


Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts



SUBSTATE
REGIONALISM
AND THE
FEDERAL
SYSTEM

Volume I

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20575


OCTOBER 1973

A-43



A COMMISSION REPORT

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PREFACE

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was established by Public Law 380, passed by the first session of the 86th Congress and approved by the President September 24, 1959. Section 2 of the act sets forth the following declaration of purpose and specific responsibilities for the commission:

“Sec. 2. Because of the complexity of modern life intensifies the need in a federal form of government for the fullest cooperation and coordination of activities between the levels of government, and because population growth and scientific developments portend an increasingly complex society in future years, it is essential that an appropriate agency be established to give continuing attention to intergovernmental problems.

“It is intended that the commission, in the performance of its duties, will—

“(1) bring together representatives of the Federal, State, and local governments for the consideration of common problems;

“(2) provide a forum for discussing the administration and coordination of Federal grant and other programs requiring intergovernmental cooperation;

“(3) give critical attention to the conditions and controls involved in the administration of Federal grant programs;

“(4) make available technical assistance to the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government in the review of proposed legislation to determine its overall effect on the Federal system;

“(5) encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation;

“(6) recommend, within the framework of the Constitution, the most desirable allocation of governmental functions, responsibilities, and revenues among the several levels of government; and

“(7) recommend methods of coordinating and simplifying tax laws and administrative practices to achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship between the levels of government and to reduce the burden of compliance for taxpayers.”

Pursuant to its statutory responsibilities, the Commission from time to time singles out for study and recommendation particular problems impeding the effectiveness of the Federal system. In keeping with this responsibility, in 1971 the Commission identified regionalism as an important intergovernmental development and resolved “to assess the record to date, including the use and accomplishments of regional intergovernmental bodies.”

The first phase of the Commission’s work dealt with multistate regional instrumentalities, and a report on *Multistate Regionalism* was approved at a meeting of the Commission on December 17, 1971. The second phase involves substate regionalism. This is the first of a six-volume report on that subject.

In this volume, the Commission considers recent substate districting actions taken by the Federal, State, and local governments in response to jurisdictional fragmentation in both urban and rural areas and to the need for areawide solutions to certain public service problems. The focus here is on regional councils of local elected officials and substate planning and development districts. In the remaining volumes of this study the Commission will deal with local governmental reorganization, the assignment of public service responsibilities, and the effectiveness of various regional approaches in the United States and Canada.

This volume was approved at a meeting of the Commission on June 22, 1973.

Robert E. Merriam
Chairman

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This volume was prepared by the Governmental Structure and Functions Section of the Commission. Major responsibility for the staff work was shared by David B. Walker and Carl W. Stenberg—Project Directors for the Commission’s substate regionalism report—and John J. Callahan, Bruce D. McDowell, Ruth A. Bosek, Jean M. Gansel, and William T. Harris. Chapter IX is based on a study of interstate metropolitan areas prepared under contractual arrangements with the Commission by Wendell and Schwann, consultants on governmental affairs. Library assistance was provided by Carol J. Monical. The secretarial-clerical services of Mary Fitzgerald, Betty Smith, Kim Sowards, Gloria Thomas, and Vicki Watts were, of course, indispensable. Judith Blakely skillfully and cheerfully performed the task of editing this volume.

A special note of thanks is due K. Thor Swanson, William E. Bivens, Charles W. Washington, and Eldon Hickey, who assisted the staff in the preparation of certain background chapters and offered helpful advice and constructive criticism during the preparation of this report.

The Commission and its staff had the benefit of review and comment on its work by a large number of persons with interest and informed judgment in regional affairs. Those participating in special “thinkers’ sessions” held on December 10 and 14, 1972 were: Jacques Avent, John Bebout, Richard Burton, William K. Brussat, Marian Clawson, Wm. G. Colman, Martha Derthick, Joseph Doherty, Richard C. Hartman, Raymond Hay, Victor Jones, John Joyner, Ira Kaye, Mark Keane, Richard Lehne, Norton Long, Ann Macaluso, James Martin, Hugh Miels, Thomas Murphy, Selma Mushkin, James H.

Pickford, Robert Steadman, Revan Tranter, George Washnis, and York Willbern.

Others persons who provided valuable assistance during the course of the study, participated in “critics’ sessions” on drafts of the issues and recommendations chapters, or commented on various draft chapters appearing in this volume include: John Bosley, William Cassella, Vance Clark, James Dowden, Aliceann Fritschler, James Forkin, John Garvey, James Hoban, Gerald Horton, Dwight Ink, James Johnson, Richard Johnson, Rodney Kendig, Ted Kolderie, Earl Lindveit, Melvin Mogulof, Beverly Osmon, Edward Rizzo, Lawrence Rutter, Frank Sandifer, Walter Scheiber, Lee Schoenecker, J. Fred Silva, Terry Smith, Edward Speshock, Glenn Stine, Charles Warren, Mary Washington, Deil Wright, and Joseph Zimmerman.

The Commission gratefully acknowledges financial assistance received from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under Section 701(b) of the Housing Act of 1954 as amended. These funds supported much of the survey research and consulting services upon which several chapters are based, and expedited the printing of this volume.

The completion of this part of the study would not have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of the persons and agency identified above. Full responsibility for content and accuracy rests, of course, with the Commission and its staff.

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
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CHAPTER I

SUBSTATE REGIONALISM TODAY



At the beginning of the last decade, political scientist Morton Grodzins described the operation of our decentralized governmental structure as "mildly chaotic." He viewed favorably the dispersion of power within the political system, concluding that "the preservation of mild chaos is an important goal for the American federal system."¹

At the close of the 1960's, academicians and practitioners alike were questioning whether power had been too dispersed, whether responsibility had been too diffused, and whether the overall operation of the Federal system had become simply too chaotic. The common point of reference for many of these people was the fragmented metropolitan areas of the Nation.

The Metropolitan Mosaic

According to the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, "population growth is metropolitan growth in the contemporary United States..."² In 1970, 69 percent of our Nation's 205 million people resided in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). Almost 85 percent of the population increase during the 1960's occurred in metropolitan areas. The 1970 Census of Population found that within SMSA's, 88 percent of the people lived in urban places, compared with 41 percent outside SMSA's.³

As defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an SMSA has as its nucleus a central city, closely knit twin cities, or two or more adjacent counties having a population of 50,000 or more and meeting certain density, labor force, and other criteria of metropolitan character. In addition, the outlying areas must be integrated economically and socially with the central city or county.⁴ Despite this interdependence, the structure of all but the handful of SMSA's with consolidated city-county governments is extremely atomized. This metropolitan fragmentation has created major problems in guiding and accommodating population growth.⁵

In 1972, 16,802 general purpose local governments, or over one-fourth of the national total, were found in the 267 officially designated SMSA's. On the average, there were 90 units per SMSA. Although wide variations were apparent, the "typical" SMSA had two counties, 13 townships, 21 municipalities, 18 school districts, and 31 special districts. With respect to incorporated municipalities in SMSA's, approximately one-third had fewer than 1,000 residents and half occupied less than one square mile of land. Only about one-ninth of the metropolitan local governments had a population over 25,000, and less than one percent had at least 25 square miles of territory.⁶

Jurisdictional fragmentation at the local level has been accelerated, mainly due to the continuing proliferation of special districts for fire protection, water supply,

sewers, housing, and other purposes. This trend has slowed the rate of decline in the overall number of governmental units located within and outside SMSA's that has taken place since 1957 as a result of school district consolidation. The total number of non-school special districts rose 30 percent during the last 10 years, from 18,322 in 1962, to 21,265 in 1967, to 23,886 in 1972. Most of this increase, however, has occurred in rural areas. In 1972, 33 percent of the special districts were found inside SMSA's, compared with 36 percent in 1967 and 30 percent in 1962. Although a majority of special districts are located within a single county, 2,418 in 1972 had boundaries extending into two or more counties. Three-fifths of these multicounty bodies were in non-metropolitan areas, mostly for soil conservation. Of the 1,028 metropolitan areawide special districts, less than 100 were found inside the 72 largest SMSA's. The boundaries of nearly one-fourth of the metropolitan special districts were coterminous with those of general purpose local governments.⁷

Since the early 1960's most metropolitan areas have experienced a mushrooming of single- and multipurpose areawide districts supported by Federal grants-in-aid. Across the country, over 4,000 geographic program areas have been recognized under 24 Federal programs. The more common single-purpose district organizations include 481 Law Enforcement Planning Regions; 957 Community Action Agencies; 419 Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System Councils; 195 Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning Agencies; 115 Economic Development Districts; 56 Local Development Districts; 165 Resource Conservation and Development Districts; and 247 Air Quality Regions.⁸

Many of these Federally supported agencies are autonomous countywide or multicounty entities. They are the substate embodiment of the single State agency approach, which has been a standard administrative condition attached to many Federal grants-in-aid—especially those administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—requiring the establishment of a separate organization to handle inter-governmental planning, programming, and funding relationships. Unlike traditional special districts and public authorities, however, most of these new bodies are concerned mainly with areawide planning and grant administration rather than with operating programs. In addition, the lion's share of their revenues comes from Federal sources instead of user charges imposed on private citizens or local government contributions. Some substate districts tend to be even less accountable to both the general public and their elected representatives.

Most metropolitan residents, then, are served by at least four types of traditional local government: a county, a municipality or township, a school district; and one or more special districts or public authorities. They also are affected by the planning, administrative,

and developmental activities of Federally supported substate districts. The nature and impact of these older and more recent developments are illustrated in a brief comparison of the jurisdictional structure of two metropolitan areas.

**Metro Fragmentation:
Cities Pittsburgh and the Twin**

The four-county Pittsburgh SMSA is one of the most highly fragmented in the Nation. In 1967, it contained 704 local governments, 441 of which could levy property taxes. Within Allegheny County alone were found 84 municipalities, 42 townships, 62 school districts, and 129 special districts.⁹ Since that time, fragmentation has increased as a result of the creation of limited-purpose

substate districts under Federal and State auspices.¹⁰ Chart I-1 shows the extent of this multiple layering from the vantage point of a resident of Whitehall, a small suburban community located in Allegheny County, who in late 1972 received services or benefitted from, and paid taxes or user charges in support of, 17 different governments or quasi-governmental units.

The Whitehall resident is affected by the planning programs of a criminal justice commission and by the regulatory activities of an air quality control agency. In addition, areawide organizations exist for comprehensive health and manpower planning, community action, and economic development, although these bodies do not have a direct impact on Whitehall Borough.

Partly in response to Federal areawide initiatives like these, many States in the past few years have demonstrated an interest in multijurisdictional planning and

Chart I-1

Layers of Governance, Whitehall, Pennsylvania, 1972

17. United States of America
16. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
15. Air Quality Control Region
14. Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission
13. Western Pennsylvania Water Company
12. Allegheny County
11. Allegheny County Port Authority
10. Allegheny County Criminal Justice Commission
9. Allegheny County Soil and Water Conservation District
8. Allegheny County Sanitary Authority
7. City of Pittsburgh
6. South Hills Area Council of Governments
5. South Hills Regional Planning Commission
4. Pleasant Hills Sanitary Authority
3. Baldwin-Whitehall Schools Authority
2. Baldwin-Whitehall School District
1. Borough of Whitehall: Population 16,607

programming. Besides authorizing the establishment of regional organizations for planning under various Federal programs, governors and legislators in 40 States, including Pennsylvania, have created substate district systems for State planning, development, and administrative purposes. The majority of these 479 districts nationwide have been in existence for less than four years; three-fifths of them are now organized. In delineating their districts, some States have relied on Federal program criteria or on existing locally initiated areawide agencies, while others have constructed a new system after a series of public hearings and studies to determine boundaries and relationships with general-purpose local units. While substate districts are essentially aggregates of local jurisdictions, the States play a critical role in boundary designation, technical assistance, and in a few cases financial support. Although broader functionally, like Federally supported single-purpose areawide bodies a large number of the State planning and development districts are separate multicounty organizations.¹¹

A regional council of local elected officials serves as the State planning and development district for the area encompassing Whitehall Borough. Most regional councils were established during the late 1960's in response to areawide planning incentives under the 1965 amendments to Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 and areawide review requirements under Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (implemented by OMB Circular A-95). These multijurisdictional organizations have been set up to foster cooperative approaches to areawide matters, with their membership consisting predominantly of elected officials or appointed representatives of constituent local governments. Although Federal agencies supply a large portion of regional council revenues, member localities also generally make financial contributions. Currently, about half of the approximately 600 regional councils in existence are located in metropolitan areas.¹²

Two regional councils serve the Borough of Whitehall, in addition to a regional planning commission. The latter is the planning arm of the recently established South Hills Area Council of Governments. The multicounty Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Planning Commission has been assigned responsibility (or "piggybacked") for A-95 review and comment, "701" comprehensive planning, and transportation planning. As indicated previously, other areawide organizations handle law enforcement, comprehensive health, manpower planning, and air quality control. Also separate from the regional council is an economic development district and a multicounty community action agency. According to the Beaver County Planning Commission, these bodies "...operate in related fields, sometimes with overlapping functions, each maintaining a degree of autonomy. A

series of organizational structures and geographic regions have been created, causing in many instances duplication of services, fragmentation, and confusion."¹³ Furthermore, there are independent areawide public authorities or special districts for transit, water supply, sewage treatment, and soil and water conservation.

To sum up, the 1972 Whitehall resident would find several layers of planning and administrative bureaucracy at the substate regional level that did not exist 10 years ago: a regional council, a Federally supported criminal justice commission, and an air quality control agency. Although not having a direct effect on Whitehall, the Pittsburgh SMSA would have been further fragmented by the addition of separate areawide bodies for comprehensive health and manpower planning, economic development, and community action. This complex multi-tiered arrangement can be found in many other metropolitan areas, particularly where the regional council has not been piggybacked extensively and where several independent areawide special districts or public authorities exist.

By way of contrast, Chart I-2 illustrates the layering of governments from the point of view of a resident of the City of Fridley, Minnesota, in 1966. The Committee for Economic Development identified 11 separate governments which at that time had some servicing or fiscal impact on the community. Since then, however, unlike most metropolitan areas, the seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul SMSA has not experienced increased fragmentation. Instead, as a result of the establishment of a fairly powerful and somewhat unique regional council in the Twin Cities area, some special district consolidation and much interjurisdictional coordination and district control have been achieved.

The Metropolitan Council of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area is not a typical regional council. The State legislature created this body, and the governor appoints its 15 members. In addition, the Metropolitan Council exercises varying degrees of control over the plans, finances, operations, and staff of the five areawide operating special districts—for airports, mosquito control, watersheds, transit, and sewers. The Council's relationships with these districts range from (1) review of the comprehensive plans of the first three, with authority to indefinitely suspend those in conflict with its Metropolitan Development Guide; to (2) review of the comprehensive plans and review and approval of the capital budget and capital improvement program of the Metropolitan Transit Commission; to (3) review and approval of the plans, operating and capital budgets, and capital improvements program, appointment of the chairman and board members, and sale of bonds for capital programs of the Metropolitan Sewer Board. The Metropolitan Council has been piggybacked extensively for regional planning under Federal grant programs, and it also serves as the A-95 clearinghouse for the Twin

Layers of Government, Fridley, Minnesota 1966

11. United States of America
10. State of Minnesota
- *9. Metropolitan Mosquito Control District
- *8. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission
7. Anoka County
6. Soil Conservation District
5. North Suburban Hospital District
- **4. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District
- **3. North Suburban Sanitary Sewer District
2. Four Independent School Districts
1. City of Fridley: Population 15,173

* Operations coordinated through Metropolitan Council

** Abolished after 1966

Source: Committee for Economic Development, *Modernizing Local Government to Secure a Balanced Federalism* (New York: The Committee, 1966), p. 12.

Cities area.¹⁴ Although some observers consider it a federated system with powers divided between the areawide unit and constituent counties and municipalities, the National Association of Regional Councils classifies the Metropolitan Council as a regional council because of its multijurisdictional organization, heavy involvement in planning and coordination activities, and evolution "...out of [a] previously existing regional council ... represent[ing] a modification and strengthening of the council concept."¹⁵

The 1972 Fridley resident would still be affected by the Metropolitan Mosquito Control District and the Metropolitan Airports Commission. Unlike the situation in 1966, however, their operations are now coordinated by the Metropolitan Council. In addition, the airports commission is subject to the authority of the Council to review and, if necessary, suspend its plans. The Metropolitan Sewer Board, established in 1967, assumed ownership of and operational responsibility for the North Suburban Sanitary Sewer District and the Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District. Due to the power of the Metropolitan Council to coordinate and partially control

areawide planning and development and to its status as the preferred regional mechanism for comprehensive and functional planning under various Federally supported programs, the growth of new separate regional bodies in the Minneapolis-St. Paul SMSA has been curbed.¹⁶

The Future of Fragmentation

Will the population pressures that have triggered proliferation of governmental and quasi-governmental bodies continue? Recent projections suggest an affirmative response. According to the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, one-sixth of the land area of the continental United States by 2000 will be encompassed by "...areas of one million people or more comprised of a continuous zone of metropolitan areas and intervening counties within which one is never far from a city."¹⁷ Five-sixths of the Nation's population will live in 23 urban regions. These areas will be considerably larger than those delineated in earlier studies of "megalopolis," such as "Boswash" (Boston to Washington), "Chippitts" (Chicago to Pittsburgh), and "Sanson" (San Francisco to San Diego).¹⁸ An urban

region in the year 2000, for example, will combine "Boswash" and "Chippitts" in a metropolitan belt touching 19 States.¹⁹

Given a continuation of present trends, metropolitan areas within these regions will absorb more than four-fifths of the one-third hike in our population that is slated to occur during the next three decades. Between 1967 and 2000 the number of non-school governments in metropolitan areas is expected to almost double (16,100 to 31,600), while the number of SMSA's will soar to 751. This increase will involve the creation of about 2,000 new metropolitan municipalities and almost 7,000 special districts. Approximately one-third of the non-school SMSA governments in 2000 will be found in areas that were non-metropolitan in 1967. And 52 percent of the metropolitan non-school governments will be special districts.²⁰

These projections assume no change in present substate regional approaches and a reluctance on the part of most Federal, State, and local officials to grapple with the jurisdictional implications of urban growth, particularly the need for major local governmental reorganization.²¹ At the same time, it is important to recognize that other regional strategies have been implemented which consolidate and simplify the metropolitan jigsaw puzzle. These include major city-county consolidations in Nashville, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis, Angeles County, establishment of "umbrella" regional councils in the Twin Cities area and Atlanta, and creation of State public authorities in certain metropolitan areas in Massachusetts and New York.²² Moreover, recommendations for unified or federated governmental systems have been made by several respected national organizations as well as State and local study groups.²³

Yet political scientists, public administrators, and economists still disagree over a number of basic regional issues. They argue over whether the polycentric political system found in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas is bad or good, whether a market mechanism influences consumer preferences and the provision of various public goods and services, and whether a single unit or two-tiered government or a system of governance involving many political actors is most desirable and feasible.²⁴

These questions will be discussed at length in Volume IV of this report. Few people, however, are willing any longer to debate whether substate regionalism in general is desirable or undesirable. Regionalism is now an accepted fact of political and administrative life in both urban and rural America. The principal question is what form should substate regional organization take?

The Apartheid Metropolis?

In its 1968 report, the National Advisory Commission

on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) reached the following basic conclusion:

The nation is rapidly moving toward two increasingly separate Americas.

Within two decades, this division could be so deep that it would be almost impossible to unite:

*a white society principally located in suburbs, in smaller central cities, and in the peripheral parts of large central cities; and

*a Negro society largely concentrated within large central cities.²⁵

The near-apartheid condition now existing in many metropolitan areas is one of the most insidious consequences of the differing growth patterns that have taken place since World War II in central city, suburban, and rural communities. During the last decade, the gradual depletion of the human and economic resources of rural America turned into a sharp erosion. At the same time, central cities experienced a significant change in the size and composition of their population and the nature of their industrial and commercial base. And suburbia, sprawling over the countryside as a result of internal growth and steady out-migration from the central city, was faced with new demands for public services and pressures for orderly development.

Continuing urban growth during the 1960's tended to exacerbate many of the social and economic disparities that accompanied the rapid urbanization following World War II. Some of the major imbalances are revealed in the changes that took place in the Nation's metropolitan areas during 1960-1970, particularly in the 72 largest SMSA's.²⁶

— Population growth was greatest in the larger SMSA's. The 12 over one million grew by 17 percent, while the 32 from one-half million to one million gained 19 percent. Generally speaking, the larger the SMSA, the larger the proportion of growth outside the central city. In the relatively few central cities experiencing population increases, especially those in the Southwest and West, annexation or consolidation were mainly responsible.

— Large segments of the central city population, particularly middle-class whites, moved to the suburbs. Ten core cities lost more than 10 percent of their citizenry. Overall, the suburban population experienced a net gain of 30 percent, due to immigration as well as natural increase, while that of central cities rose only 2 percent. In 1970, less than half of the metropolitan population lived in central cities.

– Only four of the larger central cities had a greater white population in 1970 than in 1960, while only five major suburban areas had a population that was less than 90 percent white.

Meanwhile, all but one of the 72 largest SMSA's had a larger proportion of nonwhites at the end of the decade, with 86 percent of the nonwhite metropolitan growth taking place in central cities. A major factor influencing this growth was a net out-migration of 1.4 million nonwhites from the South. By 1970, nonwhites comprised 12 percent of the metropolitan population and 28 percent of the central city population.

– Central cities had a higher proportion of elderly residents and lower school enrollment ratios than suburbs by the end of the decade.

– While the per capita income levels of central city dwellers and suburbanites were about the same in many SMSA's, the average household incomes of the former were substantially lower than those of the latter. In comparison with suburbia, on the average 40 percent more central city households earned less than \$3,000 annually, while 20 percent fewer earned over \$10,000 annually.

– The median house values and rental charges in central cities were 84 percent of those of suburban dwellings in 1970. During the 1960's, their rate of increase was only about half that of suburbia. With respect to owner-occupied housing valued at more than \$25,000, over 30 percent of suburban homes fell into this category compared to under 20 percent of those in central cities.

– Central city crime rates were more than double those of suburban jurisdictions in 1970. Only one suburban area had a higher crime rate than its central city.

– Central cities continue to spend more on public services than neighboring suburban jurisdictions due to dilapidated housing, deteriorating streets, inadequate law enforcement, traffic congestion, a declining central business district, and other manifestations of the urban crisis, coupled with well entrenched bureaucracies, highly organized public employee unions, and the presence of large numbers of "high-cost" citizens. The degree of this municipal overburden is shown by the fact that in 1970, central cities allocated 65 to 70 percent of their budgets for non-educational expenditures, while their suburbs allotted 40 to 50 percent of their budgets for such purposes. Central city per

capita outlays exceeded suburban expenditures by more than \$150.

– Although the gap has narrowed somewhat since the late 1950's, central city residents are still subject to higher tax rates than suburbanites, amounting to 30 percent more taxes per capita in 1970. On the average, the former paid over 6 percent of his personal income in local taxes, while the latter paid 5 percent. Between 1964 and 1970, per capita taxes in central cities increased \$30 more than in the suburbs. Despite having to pay more, often the central city resident receives far less for his tax dollars in terms of quality public services and facilities.

– Since 1957, Federal and State per capita aid to central cities has been increasing, with the cities receiving \$21 total per capita aid more than their suburbs in 1970. Yet suburban budgets contain a higher proportion of intergovernmental aid than those of central cities due to disproportionate education spending in the suburbs and municipal overburden in the cities.

– Central cities continued to fall behind suburbs in employment. Between 1958 and 1967, employment in manufacturing grew by 7 percent in central cities and 32 percent in suburban areas. In retail trade, employment increased by 8 percent in central cities and 61 percent in suburbs, while in wholesale trade the figures were 11 percent and 90 percent, respectively.

These disparities underscore the serious mismatch of public needs and resources within the metropolis. Located in the 267 SMSA's are over 80 percent of the Nation's bank accounts. Over 75 percent of the Federal personal income taxes are collected here, over 80 percent of the value added by manufacture occurs here, and over 75 percent of the employment in manufacturing and trade exists here. Yet most of these assets are in jurisdictions other than those facing urgent and unmet needs or are in forms that cannot be readily tapped.

Suburbs, then, are attracting large numbers of high-income people and industries that do not make excessive public service demands, except for schools. On the other hand, many central cities are attracting large numbers of low-income, "high-cost" citizens, and are finding it difficult to obtain new industry and to sustain their existing economic base. Many have become functionally specialized in banking and credit, brokerage and investments, insurance, advertising, engineering and architecture, higher education, law, the health industry, or wholesale trade.²⁷ In addition to severe economic imbalances, as pointed out by the Kerner Commission,

out-migration from both central cities and rural communities has yielded sharp social and racial contrasts, with the composition of suburbia becoming predominantly white, affluent, and middle-aged and that of the core cities and their older adjacent areas becoming predominantly black or brown, poor, and elderly. The significance of this trend has been highlighted by Daniel P. Moynihan, former Counsellor to President Nixon: "The poverty and social isolation of minority groups in central cities is the single most serious problem of the American city today."²⁸

These widening interjurisdictional disparities raise some real questions about whether many of our metropolitan areas really meet the criterion of economic and social integration specified in OMB's SMSA definition. They produce some doubts as to whether a sense of community does or can exist on a regional or metropolitan scale. And they tend to support Professor Edward C. Banfield's prediction in 1970 that "...the serious problems of the cities will continue to exist in something like their present form for another twenty years at least."²⁹

Conditions in Rural America

According to the 1970 Census, 63.8 million people lived outside of metropolitan areas. Many of the social and economic problems and servicing needs present in the metropolis are experienced by rural citizens as well.

- Declining central city population has been accompanied by a general drop in rural population, from 30 percent of the national total in 1960 to 26 percent in 1970. The farm population fell from 15 million to 10.3 million during this period.
- Nearly half of the 24.3 million people who are below the poverty level reside in rural communities. Non-metropolitan jurisdictions account for less than one-fourth of total personal income; the per capita income of residents of these areas is \$1,251 lower than those living within SMSA's.
- Almost 30 percent of the Nation's unemployed reside in rural communities.
- The level of educational attainment of rural citizens is substantially below that of metropolitan dwellers.
- One-third of the housing units in the country are in non-metropolitan areas, but two-thirds of these units lack complete plumbing.

In terms of their governance systems, non-metropolitan areas tend to equal or surpass the jurisdictional fragmentation of urban America. While containing less than 30 percent of the Nation's population, rural

America possesses 72 percent of the 78,218 units of local government. This includes 85 percent of the counties, 80 percent of the townships, 70 percent of the municipalities, and 67 percent of the independent special districts and public authorities. Furthermore, 45 percent of the federally supported substate districts operate outside of SMSA's.

Non-metropolitan governmental units cover over 95 percent of the Nation's land area. Generally speaking and when compared with their metropolitan counterparts, they provide fewer services, are subject to greater diseconomies of scale, and have less capable executive and administrative leadership. As would be expected, they also tend to be more oriented to economic development, natural resource, and conservation than SMSA jurisdictions.

Interstate Metropolitan Areas: A Special Problem

Of the 267 metropolitan areas in the Nation, 33 are interstate. Forty-five million people, or 22 percent of our population, lived in these areas in 1970. Thirty-three States are involved in one or more interstate SMSA's. Eight share in two interstate metropolitan areas, seven in three, three—Massachusetts, New Jersey, and West Virginia—in four, and portions of one State—Ohio—are found in five. The size of these interstate regions ranges widely; 18 have less than 500,000 people, seven have from one-half to one million, six have from one to five million, and two have over five million. Despite this diversity, the giant interstate SMSA's—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, the District of Columbia, and St. Louis—experience many of the same types of problems as the smallest ones—Texarkana, Texas-Arkansas; Sioux City, Iowa-Nebraska; and Fargo-Moorhead, North Dakota-Minnesota.³⁰

Functionally, the boundaries of most interstate metropolitan areas follow a river; transportation has been a common area of joint activity. Not only do bridges and tunnels have to be built and maintained but, as exemplified by the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority, the movement of people and goods over these facilities has to be closely interrelated with other modes of transportation, including highways, railways, airports, and truck and bus terminals. In other areas, such as police and fire protection, interstate service levels have to be relatively similar to avoid spillover problems resulting from inferior standards or lax enforcement on one side of the boundary line. Planning and zoning along State boundaries ought to be well coordinated.

Fiscally, the State lines make it difficult to levy income and sales taxes or impose user charges in proportion to the amount of benefit people from one State derive from working in another. In the absence of

a commuter tax, high mobility within the interstate SMSA can produce a condition similar to that existing in many substate metropolitan areas: suburbanites working in the central city and making use of its services and facilities, yet not shouldering their fair share of the financial burden for maintaining the central business district. Moreover, the member States may well utilize different types of taxes and may exert varying tax efforts, thus making it even more difficult to achieve an equitable distribution of fiscal responsibility. Constitutional and statutory restrictions may prevent them from bringing their tax systems into closer alignment; the revenue-expenditure gap may be reinforced by one State's portion of the metropolitan area having most of the problems and the other's having most of the financial resources.

Jurisdictionally, as a result of these functional and fiscal pressures and problems, orderly urban growth along State lines has been difficult to achieve. The constitutional aspects of interstate relations require the States themselves to assume a major direct role in coming to grips with these servicing, regulatory, and coordination problems, in addition to being involved indirectly in the establishment and support of regional councils. Due to a State reliance on the special district and public authority mechanisms, however, like their substate counterparts many interstate SMSA's are fragmented. Moreover, given the tendency of most Federal and practically all State program officials to consider only each State's portion of the interstate area, these metropolitan regions actually possess four tiers of activity: the interstate areawide, the single State sub-area, the single county, and the municipal. Consequently, "if a dominant characteristic does exist, it is that the solutions to the problems of these areas is most often accomplished through administrative processes which escape direct judicial control and are legislatively controlled only in a general way."³¹

The Search for a Regional Community

The uneven distribution of needs and resources in many areas makes the central city, suburb, and rural community appear as physically and psychologically separate entities. Yet in terms of the economic, educational, cultural, and recreational goods and services they provide, all three types of jurisdictions long ago lost their claim to independence.³² Advances in transportation and communications technology have blurred jurisdictional boundary lines. About 40 million people change their address annually, more than two million students cross State lines to go to college each fall, and several thousand senior citizens migrate to southern retirement communities in the winter and return to their northern or midwestern homes in the spring. One-fourth of the Nation's jobholders work in a county different

from that in which they reside.³³ In a recent speech, Governor Ronald Reagan pointed out the jurisdictional dimension of this mobility:

Someone who lives in Concord...and commutes to San Francisco to get to work travels about 30 miles—just about the distance our grandfathers had to ride to get to the county seat. In that daily trip, this commuter passes through 121 governmental units which levy property taxes, including nine cities, five water districts, nine school districts, seven fire protection districts, along with scores of other governmental units involved in providing everything from hospitals and mosquito abatement to transit services, parks and recreational services, and even a cemetery district.³⁴

Most of the privately owned utilities that Americans consume—electricity, water, gas, and telephone—are areawide services. Our favorite television and radio programs are typically transmitted from a regional station. The daily newspaper contains information about locality, region, State, Nation, and the world. We belong to civic associations, professional and trade organizations, social clubs, and other groups that are organized on a multijurisdictional basis. When ill, we often are treated in a clinic or hospital that serves the metropolitan area. We spend our leisure time at civic centers, parks, sporting events, museums, symphony orchestras, zoos, and other recreational and cultural facilities that frequently are regional in their finances, attendance, and operation.³⁵

The need for interlocal approaches to providing major public services that transcend individual cities and counties also has diminished citizen expectations that a single unit of local government is capable of responding to most servicing needs, and that problems can be confined within jurisdictional borders. Growing recognition that the costs of crime, air and water pollution, traffic congestion, and other problems spill over individual local government boundaries has focused attention on the desirability and feasibility of multijurisdictional remedial action. The possibility of achieving economies of scale in the production of public goods and services also has served as a strong incentive for cooperation. Hence, some public services traditionally provided by individual local governments—such as police and fire protection, housing, education, and libraries—have acquired regional components.³⁶

These trends have helped to nurture a sense of regional community or citizenship in some metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas despite the sharp economic and social cleavages that may exist. The nature of

regional citizenship has been defined by the Metropolitan Fund of Detroit:

1. That element of citizenship which reflects the multi-county, multi-community existence of the individual citizen within a metropolitan region. 2. Recognition by the individual citizen of his dependence on many different geographical locales in a metropolitan region, including those geographical areas in which he lives, works, worships, seeks his recreational outlets, participates in cultural and community life, obtains his medical care. 3. Recognition by an individual citizen of the regional nature of certain problems of daily life including (but not limited to) air and water purity, mass transportation, education, recreation and cultural facilities, public health and safety, solid waste collection and disposal.³⁷

The foregoing suggests that the modern city is only partly a spatially defined community. Although legal boundaries provide one type of containment, in other respects the city is "unwalled." The city is a political, economic, and social subsystem that people are free to enter and in which most are not compelled to stay. Modern technology has been mainly responsible for breaking down city walls and opening low-priced suburban and rural land for residential and industrial use. High interjurisdictional mobility, however, raises questions about the degree of loyalty that an unwalled community can command, particularly one facing severe problems. According to Norton Long, the social and economic bonds of the central city are not strong:

One might ask why, with municipal bankruptcy, the city does not rethink the wisdom of its municipal expenditures. Any family faced with such a drastic imbalance between income and outgo would get the message and begin a process of selective retrenchment. But the city and its leaders do not behave like a family. The family, unless it breaks up, has to stick together, not so the unwalled city. Faced with the choice of making a fight to change the city budget or disinvesting and leaving the city to its own resources, only a few businesses and citizens will choose to stay. An unwalled city produces insufficient loyalty among its residents to make it worth the cost in time, money, and risk to take the chance of throwing good money and good time after bad. Businesses, middle-class, and working-class follow one another out of the

city—and the decaying suburb too. All are bewildered that spending money on good objectives should have such a sorry result.³⁸

This lack of close citizen attachment to the central city is also reflected in the results of a 1971 National Public Opinion Survey conducted for the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future by the Opinion Research Corporation. As shown in Table I-1, almost two-thirds of the 1,700 persons interviewed expressed a preference to live in a nonurban setting, with 45 percent of these people actually residing in a small town or rural community. Only 14 percent of the interviewees desired to live in a large city or its suburbs, even though 27 percent were already residents of these areas. Half of those interviewed felt that the Federal government should "discourage further growth of large metropolitan areas" or should "try to encourage people and industry to move to smaller cities and towns." As the Population Commission concluded, "Americans are urban and becoming more so, but many people evidently dislike the trend."³⁹

Table I-1

Residential Location and Preferences, 1971

	Where do you live now? (Percent)	Where would you prefer to live? (Percent)
Open Country	12	34
Small Town or City	33	30
Medium-Sized City or Suburb	28	22
Larger City or Suburb	27	14
Total	100	100

Source: Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population and the American Future*, p. 34.

Another 1971 National Public Opinion Survey for the Population Commission revealed a more mixed reaction to the quality of urban life. In response to a general question regarding which level of government handles its particular responsibilities best, 20 percent answered "Federal," 18 percent "State," and 33 percent "local." Interviewees were also asked to evaluate the performance of their local government in adjusting their

service levels, excluding schools, to changing population and citizen demands. Ten percent rated it "excellent," 43 percent "good," 31 percent "fair," and 12 percent "poor."⁴⁰

Despite several integrating forces, then, most areas are only superficially close-knit communities. Although a person may well be considered a citizen of a particular region or SMSA, most people tend to identify themselves primarily with their central city, suburban, or rural county or town governments instead of with an areawide body.⁴¹ Contrary to popular belief, however, local governments are not necessarily closer to the people in terms of citizen understanding of their structure and functions, communications between officials and the public, or citizen identification. With respect to both the substate regional and local levels, the high density of governments and of quasi-governmental bodies, along with the complex service delivery system, make strong regional citizenship and a close sense of regional community difficult to achieve. As Morton Grodzins has pointed out, "For the great metropolitan areas, including the suburban fringes, the overlapping of governments and splintering of functions is extreme, and citizen comprehension of local government affairs is at the lowest."⁴²

Facing Up to Fragmentation: Districting or Reorganization?

To this point, governmental fragmentation has been viewed, at least implicitly, as being dysfunctional to the efficient and economical delivery of public goods and services on an areawide basis, to the elimination of economic and social disparities, and to the development of a meaningful notion of regional community and citizenship. Fragmentation has taken five principal forms: the proliferation of incorporated communities; the steady growth of non-school special districts and public authorities; the rapid increase in the number of separate federally supported areawide planning and development agencies; the duplication of certain county and city functional responsibilities; and the expansion of metropolitan areas over State boundaries.⁴³

During the 1960's, fragmentation was accelerated by Federal areawide grants and planning requirements, by some State governors and legislators being unwilling or unable to grapple with the need for systematic multi-functional planning and development at the State and substate regional levels, and by many county and city officials remaining steadfastly reluctant to change the jurisdictional status quo and reorganize local governments to meet demands for regional services effectively. Although there were some notable successes during this period on the city-county consolidation, urban county, and umbrella regional council fronts, the major by-products of these policies were a rapid growth in special

districts and authorities, the creation of a multitude of limited-purpose multicounty planning and administrative bodies that often operated as separate agency fiefdoms, the establishment of regional councils that usually could not implement the plans they formulated or keep in check the activities of either special districts or substate districts, and the propping up of non-viable general-purpose local government units.

At the same time, more and more services once considered localized in their administration, financing, and impact have been regionalized. Basic police patrol and preliminary investigative services, for example, traditionally have been provided through a network of neighborhood precincts, with the central station in city hall serving as a communications center, investigative unit, and lock-up. Yet increasingly counties and areawide bodies such as regional councils have assumed responsibility for providing supportive staff and auxiliary services, including communications, record-keeping, crime laboratories, and training.

If this sorting out and shifting upward of functional components from a single- to a multijurisdictional service delivery base continues in other areas, how will this affect the areal division of powers? In what ways, if any, can jurisdictional responsibility for functions like air and water pollution abatement and mass transportation be successfully divided, particularly in light of Luther Gulick's conclusion that "once an indivisible problem is divided, nothing effective can be done about it?"⁴⁴ Can effective regionalization of services occur in a balkanized metropolitan or non-metropolitan area? If not, what are the political, economic, and social requisites for successful jurisdictional reorganization?

The following generalizations concerning the types of districting and reorganization approaches that have been used for dealing with metropolitan public service needs and problems provide a conceptual framework for the subsequent consideration of these questions and their implications in this report.

- Political feasibility and acceptability have varied inversely with effectiveness; that is, what has been most politically feasible or acceptable has been least effective in dealing with general areawide problems and what has been most effective has been least politically feasible or acceptable.

Governmental reformers tend to have a penchant for neatness. The traditional response to fragmentation on the part of many political scientists and public administrators has been to advocate a single areawide multipurpose unit of government. Consolidation of political power and streamlining of the administrative system, it is argued, will clarify lines of responsibility, make service delivery more economical and effective, improve coordi-

nation, unclog communications channels, and enhance accountability to the public. These arguments, however, have not been very persuasive. "The general trend is for the voters to react to radical reorganization proposals with a massive yawn and a 'no' vote."⁴⁵ Since 1945, for example, only seven city-county consolidation referenda have been approved in areas over 100,000 population: Hampton-Elizabeth City-County, Virginia; Columbus-Muscogee County, Georgia; Virginia Beach-Princess Anne County, Virginia; Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky; Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana; Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; and Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida.⁴⁶

Consequently, most metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have a polycentric political organization, featuring many decision-making centers and service delivery mechanisms. Some economists argue that these general and special purpose units are tied together by a number of horizontal and vertical operational relationships which meet at least three conditions necessary for efficient performance: "...1) the correspondence of different units of government to the scales of effects for diverse public goods, 2) the development of cooperative arrangements among governmental units to undertake joint activities of mutual benefit, and 3) the availability of other decision-making arrangements for processing and resolving conflicts among units of government."⁴⁷ However, the hard facts that many of these units are planning and administrative bureaucracies rather than governments, that conflict resolution through State or judicial intervention has been limited, that public service needs are growing in their severity raise questions about the degree to which these conditions have been met.

In most cases, then, considerations of political feasibility and ease of implementation (acceptance) have dictated approaches to solving areawide service problems other than federation, city-county consolidation, annexation, or other types of major institutional overhaul. Usually it has been more politically expedient for local decision makers to act on a function-by-function basis and establish a substate district or an independent special district, enter into an interlocal contract or joint service agreement, or cooperate in an informal voluntary manner. If, however, it is assumed that reduction of fragmentation is proportional to the effectiveness of the service delivery system, then the latter approaches have been something less than effective.

- The inverse relationship between effectiveness and political feasibility and acceptance has resulted in an absence of authoritative multipurpose areawide decision-making bodies that can adequately respond to urban and rural problems.

Tables I-2 and I-3 attempt to show the relationship

between and among political feasibility and acceptance, the various districting and reorganization responses to areawide needs, and their effectiveness in terms of realizing certain objectives of regional organization. With only a few exceptions, moving from informal cooperation to federation, effectiveness or success in objective achievement increases as political feasibility and acceptance decrease.⁴⁸

- Growing Federal and State program official concern about the need for effective multijurisdictional responses to specific public service needs, and the absence of State or locally created authoritative multifunctional areawide institutions, have resulted in the development of districting substitutes for such bodies by the Federal and State governments.

In response to the failure of institutional reform in many metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas and to the inability of some local governments to meet the rising demands for more and better public services, the Federal government during the 1960's became the prime mover in initiating and shaping regional responses to problems. Through areawide planning, review, and districting requirements and incentives, 11 Federal agencies moved to fill the institutional void at the substate level through 19 programs. As indicated earlier in this chapter, they brought into existence and nurtured more than 1,800 limited-purpose areawide planning and administrative bodies, 600 regional councils, and 450 clearinghouses responsible for handling the A-95 review and comment function. Yet little national substate districting policy has been systematically developed to guide Federal agency efforts. For the most part, each has pursued its own areawide strategy, even though the general provisions of Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 require Federal agencies administering substate programs to make use of State-designated districts as the basis for areawide planning and service delivery.

- While some federally supported multi-purpose areawide procedures—such as A-95—have been major steps leading to the establishment of more authoritative areawide decision-making bodies by local or State governments, other efforts on the part of both the Federal and State governments—such as encouragement of limited-purpose substate districts—have hindered the prospects for achieving major institutional reorganization.

Basically, two different Federal substate districting strategies seem to be emerging: one for the generalists

Table I-2


Areawide Service Delivery Approaches and Objectives

Type of areawide approach	Adequate geographic area of jurisdiction	Legal and administrative ability to perform assigned services and implement plans	Contain spill-over costs and benefits within jurisdiction responsible for providing service	Permit realization of economies of scale: Staff/Line		Multifunctional; governing processes involve resolution of conflicting interests and balancing of needs and resources	Increase coordination of local projects with areawide functional and comprehensive development plans	Ensure equitable distribution of public goods and services	Maximize citizen participation	Performance of functions remains controllable by and jurisdiction is accountable directly to residents
Informal Cooperation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Service contract/joint services agreement	0	+	0	+	+	-	-	0	-	-
Regional council of local elected officials	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	-	0	-
Federally encouraged substate district	+	-	-	0	-	-	+	-	0	-
State planning and development district	+	0	-	0	-	+	+	-	0	-
Local special district	+	+	0	+	+	-	-	0	-	-
Transfer of functions	0	+	0	+	+	-	0	0	+	+
Annexation	+	+	0	+	+	+	0	0	+	+
Areawide special district/public authority	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	0	-	-
"Umbrella" regional council	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	-	0	-
Urban county	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
City-county consolidation	0	+	0	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Federated areawide government	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

KEY + = successful 0 = occasionally successful -- = unsuccessful

Table I-3

Effectiveness and Acceptability of Regional Service Delivery Approaches



and one for the specialists. The generalist strategy involves mainly the A-95 process, since this benefits areawide bodies representative of general units of local government. The specialist strategy, on the other hand, is geared to setting up separate multi-jurisdictional mechanisms for various federally aided program activities.

Most State governments until recently have been silent partners in regionalism. They have neither discouraged substate districting activity initiated by Federal legislation and guidelines, nor attempted to coordinate and systematize the development of areawide bodies and the solution of problems in interstate metropolitan areas. Increasingly, however, the States are beginning to assert themselves as a major force in establishing viable regional institutions. They are the strategic middlemen between conflicting Federal and local pressures for areawide action. Only the States, for example, can bring into play an "arsenal of weapons" including legal control over the creation of substate districts both under Federal programs and for State purposes; the authorization of regional councils; and the establishment of areawide umbrella bodies such as the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council or city-county consolidation as in Indianapolis, Indiana. They also have legal power over the structure, functions, and finances of local governments and special districts, which can be exercised to bring about division, consolidation, abolition, or coordination.

As far as general-purpose units of local government

are concerned, many city and county officials have been reluctant to establish effective substate regional institutions through structural-functional reorganization. For the most part, mayors, county executives, and legislators have tended to favor voluntary areawide organizations, such as regional councils, which can serve as a forum for discussing common problems and arriving at mutually acceptable solutions to them. Yet, according to Professor Joseph F. Zimmerman, as of 1970 "...no COG [had] successfully implemented a program to solve a highly controversial problem such as housing in the metropolis."^{4,9} While many local officials also consider the traditional special district or public authority a politically desirable and feasible way of delivering certain services on a pay-as-you-go basis, they criticize some of the recently created-limited purpose substate districts—especially federally encouraged ones, such as comprehensive health, manpower, and law enforcement planning agencies—as being well-insulated, unresponsive regional bureaucracies.

The result of these ambivalent Federal and State substate districting strategies has been a jumble of specialized multicounty planning and administrative bodies, special districts, and public authorities in most metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Often they do not relate to general purpose units of local government or account to the public. The generalist-oriented organizations—the A-95 agencies and regional councils—appear to be having a particularly difficult time absorbing and

monitoring the activities of the limited-purpose substate districts. In no small measure, agency separatism reflects the strength and support that the program specialists continue to enjoy at the Federal and State levels. As a result, some observers believe that regional council and substate districting efforts generally have yet to prove effective in coordinating the regional operations of State functional agencies and of special districts. They find that these efforts have failed to meld federally aided programs at the areawide level, reduce central city-suburban-rural area disparities, or meet citizen demands for more and better public services.

- Recent Federal and State substate districting actions in comprehensive and functional planning, grant administration, and program coordination, coupled with rising new fears among local officials of the prospects of uncontrollable special and public authorities and continuing hostility toward areawide government, have combined to set the scene for a new debate over regional governance. The focal point of the debate has shifted away from a unitary system and toward two-tier and three-tier approaches involving regional councils as well as general-purpose local governments. The principal antagonists have also shifted away from academicians and “blue ribbon” reformers versus the local government “power structure” and toward the politically responsible generalists versus middle management program specialists at the Federal, State, multi-county, and local levels. The key issues under debate are not only the traditional concerns with economy and efficiency, although these are important; the basic question to be resolved now is the proper relationship between generalists and specialists to ensure effective regional planning, programming, and governance.

An Agenda for the 70's

In conclusion, three important themes run throughout this chapter and this volume:

- **Fragmentation:**The regional responses to our pressing domestic needs in the 1960's through Federal grants, State enabling legislation, and local voluntary cooperation often contributed to the dispersion rather than the consolidation of power and responsibility at the substate level.
- **Ambivalence:**The Federal government, States, and local units have pursued regional strategies that often work at cross-purposes and tend to exacerbate rather than reduce the tensions existing between generalists and specialists, general-purpose local units and special districts, and planning and operating agencies.
- **Incrementalism:**The pace of metropolitan reform has been slow, and while the last decade witnessed acceptance of the regional approach and growing interest in devising districting mechanisms to meeting areawide needs, relatively little success was registered in achieving institutional reorganization on a multi-jurisdictional scale.

The 1970's will be a watershed period for substate regionalism and for American federalism. Recent regional activity in metropolitan area raises again many of the questions that accompanied the evolution of our federal system, including centralization-decentralization, responsiveness, representation, and accountability. Taken together, the above themes constitute an agenda of challenges that will have to be faced and successfully resolved if “mild chaos” is to be preserved and extreme disorder is to be avoided. The purpose of this volume is to document the recent course of substate districting and, in conjunction with the treatment of local governmental reorganization in Volume III, to provide public officials at all levels with a set of short- and long-run policy alternatives designed to achieve more effective regional governance.

Footnotes

¹Morton Grodzins, “The Federal System,” in *Goals for Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 78.

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⁵Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population and the American Future*, pp. 59-61.

⁶See Allen D. Manvel, “Metropolitan Growth and Governmental Fragmentation,” in Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Change* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 177-215.

⁷U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Special Runs, 1972 Census of Governments*.

⁸This figure may be somewhat misleading since the total number of agencies varies in accordance with changing definitions of area of jurisdiction and type of eligible recipient, degree of co-mingling of funds and staff, extent of piggybacking and interagency review and coordinating requirements, and other factors.

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¹⁸See Jean Gottmann, *Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

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
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CHAPTER II

SPECIAL DISTRICTS

AND AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION



Independent special districts are limited purpose governmental units which exist as separate corporate entities and which have substantial fiscal and administrative independence from general purpose local governments.¹ Unlike general purpose local governments, they have few functional responsibilities and are generally not the focus of the local political process. They are regarded primarily as a device for providing a particular service rather than as a general purpose device of local governance.

Special purpose governments are referred to as single or limited purpose governments, special districts, corporations, or public authorities. Throughout this chapter the term special district will be used. School districts are not included in this definition of special districts.² Special districts are found in all States except Alaska. This chapter includes a general discussion of all special districts, followed by an analysis of selected metropolitan areawide districts.

The popularity of special districts lies in the fact that they often provide and direct unique structural solutions to pressing functional problems. Moreover, they can usually be created with only minor alterations to the existing system of local government. Special districts frequently can be established by existing State legislation, their operation can begin with their creation, and in some situations provision of the service does not require additional tax dollars. Some additional claims for the use of the special district are its fiscal self-sufficiency, emphasis on technical specialization, and efficiency. Districts permit avoidance of tax and debt limitations and civil service requirements, and sometime require no local referendum for creation. These facts, plus the geographic flexibility of these mechanisms to encompass pressing metropolitan service problems, have resulted in the frequent use of special districts as a tool for substate regionalism.

