted

One aspect of this reorganization effort was the proposed annexation by Atlanta of 82 square miles of contiguous and unincorporated land in Fulton County with a population of 87,000. The other aspect concerned reallocation of functions. The city of Atlanta was to assume municipal-type services of police and fire protection, parks and recreation, sewerage, refuse collection and disposal, in the annexed area where they had been performed by the county. On the other hand, responsibility for health activities and certain other services was shifted from the city to Fulton County, for handling on a countywide basis. The employment, salary, and pension rights of the employees affected by the functional shifts were protected.

In place of separate city and county boards, a joint Atlanta-Fulton County planning board and a joint Atlanta-Fulton County board of zoning appeals were created.

These proposals resulted from a study and recommendations made by the Local Government Commission of Fulton County, created by act of the General Assembly of Georgia in 1949. The 1950 referendum acted as a guide to the Legislature for adoption of necessary constitutional amendments and implementory legislation in 1951, with the "plan of improvement" becoming effective in January 1952.

The State-named Local Government Commission was composed of six members from Fulton County and six from DeKalb County (where a minor portion of Atlanta is located). It was assisted by an Atlanta consulting group with technical assistance from other Atlanta citizens. The basic pattern of proposals followed the recommendations of a 1938 study.

The referendum vote required a majority in both Atlanta and the area to be annexed. The votes cast were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Atlanta</th>
<th>Area Annexed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>17,367</td>
<td>6,560</td>
<td>23,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>4,816</td>
<td>6,761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source:
Fulton County Local Government Commission, *Plan of Improvement for the Governments of Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia*, 1950.
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio
County Home Rule Charter
November 1959: Defeated

The proposals included in the Cuyahoga County Home Rule Charter represented a broad plan for governmental reorganization of the area, whose major urban center is Cleveland. The plan provided for an elected county executive and for a nineteen member metropolitan assembly as a legislative body. Nine of the members were to be elected at large, while 10 were to be elected from 5 districts. Under the plan, the county auditor and prosecuting attorney remained elective while the elective offices of clerk of courts, coroner, engineer, recorder, sheriff, treasurer, and the three county commissioners were to be abolished.

Under the charter, Cuyahoga County would be permitted to take over some responsibilities formerly handled by individual municipalities. To implement this, the charter provided a method for the county to provide certain services on an areawide basis—trunk sewers, relief, hospitals, water supply, main highways, civil defense, zoos, ports and airports, transit, air and water pollution, and garbage and rubbish disposal facilities. The municipalities were to retain control over local matters such as fire, police, zoning, local streets, lateral sewers, garbage and rubbish collection, building regulations, recreation, etc. The county could not undertake any of the areawide services until it had worked out a plan and gone through a lengthy procedure which contemplated full hearings and extensive public discussion.

The County Charter Commission was authorized in 1958 by a 66% plurality of the vote. As a guide for its deliberations the commission had the extensive research and studies that had been in process since 1955 by the Cleveland Metropolitan Services Commission (METRO), a voluntary citizens' organization. In addition to many citizen advisory groups, METRO employed its own professional staff as well as professional consulting organizations. Its financial support came from the Cleveland business community and foundations.

Adoption of this charter, under the Ohio Constitution, required a majority vote in the: (1) central city; (2) suburbs; and (3) county as a whole. None of these majorities was obtained, as shown by the following summary of the vote:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cleveland</th>
<th>Suburbs</th>
<th>County as a whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>82,096</td>
<td>109,257</td>
<td>191,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>111,688</td>
<td>124,689</td>
<td>236,377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Charter Commission of Cuyahoga County, Proposed County Home Rule Charter, October 1959.
Denver, Colorado
Metropolitan Capital Improvements District
September 1961: Adopted (Declared unconstitutional, February 13, 1962)

With the authorization of the Metropolitan Capital Improvements District device by the State Legislature in 1961, metropolitan areas in Colorado were provided with a method to finance, by means of an areawide local sales tax, the acquisition of capital improvements and capital equipment needed by municipal and county governments.

Under this legislation, the four Colorado counties of Denver, Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson in the Metropolitan Denver area voted to form an MCID to become effective January 1, 1962, and to impose a 2 percent sales tax. Revenue was to be allocated to the several county areas on a collection basis and then credited within each county to individual municipalities and the county government on a population basis (with the county government's share being determined by the population of its unincorporated territory). Since home rule cities are currently authorized to impose a 1 percent sales tax, which is counted in the aggregate 2 percent rate, one-half of their allocation would be unrestricted. The other allocations were to be available only for capital improvements and capital equipment.

"Capital improvements" included acquisition of real property, construction or acquisition of buildings, structures, roads, bridges, and acquisition of equipment that becomes permanently attached. Also included was permanent improvement of any building or real property. "Capital equipment" included chattels with a useful life of at least three years and a unit cost exceeding one thousand dollars.

The Denver MCID would be governed by a 12-member board of directors, six appointed by the mayor of Denver with city-council approval, and two from each of the other three counties—one named by the county commissioners and the other by the incorporated towns and cities in the county.

Officials and citizens of the Denver area had been seeking a broad-base tax to support capital improvements for the past four years. The charter was prepared by the Committee for Metropolitan Improvements, composed of elected officials of the
area. A single majority was required for adoption. The edge of 33,850 votes in Denver County was sufficient to overcome negative margins in each of the other three counties. The total area vote was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposals . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal .</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Colorado Supreme Court on February 13, 1962, by a 5-1 decision, held unconstitutional the enabling act under which the Denver MCID was created. The decision stated that the legislation violated Article XX of the Colorado Constitution which gave home rule cities "exclusive right to govern themselves in matters of local and municipal concern." Further, "the General Assembly cannot re-invest itself with any portion of the authority it lost to home rule cities upon adoption of Article XX", nor can it legislate to empower a "Four-County District" to discharge the "official functions of home rule cities with relation to local and municipal affairs."

Source:
House Bill No. 221, Forty-Third General Assembly, First Regular Session, State of Colorado, A Bill for an Act "Authorizing the Creation of Metropolitan Capital Improvement Districts . . ."
Durham-Durham County, North Carolina
"Durham County Unified"
January 1961: Defeated

The charter proposed a unified county government to be responsible for continuance of established county services plus planning, land use regulation, and building inspections on a countywide basis, and empowered also to provide urban services in appropriate portions of the county. Under the proposal, there would be no independent municipality of Durham.

The governing body was to be the Durham County Unified commission consisting of eight members, plus a chairman. The chairman, to be elected at large, would preside over commission meetings and act as chief political and ceremonial head of the county, but would not have administrative powers or duties. All eight members of the commission were to be elected by the voters of the entire county, with seven required to reside in particular geographic areas. The County Unified manager, serving at the will of the commission, would be in charge of the administration of the county. With the exception of the county treasurer who was to become appointive, elective county officials would continue to be so, and appointed positions would remain, with some change in the appointing authority.

The charter provided for a general urban services district, consisting at the outset mainly of the area of Durham City. Within this district the newly unified government would provide a comprehensive array of city-type services in addition to those available countywide. As inherited from the city government, such services were expected initially to include urban-type police and fire protection, lighting and cleaning of streets, refuse collection and disposal, traffic engineering, parks, and libraries.

The charter also authorized the commission to recognize "limited urban service districts" for outlying territory in process of urbanization, and to make particular kinds of city-type services available to them on a contract basis.

The charter was prepared by the 11 member Durham City-County Charter Commission of which 8 members were appointed by officials of the city and the county, and three members chosen by the first eight. The formation of the Charter Commission was
Chapter 3

CONCLUSIONS AND INFERENCES

A number of generalizations with regard to problems of governmental reorganization in metropolitan areas seem to be justified by the record of the 18 area efforts which have been subject to review.

1. Proposals for governmental reorganization in metropolitan areas have faced a largely apathetic public. 24/

Typically, within the 18 areas studied, only one in four persons of voting age bothered to cast a vote on the reorganization proposal. In only two instances was there voting participation by as much as one-third of the adult population. The 18 areas were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total referendum vote as percent of voting-age population</th>
<th>Number of areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40 to 45%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 35%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 14%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In any sizable community, of course, the total population of voting age includes some persons not entitled to vote—for example, through lack of citizenship, recency of moving into the area, or (generally most important) failure to register. In the absence of uniform registration figures, one may measure public concern with metropolitan reorganization by comparing the vote on such proposals with balloting in Presidential elections. Again a marked divergence appears: the turnout on reorganization matters was typically less than one-half the vote cast for President at the national election of a nearby date. In only 2 of the 18 areas was the referendum vote more than two-thirds of the local vote for President, and in 3 instances it was less than one-third. The 18 areas were distributed as follows:

24/ See Appendix C for the individual-area voting data summarized in this discussion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total referendum vote as percent of vote cast for President in election of nearby date</th>
<th>Number of areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70 to 79%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 to 69%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 59%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 49%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 29%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not being suggested, of course, that an increased turnout at the polls would automatically assure adoption of any particular reorganization proposal. In fact, the 18 efforts studied offer no clear evidence on this score: some obtained a favorable majority with a rather limited turnout of voters, and some lost in spite of a relatively high percentage of voter participation. The following array shows voter participation for the two groups of proposals—the 10 which received an over-all popular majority and the 8 which failed to do so:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total referendum vote as percent of vote cast for President in election of nearby date</th>
<th>Areas where majority of vote cast was For proposal</th>
<th>Against proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60% or more</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 59%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 49%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 30%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, a big turnout at the polls at least provides an opportunity to overcome relatively limited elements opposing change in the status quo. And whatever the outcome, the expression of the "consent of the governed" by a considerable fraction rather than by only a minor part of the electorate is likely to have clear advantages. If reorganization is thus authorized, the new arrangements start with a better chance of general community acceptance than if they could be "blamed" upon a limited, though active and effective, minority of the electorate. Furthermore, even though defeat of a particular proposal will generally leave unsolved the problems that led to its development, widespread popular participation in the action is more likely than a sparsely shared referendum to "clear the air" and perhaps to suggest what alternative kinds of change might be more likely to obtain popular approval.
Source:
Knoxville-Knox County, Tennessee
Metropolitan Charter
April 1959: Defeated

The charter proposed to replace the city of Knoxville and Knox County by a single metropolitan government with jurisdiction over the entire county area. The metropolitan government would include an elected ten-member council, with five from the city and five from the county, as the legislative body. Executive power was to center in an elected metropolitan chairman, responsible for eight newly designated administrative departments: Law, finance, tax assessment, safety, public works and services, recreation, health, and hospitals and charity.

Other parts of the proposal provided for a metropolitan court system, and consolidation of the city and county schools and libraries. A personnel board and a metropolitan pension and retirement board were to be established by the metropolitan council. Existing sanitary and utility districts were to be left undisturbed with provision for the metropolitan government to acquire the properties by arbitration or negotiation.