SPECIAL DISTRICTS—WHAT ARE THEY

Special districts are the most diverse and the least studied group of local governments in the nation.³ Hence the concern of this chapter is with the characteristics of these mechanisms and their place in metropolitan governance systems. Special districts vary greatly as to size of budget, number of employees, number of jurisdictions served, and the number and kinds of functions performed. Yet, all have certain basic common traits. They always exist as separate corporate entities and are responsible for the provision of one or more governmental services. They possess the corporate power necessary to perform their activities; are governed by a board of directors, trustees, commissioners, etc., although the selection process of the board may differ; and are authorized to raise revenue from one or more sources.⁴ A number of factors serve to differentiate special districts from other mechanisms which some-

times have similar characteristics. The following basic features are ones most commonly used for special district analysis.

Functional Responsibility. The Bureau of the Census classifies special districts by 20 single-function and three multiple-function categories.⁵ The bureau uses two methods for determining functional character. The name of the special district provides one means for categorizing, in that the functional responsibility of many districts is indicated in the title, (e.g. housing authorities, hospital districts, etc.). Census also conducts follow-up mail surveys requesting the functional nature of the district.

It should be noted that the concept of multiple-function activity has been limited to units of consequential size—those having at least five full-time employees or \$100,000 of long-term debt. Special districts which report responsibility for more than one function, but which fall below these minimum size standards, are generally classified as single-function districts, either in terms of their primary reported functions where this is apparent or in a residual “other” group of single-function units.⁶

Boundary. Special districts are jurisdictions which frequently overlap existing local government boundaries. Special district boundaries are frequently drawn along particular service regions which may encompass an area greater or lesser than that of a given local government. Consequently, a district can serve an unincorporated area, a portion of an incorporated municipality, an entire municipality, an entire county, or any combination of these areas. Moreover, special districts established by compact or by parallel State legislation are also able to cross State lines. Indeed, they are the only sub-national governmental unit which can be interstate in nature.

Independence. Many special purpose units are by law so closely related to cities, counties, or other governments that they are regarded by the Census Bureau as subordinate agencies of those governments. A district may be classified as subordinate to a parent governmental unit even when it exercises considerable fiscal and administrative independence. However, subordinate districts usually possess one or more of the following characteristics: appointment of agency officers by the chief executive and/or governing body of the parent government or control of the agency by a board composed wholly or mainly of parent government officials; control by the agency over facilities that supplement, serve, or take the place of facilities ordinarily provided by the creating government; provision that agency properties and responsibilities shall revert to the creating government after the agency’s debt has been repaid; required approval of agency plans by the creating government; and legislative or executive specification by the parent government as to the location and type of facilities that the agency is to construct and maintain.⁷

The Census Bureau defines an independent special district to be an entity possessing all three of the following traits: existence as an organized entity, governmental character, and substantial autonomy.⁸ The special districts discussed in this chapter are solely "independent" units and subordinate districts are not included in the tabular material.

Fiscal Resources. In addition to the Census Bureau's classifications, some authorities on special districts have developed other criteria for analytical purposes. One prominent observer has utilized local revenue sources as a means of classifying districts and has set forth three groupings—those primarily supported by taxes, those primarily supported by bond proceeds and user charges, and those supported almost equally by taxes, bond proceeds, and user charges.⁹

REASONS FOR SPECIAL DISTRICT CREATION

Special districts are created for a wide variety of reasons and have been promoted by all three levels of government. The chief claims for their use are: (1) fiscal self-sufficiency, (2) emphasis on technical specialization, (3) efficiency, and (4) geographic flexibility.¹⁰ The importance of these factors has encouraged all three levels of government to consider these mechanisms as important devices in the provision of urban services.¹¹

Perhaps the single greatest attraction of the special district is its claim of fiscal self-sufficiency. As this chapter and other works note, special districts traditionally obtain the bulk of their revenues from non-tax sources.¹² Frequently, they perform functions that are to be financed by the direct beneficiaries of the service. This being the case, they frequently do not need to levy property taxes for the support of their obligations. Indeed, in many cases, special districts are created to avoid local property tax limitations; and once created, they frequently are not granted independent taxing power. Consequently, financing of the district occurs through the sale of nonguaranteed revenue bonds amortized by user charges or special assessments.¹³ Hence the financing process rarely directly affects the public at large, which does not have to pay taxes or guarantee the bonds of these authorities.

A second important reason for special district creation lies in its geographic flexibility. Special districts can be regional or local in character; therefore, they can conform to the service boundaries of a particular function. Also, as later analysis indicates, special district boundaries are subject to adaptation, permitting these units to redefine the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction as necessary. Perhaps because of this geographic flexibility, many of the country's largest metropolitan districts have been in existence for a considerable period of time.¹⁴ More importantly, special district proponents have frequently pointed out the relationship between area and function and stressed that its operations are

essential to the coordinated development of a particular natural or man-made asset, such as a port, a river, a transportation system or even a city itself.¹⁵ Moreover, since most districts are concerned with only a particular function, they are primarily regarded as service mechanisms rather than governance devices. Therefore, the general public may regard their geographic flexibility as an inherent component of the structure. The resultant effect is that special districts appear uniquely able to trade on the characteristic of geographic flexibility.

Another inducement to special district creation lies in the oft-cited claim that they can perform their functional responsibilities more effectively and expeditiously than can general purpose governments. A key component of this claim is the ability of special districts to attract community leadership and more highly paid public servants than other units of government.¹⁶ Being relatively free from traditional local government personnel restrictions and the necessity to weigh competing functional interests against one another, special districts can sometimes pursue their public service responsibilities with a high degree of technical efficiency. In large measure, then, some contend that special districts have a degree of organizational flexibility and integration unparalleled among general units of government.¹⁷ In turn, this sort of organizational strength insures that the technical competence of the agency may be substantial. Several empirical investigations give some credence to this claim.¹⁸

Finally, special district establishment is often favored as the least radical means of solving metropolitan service problems. The cumbersome, sometimes sweeping alternatives to special districts—annexation, consolidation, federation, and intergovernmental service agreements—often impinge on ingrained political traditions, which are not so affected with the establishment of a special district. As one authority pointed out:

As a general rule, their establishment does not effect an abolition, displacement, or amalgamation of county offices that have a constitutional status, nor does it result in an alternation of municipal and other local boundaries, nor does it interfere with local affairs that are reserved to the cities under home rule provision. In short, it does not ordinarily bring about such changes as would require popular assent or constitutional amendment.¹⁹

For these reasons, special districts have been regarded as constructive structural responses to the problems of substate regionalism. And the favorable regard in which special districts are held can be observed in the policies of all three levels of American government.²⁰

Federal Encouragement. Franklin D. Roosevelt strongly encouraged each State to provide local governments with the ability to create an organization which would provide constituents with a method of participa-

tion in the planning, development, and installation of soil and water conservation units. Such units were given some governmental powers.²¹

The Federal government continued to encourage creation of soil and water conservation districts and in some cases special districts in public housing and urban renewal programs through promise of Federal aid. Since general purpose governments frequently encountered legal barriers and local apathy to these programs when they were first proposed, these special districts appeared to provide the most positive approach to stimulating local action.²² By 1964, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) noted the existence of numerous Federal aid programs which bypassed general purpose governments and distributed funds directly to special districts. As of that date, general purpose governments had not been exclusively designated the recipient of Federal grant monies.²³ Indeed, the following Federal programs provided and to some extent still provide encouragement of special district funding:

– Mass Transportation Loans established by the Housing Act of 1961 (42 U.S.C.A. 1492 [d]).

– Mass Transportation Demonstrations established by Section 303 of the Housing Act of 1961 (42 U.S.C.A. 1453 [b]).

– Public Housing established by U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as amended (42 U.S.C.A. 1401, *et. seq.*).

– Open Space Land Acquisition authorized under Title VII of the Housing Act of 1961 (42 U.S.C.A. 1500).

– Urban Renewal Projects authorized by Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 as amended (42 U.S.C.A. 1441 and 1450 *et. seq.*).

– Urban Renewal Demonstrations authorized by Section 314 of the Housing Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.A. 1452 [a]).

– Public Facility Loans authorized by Title II of the Housing Amendments of 1955 (42 U.S.C.A. 1491-1496).

– Advances for Public Works Planning established by Section 702 of the Housing Act of 1954, as amended (40 U.S.C.A. 642).

– Hospital and Medical Facilities Construction established by the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, as amended (42 U.S.C.A. 291).

– Waste Treatment Works authorized under Sec-

tion 6 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956, as amended (33 U.S.C.A. 466 [d]-[e]).

– Land for Recreation and Public Purposes authorized under the Recreation Act of 1926 (43 U.S.C. 869), as amended by the Recreation and Public Purposes Act of 1954.

– Reclamation authorized under the Federal reclamation laws (43 U.S.C.A. 371 *et. seq.*).

– Small Watershed Protection established by the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act (16 U.S.C.A. 1001).²⁴

By 1964 the extent of Federal encouragement of special purpose units had prompted the ACIR to recommend that the Congress take action to remove provisions from Federal aid programs which gave preferential treatment to special districts. Moreover, the Commission urged that special districts be required to coordinate their federally aided activities with general purpose governments.²⁵

In more recent years, some Federal programs have downplayed the emphasis on special purpose governments. During the middle to late 1960's, three Congressional acts—Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 as amended, Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966; and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968—exemplified this trend. These three acts focus on general purpose governments and/or areawide bodies. The Housing Act and the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act suggested a shift in emphasis to general purpose governments. Official interpretation of Section 701 of the Housing Act indicates that grants will be given only to organizations consisting primarily of representatives of general government. The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act states that all applications for certain types of urban aid must be submitted for review to an areawide agency composed of or responsible to elected officials of general local governments.²⁶ The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act stressed specifically that an agency should grant Federal funds only to general purpose governments unless substantial reasons required that a special district be the recipient of Federal aid.

Further Federal emphasis on general purpose governments was contained in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. It authorizes the distribution of federally shared revenues to general purpose governments only.

State Encouragement. It is more difficult to assess the extent of direct State encouragement of special districts, yet nearly every State has legislation which permits creation of such units. Generally, four types of State legislation allow for special district creation: general legislation authorizing a wide range of functional respon-

sibilities; general legislation authorizing only one function; special legislation authorizing multi-functions; and special legislation for one function.

The number of special districts in a State in no way reflects the number of State authorizing acts. For example, of the 1,623 special districts reported in Pennsylvania in 1967, 1,574 were established by one general law permitting municipal authorities.²⁷ At the other extreme is California, which has 176 different statutory authorizations, both general and special, for special district creation.²⁸ Some East Coast States, such as Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, also have many special acts authorizing special districts.

Although some special legislation does give local governments the option to establish the authorized district, most State special acts mandate the creation of the district. Therefore, in the States with numerous special acts the legislators not only encourage district proliferation, but are often the prime cause of special district growth.

States prompt the creation of special districts through other actions as well. The fiscal and administrative limitations on general purpose governments imposed by the State promote special district creation. One observer attributes the proliferation of special districts to antiquated State governments and lack of modernized home rule statutes in most areas. Lacking the freedom to meet new functional demands and facing traditional fiscal and personnel restrictions, local governments in many states have no choice but to permit special districts to be created and take on new functional responsibilities. Existing State restrictions on local government finance and organization then force local governments to react to, rather than direct, the delivery of public services.²⁹

That local fiscal limitations may result in the creation of special districts can be seen from Table II-1. The ten States listed in this table have no local tax limitations and all have fewer than average special districts. Nationally, the average number of special districts per State in 1972 was 487; the average number in States with no property tax limitations was 152.

Local Encouragement. Special districts provide local officials with a quick and often satisfactory method of delivering public services. Generally, they are established through recourse to existing State legislation and their operations can begin with their creation. These units tend to provide hardware rather than software services and thereby supply constituents with a visible product. Frequently, districts also do not increase local taxes since they can achieve fiscal self-sufficiency by proceeds from user charges and bonds.

The creation of a special district can be viewed as a way of meeting certain critical functional needs without radically altering local government structure. Thus, local officials still retain jurisdictional prerogatives which would be substantially, if not totally, diminished through consolidation or federation. On the other hand, special districts are more independent of local governments than local service agreements and services provided by a voluntary regional council.

Although State authorizing legislation is needed to create a special district, most often the local government must take the final action for establishment. Indeed in some cases, localities are the prime movers in special district creation. One Texas study, for example, found that municipalities indiscriminately encouraged creation of special districts with no regard for long-range implications. Using these mechanisms to provide early water and sewer services to fringe areas, Texas municipalities were frequently able to have the costs of these expensive services fully borne by new residents rather than the city as a whole. In other cases, localities did not resist special district creation since districts often undertook functions which local governments did not wish to provide. In the words of one report, "If there is an overall special district 'problem,' then general purpose governments have participated in its creation either by direct sanction or by default."³⁰

In short, the proliferation of special districts can be attributed in part to each level of government—Federal, State, and local.

SPECIAL DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

Growth Rate

Nationally, special districts have exhibited a steady growth over the past 20 years (see Table II-2). Since 1952 they have increased by 93.6 percent, a rate of growth that far outstrips that of any other governmental unit. Districts experienced their greatest growth between

Table II-1

States with No Limitations on Local Power to Raise Property Tax Revenue, 1972

State	Number of Special Districts
Connecticut	230
Delaware*	80
Hawaii	15
Maine	126
Maryland	229
Massachusetts	268
New Hampshire	94
New Jersey	341
Vermont	74
Virginia	58

*Kent County, Delaware, has limitations on its power to raise property tax revenue.

Source: ACIR *State-Local Finances: Significant Features and Suggested Legislation 1972*, and U.S. Census Bureau.

Table II-2

Number of Special Districts: 1972, 1967, 1962, and 1952

Region	1972	1967	1967-72 5-Year Change	1962	1962-72 10-Year Change	1952	1952-72 20-Year Change
United States	23,886	21,265	12.3%	18,322	30.4%	12,339	93.6%
Northeast	3,937	3,724	5.7	3,399	15.8	1,789	120.1
North Central	8,024	7,020	14.3	6,028	33.1	4,622	73.6
South	5,525	4,515	22.4	3,485	58.5	2,288	141.5
West	6,400	6,006	6.6	5,330	20.1	3,640	75.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, 1.

Table II-3

Number of Special Districts Created by Special and General Statutes:
1962 and 1967

Region	General Laws			Special Laws		
	1967	1962	% Change	1967	1962	% Change
United States	*20,558	*17,700	16.1	*691	*623	10.9
Northeast	* 3,377	* 3,056	10.5	*347	*343	1.2
North Central	* 6,986	* 6,087	14.8	* 18	* 21	-14.3
South	* 4,238	* 3,264	29.8	*277	*222	24.8
West	* 5,957	* 5,293	12.5	* 49	* 37	32.4

*Estimates.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments, 1*, 1962 and 1967.

1952 and 1962, increasing by nearly 50 percent. Growth over the last ten years was just over 30 percent. In each of the last two decades, the number grew by about 6,000.³¹

Geographically, the South experienced the greatest percentage increase—141.5 percent—in special district growth from 1952 to 1972. However, the States with the greatest number of special districts were found in all four major census regions (Illinois, 2,407; California, 2,223; Pennsylvania, 1,777; and Texas, 1,215). These States accounted for nearly one-third of all special district growth during this period. The existence of large numbers of special districts in all parts of the Nation indicates that these units of government should not be regarded as a regional phenomenon, but a national one.

Method of Incorporation

Special districts require prior enabling legislation before they can be created or undertake the perfor-

mance of any function. These units may be authorized by general law or by special acts to meet specific conditions in a particular community or area or they may be mandated by the State. Table II-3 shows the number of special districts in each State created by general or special acts. In 11 States,³² special districts are authorized exclusively by general statutes. In other States, such as Maine, Massachusetts, and Florida, a large portion of the districts are created by special acts of the legislature. There has been a small national increase (10.9 percent) in the number of districts created between 1962 and 1967 by special law, with a decrease (14.3 percent) in such authorizations in the North Central region. The overwhelming majority of special districts, however, are created pursuant to general authorizing laws.

The number of different types of special districts authorized by each State for years 1962 and 1967 is summarized in Table II-4. This table indicates that at

Table II-4

**Number of Different Types of Special Districts Authorized and Operative:
1962 and 1967**

Region	Number of Types Authorized			Number of Types Operative		
	1967	1962	Number Change	1967	1962	Number Change
United States	693	635	+58	578	513	+65
Northeast	94	88	+ 6	74	69	+ 5
North Central	161	149	+12	137	119	+18
South	244	210	+34	196	165	+31
West	193	187	+ 6	170	159	+11

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments*, I, 1962 and 1967.

Table II-5

**Number of Special Districts Located Within and Outside of SMSA's:
1962, 1967, and 1972**

Region	Within SMSA's			Outside SMSA's		
	1962	1967	1972	1962	1967	1972
United States	5,410	7,580	7,842	12,912	13,685	16,044
Northeast	1,762	2,240	2,081	1,637	1,484	1,856
North Central	1,244	1,757	2,032	4,864	5,263	5,992
South	647	1,131	1,357	2,838	3,384	4,168
West	1,757	2,452	2,372	3,573	3,554	4,028

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

least 693 individual authorizing statutes had been enacted by State legislatures by 1967—an increase of 58 since 1962. California reported the greatest number of enabling authorizations for special districts (46), followed by Illinois (28), Florida (27), New Jersey (26), and Louisiana (24).

Comparing data from Tables II-2 and II-4 indicates little correlation between the number of authorizing statutes and the number of actual special districts. For example, one or two types of districts predominate in several States that have large total numbers of districts. Thus, more than three-fifths of Illinois' special districts are of two types—fire protection and drainage. Of New York's 954 districts, 846 are for fire protection. Of Delaware's 78 special purpose districts, 72 are drainage; slightly more than half of Michigan's districts are soil conservation units.

The lack of a positive relationship between general special district authorizations and establishments indi-

cates that in many States special district authorizations are rarely or never used. Yet this authorization-establishment gap appears to follow no specific pattern. Most States which use extensively the special statute approach appear to have similar authorization-establishment ratios. Table II-4 indicates that of the at least 693 general authorizing statutes which had been enacted by State legislatures in 1967, only 578 were employed. Thus, 115 or nearly 17 percent of all general enabling acts have never been utilized.

METROPOLITAN AND NON-METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

The distribution of special districts between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas is shown in Table II-5. For the Nation as a whole, 7,842 (33 percent) of the 23,886 districts in 1972 were in SMSA's. While the total number of special districts has increased by 5,564 since 1962, the proportion of SMSA districts in relation

to the total has remained virtually unchanged over the past ten years. Census data for 1972 show that in only one region—the Northeast—do SMSA districts outnumber non-SMSA districts.

In 1972, as in the past, most special districts were formed in nonmetropolitan areas, with seven out of every ten districts located in non-metropolitan areas. The smallest non-metropolitan increase occurred in the Northeast region where only 119 more districts were reported in 1972 than in 1962, followed by the West with 455 additional districts, the North Central region with 1,128, and the South with 1,330. During this past decade, two of the nine Northeast States experienced a net decrease in the total number of non-metropolitan special districts. California, Florida, and South Carolina were the only States showing such decreases in their respective regions, while all the States in the North Central region experienced increases in the numbers of non-SMSA units.

All States with metropolitan areas had at least three special districts per metropolitan area. California and Pennsylvania had the greatest number within their SMSA's—1,279 and 1,115 respectively. Fifteen States had over 100 districts in their metropolitan areas. States with the largest numerical increase in these special districts during the decade included California—385; Pennsylvania—236; Texas—298; Illinois—269; and Indiana—119. Arkansas was the only State to experience a decrease in the number of districts in its metropolitan areas.

The proliferation of special districts has long been a concern of analysts of American federalism. Numerous public reports have called for mechanisms to regulate special district growth, and as early as 1964 the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommended the establishment of boundary commissions to control special district growth.³³

Such recommendations came to fruition in later years as five States (California, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington)³⁴ enacted legislation creating boundary commissions to control proliferation of local governments in metropolitan areas. Generally, the commissions are authorized to review and control the creation, consolidation, annexation, and dissolution of special districts on a statewide or countywide basis.

Of the over 60 operating commissions, some have retarded the steady growth of special districts. For example, the boundary commission in Portland reduced the number of these governmental units from 303 to 198 in two years. The bulk of this reduction was accomplished during the first 18 months and involved primarily highway lighting districts, which were absorbed into a county service district. Moreover, the success of the Portland commission has prompted the Oregon legislature to direct "...the Commission to accelerate its efforts regarding the elimination of special service districts through consolidation, mergers, or annexation to general purpose units such as cities or county service districts."³⁵

California has also experienced success in curtailing special district growth by its use of boundary commissions. Ronald Cease, who has studied these agencies, has attributed the reduction in district proliferation to the efforts of the State's Legal Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCO's).³⁶

Other information tends to support the premise that boundary commissions with authority over special district formation can curtail district growth. All of the States shown in Table II-6 experienced a decrease in district growth between 1967 and 1972.

Boundary Characteristics

Information concerning the area served by special

Table II-6

States Enacting Legislation to Control Special Districts and Growth of SMSA Special Districts: 1962, 1967, 1972

State	1962	1967	1962-67 5 year % increase	1972	1967-72 5 year % increase
California	894	1,300	45	1,279	-2
Nevada	19	24	26	26	8
New Mexico	7	4	-43	4	0
Oregon	247	350	42	257	-27
Washington	289	331	15	365	10

Source: ACIR tabulations; U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967, I.*

Table II-7


Relationship of Special District Boundaries to Local Government Boundaries

Region	Number Coterminous						Number Non-coterminous					
	Total		Countywide		Local		Total		Multi-County		Other	
	1967	1972	1967	1972	1967	1972	1967	1972	1967	1972	1967	1972
United States	5,263	6,048	2,479	2,721	2,784	3,327	16,001	17,838	2,322	2,418	13,679	15,420
Northeast	1,568	1,882	123	151	1,445	1,734	2,408	2,055	175	170	2,233	1,885
North Central	1,884	2,072	1,084	1,128	800	944	5,136	5,952	963	1,051	4,173	4,901
South	1,307	1,641	982	1,154	325	487	3,128	3,884	646	605	2,482	3,276
West	504	453	280	288	214	165	5,329	5,947	538	592	4,791	5,355

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; also *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

FIGURE II-1

**Special District Boundaries and Coterminality with Local Governments
Within and Outside SMSA, 1972**



Within SMSA: Northeast total 2,081 (coterminous 1,003); North Central total 2,032 (coterminous 509); South total 1,357 (coterminous 293); West total 2,372 (coterminous 113).

Outside SMSA: Northeast total 1,856 (coterminous 879); North Central total 5,992 (coterminous 1,563); South total 4,168 (coterminous 1,348); West total 4,028 (coterminous 340).

number of districts NOT coterminous
 number of districts with coterminous boundaries

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures.

district governments in 1967 and 1972 is provided in Table II-7. Only one-fourth of all special districts serve an area coterminous with those of some other local government—city, county, or township. A little over two-fifths of the districts are countywide or multicounty in nature. Most special districts, then, are subcounty regardless of their boundary relationship. The South has the largest proportion of county- and multicounty-wide districts (32 percent).

The extent to which special district boundary lines overlap or are coterminous with the boundaries of local governments inside and outside SMSA's is highlighted in Figure II-1. In 1972, the boundaries of only 1,918 districts in metropolitan areas (24 percent) and 4,130 non-metropolitan districts (26 percent) corresponded to those of local governments. On a regional basis, the Northeast accounted for the highest proportion (47 percent) of coterminous special districts. The West

showed the lowest proportion with only seven percent. A similar pattern occurred in non-metropolitan areas, with 47 percent of the Northeast districts reporting coterminality and only eight percent in the West.

Interstate Special Districts

Of the 267 standard metropolitan statistical areas in June 1972, 33, including the New York City and Chicago metropolitan areas, are interstate in nature. In 1972 there were 14 interstate special districts in operation—an increase of three since 1967 (see Table II-8). The majority of these special purpose governments were established by interstate compact, although some were created by special act of each State legislature or by Act of Congress. All but a handful of these special districts derive their primary fiscal resources from issuing bonds

Table II-8

Interstate Special Districts

Name	No. of States	Established by	Revenue
Bi-State Metropolitan District	2	Compact	B,U,G
Breaks Interstate Park Commission	2	Compact	B,U,G
Clinton Bridge Commission	2	Act of Congress	B,U,G,
Delaware River and Bay Authority	2	Compact	B,U
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission	2	Compact	B,U
Delaware River Port Authority	2	Special Act	B,U
Lake Champlain Bridge Commission	2	Compact	B,U
Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority	2	Special Act	B,U,G
Muscatine Bridge Commission	2	Act of Congress	B,U,G
Port of New York and New Jersey Authority	2	Compact	B,U,G
St. Louis Metropolitan Airport Authority	2	Compact	B,G
The Falls of the Ohio Interstate Park Commission	2	Compact	B,U,G
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	2	Act of Congress	B,U,G
Waterfront and Airport Commission of New York and New Jersey	2	Compact	T

B—issue bonds

U—user charge

G—grants or contributions from other governmental units

T—tax

and user charges. These authorities in many cases accept grants and contributions from other governments.

The interstate special district is particularly important since it is the only unit of independent subregional government that can be interstate. It is surprising that the number of interstate special districts is so low in view of the fact that there now are 33 interstate SMSA's. "According to some, the expansion of the special purpose district would offer the best fit to that significant group of metropolitan areas which are interstate."³⁷

Functional Responsibility

The Census Bureau has grouped special districts under 20 single-function and three multiple-function categories.³⁸ Tables II-9 through II-11 display census data for

these functional classifications. Significant numerical increases occurred for nearly all functional types (see Table II-9) between 1962 and 1972. During this decade the greatest growth for functional classes occurred with transit districts (230.0 percent) and sewer and water districts (355.8 percent). Fire protection districts were the most numerous (3,872) in 1972, as they were in 1967 and 1962. Soil conservation districts were the second most numerous over the past ten years. Fire protection, soil conservation, water supply, housing, and drainage districts accounted for 55 percent of the total number of special districts in 1972.

Housing and soil conservation districts were found respectively in 41 and 39 of the 49 States having special districts. Less prevalent were eight types of districts which appeared in less than 15 States in 1972. Table

Table II-9

Types of Special Districts: 1962, 1967, 1972

Type of District	1972	1967	1962	Percent Change	
				1967-72	1962-72
Single Function Districts					
Cemeteries	1,496	1,397	1,283	7.1	16.6
School Buildings	1,085	956	915	13.5	18.6
Fire Protection	3,872	3,665	3,229	5.6	19.9
Highways	698	774	786	-9.8	-11.2
Health	257	234	231	9.8	11.3
Hospitals	655	537	418	22.0	56.7
Housing and Urban Renewal	2,270	1,565	1,099	45.0	106.6
Libraries	498	410	349	21.5	14.0
Drainage	2,192	2,193	2,240	-0.0	-2.1
Flood Control	677	662	500	2.3	35.4
Irrigation and Water Conservation	966	904	781	6.9	23.7
Soil Conservation	2,564	2,571	2,461	0.3	4.2
Other Natural Resources	231	209	309	10.5	-25.2
Parks and Recreation	749	613	488	22.2	53.5
Sewers	1,406	1,233	937	14.0	50.1
Water Supply	2,323	2,140	1,502	8.6	54.7
Electric Power	74	75	76	-1.3	-2.6
Gas Supply	48	37	30	29.7	60.0
Transit	33	14	10	135.7	230.0
Other	889	622	488	42.9	82.2
Multiple-Function Districts					
Sewer and Water Supply	629	298	138	111.1	355.8
Natural Resource and Water Supply	67	45	56	48.9	19.6
Other	207	110	120	88.2	72.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

Table II-10

Number of States Reporting One or More Special Districts by Function: 1967 and 1972

Type of Special District	States Reporting One or More Special Districts	
	1972	1967
Single-function districts		
Cemetery	13	11
School building	2	2
Fire protection	30	29
Health	14	15
Hospital	28	28
Highways	27	24
Housing	41	40
Drainage	32	34
Library	11	13
Other natural resources	10	11
Parks and recreation	28	29
Flood control	29	29
Irrigation and water conservation	28	27
Sewers	34	40
Soil conservation	39	40
Other general functions	41	36
Water supply	34	36
Gas supply	7	7
Transit	10	5
Electric power	10	9
Multiple-function districts		
Natural resources and water supply	11	9
Sewer and water	33	23
Other multiple functions	27	23

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures, also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

II-10 notes an increase of one or more additional States creating districts in 11 of the 23 functional categories, while eight categories showed a decrease, and four categories showed no change in the number of authorizing States. The largest increase—ten States—was found in the sewer and water category.

Turning to the area distribution of special districts, Table II-11 shows that in 1972 more special districts were reported within SMSA's than non-SMSA's for seven functional categories: school buildings; parks and recreation; sewers; transit; natural resources and water supply; sewer and water; and other multiple functions. When examining the metropolitan districts as a whole, dominant functional categories were fire protection, water supply, sewers, and housing.

Comparison of the distribution of SMSA and non-SMSA types of districts shows that cemetery, electric power, gas supply, soil conservation, flood control, highways, and drainage districts are predominantly nonmetropolitan in nature. On the other hand, well over 55 percent of all school building, sewer, transit, water supply, sewer and water, and other multiple function districts are found in metropolitan areas.

While most special districts are established to perform a single function, some are authorized to provide a number of different services. Although these districts are classified as multi-functional, they tend to be uni-purpose. For example, a majority of them involve some combination of urban water supply with other related

Table II-11


Distribution of Special Districts Within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas by Type: 1972

Type of Special District	No. of Special Districts	% Within SMSA	% of SMSA Total
Total, SMSA Special Districts	7,842	32.8	100.0
Cemetery	157	10.5	2.0
School building	619	57.1	7.9
Fire protection	1,491	38.5	19.0
Health	101	39.3	1.3
Hospitals	150	22.9	1.9
Highways	139	19.9	1.8
Housing	691	30.4	8.8
Drainage	436	19.9	5.6
Library	148	29.7	1.9
Other natural resources	92	39.8	1.2
Parks and recreation	377	50.3	4.8
Flood control	131	19.4	1.7
Irrigation and water conservation	271	28.1	3.5
Sewers	822	58.5	10.5
Soil conservation	416	16.2	5.3
Other general functions	329	37.0	4.2
Water supply	877	37.8	11.2
Electric power	13	17.6	0.2
Gas supply	7	14.6	0.1
Transit	31	93.9	0.4
Natural resources and water supply	44	65.7	0.6
Sewer and water	379	60.3	4.8
Other multiple functions	121	58.5	1.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures.

FIGURE II-2

**Increase in Multiple Function Special Districts:
1962, 1967, 1972**



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures, also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Government: 1967, I.*

services, usually sewerage. Figure II-2 indicated the regional distribution of multiple function districts. Geographically, the North Central area has the smallest number of such districts, but has experienced the greatest growth of such entities over the past ten years. Four States— Pennsylvania (161), California (179), Texas (201), and Colorado (94)—account for 70 percent of the total number of multiple function special districts. Eight States reported no multiple function districts.³⁹

CONTROLS ON SPECIAL DISTRICTS

Even though special districts are independent units of government, they are subject to a number of organizational and fiscal controls. These restrictions usually are intended to bring the special district into a close working relationship with general purpose governments and/or insure some degree of popular control over their operation.

Organizational Controls

Organizational restrictions are probably the most prevalent form of special district controls. Such controls generally center on the method of special district creation and the manner in which special district officials are selected.

As noted, most general law-based special districts are created pursuant to local action. All or virtually all general law cemetery, fire protection, highway, health, hospital, housing and urban renewal, library, parks and recreation, and sewage districts are products of local action. State involvement, however, is more pronounced in natural resource, soil conservation, and utility districts.

The greatest variety in organizational controls relates to the procedures upon which special district creation is contingent. The unit of government and procedure for establishing special districts authorized by general legislation is shown in Appendix Table II-E. Four States (Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) do not permit public hearings or require referenda for any special districts created under general legislation. Four additional States (Vermont, North Carolina, Maine, and Georgia) only require public hearings or referenda when the special district authorized by general law is created by the State. At the other end of the spectrum, three States (Arizona, Montana, and Oklahoma) do not permit the establishment of any special districts without public approval.⁴⁰

In some States there has been a shift in the method of establishing special districts. For example, in 1969 the Wisconsin Supreme Court put a stop to the creation of new metropolitan sewerage districts by county courts on the grounds that the courts were forced to perform functions which were not judicial in character. Previously, the county court judge made all appointments for

the district commission and approved expansion of the boundaries. New sewerage districts are now established by the State Department of Natural Resources upon petition of the local governments.⁴¹

The method of selecting board members is another control which affects special district accountability. Appendix Table IV-F indicates the method of selection by State and by function of district. Although no district pattern emerges, certain observations may be made. General legislation in no State permits a housing and urban renewal district to have an elected board; in all but four States (Delaware, Florida, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) housing and renewal board members are appointed solely by local officials. However, other types of districts have their board members selected primarily through direct election. For example, 16 of the 25 States with fire protection districts provide for elected board members. Other districts opt for mixed methods of selection; soil conservation and water districts, for example, generally utilize both appointed and elected members. Arizona is the only State in which board members for all special districts are elected. In five States (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) the selection process for special district directors is exclusively appointment either at the State or local level.

Over half of all special district board members in 1967 were elected. Table II-12 shows that 53 percent of metropolitan board members and 61 percent of non-metropolitan members were elected. Although popular elections would seem to make special districts more accountable to constituents, some reports show considerable voter apathy toward district elections. One study of the San Francisco area found the "median turnout at special district elections to be 27 percent,

Table II-12

**Elected Officials of Special Districts:
1967**

	Total Membership of District Board		Members Elected	
	(A)	No.	No.	% of (A)
Total	97,708	56,943		58
Within SMSA	33,368	17,668		53
Outside SMSA	64,340	39,276		61

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, VI, *Popularly Elected Officials of State and Local Governments*.

significantly lower than for either county elections (67 percent), or city elections (45 percent)."⁴² Another study of voter turnout for 30 sanitary district elections held in four Bay Area counties from 1956 to 1962 revealed that participation ranged from 67.5 percent to 2 percent with a median of 17.5 percent. Median voter participation was 11.5 percent⁴³ for 23 fire protection districts for the same time period. In Oregon a median of 4 percent of the eligible voters was recorded for district elections during the period from 1954 to 1964.⁴⁴

Low voter participation, in some instances, can cause cancellation of elections and impelled vacancies in special district governing boards. Lack of voter interest, in turn, often means that offices are filled by appointment rather than election. In California if candidates are unopposed and 5 percent of the registered voters have not petitioned for an election the appointment is mandatory.⁴⁵ The following are but some instances of election cancellation in that State:

In Riverside County in 1967, 12 districts held elections while 33 cancelled elections and had the officer appointed by the Board of Supervisors.⁴⁶

San Diego County reported that of the 142 special district officers up for election in November, 1967, there were 46 contestants.⁴⁷

In Sacramento County in 1962, of the 62 fire commissioners in 22 autonomous fire districts, only one was elected; the other 61 had been appointed.⁴⁸

One water district with an annual budget of nearly \$1,000,000 has not had an election since formation in 1941.⁴⁹

Fiscal Controls

Special district accountability is frequently linked to the method of financing. Units supported by charges and bonds sometimes are able to exercise a greater degree of independence than districts financed through taxation. Appendix Table II-G shows revenue sources of special districts authorized by general legislation. The nature of certain functions clearly dictates their revenue sources. For example, cemeteries and libraries are totally supported by taxes, assessments, bond issuance, and grants, whereas housing and urban renewal districts are seldom financed by taxes but rather by bonds, rentals, and grants.

Certain State patterns also emerge. In some States (Georgia, Maine, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia) no taxes or assessments are used to support general legislation special purpose districts. New York and

Hawaii are the only States that do not permit financing of general legislation special districts through user charges.

While special district visibility may be raised through use of taxing power, it is by no means certain that strict accountability will result. The taxes used to support a district are often collected by the county along with its own general taxes; the citizen is unaware of the special district share of such taxes.⁵⁰

Financial reporting may be another mechanism of special district control. However, while the State law may mandate public display of the budget, it frequently does not provide a means of controlling the spending pattern. Consequently, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has recommended that States provide legislation which would permit either the local general purpose government or the appropriate State agency to review and approve the budget of the special district.⁵¹

Not unexpectedly, one finds relatively few traditional blanket fiscal controls on special districts. Less than ten States report general property tax limitations on special districts,⁵² and debt restrictions, as revealed by analysis of areawide units, usually take the form of interest rate limitations and requirements for public referenda or special district bonds.

SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND REGIONALISM

One of the unique aspects of special districts is their ability to cross jurisdictional boundaries—both local and State. This territorial flexibility is particularly appropriate for metropolitan areas where public services have become more and more interdependent and traditional boundaries less meaningful in the provision of urban services.

Table II-13 presents an overall view of the number of metropolitan special districts and the proportion of these districts that have regional or areawide dimensions. Nationally only 13 percent of the metropolitan districts are areawide, *i.e.*, countywide or multicounty. The South has the highest percentage of metropolitan areawide districts, with Mississippi and Virginia reporting more than half of their metropolitan districts to be areawide in nature. The highly urbanized Northeast has the lowest percent of areawide districts; in States with large metropolitan areas, *e.g.*, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, less than 10 percent of the metropolitan districts are multi-jurisdictional.

Why Multi-Jurisdictional Special Districts?

The need for areawide services has forced public officials to evaluate various alternatives for providing them on a multi-jurisdictional basis. Some consider special districts an adequate solution for delivery of such services for various reasons: they have been used since

Table II-13

**Areawide Metropolitan Special Districts:
1972**

Region	Number of Metropolitan Special Districts	Areawide Metropolitan* Special Districts	
	(A)	No.	% of (A)
United States	7,842	1,028	13.1
Northeast	2,081	133	6.4
North Central	2,032	372	18.3
South	1,357	291	21.4
West	2,372	232	9.8

* Areawide metropolitan includes all districts which are countywide or multicounty and are located in an SMSA.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures.

the early 1900's; they are easy to establish; they maintain the status quo; they provide an ad hoc approach to a problem; they do not change existing local government boundaries; they can act as an agent for regional government reorganization; and they provide a factual clue as to what functions are most properly areawide in nature. Opponents of these regional units cite them as being undemocratic and unaccountable, deterrents to basic governmental reform, destructive of the political power of central-city minority groups, and productive of urban-rural conflicts.

History of Viability

Regional special districts have frequently been a traditional part of many metropolitan governance systems. Large districts such as the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority, the Hartford Metropolitan District, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and others can point to relatively long histories of regional service provision. The viability of these mechanisms, in turn, has prompted the creation of similar units in other metropolitan areas. Thus, between 1957 and 1972 there was an addition of some 55 "large" special districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas. In general, most observers of these units see no immediate block to their further establishment though they forecast changes in their mode of organization.⁵³ Barring radical changes in Federal, State, or local policies, areawide districts are likely to increase in much the same manner as special districts generally.

Alternative to Consolidated Government

Regional special districts have also found favor since they can be efficient service mechanisms when local officials do not or cannot take the initiative to solve critical regional problems. Moreover, they can take the place of forceful and perhaps unnecessary reorganization of local units. One urban expert has advocated State-controlled multipurpose metropolitan districts in the belief that cities and counties, with their strong spirit of localism, will continue to be reluctant to participate in any regional reorganization program. In Professor Zimmerman's view,

...The creation of multipurpose State authorities to perform what are considered by some to be "local" functions may appear to be a violation of "home rule" and less democratic than the creation of popularly controlled metropolitan government. Nevertheless, political realities must be faced — metropolitan governments will not be created by local initiative in most areas. The State is the only government with the legal power, financial resources and hopefully determination to solve many areawide problems.⁵⁴

In a similar vein, the Musto Commission in New Jersey proposed the institution of State-created districts to provide for certain municipal services. The commission recommended that the State government through joint State-regional bodies must ultimately assume the responsibility for solid waste collection, treatment, and disposal because of the lack of local initiative. The State, said the commission, should define and plan optimal districts as a basis for coordinated service provision by local government.⁵⁵

Ironically, regional special districts can provide an inducement to general government reform at the regional level. For example, the Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities area evolved from the need for a regional agency to coordinate the planning and development of a number of metropolitan special districts. Presently, the Council reviews all plans of each independent commission, board, or agency which would have an areawide or multi-community effect. Special district plans must be submitted to the Council before any action may be taken, and the Council may indefinitely suspend any operation of the plan which it considers to be inconsistent or detrimental to the comprehensive metropolitan development guide. Moreover, the Metropolitan Council is charged with making recommendations as to which governmental agency is best suited to discharge functional responsibilities affecting the development guide.⁵⁶ Consequently, other regional districts, when they are created, will better fit into the overall metropolitan governance system.

Other States have taken different approaches to

regional governance in their efforts to control areawide districts. In 1972, Colorado enacted a regional service authority act designed to provide coordinated operation of areawide services by metropolitan districts. In part, the legislation states:

It is ...the policy of the State of Colorado to encourage the utilization of single service authorities to provide those functions, services, and facilities which transcend local government boundaries, thus reducing the duplication, proliferation, and fragmentation of local government, and encouraging establishment of efficient, effective, and responsive regional government.⁵⁷

Determinant of Areawide Functions

Areawide multi-functional districts also provide a factual clue as to what functions might be deemed areawide or local. Some governmental functions evidently can only be performed effectively on a multi-jurisdictional basis, e.g., transportation, air pollution abatement, flood control. Hence State and local government officials, in some cases, have sought to transcend traditional governmental boundaries by the creation of these special districts. Some States have enacted legislation to permit voters or local governments to determine which functions should be performed on a metropolitan or areawide basis. Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon, are but two areas where multi-functional districts exist and stand ready to perform a wide variety of regional services.

In 1957, the State of Washington enacted legislation which permits a major city to join any other incorporated city and unincorporated areas to form a metropolitan municipal corporation. The corporation may perform any or all of six functions—comprehensive planning, sewerage disposal, garbage disposal, parks and parkways, water supply, and transportation. Revenues would be raised through revenue bonds, special assessments of property owners, and a property tax subject to approval of the voters. Seattle area voters approved the formation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, but thus far have utilized the mechanism for only two services: sewerage disposal and mass transit.⁵⁸

In 1969, Oregon authorized the creation of multi-purpose metropolitan service districts. The initial directors of the districts are to be composed primarily of representatives of the city and county governing bodies. After formation, however, voters within a district may alter the composition and selection process of the board. Portland area voters approved a multi-purpose district in May 1970. This Metro Service District can coordinate the activities of existing special district functions but cannot take over a function except at the request of a district. In this fashion it unifies all functional districts in the metropolitan area, but each district still operates

individually unless it chooses to have the Metro Service District assume its operation. Initial evaluations of the usefulness of the Metro Service District revealed that many local officials felt the district would be of benefit in the functional areas of sewerage, solid waste, and transportation. Not unexpectedly, they did not believe it would be useful in supplanting the day-to-day workings of their respective general purpose local governments.⁵⁹

Opposition to Regional Special Districts

While regional special districts have sometimes proved useful for providing areawide services, there are definite sources of hostility to them. Opposition can arise because of their lack of cooperation with general purpose governments, their remoteness from local citizenry, and their erosion of minority political power.⁶⁰

Evaluations of several regional districts have pointed up their remoteness from local communities and the need for closer public scrutiny of their operations.⁶¹ Regional special districts, especially those that are State-mandated, have been found to have little direct communication with the communities they serve and are frequently the source of considerable concern to local subordinate governments affected by their activities.⁶²

Special districts which can act independently are often criticized when they behave autonomously. Complaints traditionally focus on the uncoordinated activities of regional districts. While a constituent general purpose government has responsibility for many program areas and therefore must set priorities, the uni-functional government need not and sometimes does not consider other citizen needs when performing the function for which it is responsible. Moreover, other critics argue that regional special districts frequently prevent local government reorganization and thereby cripple the chances for substantial local governmental reform.

Opposition to regional districts comes from other sources as well. Growing suburban areas meeting the new demands of urban services are sometimes resentful of special district encroachment on their service prerogatives.⁶³ Areawide districts are also often opposed by minority groups in the central city. Melvin Mogulof, for example, points out that rarely do blacks exert any real influence over special districts or other regional structures.⁶⁴ Consequently, in the future, regional special districts with heavy suburban representation may dilute the political power of the black central city populace.

LEGAL AND FISCAL ANALYSIS

Creation and Termination

Contrary to popular belief, areawide districts are not always imposed on a metropolitan governance system by

Table II-14

**Procedures for Establishing and Terminating Areawide Selected
Special Districts in the 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970**

Characteristic	Total	Petition	Hearing	State	Number Having		Court	Termination
					Local	Referenda		
Region*	94	46	27	19	25	35	8	24
Northeast	18	3	2	2	3	1	0	2
North Central	29	17	11	6	6	10	5	7
South	23	14	7	9	5	11	3	9
West	24	12	7	2	11	13	0	6
<hr/>								
Function								
Multifunctional	9	2	1	1	1	2	0	1
Transportation	12	2	2	0	2	2	0	4
Natural Resources	16	8	6	3	2	4	3	4
Soil Conservation	14	13	10	12	0	11	1	11
Sewers	11	4	2	1	3	2	3	0
Utilities	9	6	1	2	7	5	0	2
Parks/Recreation	6	5	3	0	3	3	1	0
Housing/Renewal	3	1	1	0	2	0	0	0
Hospitals/Health	6	2	1	0	2	2	0	2
Other	8	3	0	0	3	4	0	0
<hr/>								
Debt Size								
-\$10 Million	53	33	20	17	10	24	7	18
\$10-24 Million	11	3	2	0	3	3	0	2
\$25-49 Million	7	1	1	0	2	1	0	0
\$50-99 Million	13	5	3	0	7	3	1	1
+\$100 Million	10	4	1	2	3	4	0	3
<hr/>								
Type								
State	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
State-Local	23	20	13	19	1	17	2	12
Local	36	26	14	0	24	18	6	8

Source: ACIR Tabulation

*See Appendix Table II-1 for States included in each region.

the State. Analysis of the legislation creating over 94 areawide districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas indicates that at least one-third to one-half of these entities are created through a process involving local petition, local government action, or referenda. Thus, while a large number of areawide districts, particularly in the Northeast, are the result of direct State mandate, a considerable portion of special districts are created as a result of local action. Of somewhat greater concern is the fact that only 26 percent of all surveyed special districts had legislative provisions for their termination. Whether created by State, State-local, or local action, special districts appear exceedingly hard to remove from

the governmental landscape once they have been established.

The processes concerning creation and termination of a district exhibit variations as to the region where a district is located, the functions it performs, the magnitude of its fiscal responsibilities, and the level of government involved in its creation (see Table II-14).

One of the most distinct variations occurs with regard to region. The Northeast consistently has minimal local or citizen involvement in the creation of its special districts. Only one district has a provision for referendum and only two of the 18 in the region have provisions for termination. In sharp contrast, about 50

percent of Western areawide districts were created contingent to some form of local government action or popular referendum. The South and West followed a mixed pattern with 20 to 30 percent of their districts being created by these local actions. Other variations involved court activity in special district creation in the North Central region and relatively greater incidence of termination provisions in special district laws in the South.

Areawide multi-functional and transportation districts were most apt to be the product of State rather than local action, hence less subject to local controls. Districts most likely to have been created in response to specific local action were utility districts, parks and recreation units, and housing and renewal authorities. Districts created pursuant to concurrent State-local efforts were usually soil conservation jurisdictions. Districts with the greatest frequency of termination provisions were found in the transportation, soil conservation, and hospitals/health function; districts with relatively few legislative provisions for termination were found in the sewers, parks and recreation, and housing/renewal areas.

Larger special districts are usually, but not always, subject to less local control than smaller units. Forty-four percent of special districts with an outstanding debt of less than \$10 million had referenda provisions regarding their creation, whereas only 32 percent of districts with over \$10 million debt had similar provisions. In similar fashion, 34 percent of all small-debt districts had legislative provision for termination, compared to only 15 percent of large-debt districts. Indeed, only three of the 31 districts in the \$10-99 million debt range had termination clauses in their enabling legislation.

State-created districts are the least susceptible to external control, not being formed with the concurrence of local government or by popular referenda and having the lowest incidence of termination provisions (11 percent) of all three types of districts. State-local districts, on the other hand, exhibit the highest degree of control—having the greatest incidence of petition pro-control—having the greatest incidence clauses. Locally created districts fall in between, having a lower proportion of petition, referenda, and termination clauses than State-local created districts, yet a much higher proportion than solely State created units.

Boundaries

Over half of the 94 special districts surveyed had legislative provisions regarding change of boundary procedure. More than one-quarter could legally form subdistricts within their jurisdictions; yet only three of the 94 areawide units could be consolidated pursuant to their own authorizing legislation.

Special districts with the greatest degree of boundary flexibility were (1) soil conservation, sewer, and utility

districts; (2) Western special districts; and (3) special districts that were created by either local or concurrent State-local action. Those with the least flexibility tended to (1) be State created, (2) have multi-functional responsibilities, and (3) be located in the Northeast.

In short, legislative analysis reveals that special districts are subject to a considerable degree of geographic adaptation. However, this adaptation does not extend to the subject of functional consolidation with other areawide units of government (see Table II-15).

Representation

Though nearly 40 percent of the 94 surveyed areawide districts are State created and though another one-quarter are the product of concurrent State-local action, over 70 percent have a representation process which is localized in nature. Thirty-one of the 94 districts provide that all or some of the members of their governing board be appointed by constituent local governments while another 35 have elective governing boards. Only 17 of the 94 districts, or 18 percent, have governing boards that are composed solely of State appointees. Most areawide districts, then, have governing structures that are the product of local rather than State action (see Table II-16).

The districts exhibiting the most localized form of governing body—one which is locally appointive or elective—are most often located in the West and exercise various human resource functions. Districts with relatively little reliance on local appointment or electoral processes are located in the Northeast, have transportation or multifunctional responsibilities, and incur relatively large amounts of debt.

Over two-thirds of all surveyed special districts had governing boards composed of local residents. Most special districts had one- to four-year terms for their representatives; exceptions were districts with multi-functional or sewer responsibilities, those located in the Northeast, or those having significant fiscal responsibility as indicated by the amount of outstanding long-term debt.