The metropolitan area was to include a general services district coterminous with Knox County boundaries, and an urban services district consisting initially of the city of Knoxville. The urban services district could be later extended as necessary by the metropolitan council. The two service areas would assume the bonded indebtedness of the county and city respectively. The services to be performed by the general services district were to include: general administration, police, assessment, health and welfare, schools, parks and recreation, streets and roads, urban redevelopment, building codes, transit, and refuse disposal. The urban services district was to perform and finance such functions as: additional police protection, fire protection, water and sewerage systems, street lighting and cleaning, and refuse collection.

The Metropolitan Charter proposals were prepared by a ten-member Knox County Metropolitan Government Charter Commission appointed jointly by the city and county. The Commission used professional staff assistance. There had been unsuccessful reorganization efforts in 1941, and again in 1957, which resulted in State enabling legislation.
A majority referendum vote both in the city and outside the city was required for adoption. The votes as cast were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Knoxville</th>
<th>Outside City</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>3,402</td>
<td>3,514</td>
<td>6,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>12,662</td>
<td>21,899</td>
<td>34,561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Louisville, Kentucky
"Plan for Improvement" (Mallon Plan)
November 1956: Defeated

One important feature of this reorganization effort called for annexation of 46 square miles of territory, with 68,000 inhabitants, to the city of Louisville. There was to be extension of public services to the annexed area in the shortest time possible, as well as extension of the Metropolitan Sewer District sewer trunks throughout the area merged with Louisville. A new county welfare department was to be created to take over the functions of the existing city welfare and county welfare departments and the Louisville and Jefferson County Children's Home. The community's health services were to be divided into two self-contained units--preventive public health services (to be supported by Jefferson County) and public hospital services (to be supported by Louisville). The plan included provisions designed to help protect employment rights of persons engaged in functions being shifted.

The plan was developed by the Local Government Improvement Committee established by joint action of the Mayor of Louisville and the Jefferson County Judge in 1955. The six appointed members represented various economic and interest groups as well as different geographical areas. The chairman was John Mallon, whose name was attached to the plan.

Approval requirements were quite complicated under the enabling legislation. The plan had to receive a majority (1) within the city of Louisville and (2) within the "affected area" outside. The latter included both unincorporated territory and 31 small cities. In case of a majority vote against the plan in any of them, that city's votes, both "yes" and "no", were deducted from the totals cast, so that such vote would have no effect on the acceptance or rejection of the plan, and so that no such city voting against the plan would become part of Louisville regardless of the total vote on the proposal in the rest of the outside area affected.
The proposition lost, by the following vote:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Louisville</th>
<th>31 cities*</th>
<th>Unincorporated Territory</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>41,247</td>
<td>3,487</td>
<td>4,084</td>
<td>48,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>24,943</td>
<td>11,688</td>
<td>8,657</td>
<td>45,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only 2 voted favorably.

Source:
Lucas County (Toledo), Ohio
County Home Rule Charter
November 1959: Defeated

This plan proposed significant changes in the structure of the county government. The charter would have centralized legislative and administrative powers in the board of county commissioners, while enlarging it from three to five members. A chief administrative officer was to be appointed by the board to serve under its direction and supervision, with power to act as director of finance and director of personnel. The charter provided for installation of modern administrative practices in the areas of finance, purchasing, and personnel.

The commissioners were to have authority to appoint the coroner and the heads of the departments of welfare, institutions, and public works—making the engineer (head of public works) and the coroner appointed rather than elected officers. The commissioners were to appoint a board of health, thus consolidating all the health districts in the county into a single agency. They would also have authority to create additional departments.

Other elected officials were to be continued as heads of county departments, to include: auditor, clerk of courts, prosecuting attorney, recorder, sheriff, treasurer.

The county charter was drafted by a fifteen-member charter commission elected at-large on a nonpartisan basis in November 1958. An earlier study committee had been created jointly in 1954 by the city and county governments and boards of education.

Only a simple countywide referendum majority was required for adoption. However, the proposal failed to achieve positive margin in either Toledo or the county area outside Toledo. The vote was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Toledo</th>
<th>Outside Toledo</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>29,482</td>
<td>11,176</td>
<td>40,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>51,800</td>
<td>20,533</td>
<td>72,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Macon-Bibb County, Georgia
City-County Merger
June 1960: Defeated

This plan proposed merger of Macon, Payne City, and the unincorporated area of Bibb County into one government with the new city limits the same as the original Bibb County limits.

The governing body was to be a chairman and 12 commissioners. The chairman and 3 of the commissioners were to be elected from Macon-Bibb County at large, with the remaining 9 commissioners elected from 9 voting districts, 5 within and 4 outside the original limits of Macon. Two commissioners to reside outside the limits of Macon, were added to the three-member Water Board, with all 5 to be elected by a countywide vote.

The proposed merger of the three governments provided for consolidation of: tax assessing and collecting offices, engineering departments, law enforcement offices, and administrative offices. The proposal also provided for a recorder's court to be countywide in jurisdiction. The charter protected the job security and pension rights of all employees of the local governments being merged.

Under the charter, the chairman and commissioners were to investigate and to determine governmental services that could be furnished to areas adjoining the city of Macon, and, also, the cost of such services. The costs determined would be the amount of tax to be paid by the area served. The city-county governing authority could furnish all services to one area, one service to one area, or different services to different areas, but in no case would the proposal become effective until the people in the area gave their approval under a defined referendum procedure.

The existing bonded indebtedness of Macon was to be serviced solely from taxes levied in the area of the original city of Macon. Essential city services, such as street cleaning and lighting, garbage collection, more intensive police services, and fire protection, for the urban area of Macon were to be paid by specifically defined taxes in that area.

The proposal was recommended by the Macon-Bibb County Governmental Planning Commission, created in 1956 jointly by the city, the county, and the chamber of commerce. Current and
former mayors, county commissioners, and chamber presidents were members of the Commission. They conferred with authorities in municipal government, local citizens, and planning experts. A 1958 constitutional amendment and 1960 permissive legislation paved the way for the merger referendum.

Concurrent majorities in Macon, Payne City, and the unincorporated area of Bibb County were required for adoption. The votes cast were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Macon</th>
<th>Payne</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>4,598</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>6,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7,368</td>
<td>11,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
The Miami-Dade County plan represents a major metropolitan reorganization. The governing body is a thirteen-member board of county commissioners. This board appoints a county manager and a county attorney. All independent county offices in existence at the time of reorganization were abolished, with the exception of judicial and educational offices. The number of county departments was reduced from 35 to 17, with the heads made responsible to the county administrator.

The county, under the proposal, was to be responsible for regionwide facilities and services, such as: water, sewage disposal systems, arterial roads, harbor facilities, health, welfare, hospitals, parks, mass transit, housing and urban renewal, drainage, beach erosion, air pollution, and planning. Also to be established was more uniformity on a countywide basis for: traffic, building and related technical codes, assessment and tax collection, licensing, and publicity. The municipalities retained self-determination in local matters not ceded to the county under the charter.

The county commissioners were authorized by the charter to take over a function from a municipality if it fails to meet minimum performance standards set by the county. Any municipality may request the county to take over a function upon approval of two-thirds of its governing body. The county also has some limited powers in the establishment of new municipalities and changes in boundaries of existing ones.

These proposals were developed by the Metropolitan Charter Board, created by acts of the Florida Legislature in 1955 and 1956, with its 17 members appointed by the governor. The home rule movement for Dade County resulted from the activities of the 1953 Metropolitan Miami Municipal Board, which sponsored the original research study.

A single overall majority was required for referendum approval of the proposal. Votes cast were:

For proposal . . . . 44,404
Against proposal . . . 42,619

- 54 -
The Dade County reorganization has withstood two concerted assaults at the polls, in September 1958 and October 1961. Some study, as well as interviews with observers, was made in connection with the latter effort. However, no direct reference has been made to this material in the present study, in view of the decision to limit reporting to a single reorganization effort per area.

Source:
Metropolitan Charter Board of Dade County, The Charter of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida (approved May 21, 1957).
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee
"Plan for Metropolitan Government"
June 1958: Defeated

The metropolitan charter proposed to replace the city of Nashville and Davidson County by a single "Metropolitan Government for Nashville and Davidson County." A metropolitan mayor to be elected by areawide vote was provided for. A 21-member metropolitan council was to assume the legislative functions of the existing city council and county quarterly court. Six members would be elected at large and one elected from each of 15 districts.

Under the proposed charter, a metropolitan court was created to embrace the existing city and county courts. City and county fiscal functions were consolidated into an integrated department of metropolitan finance. The department of metropolitan police was to have law enforcement responsibility for the entire city and county area, including that exercised by the county sheriff and constables, who only retained custody of the metropolitan workhouse and jail. A transitional period would culminate in consolidation of the county highway commission and the city streets division into the department of public works. Coordination of water and sewer service was proposed. The heads of all the named departments were to be appointed by the mayor.

Two service districts were to be established. The general services district, covering the total area, would perform and finance numerous services, including: police, courts, jails, assessment, health, welfare, hospitals, streets and roads, schools, libraries, parks and recreation, housing and urban redevelopment, planning, electricity, refuse disposal, and building regulation. An urban service district was to perform and finance such functions as: additional police and fire protection, water supply, sanitary and storm sewers, street lighting and cleaning, and refuse collection. Provision was made for enlarging the urban service district in response to changes in population and service needs. In addition, the four incorporated communities in the county, outside of Nashville, would be allowed to continue their existence as corporations until each should decide to merge with the general metropolitan government.

The charter plan was proposed by the Davidson County Metropolitan Charter Commission, created by resolution of the Nashville City Council and Davidson County Court, with five
members from each jurisdiction. The proposals were based in part on earlier studies completed in 1952, 1954, and 1956, that had also recommended various enabling legislation adopted by the State Legislature.

A successful referendum vote required a majority in the city of Nashville and outside the city. The proposition lost, by the following vote:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nashville</th>
<th>Outside Area</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>7,797</td>
<td>13,794</td>
<td>21,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>4,804</td>
<td>19,234</td>
<td>24,038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

On June 28, 1962, the citizens of the city of Nashville and Davidson County voted to adopt a plan for a consolidated government similar to the one defeated in June 1958. A major difference in the new plan was provision for a 41-member governing council, 35 elected from single-member districts and six elected at large, including the vice mayor who presides, rather than the 21-member council of the older plan. The successful vote was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nashville</th>
<th>Outside Area</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>21,064</td>
<td>15,914</td>
<td>36,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>15,599</td>
<td>12,514</td>
<td>28,113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For additional details, see:

"Tennessee Votes on Charters This Summer," Metropolitan Area Problems, Volume V, Number 3 (May-June 1962), p. 4.
Newport News-Warwick, Virginia
Inter-City Consolidation
July 1957: Adopted

Adoption of this proposal resulted in the consolidation of the former first class cities of Newport News and Warwick into one city, that elected to use the name Newport News.