Fiscal Characteristics

Most areawide special districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas have significant taxing powers. Of the 87 areawide districts analyzed,⁶⁵ 46 derive a portion of their revenues from property tax sources, the only form of tax that special districts levy. Reliance on the property tax exceeds 85 percent in several cases, most frequently in hospital and library districts and some large districts like the Metropolitan Sanitary District in Chicago and the Seattle Port District. Districts with minor or no reliance on the property tax are almost invariably located in the Northeast and are highway, housing and urban renewal, utility, or water supply

districts, all of which derive substantial revenues from non-tax sources such as user charges, assessments, rents, or grants.

Not only do many special districts derive substantial revenue from tax sources, but also a large number receive considerable intergovernmental aid. Sixty-five of the 87 areawide districts received some form of intergovernmental assistance, with the majority receiving either Federal aid, State aid, or some combination of both. However, the variety of aid patterns suggests that a number of special districts also retain a close connection with local governments. Indeed, districts such as the Passaic Valley Sewage Commission, the Minneapolis-St.

Paul Sanitary District, and the Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority are almost completely financed from local funds. Such districts are clearly apt to be more cooperative with local governments than other districts which derive their revenues from exclusively non-tax sources.

Mixed regional patterns of financing are found among areawide units. Port authorities in the Northeast and North Central regions generally are supported from non-tax revenues. In the South and West they receive considerable property tax support. In a similar fashion, transit districts in the Northeast and North Central areas receive no tax revenues whereas they are substantially tax-supported in the West. Indeed, functional variations

Table II-15

**Boundary Characteristics
Selected Special Districts in the 72 Largest SMSA's**

Characteristic		Fixed	Altered	Can Have Subdistricts	Can Be Consolidated
Region*	94	36	54	27	3
Northeast	18	7	2	0	0
North Central	29	10	13	7	2
South	23	10	11	8	0
West	24	19	18	12	1
Function					
Multifunctional	9	3	2	1	1
Transportation	12	7	5	3	0
Natural Resources	16	8	6	6	0
Soil Conservation	14	3	9	7	0
Sewers	11	3	7	5	1
Utilities	9	2	7	4	0
Parks/Recreation	6	2	3	0	0
Housing/Renewal	3	2	0	0	0
Hospitals/Health	6	2	2	1	0
Other	8	4	3	0	1
Debt Size					
-\$10 Million	53	21	25	18	2
-\$10-24 Million	11	5	3	3	0
-\$25-49 Million	7	3	2	1	0
-\$50-99 Million	13	5	7	2	0
+\$100 Million	10	2	7	3	1
Type					
State	35	20	6	6	0
State-Local	23	9	15	11	1
Local	36	7	23	10	2

Source: ACIR Tabulation

*See Appendix Table II-1 for States included in each region.

Table II-16

Governing Board Characteristics,
Selected Special Districts in the 72 Largest SMSA's

Selection of Governing Body

Characteristic	Total	State Aptd.	Local Aptd.	Elected	State/ Local Aptd.	Local Aptd./ Elected	State Aptd./ Elected	State/ Local Aptd./ Elected	Court Aptd.	Other	N/A
Region*	94	17	25	25	6	1	9	0	6	2	3
Northeast	18	10	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
North Central	29	1	7	8	5	0	3	0	5	0	0
South	23	5	3	5	1	0	4	0	1	2	2
West	24	1	11	9	0	1	2	0	0	0	0
Function											
Multifunctional	9	4	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Transportation	12	5	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Natural Resources	16	3	4	5	0	1	0	0	2	1	0
Soil Conservation	14	1	0	4	1	0	7	0	0	1	0
Sewers	11	2	4	2	1	0	0	0	2	0	0
Utilities	9	0	2	6	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Parks/Recreation	6	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
Housing/Renewal	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hospitals/Health	6	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other	8	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Debt Size											
-\$10 Million	53	7	12	13	2	1	8	0	6	2	2
-\$10-24 Million	11	4	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
-\$25-49 Million	7	1	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
-\$50-99 Million	13	1	5	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
+\$100 Million	10	4	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Type											
State	35	13	10	5	3	1	1	0	0	1	0
State-Local	23	4	2	7	2	0	8	0	1	0	0
Local	36	0	13	13	1	0	0	0	5	1	3

Source: ACIR Tabulation. *See Appendix Table IV-I for States included in each region.

Table II-17

**Governing Board Terms,
Selected Special Districts in the 72 Largest SMSA's**

Characteristic	Total	Term of Governing Board				Governing Board Must be Residents of District
		1-2 yrs.	3-4 yrs.	5-7 yrs.	All Other	
Region*	94	8	46	29	11	67
Northeast	18	0	3	7	8	12
North Central	29	0	14	14	1	20
South	23	3	13	5	2	16
West	24	5	16	3	0	19
Function						
Multifunctional	9	0	0	7	2	6
Transportation	12	0	5	3	4	9
Natural Resources	16	2	10	2	2	13
Soil Conservation	14	0	10	4	0	9
Sewers	11	3	3	5	0	9
Utilities	9	1	6	2	0	6
Parks/Recreation	6	0	4	2	0	4
Housing/Renewal	3	0	1	2	0	1
Hospitals/Health	6	2	3	0	1	4
Other	8	0	4	2	2	6
Debt Size						
-\$10 Million	53	6	32	9	6	38
-\$10-24 Million	11	0	7	3	1	8
-\$25-49 Million	7	1	1	3	2	4
-\$50-99 Million	13	0	3	10	0	10
+\$100 Million	10	1	3	4	2	7
Type						
State	35	2	11	13	9	23
State-Local	23	1	18	5	0	18
Local	36	5	17	11	3	26

Source: ACIR Tabulation. *See Appendix Table II-1 for States included in each region.

occur even within regions. Thus, large areawide hospital districts are tax supported in Texas but aid supported in Georgia. The only generalization holding true across regions seems to be that uni-functional highway and housing and urban renewal districts have no support from taxes while library districts derive over 90 percent of their fiscal support from taxes.

In regional terms, special districts receive about a third of their revenues from tax sources in the North Central, South, and West. In the Northeast, only 2 percent of revenues comes from tax sources. Intergovernmental aid, on the other hand, is more pronounced in the Northeast, North Central, South, and West, respectively (see Table II-18).

Table II-18

**Composition of Revenue Sources,
Selected Areawide Districts 72 Largest
SMSA's: 1970**

Region*	Revenue Sources		
	Taxes (%)	Non-Taxes (%)	Aid (%)
Northeast	2	77	21
North Central	31	50	19
South	32	56	12
West	33	61	6

*See Appendix Table II-1 for States in each region.

Analyzing the form of intergovernmental assistance also uncovers regional and functional variations. Northeastern special districts frequently receive assistance from all three levels of government, whereas North Central and Western districts commonly receive aid either (1) solely from Federal sources or (2) from both State and Federal governments. A variety of funding arrangements exists in the South, with no one clear arrangement predominating. A breakdown of funding patterns appears in Table II-19.

Analyzing the form of aid support, it appears that housing and urban renewal districts are basically federally funded; transit authorities and sewage and sanitation districts are funded from combined Federal and State aid; some hospital districts receive most of their aid from State sources. Local support predominates in selected sewage and hospital districts.

Most special districts spend over one-half of their funds for capital purposes. Indeed, one-quarter of all areawide districts spend over 75 percent of their monies for capital requirements. In regional terms, large expenditure districts predominate in the Northeast and West.

Average expenditure and average indebtedness for districts in those regions are considerably higher than in the other two areas. Table II-20 notes the regional variation in selected expenditure items. The data suggest that areawide districts have a more pronounced fiscal impact in the Northeast and West than elsewhere.

On a functional basis, highway, transit, and utility districts are among those with the highest average debt. Natural resource, hospital and health, parks and recreation, and library districts have relatively low amounts of outstanding debt. Looking at the breakdown between capital and current expenditure, highway and housing and urban renewal districts exhibit the most capital-intensive operations, whereas library and natural resource districts tend to exhibit high proportions of current expenditures.

Areawide special districts face several types of fiscal controls, though the nature of these controls varies from region to region and among different types. As already noted, most areawide districts in the Northeast lack the power of taxation, but chargeback assessments exist in some. Consequently these jurisdictions rely heavily on user charge financing. Multifunctional and transportation districts also generally lack the independent power of taxation. Most human resource districts and those outside of the Northeast, however, have such powers.

Other areawide districts, however, face different types of fiscal controls. Sixty-three percent of Western areawide districts can only issue their obligations after a local referendum. Similar restrictions face districts which have public utility responsibilities or which incur substantial amounts of public debt. It should be noted that these reductions apply more forcefully to all units of general purpose governments. ACIR data reveal that 33 States require a referendum for all general purpose local governments for issuance of general obligation long-term debt; seven states require a referendum for certain general purpose local governments; and only ten States do not require a referendum for any general purpose governments with few exceptions.⁶⁶ Well over half of all special districts have interest rate limitations on their funded obligations, the practical effect of which is to keep these jurisdictions from issuing debt in times when interest rates are prohibitive (see Table II-21).

Other Characteristics

Further legislative analysis of areawide units indicates that over two-thirds can exercise eminent domain; almost all large, areawide special districts have this power. In like manner, two-thirds of all units are granted the power to enter intergovernmental agreements with other units of local government. In other areas, however, special districts are relatively free from specific legislative controls. Only 22 percent have direct legislative provisions for holding hearings relative to their operations; 24 percent have provisions authorizing or requiring a professional manager; and less than ten percent

Table II-19

**Intergovernmental Aid Sources,
Selected Areawide Districts 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970**

Funding Arrangement	Region*				
	Northeast	North Central	South	West	Total
Districts Receiving Aid	10	25	9	21	65
Federal Aid Only	0	8	0	5	13
State Aid Only	1	6	1	3	11
Local Aid Only	3	2	2	1	8
Federal, State Only	1	6	1	6	14
Federal, Local Only	0	1	1	0	2
State, Local Only	1	2	3	3	9
Federal, State, Local	4	0	1	3	8
Percent Distribution by Region					
Federal Aid Only	0%	32%	0%	24%	20%
State Aid Only	10	24	11	14	17
Local Aid Only	30	8	22	5	12
Federal, State Only	10	24	11	29	22
Federal, Local Only	0	4	11	0	3
State, Local Only	10	2	33	14	14
Federal, State, Local	40	0	11	14	12
Total	100	100	100		100

*See Appendix Table II-1 for States included in each region.

have mandated civil service requirements. Thus, while areawide districts frequently face controls with regard to their creation, representation, and fiscal activities, there appears to be no extensive personnel or procedural controls over other selected aspects of their operations.

CONCLUSION

Special district proliferation has been a continuing trend in American federalism during the past 20 years. All three levels of government have contributed, in some measure, to this development. Despite the intergovernmental problems that special districts cause, these units have become a permanent fixture in most metropolitan areas. How they function and will be organized in the future is still open to question. How that question is to be answered, in turn, will be a key factor in the future form of American systems of metropolitan governance.

This background analysis of special districts, however, permits the following observations:

- Over the past 20 years, special districts have increased by 93.6 percent, far exceeding the growth of any other unit of local government.

Federal grant-in-aid policies have encouraged district formation. State legislation authorizing creation of districts has been notably lenient, and local governments have spurred district establishment when these mechanisms deal with sensitive policy problems that general governments sometimes wish to avoid.

- Most special districts are still in non-metropolitan areas. Yet one-third of all such jurisdictions have been located in metropolitan areas since 1952. Special district proliferation, however, has been notable in such heavily urbanized States as California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.

- Functions relying heavily on special district operations include fire protection, soil conservation, drainage, water supply, and housing and urban renewal. Transit districts are becoming increasingly prevalent on the metropolitan scene.

- The rate of special district growth has caused parent units of government to take measures to control such growth. The Federal government has

Table II-20

**Expenditure Characteristics,
Selected Areawide Districts 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970**

Region*	Total Expend (000)	Percent Expenditure			Debt Outstanding (000,000)
		Current	Capital	Other	
Northeast	50,422	56	43	1	122
North Central	13,278	54	44	2	38
South	11,092	55	44	1	33
West	26,989	52	47	1	82

*See Appendix Table II-1 for States included in each region.

Table II-21

**Fiscal Controls,
Selected Special Districts in the 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970**

Characteristic	No. of Special Districts	Bonds		Power to Tax	Has Tax Exemption
		Fixed Interest Rates	Referenda		
Region*	94	56	30	50	23
Northeast	18	14	0	1	11
North Central	29	15	7	18	5
South	23	10	8	12	4
West	24	17	15	19	13
Function					
Multifunctional	9	7	4	5	2
Transportation	12	9	5	5	5
Natural Resources	16	8	5	10	3
Soil Conservation	14	2	1	2	1
Sewers	11	8	4	7	3
Utilities	9	8	6	6	2
Parks/Recreation	6	5	1	4	1
Housing/Renewal	3	2	0	1	1
Hospitals/Health	6	2	1	5	1
Other	8	5	3	5	4
Debt Size					
-\$10 Million	53	25	12	26	12
-\$10-24 Million	11	9	3	6	4
-\$25-49 Million	7	6	4	5	2
-\$50-99 Million	13	9	6	9	2
+\$100 Million	10	7	5	4	3
Type					
State	35	25	9	15	12
State-Local	23	9	3	9	3
Local	36	22	18	26	8

Source: ACIR Tabulation. *See Appendix Table II-1 for States included in each region.

taken steps to insure that general rather than special purpose units will be the prime recipients of grant money and a few States have created boundary commissions which have had some success in retarding special district growth. Neither the Federal nor State levels, however, has fully appraised the effects of special district creation on local systems of government in metropolitan areas.

— Regional special districts are becoming increasingly prominent in many of the country's metropolitan areas. Able to encompass many critical service problems, they often provide State and local officials with a convenient structural approach to a pressing regional problem. Their attractiveness lies in the facts that they are easy to establish; they do not radically alter local governmental structure; they can be a key to gradual establishment of regional governance procedures; and they can provide a factual clue as to what functions people deem to be regional in nature. On the other hand, these districts have been criticized

for being unaccountable, obstructive of general local government policy, and a hindrance to the development of minority political power.

— While areawide districts have seen their greatest numerical increase since 1957, most metropolitan areas have only one or two areawide units. Moreover, the structure and finances of areawide special districts exhibit considerable variation with regard to region, functional responsibility, and fiscal magnitude.

— Special districts exhibit a great deal of flexibility—they can be uni-functional or multi-functional; they can be coterminous with a unit of general local government or overlap its boundaries; they can have varying degrees of independence from local governing bodies; and they can frequently amend their boundaries to follow functional needs. Their functional, structural, fiscal, and territorial flexibilities insure that such units may continue to play a prominent role in most metropolitan governance systems.

Footnotes

¹U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967, I, Governmental Organization* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 13-41.

²Due to the unique features associated with the education function school districts cannot be compared uniformly with non-school districts.

³U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967, IV, Finances of Special Districts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 1.

⁴Max A. Pock, *Independent Special Districts: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problems* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Legal Publications, 1962), p. 10.

⁵Single-function categories include cemetery, school building, fire protection, health, hospital, highway, housing, drainage, library, other natural resources, parks and recreation, flood control, irrigation and water conservation, sewers, soil conservation, other general functions, water supply, electric power, gas supply, and transit. Multi-function districts include natural resources and water supply, sewer and water, and "other" multiple functions.

⁶U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967, I*, p. 5.

⁷U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967, I*, pp. 13-14.

⁸U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967, I*, p. 13.

⁹Robert G. Smith, as noted in, "Special Purpose Governments," *The American County*, November 1971, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰These factors are, for the most part, ones suggested in Robert G. Smith, *Public Authorities, Special Districts, and Local Government* (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties Research Foundation, 1964), pp. 13-14.

¹¹Thus, the Federal government in the recent 1972 Water Pollution Control Act Amendments has given considerable emphasis to using regional servicing devices in waste water treatment (Section 208 of P.L. 92-500). In similar manner,

States such as Washington and Colorado have pioneered in the development of the idea of multi-purpose metropolitan special districts as regional service devices.

¹²See Smith, *Public Authorities, Special Districts, and Local Government*, pp. 19-49; also Mabel Walker, "The Authority Device for Financing Public Works," *Tax Policy*, XXV, No. 12, December 1958.

¹³See Lennox L. Moak, *Administration of Local Government Debt* (Chicago: Municipal Finance Officers' Association, 1970), pp. 57 ff., for data on the debt characteristics of American special districts.

¹⁴See Paul Studenski, *The Government of Metropolitan Areas*, (New York: National Municipal League, 1930), p. 271.

¹⁵See Smith, *Public Authorities, Special Districts, and Local Government*, Chap. 6.

¹⁶See Smith, *Public Authorities, Special Districts, and Local Government*, p. 73; Edward Banfield, "The Political Implications of Metropolitan Growth," *Daedalus*, XC, Winter 1961, pp. 72, 74.

¹⁷John Bollens, *Special District Governments in the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), pp. 248 ff.

¹⁸See Metropolitan Study Commission, *Report on Sewage Disposal in the Milwaukee Metropolitan Area*, (Milwaukee, 1958), p. 64, and Governmental Functions Committee of the Capitol Regional Planning Agency, *Governmental Organizations for the Capitol Region* (Hartford: The Committee, 1967), pp. 15-3 to 15-4.

¹⁹Pock, *Independent Special Districts*, p. 40; see also Bollens, *Special District Governments in the United States*, pp. 66-67.

²⁰See Amos H. Hawley and Basil G. Zimmer, *The Metropolitan Community* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications Inc., 1972) pp. 103-111.

²¹"The Future of Districts: Strengthening Local Self-Government in Conservation and Resource Development," (Washington, D.C.: The National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts, 1968), p. 8.

²²Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Urban America and the Federal System*, M-47 (Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1969), p. 89.

²³Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government Organization and Planning*, A-20 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1964), p. 15.

²⁴See ACIR, *Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs*, pp. 45-184, for descriptions and evaluations of individual Federal programs.

²⁵ACIR, *Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs*, p. 23.

²⁶Robert G. Smith, *Public Authorities in Urban Areas* (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties Research Foundation, 1969), pp. 283-284.

²⁷U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I, pp. 420-421.

²⁸California Council on Intergovernmental Relations, *Allocation of Public Service Responsibilities* (Sacramento: Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970), p. 20.

²⁹David W. Tees, *Governmental Organization and Authority in Metropolitan Areas*, "A Fresh Look at Special Districts in Texas" (Arlington: University of Texas, 1971), p. 69.

³⁰California Council on Intergovernmental Relations, *Allocation of Services*, p. 20.

³¹Pennsylvania special districts increased from 34 to 1,398 between 1957 and 1962. However, this increase did not reflect a growth in these units in Pennsylvania, but rather a redefinition by the Census Bureau of special districts which caused units not previously considered special districts to be included in the 1962 data.

³²The 11 States are Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and Hawaii.

³³"The Commission recommends that States enact legislation to provide that no special district be created prior to review and approval of the proposed district by a designated agency consisting of representatives of the county or counties, within which the proposed district will operate. Agency decisions involving districts which would undertake functions of Statewide concern would not be created without State approval. The decision of the agency should be subject to court review." ACIR, *The Problem of Special Districts*, p. 75.

³⁴Acts establishing boundary commissions: California—California Government Code 54773-54799; Nevada—NRS 268-570-268.664; New Mexico—Chap. 291, Laws of 1956, Chap. 300, Laws of 1963, Chap. 248, Laws of 1967; Washington—Chap. 189, Laws of 1967; Oregon—ORS 199.410-199.540. Two additional States have enabling legislation to control the proliferation of special districts: Texas—Chap. 54, Municipal Utility Districts, Sec. 54.001; Colorado—Chap. 89, Art. 18 1-10.

³⁵Portland Metropolitan Area Local Government Boundary Commission, (Oregon) 1971 *Annual Statistic Summary*, p. 5.

³⁶Ronald C. Cease, *A Report on State and Provincial Boundary Review Boards* (Portland, Oregon: the Portland Metropolitan Study Commission, 1968), p. 36.

— ³⁷Melvin Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972), p. 15.

³⁸Refer to Footnote 5 for a classification of functions.

³⁹The eight States with no multiple function districts in 1972 were Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Mississippi, North Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

⁴⁰In California LAFCo's hold mandatory public hearings before a special district is created although all general special district legislation does not provide for hearings.

⁴¹Richard A. Lehmann, "A New Enabling Law for Metropolitan Sewerage Districts," *Wisconsin Counties*, June 1972, p. 2.

⁴²Don Koepf, "Nonpartisan Elections in the San Francisco Bay Area," *Public Affairs Report*, III, No. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Bureau of Public Administration, Au-

gust, 1962), p. 3, as cited in Stanley Scott and John Corzine, *Special Districts in the San Francisco Bay Area: Some Problems and Issues* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies, 1963), p. 2.

⁴³Stanley Scott and John Corzine, *Special Districts in the San Francisco Bay Area: Some Problems and Issues*, p. 2-3.

⁴⁴Portland State Research Bureau, *Voter Participation in Special Districts*, Report for Portland Metropolitan Study Commission (Portland, Oregon: Portland State Research Bureau, 1965), p. 6.

⁴⁵*The Register*, "22 District Directors Appointed" (Anaheim, Calif., October 15, 1969), p. 1, as cited in The Institute for Local Self Government, *Special Districts or Special Dynasties?* (Claremont Hotel, Berkeley: Institute for Local Self Government, 1970), p. 20.

⁴⁶James Carberry, "Special Districts: Forgotten Governments," *Riverside Press-Enterprise*, March 13, 1968, as cited in *Special Districts or Special Dynasties?*, p. 23.

⁴⁷1967 San Diego County Grand Jury *Final Report*, County of San Diego, California, 1967, p. 26, as cited in *Special Districts or Special Dynasties?*, p. 23.

⁴⁸Samuel E. Wood and Alfred E. Heller, *The Phantom Cities of California* (Sacramento: California Tomorrow, 1963), p. 46, as cited in *Special Districts or Special Dynasties?*, p. 23.

⁴⁹California Assembly Interim Committee on Water, *Water District Organization*, Assembly Interim Committee Reports, 1963-1965, XXVI, No. 14, (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1965), p. 15, as cited in *Special Districts or Special Dynasties?*, p. 24.

⁵⁰ACIR has recommended that States enact legislation which would require local governments to provide an itemized list of special districts' property taxes and special assessments levied against property.

The Commission recommends that States enact legislation requiring counties and municipalities, when sending out their property tax bills or providing receipts, to include in each individual property owner's bill or receipt an itemization of special district property taxes and special assessments levied against the property. At the same time, counties and municipalities should, in preparing annual reports of their operations, include pertinent information on activities of all special districts operating within the territory of the county or municipality.

ACIR, *The Problem of Special Districts in American Government*, p. 81.

⁵¹ACIR, *The Problem of Special Districts in American Government*, p. 81.

⁵²ACIR, *State-Local Finances: Significant Features and Suggested State Legislation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table III.

⁵³Robert G. Smith, *Public Authorities in Urban Areas*, pp. 241-298.

⁵⁴Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Designing A State Controlled Metropolitan Government," presented before the New York State Commission on the Powers of Local Government, Albany, New York, March 15, 1971.

⁵⁵State of New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission, *Solid Waste: A Coordinated Approach* (Trenton, NJ: The Commission, September 1972), p. 32.

⁵⁶The Metropolitan Council Act, Minnesota Statutes 1971, Chapter 473B.

⁵⁷Colorado, Service Authority Act of 1972, Chapter 89.

⁵⁸Thomas P. Murphy, *Metropolitica and the Urban County* (Washington, D.C.: Washington National Press, Inc., 1970), p.15.

⁵⁹League of Women Voters, "City-County Consolidation" (Portland, Oregon: The League, September 1970), pp. 6-11.

⁶⁰Dale Rogers Marshall, "Metropolitan Government: Views

of Minorities," *Minority Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Inc., 1972); William H. Cape, *et al.*, *Government by Special Districts*, The University of Kansas Publications Governmental Research Series No. 37 (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas, 1969); and Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, *Special Districts in Kentucky*, Research Report No. 48 (Frankfort, Kentucky: The Commission, 1968).

⁶¹Allen M. Wakstein, "Boston's Search for a Metropolitan Solution," *The Journal of American Institute of Planners*, XXVIII, No. 5, September 1972, p. 293; Metropolitan District Study Committee, *Report on the Metropolitan District Commission* (Hartford: Metropolitan District Study Commission, 1965); and Metropolitan Study Commission, *Report on Sewage Dispo-*

sal in the Milwaukee Metropolitan Area (Milwaukee: The Commission, 1958).

⁶²See Robert G. Smith, *Public Authorities in Urban Areas*, pp. 299-392.

⁶³"Regionalism and Greener Grass," *Washington Post*, December 21, 1972, No. 16, p. A14.


⁶⁴Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 119.

⁶⁵These districts are "large" areawide districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas which cover at least the central county and which have either current revenue or expenditures in excess of \$500,000 or outstanding long-term debt in excess of \$5 million.

⁶⁶ACIR, *State-Local Finances: Significant Features and Suggested Legislation* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 160-161.

CHAPTER III

A REGIONAL COUNCIL PROFILE



This chapter examines the evolution, structure, and functions of multi-functional substate regional bodies. The focal point is both on traditional regional or areawide planning agencies or commissions, and on more recent councils or conferences of local governments or local elected officials. Some attention is also given to those local or economic development district organizations and other hybrid areawide bodies that take on the characteristics of regional planning commissions or councils of governments.

ORGANIZATIONAL DISTINCTIONS

While sharing certain common features, the various types of regional organizations considered in this chapter have some distinguishing features.

Those agencies termed councils, associations, or conferences of local governments or local elected officials are commonly known as councils of governments, or COG's. They are generally defined as multi-functional voluntary regional associations of elected local officials or of local governments represented by their elected officials.¹ The governing body of a COG is composed predominantly of the chief elected officials of the member political jurisdictions, and at least part of its funds come from local public sources.²

In broader terms, a council of governments may be viewed as an organizational device for bringing together, at regular intervals and on a voluntary basis, representatives of the local governments within a given area to discuss common problems, exchange information, and develop consensus on policy questions of mutual interest. Typically, a COG has no governmental powers or operating responsibilities. Since it has no authority to compel either participation, attendance, or acquiescence in policy decisions, its existence rests explicitly on the good will of the constituent local governments.³ Some COG's are based on general State legislation authorizing interlocal planning, contracts, agreements, or joint exercise of powers arrangements; others on a specific enabling act; and still others on no formal express or implied State permissive action. COG's, then, basically embody a confederal approach to areawide coordination.

Metropolitan, regional, areawide, or joint planning agencies or commissions (RPC's or RPA's) sometimes are defined in terms of the representation on their governing bodies. Instead of elected local officials, their members are citizens appointed by the State government or localities involved. RPC's are public planning bodies authorized by the State legislature, and a number serve as official State agencies under a specific act or general enabling legislation. These organizations are primarily responsible for comprehensive planning, traditionally with an emphasis on land-use planning or the coordination of local plans.⁴

Regional planning commissions come in three basic varieties.⁵ Generally regarded as the oldest form is the county planning commission, which dates to at least 1922. Of more recent vintage are city-county planning commissions, established jointly by the county and its central city. The most common form in metropolitan areas is the multi-jurisdictional planning commission, which is sponsored by two or more municipalities and/or counties.

County planning commissions generally include representatives of official county agencies (county planning boards, commissions, agencies, or departments) and a few other bodies which have assumed other county designations. They receive all of their local revenues from the county, and their members are selected by the county governing body. City-county planning commissions may accept funds and include spokesmen from constituent agencies of county government, but they also receive substantial revenues from cities, have governing body members appointed by both city and county governments, and serve both county and city. Multi-jurisdictional planning commissions include not only multi-county bodies, but also commissions encompassing cities and towns in States with no or only weak county governments.

Development district agencies are generally defined in terms of the organizational bases provided by the Appalachian Regional Development and the Public Works and Economic Development Acts of 1965 and implementing regulations and guidelines, but many have assumed characteristics normally attributed to COG's and/or RPC's. In addition, some "development districts" are designated and defined under State rather than Federal legislation. These two types of development districts are included as a category for examination in this chapter in terms of their COG- or RPC-type features, while Chapter VI looks at them in greater depth.

Hybrid areawide organizations are those which possess attributes not generally associated with COG's or RPC's, but which still can be characterized as essentially fitting their definitions. Also included are bodies which represent unusual attempts at institutionalized multi-jurisdictional planning cooperation, such as the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council. Only passing historical attention is devoted to strictly private efforts at regional planning and coordination.

The term "regional council" is used throughout this chapter as a generic identifier for COG's and RPC's. This grouping is based primarily on their common distinguishing characteristics as examples of the confederal approach to interlocal coordination. Since the mid-1960's, many of the older traits that differentiated these bodies have disappeared. As procedural devices, both COG's and RPC's generate a multi-jurisdictional regional apparatus to deal with common problems on an areawide scale.

REGIONAL CONFEDERALISM: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The confederal approach embodied in councils of governments and regional planning commissions involves the association of general purpose local governments in a given area for common purposes which are not merely temporary. Although local governments often have joined together formally and informally to achieve mutual objectives, the relationship was usually limited in terms of the number of participants, the scope of activity, and the duration of the arrangement. By contrast, the confederalism of COG's and RPC's is characterized by a more comprehensive definition of common interests and problems, a more conscious division of responsibility between the areawide body and its constituent localities, and a more continuous regional-local and interlocal interaction. Under this confederal approach, there is a multi-purpose or multi-functional focus to the alliance.

Regional confederalism, then, is a largely voluntary interlocal compact or covenant to promote common interests without the individual member units subordinating any of their essential powers or autonomy to the areawide body. Confederal arrangements such as COG's and RPC's serve as catalysts in encouraging members to act jointly to meet areawide needs or implement comprehensive or functional plans. They cannot bind their members or non-members to policy decisions nor compel them to take implementing action. COG's and RPC's are not units of government in the legal sense, since as a rule they lack the power to tax or exercise eminent domain and have no legislative or administrative powers. Their powers are mainly advisory, and their services or assistance to members are usually limited to "software" functions such as planning, technical assistance, and joint purchasing.

Though voluntary in nature, COG's and RPC's gain a quasi-compulsory quality, from State and Federal areawide planning and clearinghouse requirements, since involvement brings certain advantages in grantsmanship and nonparticipation could result in a loss of eligibility for certain grants or unfavorable clearinghouse reviews of local project applications. But, even in this context, an element of voluntarism remains as long as there is no sanction by which acquiescence in policy decisions or action programs can be secured. The most basic vestiges of voluntarism disappear only when, by external intervention or otherwise, membership is mandated and a strong element of central coercion is introduced into implementation. At such a point, confederalism melds into a stronger, more authoritative approach to areawide organization and action.

COG's and RPC's are essentially a device for incremental local adaptation to changing needs. Structural modifications are only incidental to the confederal approach, as witnessed by its traditional reliance on a

consensual decision-making procedure aimed at facilitating rather than enforcing the resolution of areawide issues. As an attempt to pursue a "rational" course of regional action without infringing on the political traditions and powers of individual communities, COG's and RPC's represent a procedural effort at balancing local independence and areawide interdependence.

Confederal regionalism, then, derives its legitimacy from the participating local governments. It may or may not involve strictly indigenous voluntary local initiative and support, but it does depend upon voluntary compliance for the implementation of decisions, policies, and plans. Although State enabling legislation may convey certain powers and A-95 clearinghouse designation may lend an aura of authority in the Federal grant process, COG's and RPC's exercise not much more power over the affairs of the constituent local governments than their members allow, both collectively and individually.

Regional Confederalism in Historical Perspective

The genesis of confederal regional organization is found in earlier 20th century attempts to discover an efficient structure for achieving economies of scale in public service delivery while taking into account the complexity and diversity of areawide needs and local interests. With the increased recognition of local interdependence over the last 50 years, COG's and RPC's have been accepted as a useful procedural device, short of structural change, through which common areawide objectives may be pursued. Their popularity reflects a growing awareness that local government fragmentation can be seriously dysfunctional, particularly in light of the increasing centrifugal force of suburbanization.

The Metropolitan Influence

The evolution of COG's and RPC's has been largely bound up in a long-standing trend toward regional planning, particularly for metropolitan areas. Especially since the 1930's, the scale of planning has been expanded geographically to include the "regional city"—the total metropolis—and the scope has been broadened functionally to encompass socio-economic as well as physical factors. Paralleling this development has been a growing concern for the practical and political implications of regional planning, and for the consequent need to bring planning into closer contact with the day-to-day affairs of local governments. To some, areawide planning has come to mean interlocal coordination of public and private community development programming, necessitating a regional mechanism for making policy decisions influencing various separate, but interdependent forces in the area.

During the late 19th century, the proliferation of local governments had diffused public power and allowed much of the initiative in development decisions to fall to the private sector. By the 1920's, a number of

planners and city and county chief executives saw the need for officially sanctioned planning on an interlocal basis. Yet the quasi-independent advisory planning commissions that were formed embracing the concepts of progressive political reform and scientific management did not flourish. Rather, they were allotted minimal budgets, sufficient only for an emphasis on one-shot plans by itinerant consultants. At the metropolitan level, planning efforts usually were carried out by private groups, until the 1950's, when the Federal government entered the picture with ongoing financial support for regional planning by public bodies.

Explicit Federal interest in metropolitan planning began as early as the 1920's, heightened during the 1930's, and was legislatively reinforced by the Housing Act of 1949. But it was the report of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs and the passage of Section 701(d) of the 1954 Housing Act that ushered in substantive Federal financial support. At that point, it became avowed Federal policy to grant matching financial assistance directly to metropolitan and regional planning agencies. Section 701 funds have been used increasingly to encourage comprehensive planning on a metropolitan scale and to strengthen both metropolitan and non-metropolitan planning agencies.

During the 1960's, the growth of COG's was in some respects a reaction to the controversy over regional plan implementation. Traditionally, RPC's had been mandated to plan, coordinate, make policy, and guide development, yet they had not been accorded the essential political ingredients necessary for implementation. Prior to the administrative promulgation of Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, few RPC's had been given power to review or comment on applications for local, State, or federally supported projects. Even fewer had mandatory referral power over local plans, and RPC adoption of a plan rarely had the effect of making it "official" in a legal sense.

Even with Federal financial support, many RPC's were still faced with a remoteness from the local political decision-makers that inhibited effective areawide action. It became apparent to a number of those involved in largely frustrated efforts at regional planning implementation that the full range of regional planning objectives could not be accommodated within most existing local political systems, and that traditional RPC's had very real legitimacy problems. Without political communication on a continuing basis, the political acceptability and clout needed to implement plans could not be achieved. The result was a call for political regionalism—pressure to make metropolitan planning more a part of the political process.

In sum, there has been an incremental shift of regional planning activity and responsibility, from private sector and good government group efforts to

semi-public, quasi-independent appointed citizens planning commissions. Then, more or less simultaneously, areawide planning was undertaken by appointed generalist public commissions and by more functionally specialized agencies. Finally, beginning in the mid-1960's, there was a shift toward the generalist and elected-official-oriented organization for regional planning, coordination, and implementation—the regional council.

The Ambivalent Federal Role

Regional confederalism has evolved into an important instrument of Federal policy, particularly in metropolitan areas. The intervention of the Federal government has transformed areawide confederalism from a wholly independent undertaking to a largely federally financed surrogate for metropolitan government. As the Federal government has become a preeminent actor with regard to the issues of regional governance, COG's and RPC's have been the beneficiaries (or victims) of increased, although disjointed, Federal attention, including financial assistance for regional and metropolitan planning and review requirements for certain local assistance.

The "701" program has not been the only federally initiated force behind regional councils. They also have been sustained by Federal grant-in-aid programs such as those for law enforcement, health, manpower, and transportation planning. There have been more requirements for functional coordination than for cooperation on a broader jurisdictional basis. In their impact on RPC's particularly, functional planning requirements have not always helped promote a general areawide frame of reference. Rather, they have often reinforced conflict between different functional planning hierarchies or have led to the establishment of separate planning bodies. The Federal government considers some metropolitan planning commissions simultaneously as special purpose organizations serving particular clientele groups and as coordinating mechanisms in developing comprehensive regional frameworks for local and special district plans. It has viewed others as irrelevant in areawide planning or programming or as merely weak competitors of another, preferred mechanism. This dichotomy has been compounded over time by a proliferation of additional federally supported regional functional planning programs.

As evolutionary institutions, then, COG's and RPC's have made internally initiated adjustments and have been altered by externally imposed requirements affecting them both directly and indirectly through their member governments. Their adaptive reactions to externally directed change have altered both their organizational formats and program priorities. In a certain sense, they are no longer exclusively local confederations. By means of financial assistance and planning as well as

clearinghouse requirements, the Federal government has become a major partner in these areawide alliances. Not only do most COG's and RPC's receive the bulk of their financial support for areawide planning from Federal sources, but also they have been vested by A-95 with a new quasi-authority in the Federal grant system.

The historical description and analysis of the confederal approach in this chapter is organized chronologically, based primarily on certain benchmarks in the evolution of Federal policy toward COG's and RPC's, particularly during the post-World-War-II period. These reference points include the Housing Acts of 1954, 1959, 1961, and 1965; the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966; and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968. Although alternative policy landmarks could have been logically selected, these Federal enactments provide a meaningful basis for organizing the chapter materials into manageable segments.

The early, wholly voluntary phase of confederalism in the New Deal era is covered in a summary fashion to provide an historical background. The immediate post-war period of metropolitan expansion and increased local concern about areawide problems is then presented briefly, ending with the Federal entrance onto the scene through Section 701(d). The late 1950's witnessed significant amendments to the "701" program and the enactment of the Interstate Highway and Defense Act. The Housing Act of 1959 modified Section 701 to provide the first legislative definition of comprehensive planning. Physical planning and capital improvement were the main elements stressed. These and other legislative developments set the stage for increasing Federal emphasis on metropolitan planning during the early 1960's, as exemplified by the joint efforts, beginning late in 1959, of the Housing and Home Finance Agency and the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) at supporting metropolitan planning.

The early 1960's represent the formative period in Federal functional planning requirements policy, involving the mass transit and open space programs of the Housing Act of 1961 and the transportation programs of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. By mid-decade, the Federal emphasis reflected more of a generalist approach, embodied in Section 701(g) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 and Sections 204 and 205 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. However, an accompanying proliferation of new functionally oriented Federal planning assistance programs lends an ambivalent quality to this period. Then the administrative implementation of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 at the end of the decade, provided a potential for renewed gener-

alist impact in the context of functional programs for the 1970's.

Within this chronological framework, certain topics are used to establish a context for the examination of trends relating to the confederal approach. The salient features are treated as basically structural-organizational, functional, or fiscal. Under these three general descriptive headings, there is an attempt to determine what themes, if any, exist as a basis for analysis. The factors involved in structural-organizational analysis are methods of establishment, legal bases, membership and representation, voting arrangements, general organization, and staffing. The fiscal rubric is used to treat funding arrangements, including financial relationships with Federal, State, and local governments. The functional side involves the activities of COG's and RPC's, such as communications, planning, coordination, grant review, and service delivery.

The Confederal Approach: Pre-1945 Developments

Public regional planning commissions and councils of governments are a recent phenomenon in the United States, although regional planning and areawide performance of public services are rooted in Colonial town planning and subdivision control and early county road and bridge construction and maintenance. During the 19th century, however, this earlier agrarian concern for integration of the area of urban settlement with its surrounding farmlands was overshadowed by the American industrial revolution, immigration, and the great westward expansion. Only with increasing recognition of the public service needs created by dense urban settlement was regional planning reborn toward the end of the century.

During the early years of the 20th century, the City Beautiful Movement established planning as an official function of local governments. As industrial suburbs arose, planners, politicians, and businessmen saw the need for metropolitan land-use planning. In 1902, a Boston Metropolitan Improvement Commission was created, possessing comprehensive regional planning responsibilities.⁶ In 1909, the Plan of Chicago, which was a private undertaking, placed the city in its regional context and pointed out the need for control over development beyond city limits.⁷ From 1913 until 1915, Pennsylvania law authorized a Suburban Metropolitan Planning Commission to levy assessments and prepare

coordinated, comprehensive plans of highways and roads, parks and parkways, and all other means of inter-communication, water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal, collection and disposal of garbage, housing, sanitation and health, playgrounds, civic centers, and other public improvements for a district

encompassing more than 130 local governments within a 25-mile radius of Philadelphia.⁸

In New York, the Committee on Regional Plan of New York and its Environs, a private group, worked from 1921 until 1929 to produce a plan for the 5,528-square-mile and 500-incorporated-community area. The document emphasized transportation planning and the decentralization of commercial and industrial centers.⁹ In 1922, the first metropolitan county planning commission was established in Los Angeles, California, to serve as an advisory body to the County Board of Supervisors in executing their planning responsibilities for the entire habitable region of the county and their control over platting in all of its unincorporated places.¹⁰

By the 1920's, the country was fully into the voluntary phase of metropolitan planning under both governmental and private auspices. While regional planning was emerging as a private foundation or civic club endeavor in New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Minneapolis-St. Paul, in 1923 the Ohio legislature provided the first enabling legislation for joint planning arrangements between local governments. The same year, the quasi-public Chicago Regional Planning Association was formed as an organization of "sovereign municipal bodies," and the Allegheny County Planning Commission (Pittsburgh) was created officially after five years of unofficial status as part of the County Department of Public Works. In 1924, the Milwaukee County Regional Planning Department was converted from a branch of the county highway commissioner's office. At least 11 other new county, city-county, and multi-county planning agencies were established from 1924 to 1929.¹¹

Although councils of local governments or elected officials are generally thought to be post-World-War-II phenomena in this country, there is some evidence that the idea was put into practice when some of the early metropolitan planning commissions were being created.¹² For example, a Cleveland metropolitan council composed of the chief executives of the principal municipalities in the area was set up in 1925 on the initiative of Cleveland's city manager. The council met informally in the city manager's office and soon became the parent of the Greater Cleveland Transportation Committee, with representatives from Cleveland and its three principal suburbs. In 1933, the Cuyahoga County Mayors and City Managers Association was organized in the same area to promote intergovernmental cooperation among its 57 municipalities. Similarly, an Allegheny County (Pennsylvania) League of Municipalities was formed in 1929.¹³

By the end of the 1920's, metropolitan and county planning was a major topic of concern among professional planners. Many city planning commissions found that central city development plans ignored the

surrounding local governments and that regional planning and cooperative political solutions were required. Some saw the need for an agency empowered to take an overall view of serious problems besetting the entire metropolitan area.

Regionalism During the Depression

In the later 1920's the concept of the "regional city" had been introduced by the Regional Planning Association of America. During the 1930's, the Great Depression fostered an interest in economic planning. The scope of urban planning also expanded as a result of the National Resources Planning Board's calling for planning on a scale capable of comprehending the forces at work on the city and of influencing the form of future development.

The initial Depression years witnessed a downturn in multi-jurisdictional planning efforts, as "economy" groups were often successful in deactivating regional planning bodies or in cutting their staffs. With the advent of the Public Works Administration and its National Planning Board (NPB) in 1933, however, regionalism began to gain ground. The \$3.3-billion Federal public works program—with its planning requirements, federally sponsored State and multistate planning programs, and concern with housing issues, county zoning, and the satellite city concept—had a significant impact on the revival of regional planning.

Federal requirements relating to metropolitan planning began in 1933 with the first circular of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works (APW), which specified the relation of local public works projects to coordinated planning as a test for funding eligibility. The second APW circular prescribed that loan applications indicate whether they had a regional planning board, whether the proposed project had been submitted to this body, and what its views were regarding the application. A copy of the planning board's report had to be attached to the application, with a statement as to whether the community was part of a metropolitan district, and if so whether the proposed project was coordinated with plans for metropolitan development.

The NPB was also at work promoting urban, metropolitan, State, and interstate planning. On the interstate level, it encouraged the creation of the four-State Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission which in turn provided the stimulus for the formation of 226 local planning commissions. On the State level, under the Pacific Northwest umbrella, the Montana Planning Board promoted planning in districts as well as in counties. In the metropolitan context, the NPB gave its blessing to the bi-State St. Louis Regional Planning Commission, which it hoped would inspire similar efforts nationwide. Composed of representatives appointed by the governing

authorities of St. Louis and the interstate metropolitan area's seven counties, the Commission was provided a planning staff by emergency relief agencies. In 1936, it recommended establishment of a five-member interstate compact agency with Federal participation to plan for and advise and cooperate in areawide development. Also significant for the future was the work of the NPB (by then the National Resources Committee) Research Committee on Urbanism, whose formation in 1935 signaled a realization by important Federal officials that physical planning should be based on economic, social, and political considerations and that urban planning should be integrated with regional and State planning.

Due in large measure to the impetus of Federal public works and relief programs, between 1934 and 1939 metropolitan planning organizations became fairly widespread. In 1934, there were only 85 metropolitan multicounty and county planning bodies and 23 regional planning agencies in existence. By January 1937, there were 506 metropolitan multicounty and county planning agencies, of which at least 316 were official public bodies. Two years later, metropolitan planning agencies or regional planning boards, commissions, or associations were operating in at least 30 major cities. In addition to these metropolitan developments, by the close of the decade areawide planning also had been extended to a number of smaller urban areas and several non-metropolitan regions.

World War II and the Beginnings of a New Era

Despite the demands of a war-time economy and the Federal government's ambivalence toward planning (evidenced by the abolition of the National Resources Planning Board in 1943), the post-Depression resurgence of long-range regional planning continued to gain ground during the first half of the 1940's. Urban blight and the rapid growth of suburbs, the enactment of airport construction and emergency housing programs, and the consequences of prior failures to plan for and coordinate the development of public transportation, water supply, and sewer systems contributed to a renaissance in planning and a renewed search for solutions to metropolitan problems.

The war years witnessed the creation of at least seven new public regional planning bodies, as well as the formation or reactivation of a number of areawide citizen planning committees. Most of the public regional planning agencies established through the mid-1940's were organized on a county basis, which seemed the most advantageous political unit for that purpose. Despite this political boundary alignment, by the close of the war years few regional planning agencies had progressed beyond the organizational stage or had any staff or facilities to undertake an active work program. Constrained by limited funds, only a small number attempted to use their advisory powers to direct

development, and those which did so often were frustrated in their efforts by decisions beyond their control.

This era also gave birth to a number of private regional planning councils. In 1943, the Allegheny Conference on Community Development was established in the Pittsburgh area. This association of individual leaders in business, labor, and government relied on the privately financed Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association for research and studies and on the Pittsburgh Civic-Business Council for its annual \$50,000 budget. A year later, similar organizations were formed in the San Francisco, St. Louis, Boston, Cincinnati, and Kansas City areas. The bi-State Kansas City Citizens Regional Planning Council, for example, included the mayors and chamber of commerce presidents of four cities and was financed mainly by some 200 business firms. It fostered the creation of affiliated local planning councils in at least five of the region's municipalities, and successfully supported bond issues for public improvement projects it proposed.

Perhaps more important for the future than the creation of a handful of new regional planning bodies in the post-war period was the rising concern for community participation in the planning process, growing support for a long-range approach to planned local and regional development, general strengthening and expansion of planning as a public function, absorption of State planning bodies within State development agencies, and the renewed search for new organizational solutions to metropolitan problems. Despite these accomplishments, however, the proliferation of planning efforts during the 1940's created severe problems in coordinating regional planning due to duplication of effort, overlapping surveys, and conflicting plans.

Early Post-War RPC's and COG's

The creation of the Central Lane Planning Council (now Lane Council of Governments) in November 1945 opened the post-World-War-II era of voluntary confederalism. Covering the single-county Eugene-Springfield metropolitan area in Oregon, it immediately conducted an areawide planning study in cooperation with the City of Eugene, setting a pattern for its future evolution as a planning-oriented council of local government officials. A second landmark of the period was the formation of the bi-county Atlanta Regional Metropolitan Planning Commission in 1947, the first official multicounty metropolitan planning organization supported entirely by public funds. Established in the same year were the Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, which was financed by voluntary contributions from both public and private sectors, the Northern Virginia Regional Planning and Economic Development Commission, and the multi-jurisdictional Regional Planning Commission of Reno, Sparks, and Washoe County, Nevada.

At the State level, in 1945 the Michigan legislature enacted a regional planning enabling act authorizing the State planning commission to create regional planning commissions encompassing homogeneous areas. By the close of the year, eight States had enabling legislation for joint or cooperative planning arrangements between two or more local governments. By the end of 1947, the number had risen to 11, but it was not until after 1955 that most States had adopted such laws.

At the Federal level, the Housing Act of 1949 vaguely required metropolitan planning as a condition for Federal financial assistance to urban redevelopment projects, and it directed the administrator of the new Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) to encourage the operation of local public agencies capable of contributing effectively to the solution of community development or redevelopment problems on a substate regional or unified metropolitan basis. Despite this congressional mandate for Federal promotion of metropolitan planning, HHFA's activities were confined to housing and slum clearance programs, leaving broad-scale Federal encouragement of metropolitan and regional planning to the future.

From 1947 through 1950, approximately 18 public regional planning bodies, in addition to the five already mentioned, joined the list of active agencies. By the mid-1950's, at least five more RPC's and a new council of governments, the Detroit area's Supervisors Inter-County Committee, had been organized. A November 1953 survey by the American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) estimated that there were between 35 and 40 official joint planning agencies, most of which had been formed since 1945. Of the 33 joint and cooperative planning agencies responding to the survey, 16 served regions under 150,000 population, indicating that only a limited number were at work in major metropolitan areas. Seven operated under arrangements involving a jointly funded central planning staff without any formal joint organization at the local governing body or planning commission level. Three acted under agreements involving a joint staff plus interlocking membership among the planning commissions of the participating units. More prevalent were joint commission agreements.

As was the case with their predecessors, few of the regional planning agencies formed during the 10 years following World War II proved capable of influencing directly the actions of their municipal and county governments. And, as a rule, they had no parallel metropolitan or areawide government to finance or carry out the proposals embodied in their long-range plans. Most were left to their own ingenuity in trying to overcome their legal and political handicaps. At best, they could work closely with the region's local governments to effect their decisions. Exceptions such as the Tulsa, Oklahoma, metropolitan planning commission, established in 1953 under a statute requiring city and

county governments to refer all proposed public improvement projects and new subdivision plans for its review and recommendations, were not copied elsewhere.

The general separation of the regional planning function from the implementation powers of general purpose local governments set the stage for the emergence of councils of governments. With the passage of a few favorable Federal and State laws and the creation of a number of new public regional planning bodies, the early post-war period set a pace for areawide confederalism which increased gradually in the late 1950's, then gathered momentum as Federal involvement picked up and COG popularity rose in the decade of the 1960's.