The new city of Newport News is governed by a seven member city council which elects the mayor. The administration is in the hands of a council-appointed city manager. Upon appointment, the city manager chose department heads from among the staffs of both cities. Most of the employees of the two cities were retained. The constitutional elective offices of the new city treasurer, commissioner of revenue, commonwealth's attorney, and city sergeant were filled at a special election.

The two sets of municipal services, such as police and fire protection, were merged into one. The new city inherited the physical assets as well as the construction programs and bonded debt of the two cities.

Previous unsuccessful efforts for governmental reorganization had been made in 1950 (annexation proceedings), and again in 1956 when Newport News, Warwick and Hampton drew up a three-way consolidation charter. This 1957 charter was developed by the Charter Committee on Consolidation created by the Newport News city council, which appointed itself, and the Warwick city council, which appointed representatives.

A majority vote in each of the cities was necessary. The successful referendum, as indicated below, was confirmed by appropriate State legislation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Newport News</th>
<th>Warwick</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>4,398</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>8,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>3,253</td>
<td>4,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Oneida County (Utica), New York
County Home Rule Charter
November 1961: Adopted

This proposal dealt primarily with reorganization of the structure of Oneida County government.

It provided for an elected county executive with broad administrative authority, to supervise, direct, and control administration of departments of the county government. Legislative power was vested in the board of supervisors composed of persons elected from the constituent towns and cities.

The creation of a department of finance under the control of the county executive resulted in abolishing the office of elected treasurer. Also created was a department of audit and control, headed by an elective comptroller, thus abolishing the office of county auditor. The elected offices of county clerk, district attorney, and sheriff had no change in powers or duties. An appointed office of commissioner of public welfare was substituted for an elected one.

There were several other changes proposed by the charter. A department of public works to be in charge of highways and buildings was created. Also created was a board of acquisition and contracts consisting of the county executive, commissioner of public works, and chairman of the board of supervisors. A new department of personnel was to replace the Oneida County civil service commission. Provisions for other departmental changes were also included. The proposed changes in the structure of the county government were not to alter the civil service rights and benefits of county employees.

The charter also specified that local government functions, facilities, and powers were not to be transferred, altered, or impaired. There was provision for contracting for services between municipal and county governments.

The charter was prepared by a charter commission of five members, appointed by the chairman of the board of county supervisors as authorized by resolution of the board. They were helped in their work by local and State municipal research organizations and persons from the local college.
Adoption required a referendum vote of concurrent majorities in the 2 cities and 26 towns that altogether comprise Oneida County. The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>18,795</td>
<td>12,940</td>
<td>31,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>6,897</td>
<td>11,136</td>
<td>18,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Onondaga County (Syracuse), New York
County Home Rule Charter
November 1961: Adopted

This proposal dealt primarily with reorganization of the structure of Onondaga County government.

It provided for an elected county executive with broad administrative authority, to supervise, direct, and control administration of departments of the county government. Broad legislative power was vested in the board of supervisors composed of persons elected from the constituent towns and the city of Syracuse.

The creation of a department of finance under the control of the county executive resulted in abolishing the office of elected treasurer. Also created was a department of audit and control, headed by an elective comptroller, thus abolishing the elective office of county auditor. The elected offices of county clerk, district attorney and sheriff had no change in powers or duties, although the term of office was increased from 3 to 4 years. An appointed office of medical examiner replaced the elective office of coroner.

There were a number of other changes proposed by the charter. The scope of the department of public works was broadened. A department of planning replaced the Onondaga County regional planning board; a new department of personnel replaced the county civil service commission; and a department of mental health replaced the mental health board. The commissioner of social welfare was to be appointed rather than elected. The position of county inspectors of penitentiary was abolished. The directors of the various administrative departments were to be appointed by the county executive according to specified professional and technical standards, with confirmation by the board of supervisors where required. The proposed changes in the structure of the county government were not to alter the civil service rights and benefits of county employees.

The charter also specified that local government functions, facilities, and powers were not to be transferred, altered, or impaired. There was provision for contracting for services between municipal and county governments.
The charter was prepared by a charter commission appointed by the board of county supervisors.

Adoption required a referendum vote of concurrent majorities in the one major city and 19 towns that altogether comprise Onondaga County. The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Syracuse</th>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal . . .</td>
<td>26,106</td>
<td>23,474</td>
<td>49,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal . .</td>
<td>12,512</td>
<td>18,634</td>
<td>31,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Richmond-Henrico County, Virginia
City-County Consolidation
December 1961: Defeated

The purpose of this proposal was to consolidate the city of Richmond and Henrico County. The plan, if adopted, was to be effective January 1, 1963, and allowed for a five and one-half year transition period for structural change in the council, as well as a fourteen-year tax equalization program.

After the transition period the council of the enlarged Richmond would have 9 members elected at large, but with each of the four boroughs, to be set up, having at least one member. The council was to elect from its members a mayor and vice-mayor, and was to appoint the city clerk, city attorney and city manager. The city manager was to be the chief executive officer of the city, responsible to the council for administration of the city government.

A key feature of the merger plan was the fourteen-year period to increase Henrico County's real estate tax of $1.10 per $100 of assessed value until it matched the Richmond rate of $1.88. Some services, such as trash and garbage collection, fire and police protection, would be extended almost immediately, while others would be extended with "reasonable promptness." Also to be combined, with compromise agreements and some transition arrangements, were the city and county school systems, judicial systems, and bus lines. The council was required by the charter to establish a separate department of rural affairs and maintain it as long as departmental status would be justified. No city or county employee was to lose his job as a result of the merger and their retirement and civil service rights would be protected.

The charter was developed jointly by the Advisory Committees of Henrico County and of Richmond, each with three members appointed by their respective governing bodies. They were aided in their conferences by an earlier study done by Public Administration Service, and by local governmental and lay personnel. Adoption required: (1) passage by the governing body of each jurisdiction; (2) a majority vote in each jurisdiction; (3) passage of appropriate State legislation. Number one was accomplished, but the referendum was defeated by an unfavorable vote in Henrico County, as indicated by the following summary:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Richmond</th>
<th>Henrico County</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>15,051</td>
<td>8,862</td>
<td>23,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>13,647</td>
<td>20,347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Board of Supervisors of Henrico County and Council of City of Richmond, Report of the Advisory Committees for the Consolidation of the City of Richmond and Henrico County, July 31, 1961.
St. Louis, Missouri
"Greater St. Louis City-County District"
November 1959: Defeated

The proposed government was to serve the area comprising both St. Louis City and St. Louis County, which are nonoverlapping jurisdictions. It was to assume areawide responsibility for the following seven functions: establishment and control of a metropolitan road system; regulation of mass transit facilities; promotion of economic development; preparation for consideration of a comprehensive master plan; central control of police training and communication functions; civil defense; and sanitary powers and land drainage. Existing municipalities and St. Louis County would continue to have control over purely local aspects of the seven named functions.

The legislative body was to be a fifteen-member board of supervisors elected for four-year staggered terms. Four of the supervisors, two each from the city and county, would be elected at large. The other eleven would be elected from districts, four of which would be entirely in the city, three entirely in the county, and four to include both city and county territory. The board was to select annually one of its members to act as chairman. The chief executive of the proposed District, called president, was to be elected from the city and county at large, for four years, on a partisan ballot. He was to have a seat on the District's board of supervisors, without voting privileges, but with veto power and power to appoint and remove directors of District departments, who would also serve as his "cabinet."

The existing Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District was to be absorbed by the new multipurpose district. It had been approved at a special election, February 9, 1954 by a majority vote in both St. Louis City and St. Louis County. The Sewer District has necessary power to build, operate, and maintain sewer facilities. The district was authorized to incur indebtedness, impose charges for use of sewer facilities, and create subdistricts to bear the expense of specific localized improvements and have limited taxation power. It also has power to enact ordinances for regulation of sewers and prevention of stream pollution. The district is governed by a board of trustees, three appointed by the mayor of St. Louis and three by the county supervisor, with approval of the city and county circuit judges, respectively.
A proposal for a Metropolitan St. Louis Transit District had been defeated both in the city and county on February 25, 1955. The Transit District was to have had power: (1) To regulate private transit and taxi operations, (2) To conduct a comprehensive survey of mass public transportation needs and the facilities and services required to meet them, and (3) To submit to a referendum vote the question, "whether the District should acquire mass transit facilities." If a majority in both city and county voted affirmatively, the District would then acquire transit facilities to operate itself or to lease for private operation. The District would be governed by a Commission with 3 members each appointed by the mayor of St. Louis and the county supervisor of St. Louis County, and an additional member, chosen by these appointees, to act as chairman.

The proposal for the "Greater St. Louis City-County District" was written after one year's study and discussion by the Metropolitan Board of Freeholders, appointed in May 1958 by city and county officials and the governor. The proposed plan closely followed the recommendations of the Metropolitan St. Louis Survey issued in 1957.

Concurrent majorities from the city and the county were necessary for adoption. The vote was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>21,450</td>
<td>27,633</td>
<td>49,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>43,237</td>
<td>82,738</td>
<td>125,975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
Metropolitan Board of Freeholders of St. Louis City-St. Louis County, Proposed Charter for Greater St. Louis City-County, May 6, 1959.
Seattle, Washington
"Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle"
March and September 1958: Adopted

With the authorization of the Metropolitan Municipal Corporation device, as defined by 1957 State enabling legislation, the cities and towns of Washington could "act jointly to meet common problems" and would be able to obtain "essential services not adequately provided by existing agencies of local government."

In March 1958, a proposal was unsuccessful at the polls which sought to establish a Seattle MMC to assume the metropolitan aspects of the functions of (1) sewage disposal, (2) public transit, and (3) comprehensive planning. The boundary for this three-function municipal corporation would include as much of the Lake Washington drainage basin as possible, as well as all the metropolitan area within King County.

A Metropolitan Municipal Corporation with less extensive responsibilities was then proposed in September 1958. Under the modified plan, the district's jurisdiction was limited to sewage disposal and water pollution control. New boundaries reduced the area to communities immediately surrounding Lake Washington that were part of a first stage construction program of a comprehensive sewage plan.

The governing body of the district is a metropolitan council of 16 members, comprised of 14 elected officials from component municipalities, a resident of King County to be selected by the commission, and one additional person (not an elected official) chosen by the remainder of the council to act as chairman. Administrative and management functions are delegated to the executive director chosen by the council.