The Late 1950's: Background for the Rise of Confederalism

By the mid-1950's, the future Federal role in substate regionalism was beginning to take shape.¹⁴ A new Federal planning assistance program, under HHFA, stimulated communications between various governmental units and interest groups in metropolitan areas, while an older one, involving the Bureau of Public Roads and the States, became recognized as a significant potential Federal lever in promoting metropolitan planning. In some States a movement toward statewide delineation of substate regional planning jurisdictions was initiated and additional laws authorizing and supporting regional planning were enacted. Locally, the COG concept was gaining greater popularity in some major metropolitan areas.

THE ADVENT OF "701"

In 1955, at least four additional regional planning bodies were established, reflecting an increasing local interest in metropolitan planning following passage of the Housing Act of 1954.¹⁵ Section 701 of this new Federal legislation provided 50-50 matching grants-in-aid for planning on a metropolitan basis by official State, metropolitan, or regional planning agencies. Although at first it tended to foster a substantial increase in individual municipal planning activity rather than to initiate much planning on a metropolitan basis, eventually some of the "701"-funded metropolitan planning programs furthered interlocal confederalism.

The first regional agencies to take advantage of the new planning assistance program were those already in business under the authority of State laws, since they had both a legal base and matching funds. In the first year after passage of the Act, only six official metropolitan planning agencies and three urban regional planning bodies benefitted from "701" assistance. It was not until December 1957 that "701" applications on hand exceeded available funds. By the fall of 1959, there

were so many requests for aid that funding limitations based on population had to be set for each State.

Another significant feature of the Act was the requirement that as a condition for urban renewal assistance, localities put into operation "workable programs for community improvement," including long-range general plans of land use, transportation, and public facilities. Urban renewal plans were to conform to the workable program and to the general plan of the community as a whole. Although not specifically directed at metropolitan planning, the requirement for a general plan proved a boost for the regional perspective in some areas. A few regional planning agencies developed contractual arrangements with eligible local governments for elements of urban renewal planning.

Section 702 of the Act established a program of advances for public works planning. Projects were required to conform to an overall State, local, or regional plan approved by a competent governing authority.

Although the "701" program provided a positive thrust for areawide confederalism, grants under this section were only for specific studies leading to comprehensive plans, not for continuing operation or overhead. The problem of stable financial support remained unresolved.

At least 13 States passed regional planning enabling acts in the three years following enactment of the 1954 Housing Act, setting the stage for a tremendous increase in the number of multi-jurisdictional planning organizations. During this period, the legislatures of at least nine of these States enacted legislation requiring or permitting the establishment of planning agencies for entire urbanized areas, and usually specifically empowering such agencies to apply for and receive Federal grants. Some States went so far as to adopt special acts creating planning commissions for certain metropolitan areas, and in the Baltimore region a State planning council was formed without legislation. Under the State general laws, a number of small metropolitan centers also formed official regional planning organizations.

Some variations in the traditional types of joint and regional planning bodies were established during the period immediately following initiation of the "701" program, totaling at least 13 in 1956 and 1957 alone. Among these were two early councils of governments, the New York Metropolitan Regional Council and the Puget Sound (Seattle) Governmental Conference. In Georgia, following passage of a 1957 act permitting locally organized local and joint planning commissions, some representatives of public utilities, universities, State government agencies, and other statewide organizations began selling the concept of regionalization as a way to revitalize the State's depopulated and economically stagnating areas. However, it was not until two years later that the first multicounty organization was formed in the Coosa Valley region around Rome,

Georgia. In 1960, the planning law was amended to permit local creation of area planning commissions by any combination of counties and cities, and the 11 Coosa Valley counties set up the first formal area planning and development commission. Meanwhile, in 1958, the Connecticut legislature had authorized the State Development Commission to establish regional planning areas and to assist regional planning agencies. And in 1959 the rather unique Penn-Jersey Transportation Study was established, involving the Federal government with the Pennsylvania and New Jersey State Highway Departments, the City of Philadelphia, and four neighboring counties in each State in a functional planning effort. It helped stimulate the formation of the Regional Council of Elected Officials in 1961 as a mechanism for focusing on the problems of the interstate metropolitan area.

Throughout the late 1950's, the number of metropolitan and regional planning agencies continued to increase despite Federal legislative setbacks and the fact that only 40 of these bodies had received "701" assistance by the close of fiscal year 1958. At least four new organizations were created in 1958, with an additional eight or more formed in 1959.

Reflecting its growing interest in local and regional planning, Congress in the Housing Acts of 1956 and 1957 amended the "701" program to permit grants to small cities struck by disaster, counties having populations of less than 25,000, and rural areas threatened with rapid urbanization due to the establishment or expansion of a Federal installation. After omnibus housing legislation failed in 1958 and was vetoed in 1959, the Housing Act of 1959 extended "701" assistance to cities, counties, or groups of adjacent communities with populations of less than 50,000, as well as to State planning agencies carrying out statewide or interstate comprehensive planning.

The Housing Act of 1959 represented the first major change in the "701" program, increasing its impact on regional planning. In addition to broadening eligibility for funds, it substituted "comprehensive" planning for "urban" planning as the activity to be assisted, and defined the former to include intergovernmental coordination of planning. It further required that, to the maximum extent feasible, Federally assisted planning cover entire urban areas having common or related development problems. In its Planning Agency Letter No. 14 (December 1959) implementing the new requirements the Housing and Home Finance Agency indicated that some local agency had to possess authority to plan in the entire common or related urban area, and that if no such agency existed it was the responsibility of the appropriate State agency to see that one was established or to work out some other satisfactory arrangement for assuring adequate coverage. While specific organizational requirements were left in the hands of the States, arrangements ranging from city-county or regional agen-

cies to more informal cooperative agreements among local jurisdictions were deemed by HHFA administrators to meet the intent of the Act.

Between the initiation of the "701" program in 1954 and the end of the decade, at least three dozen new metropolitan and regional planning organizations had been established and the way had been paved by new State legislation for the formation of many others. By the beginning of the 1960's official planning agencies operated on a metropolitan or regional basis in about half of the Nation's metropolitan areas (then 212) and in a number of non-metropolitan regions.

The Transportation Planning Challenge

As early as 1934, an attempt was made to provide Federal support for planning through Section 11 of the Hayden-Cartwright Act, which authorized the use of not more than 1.5 percent of Federal-aid highway funds for surveys, plans, and engineering investigations of projects for future construction. By 1939, this allocation had become obligatory, with States required to match the Federal planning funds. The result, however, was establishment of fact-finding highway planning surveys at the State level which were not really planning agencies. In the contest for funds, non-highway public officials exerted almost no appreciable influence on highway policy implementation. Although the "one-and-one-half percent" fund represented the largest potential source of Federal financial support for metropolitan planning, by the mid-1950's direct State cash contributions for this purpose were still limited in dollar amounts and were confined to a few States.

In this context, passage of the Interstate Highway and Defense Act of 1956 contributed to a sense of urgency for a Federal policy supporting regional planning in a particular functional area.¹⁶ Its absence of provisions for substantial participation in the highway planning process by affected localities generated pressure for the establishment of metropolitan regional councils to effectively harmonize Federal, State, and local highway and transportation programs in metropolitan areas.

By 1959, a number of metropolitan transportation plans had been undertaken by special transportation planning agencies. Some of these bodies were organized by State governments, while others were set up by localities. Highway plans in particular were often the product of State-agency-dominated *ad hoc* committees, mainly representing Federal, State, and local highway construction agencies. Out of this fragmented inter-governmental effort arose a concern for continuous integrated regional land-use and transportation planning supported by local policymakers in the metropolitan area. The scene was set for increased Bureau of Public Roads involvement in metropolitan planning.

Confederalism Emergent

Throughout the 1950's metropolitan government had been advanced by many observers as the only true remedy for the problems of agglomerating urban regions. Despite an avalanche of elaborate studies and well-documented proposals, the quest for metropolitan consolidation generally failed at the polls. Facing the absence of metropolitan governmental units, academics, planners, and local government officials began a new search for less drastic official governmental machinery to ensure coordinated local government action.

Federal legislative policy was evolving toward increased involvement in and support of metropolitan planning. Although fundamentally narrow-gauged, the housing and highway legislation of the period provided a public policy base for future legislative and executive branch action.

By the close of 1959, all but 16 States had statutes authorizing official regional planning in metropolitan areas. Seven States had laws requiring the organization of regional planning agencies, either for the entire State or for certain areas. Areawide confederalism rested on several types of legal base, and a few States were moving toward statewide regionalization.

By 1954, if not earlier, the COG had emerged as a procedural device for institutional adjustment among local governments to help meet common problems and needs through cooperative regional planning and policy making. During the late 1950's, interest in this approach grew substantially, partly in response to the record of defeat of city-county consolidation proposals. COG alliances represented an explicit rejection of regional "super-government," substituting loose confederalism for metropolitan government. At the same time, they were seen as providing a link between planning and the political process.¹⁷ By 1960, five COG's were in existence and others were on the drawing board.

The Early 1960's: Expanding the Federal Role

During the first half of the decade of the 1960's, the regional planning movement began to build on its considerable foundation as the Federal emphasis on metropolitan planning increased. This Federal interest was expressed not only in new legislation, but also in a spate of Presidential messages, congressional hearings, administrative arrangements and regulations, and research studies. Significant at the State level was a new trend toward substate regional division for planning, development, and administrative purposes. Not to be overlooked was a steadily rising interest in voluntary regional councils of elected officials among local governments and their national associations.

The Opening Years

The years 1961 and 1962 were big ones for substate regionalism in terms of both Federal programs and local official attitudes. In August 1961, regional councils were formally recognized for the first time by organizations representing the nation's local and State officials. The American Municipal Association (AMA) held a workshop on voluntary, multi-purpose regional governmental councils as a part of its national convention. At this meeting, continuing cooperation among the AMA, the Council of State Governments, the National Municipal League (NML), and the National Association of Counties (NACO) was urged in assisting and disseminating information to voluntary multi-purpose metropolitan organizations. At about the same time, NACO held a special workshop on this subject at its national conference and created a permanent committee on regional voluntary cooperation.¹⁸ Meanwhile, NML authorized its "All American Cities" award to be given for multi-jurisdictional attacks on metropolitan problems.

The Housing Act of 1961 expanded financial assistance to metropolitan areas for the preparation of comprehensive plans by raising the "701" authorization from \$20 million to \$75 million and the maximum Federal contribution from one-half to two-thirds of planning costs.¹⁹ The Act also authorized Federal grants or loans for mass transportation and open space programs for localities or groups of local governments engaged in planning in metropolitan areas. Furthermore, comprehensive planning for mass transportation was made eligible under "701", and a joint Federal effort in metropolitan planning assistance was undertaken when HHFA and the BPR funded a number of metropolitan land-use/transportation studies. By June 1964, 53 projects were underway in accordance with this arrangement.

Although progress toward widespread regional planning was still slow in some States and localities, by the early 1960's it appeared that the Federal government was seeking seriously to encourage planning on a metropolitan scale. Between 1955 and 1962, the number of grants approved for metropolitan planning under Section 701 increased from two to 53. At the same time, the "701" fund total soared from \$47,000 to \$6.5 million, with over one-third of the HHFA urban planning assistance appropriations used to support metropolitan planning efforts.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 further emphasized the Federal Government's interest in metropolitan planning by calling for the establishment of a cooperative, comprehensive, and continuous planning process as a prerequisite for Federal financial assistance to interstate highway development in metropolitan areas.²⁰ This legislation required the preparation of regional transportation and development plans in urban

areas of 50,000 or more population as a precondition for construction funds after June 1965, and also offered a "carrot" in the form of 70 percent matching grants to finance the necessary studies.

As the 1962 law became effective, a new set of planning activities developed and new types of planning agencies emerged. In some places, the transportation planning process was consolidated with the existing "701"-assisted agency, such as a metropolitan council of governments in Denver, Washington, and Detroit. In other areas, a special planning body was created to deal with transportation. And, quite frequently, mass transportation responsibility was given to a special purpose agency, such as the bi-state authority in Kansas City, not organizationally linked to either metropolitan comprehensive planning or to the transportation planning process. In Baltimore, for example, the State Roads Commission maintained control over highway planning separately from the Regional Planning Council.

Regional Agency Counting Begins

In response to numerous inquiries concerning the basic organization of metropolitan planning agencies, in 1962 the National Municipal League, in cooperation with ASPO, the Conference on Metropolitan Area Problems, and HHFA, prepared an annotated inventory of metropolitan, regional, and joint planning agencies. This survey listed 63 agencies in 26 States that were considered to have been created consciously on a multi-jurisdictional basis to serve several counties or municipalities, a combination of counties and municipalities, or a city and county jointly.²¹

About three-quarters of these agencies had been formed during the previous 10 years and over two-fifths had existed for five years or less, reflecting the upsurge in multi-jurisdictional planning after the inception of the "701" program. Although the range was considerable, the typical agency annual budget was less than \$100,000. Over a fourth had budgets of \$50,000 or less, which probably constrained their activities. Most agency jurisdictions encompassed populations of over 250,000, and one-third covered areas of more than half a million. The per capita agency budget for the smallest population area was about 31 cents, while for the largest it was less than six cents, suggesting that there may be some economies of scale in regional planning activities.

Reflecting the fact that over half of the agencies operated on a single county or smaller areal basis, nearly two-thirds had 16 or fewer members or delegates serving on their governing body, and well over one-third had a dozen or less. Most representatives were appointees of city, town, and county legislative bodies or chief executives. Some, however, were appointed by the State governor, or were chosen specifically to represent local planning boards, school districts, and other special districts and authorities. In relatively few cases were the

chief elected officials of member general purpose governments *ex officio* representatives.

Later the same year, ASPO published an inventory of eight councils of governments and gave its endorsement to voluntary governmental councils as a means of furthering the goals of metropolitan planning. Results from this survey are summarized with those from the inventory of multi-jurisdictional planning agencies in Table III-I. Despite the small number of COG's examined, the data indicated a tendency for these organizations to have larger areas and governing bodies but smaller budgets than the agencies listed in the survey of multi-jurisdictional planning bodies. The COG's, by definition, had a greater representation of elected officials from local general purpose governments, although some did include Federal and State officials as well as local non-elected officials.

The ASPO inventories proved to be the first of many surveys and studies of COG's during the decade of the 1960's. They signaled an emerging concern regarding the extent of regional planning and the nature of regional organization, structure, finances, staffing, and functions.

Federal Examination of Metropolitan Planning

Concerned with the potential of planning as a means of coordinating Federal programs and providing for a maximum degree of local government participation, in

1963 the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations sponsored an examination of the effectiveness of metropolitan planning.²² At about the same time, HHFA conducted the first national survey to ascertain the status of metropolitan planning,²³ and sponsored an in-depth study of local government adaptation to changing urban needs.²⁴ The next year, HHFA followed up with a second national survey, focusing on comprehensive transportation planning programs in light of the planning requirements of the Highway Act of 1962.²⁵

Based on the results of the 1963 *National Survey of Metropolitan Planning*, the typical metropolitan planning agency (including multi-jurisdictional planning agencies, city-county planning agencies, and county planning agencies) was about nine years old, and served an area of about 1,600 square miles with a 1960 population of approximately 772,000. Established by local resolution under a State enabling act, it had a 16-member commission serving for four-year terms. Its members were a combination of elected and appointed officials and private citizens selected by the governmental units represented. There was a fairly even distribution of elected and appointed officials, with county and city governments far more heavily represented than States, townships, and special districts. The average budget was \$137,000, with the Federal and county governments the largest contributors. The greatest portion of funds went for staff salaries, primarily for long-range planning

Table III-1

Characteristics of Multijurisdictional Planning Agencies and COG's 1962 ASPO Surveys

	(63) Area Planning Agencies	(8) Voluntary Metropolitan Governmental Councils
Age of Organization		
Average	9-1/2 years	3-3/4 years
Range	2 to 36 years	1 to 8 years
Number of Counties Served		
Average	1-3/4	7-1/2
Range	0 to 7	2 to 17
Number of Municipalities Served		
Average	6
Range	0 to 21
Number Operating Under State Enabling Legislation	6
Budget		
Average	\$120,000	\$29,691
Range	\$6,000 to \$950,000	\$14,400 to \$67,365

operations and general administration. The average staff size was 13 persons, with about one of every two staff members being a professional. Metropolitan agency programs concentrated on general planning studies with population and economic analyses, and on land-use and transportation studies. Some attention was also given to zoning and subdivision control programs. Public support for these organizations came chiefly from chambers of commerce, citizens' development groups, and the League of Women Voters.

The 1964 *National Survey of Metropolitan Planning* revealed only a few changes in the characteristics of the typical metropolitan planning agency. The size of the commission had declined to 12, and its members were predominantly lay citizens selected by the county and/or city governing bodies. These members were more likely to be businessmen. The average staff size of the typical metropolitan planning agency increased to 16, but the proportion of professionals did not change significantly. Following are some specific findings and conclusions reached in the 1963 and 1964 surveys regarding the jurisdiction, staffing, finances, and functions and powers of metropolitan planning agencies.

Areal Adequacy. HHFA's 1963 survey concluded that planning agencies covering two or more counties or the equivalent, because of their larger areal jurisdictions, were better structured to handle metropolitan development problems than were city-county or county planning agencies. Seventy-one percent of the multi-jurisdictional planning agencies had responsibility for areas larger than a single SMSA, and their boundaries included non-metropolitan territory. On the other hand, two-fifths of the city-county and three-tenths of the county planning agencies covered less than an SMSA, raising questions of areal adequacy. Of the 38 multijurisdictional agencies responding, two-thirds served areas with a population in excess of 500,000. In contrast, two-thirds of the 41 city-county planning agencies and 55 percent of the 47 county planning agencies encompassed areas having less than 250,000 people.

The 1964 survey also found that multi-jurisdictional agencies predominated in large population centers. Sixteen of the 18 areas with populations greater than a million and 23 of the 37 areas of 500,000 and over had such bodies. The planning area of 54 percent of the multi-jurisdictional agencies was larger than the SMSA, and that of 44 percent included non-metropolitan territory. Over 86 percent of the multi-jurisdictional agencies served areas with 250,000 people or more, while two-thirds of the city-county agencies and one-half of the county agencies covered populations of less than 250,000.

Eighty-eight percent of organizations examined had their jurisdiction determined in their enabling legislation. For 58 percent of the multi-jurisdictional agencies, however, boundary revision was possible by agreement among the participants or by unilateral secession, illustrating the confederal nature of their organization.

Staffing. The surveys revealed that metropolitan planning bodies employed fewer professionals and spent considerably less per agency than city planning agencies serving the same population groups. Metropolitan planning organizations tended to have moderate-sized staffs compared to city planning agencies, reflecting a reliance on consultants. With respect to the metropolitan transportation planning function, in light of the requirements of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, the 1964 study determined it was likely that the shortage of professional staff would be an impediment to effective administration of the Federal transportation planning program at the areawide level.

Finances. As shown in Table III-2, on the fiscal front multi-jurisdictional planning agencies have fared rather well. Although comprising less than three-tenths of the organizations participating in the 1964 survey, multi-jurisdictional agencies accounted for almost half of the total expenditures. The outlays of these bodies decreased with the population size of the area served. Twenty-one of them reported having received "701" assistance, but this amounted to only 13 percent of their total revenue. By far the largest source of metropolitan planning funds at that time was BPR for transportation purposes.

By the mid-1960's, it had become clear that multi-jurisdictional planning agencies would be hard pressed to mount anything resembling a metropolitan planning program without Federal and State money. Member local governments were generally unable or unwilling to give much financial aid to these organizations. In 1963, counties provided 19 percent of their revenues, while cities contributed a meager four percent. Multi-jurisdictional agencies serving populations over a million were heavily financed by the Federal and State governments, which provided 73 cents out of every dollar they spent.

Functions and Powers. All but three of the 126 respondents to the 1963 survey viewed the formulation of comprehensive plans as their primary purpose. Yet only 35 percent had actually completed such a plan. Despite the fact that 54 percent were required by law to adopt general plans, and the bulk of the agencies indicated a desire to emphasize comprehensive planning, most of their activity was in reality concerned with land-use studies. With respect to comprehensive transportation planning studies, 17 percent of the agencies had completed their efforts, 33 percent were currently underway, and 23 percent anticipated studies in the near future. One year later, however, 90 percent reported participation in comprehensive transportation planning and 26 percent had primary administrative responsibility for these programs in their areas, illustrating the impact of Federal financial support for functional planning.

The 1963 survey concluded that metropolitan planning agencies had little real power. Although half were required by law to adopt a comprehensive plan, only

Table III-2

Expenditures of Metropolitan Planning Agencies:
1963 and 1964

	<u>1963 Survey</u>	<u>1964 Survey</u>
Number and Percentage of SMSA's Having Metropolitan Planning Activity	142 (67%)	150 (69%)
Average Expenditure per Agency (in \$1,000's)		
All types of agencies	104.6*	158.6**
Multijurisdictional agencies	157.7	309.5
City-County agencies	92.8	115.3
County agencies	75.0	84.2
Per Capita Expenditures (in cents)		
All types of agencies	14	32
Multijurisdictional agencies	8	20
City-county agencies	36	43
County agencies	23	28
Average Expenditure for Staff (in \$1,000's)		
All types of agencies	66.7	118.4
Multijurisdictional agencies	75.4	229.6
City-county agencies	68.9	82.7
County agencies	58.2	67.1
Average Expenditure for Central Administration (in \$1,000's)		
All types of agencies	31.3	32.9
Multijurisdictional agencies	40.2	36.9
City-county agencies	33.2	33.2
County agencies	21.0	28.7
Average Expenditure for Long Range Planning (in \$1,000's)		
All types of agencies	43.9	99.8
Multijurisdictional agencies	55.5	238.3
City-county agencies	46.6	49.6
County agencies	30.3	34.4
Average Expenditure for Local Technical Assistance (in \$1,000's)		
All types of agencies	6.5	9.1
Multijurisdictional agencies	8.5	13.4
City-county agencies	6.0	8.2
County agencies	5.3	6.3

*All financial data for the 1963 survey is for FY 1962.

**All financial data for the 1964 survey is for FY 1963.

Sources: U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, *National Survey of Metropolitan Planning* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 1963); U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, *1964 National Survey of Metropolitan Planning* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March, 1965).

one-fourth stated that other areawide agencies were specifically authorized to adhere to it. Similarly, a quarter of the respondents had mandatory referral power for review and comment on local plans or codes, and one-tenth on local capital improvement programs. Usually these comments were not binding. Nearly half claimed that they had authority to review or comment on local, State, or Federally supported projects.

Metropolitan planning agency directors confirmed that a major limitation on their organization was insufficient power vis-a-vis local governments and other areawide agencies. They also felt that inadequate public support, funds, and staff assistance were major weaknesses.

Confederalism as Procedural Adaptation

By the early 1960's the problems in metropolitan planning agency operation and the limitations on the powers of these organizations were receiving more and more attention from the academic community. The September 1963 study by Roscoe C. Martin and eight others included case studies of the Mid-Willamette Valley (Oregon) Council of Governments, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the Twin Cities (Minnesota) Metropolitan Planning Commission, and the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission.

Professor Martin's study treated the Mid-Willamette Valley and Metropolitan Washington COG's as illustrative of the "conference approach" to procedural adaptation to changing urban problems. He found that metropolitan conferences of governments were the "...weakest kind of alliance conceivable, one which has no sanctional authority with regard to its members, one from which a participant may withdraw without citing cause. It is not a body politic or corporate, nor could it by any reasonable definition of the term be called a government."²⁶ Yet, he concluded that COG's should "...not be written off as a futile exercise," since they had "...demonstrated a capacity to achieve some alleviation of those metropolitan problems which lie within the purview of existing governments—and there are many such."²⁷ Covering the Twin Cities and Atlanta Regional Metropolitan Planning Commissions under the aegis of the areawide planning approach, he indicated that a basic dilemma was whether such bodies should limit their activities to research, publication, and advice or should seek to implement their findings through political action.

The 1964 study by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard of the effectiveness of metropolitan planning pointed out that metropolitan planning agencies had been severely handicapped by insufficient legal power to permit active participation in development decisions, lack of clear statutory direction, and small and uncertain budgets. Stating that existing

efforts at metropolitan planning were for the most part too new and too limited to have much effect on patterns of metropolitan growth, the study warned that unless means for metropolitan policy making and intergovernmental coordination were strengthened there would be a mounting accumulation of unsolved problems. It proposed a model metropolitan planning agency with a budget of \$247,000 per year and a professional staff of about 20.²⁸

CASE STUDIES OF EARLY COG EXPERIENCE

Some of the difficulties in confederal regional organization indicated by the 1963 and 1964 national surveys of metropolitan planning and by the Martin and Joint Center studies can be better understood through a brief examination of the experience of some of the early COG's. The following case studies include the Supervisors Inter-County Committee (now Southeast Michigan Council of Governments) in the Detroit area, the Metropolitan Regional Council (New York City), the Puget Sound Governmental Conference, the Regional Conference of Elected Officials of the Philadelphia region, the Mohawk Valley (New York) Federation of Local Governments (now defunct), the Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Governments, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the Association of Bay Area Governments, the Southern California Association of Governments, and the Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments.²⁹

Supervisors Inter-County Committee

A COG-type organization was established in the Detroit area in June 1947 when the Michigan Planning Commission, acting on enabling legislation passed two years earlier, created a Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission. This body was composed of 46 gubernatorially appointed members, half of whom were public officials, and was funded on a voluntary basis by local governments and private contributions. But the movement to institutionalize intergovernmental communication and cooperation really got underway in 1954 with the organization of the Supervisors Inter-County Committee. Its inception was triggered by local concern for water supply, sewage and waste disposal, and regional transportation needs created by the rapidly growing population, and by the lack of common understanding among local governments of southeastern Michigan's metropolitan problems. The President of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors, who was also a Detroit city councilman and former member of the Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, voiced this concern by inviting his counterparts from neighboring Oakland and Macomb Counties to meet with him to discuss mutual problems and ways to overcome them. After this initial meeting, invitations

were sent to other counties in the region to join the discussions. These sessions eventually led to the formation of the Supervisors Inter-County Committee.

The Committee was composed exclusively of representatives chosen by the boards of supervisors of the six counties in the area, with each jurisdiction having equal representation. It was unique in that it did not include representatives from the State, municipalities, or special districts. In 1957, the Committee was given *ex post facto* legal status by a permissive State act, which recognized such voluntary groups and empowered them to receive and administer funds from counties, other governmental units, and private agencies, as well as to utilize standing committees and special groups needed to study intergovernmental problems.

Throughout its existence, the Committee was confronted by financial problems. In fiscal 1965, after 10 years of activity, it still operated on a budget of \$45,000.

In 1965, the Metropolitan Fund, a private foundation, initiated a movement to strengthen cooperation through creation of a new and more representative COG. A Committee of 100 composed of community and governmental leaders was appointed to develop a specific proposal for establishing a voluntary regional organization for the Southeastern Michigan area. After two years of effort, the work of the Committee of 100 came to fruition with the merger of the Supervisors Inter-County Committee with the Detroit Metropolitan Area Planning Commission to form the Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments. It thereby assumed new responsibilities in regional and transportation planning and broadened its membership to include cities, villages, townships, and school districts. In addition, the revenues of the new body jumped to \$804,710 in fiscal 1968.

Metropolitan Regional Council

The Supervisors' Inter-County Committee was just a step ahead of the establishment of the Metropolitan Regional Council. In 1956, the Mayor of New York City invited the top officials of 40 neighboring local jurisdictions to join him in forming a regional organization to provide leadership for the tri-State New York metropolitan area. The Metropolitan Regional Conference was established informally and consisted of the chief elected officials of constituent counties and municipalities, with membership available to any local governments in the region other than special districts. Essentially parallel authorizing legislation was passed by the New York legislature in 1957 and by the Connecticut and New Jersey legislatures in 1961, giving legal basis for the tri-state organization to engage in interlocal agreements across State lines.

At its initial meeting, Mayor Robert Wagner pointed out that mutual cooperation would enable local officials to better understand regional needs, identify mutual

problems, work out solutions by voluntary local action, and create a force to protect the region's prosperity. There was general agreement about the need to deal with certain regional problems, including traffic and transportation, recreation, water supply, air and water pollution, sewerage disposal, teen-age drinking, housing, and planning for future population growth and economic expansion. A joint policy statement and proposal for continued action by the group was adopted, and Mayor Wagner was asked to act as *pro tem* chairman and to appoint a steering committee to study and make recommendations on the form of regional organization and the top priority areawide problems.

Meeting in July 1956, the steering committee decided to include as members of the Conference the communities that had attended the original meeting plus all other counties and cities in the region, and it created two working committees to deal with transportation and teen-age drinking. At the first membership meeting in December 1956, the Conference adopted the plans proposed for organization, committee work, and membership, with the proviso that only the elected chief executive of each community would be eligible for membership and voting privileges. Voting was established on a one-unit, one-vote basis, with all proposals carried by majority action. At its next meeting in May 1957, the Conference voted to establish a permanent organization and elect an executive board composed of a chairman and eight chief executives of member governments, three each from New York and New Jersey and two from Connecticut.

The organization was redesignated as the Metropolitan Regional Council in 1958, and a five-member Committee on the Future of the Council was appointed to investigate a more formal structure leading to official governmental status. Some 18 months later, the Council voted to seek State legislation establishing it as a federation of local governments with power to employ a staff and to assess its members no more than one cent per capita.

An overriding concern for obtaining statutory recognition, coupled with difficulties in organizing, staffing, and particularly funding were major obstacles during the Council's formative years. Political parochialism and neglect of public relations also hindered the Council's attempts to establish itself as a viable regional force. It never achieved a sound basis of cooperation, in part because the suburban jurisdictions feared domination by the central city. The appearance of core-city dominance was sustained by the fact that the funds and part-time secretarial staff for the Council was contributed by the City of New York. This close identification with the central city led to gradual organizational atrophy until the Council was revived and reorganized as a nonprofit corporation in October 1966.

The Metropolitan Regional Council had to compete with other established regional organizations for area-

wide attention and financial support. Also operative in the New York metropolitan area have been the Metropolitan Council of Planning Agencies, the Tri-State Transportation Commission (an interstate compact body formed in 1964 to replace the Tri-State Transportation Committee established in 1961, and recently renamed the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission), and the Regional Plan Association (a private group which at an earlier, crucial point in MRC's development recommended advisory planning powers only for the Council).

Puget Sound Governmental Conference

The Puget Sound Governmental Conference was formed in March 1957 to serve the Seattle-Tacoma area. This followed efforts beginning with a meeting of the Washington State Chapter of the American Institute of Architects in October 1953, which sparked a conference of county and city officials, businessmen, and planners in January 1954 to explore the desirability of creating a regional planning agency. In April of that year the advisory Puget Sound Regional Planning Council was organized, consisting of representatives of 36 county and city planning commissions in the four-county area.

After three years of quarterly meetings and no financial commitment from county officials, the Council's efforts to focus public attention on the need for regional planning paid off in January 1956 when the Chairman of the King County Board of Commissioners asked the Washington Association of County Commissioners to conduct a study of the need for an official regional planning agency involving local policy makers. Following completion of the study, in May 1956 the commissioners of the four counties decided informally to sponsor a regional planning program. In February and March, 1957, these counties ratified the formation of the Puget Sound Regional Planning Conference under a 1935 State planning enabling act, with the Puget Sound Regional Planning Council recognized as the advisory body. Anticipating responsibilities of a governmental nature outside the normal scope of planning activities, the organization changed its name to the Puget Sound Governmental Conference in January 1958.

Originally the Conference was composed of three county commissioners from each of the member counties, and for the first three years it was partially supported by loans from the Washington State Association of County Commissioners. Until the original State enabling act was amended in 1957, cities and towns were not permitted to participate in regional planning agencies. In 1959, however, three of the counties' respective central cities were invited and became members, to be joined by the fourth in 1963, with their mayors and two other designees each serving as representatives.

In 1959, the State legislature passed a new enabling act authorizing regional planning commissions to receive grants-in-aid from Federal and State agencies,

and giving them the same planning responsibilities as counties except for the power to enact official land-use controls. Under this legislation, the Conference was able to launch the Puget Sound Regional Transportation Study in 1961. In 1965, the Conference adopted a revised set of articles of association and bylaws as a consequence of a new State law allowing the governing boards of counties, cities, and towns to establish regional agencies of elected officials. In April of the same year, the Puget Sound Regional Planning Council was deactivated, but the Conference continued to include a Planning Directors Committee.

Regional Conference of Elected Officials

The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Delaware Metropolitan Project, Inc. (PENJERDEL) was established in 1957, culminating almost two years of planning by interested citizens, college and university leaders, and business, civic, and research organizations in the Philadelphia area. Funded by a seven-year \$900,000 appropriation from the Ford Foundation, matched by funds from local sources, this private body was formed to serve as an umbrella for other organizations with metropolitan interests and to encourage studies of urban-regional problems encompassing an 11-county area stretching from Trenton, New Jersey, to Wilmington, Delaware.

Due to difficulty in proving to the Internal Revenue Service that it should be given tax-exempt status as an educational organization, PENJERDEL was delayed in getting underway until the fall of 1959. This experience and the traditional hostilities between Philadelphia and its suburbs caused PENJERDEL's board of directors to favor noncontroversial programs and avoid developing a very clear institutional and programmatic focus.

With the active support of the staff head of the Penn-Jersey Transportation Study, however, in June 1961 PENJERDEL invited the elected heads of every general purpose government in the 11-county area to meet and discuss the formation of a regional voluntary association of elected officials. At this meeting, a resolution creating a Regional Conference of Elected Officials was passed unanimously by the elected heads of four counties, the four principal cities, and 20 other municipalities, and by the representatives of four other counties, five municipalities, and the governors of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Membership in this informal advisory body was open to the chief elected officials, or their designees, of each of the 388 general purpose governments in the region.

This attempt to relate planning to regional political decision making never really got off the ground, partly due to the lack of a regional perspective among the area's leaders and to an overdependence on the less action-oriented PENJERDEL organization. The latter itself foundered in mid-1964, having received only \$715,000 in actual grants from the Ford Foundation

due to its inability to raise local matching money. By 1963, the unofficial, *de facto* Conference had a budget of only about \$16,000. Although this amount was about triple the previous year's figures, it was typical of the insufficient financial support which, as late as the summer of 1965, prevented both the Conference and PENJERDEL from continuing their work.

Mohawk Valley Federation of Local Governments

In 1957 local industrialists and Utica College formed the Mohawk Valley Council for Economic Development to analyze regional economic conditions in the Utica-Rome (New York) area and recommend an action program. Based on its findings, the Council prescribed, among other things, greater cooperation among local governments to stimulate industrial development. Under the leadership of the Mayor of Utica, 18 mayors formed a Mayors' Conference and met to discuss federation. The chief organizational problem centered around the fear of the small towns and villages that Utica would dominate them. To allay this fear, assurances were given that the city had no such plans and needed the help of the small towns. Furthermore, it was decided to rotate the chairmanship of the conference and hold each meeting in a different town. More importantly, each government was given one vote on all questions. After three months, the Conference evolved into the Mohawk Valley Federation of Local Governments.

In February 1961, the 25 member cities, towns, and villages elected an executive secretary and an executive council, who were instructed to recommend a budget and a slate of officers. Their proposed budget totaled \$270,500, of which \$130,000 was slated to be provided by the counties on the basis of population, despite the fact that these jurisdictions had never indicated much interest in the federation. A 1962 test vote in Onieda County, which was scheduled to furnish 80 percent of the local funds, fell one short of the three-fourths required by law, and the federation proposal was pigeonholed. Meanwhile, the two other counties established a Governmental Policy and Liaison Committee composed of the chief executive officer of each county government, the chairman of its planning board, and appropriate State and Federal officials.

Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Governments

In 1958, the city manager of Salem, Oregon, in his annual budget message urged "massive" intergovernmental cooperation as the most effective means of meeting the common problems of the two-county area surrounding the Oregon State capital. He recommended that the mayor convene a conference of local chief executives to consider undertaking an intensive study of intergovernmental problems, solutions, and opportu-

nities. The Chamber of Commerce endorsed the proposal and offered to finance the study. In June 1958 Salem's mayor called a meeting of the heads of the five principal governments in the region, who informally organized themselves as the Mid-Willamette Valley Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee to act as a resource body for the study.

A 200-member Citizens' Conference for Governmental Cooperation was established by the Chamber of Commerce and a full-time executive secretary was retained. At the end of a year-long examination of the region and its problems by 17 conference subcommittees, a 300-page final report with 81 recommendations for action by various governmental and non-governmental agencies was adopted. In December 1959 the informal group of public officials organized officially, as recommended, under a compact signed by each of the five major governments of the region—Salem, two counties, a school districts, and the State.

The compact of voluntary intergovernmental cooperation, formed under the provisions of a 1933 State statute, was ratified by the legislature in 1961, and the Mid-Willamette Intergovernmental Cooperation Council became a legal entity. The State legislature gave specific authorization for State financial participation, and for the members to enter into contractual relationships to plan and perform services for one another or to act jointly on common problems in the area.

The Council was initially composed of five permanent members—the chief elected officials of the original participating governments—and such additional members as they would choose. In June 1962, the compact was amended to provide that the local governing bodies could elect their representative to serve on the Council instead of the chief executive officer serving as an *ex officio* member. This change allayed dissatisfaction on the part of some county commissioners over the Council's organization and manner of operation (during the summer of 1962 two of the three Marion County Commissioners had voted to withdraw the County from financial participation) although there was no immediate change in representation. In September 1962, the name of the organization was changed to the Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Governments.

The compact provided that each member had one vote. Decisions on procedural matters could be taken by an affirmative majority vote, but decisions which involved cooperative action between two or more participating governments required an affirmative vote of the representatives of the governments involved. Hence, no government could be bound to a specific course without its consent.

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

In the early 1950's some political leaders in the

Washington, D.C., area recognized that many metropolitan needs could not be met by the existing governmental machinery. In 1950, a regional planning commission was recommended to replace the existing city planning mechanism, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, which had been unable to deal effectively with regional growth matters. Two years later, Congress enacted the National Capital Planning Act, creating the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) for the central city and the National Capital Regional Planning Council (NCRPC) for the peripheral bi-state, multi-county area. The NCPC, as the central advisory planning agency for the Federal and District governments in the National Capital area, was assigned ultimate responsibility for handling all Federal questions in the region, but only after formal consultation with the NCRPC, on which the surrounding localities were represented.

The National Capital Regional Planning Council was composed of *ex officio* representatives of the National Capital Planning Commission and representatives nominated by the subregional planning agencies in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs and appointed by the Commission. Since local governments were forbidden by law to contribute to the finances of the Council, it was entirely financed by the Federal Government and was perpetually starved for funds.

In 1952, the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia called together a group of representatives of the governing bodies in the region to establish an informal cooperative organization. He left office shortly thereafter, however, and this effort at creating a voluntary intergovernmental conference never really got off the ground.

The concept of a voluntary areawide agency was revived five years later, when another President of the D.C. Board of Commissioners invited suburban local government officials and State legislators representing the Maryland and Virginia suburbs to consider forming a metropolitan conference to deal with urgent regional problems. Beginning in April 1957 the group met several times and created steering, legal, and functional committees. By November, the Washington Metropolitan Conference had evolved as a reality. The group adopted a charter which emphasized volunteerism as a basic guiding principle for the body.

The Conference was encouraged in its formative years by the warm endorsement it received from Congress' Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan Problems, which also was created in 1957. The Committee prepared a series of reports on metropolitan needs and suggested a variety of organizational and other steps designed to provide remedial action. A principal recommendation called for legal strengthening of the Conference, in which the Committee found high promise as an organization for identifying metropolitan problems and

moving, through consensus among existing governments, toward their alleviation.

Initially, the Conference met monthly in the office of the President of the D.C. Board of Commissioners and pursued relatively few areas of interest, acting only when there was unanimity among its members. The membership steered clear of problems which they feared might split the group and carefully chose projects with broad political appeal. The Conference's most important early activities concerned the promotion of an area transit commission compact and the solution of water supply and pollution abatement problems. In 1959, it created the Washington Metropolitan Sanitary Board as a technical committee and completed its joint mass transportation survey, with the Regional Planning Council, which recommended the establishment of a National Capital Transportation Agency and a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission. Both of these agencies were formed a year later.

In 1959 the Conference was able to adopt a budget and hire a staff, due to a \$13,000 Congressional appropriation through the District Government and \$6,000 in pledges from suburban jurisdictions. It avoided consideration of legal status, however, for fear of creating suspicions among local governments in the area.

In 1961, the Conference discarded its unanimous consent approach in favor of a concurrent majority system of voting and changed its steering committee into an Executive Board. The next year it changed its name to the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.

Due to a combination of organizational jealousy from the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission and suburban fear of "super-government," in July 1963 the Montgomery County (Maryland) Council officially withdrew from participation in the COG, almost triggering similar reactions by other members. As a result of pressure from civic groups, the County rejoined in 1965, the year that the COG incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia.

Association of Bay Area Governments

In response to the prospect of aggressive State intervention in metropolitan affairs, in 1961 local governments in the San Francisco Bay area set up the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) as a defensive measure to protect their home rule powers. These localities feared that the State government would establish regional authorities and planning districts if they did not act independently and in concert to meet areawide problems.

ABAG came into existence when a majority of the eligible counties and cities signed an intergovernmental agreement drawn up under the aegis of the California Joint Exercise of Powers Act. The bylaws assigned the COG the following functions: review of governmental

proposals; study of metropolitan area problems; and such other assignments as the general assembly might deem appropriate. The first executive director stated that ABAG was to serve as a forum to discuss and study metropolitan problems and develop policy and action recommendations.

Although neither San Francisco nor Oakland joined for some time after its creation, ABAG flourished as an advisory organization which could recommend solutions, but not implement them. As early as 1961, the ABAG general assembly placed regional planning on the agenda for early study and committees were appointed. It endorsed the concept of regional planning as a voluntary activity to be undertaken within the ABAG structure by the local planning commissions and staff, and it approved the preparation of studies of future needs for sewage treatment plant and disposal sites, solid waste disposal sites, and regional recreation facilities. These efforts, it was felt, would produce an inventory of the existing general plans for counties and cities in the Bay Area.

During the formative period, ABAG rejected suggestions for the creation of a regional planning district, for the employment of its own planning staff, and for application to the Federal government for a "701" grant to help finance the regional planning program. But by 1962, ABAG's attitudes toward Federal financial assistance had changed, and application was made for "701" funds to initiate a continuing program of regional planning with a permanent professional staff. As a result, ABAG became the official planning agency for the entire San Francisco metropolitan area. Due to its status under the "701" program and because it became a major participant in the regional transportation planning process required by the 1962 amendments to the Federal Highway Act, ABAG is considered the first voluntary council of governments to have moved strongly into the field of comprehensive regional planning.

Southern California Association of Governments

In the Los Angeles area, the California League of Cities and the County Supervisors Association co-sponsored initial efforts leading to the organization of the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG). In 1961, they called local officials together to consider the formation of such a body, and the League of Cities donated staff services during the discussion period.

In March 1963, perceiving a threat to their autonomy in proposed State legislation which would divide the 10-county metropolitan region into three State-designated regional planning areas, the President of the Southern California Regional Association of Supervisors convened a meeting of the county supervisors, planning directors, and planning commissioners from nine of the

region's 10 counties. This session resulted in the creation of a Southern California Regional Planning Steering Committee to investigate the question of formation of a cooperative regional planning commission.

The Committee's report to an April 1963 meeting of the Southern California Regional Association of Supervisors proposed establishment of a voluntary association of local governments under county leadership to assess regional problems and needs and to address their solutions. Following up on a resolution adopted at this session, a new committee composed of one supervisor from each of the 10 counties was appointed, a meeting between certain members of the California congressional delegation and city officials and county government representatives took place, and the need for city participation on an equal basis was recognized.

Following passage of new State legislation providing for the formation of regional planning districts and the conveying of minor taxing powers to these bodies, a meeting of city and county officials was held to formulate the structure and draft the bylaws of a proposed joint powers agreement organization which would exempt the region from coverage by the new act. After numerous meetings of city and county officials, the bylaws were adopted at a joint session in March 1964. In October 1965, delegates from five counties and 56 of the 80 city members met to create officially the Southern California Association of Governments. Although only five of the six counties and 80 of the 142 cities in the region joined initially, both the City and the County of Los Angeles did become members in 1966, and by the spring of 1968 there were 90 city members.

Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments

The idea of establishing a voluntary metropolitan government council or advisory committee in the Atlanta area originated with the Chairman of the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, who proposed a meeting of mayors and county commissioners in February 1963 to discuss metropolitan cooperation. After several subsequent meetings of the chief executives of the City of Atlanta and the five counties, it was decided in late 1963 to involve the legislature and to use the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission, which had been set up in 1960 to provide advisory planning services to localities in the region, as the vehicle to create the new metropolitan government council. In 1964, the Commission was authorized by State Senate Resolution to hold meetings to determine local interest in forming a permanent council of governments, to identify the objectives of such a body, to specify its method of operation, and to recommend necessary legislation.

Initial organizational meetings were called by the Planning Commission, beginning formally with a May

1964 gathering of 75 representatives from most of the area's 50 city and county governments to discuss a proposal for creating a five-county voluntary council of governments. After hearing a report on inter-governmental cooperation experience in the Detroit area, the group unanimously adopted a motion by the Mayor of Atlanta, the largest municipality in the area, which was seconded by the mayor of one of the area's smallest towns, to empower the Planning Commission to appoint a steering committee, composed of not more than seven members representing the elected officials of the 50 governments, to form a COG.

This initial meeting was held at the time Federal civil rights legislation was pending, and this was cited by the Mayor of Atlanta as the most pressing immediate metropolitan problem inviting external intervention. The other major issues raised were the expansion or contraction of Atlanta itself and the traffic and perimeter highway systems.

The steering committee, headed by the Chairman of the Planning Commission, held its first meeting in June 1964 to develop a set of bylaws. A month later the bylaws were adopted, officers were elected, and committees were named to consider projects in the fields of health facilities, traffic regulations, electronic data processing, and housing and building codes. In February 1965, the Council adopted a work program based on reports from the committees, and a \$30,000 budget to implement it. A financial contribution plan based on population was approved which specified that Atlanta and the five counties would contribute \$25,000 and the smaller cities would provide the remaining \$5,000.

During its first year, the Council had no regular full-time staff. Instead, the executive director of the Planning Commission served unofficially as its director while the Planning Commission's engineer/planner, who was engaged in the building codes study, was given the extra assignment of coordinating Council activities. The Council performed a communications function as a *de facto* subsidiary of the Planning Commission.

Conclusions from Early COG Experience

These brief studies of early regional council experience illustrate the key features of organizations established prior to massive Federal involvement on the comprehensive and functional planning assistance fronts, and provide a backdrop for the growth of COG's in the post-1965 period. Generally, these bodies were initiated voluntarily by local government officials in response to a realization that collaborative governmental decisions and actions were necessary to deal effectively with certain areawide problems. Another motivating factor was fear that local units might lose power to the State and Federal governments or to proposed metropolitan governments if they did not take regional action. Yet no two COG's were identical. There was significant varia-

tion in terms of public support, representation of constituent governments, relationships with special purpose districts, and the extent, stability, and independence of financial support.

These early COG's came about largely through a variety of actions involving existing public regional planning agencies, privately supported planning or development groups, State-level local government associations, or top officials in the area's central city or county governments. Organizational efforts that were intrastate, free of central city domination, and lacking in competition with other regional entities proved the more viable, and those involving balanced local government initiative and "good government" or public interest group support were most successful in creating a strong organization.

All of the COG's examined had funding problems from the outset, reflecting their primary dependence on member government donations. Yet the ones that quickly obtained legal status and the ability to receive funding from public sources seemed to fare better than those that relied on private finances. Although a legal basis in State legislation did not guarantee survival, organizations that could avail themselves of existing statutory provisions were able to avoid some of the birth and growing pains experienced by others, since this position gave them a distinct identity and clear powers and facilitated funding and contracting. These were not inconsiderable factors during early stages of regional council organizational development.

The majority of the COG's limited their membership to general purpose local governments, which then chose representatives from among their elected officials. And they generally tended to seek unanimity on decisions concerning council action. Most initially adopted a one-unit, one-vote arrangement giving equal power to all member jurisdictions. While this system facilitated COG establishment, it was to become a major barrier to broadening their responsibilities, since larger jurisdictions were often unwilling to take subordinate positions when matters of importance were being decided.

In functional terms, practically all of the early COG's served as an areawide forum for local elected officials to discuss problems. In the few cases where the regional council inherited or assumed a planning function of its own, a more activist organization emerged. The COG was seen as the connecting link between metropolitan planning and local government action. It was hoped that the regional council would put regional planning in the mainstream of local policy making and execution.

Common weaknesses in these COG's included their heavy fiscal dependence upon member local governments and in some instances their primary reliance on private sector support. Regional organizations serving interstate metropolitan areas encountered the severest jurisdictional problems. The issues dividing COG membership and causing nonparticipation included inequitable systems of assessing dues; differences between

central city and suburban perspectives on problems; dominance by single, large jurisdictions; and conflicts over race, economic development, transportation, and fiscal resources.

REGIONAL CONFEDERALISM AT MID-DECADE

Regional Confederalism at Mid-Decade

At the time Professor Martin's and the Joint Center's studies were published, only three, relatively rural, States had not enacted laws authorizing regional or metropolitan planning. In seven others, however, authority was unclear or limited. Only the three States lacking legislative authorization and seven other primarily rural ones were not participating in the "701" program. Two-thirds of the 212 SMSA's were engaged in some form of metropolitan planning.

Much of this substate regional activity was due to the pervasive influence of Federal funds for comprehensive and functional planning. By mid-decade, the Federal government had become the predominant force in shaping procedural responses to the needs and problems of the growing urban areas and depressed rural regions of the country. Five grant in-aid programs administered by three agencies were the major instruments of Federal involvement in regional confederalism: HHFA's comprehensive planning assistance, open space, and urban mass transportation planning; BPR's comprehensive areawide transportation planning; and the Area Redevelopment Administration's (ARA) area redevelopment program.

HHFA's "701" grants covered up to two-thirds of eligible planning costs, and up to three-fourths in areas designated as economically distressed under the 1961 Area Redevelopment Act. As a source of continuing support for areawide planning agencies, "701" encouraged cooperation among jurisdictions and the undertaking of joint planning projects. By making the establishment and operation of metropolitan and regional planning organizations one of its major objectives and requiring intergovernmental coordination of all related planning activities among the State and local agencies concerned, the program encouraged a multi-jurisdictional approach to achieving balanced development.

The open-space land acquisition program, authorized by the Housing Act of 1961, provided for 20 percent matching grants if the land to be acquired was important to the execution of a comprehensive plan. It required not only an urban development plan, but also a comprehensive areawide planning process. By offering a 10 percent bonus grant to agencies authorized to acquire open space for the entire urban area or having delegated responsibility under an interstate or intergovernmental compact or agreement for open space in a substantial part of the area, the legislation gave local governments

an additional incentive to join together for this purpose.

The HHFA urban mass transportation program authorized by the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as a successor to the modest mass transportation grant and loan programs under the 1961 Housing Act, that federally assisted transit projects be meaningfully related to general urban development through definite stages of planning and programming.³⁰ The earlier loan program had mandated all but emergency projects to be consistent with a mass transportation plan for the urban or metropolitan area served by the applicant, which in turn had to be coordinated with comprehensive development plans. The 1964 law took the added step of restricting Federal aid to the equipment and facilities necessary to carry out a program for a unified or officially coordinated mass transportation system, including both transit and highways, as part of the comprehensively planned development of an urban area.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 provided that after July 1, 1965, none of the funds under BPR's primary and secondary highways grant programs could be approved for projects in any urban area of more than 50,000 population lacking an established comprehensive areawide transportation planning process being carried on actively and cooperatively by States and localities. By creating this "3c planning process," Section 134 of the Act induced a rudimentary form of Federal interagency advocacy of intergovernmental comprehensive planning which included transportation systems planning.

The Area Redevelopment Administration, unlike most other Federal programs of the period, had its most significant impact on non-metropolitan regionalism. All of the public facility grants and public facility and commercial/industrial loans authorized by the Area Redevelopment Act had to be made to or sponsored by a local area redevelopment agency or committee. These organizations were required to have official status, through designation by the governing bodies of the local jurisdictions comprising the "redevelopment areas." They were responsible for mobilizing resources for economic development and community improvement. These new confederal institutions added a rural element to the predominantly urban movement toward institutionalized interlocal cooperation through COG's and RPC's. With the replacement of ARA by the Economic Development Administration (EDA) under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, the trend toward non-metropolitan confederalism took on a multicounty and developmental thrust.

In addition to these programs, by 1965 the Congress had enacted a number of other measures promoting uni-functional regionalism at the local level. Amendments to the Federal Airport Act authorized matching grants for regional airports sponsored jointly by two or more eligible public agencies, and both the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Agency explicitly endorsed the regional airport concept. Moreover,

the waste treatment works program of the Public Health Service specifically recognized intermunicipal agencies, and allowed grants to separate municipalities to be pooled for use on a single larger project serving the contributing jurisdictions, with a quadrupled dollar ceiling on grant awards under such arrangements.

The centrifugal force of these narrow functionally oriented programs counteracted, in some ways, the weaker centripetal force of the more comprehensively designated ones. The Federal assistance programs enacted during the first half of the 1960's, then, were the forerunners of a trend later in the decade to use the grant system to insulate State, substate regional, and local program specialists from generalist influence and control.

In 1965, despite limited experience with the approach, the COG movement received a major boost from the Federal Government. A profound change in the organization of metropolitan planning was initiated with the addition of Section 701(g) to the basic urban planning assistance program established by the Housing Act of 1954. This amendment in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 made organizations of locally elected officials in metropolitan areas directly eligible to receive "701" grants.³¹ The other principal provision of the Act affecting metropolitan planning was the authorization of a grant-in-aid program for basic water and sewer facilities. By extending the principle or requiring conformance with areawide planning as a prerequisite for each grant, Section 702(c) of the Act became an important vehicle for extending Federal planning requirements begun in the early 1960's.

This legislation also set the stage for enactment the following year of Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, which had a major impact on COG's. But the stimulus of Sections 701(g) and 702(c), and of the increased "701" authorization of \$230 million, were critical factors in launching the COG movement.

The main objective of "701(g)" grants was to foster broad metropolitan cooperation by establishing and maintaining organizations of "policy and decision makers" representing the various local governments in the area. These bodies, however, were not considered as the only eligible applicants for "701" planning assistance. As a result, dual planning grants were possible to both a COG and an RPC operating in the same area. Although there was no uniform model of an eligible "701(g)" organization, several administrative criteria had to be met. Of particular significance was the requirement that members of the regional organization represent "about" 90 percent of the aggregate population of the urbanized or urbanizing jurisdictions of the metropolitan area involved. Once they complied with such conditions, COG's could be funded for studies of local government organization and finance, among other things, which had not been eligible under HHFA's previous definition of

comprehensive planning, which had stressed land use, transportation, and public facilities.

Two other laws enacted in 1965, the Public Works and Economic Development Act³² and the Appalachian Regional Development Act,³³ had a bearing on the future growth of regional councils. Both Acts were intended to provide financial aid, as well as planning and technical assistance, to specific sections of the country experiencing high unemployment, out-migration, and/or low income. The former legislation authorized the establishment of economic development districts (EDD's) and the latter of local development districts (LDD's). The purposes of both were essentially the same: to promote economic progress and to coordinate public and private planning and developmental efforts in multi-county target areas.

Since the first districts were designated in 1966, EDD's in particular have assumed some COG-type attributes. Economic Development Administration policy required development districts to incorporate as non-profit bodies under the laws of the State or States in which they were located, unless this proved infeasible. The governing body of each county and major city joining the district was required to name an elected public official to represent it, and the district organization had to be broadly representative of the principal economic interests and viewpoints in the area, including business, labor, agriculture, minority groups, and the unemployed and underemployed.

EDA administrative regulations currently provide that the majority of the members of each EDD governing body shall be elected local officials. All EDD's conform to this requirement, and as of the fall of 1972, 54 percent of the aggregate number of EDD policy board members were elected local government officials. In addition to meeting regional council representational criteria established by the National Association of Regional Councils,³⁴ some of the 115 EDD's are expanding the scope of their functional responsibilities to encompass "701" comprehensive planning (33); federally assisted areawide functional planning such as for law enforcement (32); and A-95 review and comment activities (57). An October 1971 EDA staff survey of 102 EDD's revealed that 55 percent of their total of \$26 million funding from all sources came from other Federal agencies, compared with 19 percent from EDA. A number of EDD's have undertaken developmental programs not funded by EDA, including solid waste disposal, water and sewer, and land use.³⁵ EDD's having the above representational and functional characteristics are considered as regional councils in this report.

By the close of 1965, the era of voluntarism in the regional movement was drawing to a close. By mid-1964, there was an increasing Federal awareness of the ineffectiveness of many metropolitan planning agencies, stemming largely from their lack of political muscle and from their inability or failure to participate effectively in

metropolitan decision making. Criticized as being merely advisory bodies with a narrow focus on land-use planning and physical development programming, RPC's in some areas began converting to COG's in an effort to involve local political decision makers directly in the planning process and to meet post-1965 Federal areawide requirements and incentives.

On the COG front, in 1965 it had already become evident that voluntary coalitions of local elected officials were not without problems, some inherited from prior regional planning commission experience and others unique to their own objectives and structure. One major obstacle—financial support—was partially overcome by the advent of Federal planning grant “carrots.” These programs, however, brought with them a new financial dependency on the Federal government.

Frequently formed for defensive purposes, during their initial years COG's were beset by secessionist tendencies among member governments as immediate crises disappeared. Again, Federal involvement provided a partial solution by way of areawide planning requirements for certain hardware grants. Yet, the Federal “stick” represented a blow to the concept of voluntary interlocal cooperation.

Through 1965, COG's tended to operate at a relatively low profile, reflecting their relatively small number and the difficulties of maintaining a consensual approach to identifying issues and solving problems. They had attracted sufficient national attention, however, to be heralded by academicians and practitioners alike as a possible wave of the future in helping to solve metropolitan problems.

FROM CREATIVE CONFEDERALISM TO NEW CONDEDERALISM

The last half of the 1960's opened with a fragmented but supportive Federal policy toward the regional approach. Comprehensive planning was becoming part of the country's political language. But legislative definition of the term continued to take on a functional bias.

It was the era of “creative federalism,” and of growing concern for the improvement of intergovernmental cooperation in the management of Federal aid programs. By 1966, there were over 75 different planning requirements and planning assistance programs, many of them recognized as duplicative and too narrow. The new Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) alone had six separate programs containing metropolitan areawide planning requirements. While some agency and congressional committee staffs were preparing additional functional regional planning legislation, others were drafting bills to strengthen generalist approaches to regional planning and development. At the substate regional level, then, it was an era of “creative (if not confusing) confederalism.”

Just as 1965 was a watershed year for COG planning

programs, 1966 was a seminal year for the regional council role in areawide grant administration and coordination. That year, the enactment of Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act established a review and comment process involving applications by local governments in metropolitan areas for a variety of Federal grants for public facility construction projects.³⁶ By encouraging regional review agencies to consist insofar as practicable of local elected officials, and requiring them to evaluate local applications in light of areawide plans and programs, the Federal government helped the growth of metropolitan COG's and increased their involvement in planning. In addition, Section 204 gave COG's an important foothold in coordinating the activities of areawide functional planning and operating agencies.

Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities Act was the most significant Federal action to date strengthening the position of regional councils in the metropolitan political process. Equally significant, the Act asserted a Federal concern with achieving better vertical and horizontal integration of major construction projects undertaken in SMSA's. This interest reflected a belief that COG's could succeed where Federal interagency arrangements had failed. Yet because no money was provided directly to conduct project evaluations, without Section 701(g) funds from HUD most regional councils would have found it difficult if not impossible to survive, let alone perform their planning and review functions.

Reflecting the ambivalent position of the Federal government regarding substate regional planning and development, the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Service Amendments were enacted at the same time the Demonstration Cities Act was passed. The amendments called for a two-year program of project grants for areawide health planning. A new Section 314(b) was added to the Public Health Service Act, authorizing grants for up to 75 percent of the costs of developing and revising comprehensive regional, metropolitan, or other local area plans for coordination of existing and future health services. Implementation of this program in 1968 spurred the creation of a new breed of regional organization—the health planning council.

The trend toward Federal programs supporting functional planning on a regional basis continued unabated in 1967. The Partnership for Health Amendments extended the life span of areawide health planning councils, while the Air Quality Control Act, which amended the Clean Air Act of 1963, added regulatory dimension to Federally encouraged regionalism. This Act authorized various types of assistance to areawide agencies having powers relating to air pollution control, including grants of up to 100 percent for interstate regions and up to two-thirds for intrastate areas to cover the costs of planning.

The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of

1968, which superseded the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, increased the dollar amount of Federal planning grants for law enforcement and made them available on an attractive matching basis of up to 90 percent Federal money.³⁷ Although some COG's had worked previously on improving communications among local police departments, planning for the entire criminal justice system was a different phenomenon. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) program guidelines encouraged planning on a metropolitan, regional, or other "combined interest" basis, preferably using planning regions coterminous with those set up under existing Federal areawide grant programs or State planning district arrangements. Thirty of the 43 districted States assigned law enforcement planning to COG's, RPC's, EDD's, or other existing areawide bodies, while the remainder set up new substate regional planning councils for this purpose, accelerating the proliferation of federally funded areawide functional agencies.³⁸

With passage of the Housing and Urban Development³⁹ and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Acts of 1968,⁴⁰ rural regionalism received its first major shot in the arm from the Federal government since the 1965 EDA and Appalachian legislation. Among other changes, the Housing Act extended "701" grants to State planning agencies to assist district planning bodies, including EDD's in non-metropolitan areas, as well as to cities within SMSA's for planning that was part of metropolitan planning. It also made housing a necessary element of any comprehensive plan prepared with "701" funds.

In August 1969, guidelines were issued by HUD in Circulars MD 6415.1, MD 6415.2, and MD 6415.3, pertaining to certification of areawide planning organiza-

tions (APO's) for water and sewer facilities and open space funding.⁴¹ An areawide planning jurisdiction consistent with carrying out the purposes of Section 204 had to be delineated. An APO had to be legally established and have (1) authority to engage in areawide comprehensive planning on a continuous basis; (2) regular State and/or local financial support; (3) an affirmative action program for equal opportunity; (4) a full-time staff; and (5) a governing body consisting primarily of elected officials representing all local units within its jurisdiction, but also having representatives of low-income and minority groups.

The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 established a statutory basis for extending the Section 204 areawide review and comment procedure. Regulations issued to implement Title IV of the Act authorized the establishment of State and non-metropolitan "clearinghouses" to review applications for approximately 100 Federal and Federally assisted grant programs in to the metropolitan review agencies designated under Section 204. As pointed out in a later chapter, the "early warning system" set up under OMB Circular A-95, which implemented Title IV had a significant impact on the power position of regional councils by linking areawide comprehensive planning with local project applications and by formally assigning these generalist-oriented organizations communication, coordination, and monitoring responsibilities in the Federal grant process.

Despite the fragmenting effects of some functionally oriented Federal planning assistance programs, they had a potentially beneficial secondary impact in opening new avenues of financial support for existing regional councils. The availability of planning funds gave rise to a "multi-funding" approach, under which Federal sup-

Table III-3

**Growth of Regional Planning Commissions:
1963-1970**

	Total			Metropolitan Areas			Non-Metropolitan Areas		
	1963	1967	1970	1963	1967	1970	1963 ^b	1967	1970
Multicounty	38	97	101	38	41	50	56	51
Single County ^a	88	119	152	88	91	93	28	59
Totals	126 ^c	216	253	126	132	143	84	110

a) Single county with representation from cities.

b) No survey was made of these in 1963 study.

c) Responsible agencies for 142 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

Source: National Service to Regional Councils, *Regionalism: A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations*, p. 5.

Table III-4

**Growth of Regional Councils with Local Elected Officials Composing a Majority of the Governing Body*:
1954-1972**

<u>1954</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
2 ²	13 ¹	35 ¹	49 (77) ³	103 ¹	109 ⁷	148 ⁹	223 ¹	322 ¹²	352 ¹³
1 ¹	17 ²	18 (28) ⁴	89 ⁵	94 (102) ⁸	146 ¹	191 ¹¹
....	25 ¹⁴	47 (56) ⁶	99 ¹⁰

*These figures are based on various surveys of COG's, metropolitan and regional commissions, and other areawide bodies. The variances reflect differences in response rates and interpretation of results.

Sources:

1. National Service to Regional Councils, *Regionalism: A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations*, p. 6.
2. Joseph F. Zimmerman, ed., *1967 Metropolitan Area Annual* (Albany: State University of New York at Albany, 1967), p. 37.
3. Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, *Councils of Governments* (Washington, D.C.: The Council, October, 1966). The figure in parentheses includes those under consideration or in the process of formation.
4. Joseph F. Zimmerman, ed., *1966 Metropolitan Area Annual* (Albany: State University of New York at Albany, 1966), pp. 5-6. Figure in parentheses includes those listed as inactive.
5. Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, *Metropolitan Councils of Governments in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The Council, May, 1967).
6. Zimmerman *1967 Metropolitan Area Annual*, pp. 37-40. Figure in parentheses includes those listed as inactive.
7. National Service to Regional Councils, *1968 Directory of Regional Councils* (Washington, D.C.: The Service, May, 1968).
8. Joseph F. Zimmerman, ed., *1968 Metropolitan Area Annual* (Albany: State University of New York at Albany, 1968), pp. 65-77, 79-85.
9. National Service to Regional Councils, *1969 Directory of Regional Councils* (Washington, D.C.: The Service, February, 1969).
10. Iliana S. Hastings and Wendell G. Lorang, Jr., eds., *1969 Metropolitan Area Annual* (Albany: State University of New York at Albany, 1969), pp. 72-75.
11. National Service to Regional Councils, *1970 Regional Council Directory* (Washington, D.C.: The Service, February, 1970).
12. National Service to Regional Councils, *1971 Regional Council Directory*.
13. National Association of Regional Councils, *1972 Regional Council Directory*.
14. American Institute of Planners, "Survey of Areawide Planning Activity" (Washington, D.C.: The Institute, October, 1966). Mimeographed.

port was sought for a number of different functional programs. By broadening their base to embrace as many Federal grant sources as possible, it was thought that regional councils could improve their program capability and funding stability. COG directors recognized, however, that there would always be a danger that regional needs and goals would be lost in the search for Federal monies. The real test of regional council "grantsmanship" was seen as being able to use Federal funds to meet the particular needs of an individual region while fulfilling Federal program requirements.

Regional Council Expansion

As a result of Federal conditional grants-in-aid, during the latter half of the 1960's areawide planning in one form or another became relatively widespread, although most of it was functionally oriented. Nevertheless, the roster of multi-purpose areawide planning agencies continued to grow. Moreover, due to the desire of city and

county chief executives to become directly involved in regional affairs, as well as to the Section 701(g) incentives and Section 204 requirements, many of these newer organizations had governing bodies composed of a majority of elected local officials, and several of the older regional planning commissions took action to broaden their representational base. Consequently, as shown in Tables III-3 and III-4, the rate of growth of metropolitan and regional planning commissions slowed after 1966, while that of COG's substantially accelerated.

Surveys conducted by the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the State University of New York at Albany during 1967 and 1968 revealed the changing nature of metropolitan planning commissions.⁴² Compared with the results of the national surveys of metropolitan planning undertaken by HHFA four years earlier, the most significant trend, apart from the rapid increase in the number of metropolitan planning commissions, was the tremendous growth in their operating budgets. This

amounted to a 264 percent rise, despite a considerable decrease in average State financial support. The financial slack was more than taken up by an increase in Federal funds, which had doubled to become the primary revenue source for metropolitan planning commissions by 1967. In line with the greater financial resources, between 1963 and 1967 the total number of planning commission staff members had nearly doubled, and the number of long-range planning studies had sharply risen. Functionally, the trend was moving away from areawide agencies limited to transportation planning and toward increased responsibility for the actual preparation of comprehensive plans, as opposed to coordinating comprehensive plans prepared by other planning commissions in the area.

Only eight days before the issuance of the Bureau of the Budget circular implementing Section 204, the first national conference of COG's had been formally convened and keynoted by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. Sponsored by the Metropolitan Washington COG and partially funded by the Ford Foundation, in cooperation with the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, the American Institute of Planners, and Urban America, Inc., this conference represented a high-water mark for the COG movement. It was called primarily in response to the Federal initiatives embodied in passage of Section 204 and implementation of the Section 701(g) planning assistance program. The meeting was attended by some 500 delegates from 44 States, representing most of the approximately 50 operational COG's and an additional 30 that were in various stages of formation. Because public interest groups had agreed to form and HUD had committed funds for a National City-County Service to Regional Councils, a proposal calling for creation of a national association of councils of governments was rejected.

The second half of the 1960's witnessed completion of the conversion of many metropolitan and regional planning commissions into COG's, and the growing tendency of EDD's and LDD's to take on the representational and functional characteristics of these organizations. As shown in Chart III-1, during this period the financial incentives of Section 701(g), new federally supported regional functional planning programs, and the areawide review requirements of OMB Circular A-95, provided fertile soil in which regional councils could take root and grow.

COG's: Phase II

During the period from 1965 through 1969, there were at least four major studies of regional councils. As part of the move to create a broadly based COG in the Detroit area, in late 1965 the Citizens Research Council of Michigan examined eight such organizations.⁴³ The

next year, Professor Royce Hanson also analyzed eight COG's in hopes of providing guidelines for their future development.⁴⁴ The regional bodies considered in these two studies had been established on a completely voluntary basis without substantial Federal financial assistance to improve interjurisdictional communication and coordination, to foster joint approaches to common problems, and to serve other primarily local purposes.

The two other studies looked at organizations formed during the second major phase of COG development. These "Phase II" regional councils relied heavily on Federal funds as opposed to member contributions or private support, and because of the "701" program and the A-95 process, cannot be viewed as purely voluntary bodies. Furthermore, they were set up to serve both local and Federal objectives. A 1969 study of 74 COG's by Professor Charles W. Harris focused on regional council activities as they related to central cities.⁴⁵ A second 1969 report, prepared by Professor B. Douglas Harman, analyzed the results of an International City Management Association survey of the general characteristics, functions, staffing, and problems of 93 COG's.⁴⁶


In general, all of the regional councils examined in the first two studies appeared to have suffered from uncertainties, inexperience in metropolitan cooperation, and lack of adequate financial resources and staff. Although no archetype structure was revealed for these case studies of the first major phase of COG evolution, certain commonalities among the organizations examined were uncovered. The two later surveys reflected the accelerated growth rate of regional councils between 1965 and 1969. They showed significant concerns for the practical and political ramifications of areawide federalism, as well as for the effects of widespread Federal bankrolling of the Phase II COG's. Following is a comparative analysis of the principal findings and conclusions of these four studies.

Organization and Structure. Hanson's study found that regional council organization closely resembled the legal and political systems of the local units within their jurisdiction. Elected officials from the local governments in the region tended to predominate, although some top appointed officials also played key roles. Suburban governments were more interested in being associated with a COG. The core cities had not yet assumed a leadership position in the older COG's, even though their active involvement was considered vital to regional council success.

Although Hanson uncovered substantial evidence that COG's could operate without consensus, Harris contended that the need to make regional councils as acceptable as possible to nearly all local governments explained provisions relating to open admission and withdrawal, unanimous decision making, unweighted voting arrangements, and certain other structural and organizational elements of a confederal, forum-type nature. Harris also concluded that COG's were basically an

Annual Growth Rates of Regional Councils, by Federal Program Enactments 1954-1971

CHART III-1



extension of the existing political structure and that they tended to be "establishment"-oriented. Like the older regional councils, the federally supported ones operated on a one-unit, one-vote representation system which, coupled with the COG's voluntary membership base and suburban outlook, made it difficult to raise controversial issues, such as the social problems of the central city. Harris confirmed the view expressed by Hanson three years earlier that the underrepresented core city would gradually become more involved in COG activities. This was partly attributed to the influence of Federal funding conditions.

Harman saw the COG, to a large extent, as a creature of Federal policy and funds, whose future depended on action taken in Washington, D.C. In his judgment, the Federal government was the catalyst for spreading COG's across the country. The States had played an important, but passive, role in the evolution of regional councils, with their involvement for the most part limited to authorizing local governments to form these cooperative organizations. While Harman found that regional councils were reluctant to tackle tough social problems, unlike Harris he did not attribute this attitude to structural constraints. He pointed out that since COG's relied heavily on Federal funding, responsibility for their failure to become involved in areas with strong social implications rested in significant measure with the Federal government, since it emphasized physical development planning in its assistance programs. The regional councils responding to the ICMA survey had organizational and structural characteristics similar to those examined by Hanson and Harris.

Programs. The two earlier studies were fairly optimistic about COG operations, while those reflecting the perspective of the late 1960's were much less sanguine. The Citizens Research Council saw COG's as being somewhat effective in both preparing and implementing regional plans at the local government level. It predicted that they would continue to become more operational in character and that their level of commitment to and participation in regional planning would increase. Greater use of Federal funds to foster the development of comprehensive planning processes directly linked with regional "action agencies," it was believed, would strengthen the COG's program implementation role.

Hanson, in a somewhat similar vein, stated that COG's had proved their worth in planning and problem-solving, and that they had the potential capacity to develop into institutions capable of performing operating programs in metropolitan areas. Provided they were willing to enter into controversial areas and to operate on a majority rather than a unanimous basis, he foresaw COG's assuming responsibility for not only general and transportation planning, but also for air pollution, water pollution and drainage, police information and data systems, interstate area water and sewer facilities, and urban manpower training. This transformation from a

communications-planning forum to a regional decision making and action agency could be facilitated by Federal financial assistance and areawide review and coordination requirements.

By the time of the 1969 studies, the functional effects of Federal and other program funds on COG growth and activity were becoming evident. Reflecting some of the emphasis in the 1969 HUD 701(g) guidelines, most of the respondents to the ICMA survey indicated participation in planning for sewer and water, transportation, land use, and open space. A majority also were working in the housing and sewerage and solid waste areas. New regional council programs in law enforcement planning were just getting underway in response to the Safe Streets Act. These usually took the form of police training, data and communications systems, and the preparation of study designs and functional plans. Regional review activities were the second most frequently mentioned COG program.

While many COG's were still of comparatively recent origin, the number engaged in multiple program activities was fairly impressive. Of the 88 organizations reporting information on this point, 11 percent were involved in one to five programs, 26 percent in six to 10, and 38 percent in 11 to 15. The ICMA survey also attempted to gauge the extent of "piggybacking" of COG's for various Federal areawide program purposes. Of the 78 responding regional councils, 79 percent had been designated as the "701" agency, 67 percent performed law enforcement planning, 41 percent transportation planning, and 29 percent health planning.

Staffing. Hanson concluded that the speed with which a COG developed and the range of activities it undertook was largely a function of staff capacities and interest, and that regional councils could not succeed without a significant contribution from the professional staffs of their member governments. Harman, however, found that the newer COG's had important limitations on the amount of work they could accomplish without using consultants. He characterized their staffs as primarily oriented to traditional physical planning tasks, as evidenced by the substantial amount of time devoted to comprehensive land-use planning.

Harris asserted that the success of COG's as voluntary organizations depended to a large degree on internal political leadership, a responsibility he saw most often befalling their executive directors. On the other hand, Harman indicated that the principal leadership role rested with COG presidents and board and committee chairmen.

Funding. On the financial front, the four reports showed a significant range in regional council budgets and expenditures, often reflecting the differential impact of Federal grants. Even at the relatively early stage of COG development probed in the first two studies, direct Federal grants supported many important COG pro-

grams and activities. Already the effect of enlarged matching on members' increasing financial contributions was becoming a concern. Local dues were growing absolutely to match Federal dollars and to expand regional council activities, while representing a relatively smaller proportion of the total organizational revenues.

In terms of determining the amount of local financial support, the various studies revealed that factors relating to members' ability to pay were not generally employed, nor had the COG's surveyed developed sophisticated cost-benefit formulae. Annual contributions were based primarily on population, and were not completely satisfactory in the eyes of many COG staff directors. Because regional council membership was voluntary and local governments had to appropriate their budgetary shares annually, a system that appeared to be inequitable could easily become controversial and lead to a refusal to participate.

With respect to the impact of Federal funding, Harman indicated that without substantial assistance from the Federal government, it would be difficult for COG's to contribute significantly to urban problem solving. Yet he warned that too much Federal control over budgets and programs might suffocate regional councils. Both Harman and Harris saw Federal emphasis on greater social program involvement by COG's as an emerging condition for receipt of HUD planning assistance. They felt this would stimulate regional councils to alter their policy objectives and program goals.

Citizen Participation. By the time the 1969 studies were undertaken, the issue of citizen participation had attained new significance, due primarily to a "701" requirement implemented by HUD in that year. ICMA's survey revealed that a basic dilemma facing COG's was a wide gap between it and the man on the street. Many regional councils were closed governmental forums with little exposure to local citizens. While Hanson preferred to keep COG's "pure" as conferences of local officials, he also recognized a need for greater official and public participation if they were to become effective regional forums. Like ICMA, Harris found that citizen awareness of and involvement in COG activities were at a rather low level, and that these organizations had not made a serious effort to make themselves visible and to enroll public support.

Intra-Regional Competition. Hanson pinpointed a problem for the future growth of COG's in the existence of numerous narrow function metropolitan and regional organizations competing for authority over projects, the time of elected officials, and local or Federal funds. He viewed the creation of independent special purpose authorities to undertake operating programs as an inherent danger to the voluntary cooperation embodied in the COG approach. Three years later, Harris underscored this point by observing that COG's were finding increasingly that they had to compete with other

regional agencies and special purpose authorities if they were eventually to become regional "umbrella" organizations.

These general findings set the stage for an intensive description and analysis of the status of regional councils as of 1972. The following section attempts to provide a profile of their structure, membership, and finances; to examine their services and programs; and to probe their problems, accomplishments, and future direction.

REGIONAL CONFEDERALISM TODAY

By the beginning of the 1970's, some observers believed regional confederalism had evolved into a form of limited *de facto* areawide government. Others, however, considered it as a regional bureaucracy superimposed to implement and promote Federal planning and grant administration objectives, thus adding another layer of red tape to the already cumbersome grant-in-aid process and diverting to regional programs funds that would otherwise have been allocated to individual local governments. A third line of thought looked at regional confederalism as merely a voluntaristic extension of the existing local government structure, which served as an areawide forum and as a mechanism for obtaining Federal aid and complying with grant conditions.

Little consensus has developed regarding which, if any, of the above views correctly describes the status of regional confederalism today. Are regional councils governments, in the sense of possessing taxing powers and operational responsibilities as well as representational and accountability attributes? Are they ponderous bureaucracies? Or are they debating societies?

These questions are particularly significant at this point of time due to changes taking place in Federal policy. Since the mid-1960's, regional councils have been asked to perform not only comprehensive planning, but also to assume responsibility for areawide functional planning, or at least to relate to organizations established for such purposes through the Section 204 and A-95 review processes. Regional councils, then, have moved from a predominantly planning to a joint planning-administrative role. The decentralization thrust of President Nixon's "new federalism" philosophy, reflected in his special revenue sharing proposals, and the action orientation of recent congressional water quality legislation suggest that a third phase in regional council evolution is on the horizon. The "new confederalism," as it might be called, would thrust regional councils into new plan implementation and service delivery roles.

In light of these developments, an understanding of the current structural, fiscal, functional, and personnel aspects of regional councils is necessary. Moreover, an analysis of the problems experienced by regional councils, their accomplishments, and perspectives on future directions are essential to arriving at an assessment of the capacity of these organizations to carry out

their present and future responsibilities.

In order to gain insight into these matters, in March 1972 ACIR, in cooperation with the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC), distributed a detailed questionnaire to the directors of 576 organizations listed in the *1972 Regional Council Directory*, and to 49 regional councils either omitted from the Directory or established since its publication. A questionnaire also was sent to 80 A-95 clearinghouses not recognized by NARC as regional councils because they were county planning commissions or were responsible for only the A-95 function. Of the total 705 questionnaires mailed, a response rate of 44 percent was obtained. The 312 regional council sample used in this chapter (hereinafter referred to as the ACIR-NARC survey), however, does not include the organizations not recognized by NARC, so the adjusted response rate is approximately 50 percent. In general, the returns to the mail survey were fairly well stratified in terms of population, region, and metropolitan status.

A second questionnaire, developed by ACIR and the International City Management Association (hereinafter referred to as the ACIR-ICMA survey), was sent to the regional councils listed in NARC's Directory in October 1972. It was designed to gather information on the director's educational background and previous job experience, and to probe regional council management styles and leadership. A 53 percent response rate was obtained.

Structure and Jurisdiction

Of the 312 regional councils responding to the ACIR-NARC mail survey, 297 answered questions concerning their structure and jurisdiction. Forty-six percent were classified as regional planning commissions, 30 percent as councils of government, 14 percent as economic development districts, and 10 percent as another type of areawide body. As indicated in Table III-5, the current legal basis of most of those reporting was a regional planning agency act or a council of governments act. A few EDD's and RPC's were established under a State law creating a particular agency, while some COG's were set up under an interlocal agreement or joint exercise of powers act. Appendix III-A contains the specific citations for State regional council enabling legislation.

Most regional councils participating in the survey were less than six years old. Forty-four percent were formed between 1966 and 1968, reflecting the influence of the "701" areawide planning incentives and the Section 204 grant application review requirements. One-third of the regional councils were established in 1969 or later, illustrating the continued effects of earlier Federal legislation as well as implementation of Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act through OMB Circular A-95.

With respect to jurisdiction, 45 percent served non-

Table III-5

Current Legal Basis of Regional Councils: 1972

Type of Legal Basis	Number of Respondents	Percent
Regional Planning Agency Act	124	41%
Council of Governments Act	45	15
Nonprofit Corporation	17	6
Interlocal Agreement Act or Joint Exercise of Powers Act	34	11
Specific State Law Creating Particular Agency	26	9
Economic Development Agency Act	10	3
Local Planning Act	5	2
Interstate Compact	5	2
Metropolitan Planning Act	3	1
Other General Enabling Legislation	19	6
Voluntary Agreement	12	4
Total	300	100%

metropolitan areas, 26 percent included more than one SMSA, 21 percent were coterminous with the SMSA, and 6 percent covered only part of a metropolitan area. Most of the regional councils with jurisdiction over more than one SMSA served populations from 76,000 to 250,000 or from 500,000 to a million. Organizations coterminous with the SMSA boundaries were most likely to have a regional population from 76,000 to 500,000. Those with less than 250,000 people were generally non-metropolitan regional councils.

Membership, Representation, and Voting

As indicated in Table III-6, the typical regional council had 19 municipal and five county government members in 1972. As would be expected, the average number of both types of jurisdiction belonging to a regional council increases with the population of the area and the SMSA coverage. With regard to non-general purpose local units, 61 regional councils (22 percent of the respondents) reported having school district members, while 56 (20 percent) had other special district members.

Turning to the non-member jurisdictions, a fairly large number of both cities and counties were not involved in regional council affairs. In some cases municipalities were not eligible for membership, especially where the regional council served a non-metropolitan population of less than one-half million. Ineligible counties, however, were found in the largest and smallest population groups and in multi-SMSA areawide organizations. The nonmember school and special districts were fairly evenly distributed between eligibles and ineligibles, with the latter having a slight margin.

Some regional councils have been more concerned with encompassing a geographic area or jurisdictions having common problems than with delineating regional boundaries in accordance with economic, demographic, or other criteria. This "problem shed" approach usually follows established city, county, or SMSA boundary lines.⁴⁷ Yet if some of the governmental units within the regional council's jurisdiction are unwilling or unable to join, as the above data indicate, then regional action on common problems might be impaired. In addition,

to the extent that the COG does not include the cities and towns and/or counties of the metropolitan region, it may serve as a barrier to the normal cooperation which might exist among the various jurisdictions of the region. The polycentric system allows for maximum flexibility in terms of the cooperation among the jurisdictions of the region; the "problem shed" concept can be put to a stiff test.⁴⁸

Representation and voting systems have been a persistent problem accompanying regional council

development. As Professor Victor Jones has pointed out, the most serious danger confronting COGs is "...ideological warfare over the representation base of the governing body."⁴⁹ The relative distribution of representation and voting power between the central city or county and smaller suburban and rural neighboring jurisdictions becomes particularly significant as the regional council assumes greater grant administration and servicing roles and responsibilities.

As shown in Table III-7, the one-unit, one-vote method of apportioning member representation and voting continues to be the predominant formula, either in its pure form or with some modification such as giving special districts less representation and votes than general purpose local governmental units. Only 11 percent of the regional councils surveyed had adopted a formula that weighted representation and voting in the general assembly and executive committee in accordance with the population of the member governments.

The diluting effect of the one-unit, one-vote system on the central city's power position in the regional council governing body is illustrated in Table III-8. If a strict population based representation and voting system were used, two of the 15 largest central cities in the country would have a majority of the votes in their regional council, five others would have from two-fifths to half of the votes, and three would have one-third of the votes.

The regional councils to which half of these central cities belong—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Dallas, Milwaukee, and San Francisco—have adopted a formula giving each local member the same number of votes. The remainder have allotted a proportionately greater number of votes to the largest city and/or county governments, but usually this has involved merely assigning an extra vote or two to such jurisdictions, or authorizing weighted voting on certain matters. For example, while other members have one vote apiece: Los Angeles casts three votes in the Southern California Association of Governments general assembly and executive committee; the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments gives Wayne County four votes, Oakland two votes, and Detroit two votes; and in the Houston-Galveston Area Council governing body, Harris County has two votes, Houston has one vote, and the Houston School District has one vote. Hence, the central cities examined do not generally exercise voting power commensurate with their share of the region's population.

The following case study of Cleveland's fight to gain a greater voice in the affairs of its regional council illustrates the sensitivity of this issue to big-city mayors as well as to urban county chief executives. Moreover, it shows the deleterious effects of member conflict on interlocal relationships and areawide programs, and the significant impact of Federal policies and administrators on regional activities.

Table III-6

Regional Council Membership and Eligibility:
1972

	Total in Region			Members			Nonmembers									
							Eligible			Non-eligible						
	No. of councils	Low	Average	High	No. of councils	Low	Average	High	No. of councils	Low	Average	High	No. of councils	Low	Average	High
Municipalities	276	1	37	560	261	1	19	121	128	1	17	349	34	1	67	560
Counties	272	1	5	26	256	1	5	19	38	1	3	19	6	2	8	22
School Districts	157	1	25	327	61	1	8	44	51	1	30	327	61	1	23	128
Other Special Districts	111	1	57	806	56	1	10	88	35	1	34	384	44	1	80	806

Table III-7

**General Assembly and Executive Committee
Representation/Voting Apportionment Formulae**

Representation/Voting Formulae	General Assembly		Executive Committee	
	Number of Respondents	Percent	Number of Respondents	Percent
Each Member Government has an Equal Number of Representatives or Votes	126	50%	90	49%
Each Member Government has Representatives or Votes in Proportion to its Population	29	11	20	11
Combination of the Above	41	16	30	16
Other	57	23	44	24
Total	253	100%	184	100%

Table III-8

**Percentage of Regional Population Residing in 15 Largest Central Cities:
1970**

	Population of Region (1970)	Population of Central City (1970)	Percent of Regional Population in Central City
New York	19,000,000	7,894,862	42%
Chicago	7,300,000	3,366,957	46
Los Angeles	10,126,376	2,816,061	28
Philadelphia	5,121,900	1,948,609	38
Detroit	4,880,500	1,511,482	31
Houston	2,500,000	1,232,802	49
Baltimore	2,100,000	905,759	43
Dallas	2,250,000	844,401	38
Washington, D.C.	3,000,000	756,510	25
Cleveland	3,271,000	750,903	23
Indianapolis*
Milwaukee	1,054,063	717,099	68
San Francisco	4,860,000	715,674	15
San Diego	1,492,000	696,769	47
San Antonio	978,967	654,153	67

*Not included due to lack of regional council as of 1970.

Sources: Regional population figures taken from National Service to Regional Councils, *Regional Council Profiles* (Washington, D.C.: The Service, February, 1970); Central City population figures taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census: Population: Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 116. See also Harris, "Regional Responses to Metro-Urban Problems: Councils of Governments," p. 10.

A CASE STUDY OF CONFLICT

On June 14, 1971, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development decertified the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency (NOACA) as an areawide planning agency. This effectively stopped the flow of about \$5 million worth of water, sewer, and open space grants into the Cleveland-Akron area.⁵⁰

This was the first time that HUD had taken action of this kind. The occasion for decertification was the conflict between the agency and the City of Cleveland, resulting in Cleveland's nonparticipation in NOACA affairs. The hostility between NOACA and Cleveland and events growing out of it raise some basic issues concerning the relationships between a regional council and its major constituent central city. These include the power position the city should occupy in the regional organization, the amount of attention that should be given to helping solve the city's problems, and the impact the surrounding communities should have on the city's development. The Cleveland-NOACA experience offers an interesting look at what can happen when these questions are not settled to at least the partial satisfaction of the participants.

Prelude to Conflict. NOACA was activated in April 1968, encompassing a seven-county (Cuyahoga, Lorain, Medina, Summit, Lake, Geauga, and Portage), three-SMSA (Cleveland, Akron, and Lorain-Elyria) area with a population of three million. The region contains a broad range of attitudes, needs, goals, and fears. Cleveland and Akron contain most of the area's black population. There are wide disparities in the make-up of the counties. One has more than 99 percent of its population and 97 percent of its land in incorporated areas while three others have less than 10 percent of their land and population in incorporated areas.⁵¹

Movement to form an areawide agency in the Cleveland region began after passage of the 1966 Demonstration Cities Act. At that time, there were two county and three regional planning commissions. The Lorain County RPC and the Tri-County RPC (encompassing Summit, Portage, and Medina Counties) covered their respective SMSA's and applied to HUD to be certified for their areas.⁵²

Another organization which sought HUD approval was the Seven-County Transportation and Land Use Study (SCOTS). SCOTS was supported by the Ohio Department of Highways, which felt that the agency should expand its transportation planning activities and be eligible for HUD certification.

HUD believed that only an agency encompassing the entire seven-county area was acceptable. This eliminated the county planning commissions. HUD also believed that the SCOTS operation was too limited in scope to assume multi-functional areawide planning and review responsibilities. In response to HUD's requirements,

NOACA was formed by the counties and was designed simply to meet Federal requirements.⁵³

Hostilities were created during the formation and early development of NOACA. The representation formula, weighted heavily towards the counties, was a continuous source of trouble. Local officials resented HUD's insistence on a seven-county agency and were hostile to NOACA, which they viewed as another layer of government forced on them by the Federal government. Shortly after NOACA began to operate, HUD informed SCOTS that it would continue to fund only one areawide agency, forcing SCOTS to merge with NOACA. This merger further aggravated the situation, as all the problems that had arisen in SCOTS were absorbed into NOACA. It was opposed by the Ohio Department of Highways, which feared transportation planning would be diminished in importance; by the Cuyahoga County engineer, who was a powerful Democrat and feared loss of control over highway planning; and by some local governments that did not want NOACA to have any additional powers.

During the two years prior to decertification, two major problems arose between NOACA and Cleveland. The first was the corridor chosen by NOACA to run I-290 east out of Cleveland, and the second was Cleveland's representation on the Policy Board.

I-290. SCOTS had developed a plan for an interstate highway, which was to run east from Cleveland through Lake and Geauga Counties, and had mapped out four possible corridors. In December 1969 NOACA's Policy Board voted to accept the Southern Heights corridor, which ran through low- and moderate-income housing in Cleveland and some expensive land in the suburbs. Norman Krumholz, Cleveland's planning director, has stated that this decision was contrary to the advice of NOACA's technical staff, planning council, and steering committee, but was in line with the wishes of the Cuyahoga County engineer and the Ohio Department of Highways.⁵⁴

This decision was deeply resented and fought by the city. The Southern Heights route would displace 1,200 to 1,800 low- and moderate-income families, with no provision made for their resettlement elsewhere. Krumholz describes Cleveland's reaction:

It seemed to Cleveland's representatives that the NOACA board, in taking this action on I-290, indicated that it did not wish to confine its activities to rubberstamping grant requests....Rather, it seemed almost eager to lend itself to simple political co-optation. In this view, NOACA merely provided data, financial support and symbolic legitimacy for a project dominated by the needs of the highway bureaucracy. What was worse was the realization that Cleveland, with three representatives on the 49-man board, was

virtually powerless to prevent NOACA from taking similar disastrous actions in the future.⁵⁵

After the I-290 decision, Cleveland began to challenge NOACA in several areas. Previously, the city had not paid much attention to the agency.

Representation. In 1968, Cleveland had one representative on the 43-member Policy Board. In June 1969, NOACA added six members to the Board due to pressure from Cleveland and the Cuyahoga County commissioners. Two new members were from Cleveland, three from Cuyahoga County, and the final addition was the Mayor of Akron. Although the Board felt it had settled the problem of fair representation for Cleveland through this expansion, the city considered the action just a beginning. At this point, the city had 6 percent of the Board members and 25 percent of the area's population.

Unable to budge the Board any further, Mayor Carl Stokes filed suit in March 1970 in U.S. District Court, alleging that the citizens of Cleveland were being denied equal protection of the laws because of their disproportionate representation, and claiming that the one-person, one-vote principle should be applied to NOACA's Policy Board. In January 1971, the suburban cities of Cleveland Heights and Shaker Heights showed their resentment over the I-290 decision by filing to intervene in the suit on Cleveland's behalf.

On the same day that these two cities took action, NOACA made a peace gesture by offering somewhat weighted representation. The counties would still have three representatives apiece, but each would receive additional representation on a one per 100,000 population basis. Any city over 60,000 population would have one representative, with one additional for each 100,000 people over the first 150,000. This system would have given Cleveland eight representatives.

Mayor Stokes supported this plan, provided there were no major changes. The Policy Board, however, voted to amend it to allow county engineers to be a part of the county's municipal at-large representation. This was designed to permit the Cuyahoga County engineer, a longtime political foe of Mayor Stokes, to sit on the Policy Board. Cleveland then withdrew its support. Since he now considered the new representation plan unsatisfactory, Mayor Stokes refused to pay Cleveland's dues to the agency. NOACA immediately responded by suspending the voting privileges of all members not in good financial standing.

The growing discontent with NOACA was shown by Cleveland in March 1971, when it filed complaints with both the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and HUD claiming a violation under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The city charged that NOACA: (1) had not given priority in its work program to the problems of low-income and minority persons; (2) had not set up an Affirmative Action Program for Equal Employment

Opportunity; and (3) had not met HUD citizen participation requirements. HUD was requested to investigate the situation and to withdraw NOACA's certification and stop funding the agency during the investigation.

On June 4, Cleveland filed another complaint against NOACA with HUD. The charges were essentially the same as before, but the city also claimed specifically that since Cleveland, with 25 percent of the region's population, was no longer an active member, NOACA did not meet HUD's population requirements for areawide planning agencies. Ten days later, HUD announced that NOACA had been decertified, mainly on account of Cleveland's nonparticipation, as well as NOACA's failure to meet other certification requirements—including setting up equal employment and citizen participation programs—and deadlines.⁵⁶

NOACA Administrative and Policy Headaches. In addition to its ongoing problems with Cleveland, NOACA was experiencing serious internal fiscal and personnel difficulties. In July 1971 HUD audited NOACA and found a lack of management controls. This was the third audit to cite administrative problems, such as weaknesses in the accounting program and a lack of communication among the staff and between the staff and the Board. Consequently, HUD held back a 10 percent project closeout fee, which in turn caused a cash shortage.⁵⁷

NOACA's original executive director had resigned in July 1969; he was replaced by a Portage County commissioner lacking any background in planning and having little administrative experience. The Board felt he would cut back the size of NOACA's staff (which had mushroomed with the merger of SCOTS) and not move NOACA beyond its minimal review and comment role. His inexperience contributed to some of NOACA's internal problems. The director was accused of "overt discrimination and using racial slurs"⁵⁸ by Cleveland in its March 1971 administrative complaint. The turnover of NOACA's staff increased during his tenure.

With respect to sources of policy tension, the officials who belonged to NOACA simply wanted a low-profile agency which would do Federal grant application review work and require only minimal local funds to sustain its operation.⁵⁹ For the most part, they got what they wanted. A review of the minutes, reports, and activities of the first two and one-half years of NOACA's existence shows that despite HUD's and Cleveland's efforts to broaden its role, the agency did little beyond what was required to maintain its existence.⁶⁰

NOACA's Planning Council did not try to strengthen the organization. Some of its members had applied to be the review agency for their own area and resented the Federal government's forcing a new body on them.⁶¹ The county planning directors promoted their own operations through subcontracting NOACA's work.⁶² Most city planners saw NOACA as a data collector and a coordinator, but not as an areawide planning body.⁶³

Two months after HUD acted practically nothing had been done by NOACA to achieve recertification. HUD requested Ohio Governor John Gilligan to intervene, but the Governor felt he could not interfere in local matters unless asked by those involved. Prompted by HUD, the Policy Board requested State intervention. In September the State of Ohio, Cleveland, and NOACA signed an agreement providing that the Ohio Department of Development would receive interim certification and that the Governor would appoint a committee to resolve the difficulties between HUD, Cleveland, and NOACA.

The Recertification Committee was headed by James A. Norton, a Cleveland civic leader, and was composed of representatives of the Policy Board, the major cities in the area, and private citizens. The citizen members were generally active in the community and were chosen to represent certain points of view.⁶⁴

The charge to the Committee to mediate all issues between the conflicting parties was conveniently vague. This left open the possibility that the I-290 decision could be reconsidered. It also gave HUD an opening to insist on a new work program which place more emphasis on housing and contained equal employment and citizen participation programs. In addition, the Committee was empowered to hire the necessary staff to accomplish its work, which could be construed as the power to replace the NOACA staff.

Issues and Solutions. A great variety of issues were raised formally and informally during the recertification process. They included payment of Cleveland's dues, the Committee's role vis-a-vis NOACA, representation, the work program, NOACA's internal problems, and I-290. The Committee was able to affect some changes in most of these areas.

The payment of Cleveland's dues was settled early. Cleveland's new mayor, Ralph Perk, had run an anti-Stokes campaign and was committed to reconciliation.⁶⁵ The Committee was forced to handle the issue, since NOACA refused to negotiate with Cleveland until the money was received. Mayor Perk presented the Board with the dues in December.

The Committee itself was resented by NOACA as an outsider. The agency was uneasy over a number of the Committee members who favored regional solutions to problems. NOACA's hostility increased when the Committee took charge of the Federal funds that were brought in by Cleveland's payment of back dues. NOACA felt that it should have received the money.⁶⁶

Representation was the biggest issue, and it was the only one that the Policy Board felt the Committee should handle.⁶⁷ Cleveland gave up its demand for a one-person, one-vote apportionment and asked for three members on a 55-person board. Strict population apportionment would have been virtually impossible to obtain if every county commissioner remained on the Board. Elimination of some of the commissioners was rejected

because many people on the Committee and the Board refused to reduce the smaller counties' representation.⁶⁸ Cleveland's case had to be considered in the context of pressure being exerted by the Cuyahoga County suburbs and the City of Parma for a greater voice in NOACA affairs. The final agreement gave Cleveland three new representatives (raising its total to 11) and Cuyahoga County two additional members (giving the county 11 also). Parma's request was rejected. The total number of the Policy Board was raised to 58.

NOACA's work program was an unexpected issue, since HUD had approved it in March. HUD, however, wanted a new one submitted prior to recertification. The NOACA staff could not comply—it had taken them six months to develop the first, and most of the professional planning staff had left by this time. As a result, the Committee hired a consultant who worked closely with HUD and the NOACA Planning Council in preparing another program. In early February 1972, the Committee recommended a new work program to the Policy Board, containing an open housing section and setting three goals for NOACA: to assist local governments in their policy making, to develop areawide policies, and to become a spokesman for the region. The Board either had to accept or reject the entire document. If it was turned down, the members would be faced with the possibility of not regaining certification. Without any alternatives to choose from, the Board felt it was having the expanded work program forced upon it.⁶⁹

The Committee also examined NOACA's administrative problems because of its responsibilities for handling Federal funds and HUD's desire to have the lack of internal management controls corrected. A subcommittee went over NOACA's operation and found its financial records in extremely poor shape. As a result, an independent consulting firm was hired to rectify the situation.