"Metro" has no direct taxing powers. It is authorized to accept Federal grants and to borrow from other local governments, as well as to issue revenue bonds for its capital requirements. Revenue to finance current operation, maintenance, and debt service is to come from service charges imposed on a per-household basis. MMC can also obtain "supplemental income" from each component city and county based on its proportionate share of the total assessed, valuation of "Metro" that is within its boundaries.
There had been active interest in finding a solution to the area's problems since 1953. The Metropolitan Problems Advisory Committee, appointed by the mayor of Seattle and the King County board of commissioners, was responsible for the 1957 enabling legislation and the 1958 proposals.

Adoption required a majority vote both in Seattle and in the outlying area. The vote in the September referendum was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seattle</th>
<th>Outside</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For proposal</td>
<td>54,807</td>
<td>15,268</td>
<td>70,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against proposal</td>
<td>40,325</td>
<td>7,551</td>
<td>47,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
APPENDIX B

REPORTED ROLE OF VARIOUS COMMUNITY ELEMENTS IN EFFORTS MADE AT GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN 18 METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1950-1961

Key:
+3  A leading, active, united element for the plan
+2  A unitedly favoring element, but not in a strong or leading role
+1  Predominantly for, but with some splitting or reservations
0   Strong but divergent positions taken by some important components of this group
-1  Predominantly against, but with some splitting or reservation
-2  A unitedly opposing element, but not in a strong or leading role
-3  A leading, active, united element against the plan

Not reported: This element lacking here, or, as such, largely disinterested or inactive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community element</th>
<th>Number of Areas With Reported Role for the Community Element Indicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan newspapers...............</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other newspapers......................</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio and TV stations.................</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city homeowners...............</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban homeowners..................</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural homeowners.....................</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city commercial interests.....</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban commercial interests.........</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city real estate interests...</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban real estate interests........</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural real estate interests..........</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing industry...............</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities............................</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks................................</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government suppliers................</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX B -- Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community element</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>+3</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city officials</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>County officials</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officials of other local governments</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city employees</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County employees</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees of other local governments</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State political leaders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central city political organization</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County political organization</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban Chambers of Commerce</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Women Voters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal League or similar research group</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayer group(s)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent-Teachers Association</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Farm organizations</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Church groups or leaders</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Academic groups or spokesmen</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Minority racial elements</td>
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- 70 -
## APPENDIX C

### SUMMARY OF VOTE CAST AND VOTER PARTICIPATION, 18 REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Referendum Vote Cast, Entire Area (*indicates majority)</th>
<th>Voting-age population 1/</th>
<th>Vote cast gor President, nearest election 2/</th>
<th>Referendum vote as percent of Voting-age population</th>
<th>Presidential vote</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,038,000</td>
<td>714,234</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>142,000</td>
<td>84,742</td>
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<td>Albuquerque-Bernalillo Co., N. M.</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>13,504*</td>
<td>19,284</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>78,0142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlanta-Fulton Co., Ga.</td>
<td>23,927*</td>
<td>6,761</td>
<td>30,688</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>368,728</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuyahoga Co., Ohio.</td>
<td>191,353</td>
<td>236,377*</td>
<td>427,730</td>
<td>1,038,000</td>
<td>714,234</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denver (4 counties), Colo.</td>
<td>83,439*</td>
<td>67,145</td>
<td>150,584</td>
<td>661,000</td>
<td>487,856</td>
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<td>Erie County, N. Y.</td>
<td>118,688*</td>
<td>60,558</td>
<td>179,246</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>368,728</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knoxvill-Knox Co., Tenn.</td>
<td>6,916</td>
<td>34,561*</td>
<td>41,477</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>82,801</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisville-Jefferson Co., Ky.</td>
<td>48,818*</td>
<td>45,288</td>
<td>94,106</td>
<td>661,000</td>
<td>487,856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lucas County, Ohio.</td>
<td>40,058</td>
<td>72,333*</td>
<td>112,891</td>
<td>661,000</td>
<td>487,856</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macon-Bibb Co., Ga.</td>
<td>6,537</td>
<td>11,711*</td>
<td>18,248</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>24,910</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miami-Dade Co., Fla.</td>
<td>44,404*</td>
<td>42,619</td>
<td>87,023</td>
<td>536,000</td>
<td>236,522</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nashville-Davidson Co., Tenn.</td>
<td>21,511</td>
<td>24,107*</td>
<td>45,618</td>
<td>237,000</td>
<td>94,874</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newport News-Warwick, Va.</td>
<td>8,337*</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>12,463</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>15,735</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oneida Co., N. Y.*</td>
<td>31,735*</td>
<td>18,033</td>
<td>49,768</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>120,161</td>
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<td>Onondaga Co., N. Y.</td>
<td>49,580*</td>
<td>31,146</td>
<td>80,726</td>
<td>261,000</td>
<td>194,675</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richmond-Henrico Co., Va.</td>
<td>23,913*</td>
<td>20,347</td>
<td>44,260</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>74,021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saint Louis City-Saint Louis Co., Mo.</td>
<td>49,083</td>
<td>125,975*</td>
<td>175,058</td>
<td>909,000</td>
<td>597,530</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seattle-King Co., Wash.</td>
<td>70,075*</td>
<td>47,876</td>
<td>117,951</td>
<td>514,000</td>
<td>364,7024</td>
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1/ Interpolated or extrapolated from Census of Population data as to population 21 and over, 1950 and 1960. Entire county areas except for Atlanta and Seattle; see footnotes 3 and 4.


3/ Estimated as 89 percent of Fulton County.