No action was taken on replacing NOACA's staff because the Committee felt that this should not be a formal issue. Many Committee members, however, believed the executive director would have to be replaced before the agency could become effective.⁷⁰

The I-290 decision similarly did not become a major issue. Cleveland pressed to reopen the question until it realized that it did not have enough votes to win, and then dropped the fight.⁷¹

Overall, the Committee had the most influence on the representation issue and on the work program. All of the Committee's recommendations in these areas were accepted by the Policy Board. It was also able to establish internal controls for NOACA to help it function more effectively.⁷² The goal of recertification seemed to be accomplished.

Recertification. In mid-February, HUD announced that NOACA would receive Certifications I and II until June 30, 1972. But NOACA was to be on probation, with HUD keeping a careful eye on implementation of

the work program.

Evidently, NOACA did not fulfill HUD's expectations. At the end of June, Certification II was again suspended. Another indication of lack of real change despite reorganization was the retention of the executive director. He finally resigned in April, due to pressures from the Steering Committee. A qualified planner accepted the post but then suddenly declined. In July the former executive director was rehired for a probationary period of six months.⁷³ The rehiring was a surprise move which occurred at a meeting from which most of his opponents were absent. The members were under pressure to obtain certification and wanted to get things moving, and some members felt that the executive director had not really been given a chance to prove what he could accomplish.

The recertification process meant different things to the various participants. Their expectations affected both the recertification effort and the future direction of NOACA.

HUD wanted to improve its relations with NOACA. The communications between them had deteriorated to a point where HUD was not sure how its money was being spent. Although HUD officials never said it formally or directly, they wanted the executive director replaced. They informed NOACA that it could no longer fund the administration of an agency unless its director had a background in planning. They also were concerned about having Cleveland returned to active membership, and so backed the city's demands as much as possible. Political pressure on HUD from all parties, however, restricted the support that its officials were able to give Cleveland.⁷⁴

The Policy Board expected to be recertified but resisted making basic changes since its members felt that a Federal department should not dictate to a regional agency. They believed that representation was the sole issue, and felt that Cleveland had its fair share. Cleveland, therefore, should pay its dues and be reprimanded for its behavior. The Board did not expect to bear any responsibility for NOACA's internal or external problems.⁷⁵ These attitudes influenced NOACA's reactions to the Committee's work.

Cleveland felt that NOACA should pay more attention to the needs of low- and moderate-income persons, especially housing. But NOACA took no action in this area. In fact, the I-290 route case seemed to point up the agency's unconcern, since no provisions were made for the relocation of displaced families. Because of its disproportionate representation on the Policy Board, Cleveland felt that it could not broaden the scope of the agency's activities or prevent it from taking actions harmful to the city. When Cleveland underwent a change in administration, however, it was accompanied by a change in attitude. After several setbacks, Mayor Stokes had concluded that there was no real need for the regional agency—it could hurt rather than help the city.

His successor wanted to make peace with NOACA. He modified the representation request, and pressed for adoption of his position.

The Recertification Committee itself did not have a unified point of view. The Policy Board members wanted recertification quickly. They represented the agency and so were put on the defensive about NOACA's past actions and inactivity. This impeded their efforts to bring about constructive change. The citizen members wanted to make NOACA a more effective regional organization. They also acted as mediators between HUD, Cleveland, and the Policy Board members, which put them in the position of having to find a common ground and offer solutions.⁷⁶

It seems that the recertification process simply reinforced the prior attitudes of each group. Some short-term solutions were accepted, but basic perceptions of what role NOACA should play in regional plans and programs were for the most part unaltered.

Epilog and Implications. As of December 1972 NOACA remains without Certifications II and III, and is unable to receive HUD capital facilities grants. The executive director has once again been replaced and the agency is working with HUD to regain its certification. The State of Ohio is presently involved in delineating State regional districts, and one recommendation for the NOACA region is that it be broken up into three areas. One would include Cuyahoga, Lake, and Geauga Counties; another Summit, Portage, and three other counties; and the final area would be Lorain and two other counties.

A number of factors in the NOACA situation were unique to the area, while others may have a bearing on developments elsewhere. Like other regional agencies, NOACA covered a wide, disparate area, making it difficult to arrive at a consensus on priorities. Moreover, because of jurisdictional jealousies and other concerns, the local officials did not want priorities developed. NOACA was to do nothing more than review and comment on grant applications. This limited view was closely related to the hostility toward NOACA caused by county and city officials' feeling that the agency was thrust upon them by the Federal government. The "feds" forced them to organize an areawide agency to review grants; therefore, the agency would do that and nothing else. Other sources of problems more peculiar to Cleveland were the background and experience of the executive director, the attitude of the Planning Council, and the political rivalry between Mayor Stokes and the Cuyahoga County engineer.

Developments Elsewhere: Court Cases. The first court decision related to the voting apportionment issue involved the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, an interstate planning commission on the Nevada-California border. Two California counties refused to pay the dues allotted them by the commission, which had been set up

by a compact between the States. The counties claimed that establishment and operation of the commission violated a number of State and Federal constitutional guarantees, among them the equal protection of the laws provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They specifically charged that the method of selecting the commission's governing body violated the one-person, one-vote principle.

California's Supreme Court rejected this argument on the grounds that the governing body was appointed, not elected.⁷⁷ Therefore, one-person, one-vote was not applicable. The Court refused to try to differentiate the activities of the commission as being either legislative or administrative. The Court stated that it was nearly impossible to categorize activities in this manner, and that the test of the applicability on one-person, one-vote should be the method of selection. If the governing body is elected the principle applies; if it is appointed it does not. The Court saw no reason to mandate election rather than appointment of the regional council governing body. Rather, it found "significant State interests" in the appointment of the board, due to the interstate nature of the area. The interests of State citizens outside the Tahoe region in its preservation argued against representation based strictly on local population.

Another case raising the voting apportionment question was filed in U.S. District Court in Connecticut in October 1972; a partial decision was handed down in June 1973. An areawide education and citizen service organization and three citizens in Hartford brought suit against the Capital Region Council of Governments, the Capital Region Planning Agency, and HUD. The COG and the regional planning agency were planning to merge, and the suit challenged the proposed apportionment of representatives under consolidation. The plaintiffs claimed that the governing body must be apportioned on a one-person, one-vote basis and that low-income and minority group representation must be provided under the Civil Rights Act and HUD regulations.

Ruling only on the claim that the apportionment procedure violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, the court found this clause to be inapplicable since the new agency would be "essentially advisory and non-governmental in both purpose and function..."⁷⁸ This decision rested primarily on a March 20, 1973 United States Supreme Court ruling in the case of *Salyer Land Co. et al. v. Tulare Water District* that the votes for the governing body of a water district need not be equally apportioned because of the non-governmental powers of the district.

Both the Tahoe and Hartford cases arrived at the same conclusion, then, but for different reasons. If the decisions in these cases are followed by other courts, it would appear that the only way to require one-person, one-vote through the Fourteenth Amendment would be if the regional council in question had an elected

governing board which exercised general governmental powers and functions.

Secession. Another approach taken by some counties and cities to register dissatisfaction with their participation in regional council policy making has been secession. As indicated earlier, regional council membership is not mandatory nor are members required to abide by governing body decisions. There are no formal sanctions to prevent withdrawal by a large county or city that is dissatisfied with its representation and voting power and feels that it is unable to alter policy decisions with which it disagrees, or by smaller localities that believe regional council affairs are being dominated by the central city or county. The following brief Michigan, California, and Oklahoma case studies illustrate some of these secessionist tendencies, and some of the ways they can be overcome through outside intervention.

In February 1972 Macomb County withdrew from the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG) after a membership of one year. Macomb is to the north of and borders on Wayne County, which contains Detroit. In the 1960's there was a large exodus from Detroit to Macomb County, and many of the people wished to have nothing to do with the city's problems. When SEMCOG was formed in 1968, Macomb refused to join. It was not until 1971 that the county became a COG member—after an 11-10 vote by its Board of Supervisors. During the next year the public began to link SEMCOG with the busing issue—a volatile subject in the Detroit area. People felt that SEMCOG was going to bring about cross-district busing, even though the issue had never been discussed in any COG committee or placed on a meeting agenda. After Macomb's withdrawal, the cities and towns within the county were informed by HUD that their grant applications could not be processed unless they belonged to SEMCOG. As a result, at least seven of these jurisdictions joined the COG, while others refused to do so, charging that HUD was attempting blackmail. At the present time, Macomb still does not belong to SEMOG although it has membership under consideration.

In 1971, the voters of Sonoma County, California, voted by a three-to-one margin to accept a proposal advising their county supervisors to withdraw from the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) and to align Sonoma with the north coast counties in a new regional organization. In April 1972, the county supervisors voted to take such action. The underlying reason for the county's secession was fear that ABAG would grow too powerful and usurp its powers. Some cities within the county, however, remained ABAG members. Before Sonoma could legally form another COG eligible to perform A-95 grant application reviews, the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations (CIR) would have had to change the county's official alignment from the Bay area to the north coast area. After three separate and conflicting votes spread over eight months, the

Council refused to do so. In an effort to circumvent the CIR decision a bill has been introduced in the State Senate to allow any two counties to form a regional organization and force CIR to recognize the new alignment.

Farther to the south, in 1972 San Bernardino County began efforts to terminate its membership in the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) and to set up either a single-county COG or a joint COG with Riverside County. San Bernardino felt that most of the money disbursed by SCAG, particularly recently appropriated State transportation funds, would be allocated to heavily populated Los Angeles County. Another factor was a bill in the State legislature making SCAG membership mandatory for jurisdictions already belonging to the organization; San Bernardino wanted to get out before it was frozen in. A joint COG with Riverside was not feasible since that county showed no desire to leave SCAG. In order to form a single-county COG, San Bernardino had to convince its constituent cities to support this move, and to be designated as a separate SMSA. The former was accomplished by delaying the renewal of the county sales tax (loss of this tax would have cost the cities more than \$12 million in revenues) until the cities agreed to support the single-county COG. The latter involved convincing the U.S. Bureau of the Census to slice San Bernardino off the San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario SMSA, something which has not been accomplished to date.

Representation was one of the problems cited by Oklahoma City when it withdrew from the Association of Central Oklahoma Governments (ACOG) in August 1972. Oklahoma City, with 55 percent of the area's population, had only one of 32 votes. The city also claimed that ACOG had endangered a mid-city plaza by allowing the Federal open-space certification to lapse, a charge ACOG denied. The real problem was perhaps the fear of "metro." The Mayor of Midwest City said that changes in ACOG would bring about metropolitan government, while Oklahoma City's mayor contended that this was not sought. After two months, Oklahoma City rejoined ACOG, having obtained more than one-third of the votes on the newly formed executive committee. Ultimate power, however, rested with the assembly, where the city had the same number of votes as previously.⁷⁹

FINANCING REGIONAL CONFEDERALISM

Throughout this chapter, the major role of Federal funds and policies in regional council development has been underscored. This influence was a specific example of a general assumption of responsibility for solving urban problems by the Federal government during the 1960's according to Victor Jones:

The most startling and far-reaching change in American federalism is the emergence of the

national government as the focus for discussing urban and metropolitan affairs, as the leader in formulating urban programs and using the grant-in-aid to elicit intergovernmental cooperation among local governments in our metropolitan areas.⁸⁰

Although most observers agree that the Federal dollar has been a strong catalyst in regional council formation, its impact on the day-to-day operations of these organizations is less certain. Melvin B. Mogulof, for example, has contended, "It is Federal money, Federal staff assistance and Federal policy that is largely responsible for the health and/or weakness of the COG."⁸¹ Harris carries the argument one step further: "Stripped of its present Federal program and funds, many jurisdictions could see no real advantage in affiliating with the COG."⁸²

As shown in Table III-9, the percentage of the Federal share of regional council revenues has not changed significantly from fiscal 1969 through fiscal 1971.⁸³ For each of the three years, two-thirds of the regional councils responding indicated that over half of their revenues were from the Federal government. In 1970 and 1971, regional councils covering more than one SMSA, followed by those in non-metropolitan areas, were most likely to have more than 50 percent of their budgets comprised of Federal funds, while in 1969 their positions were reversed. Regional councils coterminous with an SMSA most often reported receiving less than half of their revenues from the Federal government during the three-year period.

Table III-10 points out that "701" comprehensive planning grants were the most significant revenue source for the regional councils participating in the survey, providing almost four times more financial support than any of the 18 other programs examined. Functional planning grants for mass transportation, law enforcement, and highways were also important contributors to regional council budgets.

Like Federal aid, the proportions of State and local financial assistance have not changed dramatically over the three-year period. States continue to furnish relatively minimal funds, with only 9 percent of the regional councils surveyed reporting over 50 percent of their budget from this source in 1971, compared with 6 percent two years earlier. The percentage of respondents receiving more than half of their funds from local governments declined from 30 percent in 1969 to 26 percent in 1971. Non-metropolitan and multi-SMSA regional councils were most likely to receive less than half of their revenues from their membership.

Even though the majority of regional councils has adopted the one-unit, one-vote system, large and small local jurisdictions are not treated alike when it comes to making financial contributions. Almost six-tenths of the organizations surveyed stated that their members' dues were assessed in accordance with a per capita based

Table III-9

**Percent of Regional Council Total Revenues from Federal, State, and Local Governments:
FY 1969-1971**

Percent Range of Total Revenues	Source of Revenue																	
	Federal Government Respondents Receiving Indicated Percentage						State Government Respondents Receiving Indicated Percentage						Local Government Respondents Receiving Indicated Percentage					
	FY69		FY70		FY71		FY69		FY70		FY71		FY69		FY70		FY71	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
81 - 100%	9	7	8	5	18	9	0	0	1	1	1	*	28	18	24	13	25	11
71 - 80	30	23	39	23	48	23	0	0	0	0	2	2	5	3	9	5	5	2
61 - 70	25	19	38	23	50	24	2	3	2	2	2	2	5	3	7	4	12	5
51 - 60	24	18	25	15	21	10	2	3	6	7	6	5	8	5	10	5	16	7
41 - 50	17	13	21	13	24	12	3	5	7	8	7	6	11	7	14	7	18	8
31 - 40	16	12	14	8	15	7	12	20	7	8	16	13	30	20	30	16	35	16
21 - 30	6	4	15	9	12	6	13	21	18	21	18	15	41	27	48	26	51	23
1 - 20	6	4	7	4	19	9	29	48	46	53	70	57	26	17	46	24	63	28
Totals	133	100	167	100	207	100	61	100	87	100	122	100	154	100	188	100	225	100
Above 50%	88	66	110	66	137	66	4	6	9	10	11	9	46	30	50	27	58	26
50% and below	45	34	57	34	70	34	57	94	78	90	111	91	108	70	138	73	167	74

*Less than 1 percent.

Table III-10

Funding of Regional Councils by Federal Programs*

Revenue Sources by Federal Program	Dollar Amount FY71 (\$000's)	Percent of Total
HUD Section 701 Comprehensive Planning	\$14,329.1	43%
DOT/UMTA Mass Transportation Planning	3,692.1	11
DOJ/LEAA Law Enforcement Planning	3,347.3	10
DOT/BPR (& State Passthrough) Highway Planning	3,277.7	10
DOC/EDA Economic Development Planning	2,107.0	6
ARC Appalachian Development Planning	1,473.0	4
DOL-HEW-EDA Manpower Planning ¹	1,213.6	4
HEW/PHS Comprehensive Health Planning	919.7	3
EPA-HEW-HUD Solid Waste Disposal Planning	901.9	3
HUD Water and Sewer Planning	716.0	2
USDA/FHA Water and Sewer Planning	625.0	2
EPA Water Quality Planning	231.0	0.7
FAA-HUD Airport Planning	176.6	0.5
OEO Economic Opportunity Programming	170.4	0.5
HUD Research and Training	121.9	0.4
DOC Miscellaneous Programs ²	47.6	0.1
DOI Miscellaneous Programs ³	47.8	0.1
HEW Miscellaneous Programs ⁴	32.6	0.1
EPA Air Pollution Control Planning	19.6
	<u>\$33,449.8</u>	

*N = 207

¹Includes Emergency Employment Act and Public Service Careers grants.

²Includes Title V multi-State regional commissions.

³Includes Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Historic Preservation, and Remote Sensing grants.

⁴Includes Title I grants.

Table III-11

Local Government Financial Contribution Formulas:
1972

Type of Contribution Formula	Number of Respondents	Percent
Each Member Government Contributes Equally	9	3%
Member Governments Contribute Equally by Type of Jurisdiction	8	3
Member Governments Contribute on a Per Capita Basis	161	58
Combination of the Above	29	10
Use of Assessed Valuations	35	13
Other	37	13
Total	<u>279</u>	<u>100%</u>

Table III-12

Regional Council Director Professional Career Patterns:
1972

Position	Number Reporting*	Percent of Respondents
Local Planner	90	34%
Other position in regional council	72	28
Private entrepreneur	68	26
Metropolitan planning director	61	23
State administrator	41	16
City or county department head	35	13
Teacher	28	11
City or county manager or CAO	25	10
Engineer	24	9
Assistant city or county manager or CAO	23	9
Federal administrator	14	5
Urban renewal planner	12	5
Model Cities staff	4	2
Other	145	56

*N=261.

formula. Only 6 percent had provided for equal member representation and funding status. (see Table III-11).

Management Profiles, Styles, and Leadership

The ACIR-ICMA survey obtained information from regional council directors concerning their personal background, management styles and problems, and relationships with the Federal and State governments as of late 1972. These data underscore the Federal government's pervasive influence over regional council programs and personnel, as well as the member localities' desire to avoid controversy.

The Regional Council Director: A Profile. Ninety-one percent of the 306 reporting regional councils indicated that they had a full-time executive director. Although generalizations of this type should be treated cautiously, the "typical" staff director is young, a long-time resident of the area served by the regional council, well-educated, and was employed previously as a local or metropolitan planner. He considers himself to be mainly an administrator, innovator, and grantsman.

The median age of regional council directors participating in the survey was 38. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents lived in the area served by the regional council prior to becoming executive director, and their average length of residence was 13 years. The majority of directors were appointed to their position between 1970 and 1972. Overall, more than four-fifths were college graduates, with 42 percent holding a Master's

degree, 18 percent an undergraduate degree with some graduate work, and 23 percent an undergraduate degree. Only 4 percent held a law degree. Their median annual income was \$17,500. As revealed in Table III-12, over half of the regional council directors have spent the principal part of their professional career in the planning field. A surprisingly small number have been managers or chief administrative officers of city or county governments.

Most regional council directors spend the greatest portion of their time on program coordination and administration, seeking Federal or State financial aid, and developing regional plans. On the average, these three activities account for one-third of the executive director's time. On the other hand, regional council professional staff members devote one-fourth of their time to areawide plan development and about one-eighth of their time to providing technical assistance to members (see Table III-13).

When asked to rank their five most important roles, the replies in descending order were: staff administrator, program innovator, policy initiator, advisor to council members, and program coordinator. Consistent with other findings in this chapter, the directors stated their least important roles were community leader and conflict resolver.

Table III-14 suggests that executive directors feel they should exercise leadership in educating their members and officers, even if this involves raising unpopular matters. Clearly, they consider themselves as having an

important part in regional policy making and goal-setting, as opposed to being neutral administrators. The directors also believe that they, rather than the chairman of the governing board or some other officer, should be the spokesman for the council in its dealings with the Federal and State governments.

The Professional Staff. As shown in Table III-15, on the average, regional council staffs consist of nine people. The staff size declines steadily with the population of the area served by the council. Like their executive directors, regional council professional staff tend to have a planning background. (See Table III-16).^{8,4} Two-thirds of the respondents provide their staff opportunities to gain new skills or keep abreast of developments in their profession through in-service

training programs, usually held at a local university. An average of 4 percent of the total regional council budget is spent on staff education.

Executive directors feel a need for a close working relationship with their professional staff. When asked to indicate what they expected the staff to do, participation in the formulation of issues, objectives, and plans was the most frequent reply. This was followed by staff activities in developing and recommending objectives or planned strategies primarily in well defined issue areas, and offering advice to the director.

Management Styles. In preparing regional policies and programs, executive directors stated that their professional staff and executive board members were the sources of the most valuable assistance. Elected officials

Table III-13

**Proportion of Director and Staff Time Spent on Regional Council Activities:
1972**

Activity	Director's Time		Staff Time	
	Number Reporting	Mean Percent	Number Reporting	Mean Percent
Grantsmanship—seeking Federal or State support for programs	231	10	167	9
Assisting local governments in preparing applications for grants	168	5	176	8
Reviewing applications of local units of government for Federal grants for consistency with regional planning and development of goals	194	5	189	8
Informing members of the council on regional problems	224	6	144	5
Working out differences between members on plans and programs	158	4	116	5
Providing technical assistance to member governments	193	8	200	13
Providing visible services to member local governments	148	5	148	9
Implementing policies decided upon by your council	204	9	125	8
Developing regional plans	208	10	201	25
Public information activities	229	6	168	6
Citizen involvement activities	209	5	167	6
Working with State agencies	235	5	173	5
Working with Federal agencies	216	5	149	4
Budget development	229	5	114	4
Staff development	203	5	101	3
Program coordination and administration	233	14	132	7
Development of policy	211	7	97	5
Working with chief administrative officers or city and county managers to involve them in council activities	198	6	117	5

Table III-14

Activities Regional Council Directors Should Perform:
1972

Activity	Tend to agree		Tend to disagree		Strongly disagree	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Concern yourself with activities that operationalize council objectives and leave the formulation of objectives to the council membership	110	36	157	51	38	12
Maintain a neutral stand on any issue which may have the membership divided	75	25	165	54	66	22
Volunteer technical information in order to educate council members	302	98	5	2	1	0
Work with the chairman or members of the executive board in order to achieve agreement on the council plans	302	98	5	2	1	0
Make known your viewpoint concerning the objectives of the council	274	90	26	9	5	2
Work informally with council members to achieve agreement on council activities	276	90	29	9	3	1
Work for certain council objectives even if they may not be popular with some council members	270	88	31	10	5	2
Assume leadership in developing objectives for the council	225	14	72	24	8	3
Represent the region when dealing with officials on higher levels of government	252	83	47	15	6	2
Speak to State legislatures as the spokesman for the council membership when important legislation is being considered	184	61	87	29	30	10

of constituent local governments and the chairman or president of the executive board were also helpful. The least important inputs came from community leaders, professional associations, and Federal or State administrators.

Like their views on staff activities, the directors rated highly executive board involvement in issue, objective, and plan formulation. But the most important role of the board was leadership, in the sense of initiating, recommending, and taking positions on most problems coming before the director and council members. The least significant board function was advisory to the executive director.

Table III-7 reveals that most regional council directors enjoy considerable freedom in fulfilling their staff administration, agenda formulation, and project and budget development responsibilities. As would be expected, the creation of new staff positions and relations with citizen groups are generally shared activities, while policy formulation is mainly an executive board task

although occasionally the director participates in this process. In addition, consultation between the head of the executive board and the director occurs most often when it concerns the working relationship of the board or its committees, and least often when it involves the internal affairs of the organization.

Relations with Federal and State Agencies. Reflecting the heavy reliance of regional councils on Federal financial support, almost 90 percent of the executive directors indicated that maintaining good relations with Federal agencies was essential. Over four-fifths pointed out that their members expected them to work with these agencies and cut red tape. As a consequence, 60 percent felt that they were often put in the middle between the expectations of their members and those of the Federal government.

Directors were requested to identify the Federal and State agencies that had been most helpful in formulating their regional programs. The State planning agency was considered to be the most helpful, followed closely by

HUD. The former response pattern probably is due to the regional council's legal, and increasingly programmatic, dependence on the State government while the latter, of course, reflects the influence of the "701" program.

As in the case of Federal agencies, over 90 percent of the directors believed it absolutely necessary to maintain good relations with the State. Nearly three-fourths felt that the council members expected them to act as a spokesman for regional interests on State issues that had an impact on the region as a whole.

In addition to red tape cutting, 77 percent of the executive directors indicated that they had been involved in State legislation directly affecting their organization. Furthermore, two-fifths believed that State agencies sometimes relied on the council in tailoring programs or requirements to suit regional conditions, while one-fourth stated that they never did so.

REGIONAL COUNCIL PROGRAMS

For several years, regional councils have been described in somewhat less than glowing ways by friends and critics alike. They have been viewed as "...the weakest kind of alliance conceivable,"⁸⁵ as "...the mildest of all approaches, building on the status quo without disturbing its formal organization,"⁸⁶ as "bland,"⁸⁷ and as an "...extension of the 'establishment'."⁸⁸

This lack of enthusiasm is undoubtedly due to the feeling on the part of some reformers that the regional council approach is only half a loaf; indeed that it may even impede movement toward metropolitan government,⁸⁹ or at best that it will require considerable time and effort to be converted into such a unit.⁹⁰ At the same time, however, it reflects more than an awareness

Table III-15

Number of Full Time Regional Council Staff Members: 1972

	No. of Councils Reporting	Mean	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile
Total, All Councils	296	14	4	9	16
Population Group					
Over 500,000	47	37	10	31	50
250,000 - 500,000	56	13	6	12	19
100,000 - 250,000	111	13	6	11	15
50,000 - 100,000	48	5	3	4	7
25,000 - 50,000	22	4	2	4	5
10,000 - 25,000	9	2	1	3	4
5,000 - 10,000	2	6	5	6	7
2,500 - 5,000	1	2	2	2	2
Geographic Region					
Northeast	52	14	3	6	13
North Central	66	14	3	7	15
South	117	16	7	13	18
West	61	11	3	5	12
Metro Status					
Coterminous with SMSA	64	22	7	14	24
Part of an SMSA	18	8	3	8	12
More than one SMSA	77	18	6	12	26
Non-SMSA	137	9	3	6	11

Table III-16

**Background of Regional Council Professional Staff Members:
1972**

	Number Reporting*	Percent of Respondents	Mean
City planning	203	86%	3
Engineering	108	46	2
Public administration	136	57	1
Economics	104	44	1
Business	77	32	2
Law enforcement planning	94	40	1
Environmental health	62	26	1
Mathematics or statistics	54	23	1
Sociology	104	44	1
Law	36	15	1
Accounting	80	34	1
Housing	77	32	2
Systems analysis	56	24	3
Other	119	50	2

*N=237

Table III-17

**Division of Regional Council Executive Board and Executive Director Responsibilities:
1972**

	Exclusively Executive Director		Shared		Exclusively Executive Board	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Staff administration	275	99	3	1	1	0
Agenda formulation	213	76	58	21	9	3
Project development	192	69	75	27	12	4
Budget development	184	66	87	31	9	3
Creating new staff positions	150	54	84	30	44	16
Relating to citizen groups	114	41	140	50	26	9
Policy formulation	30	11	110	40	137	49

of the structural limitations of volunteerism and confederalism; it underscores what some consider to be a mediocre functional track record that has been compiled by regional councils in recent years.

The substantial portion of regional council revenues that comes from planning grant programs—including “701,” mass transportation and highways, law enforcement, solid waste, water and sewer, and other areas—

means that considerable staff time will be invested in the preparation of comprehensive and functional plans, which are advisory, not binding. As indicated in Table III-18, regional councils are most likely to have an adopted plan or policy in the land use, water and sewer, open space and recreation, transportation, and solid waste areas. (See also Appendix Table III-B). In addition, if the regional council has been designated an A-95

clearinghouse, its staff will have to spend time on both grant administration and diplomacy. According to some observers, the amount of attention devoted to planning and reviewing applications for physical development programs, as well as data collection and technical assistance activities, reinforces the regional councils' already strong tendency to avoid controversy.

The survey data reveal that a significant amount of regional council staff time and budgets are devoted to federally supported areawide activities. While local members undoubtedly derive benefit from these programs, some observers have argued that regional councils may be more responsive to Federal policies, needs, and objectives than to local ones. A recent study of decision making in 120 metropolitan regional councils, for example, found that under 5 percent of these organizations had undertaken any action without Federal funds:

...the council's actual ordering of functional expenditure preferences is based on a maximization of Federal financial support to the

metropolitan region rather than some maximization of public program functional utility. For those functional areas where little or no Federal funding existed there was also unanimous financial inaction on the part of metropolitan regional councils.⁹¹

As stated previously, the operating style of regional confederalism is voluntaristic, consensus building, and functionally limited. Physical planning, grant application review and comment, research, and service programs directly benefiting member governments are consistent with this approach, provided that the regional council does not possess power to implement plans, veto local projects, or operate its own programs. Regional council activities are "systems maintenance" oriented, and do not have strong social or "life style" implications, nor are they heavily value-laden. It has been contended, therefore, that regional councils will be reluctant to risk making decisions that substantially affect life-styles—such as those dealing with pollution, housing, education, urban renewal, police, and zoning—due to fear of

Table III-18

**Regional Councils with an Adopted Plan or Policy:
1972**

Area	Number Reporting*	Percent of Respondents
Water/sewer	240	83%
Land Use	240	83
Open space/recreation	213	74
Transportation (highways, mass transit)	192	66
Solid waste	179	62
Economic development	150	52
Law enforcement	126	44
Housing dispersal	123	43
Resource conservation	121	42
Health	118	41
Airports	116	40
Manpower	87	30
Antidiscrimination	71	25
Aged	62	21
Air pollution	39	13
Unemployment	38	13
Drug abuse	38	13
Air quality	35	12
Youth programs	32	11
Antipoverty	29	10
Fiscal disparity	28	10
Other	40	14

*Total N reporting information on adopted plans or policies: 289.

Table III-19

Social Implications and Conflict Potential of Functions and Services Provided by COG's

Service or Function	Social Implications	Core City-Suburb, and Suburb-Suburb Conflict Potential
Sewer Planning	None	Low
Water Planning	None	Low
Sewage and Solid Waste	None	Low
Data Collection	None	Low
Transportation Planning	None	Low
Comprehensive Land-Use Planning	None	Low
Open Space Planning	None	Low
Air and Water Pollution Control	None*	Low*
Communications	None	Low
Flood Control	None	Low
Economic Development	None	Low
Codes and Licensing	None	Low
Joint Purchasing	None	Low
Libraries	None	Low
Fire Protection Programs	None	Low
Law enforcement	Certain phases—yes**	Certain phases high
Recreation	Certain phases—yes**	Certain phases high
Education	Certain phases—yes**	Certain phases high
Health	Certain phases—yes**	Certain phases high
Zoning	Yes	High
Public Housing	Yes	High
Urban Renewal	Yes	High
Community Action	Yes	High
Senior Citizens Programs	Yes	High
Open Occupancy	Yes	High
Juvenile Delinquency	Yes	High
Noise Control Program	None	High

*This table views social implications and conflict in a short-range (five years) time perspective. It is conceivable that issues such as air and water pollution control may produce a high amount of conflict among local governments in years to come.

**Certain phases of law enforcement have a social implication, such as police investigations and patrol services, whereas police communications systems and training academies have no social implications. The same can be said for recreation, education and health.

Source: Marando, "Metropolitan Research and Councils of Governments," p. 12.

generating resistance from member local governments, particularly suburban jurisdictions. However, some of their systems maintenance efforts—such as streets, water supply and sewage disposal, libraries, police training, crime laboratories, and communications networks—have an indirect effort on the preservation of life-styles.^{9,2} Table III-19 attempts to point out specific services of functions having social or life-style implications.

The ACIR-NARC questionnaire asked regional council directors to indicate the amount of staff time and budgeted funds devoted to certain programs or

activities during FY 1972. The responses from 312 organizations are shown in Tables III-20 and III-21. As can be seen from a comparison of the latter with Table III-19, in 1972 nine of the regional council activity areas had no social implications and low core-city-suburban and inter-suburban conflict potential. Certain phases of two activities—law enforcement and comprehensive health—have social and conflict dimensions. Three regional council programs—aged, drug abuse, and especially housing—have high social implications and central-city-suburban area or inter-suburban conflict potential.

Of the four activities not covered in Table III-19—tourism, manpower, A-95 review, and airports—the first has little social or conflict producing elements, parts of both manpower and A-95 (particularly the “social” and environmental impact statements) have such implications, and airports had a high life-style significance and controversy potential.

These tables call into question life-style theory as applied to regional councils. Of the two activities on which most staff time and funds are spent—A-95 and housing—one is moderately and the other is highly social-related and conflict-producing. Of the 16 other areas, only nine can be considered as system maintenance and non-controversial in nature.

The ACIR-ICMA survey approached the controversy area from the vantage point of the executive director’s perspectives on the incidence of and reasons for inter-jurisdictional conflict and specific courses of action taken to reduce tension. This political rather than programmatic focus provides further evidence that not only have regional councils experienced controversy, but they have developed mechanisms to cope with it.

Over three-fourths of the directors felt that there was

a strong consensus about the objectives of the regional council among its members. At the same time, however, controversies did arise over certain issues, particularly dominance by a single jurisdiction, dues assessment, representation, and voting apportionment. (see Table III-22).

The executive directors often participated in the resolution of disagreements. Usually their role involved attempting to persuade members to agree in the best interest of the council, and bringing the disputing parties together so they could settle their differences among themselves.

When controversial matters reached the governing board, the voting behavior generally did not consistently reflect jurisdictional or partisan factors. Only four percent of the respondents pointed out that votes followed city-suburban lines, 10 percent stated that they followed city-county lines, and 14 percent agreed that they followed rural-urban lines. Fifty-four percent, however, felt there was no recognizable pattern. These replies underscore the view of three-fifths of the directors that for the most part there had been little conflict between central city and suburban interests.

Table III-20

**Regional Council Program or Activity Areas
During 1972**

Program or Activity	Allocate Staff Time		Allocate Funds	
	Number* Reporting	Percent of Respondents	Number Reporting*	Percent of total Respondents
A-95 Review	205	66%	115	37%
Housing	184	59	125	40
Water and Sewer	183	59	104	33
Land Use	180	58	112	36
Open Space/Recreation	157	50	96	31
Transportation	149	48	86	28
Solid Waste	140	45	78	25
Economic Development	126	40	69	22
Law Enforcement	122	39	70	22
Comprehensive Health	105	34	55	18
Water Quality	95	30	53	17
Manpower	94	30	44	14
Airports	91	29	41	13
Drug Abuse	58	19	32	10
Aged	52	17	17	5
Tourism	52	17	14	4
Air Pollution	36	12	15	5
Joint Purchasing	30	10	15	5

* N = 312

Table III-21

**Allocation of Staff Time and Budgeted Funds to Regional Council Program or Activity Area,
Ranked by Frequency of Response:
1972**

By Percent Staff Time	By Percent Budgeted Funds
1. A-95 Review	*1. Housing
***2. Housing	**2. A-95 Review
*3. Water/Sewer	*3. Land Use
*4. Land Use	*4. Water/Sewer
*5. Open Space/Recreation	*4. Open Space/Recreation
*6. Transportation	*6. Transportation
*7. Solid Waste	*7. Solid Waste
*8. Economic Development	**8. Law Enforcement
**9. Law Enforcement	*9. Economic Development
**10. Comprehensive Health	**10. Comprehensive Health
*11. Water Quality	*11. Water Quality
**12. Manpower	**12. Manpower
***13. Airports	***13. Airports
***14. Drug Abuse	***14. Drug Abuse
***15. Aged	***15. Aged
*16. Tourism	*16. Air Pollution
*17. Air Pollution	*17. Joint Purchasing
*18. Joint Purchasing	*18. Tourism

Key
 *No social implications; low central city-suburb, suburb-suburb conflict potential.
 **Some social implications; some central city-suburb, suburb-suburb conflict potential.
 ***Many social implications; high central city-suburb, suburb-suburb conflict potential.

Even though regional councils are thought to operate on the basis of unanimity, the directors indicated that, on the average, during the past year, 14 percent of the decisions within the executive board and 13 percent of those among council members had been made on a split vote. Clearly, then, while many regional councils are involved in controversial life-style or social programs, the shaping and resolution of issues are not necessarily conditioned by interjurisdictional conflict or by a need for consensus.

EVALUATION OF COUNCIL SERVICES

The survey data on staff and budget allocations for various areawide programs highlight the multi-functional nature of regional councils. Although the degree of "piggybacking" is documented in Chapter V and VI, at this point it appears that many regional councils are responsible for Federally supported functional planning in addition to providing technical and planning assistance. As one way of probing the functions of regional

councils and gauging their impact, their directors were asked to evaluate the overall success of their activities and the types and significance of their assistance in specific program areas.

Table III-23 provides further evidence that regional councils furnish a wide range of services and assistance to their membership, especially in the land-use and physical planning, water and sewer systems, housing, and transportation areas. In general, their directors felt that these organizations had played a significant role in meeting particular local problems, with land use and physical planning, open space, water and sewer, recreation, conservation, and law enforcement receiving the highest ratings. Regional councils were thought to be of least assistance to their members in joint purchasing, air pollution abatement, juvenile delinquency, and highway safety.

Only two overall response patterns are discernible. The directors of regional councils with a jurisdiction encompassing a half million people or less tended to give

Table III-22

**Areas of Regional Council Controversy:
1972**

Area	Number Reporting*	Percent of Respondents	Weighted Mean**
Representation	137	60%	2.6
Provision for membership	81	35	2.9
Withdrawal of members	46	20	3.3
Voting apportionment	86	37	2.6
Assessment of dues	130	57	2.4
Committee structure	46	20	3.2
Dominance by a single jurisdiction	119	52	2.1
Dominance by a coalition of jurisdictions	54	23	2.6
Powers of the executive director	50	22	3.6
Powers of the executive board	36	16	3.0
Powers of the board and its officers	42	18	3.4
Other	43	19	2.1

*N = 230

** Respondents were asked to rank the five issues that provoked the greatest degree of controversy, with one being most important and five the least most important.

higher rankings, as did those of A-95 clearinghouses.

In comparison with the results of the ACIR-ICMA survey of mayors and county executives on regional council performance (see Chapter IV), as would be expected, the director's responses were much more favorable than those of the members. Within this context, the replies were quite similar in terms of identifying areas of greatest and least significance in solving local problems. Although the ordering was not identical, both regional council directors and local government members listed land use, water and sewer systems, open space, and law enforcement among the half dozen most significant programs. The former, however, included recreation and conservation and the latter solid waste and economic development. On the other hand, both directors and members believed air pollution abatement and joint purchasing were the least significant areas.

Turning to more general types of functions, Table III-24 indicates that regional council directors considered their organization's most successful activities to be reviewing and coordinating applications for Federal grants-in-aid, communications among local officials, and technical assistance to members. Development of functional plans and comprehensive physical planning were also ranked among the more successful areas.

Comprehensive social planning was evaluated the least successful of all activities. This assessment may reflect

the desires of consensus-oriented regional councils to avoid a possible source of controversy among their local members. It also may be due to the fact that many cities and counties have their own staffs to handle social planning and programs and do not need regional council assistance.^{9,3} Other activities viewed as relatively less successful by council directors were review and coordination of applications for State grants-in-aid, economic development planning and programming, and education of the public on regional affairs.

The regional councils in areas under 250,000 population tended to be more positive in their evaluations, except in the case of coordinating applications for Federal aid, physical planning, and development of functional plans. The smallest councils, serving less than 75,000 people, felt they experienced the greatest success in communications with local officials and citizens.

The metropolitan status of a regional council can affect the actual and perceived performance of various activities. Overall, non-metropolitan council directors tended to be more favorably inclined than their metropolitan counterparts.

Regional councils which also served as A-95 clearinghouses evaluated nearly every activity more favorably than those not performing the review and comment function. As would be expected, A-95 clearinghouses were strongly supportive of this activity.

The evaluations by regional council directors and city

Table III-23

**Areas in Which Regional Councils Have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting
Local Government Problems: Director's Perspectives:
1972**

Area of Assistance	Number Reporting*	Percent of Respondents	Weighted Mean**
Law enforcement and criminal justice	176	56%	3.7
Manpower	149	48	3.2
Health	143	46	3.1
Community action	128	41	3.2
Air pollution abatement	93	30	2.0
Water pollution abatement	159	51	3.2
Conservation	182	58	3.7
Economic development	191	61	3.6
Transportation	250	80	3.4
Housing	252	81	3.4
Education	128	41	3.0
Open space	225	72	4.0
Water and sewer systems	259	83	4.0
Solid waste disposal	204	65	3.5
Recreation	203	65	3.7
Juvenile delinquency	114	37	2.6
Land use and physical planning	262	84	4.2
Joint purchasing	82	26	2.0
Highway safety	125	40	2.7

*N=312

**Respondents were asked to indicate and evaluate the areas in which the regional council had provided assistance (one being of no significance and five being of great significance).

and county chief executive and administrative officials (see Chapter IV) were quite similar. Both groups considered review and coordination of applications for Federal grants-in-aid to be the most successful activity. Local officials rated the A-95 clearinghouse operations higher than council directors.

Some discrepancies did occur between the views of the two groups. For example, city and county officials appeared to be satisfied with the review and coordination of applications for State grants-in-aid, while council directors felt this activity had been one of their least successful. On the other hand, the directors surveyed were fairly satisfied with their organization's performance in helping solve local government problems. Yet this area was ranked fairly low by local officials. Regional council directors also were more positive in their evaluations of communications with local citizens and their ability to generate new ideas about local problems.

With respect to the metropolitan regional council's

programmatic response to central-city problems, overall 54 percent of the directors indicated that their organization had not contributed to the elimination of existing or potential SMSA core-city-suburban economic and social disparities. The incidence of this attitude tended to decline inversely with the total regional population. Turning to the views of the directors of both metropolitan and non-metropolitan bodies, 54 percent felt that on the whole, their regional council had contributed to the elimination of urban-rural disparities in their area.

REGIONAL COUNCIL PROBLEMS

Regional council directors were asked in the ACIR-NARC questionnaire to rank not more than five aspects of their operations according to the degree to which they have been a problem during three time periods: 1965-1967; 1968-1969; and 1970-1971. The responses to this question appear in Table III-25.

Generally, there has not been significant change in

the problems reported by regional councils since the mid-1960's. Federal program participation, implementation of comprehensive and functional plans, relationships with other areawide bodies, and citizen participation have consistently been the most frequently mentioned sources of difficulty. There have been slight decreases in the incidence of certain problems, such as voting apportionment and dues assessment. At the same time, however, between 1965 and 1971 a constant increase is apparent in five areas—implementation of comprehensive and functional plans, program relationships with State government, relations with other areawide bodies and with special districts, and committee structure. These data suggest that as regional councils develop, the internal difficulties experienced during the initial start-up period and early years of operation will be superseded by external relations problems as the body shakes down and begins to compete with its regional neighbors for grants-in-aid, local official involvement, and public visibility and support.

For each of the time periods, both Federal program participation and implementation of plans were considered as the top problems by regional council directors

regardless of the size or metropolitan status of the area served by their organization. In 1970-1971, implementation of comprehensive and functional plans replaced Federal program participation as the most widespread problem. Almost half of the regional councils reported this to be the case. Furthermore, using the weighted mean as a measure of intensity, plan implementation was the most serious source of difficulty in all three time periods.

The incidence of certain types of problems, other than Federal programs and implementation, was related to the jurisdiction of the regional council. During 1965-1967, citizen participation was a major problem area primarily for organizations with a regional population of less than 250,000. Several councils serving under 75,000 people were concerned about relations with other areawide bodies, while many of those with more than a quarter million people had experienced difficulties in their financial relationships with the State government. By 1968-1969, citizen participation was still a source of difficulty for regional councils in areas under 250,000, and relations with areawide bodies had become a problem common to organizations regardless

Table III-24

**Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972**

Activities	Number of Councils Reporting	Weighted Mean*
Total, all councils	312
Communications among local officials	298	3.8
General local government coordination	298	3.6
Review and coordination of applications for Federal grants-in-aid	286	3.8
Review and coordination of applications for State grants-in-aid	251	2.8
Comprehensive physical planning	285	3.6
Comprehensive social planning	275	2.5
Development of functional plans	287	3.7
Implementation of comprehensive and functional plans	283	2.9
Solutions to particular local government problems	289	3.4
Technical assistance to member governments	290	3.8
Economic development planning and programming	273	2.8
Education of the public on regional affairs	286	2.8
Communication with local citizens	292	3.0
Generation of new ideas about local problems	288	3.4

*Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council's activities on a 5-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Table III-25

**Regional Council Problems:
1965-1967, 1968-1969, and 1970-1971***

Problems	1965-1967			1968-1969			1970-1971		
	No.	% of (A)	Weighted Mean	No.	% of (A)	Weighted Mean	No.	% of (A)	Weighted Mean
Number of councils reporting (A)	149	100	...	240	100	...	312	100	...
Voting apportionment	16	11	2.5	20	8	2.5	19	6	2.9
Representation	28	19	2.7	40	17	2.7	53	17	2.8
Citizen participation	46	31	2.9	71	30	3.0	103	33	3.1
Assessment of dues	36	24	2.8	47	20	2.8	60	19	2.9
Dominance by a single jurisdiction	24	16	2.5	27	11	2.9	41	13	2.7
Federal program participation	64	43	2.8	98	41	2.7	126	40	2.8
Relationships with other areawide bodies	45	30	3.2	81	34	2.9	119	38	2.7
Relationships with special districts	15	10	2.8	30	13	2.6	45	14	2.9
Powers of the policy board and its officers	22	15	2.5	30	13	2.9	40	13	2.7
Committee structure	17	11	3.8	32	13	3.6	44	14	3.4
Staff-policy board relationships	20	13	3.3	22	9	3.1	40	13	3.3
Implementation of comprehensive and functional plans	55	37	2.3	90	38	2.5	153	49	2.5
Legal relationships with State government	18	12	3.2	29	12	2.9	42	13	2.9
Program relationships with State government	34	23	3.1	63	26	3.0	94	30	2.9
Financial relationships with State government	42	28	2.4	31	13	3.1	84	27	2.8

* Respondents were asked to rank five operational aspects of their regional council according to the degree to which it was a problem during the indicated time periods. (One being the most important problem, two the next most important problem, etc.)

of size. These trends continued in 1970-1971.

The ACIR-ICMA poll found that minority citizen participation was an especially acute problem. While directors believed generally that their regional council's activities were moderately known to citizens and community groups, half thought that the organization was scarcely known to minority groups. In the opinion of the executive directors, minorities tended to be lower in their levels of involvement in and understanding of regional affairs, compared with civic, transportation, environmental, business, and other groups. The most commonly used methods for getting citizens involved in council affairs were direct personal contact by the staff, advisory committees, and public participation on boards

or committees. Fifty-six percent of the councils had an on-going information program.

With respect to SMSA status, for all three time periods covered in the ACIR-NARC survey, both metropolitan and non-metropolitan regional councils reported difficulty in citizen participation and relations with other areawide bodies. A large proportion of the latter also were concerned about their financial and program dealings with the State government.

A somewhat different pattern emerges from a consideration of problem severity, as measured by weighted means. From 1965-1971, the most difficult aspects involved in the operation of smaller regional councils (under 75,000) were implementation, legal relations

with the State, and the powers of the policy board and its officers. Those of medium-sized organizations (between 75,000 and 250,000) were mainly limited to voting and special district relationships prior to 1969 and to implementation and policy board powers after that time. The largest regional councils in 1965-1967 experienced severe problems with voting apportionment, debates over the dominance of the regional body by a single member, and the powers of the policy board and officers; in 1968-1969 dues assessment, representation, and voting came to the forefront; and in 1970-1971 implementation, dominance, and relations with other areawide bodies were the chief challenges.

Turning to metropolitan-non-metropolitan contrasts

and similarities, during each time period regional councils operating in the former areas reported implementation as a critical problem, while those in the latter indicated difficulties over the powers of the policy board and officers. The other top concerns of metropolitan organizations shifted from State funding and dominance by a single jurisdiction in 1965-1967, to special district relations and voting in 1968-1969, to member dominance in 1970-1971. The prime concerns on non-metropolitan councils changed from staff-policy board relationships, to voting and State programs, to legal relations with the State and areawide body relationships over these three periods.

Local chief executive and administrative officials and

Table III-26

**Significance of Barriers to Expanded Regional Action on Areawide Problems*:
1972**

Barrier	Percent Reporting No Significance	Percent Reporting Little Significance	Percent Reporting Moderate Significance	Percent Reporting Great Significance
Legal barriers in State laws	62%	7%	10%	21%
Voluntary nature of membership	55	6	14	25
Lack of leadership by policy board	62	8	12	18
Reluctance to make policy decisions affecting all local members	58	7	14	21
Local member resistance to implementation of areawide policies	51	7	14	27
Lack of professional personnel	64	7	9	20
Lack of Federal financial support	53	4	11	33
Lack of State financial support	47	4	9	41
Lack of local financial support	62	8	9	21
Lack of private sector support	71	8	9	13
Preference for use of single purpose areawide units for planning and administration	68	5	11	16
Political traditions opposing metropolitan/regional government	35	7	13	45

N = 305

*Respondents were asked to evaluate the five most significant barriers to expanded regional council action on areawide problems (one being an insignificant barrier; 2 being little significance; 3 being of moderate significance, and 4 or 5 being of great significance).

regional council directors viewed these problems somewhat similarly (see Chapter IV). Generally, a slightly higher proportion of directors reported for each area and time period. However, for all three time periods, voting apportionment and representation were considered as a source of difficulty by a higher percentage of mayors and county executives. More local officials also reported dominance by a single jurisdiction and powers of policy board and its officers as problems during 1968-1969 and 1970-1971.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

As indicated earlier, some observers consider regional councils to be evolving incrementally in the direction of metropolitan or areawide governments with responsibility for performing certain operational programs. Others view these organizations as moving toward "umbrella" agency status, by being piggybacked for federally supported areawide functional planning and acting as holding companies for subordinate operating units like special districts. Still others believe that due to their organizational and representational constraints, regional councils will remain functionally circumscribed and basically will conduct physical planning and reviews of Federal grant-in-aid applications. And a few feel that regional councils should be abolished, because they are considered as unresponsive regional bureaucracies, unwieldy supergovernments, or even as impediments to restructuring of local government in metropolitan areas.

As reflected in Table III-26, regional council directors identified only a few significant barriers to expanded regional council action on areawide problems. Political traditions opposing areawide government was the principal attitudinal hurdle, while lack of State financial support was cited as the major fiscal obstacle. Otherwise, relatively few potential barriers were regarded as being significant, although some concern was evidenced with respect to inadequate Federal aid, local member resistance to areawide policy implementation, and the voluntary nature of council membership.

City and county officials responding to the ACIR-ICMA survey also focused on anti-metropolitan or regional government political traditions as the prime barrier to broadened council activity on areawide problems. Unlike the directors, however, many were troubled by legal restraints in State laws and lack of local financial support.

If regional council directors foresee only a few major barriers in the path of greater areawide problem solving, then in what specific directions would they like their organization to head? Table III-27 provides some answers to this question. Most directors were expansionist in their attitudes; only a handful, for example, revealed a preference for being divested of their A-95 clearinghouse responsibilities and only a quarter wished to retain their present functions without assu-

ming new ones.

In general, the majority of regional council directors preferred to undertake greater responsibilities in coordinating and monitoring both areawide and local activities. Eighty-seven percent indicated that the regional council should be designated as the official body for Federal and State areawide planning, instead of single purpose districts. Almost three-fourths specifically supported the umbrella agency concept. Consistent with this idea, 69 percent believed their regional council should have power to veto the program plans and capital budgets of special districts and 56 percent favored a regional veto role vis-a-vis local plans. Moreover, nearly half felt the regional council should perform certain line functions.

Non-metropolitan organizations with jurisdiction over less than 250,000 people were most interested in moving in these directions in the future. Mayors and county executives generally agreed with this approach, provided local officials controlled the umbrella agency, but a lesser proportion were willing to accept a regional council veto power over local projects or assumption of operational responsibilities.

CONCLUSION: REGIONAL COUNCILS AT THE CROSSROADS

More than anything else, American substate regionalism represents an indigenous attempt to adapt our public institutions to deal with the problems accompanying population growth and technological change, without running too hard against certain political-cultural rigidities that seemingly cannot be overcome short of major survival-related crises. Although drawing upon a Western European, and particularly a British, heritage in certain basic respects, American substate regionalism is a distinctly native product. It reflects the unique nature of the American federal system, with its own political access channels and methods to demand articulation and realization. It is fluid and evolutionary like the system of which it is a part. Within this framework, regional councils serve as excellent examples of the strengths and weaknesses of the process of institutional adaptation.

Governmental reformers have long maintained that the lack of adequate areawide planning and programming was one of the major facets of the so-called "urban problem." They have claimed that metropolitan areas possess the requisite resources to meet their needs if only they could be mobilized on an areawide basis. They have cataloged a number of problems which transcend local government boundaries, and have emphasized the economies of scale and other benefits of regional approaches to public service delivery. The jurisdictionally fragmented metropolitan landscape was seen as dysfunctional to the solution of problems and provision of services in an increasingly interdependent society.

The general failure of proposals to restructure and

Table III-27

Possible Future Directions of Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Total Number Reporting (A)	Designation as Official Regional Planning Body for Federal and State Program		"Umbrella" Agency to Review Single-Purpose Areawide District Plans		Veto Power Over Single Purpose Areawide Districts Plans and Capital Budgets	
		No. Affirmative	% of (A)	No. Affirmative	% of (A)	No. Affirmative	% of (A)
Total, All Councils	3	3	100%	3	100%	3	100%
Population Group							
Unknown	75	67	89	55	73	51	68
0 - 74,000	139	122	88	91	66	98	75
75,000 - 249,000	51	40	78	42	82	32	63
250,000 - 499,000	27	26	96	17	63	18	67
500,000 - 999,000	7	5	71	5	71	3	43
1,000,000 - 1,999,000	10	9	90	7	70	9	90
Over 2,000,000							
Metropolitan Status							
Coterminous with SMSA	70	59	84	46	66	43	61
Partial SMSA	18	12	67	14	78	10	56
More than one SMSA	81	72	89	59	73	59	73
Non-SMSA	143	129	90	101	71	102	71
Clearinghouse Status							
A-95 Clearinghouse	256	226	88	181	71	171	67
Not A-95 Clearinghouse	48	38	79	33	69	38	79

Table III-27
(cont.)

Classification	Total Number Reporting (A)	Veto Power Over Local Plans and Projects Not Conforming to Areawide Plans		Operational Responsibilities for Certain Local Government Line Functions		No Additional A-95 Functions Responsibilities	
		No. Affirmative	% of (A)	No. Affirmative	% of (A)	No. Affirmative	% of (A)
Total, All Councils							
Population Group							
Unknown	3	2	67%	0	0%	2	67%
0 - 74,000	75	44	59	34	45	23	31
75,000 - 249,000	139	86	62	73	53	36	26
250,000 - 499,000	51	20	39	20	39	11	22
500,000 - 999,000	27	14	52	10	37	4	15
1,000,000 - 1,999,000	7	4	57	3	43	0	0
Over 2,000,000	10	4	40	7	70	3	30
Metropolitan Status							
Coterminous with SMSA	70	33	47	30	43	16	23
Partial SMSA	18	8	44	7	39	8	44
More than one SMSA	81	43	53	36	44	16	20
Non-SMSA	143	90	63	74	52	39	27
Clearinghouse Status							
A-95 Clearinghouse	256	141	55	122	48	66	26
Not A-95 Clearinghouse	48	27	56	21	44	11	23

Table III-27
(cont.)

Classification	Total Number Reporting (A)	Discontinuation of A-95 Clearinghouse Responsibilities		Abolishment of Council	
		No. Affirmative	% of (A)	No. Affirmative	% of (A)
Total, all councils					
Population Group					
Unknown	3	0	0%	0	0%
0 - 74,000	75	3	4	0	0
75,000 - 249,000	139	5	4	0	0
250,000 - 499,000	51	5	10	0	0
500,000 - 999,000	27	4	15	0	0
1,000,000 - 1,999,000	7	0	0	0	0
Over 2,000,000	10	1	10	0	0
Metropolitan Status					
Coterminous with SMSA	70	3	4	0	0
Partial SMSA	18	3	17	0	0
More than one SMSA	81	6	7	0	0
Non-SMSA	143	6	4	0	0
Clearinghouse Status					
A-95 Clearinghouse	256	14	6	0	0
Not A-95 Clearinghouse	48	3	6	0	0

consolidate local government to win voter approval or State support generated increased interest in other approaches on the part of Federal, State, and local policy-makers. A major politically acceptable alternative to fragmentation was the voluntary association of local government officials.

The growing recognition of the lack of success of metropolitan planning provided a further stimulus to change. Separated as it was from public decision making, the planning process had proven ineffectual in terms of the implementation of regional plans. As civic leaders became more and more aware of the limitations on areawide action stemming from the multiplicity of local governments and the difficulty of carrying out regional plans, they joined in the search for a suitable alternative arrangement. One such approach was the council of governments, which was seen as a device for putting regional planning into the local government mainstream.

The 1954 Housing Act provision establishing the Section 701 program fostered a substantial increase in individual municipal and county planning activity, but it did little initially to encourage planning on a metropolitan basis. Rather, by strengthening planning in recently established suburbs, the early "701" program had the effect of stimulating a fragmented areawide planning process. Even with passage of the more metropolitan-oriented Housing Acts of 1959 and 1961 and the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962, by 1963 only two-thirds of the 212 SMSA's were engaged in some form of public regional planning. Even then, the agencies performing this activity were often severely handicapped by small and uncertain budgets, insufficient legal power to permit active participation in local and areawide development decisions, and general lack of clear statutory direction and implementation authority.

With the arrival of "creative federalism" during the mid-1960's came a proliferation of new Federal planning requirements and assistance programs aimed at the regional level. The present regional council dilemma is a product of ambivalent Federal policies and inconsistent State action. On the one hand, the Federal government sponsors a comprehensive approach to regional planning and grant coordination and, on the other, it supports function-by-function areawide planning and project development. This bifurcation was exemplified by the Section 204 review requirements of the Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, and the functional planning program of the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Service Amendments of the same year. The trend toward procedural comprehensiveness in the context of separate functional planning processes, often performed by distinct organizations, has remained to the present, and has minimized the potential effectiveness of regional planning in both urban and rural areas.

Amidst the multitude of federally supported areawide functional planning bodies, regional confederalism has

continued to flourish. Over 600 regional councils have been established in the last eight years to undertake comprehensive planning, coordinate areawide development, provide technical and "grantsmanship" assistance, and (for 445 bodies) perform A-95 review and comment functions.

In recent years, however, many metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have witnessed increased competition between the regional council and its neighboring areawide functional planning bodies, as well as growing tension among the council's core-city, suburban, and rural member jurisdictions. This tension has strained regional confederalism, since it involves fundamental questions of generalist-specialist relations, centralization and decentralization of functions, equity, and balanced growth. As a result, regional councils are now at a major crossroad in their future role in the American political system.

Although they will be discussed in greater depth in a later chapter, six basic challenges confronting regional councils deserve mention.

-Despite increasing pressure from central cities for proportionate representation as regional council functional and grant administration responsibilities grow, the majority of regional councils continue to rely on a voting system that gives each member jurisdiction equal power in regional decision-making regardless of size, financial contributions, or needs.

-Although initially established to provide a forum for interlocal communication and problem-solving, many regional councils have become heavily dependent on Federal funds, with the result that local goals and priorities are sometimes displaced by Federal ones, and membership is no longer truly voluntary.

-Federal planning funds have spurred regional councils into controversial social and life-style areas, but some of these bodies have not established the necessary machinery for handling central city-suburb and inter-suburban conflict.

-Regional councils are producing more and more comprehensive and functional plans, yet still lack the power to implement them directly or to compel or coerce constituent general purpose jurisdictions or special districts to carry out or abide by them.

-Even though a consensus is emerging regarding the need to perform certain urban functions on an areawide basis, only a handful of regional councils have been able to assume operational responsibilities for public services and programs.

-While considerable support exists among regional council directors, mayors, and county executives for these organizations to become umbrella agencies, the feudalistic attitudes of program specialists and the general public's opposition to metropolitan or regional government remain considerable barriers to expanded action.

Professor Henry J. Schmandt has succinctly stated

the present dilemma of regional councils: "COGs are kept busy, on the one hand, trying to demonstrate to federal authorities that they are worthwhile investments and, on the other, reassuring local units that they constitute no threat to them."⁹⁴ The essential issue, then, involves whether in light of growing demands for areawide public service delivery and authoritative

decision making, regional councils can continue to serve two masters. In a real sense, their rather fragile structure is being strained by the conflicting objectives and strategies of higher and lower authorities. The possible future directions of the regional council movement in response to these challenges, and their consequences, will be discussed in a later chapter.

Footnotes

¹See: American Society of Planning Officials, *Voluntary Metropolitan Governmental Councils* (Chicago: The Society, August, 1962), p. 2; National Service to Regional Councils, *Regionalism: A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Service, 1971), p. 6.

²See: National Service to Regional Councils, "Regional Alternatives: Special Report #2" (Washington, D.C.: The Service, May, 1968), p. 8; National Service to Regional Councils, "Regional Council Bylaws: Special Report #4" (Washington, D.C.: The Service, May, 1968), p. 3.

³See: Joan B. Aron, *The Quest for Regional Cooperation: A Study of the New York Metropolitan Regional Council* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 5; Roscoe C. Martin, *Metropolis in Transition: Local Government Adaptation to Changing Urban Needs* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, September, 1963), p. 6.

⁴National Service to Regional Councils, *1971 Regional Council Directory* (Washington, D.C.: The Service, 1971), p. 5.

⁵See: Mel Scott, *American City Planning Since 1809* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 206; National Service to Regional Councils, *Regionalism: A New Dimension*, p. 4.

⁶Bureau of Public Affairs, Boston College, *Metropolitan Boston: A Fresh Approach* (Boston: The Bureau, August, 1967), pp. 9-10.

⁷Scott, *American City Planning Since 1809*, pp. 100-109; William I. Goodman, ed., *Principles and Practice of Urban Planning* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1968), p. 20.

⁸Scott, *American City Planning Since 1809*, p. 176.

⁹Scott, *American City Planning Since 1809*, pp. 200, 223-224, 261-264.

¹⁰Scott, *American City Planning Since 1809*, p. 206; Goodman, *Principles and Practice of Urban Planning*, p. 23.

¹¹Lucas County (Ohio) Planning Commission (1924); Niagara Frontier Planning Board (Buffalo, N.Y.) (1925); Santa Barbara County (California) Planning Commission (1927); City-County Planning Commission of Lexington and Fayette County (Kentucky) (1928); Hamilton County (Ohio) Regional Planning Commission (1929); Kern County (California) Planning Commission (1929); Glynn County (Georgia) Planning Commission; Onondaga County (New York) Planning Commission; Monroe County (New York) Planning Commission; Albany (New York) Capital District Planning Commission.

¹²Metropolitan or regional councils of governments can trace their origin in form to the Metropolitan Borough's Standing Joint Committee, created in 1912 in the Greater London area, to achieve interborough cooperation and act as liaison between them and higher public authorities.

¹³Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Metropolitan Ecumenism: Road to the Promised Land?" *Journal of Urban Law*, Spring, 1967, pp. 433-57.

¹⁴For a discussion of the evolution of Federal policy concerning metropolitan planning see: Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, *Comprehensive Planning for Metropolitan Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Center, 1970), pp. 44-65. Mimeographed.

¹⁵Housing Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 590 (1954), 40 U.S.C. 461 (1965).

¹⁶Interstate Highway and Defense Act of 1956, 70 STAT. 374, 23 U.S.C. 101 (1956).

¹⁷Joseph F. Zimmerman, "The Planning Riddle," *National Civic Review*, April, 1968, pp. 189-94.

¹⁸See: National League of Cities and National Association of Counties, *Voluntary City-County Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: The League and Association, 1963). Mimeographed.

¹⁹Housing Act of 1961, 75 STAT. 183, 42 U.S.C. 1500 (1961).

²⁰Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, 76 STAT. 1145, 23 U.S.C. 101 (1962).

²¹American Society of Planning Officials, *Voluntary Metropolitan Governmental Councils*.

²²U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Effectiveness of Metropolitan Planning*, by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1964).

²³U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, *National Survey of Metropolitan Planning* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 1963).

²⁴Martin, *Metropolis in Transition*.

²⁵U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, *1964 National Survey of Metropolitan Planning* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March, 1965).

²⁶Martin, *Metropolis in Transition*, p. 49.

²⁷Martin, *Metropolis in Transition*, p. 49.

²⁸Joint Center for Urban Studies, *The Effectiveness of Metropolitan Planning*.

²⁹These case studies draw upon the following sources: Martin, *Metropolis in Transition*, pp. 27-50; Royce Hanson, *Metropolitan Councils of Governments* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, August, 1966); Aron, *The Quest for Regional Cooperation*; and annual reports of individual regional councils.

³⁰Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 75 STAT. 302, 49 U.S.C. 1601 (1964).

³¹Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79 STAT. 451, 42 U.S.C. 3102 (1965).

³²Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 79 STAT. 552, 42 U.S.C. 3121 (1965).

³³Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, 79 STAT. 5, 40 U.S.C. 105 (1965).

³⁴National Association of Regional Councils, *1972 Regional Council Directory* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1972), pp. iv-v.

³⁵National Service to Regional Councils, *Regionalism: A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations*, p. 5.

³⁶Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 80 STAT. 1255, 42 U.S.C. 3301-314 (1966).

³⁷Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 STAT 197, 18 U.S.C. 921 (1968).

³⁸U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Making the Safe Streets Act Work: An Intergovernmental Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 1970), p. 33.

³⁹Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 STAT. 476, 12 U.S.C. 1701 (1968).

⁴⁰Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 82 STAT. 1103, 42 U.S.C. 4201-243 (1970).

⁴¹U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Circulars MD 6415.1-MD 6415.3, *Areawide Planning Requirements* (Washington, D.C.: The Department, August 28, 1969).

⁴²Zimmerman, 1967 *Metropolitan Area Annual*; 1968 *Metropolitan Area Annual*; and Joseph F. Zimmerman and Mary E. Snyder, "New Trends Seen in Area Planning," *National Civic Review*, September, 1967, pp. 470-74.

⁴³The following reports were published by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan: *Research Brief on Membership, Representation, and Voting Procedures of Councils of Governments* (January, 1966); *Research Brief on Regional Planning Processes and Programs of Councils of Governments* (February, 1966); *Research Brief on Financing of Eight Selected Councils of Governments* (February, 1966); and *Research Brief on Selecting Representatives to Serve on Major Policy Bodies* (February, 1966).

⁴⁴Royce Hanson, *Metropolitan Councils of Government*. Using field interviews and surveys in a summary comparative case study approach, Hanson examined the origins, activities and functions, membership, internal structure and procedures, committee structure, staffing, and self-limitations of the councils, as well as the problems of finances, legal authority, inter-organizational competition, and the roles of central cities in such bodies. He analyzed the seven COG's previously studied by Citizens Research Council, but substituted the Supervisors Inter-County Committee for the Metropolitan Regional Council.

⁴⁵Charles W. Harris, *Regional COGs and the Central City* (Detroit: The Metropolitan Fund, Inc., March, 1970).

⁴⁶B. Douglas Harman, "Councils of Governments: Trends and Issues," *Urban Data Service* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, February, 1969).

⁴⁷Harris, *Regional COGs and the Central City*, p. 3.

⁴⁸Charles W. Harris, "Regional Responses to Metro-Urban Problems: Councils of Governments" (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 5-9, 1972), p. 8. Mimeographed.

⁴⁹Victor Jones, "Metropolitan Detente: Is it Politically and Constitutionally Possible?" *George Washington Law Review*, May, 1968, p. 742.

⁵⁰Glen R. Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency: A Case Study* (unpublished Master's thesis, University of North Carolina, 1972) p. 1.

⁵¹Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, pp. 29-30.

⁵²Under the Housing Act of 1965, regional planning programs in the areas of water, sewer, and open space facilities were necessary before a locality would be eligible for a Federal grant for one of those functional areas. HUD used this requirement to set up criteria for regional agencies; HUD had to certify the adequacy of the area's planning before grants could be received. Certification I, effective January 1, 1971, dealt with the area to be covered by a regional planning agency and with the composition of the agency itself. Certification II, effective October 31, 1971, mandated areawide comprehensive planning.

Certification III, effective October 1, 1972, required additional functional planning in water, sewer, and open space. All three certifications were necessary to be eligible for water, sewer, and open space funding.

⁵³Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, pp. 29-30.

⁵⁴Norman Krumholz, "Cleveland's Fight for a Fair Share of the Region," *Planning*, November, 1972, p. 275.

⁵⁵Krumholz, "Cleveland's Fight for a Fair Share of the Region." p. 275.

⁵⁶Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 1.

⁵⁷Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, pp. 41-42.

⁵⁸Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 43.

⁵⁹Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 43.

⁶⁰Douglas C. Montgomery, *Federal Versus Local Autonomy: Conflicts in Decertification and Recertification* (paper presented at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 7.

⁶¹Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 45.

⁶²Montgomery, *Federal Versus Local Autonomy*, p. 8.

⁶³Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 45.

⁶⁴Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 51.

⁶⁵Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 66.

⁶⁶Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, pp. 54-55.

⁶⁷Montgomery, *Federal Versus Local Autonomy*, p. 11.

⁶⁸Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 56.

⁶⁹Montgomery, *Federal Versus Local Autonomy*, p. 15.

⁷⁰Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 63.

⁷¹At the November 1972 NOACA Board Meeting the issue of I-290 was reopened and the original recommendation on the Southern Heights corridor was withdrawn since the Ohio Department of Highways had dropped the corridor.

⁷²Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency* pp. 68-69.

⁷³Montgomery, *Federal Versus Local Autonomy*, p. 20.

⁷⁴Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 64.

⁷⁵Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, p. 65.

⁷⁶Stine, *The Process of Recertifying an Areawide Agency*, pp. 67-68.

⁷⁷*The People ex rel. Evelle J. Younger v. County of El Dorado, et al.*, Supreme Court of California, August 17, 1971.

⁷⁸*Education/Instruction, et. al v. Thomas Moore, et. al*, U.S. District Court, Hartford, Connecticut, June 13, 1973.

⁷⁹"Chronicle," *City*, Winter 1972, pp. 57-58.

⁸⁰Victor Jones, "New Local Strategies," *National Civic Review*, March, 1970, p. 130.

⁸¹Melvin B. Mogulof, *Governing Metropolitan Areas: A Critical Review of Councils of Governments and the Federal Role* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1971), p. 13.

⁸²Harris, "Regional Responses to Metro-Urban Problems: Councils of Governments," p. 14.

⁸³For a summary of earlier NARC surveys on COG finances, see Parris N. Glending, "The Federal Role in Regional Planning Councils: Trends and Implications," (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Political Science Association, New Orleans, April 9-10, 1970). Mimeographed.

⁸⁴Data concerning the professional staff size and composition of A-95 clearinghouses are contained in Chapter V.

⁸⁵Martin, *Metropolis in Transition*, p. 49.

⁸⁶Stanley Scott and John C. Bollens, *Governing a Metropolitan Region: The San Francisco Bay Area* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1968), p. 86.

⁸⁷Mogulof, *Governing Metropolitan Areas*.

⁸⁸Harris, *COGs and the Central City*, p. 26.

⁸⁹Hanson, *Metropolitan Councils of Governments*, p. 34.

⁹⁰John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, *The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life* (2nd ed., revised; New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 443.

⁹¹John A. Bielec, *Metropolitan Regional Council Decision-Making: Public Program Selection, Environmental Influence and*

Executive Rationality (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, 1972), p. 443.


⁹²Vincent L. Marando, "Metropolitan Research and Councils of Governments," *Midwest Review of Public Administration*, February, 1971, pp. 7-10. See also Oliver P. Williams, "Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, December, 1967, pp. 299-310; and Matthew Holden, Jr., "The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in Diplomacy," *Journal of Politics*, August, 1964, pp. 627-47.

⁹³See Harris, *Regional COG's and the Central City*, pp. 8-12.

⁹⁴Henry J. Schmandt, "Intergovernmental Volunteerism," in *The Regionalist Papers* (Detroit, the Metropolitan Fund, V), p.8 Mimeographed, forthcoming.

CHAPTER IV

**REGIONAL COUNCIL PERFORMANCE:
LOCAL AND
MINORITY PERSPECTIVES**



During the latter half of the 1960's, regionalism became a generally accepted approach to planning and problem-solving in most of the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of the United States. City and county officials found themselves confronted by a growing number of problems that transcended the boundaries of individual jurisdictions and spurred by areawide planning incentives and requirements attached to Federal grants-in-aid. So these officials searched for a regional planning and administrative process that was broader and more systematic than previous attempts to meet cooperatively specific common needs through shared facilities, inter-local contracts and joint service agreements, and special districts. At the same time, this process had to be easier to establish and less radical and preemptive than a consolidated city-county or other type of metropolitan government. And it had to preserve local self-determination and the prerogatives of representatives of constituent jurisdictions. The movement to institutionalize these objectives took the form of regional councils of governments (COG's) and "conferences," "associations," or "committees" of elected officials.

Regional councils include COG's, regional planning commissions (RPC's), economic development districts (EDD's), and certain other voluntary, multi-jurisdictional, and multi-functional organizations representing local elected officials. They are rapidly becoming the cornerstone of regionalism in this country. According to the latest membership directory published by the National Association of Regional Councils, in 1972 over 600 regional councils existed, compared with 142 three years earlier. Their growth is attributable to a number of factors, including (1) expansion of the "701" comprehensive planning assistance program in 1965 to include COG's as eligible recipients of funds; (2) implementation of requirements for review and comment on applications for certain Federal and Federally assisted projects for conformance with regional plans contained in Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968; and (3) preferences among several Federal agencies for using areawide bodies for functional planning and grant administration.

Legislative proposals introduced in the 92nd Congress dealing with rural community development revenue sharing, transportation revenue sharing, allied services, water quality, and coastal zones management (and enactment of the latter two bills), suggest continuing popularity of the areawide approach in general and regional councils in particular in the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government. Yet no clear picture has emerged of the current views of local officials concerning regional council performance, although public interest groups representing the Nation's mayors and county executives have endorsed this approach. In addition, while the adverse reactions on the

part of minority groups to city-county consolidation and other proposals for governmental reorganization on an areawide scale have been extensively documented, relatively little is known about the attitudes of minority local officials regarding regional councils. The regional objectives of minority and non-minority city and county officials and the criteria used for assessing these organizations are probably different from those of Federal agencies and the Congress. Hence, knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of regional councils from the vantage point of their members can provide some useful insights to help guide the shaping of future inter-governmental policies on regional planning and programming.

LOCAL PERSPECTIVES

In order to determine local attitudes toward regional councils, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the International City Management Association conducted a joint mail survey of mayors and county chief executives. For survey purposes, a regional council was defined as an organization of local governments having the following characteristics: (1) established to foster cooperative approaches to matters of areawide concern; (2) involved in activities involving more than one policy or program area; (3) having a membership consisting predominantly of elected officials or appointed representatives of constituent local governments; and (4) financed in part by local contributions.

Councils of governments, regional planning commissions, economic development districts, local development districts, and certain other areawide bodies were considered as regional councils, provided they included membership of elected local officials or their representatives and were of a multi-functional, multi-jurisdictional nature.¹ These terms, however, have become less and less accurate in differentiating the regional organization's objectives, structure, activities, and funding sources.

Since the mid-1960's, for example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has been the major supporter of COG's as the vehicle for comprehensive planning in metropolitan areas, while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has looked upon these agencies as grant reviewers and coordinators in both urban and rural areas. Many older metropolitan and regional planning commissions have expanded their functions and local elected official membership and have thus been converted into *de jure* or *de facto* COG's. The U.S. Department of Commerce has organized EDD's to perform economic development and planning functions in certain parts of the country. Yet a number of EDD's have broadened the scope of their responsibilities into other areas such as law enforcement and have provided for majority local government representation on EDD policy boards.

Efforts have been made under Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 to designate the same geographic area and regional organization to serve the varying purposes of several Federal and State areawide programs. These "piggybacking" efforts have clouded past distinguishing features between COG's, RPC's, EDD's, and LDD's so as to make them virtually meaningless.²

Profile of Survey Respondents

In March 1972, the survey instrument was sent to all municipalities over 5,000 population and to all counties. A second mailing in May went to those officials who had not returned the first questionnaire, and in July non-respondents in jurisdictions over 25,000 population received another request.

Appendix Table IV-A presents the responses to the survey. Of the 3,817 questionnaires mailed to cities, 2,081 or 55 percent were returned. Of the 3,047 counties surveyed, 1,384 or 45 percent responded. Although the replies were well stratified, generally the larger and the metropolitan jurisdictions had a higher response rate, as did cities having a council-manager form of government and counties with a chief administrative officer (CAO).

More than half of the cities and counties indicated that their jurisdiction was located within the boundaries of a regional council, and well over four-fifths of these units were members (see Appendix Table IV-B). The tendency of local governments to be located within the boundaries of and to belong to a regional council decreases with size.

Interstate regional councils were separated from intrastate bodies due to their unique geographic and legal status. Of the 894 cities reporting intrastate membership, 56 percent belonged to COG's, 33 percent to RPC's, 8 percent to EDD's, and 4 percent to other areawide bodies. Thirty-seven percent of 668 county respondents belonged to intrastate RPC's, 29 percent to COG's, 16 percent to EDD's, and 7 percent to other regional organizations.

Seven percent (67) of the cities and 3 percent (38) of the counties were members of interstate regional councils. Seventy-eight percent of the former were under 50,000 population, 63 percent were in the North Central region, and 87 percent were in a metropolitan area. Sixty-one percent of the latter were over 50,000 population, 76 percent were in the North Central or Southern regions, and 63 percent were in an SMSA.

A marked geographic pattern is apparent in the overall replies. About four-fifths of the municipalities and two-thirds of the counties in the West and South were located within the boundaries of a regional council, and nine of every ten of these jurisdictions also were members. The response rate for the Northeast was not high, and only a small number of localities in that region indicated they were within regional council borders.

The most common reasons cities gave for not joining a regional council were fear of loss of autonomy or domination by the largest member jurisdiction. Many also felt that planning and services could be performed better at the local level and that the regional council would create unnecessary red tape and would delay outside funding for local programs. County reluctance to join was due mainly to a belief that planning and service delivery could be handled better at the local level and to apprehension about domination of the regional council by its largest members. Counties also were concerned about red tape and the cost to the taxpayer (see Table IV-1 and Appendix Table IV-C).

City size seems to influence the reasons for non-membership. For instance, the fear of unnecessary red tape and the belief that services could be performed better at the local level were cited more often by larger jurisdictions. For counties, however, population does not appear to have a significant effect on the decision to join a regional council.

Geographically, the greatest difference in municipal responses occurred in the loss of autonomy category. Less than a fifth of the cities in the South reported this as a reason for not joining, compared with half of those in the West. Southern counties were quite concerned about the cost, domination, and red tape factors, as well as about keeping planning and services at the local level.

Council-manager cities were more sensitive to the possible loss of autonomy and dominance of a regional council by its largest members than were those operating under the mayor-council form. This finding can be explained mainly by the fact that most council-manager municipalities are smaller, suburban, or independent (non-metropolitan) jurisdictions.³ Several city managers also criticized the regional council for generating unnecessary red tape.

Some of the "other" reasons given for not joining included the feeling that the regional council was another layer of government; that it would become an operational unit and be granted taxing powers; that it duplicated efforts of other organizations; that it had displayed ineffective and irresponsible action; and that these bodies were more appropriate for large metropolitan areas. In addition, a few small jurisdictions stated that regional council bylaws denied them membership because of their size.

Even though they belonged to a regional council at the time the questionnaire was received, some reporting local governments were unable to appraise its performance since it was newly formed and had not yet become active, or because of recent turnover in office. Three percent of the cities and nine percent of the counties declined to make evaluations, citing these factors.

Another category of respondents unable to assess their regional council's record were the members of

Table IV-1

**Reasons for Local Non-Membership in Regional Councils:
1972**

Reason	Number of Cities Reporting	Percent of Total	Number of Counties Reporting	Percent of Total
Total	155	100	49	100
Weakened influence in State and Federal policy decisions	11	7	6	12
Unnecessary red tape delaying Federal funding of local programs	32	21	16	33
Regional council would receive Federal and State funds otherwise allocated to local government	4	3	4	8
Planning and delivery of services could be performed better at local level than at regional level	33	21	23	47
Too costly to taxpayers	30	19	15	31
Domination by largest county or central city	36	23	20	41
Domination by many smaller governments	4	3
Other	56	36	22	45

organizations which had become inactive. Forty-one cities and 15 counties cited this reason. Most inactive councils were found in non-metropolitan areas.

Formation of Regional Councils.

As shown in Table IV-2 (and Appendix Table IV-D), the predominant reason for creating regional councils from the perspective of local officials was to achieve cooperation on general regional problems. The mayor of a small California city, for example, stressed the need for local cooperation through a regional body: "It seems to me it will take giving up some responsibilities on the part of all agencies involved to meet local demands and needs at the lowest possible cost. There has been too much overlap in the past—control must be at the local level." This view was particularly strong in the Northeast region and among members of councils formed between 1954 and 1961.

Compliance with the planning requirements of Federal grant-in-aid programs was considered to be the second most important reason for establishing regional councils. This reflects the fact that over two-fifths of the

city and one-third of the county respondents were members of councils formed between 1966 and 1968, following enactment of Section 701(g) of the 1965 Housing Act, which authorized grants to organizations of public officials representing the political jurisdictions within a metropolitan area or urban region to assist them in undertaking studies, formulating regional plans and programs, and taking other steps to solving areawide problems.

A total of over four-fifths of the reporting local governments, then, believed that the principal purposes for council formation were to meet regional cooperation needs as well as Federal planning requirements. In addition, about three-tenths stated that compliance with areawide review requirements also was an important factor. Three of every ten cities and four of every ten counties gave formalization of informal cooperative arrangements as a for establishing regional councils.

As indicated above, the greatest growth in regional council membership occurred after 1966.⁴ Only about one-sixth of the reporting jurisdictions belonged before the mid-1960's. Although there was a slight tendency for

larger, metropolitan cities and counties to be members before that time, the thrust for regional council membership began uniformly in the post-1966 period for all local classifications.

A slight lag occurred between the peak periods of council formation and membership. The majority of jurisdictions belonged to regional councils created between 1966 and 1968, while the greatest percentage of cities and counties actually became members between 1969 and 1972.⁵

As would be expected, membership in regional councils appears to be based on reasons similar to those given for formation. Table IV-3 (and Appendix Table IV-E) shows that nationally the majority of respondents indicated possible contributions to the solution of areawide problems as the most important reason for joining, followed by a belief that the regional approach was necessary for obtaining Federal funds. A relatively small number replied that this was a requisite for receiving State aid. Another common motive for membership was the use of the regional council as a forum for discussing regional problems.

Some patterns in the responses are discernible. In general, larger jurisdictions (over 100,000 population)

joined a regional council mainly in order to obtain Federal funds, while smaller ones did so to arrive at solutions to local problems. Pre-1961 members believed the council would serve as a forum for discussing and possibly helping to solve regional problems, while those joining later did so primarily to obtain Federal financial assistance.

Representation, Voting, and Member Involvement

Representation and voting formulas have long been issues confronting many regional councils, particularly those in areas experiencing strained relationships between the central city or county and outlying suburban or rural areas. The most common approach is to assign an equal number of representatives or votes to each member jurisdiction, although a growing number of areawide organizations use a population-based formula. Both of these practices present problems for large and small communities alike. When a regional council uses a straight one unit, one vote formula, central cities often contend that they are under-represented, since their vote counts the same as that of a much smaller outlying

Table IV-2

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Forming Regional Councils: 1972

Reason	Number of Cities Reporting	Weighted Mean*	Number of Counties Reporting	Weighted Mean*
Total	987	629
Initiate cooperative approaches to solving general regional problems	829	1.5	531	1.5
Meet serious problem in a specific functional area	228	2.4	153	2.5
Formalize previous informal cooperative arrangements	282	2.6	160	2.5
Offset some State action or threat of action	94	2.3	64	2.3
Compliance with planning requirements of Federal grant-in-aid programs	723	1.8	498	1.9
Compliance with areawide review requirements under Section 204 and Circular A-95	295	2.4	199	2.4

*Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons that their regional council was formed (one being the most important reason, 2 and 3 being the next most important reasons.)

Table IV-3

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Joining Regional Councils:
1972

Reason	Number of Cities Reporting	Weighted Mean*	Number of Counties Reporting	Weighted Mean*
Total	810	573
Forum for discussion of regional problems	413	2.0	277	1.9
Contribute significantly to solution of areawide problems	564	1.8	407	1.8
Contribute significantly to solution of local problems	322	2.1	272	2.0
Improve cooperation between central city and suburbs	169	2.3	83	2.6
Necessary to obtain Federal funds	463	1.8	393	1.8
Necessary to obtain State funds	146	2.2	124	2.3
Concurrence with idea although doubtful of any real local benefits	104	2.4	73	2.4

*Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why their regional council was formed (one being the most important reason; 2 and 3 the next most important reasons).

locality. In some human resources and capital facilities programs targeted on core cities—such as law enforcement, manpower training, health care, and housing—these units can be outvoted by a coalition of suburban jurisdictions which have different program priorities. On the other hand, the smaller municipalities sometimes feel threatened by a population-weighted voting system because of the dominance of the central city. Of the local governments reporting the voting formula for their regional council, 38 percent of 821 cities and 36 percent of 533 counties cited use of one unit, one vote. Thirty-three percent of the former jurisdictions and 34 percent of the latter noted use of population.

Although less common, some regional councils have employed a combination of procedures in their voting to ensure a more equitable method of representation. Four percent of the city and county respondents reported use of population combined with another factor; 2 percent, financial contributions; and 23 percent, a mixed formula such as one unit, one vote with an additional vote for large jurisdictions or two votes for county governments and one vote for other units.

Municipal officials appear to be reasonably satisfied and county officials very satisfied with their representa-

tion on the regional council policy board. Table IV-4 shows that on a five-point scale (five being well represented and one being poorly represented) their cumulative evaluation of representation was 3.8 for the former and 4.3 for the latter.⁶

Smaller communities expressed much greater satisfaction with their representation than the largest ones, and jurisdictions without a chief administrative officer indicated about the same degree as those with one. A higher level of satisfaction was found in non-metropolitan than in metropolitan areas. The five cities that were members before 1953 felt more adequately represented than other respondents, followed by the 288 that joined a regional council between 1969 and 1972. The highest county evaluations, however, came from those who had joined between 1954 and 1965.

Mayors, city managers, and county chief executives and administrators interact frequently with the regional council staff. Nationally, over half of the reporting cities and three-fourths of the counties stated their personal contact with staff occurred often or very often. Although there are some exceptions, respondents generally assessed the amount of their contact with the policy board to be slightly less than with the staff. Members of

Table IV-4

**Level of Satisfaction of Local Government Representation on Regional Council Policy Board:
1972**

Classification	Number of Cities Reporting	Weighted ¹ Mean	Number of Counties Reporting	Weighted ¹ Mean
Total	913	3.8	600	4.3
Population Group				
Over 1,000,000	6	3.5
500,000 - 1,000,000	15*	3.0	18	3.4
250,000 - 500,000	14	3.6	30	4.0
100,000 - 250,000	42	3.6	67	4.5
50,000 - 100,000	91	3.4	85	4.4
25,000 - 50,000	151	3.8	143	4.3
10,000 - 25,000	290	3.8	152	4.4
5,000 - 10,000	310	3.9	60	4.0
Under 5,000	39	4.5
Geographic Region				
Northeast	122	4.1	39	4.4
North Central	234	3.6	145	4.3
South	323	3.8	312	4.3
West	234	3.7	104	4.2
Form of Government				
Without administrator	231	3.6	107	4.3
With administrator	577	3.7	215	4.3
Other	105	4.2	278	4.3
Metropolitan (status)				
Central	148	3.5		
Suburban	404	3.7	157	4.2
Independent	361	4.0	443	4.3
Jurisdictional Boundaries				
Interstate	61	3.4	32	3.8
Non-interstate	852	3.8	568	4.3
Council Formation²				
Pre-1953	5	4.2	1	5.0
1954-1961	50	3.6	28	4.6
1962-1965	130	3.5	60	4.2
1966-1968	322	3.8	192	4.3
1969-1972	288	4.0	245	4.4
Membership to Council³				
Pre-1953	4	4.5	1	3.0
1954-1961	35	3.4	22	4.6
1962-1965	96	3.6	51	4.4
1966-1968	305	3.8	179	4.2
1969-1972	376	3.9	296	4.3

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate on a 5-point scale how well their local government is represented on the regional council policy board (5 being well represented and one being poorly represented).

² 118 city and 74 county respondents indicated level of satisfaction of representation but did not indicate year of formation.

³ 97 city and 51 county respondents indicated level of satisfaction of representation but did not indicate year of membership.

*Responses were combined with those from cities over one million population.

intrastate organizations tended to have contact with the staff and policy board more often than those in interstate regional councils.

Programs and Performance

Although the number of cities and counties receiving planning, technical assistance, and services in various types of program areas ranges widely, their evaluations of regional council performance remain relatively similar for many of the specific functions and most of the size, region, form of government, and metropolitan status classifications (see Table IV-5 and Appendix Table IV-F).⁷ The highest overall rankings occurred in the water and sewer, law enforcement, land use and physical planning areas, while the lowest were for joint purchasing, highway safety, education, and air pollution abatement. In general, however, members were rather neutral in their judgment of the regional council record, or indicated that it had been less than significant in

many areas. The planning director in a large Ohio city, for example, questioned whether regional councils served Federal or local objectives: "If A-95 review agencies, metro governments, or regional planning agencies address themselves only to legitimizing highway programs and providing the rubber stamp for Federal requirements, their actual utility is unclear." Counties tended to rate regional council assistance somewhat higher than cities.

Cities and counties over 250,000 population were most critical of regional council activities. Excluding transportation and open space, jurisdictions under a quarter of a million were more positive in their assessments. Mayor-council cities evaluated regional council assistance more favorably than council-manager governments, as, to a lesser degree, did counties without a chief administrative officer compared to those with a CAO. With the exception of air and water pollution abatement, conservation, transportation, open space, land-use and physical planning, and highway safety,

Table IV-5

Areas in Which Regional Councils Have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems: Local Officials' Perspectives: 1972

Area of Assistance	Number of Cities Reporting	Weighted Mean*	Number of Counties Reporting	Weighted Mean*
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice	638	3.4	398	3.5
Manpower	411	2.4	266	2.9
Health	402	2.3	273	3.0
Community Action	352	2.3	225	2.9
Air Pollution Abatement	367	2.3	186	2.3
Water Pollution Abatement	448	2.9	253	2.9
Conservation	353	2.3	211	2.7
Economic Development	447	2.7	283	3.1
Transportation	503	2.9	260	3.0
Housing	477	2.6	276	2.9
Education	327	2.1	189	2.6
Open Space	512	2.9	260	3.1
Water & Sewer Systems	618	3.5	384	3.7
Solid Waste Disposal	494	2.9	313	3.3
Recreation	446	2.7	275	3.1
Juvenile Delinquency	344	2.3	228	2.7
Land Use & Physical Planning	571	3.2	338	3.4
Joint Purchasing	338	1.9	159	1.8
Highway Safety	335	2.1	161	2.3

*Respondents were asked to indicate and evaluate the areas in which the regional council had provided assistance (one being of no significance and 5 being of great significance).

non-metropolitan communities gave regional council programs higher significance ratings than those in SMSA's. Regional council assistance in manpower, health, water pollution abatement, conservation, economic development, and water and sewers was evaluated more positively by central than by suburban municipalities.

The geographic region, age of the regional council, and length of city membership categories show differing evaluations according to each function. No clear pattern emerged with regard to the assessments in these areas.

Of the 19 programs listed in Table IV-5, over half of the local governments reported involvement by the regional council in three planning and service areas—law enforcement and criminal justice, water and sewer systems, and land-use and physical planning. More than half of the cities pointed out that their council also was

active in transportation, open space, and solid waste disposal. These six programs were not only the most frequently mentioned, they also were the most highly regarded in terms of the significance of the assistance rendered by the areawide body.

Unlike the results of the evaluation of specific regional council programs, wide variations are evident in city and county assessments of the general areawide coordination, planning, technical assistance, and grant administration efforts of these organizations (see Table IV-6 and Appendix Table IV-G). Review and coordination of applications for Federal grants-in-aid under OMB Circular A-95 was definitely viewed as the most successful activity of regional councils, followed by similar handling of applications for State grants (where authorized) and communications among local officials. For

Table IV-6

**Local Government Evaluation of Regional Council Activities:
1972**

Activity	Number of Cities Reporting	Weighted Mean*	Number of Counties Reporting	Weighted Mean*
Total	987	668
Communications among local officials	901	3.5	568	3.7
General local government coordination	890	3.1	562	3.4
Review and coordination of applications for Federal grants-in-aid	880	3.9	556	4.0
Review and coordination of applications for State grants-in-aid	838	3.6	526	3.8
Comprehensive physical planning	822	3.1	483	3.3
Comprehensive social planning	789	2.3	439	2.4
Economic development planning and programming	787	2.6	463	3.1
Development of specific functional plans	812	3.3	475	3.6
Implementation of comprehensive and functional plans	791	2.5	457	2.8
Solution of particular local government problems	813	2.5	475	2.9
Technical assistance to member governments	812	3.0	493	3.5
Education of the public on metropolitan/ regional affairs	814	2.5	470	2.7
Communications with local citizens	813	2.3	489	2.7
Generation of new ideas about local problems	815	2.8	482	3.1

* Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council's activities on a 5-point scale (one being not successful and 5 being very successful).

each category, county evaluations of regional council performance were higher than those of cities.

Other regional council activities considered to have been carried out fairly successfully were development of specific functional plans for open space, water and sewer, and other functions; general local government coordination; technical assistance to members; and comprehensive physical planning. The two areas ranked least successful were comprehensive social planning and communications with local citizens.

For certain activities, there was some contrast in the evaluative score by different city and county classifications. Smaller jurisdictions (under 50,000 population) were more positive than larger ones in their assessment of regional council economic development planning and programming, implementation of plans, and local problem-solving. Early council members were much more satisfied than recent ones with the council's work in

comprehensive physical planning and the development of specific functional plans.

Problems and Barriers to Their Solution

Table IV-7 shows that local governments considered implementation of comprehensive and functional plans to be the most serious problem facing regional councils. The percentage of cities viewing implementation as a problem almost doubled, to over two-fifths, between 1965-1967 and 1970-1971. An Oregon mayor underscored some of the reasons for this attitude: "Studies, statistics, and plans have accumulated for every imaginary area and mostly gathered dust on shelves if they escaped the incinerator. Efforts and funds should now be directed toward implementation." Other major problem areas were participation of the regional council in Federal programs, member representation, citizen par-

Table IV-7

Local Government Views on Operational Problems Faced by Regional Council: 1965-1967, 1968-1969, 1970-1971

	1965-67		1968-69		1970-71	
	City	County	City	County	City	County
Total-Number Reporting	351	198	588	348	813	540
Percent of Total						
Voting Apportionment	12	13	11	11	14	11
Representation	21	20	19	17	22	19
Citizen Participation	12	24	16	21	22	28
Assessment of Dues	15	23	16	20	19	20
Dominance by a Single Jurisdiction	15	16	16	12	17	12
Federal Program Participation	17	22	22	24	29	30
Relationships with Other Areawide Bodies*	12	14	15	17	19	21
Relationships with Special Districts	9	10	10	7	13	9
Relationships with State	14	18	17	19	20	22
Relationships with Statewide Association of Local Government Officials	7	5	7	4	8	6
Powers of the Policy Board and Its Officers	13	18	14	15	19	15
Committee Structure	9	10	10	11	13	11
Staff-Policy Board Relationships	8	11	11	10	13	11
Implementation of Comprehensive and Functional Plans	23	36	27	30	41	34
Other	7	4	5	3	11	6

*Manpower, comprehensive health, law enforcement, and other Federally supported regional planning organizations.

Table IV-8

**Local Government Views on Barriers to Expansion of Regional Council Action on Areawide and Local Problems:
1972**

Problems	Areawide				Local Problems			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
Legal restraints in State laws	111	66	2.5	2.3	102	71	2.6	2.3
Voluntary nature of membership	152	73	2.6	2.8	162	64	2.5	2.8
Lack of leadership by policy board	67	31	2.9	3.1	72	29	3.3	3.0
Reluctance to make policy decisions affecting all members	110	77	3.0	3.1	107	71	3.1	3.2
Local member resistance to implementation of areawide policies	186	110	2.8	2.9	197	100	2.5	2.9
Lack of professional personnel	60	56	3.0	2.6	87	39	3.1	3.8
Lack of Federal financial support	71	64	2.8	2.6	92	55	2.9	2.7
Lack of State financial support	78	66	2.9	2.7	90	56	2.8	2.8
Lack of local financial support	65	73	2.9	2.5	104	51	2.9	2.8
Lack of public sector support	42	50	3.4	3.1	63	28	3.6	3.2
Preference for use of single purpose areawide units for planning and administration	70	40	3.4	2.9	66	30	3.1	2.9
Political traditions opposing metropolitan or regional government	207	163	2.4	2.3	261	128	2.3	2.4
Other	21	23	2.1	2.1	26	19	2.7	1.9

*Respondents were asked to evaluate the five most important barriers to expand regional council action (one being the most important barrier, two being the next most important, etc.

ticipation, and dues assessment. Overall, relations with statewide associations of local government officials were thought to involve the least difficulties, followed by committee structure and staff-policy board relationships.

Larger jurisdictions viewed voting apportionment and representation more as a problem than did smaller ones. Central cities were quite concerned with the regional council's relationship with other areawide bodies, such as separate Federally supported organizations for law enforcement planning, comprehensive health planning, manpower planning, and economic development. Its role vis-a-vis special districts was viewed as a problem for interstate organizations more often than for intrastate ones.

Fifty-one percent of the cities and 49 percent of the counties felt that certain barriers had to be overcome before regional councils could expand action in solving local and areawide problems. Larger jurisdictions (over 100,000) and those in metropolitan areas tended to be more pessimistic regarding growth of the regional council's role and responsibilities than did smaller and non-metropolitan jurisdictions. Western and North Central cities and North Central and Northeastern counties were more inclined to indicate barriers. Of the 71 reporting cities over 100,000 population, 86 percent pointed out that there were constraints on broadening regional council programs, compared with 70 percent of the 121 counties of this size.

Barriers to expanded regional council action included the strong desires of many officials for preserving local autonomy, as reflected in the responses showing the presence of political traditions opposing metropolitan or regional government and local member resistance to implementation of areawide policies (see Table IV-8). In addition to these attitudinal restraints, basic structural and operational barriers—legal restraints in State laws and voluntary membership and consensual problem-solving—also stand in the way of expanding regional council action, particularly into controversial and politically sensitive program areas. The mayor of a large Minnesota city stated, "I worked long and hard to establish a regional council but now am much less enthused. A degree of mediocrity is becoming apparent. Politics dictates 'something for everybody,' and there seemingly is no way to concentrate on developing an effective program in one part of the region."

The Future

Lack of public sector support was indicated as a relatively insignificant handicap for future growth of regional councils, despite the opinion shown in Table IV-6 that these organizations have been least successful in communicating with local citizens. Lack of financial assistance from Federal, State, and local sources was viewed as inhibiting expanded activities by only about a

fifth of the city and three-tenths of the county respondents.

Three-fourths of the respondents preferred their regional council to be designated as the official planning body for Federal and State areawide programs—such as manpower, law enforcement, and transportation planning—rather than using single purpose areawide districts (see Table IV-9). The population of a jurisdiction did not appear to greatly affect the desire for a multi-functional regional planning body, although the data show that cities over 250,000 were somewhat more reluctant to assign regional councils a broad role in areawide planning.

Generally, city and county officials appear to have little difficulty with giving regional councils additional responsibilities, as long as their power is kept in check. Four-fifths felt that regional councils should perform the duties of an "umbrella" agency and review and coordinate the plans and programs of single-purpose areawide districts. Yet only a third indicated that regional councils should be allowed to veto plans and capital budgets of special districts.

Local officials were somewhat reluctant to empower regional councils to veto local plans and projects not conforming to areawide plans. Nevertheless, over two-fifths would assign such organizations this power. No discernible pattern appears among the different city or county classifications on this issue.