4/ Estimated as 91 percent of King County.
Appendix D

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES

Extensive bibliographic references regarding metropolitan reorganization efforts that occurred or were under way up to late 1958 can be found in:


The citations which follow are intended to supplement rather than to repeat those earlier references.

Three recurrent sources deal extensively with local government in metropolitan areas--National Civic Review, the monthly journal of the National Municipal League; the bimonthly bulletin of the Conference on Metropolitan Area Problems, entitled Metropolitan Area Problems: News and Digest; and The Municipal Year Book, the authoritative reference volume published annually by the International City Managers Association. Each of these sources has been reviewed for the period since 1958 to locate references to the recent metropolitan reorganization efforts which are included in this report. The resulting citations are listed below, under the heading "Recurrent Publications," with references to particular reorganization efforts or areas in terms of the following numeric coding:

1. Albuquerque-Bernalillo Co. 10. Macon-Bibb County
2. Atlanta-Fulton County 11. Miami-Dade County
3. Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) 12. Nashville-Davidson County
5. Durham-Durham County 14. Oneida County, N. Y.
6. Erie County (Buffalo) 15. Onondaga County, N. Y.
7. Knox ville-Knox County 16. Richmond-Henrico County
8. Louisville, Kentucky 17. St. Louis Metropolitan Area
9. Lucas County (Toledo) 18. Seattle Metropolitan Area

A multiple citation can similarly be made (involving areas 7, 11, 12, and 17) to the following recent publication:

The further citations shown below under "Other Selected References" relate to particular areas and are so arranged. This represents a listing of items which have come to hand in the course of the present study, rather than a comprehensive bibliography.

RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS

National Civic Review

1958 - Volume XLVII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Authors</th>
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<th>Pages</th>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Becker, Don</td>
<td>&quot;Seattle Area to Vote on Metro Plan,&quot;</td>
<td>80-81</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Schmandt, Henry J.</td>
<td>&quot;Study of Governments in St. Louis,&quot;</td>
<td>179-181</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>Grant, Daniel R.</td>
<td>&quot;Nashville Metro Charter Proposed,&quot;</td>
<td>235-236</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Becker, Don</td>
<td>&quot;Seattle Metro Plan Fails,&quot;</td>
<td>237</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>Schmandt, Henry J.</td>
<td>&quot;St. Louis Creates City-County Board,&quot;</td>
<td>342-343</td>
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<td>&quot;Vote on New Seattle Metro Set for Fall,&quot;</td>
<td>345-346</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Grant, Daniel R.</td>
<td>&quot;Suburban Vote Downs Nashville Metro Charter,&quot;</td>
<td>399-401</td>
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<td>October</td>
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<td>&quot;Seattle Metro Wins,&quot;</td>
<td>465</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Condon; George A.</td>
<td>&quot;City-County Merger Sought in Knoxville,&quot;</td>
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1959 - Volume XLVIII

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<td>January</td>
<td>&quot;Objectives of Metro Government Listed,&quot;</td>
<td>29-32</td>
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<td>March</td>
<td>&quot;St. Louis Freeholders to Consider Two Plans,&quot;</td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>&quot;Metro Plan Loses in Knoxville,&quot;</td>
<td>259</td>
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<td>&quot;Metropolitan Proposal Made for Cleveland Area,&quot;</td>
<td>259-260</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>&quot;Lucas County Drafting Home Rule Charter,&quot;</td>
<td>314</td>
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<td>&quot;Propose Metro Plan for St. Louis,&quot;</td>
<td>315</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>Schmandt, Henry J.</td>
<td>&quot;St. Louis to Vote on Metro Plan,&quot;</td>
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</table>

- 73 -
National Civic Review

1959 - Volume XLVIII--continued

December - Esser, George H., Jr., "Durham City-County Study Begun," pp. 586-587 (5).

1960 - Volume XLIX

March - "Cleveland Seeks New Metro Solution," pp. 142-144 (3).
September - "Voters Turn Down Macon-Bibb County Merger," p. 441 (10).

1961 - Volume L

February - "Interest in County Charter Continues in Cleveland Area," pp. 99-100 (3).
- "Richmond Considers City-County Merger," p. 493 (16).

1962 - Volume LI

- "New York Counties Adopt Charters," p. 36 (14,15).

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April-May - "Township Approves Annexation to Toledo," p. 5 (9).
June-July - "St. Louis Board of Freeholders Appointed," p. 8 (17).
- "Davidson County Voters Defeat Consolidation Move," pp. 1, 4 (12).
- "Metro County Recommended for Cleveland," pp. 1, 4 (3).

1959 - Volume II

- "Erie County Survey Committee Submits Charter," p. 3 (6).
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1961 - Volume IV

- "Threat to Dade Metro Defeated," p. 8 (11).
The Municipal Year Book, Chicago: International City Managers Association

1959

Bollens, John C., "Metropolitan and Fringe Area Developments in 1958," pp. 47-55 (1,3,4,6,7,9, 12,13,17,18).

1960


1961


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Denver, Colorado--continued


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- - - -. Analysis of County Charter Vote, a research report, November 12, 1959.

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- - - -. Metropolitan Dade County - Its First Four Years, A summary report.


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Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee


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Richmond-Henrico County, Virginia


Saint Louis, Missouri


Seattle, Washington


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*Reports of Metropolitan Problems Advisory Committee*, James R. Ellis, chairman, Seattle: University of Washington, October 1956.

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Local Nonproperty Taxes and the Coordinating Role of the State. September 1961. (Report A-9; 66p., offset.)


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1 Available free of charge from Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington 25, D.C.