Nationally, only about one-quarter of the municipalities and one-sixth of the counties favored regional councils assuming operational responsibility for certain functions being performed presently by individual local governments. While Northeastern cities were more inclined to do so than those in other regions, they also were the least willing to give regional councils additional planning responsibilities or a veto power over either local or special districts plans, capital budgets, and projects. A total of 192 municipalities and 96 counties indicated that regional councils should perform operational or line functions. The areas specified most often were solid waste disposal (24 cities, eight counties); water and sewer (21 cities, seven counties); police (15 cities, seven counties); transportation (13 cities, four counties); housing (13 cities, one county); zoning (10 cities, one county); and recreation (10 cities).⁸

Only a relatively small number of localities would like to have discontinued the A-95 clearinghouse responsibilities of regional councils. In general, the respondents appeared content with existing areawide project review requirements. The city manager in a small Colorado municipality favored continuing A-95 responsibilities but suggested some modifications: "There should be a point at which local entities should not have to submit all requested grants through A-95 procedures. For example, why should a mini-park of two acres be subjected to the same review procedures as a multi-

Table IV-9

**Local Government Views on Possible Future Directions of Regional Councils:
1972**

Classification	Designation as Official Regional Planning Body for Federal and State Program						"Umbrella" Agency to Review Single Purpose Areawide District Plans					
	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (A)	% of (B)	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (C)	% of (D)
	City	County	City	County			City	County	City	County		
	(A)	(B)					(C)	(D)				
Total	878	575	660	444	75	77	850	532	677	451	80	85
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	4	...	57	...	7	...	6	...	86
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	19	10	16	63	84	15	19	12	16	80	84
250,000 - 500,000	14	35	9	24	64	69	15	33	12	28	80	85
100,000 - 250,000	44	68	36	52	82	77	44	65	37	55	84	85
50,000 - 100,000	91	82	67	67	74	82	87	80	68	67	78	84
25,000 - 50,000	151	135	121	112	80	83	151	126	120	111	80	88
10,000 - 25,000	279	140	198	99	71	71	264	123	214	104	81	85
5,000 - 10,000	283	54	219	41	77	76	274	51	214	39	78	77
Under 5,000	...	35	...	29	...	83	...	28	...	25	...	89
Geographic Region												
Northeast	117	39	87	25	74	64	106	37	85	34	80	92
North Central	218	136	151	109	69	80	215	125	163	105	76	84
South	314	300	245	233	78	78	299	273	237	230	79	84
West	229	100	177	77	77	77	230	97	192	82	84	85
Form of Government												
Without administrator	222	109	148	85	67	79	203	106	157	89	77	84
With administrator	556	205	435	159	78	78	550	184	442	157	80	85
Other	100	261	77	199	77	76	97	242	78	205	80	85
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	148		116		78		146		119		82	
Suburban	393	164	281	124	72	76	377	162	304	134	81	83
Independent	337	411	263	320	78	78	327	370	254	317	78	86

Table IV-9--Continued

Local Government Views on Possible Future Directions of Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Veto Power Over Single Purpose Areawide Districts Plans and Capital Budgets						Veto Power Over Local Plans and Projects Not Conforming to Areawide Plans					
	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (E)	% of (F)	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (G)	% of (H)
	City	County	City	County			City	County	City	County		
	(E)	(F)					(G)	(H)				
Total	841	524	279	168	33	32	852	542	356	241	42	45
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	1	...	14	...	7	...	3	...	43
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	18	7	9	44	50	16	19	5	9	31	47
250,000 - 500,000	14	33	3	12	21	36	14	34	4	17	29	50
100,000 - 250,000	43	66	18	20	42	30	44	69	26	31	59	45
50,000 - 100,000	86	78	37	30	43	39	89	79	38	38	43	48
25,000 - 50,000	150	123	53	38	35	31	150	128	69	66	46	52
10,000 - 25,000	263	123	86	33	33	27	268	129	107	49	40	38
5,000 - 10,000	269	47	75	14	28	30	271	49	107	13	40	27
Under 5,000	...	29	...	11	...	38	...	28	...	15	...	54
Geographic Region												
Northeast	104	36	23	9	22	25	109	36	31	16	28	44
North Central	216	118	71	47	33	40	220	124	103	67	47	54
South	296	274	84	80	28	29	299	285	116	105	39	37
West	225	96	101	32	45	33	224	97	106	53	47	55
Form of Government												
Without administrator	202	107	61	38	30	36	203	108	79	55	39	51
With administrator	548	180	196	65	36	36	553	190	239	90	43	47
Other	91	237	22	65	24	27	96	244	38	96	40	39
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	144		51		35		145		61		42	
Suburban	371	157	128	52	35	33	379	34	155	14	41	41
Independent	326	367	100	116	31	32	328	508	140	227	43	45

Table IV-9-Continued

Local Government Views on Possible Future Directions of Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Operational Responsibilities for Certain Local Government Line Functions						No Additional A-95 Functions Responsibilities					
	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (I)	% of (J)	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (K)	% (L)
	City	County	City	County			City	County	City	County		
	(I)	(J)					(K)	(L)				
Total	833	525	192	96	23	18	741	481	473	334	64	69
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	2	...	29	...	7	...	4	...	57
500,000 - 1,000,000	15	19	6	7	40	37	14	19	6	10	43	53
250,000 - 500,000	14	33	1	7	7	21	14	33	9	22	64	67
100,000 - 250,000	45	67	14	9	31	13	37	62	22	45	60	73
50,000 - 100,000	83	77	21	16	25	21	73	70	42	46	58	66
25,000 - 50,000	148	121	41	23	28	19	141	109	80	75	57	69
10,000 - 25,000	263	123	52	20	20	16	231	115	154	83	67	72
5,000 - 10,000	265	49	57	9	22	18	231	42	160	29	69	69
Under 5,000	...	29	...	3	...	10	...	24	...	20	...	83
Geographic Region												
Northeast	103	36	33	6	32	17	89	30	58	20	65	67
North Central	212	117	52	23	25	20	174	110	103	75	59	68
South	300	277	67	49	22	18	273	246	193	177	71	72
West	218	95	40	18	10	15	205	95	119	62	58	65
Form of Government												
Without administrator	200	107	38	20	19	19	169	102	113	72	67	71
With administrator	542	188	135	37	25	20	491	172	303	121	62	70
Other	91	230	19	39	21	17	81	207	57	141	70	68
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	142		40		28		131		78		60	
Suburban	368	159	83	35	23	22	323	151	190	101	59	67
Independent	323	366	69	61	21	17	287	330	205	233	71	71

Table IV-9-Continued

Local Government Views on Possible Future Directions of Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Discontinuation of Clearinghouse Responsibilities						Abolishment of Council					
	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (M)	% of (N)	Number Reporting		Number Affirmative		% of (O)	% of (P)
	City	County	City	County			City	County	City	County		
	(M)	(N)					(O)	(P)				
Total	689	447	97	49	14	11	721	460	47	20	7	4
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	1	...	14	...	5
500,000 - 1,000,000	14	18	3	1	21	6	14	18	2	2	14	11
250,000 - 500,000	14	33	1	2	7	6	15	30	...	1	...	3
100,000 - 250,000	36	58	2	6	6	10	35	60
50,000 - 100,000	71	68	10	4	14	6	69	71	4	2	6	3
25,000 - 50,000	133	110	10	15	8	14	135	108	4	4	3	4
10,000 - 25,000	213	97	31	11	15	11	231	107	18	6	8	6
5,000 - 10,000	208	38	40	7	19	18	222	41	19	3	9	7
Under 5,000	...	18	...	2	...	11	...	20	...	2	...	10
Geographic Region												
Northeast	81	30	13	2	16	7	92	32	3	2	3	6
North Central	156	105	28	16	18	15	169	105	13	5	8	5
South	248	225	34	20	14	9	261	238	21	9	8	4
West	204	87	22	11	11	13	199	85	10	4	5	5
Form of Government												
Without administrator	153	96	29	8	19	8	164	96	11	3	7	3
With administrator	465	156	57	23	12	15	481	154	31	9	6	6
Other	71	195	11	18	15	9	76	210	5	8	7	4
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	127		11		9		127		5		4	
Suburban	290	147	48	13	17	9	319	144	18	5	6	4
Independent	272	300	38	36	14	12	275	316	24	15	9	5

million dollar program?" Two-thirds of those reporting wanted regional councils to retain existing A-95 functions but not assume any additional responsibilities.

Nearly all jurisdictions indicated they felt that the regional council approach should be continued. Only 7 percent of the cities and 4 percent of the counties believed these organizations should be abolished. For the most part, they included members of recently formed councils and those which had belonged to such bodies for only a relatively short period of time.

To sum up, the survey results show that in the judgment of their membership, regional council performance has been generally favorable but not outstanding. These organizations are viewed chiefly as having been formed to develop cooperative approaches to areawide problems and to comply with Federal planning requirements. Although there has been some local resistance due to feared loss of autonomy and central city dominance, the number of regional councils and their membership have grown substantially since 1966. This expansion has been mainly in response to Federal initiatives through grant-in-aid programs calling for areawide comprehensive and functional planning, and requirements for the review of applications for certain Federal and Federally assisted projects in terms of their conformance with regional plans. As a result, regional council operations are heavily influenced by Federal funds and regulations.

Most cities and counties appear to be satisfied with their representation in the regional council policy-making process. They do not feel strongly, however, about the significance of regional council planning, technical assistance, and other services in meeting local problems. In many areas, these efforts are regarded as being less than significant. Regional councils have been most successful in reviewing and coordinating applications for Federal and State grants. The greatest obstacle standing in the way of expanded activity is local member resistance to the implementation of areawide plans and programs.

With respect to the future, city and county officials believe that regional councils should undertake more areawide planning responsibilities and serve as umbrella agencies in reviewing and coordinating functional plans prepared by single purpose areawide bodies responsible for law enforcement, health, manpower, and other Federally supported planning programs. Only a small number of cities and counties would like regional councils to assume responsibility for line functions performed by individual local governments.

MINORITY PERSPECTIVES*

Interest in structural reform of local governments reached a peak in the 1950's. In the 1960's, there followed a period of increased planning on a metropolitan areawide scale as a result of Federal grant-in-aid

program requirements. As these developments have grown in size and scope, there has been a parallel increase in the literature addressing their political, social, and economic impact. However, the attention given by academicians and practitioners to the implications of changing local governmental forms for blacks and other minorities has not kept pace with the mounting concern on the part of these groups with the consequences of regionalism.

Metropolitan areawide bodies range from voluntary associations of local governments, such as regional councils, to city-county consolidations and other metropolitan governmental units. While these bodies are intended to improve services to all citizens in an area and to solve problems which extend beyond existing local political boundaries, to varying degrees they cause shifts of political power within the areas involved. In many cases these shifts have occurred just at the time when blacks were gaining political control in some large and small cities. This regional emphasis, coincident with a loss or dilution of black political clout, has evoked expressions of concern by many black leaders.

Little conclusive evidence is available as to the effectiveness of the concept of regionalism when translated into practice. When the focus is narrowed to the impact of regional councils on minorities, the literature is almost non-existent. Two major points can be made:

1. If minority groups do not comprise a majority of the population in a metropolitan area, they may improve their political status under an areawide form of government, because this body may be subject to various Federal requirements which would overcome the racially restrictive policies of smaller individual units of local government.
2. In areas where minority groups are in control of the central city or comprise a significant political majority, they could lose political power in an areawide body because it may be responsive to a majority coalition of suburban and central city whites.

Several contrasting arguments underlie these assumptions. Single-member districts, for example, are considered by some as a means of maximizing black political power on a regional body. Others caution that black majorities in central cities must be careful not to be satisfied with gaining control of an empty purse—that is, an area with declining tax revenues. Thus, blacks should participate in regional cooperative efforts just to maintain the present level of services for their constituents, let alone to improve them. For instance, the Executive Director of the Atlanta Regional Commission has sug-

*This part is based on a report prepared for ACIR by the Joint Center for Political Studies, Washington, D.C.

gested that blacks taking political control of the central city is like "...being in command of a sinking ship" which can only stay afloat with the aid of white suburbs (the "tugboats").⁹ Another viewpoint sees black attitudes toward regionalism as evolutionary: once blacks feel they control a portion of their own destiny they will realize the need for cooperative areawide efforts—rather than separatism—in order to better their standard of living.

Regional Council Literature

Although regional councils are not units of government, black leaders tend to be suspicious of them as disguised forms of broader metropolitan area governments, leading to a possible erosion of hard-won black political power.

A 1970 research brief on blacks and councils of governments concluded that black leaders generally view the regional council movement in metropolitan areas as a potent threat to the sources of their political power.¹⁰ It was found that the views of black leaders were influenced by their knowledge and participation in COG activities, and by whether or not they believed that the problems of central cities were likely to receive adequate attention from the regional council professional staff and the majority of its governing body.

A 1971 study of councils of governments noted that certain new arrangements of governmental forms could both maximize blacks' capacity for realizing benefits from resources available in the region as a whole and maintain their political power.¹¹ One approach suggested was a two-tiered structure—areawide and local—under which the black community could retain some power over the functions which were peculiarly local in nature, but could reap the benefits of regional problem solving in those areas that were more multi-jurisdictional and required greater resources. This arrangement, or a similar one, was thought likely to take place if minority leadership became more involved in COG's. At the same time, however, because of limited time and resources some tension would be created between maintaining efforts at the local level and participation in a regional body.

Another dimension of regionalism centers on the role of comprehensive planning and development agencies under OMB Circular A-95. This circular gives multi-jurisdictional agencies, or clearinghouses, authority to review requests for Federal funds from local governments. Although these organizations cannot veto requests for Federal funds for municipalities with large minority populations, they can thwart or obstruct the process through their review and comment role. It is in the performance of this role that regional councils can threaten the effective control of cities by their black majorities.¹²

Proportional representation of minorities on the governing boards and staffs of regional councils is considered a must by some observers as a way of assuring equitable distribution of resources to central cities with black majorities. The priorities and interests of organizations generally reflect the attitudes of their membership and staff. Hence, as long as there are no guarantees of equitable representation for minorities in proportion to their population strength, the decision making process of regional councils presents a continuous threat to minority political power.¹³ Without adequate safeguards for recognition of minority needs through equitable representation and participation, the COG is likely to have negative effects on the black community. Federal regulations provide some, but not enough, assurances that regional councils will not blatantly ignore the central cities or persist in obvious racist policies, but Federal regulations are not self-enforcing and must be triggered by vigorous protests by those discriminated against.

Metropolitan Government Literature

One of the first major works to draw attention to the possible threats of metropolitanism to black political power in central cities was a series of articles by Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward of Columbia University.¹⁴ Piven and Cloward's main thesis, that metropolitanism will diminish black political power in some major cities, has since become the central theme of the regional debate among both academicians and practitioners.

Piven and Cloward pointed out that while voters were continuing to reject referenda for city-county consolidation, the same objective was being achieved administratively as a result of Federal intervention. Federal grant-in-aid review requirements administered by regional planning agencies had in effect accomplished a form of metropolitan government. The Federal government acted to compel local governments to cooperate on urban problems since "communities fail to deal with many urban problems, not for lack of areawide planning and coordinating, but for lack of political will." The Johnson Administration was accused of using Federally inspired metropolitan consolidation to build a political coalition which would include the growing white suburbs and the racially divided cities.

In contrast to the first articles, the second Piven and Cloward work stated: "We are describing an emerging pattern of metropolitan government: we do not contend that political leaders are conspiring to produce it. No secret blueprint exists."¹⁵ Metropolitan approaches were viewed as sometimes helping the Federal government circumvent opposition to programs which might otherwise encounter resistance if applied only to inner cities. They discussed strategies of participation, bargaining, cooperation, and creating impediments as possible

means by which blacks could affect metropolitanism. However, it was believed that the black community could not be mobilized for an obstructionist strategy even if black leaders were willing. The authors felt that traditional Negro leadership would become an agent of metropolitan government and the "metro" would provide new opportunities for the advancement of a Negro elite, which would be very easily absorbed into the status quo political milieu. At the same time, they saw areawide consolidation and centralization as inevitable, due to technical demands, governmental bureaucracies, and the political needs of a national administration.

While a number of whites may favor an areawide or metropolitan government approach to counter the growing political power of blacks in the central city, the deep and growing fiscal crisis of many central cities is a major incentive for certain groups, even blacks, to favor such restructuring. If conditions in the central city are to be improved, new financial resources must be found. A metropolitan government would be in a position to mobilize considerably greater resources than a central city in order to solve the most pressing problems in the area.

Professor Joseph F. Zimmerman studied the experience of two cities in which metro governments were formed—Nashville, Tennessee, and Jacksonville, Florida.¹⁶ His analysis of voting patterns in Nashville in 1962 showed that both whites and non-whites in the old city voted against the consolidation. Prior to merger there were two blacks on the 31-member Nashville city council and none on the 55-member county council. In 1970, there were five black members on the 40-member Metropolitan Council; 35 of whom were elected by districts. All other elective offices were held by whites. In Jacksonville the black areas voted for consolidation in 1967, a reform that was endorsed by civil rights groups. The proportion of the black population dropped from 42 percent of the old city to 23 percent of the consolidated area.

In an essay which reviewed the impact of metropolitan consolidation on the political standing and economic environment of minority groups, Dale Rogers Marshall concluded that too little is known to tell how minorities are likely to fare under such reforms.¹⁷ His analysis heightened, rather than set to rest, apprehensions that minority groups may indeed have much to lose. According to Marshall, existing literature on this topic follows two main lines of argument. One, made by minorities, centers on political power. They see their power in central cities being diluted by metropolitan government. The second, a counter-argument held by whites, is concerned with the benefits to blacks resulting from improved quality of services. Marshall's analysis of votes on metropolitan reorganization questions in Cleveland, St. Louis, Miami, and Nashville shows blacks to be against these reform proposals primarily because of poor

representation of blacks on the metropolitan body. Single-member districts are suggested as one means of ensuring minority representation on regional bodies.

Willie L. Brown, Jr., a California State assemblyman from San Francisco, also has emphasized that special consideration must be given to minority groups to encourage them to participate in a regional government. In his view, if districts are to be gerrymandered, it should be done in such a way as to protect black and other minority interests. The white affluent suburbs and the poor central city blacks have differing concerns. The poor's priorities include housing, jobs, education, and manpower training, while the affluent want a cleaner environment. Adequate minority representation, then, is necessary in order to have a regional government where the goals of both the poor and the affluent are mutual and interdependent.¹⁸ The architects of the Jacksonville consolidation, for instance, drew district lines for council seats to assure the election of three blacks. Black leaders preferred consolidation as "the lesser of two evils" compared with the possibility of annexation.¹⁹

Julian Bond, the black State legislator from Georgia, has suggested that efforts for consolidated government should be subject to a vote of duly elected representatives of black political districts. Broader political controls must then be fought by minorities until they can get certain guarantees of equitable representation.

Armando Rendon distinguished between possible benefits in redistribution of resources and possible detriments in loss of black political power. After discussing some cases where these factors vary in importance, he warned of the dangers of generalizations. Variables such as strength of minority political organization, structure and problems of an area, and participant attitudes lead to differing conclusions for different areas.²⁰

While the available literature deals with theoretical arguments, case studies of campaigns for consolidation, and experiences of a few established metropolitan and regional structures, little information has heretofore been available on the views of black elected officials in general toward regionalism. It is this gap which the present study has attempted to fill.

Survey of Black Elected Officials

In 1972, the Joint Center for Political Studies (JCPS) conducted a mail survey of black elected officials' (BEO's) attitudes toward regional councils. The JCPS mailed 2,215 questionnaires with an accompanying explanatory letter, on June 1, 1972, to all but 63 persons listed in the National Roster of Black Elected Officials. To maximize questionnaire returns, two additional mailings were made during the course of the study. The first, on July 1, went to all BEO's who failed to answer the original letter; the second, on September 22, went to all black mayors, city councilmen, and

Table IV-10

**Regional Council Members; Black Elected Officials:
1972**

	No. of Respondents		Number Within Council Boundaries		Members		Non-members	
	(A)	(B)	% of A	No.	% of B	No.	% of B	
Total, all respondents	253	223	88	184	83	39	17	
County officials	38	37	97	35	95	2	5	
City officials	215	186	87	149	80	37	20	

county officials who did not reply to the earlier request.

Between the second and third mailings, JCPS staff assistants made nearly 500 phone calls to BEO's who had not responded, and in many cases sent an additional questionnaire with a covering letter to officials contacted by phone. Questionnaires were also distributed at regional conferences held by the JCPS.

Initially it has been hoped that the response rate would reach 30 to 40 percent. It became clear, for a variety of reasons, that the overall returns would not reach this level. These reasons included many officials' lack of familiarity with the subject matter, the feeling of some recipients that the survey was not relevant to them, and the lack of prior involvement of recipients with social science surveys. Many black officials were located in rural or small town areas and have had little contact with regional forms of governance.

The overall responses which were able to be used was 20 percent (see Appendix Table IV-H). The survey analysis was restricted primarily to the responses of elected officials from units of local general purpose government—county officials (including 19 county commissioners, 11 county supervisors, two parish police jurors, four election commissioners, and two chairmen, of boards of supervisors), mayors and vice mayors, councilmen, and other municipal officials. The return rate was 23 percent of these officials.

Both the nature of the survey and of the responses elicited contributed to the total bias involved in the results. As a survey of all black elected officials, it is representative of the opinions of the universe of BEO's only to the degree that our sample of respondents satisfactorily reflected the diversity of the universe itself in terms of such critical variables as type of office and geographic region. The representativeness of responses by these variables is shown in Appendix Table IV-H.

The typical respondent to the survey had been in

office four or more years, resided in the South, was a male, and was elected as a councilman from a central city (see Appendix Table IV-I). The city black elected official was from a community of 5,000 to 25,000 population and the county official resided in a heavily populated area, over 100,000 (see Appendix Table IV-K).

Regional Council Members

Of the 253 black elected local government officials responding, 88 percent were located in an area where a regional council existed. All but one responding county official were within the boundaries of a regional council. Eighty-three percent of the officials in an area covered by a regional council reported membership. Table IV-10 shows that a higher percentage of black county officials than city officials were regional council members.

Black elected officials were asked their opinion as to why their jurisdictions joined the regional council (see Table IV-11). City officials believed the foremost reason for council membership was to obtain Federal funds, followed by the belief that the regional council could possibly contribute to the solution of areawide problems. In addition to these reasons, county officials felt regional council membership was necessary for their government to obtain State funds.

The least often indicated reasons for local governments joining regional councils were the belief that the regional council approach would be one means of strengthening the political power of suburban areas surrounding increasingly black central cities (10 respondents), and that the regional council was a mechanism for diluting emerging black political power and influence (18 respondents).

Effectiveness of Regional Council Programs

A primary concern of black elected officials is with providing needed social services to their constituents, such as housing, health, education, and manpower training. If regional councils are to assist in achieving these goals they must be effective in delivering services required by minority groups in local communities.

When asked to evaluate regional council programs on a five-point scale, the overall results were neutral to negative. The only program deemed fairly effective by both county and city black elected officials was water and sewers. Regional councils have generally not participated in social programs, many of which are particularly important to the black community. BEO's evaluated the role of these bodies in almost all the social programs covered in Table IV-12 as ineffective. County respon-

dents felt transportation and housing programs were the most ineffective and city black officials felt education, housing, and manpower training programs were least effective.

Appendix Table IV-L shows the evaluations of all respondents (Federal, State, and local black elected officials). For most program areas Federal and State black elected officials were more negative in their assessments than were city and county officials. This was particularly apparent in manpower, conservation, housing, juvenile delinquency, and land-use and physical planning programs. Educators and law enforcement officials showed no striking differences in evaluating their particular interest areas. Some law enforcement-related functions (transportation, juvenile delinquency prevention, and highway safety), however, were deemed more effective by law enforcement officials than by other respondents.

Table IV-11

Opinions of Black Elected Officials Concerning Why Their Jurisdictions Joined a Regional Council: 1972

	County		City	
	Number Reporting	Cumulative Weight ¹	Number Reporting	Cumulative Weight ¹
Felt the regional council approach was necessary to obtain State funds	10	1.7	37	2.0
Felt the regional council approach was necessary to obtain Federal funds	17	2.0	71	1.7
Felt a forum was needed for discussion of the region's problems	5	2.0	42	2.3
Felt a regional council could contribute significantly to the solution of areawide problems	14	1.9	58	1.9
Felt a regional council could contribute significantly to the solution of local problems	6	2.3	24	2.5
Felt a regional council would improve cooperation between central cities and suburbs	6	2.3	17	2.4
Felt the regional council approach would be one means of strengthening the political power of suburban areas surrounding increasingly black central cities	0	10	2.4
Felt the regional council was a mechanism for diluting emerging black political power and influence, especially in the area of Federal and State grants	3	1.0	16	2.6
Other reasons	0	8	1.8

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the three most important reasons in their opinion why their jurisdiction joined a regional council.

Black Participation in Regional Councils

If regional councils are to effectively represent black interests, there must be adequate representation of blacks on both regional council policy boards and staff. A minority, 28 percent, of the local black elected officials were members of the policy board; only a little over a quarter of the county officials were board members²¹ (see Table IV-13). However, it is important to note that most policy board members were the chief executives of their jurisdictions. Many of the county elected officials responding were not the chief executive (83 percent were members of the governing body; 11 percent were election commissioners; and only 6 percent were chairmen of the board of supervisors). Policy board membership was found predominantly among the black mayors and vice mayors, but even this group did not have a 50 percent representation. Generally, local black elected officials have been unsatisfied with black representation on policy boards and staffs of regional councils, particularly the latter (see Table IV-14).

Eighty percent of the county officials and 68 percent of the city officials responding believed barriers existed

which restrict black elected officials from effectively representing black citizen interests in the process of deciding regional policy. Some of the barriers cited by local BEOs were:

They picked the blacks to suit their type of representation for us.

[Black representatives possess] no voting strength. Need special information and knowledge of how to force needed action, without majority vote.

The only existing barrier is the resolute determination of the Council *not* to appoint a black to the Council. This "gentlemen's agreement" was projected and approved at the time of my election.

Communications—Input on what is desired by black citizens.

Racism and a few black political leaders whose interest is not for the benefit of the local black citizens.

Table IV-12

Black Elected Officials' Evaluation of Effectiveness of Regional Council Programs: 1972

	Counties		Cities	
	Number reporting	Weighted mean ¹	Number reporting	Weighted mean ¹
Law enforcement and criminal justice	23	3.0	98	3.0
Health problems	24	3.0	78	3.1
Air pollution	19	3.6	64	3.4
Water pollution	21	3.3	68	3.0
Manpower	19	3.6	55	3.7
Conservation	16	3.6	57	3.5
Economic development	19	3.0	73	3.4
Transportation	16	3.9	70	3.2
Housing	16	3.7	72	3.7
Education	11	3.6	52	4.0
Open space	15	3.5	59	3.5
Water and sewer systems	19	2.5	92	2.7
Recreation	17	3.1	64	3.3
Juvenile delinquency	14	3.4	63	3.7
Land use and physical planning	19	2.8	87	3.0
Highway safety	16	2.8	60	3.3

¹ Respondents were asked to indicate and evaluate the effectiveness of regional council programs (one being very effective and five being very ineffective).

Table IV-13

**Black Elected Officials on Regional Council Policy Boards:
1972**

	Number reporting	Member of Policy Board	
	(A)	No.	% of (A)
Total, all respondents	184	52	28
Counties	35	9	26
Cities	149	42	28
Mayors/vice mayors	25	11	44
Councilmen	119	29	24
Other municipal officials	5	2	40

The regional system is not geared to a forum for discussions which give notice to cultural and various human considerations. It is primarily a public relations and information forum, with limited political focus and value.

contrasts sharply with the members' interests. Regional council members were more motivated by Federal monies, and their interests were externally and program-oriented. The primary reason for joining expressed by members—to meet planning requirements under Federal grant-in-aid programs—was ranked fourth by nonmembers desiring a regional council.

Nonmembers' Reasons for Desiring Regional Council Formation

Nonmembers of regional councils thought that a major reason for forming a regional council would be primarily to serve local interests. To initiate and sustain cooperative approaches to solving regional problems and to tackle a serious problem in some specific functional area on an areawide basis were the two most important reasons given (see Table IV-15). The nonmembers' interests were internally and problem-oriented. This

Views on Regional Councils

The key question posed in the survey asked the personal views of black elected officials toward regionalism (see Table IV-16). More than half of the local government officials (58 percent) believed the regional council approach "may help somewhat" or "will help" solve some of the problems in places where blacks are concentrated in large numbers by making more resources available on an areawide basis to meet local needs. There

Table IV-14

**Black Elected Official Satisfaction with Black Representation with
Policy Board and Staff of Regional Councils:
1972**

	Total		County		City	
	Number reporting	Weighted mean ¹	Number reporting	Weighted mean ¹	Number reporting	Weighted mean ¹
Policy board	174	3.6	33	3.5	141	3.6
Staff	160	3.7	30	3.8	130	3.7

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate on a five-point scale their degree of satisfaction with black representation on the policy board and staff (one being very satisfied and five being very unsatisfied).

was a strong feeling voiced by both black county officials (65 percent) and city officials (57 percent) that regional councils may have some positive value. Even with the majority of the respondents endorsing the regional council approach, nevertheless it is significant that a large minority—37 percent—of the black elected officials viewed this organization as a threat or a possible threat to their constituents.

Almost three-quarters of the respondents provided written explanation of their view of regionalism. Some officials took the position that regional councils could be either a threat or a benefit depending on how they were structured. A sampling of their opinions follows.

Regionalism in the New York metropolitan area may be totally irrelevant to blacks, depending upon the purpose and structure of the regional government. In other areas it may be of real help, again, depending on the structure and purpose.

I am concerned about two things: 1) who has the power, 2) who controls the money.

The regional approach can help if blacks have a real input on the regional level. There must be adequate black representation on the policy board and staff to accomplish this. It depends on the problems the council

is willing to attack, council leadership, grass roots involvement, and funds involved.

These comments suggest that black elected officials tend to look favorably on quasi-governmental regional approaches, but are aware of and will criticize changes in governmental forms which could be detrimental to their constituents.

Among those who expressed positive opinions of regional councils, the most prevalent reasons given were that these bodies could increase the resources available to black communities and provide collective action and organization for solving problems which extend beyond the city. For example:

Large cities are being drained of their tax base because of out-migration, and regional governments should return resources to needed areas.

Blacks for the most part are in concentrated areas and these areas contain little or no resources; regional councils will allow for greater spread of resources into areas where blacks are concentrated.

Regional planning might help to bring some type of industry into the area.

Table IV-15

**Reasons for Approving Creation of Regional Council:
Views of Nonmember Black Elected Officials:
1972**

	<u>Number Reporting*</u>	<u>Weighted Mean¹</u>
To initiate and sustain cooperative approaches to solving regional problems	33	2.1
To meet a serious problem in some specific functional area on an areawide basis	32	2.3
To formalize cooperative arrangements	11	3.3
To foster comprehensive regional planning for programs and development	29	2.5
To offset State action or threat of action	4	3.5
To meet planning requirements under Federal grant-in-aid programs	27	2.7
To make available to depressed core city areas of large SMSA's an expanded tax and resource base found in regional suburban areas	9	3.6

*County and city responses are combined. Two counties reported reasons.

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the four most important reasons they would approve of creating a regional council.

Table IV-16

Black Elected Officials Views Toward Regional Councils:

	Number reporting (A)	Clear threat		May be a threat		Irrelevant		May help somewhat		Will help	
		No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)
Total, all respondents	237	30	13	57	24	12	5	90	38	48	20
County	37	4	11	7	19	2	5	16	43	8	22
City	200	26	13	50	25	10	5	74	37	40	20

By getting an overall view of the problems in several local governments, by a joint effort on the part of this council, more can be done to remove the problem areas for all.

At the same time, the comments of those with negative views on regional councils were direct and to the point—regional councils will dilute black political power, and where power is diluted, there will be less concern for problems of blacks. Generally, blacks considering regional councils as a threat looked upon these organizations as the first step toward a regional government. Typical comments include:

If blacks cannot receive a fair share of the services in the status quo, diluting black power will further dilute response.

I feel that if regionalism is really developed into a form of metropolitan government (as in Indianapolis, Indiana) that black political power will be diluted. Whites have left most major cities and fled to the suburbs. They now realize they have given us control of many major cities. It is primarily those areas where this regionalism concept is being developed most.

[Regionalism] Will tend to lessen black representation and the input from black politicians. In this area the percentage of black population will be less in any regional approach, and it is likely that consideration and concern for the problems of blacks will be less.

Our influence (vote) will be so diluted that complete control would be in the hands of the greater community.

Appendix Table IV-M shows the opinions of all respondents toward regionalism—Federal, State, and lo-

cal officials. A majority (52 percent) of the Western black elected officials and a near majority (49 percent) of those from the North Central region viewed regional councils as a threat or possible threat. Geographically, the strongest support for regional councils came from the South. There was a more positive attitude toward the benefits of regional councils among nonmembers than members. The other cluster of support was found among non-metropolitan respondents, who considered regional councils to be helpful or somewhat helpful.

This overview of black elected officials' attitudes on regional councils indicates that there is a fair mixture of hope and concern. The concern focuses on the structure and form of regional councils in which black communities are involved. The hope is that these councils will deliver concrete help to black communities.

Conclusion

At best there is less than unanimity of opinion among black elected officials as to the value of regional approaches. What little consensus that can be discerned is, however, a positive one. But one must view this with caution in light of whether these results are representative. What can be said with some confidence is that a majority of the black elected officials surveyed saw regional councils as of potential benefit to themselves and to their communities. At the same time, a sizeable minority expressed their concern about the possible negative impact of regional councils on black citizens. In their written statements, these black leaders indicated that their attitudes toward councils will ultimately be determined by the form such councils will take and the resulting distribution or redistribution of political power and funds.

Black leaders appear to hold a flexible position and may be amenable to political compromise and adjustments in the interest of preserving necessary and meaningful input and political muscle. Such a stance should be of interest to those involved in creating what

is likely to be a major reordering of local governmental structures on a regional basis. Even if they wished to do so, blacks are unlikely to be able to stop these changes. The key question will be whether the new mechanisms are responsive to black needs and goals and to black participation.

The subsidiary findings of this study provide both positive and negative indications in answer to this question. Black political leaders generally felt that their governments joined regional councils to gain increased Federal and State financial resources. Maximizing the receipt of Federal and State funds seems to take precedence over concerns for political autonomy, but not involvement, so long as resources are passed on to the black community in proper measure.

A considerably lesser amount of flexibility exists regarding tolerance of poor program effectiveness of regional bodies. Those programs of great importance to

black communities such as housing, manpower, and education are, in the opinion of black elected officials, grossly neglected or ill administered. If regional councils are to be of benefit in general, or of benefit to black communities in particular, they must begin to recognize and make provisions for diverse input from blacks and other minorities on policy boards, committees and professional staffs so as to produce results that are broad in coverage and equitable when translated into policy.

In sum, black political leaders are prepared to look favorably on regional councils if they can be assured that regional councils will take effective action with respect to the social, economic, and political problems the black community has faced and continues to face. Black leaders have gone through a series of programs and policies which were expected to aid blacks but which many blacks feel did not meet their expectations. New changes will be viewed with a critical eye.

Footnotes

¹The Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota was included as a regional council, even though its members are appointed by the governor, because of its multi-jurisdictional organization and heavy involvement in planning and coordination activities.

²See National Association of Regional Councils, *Regional Council Directory* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, February 1972), pp. iv-v.

³Metropolitan jurisdictions include both central and suburban local governments. Central city jurisdictions are the core of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Suburban jurisdictions are the additional governments which make up the total SMSA. Independent jurisdictions are outside an SMSA.

⁴Of the 865 cities reporting the year in which they joined the regional council, four cities (0.5 percent) joined before 1954; 40 (5 percent) between 1954-1961; 100 (12 percent) between 1962-1965; 325 (38 percent) between 1966-1968; and 396 (46 percent) between 1969-1972. Of the 596 member counties, one joined before 1954; 25 (4 percent) between 1954-1961; 54 (9 percent) between 1962-1965; 194 (33 percent) between 1966-1968; and 322 (54 percent) between 1969-1972.

⁵Of the 842 cities reporting the year in which their regional council was formed, five (0.6 percent) indicated formation before 1954; 55 (7 percent) between 1954-1961; 136 (16 percent) between 1962-1965; 346 (41 percent) between 1966-1968; and 300 (36 percent) between 1969-1972. Of the 571 county members, one indicated formation before 1954; 32 (6 percent) between 1954-1961; 63 (11 percent) between 1962-1965; 207 (36 percent) between 1966-1968; and 268 (47 percent) between 1969-1972.

⁶Weighted means were calculated by multiplying the number of cities by their indicated ranking score, adding the total weighted scores, and dividing by the total number of cities.

⁷Respondents were asked to evaluate the significance of the assistance they received from the regional council in each program area on a five point scale—five being of great significance and one being of no significance. A rating of three, therefore, represents a significant evaluation but one that is neutral or indifferent as to degree.

⁸Functions specified by from five to ten jurisdictions included health, air and water pollution abatement, fire protection, flood control, and land-use and open space planning.

⁹Dan E. Sweat, "Regionalism—A Must for America's Urban Areas," paper prepared for the Convention of the National League of Cities, October 1971.

¹⁰Charles W. Harris, *A Research Brief on Council of Governments and the Central City* (Detroit: The Metropolitan Fund, 1970).

¹¹Melvin B. Mogulof, *Governing Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1971).

¹²Tobe Johnson, *Metropolitan Government: A Black Analytical Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1972).

¹³Johnson, *Metropolitan Government: A Black Analytical Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1972).

¹⁴Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "Heading It Off by Metropolitan Government," *The New Republic*, September 30, 1967, pp. 19-21.

¹⁵Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "How the Negro Will Lose," *The New Republic*, October 7, 1967, pp. 15-19.

¹⁶Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Metropolitan Reform in the U.S.: An Overview" *Public Administration Review*, September/October, 1970, pp. 531-543.

¹⁷Dale Rogers Marshall, "Metropolitan Government: Views of Minorities," in *Minority Perspectives* (Baltimore: Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 9-30.

¹⁸Willie L. Brown, Jr., "Regional Government: Impact on the Poor," in *Toward a Bay Area Regional Organization* (Berkeley, California: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1968), pp. 84-98.


¹⁹Richard Martin, *Consolidation: Jacksonville-Duval County: The Dynamics of Urban Political Reform* (Jacksonville: Crawford Publishing Company, 1968) and Lee Sloan and Robert M. French, "Black Rule in the Urban South?" *TransAction*, November/December 1971, pp. 29-34, reprinted in *Blacks and Metro-Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1972).

²⁰Armando Rendon, "Metropolitanism: A Minority Report," *Civil Rights Digest*, Winter 1969, pp. 5-13.

²¹These figures are particularly suspect as representative of all black elected officials. Members of regional council policy boards have a direct interest and involvement in regional councils and are more likely to respond to a questionnaire on this subject than those BEO's with lesser involvement.

CHAPTER V

THE A-95 REVIEW PROCESS



The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 has been hailed as a first step towards a new congressional "charter" for Federal-State-local relationships. Under it, the Federal government seeks to strengthen the capacity of State, county, and city chief executives to manage Federal grants-in-aid and to integrate them with State and local policies and programs.¹ This new charter is generalist and multi-functional in its orientation. It discourages the middle management "vertical functional autocracies" at different levels of government from making decisions and commitments independently from elected and appointed policymakers, as well as from administrators in related functional areas. It encourages communication and coordination between and among generalists and specialists on both an intragovernmental and intergovernmental basis. The new congressional charter for federalism, which is best reflected in Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, substitutes the "politics of negotiation" for the "politics of bypassing."

Circular A-95, implemented in 1969 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is the major response on the part of the executive branch to Title IV.² Its provisions relating to the evaluation, review, and coordination of Federal and Federally assisted programs substantially broadened the scope of Federal-State-local relationships in areawide grant administration initiated under earlier Federal legislation, guidelines, and circulars. The purposes of this chapter are to trace the evolution of Federally inspired areawide review and coordination requirements, to describe the operation of the A-95 process, to examine the first three and one-half years of experience under its provisions, and to analyze its role and impact in the "politics of negotiation."

SECTION 204: INSTITUTIONALIZING AREAWIDE COORDINATION

Requirements calling for the coordination of applications by local or metropolitan planning agencies as an element of comprehensive planning for certain Federally assisted projects were contained in legislation enacted by Congress between 1954 and 1965. However, the first major multi-program breakthrough was Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. The following five major acts set the stage for Section 204.³

-Section 701 (d) of the Housing Act of 1954 defined comprehensive urban planning as including coordination of all pertinent plans of the departments and subdivisions of the local applicant and the related planning activities of State agencies. Section 101(c) of this Act required communities applying for urban renewal funds to submit a Workable Program for Community Im-

provement, a "general plan" which demonstrated to the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) that the urban renewal project would take into account land use, transportation, and public facility considerations. Although not necessarily areawide in scope, "if such a plan is in existence, it is expected that the coordination of Federal and other public and private community development activities will be facilitated."⁴

-Section 703 of the Housing Act of 1961 contained the first statement of Federal policy regarding the need to satisfy areawide planning requirements in order to obtain grant support for local projects. This section established a program to assist localities in acquiring open space to help curb blight, encourage orderly urban development, and provide parks and other recreation areas. As a condition for receiving a grant, the HHFA Administrator had to determine whether assistance was needed to carry out a unified or officially coordinated program relating open-space land acquisition to the comprehensively planned development of the urban area.

-Section 134 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and Section 4 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 recognized the need for a continuous comprehensive transportation planning process, under which applications for highway or mass transit facilities would be coordinated with the "701"-assisted activities of areawide and local planning agencies, HHFA's open-space land program, comprehensive development plans for the area in which the project would be constructed, and related planning requirements of other Federal aid programs (and, in the 1962 Act, State highway departments).

-Section 702(c) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 established a grant program for basic water and sewer facilities. As a prerequisite for receiving funds, the HHFA Administrator had to make a finding that the proposed facilities were consistent with a unified and officially coordinated areawide water and sewer facility system, which was part of a program for the comprehensive planning development of the area. Section 701(g) of this Act provided a substantial boost to the institutionalization of areawide planning and coordination by authorizing grants to organizations of public officials representing the political jurisdictions within a metropolitan area or urban region to assist them in undertaking studies and collecting data, formulating regional plans and programs, and engaging in

other activities related to the solution of problems in their territory.

These early Federal attempts to stimulate comprehensive planning activity at the local and metropolitan levels and to coordinate functional programs through the planning process provided a basis for assigning areawide agencies responsibility for formally reviewing and commenting on the relationship of proposed Federally assisted projects to such plans. In particular, Section 701(g) "...gave encouragement to the creation of a substantive planning function in order for the agencies to perform adequately the review function."⁵

Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966⁶ provided that after June 30, 1967, all applications for over 30 Federal grant or loan programs to assist certain types of public works planning and construction activities and for open-space land acquisition in metropolitan areas would have to be accompanied by the comments of an official State or regional planning agency with respect to the relationship of the proposed project to the comprehensively planned development of the area.⁷ These agencies were required to be composed of or responsible to elected officials of an areawide governmental unit or constituent general purpose local governments.

Section 205 of the Act also sought to provide an incentive for coordinated planned metropolitan development in the form of 20 percent bonus supplemental grants for individual major public facility projects that had been developed and implemented in accordance with metropolitan-wide planning and programming. The same Congress that had passed the landmark 1966 legislation, however, failed to authorize funds for payment of supplemental grants under Section 205. Moreover, in June 1967 it accepted a rider to the fiscal 1968 appropriations bill for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) prohibiting the use of departmental funds for administering Section 204.⁸

Despite congressional ambivalence regarding comprehensive metropolitan planning and development, Section 204 clearly signaled the Federal government's intention to force local and regional operating agencies with narrow functional responsibilities to examine their relationships with allied programs and facilities, as well as their role in comprehensive areawide developmental plans. Section 204 gave official sanction to an areawide mechanism responsible for coordinating Federally assisted metropolitan development. Counties and cities in areas lacking associations of governments or metropolitan planning agencies had to create these organizations if they wished to continue receiving Federal aid for their major capital construction projects. While the financial "carrot" used in earlier planning grant legislation was missing, then, the Federal administrative "stick" contained in the Metropolitan Development Act was a strong stimulus to continued substate regional activity.

As a report by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) on the first six months operation of Section 204 concluded, "...the requirement now has become widely known and, by and large, accepted as a fact of life in most metropolitan areas, and 1968 should see its further institutionalization."⁹

Implementation of "204"

As a result of the Cramer amendment, in December 1967 the Bureau of the Budget assumed HUD's general administrative oversight responsibility under Circular A-82. BOB's role involved identifying areawide agencies, modifying Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) boundaries where necessary for "204" purposes, and evaluating the application of the review requirement.

By October 1967, 203 separate metropolitan review agency designations had been made for the 231 SMSA's existing at that time. Of the designees, 194 were distinct areawide organizations; in the remaining cases State planning agencies served as the "204" review bodies for several SMSA's. In 15 instances, involving a total of 43 SMSA's, the areawide review agency covered two or more metropolitan areas. In the 62 SMSA's where HUD or BOB officials were unable to identify a viable organization to handle "204," State governors were asked to designate interim agencies. Forty-three interim gubernatorial designations, covering parts of or all of 46 SMSA's, were made in 25 States and for eight bi-State or tri-State metropolitan areas. Initial problems with designation were caused partially by the 26 bi-State and three tri-State SMSA's, but by the fall of 1967, review agencies for 12 of the former and all of the latter had been named, although in several of the bi-State areas the jurisdictions of the designated "204" bodies were larger or smaller than the SMSA boundaries.

The initial group of review agencies was a mixed lot, mirroring the status of metropolitan planning. Of the 203 designations, only 33 were multi-jurisdictional councils of governments (COG's), reflecting the still small number of operational metropolitan COG's. Fifty-nine were multicounty or regional planning agencies, while three were metropolitan transportation-land use study groups. Another 72 were single county or city-county planning agencies, and three were general purpose county governments. The remaining 33 designations went to 20 State planning agencies, indicating the absence of viable areawide organizations.¹⁰

Section 204, then, served as a major catalyst to the institutionalization of metropolitan planning activities initiated under the "701" program. In order to link specific project applications with comprehensive plans, a multi-jurisdictional organization having some planning, administrative, and technical capabilities was needed. Between 1966 and 1970, the number of SMSA's lacking an areawide planning body representing constituent local governments decreased from 62 to 6.¹¹

Table V-1

Section "204" Project Reviews by Federal Agency:
1968 - 1969

	1968		1969	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
HUD	1453	47	1114	35
DOT	856	28	912	29
Interior	548	18	581	19
Agriculture	162	5	269	9
Commerce (EDA)	30	2	41	1
HEW	---	---	214	7
Army Corps of Engineers	11	---	3	---
TOTALS	3060	100	3134	100

SOURCE: U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966: Two Years Experience" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, April 10, 1970), p. 4. Mimeographed.

Table V-2

Section "204" Project Reviews by Function:
1968 - 1969

	1968		1969	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Water, sewer, waste treatment	980	32	1090	35
Highways	618	20	736	23
Open space	582	19	473	15
Urban planning	355	12	397	12
Public works planning	154	5	---	---
Airports	233	8	137	5
Hospitals and health	---	---	205	7
Miscellaneous	138	4	96	3
TOTALS	3060	100	3134	100

SOURCE: U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966: Two Years Experience" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, April 10, 1970), p. 5. Mimeographed.

As indicated in Tables V-1 and V-2, during the first two years of Section 204 operation, nearly 6,200 applications for Federal grants or loans were reviewed by areawide agencies. Seven of every ten were received subsequently by HUD and the Department of Transportation. Over half of the local projects considered in the "204" process were for water, sewer, or waste treatment facilities or for highways.

With respect to areawide review agency action on applications, Table V-3 shows data from 35 such bodies covering 1,383 projects. Although the overall percentage of critical reviews increased from five to 18 percent between 1968 and 1969, it is not clear whether the problems identified and changes suggested were of a major or minor nature. The table does reveal, however,

that a substantial majority of the "204" reviews were favorable. According to BOB, in addition to the maturation of agency review procedures and addition of professional staff, a major reason for the increase in recommended changes was that, "as the significance of the review process became apparent to the leadership in many areas, it was taken more seriously, and reviews became more searching. Moreover, we suspect that 'log-rolling' may have declined substantially among members in many areawide agencies."^{1 2}

Strengths and Weaknesses

In addition to spurring the growth and reorganization of metropolitan planning agencies, BOB's two-year

assessment of Section 204 experience indicated that the requirement had "helped improve the credibility of planning by focusing the attention of metropolitan agencies on shorter-range and programmatic questions."¹³ While comprehensive planning activities supported by the "701" program continued, "204" forced many review bodies to come to grips with more pressing short-run developmental and operational problems of their constituent localities. In addition to these accomplishments, BOB found some evidence that "204" reviews had resulted in dollar savings to the Federal government. After two years, however, the most significant contribution made by the requirement was an increased level of interlocal communication and cooperation in metropolitan areas.¹⁴

At the same time, several weaknesses were revealed in the "204" process. Timing was a major problem area. Although Circular A-82 gave the metropolitan reviewing body 60 days to file comments, delays were incurred in processing local applications due to the failure of some agencies to eliminate or minimize consideration of projects having little or no interjurisdictional importance. In addition to overloading the review process, occasionally local units would initially bypass the "204" agency, and then submit to the review body an application that the Federal agency in effect had already approved. The quality of the review effort was a second type of weakness, stemming from the lack of adopted regional plans and policies, poor staffing of some areawide agencies, their submission of superficial comments, tendency to practice "log-rolling," and heavy

dependence on inconsistent levels of Federal financial support for regional planning and programming activities. The single most prevalent problem, however, was the "spotty" performance record of Federal agencies in meeting the requirement of Circular A-82 (revised) for providing feedback to areawide review bodies regarding disposition of applications.¹⁵

In general, BOB concluded that after two years' operation both Federal agencies and metropolitan review bodies were for the most part satisfied with the "204" process. The results of this attempt to institutionalize areawide coordination on a relatively limited program and jurisdictional scale paved the way for a much more sweeping Federal effort to orchestrate intergovernmental relations through the grant-in-aid system.

A-95 AND THE 'POLITICS OF NEGOTIATION'

As indicated previously, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act has been viewed as the major instrument for forging a new congressional charter for the Federal-State-local partnership, under which the Federal government would take steps to bolster the management and coordination capabilities of State and local chief executives and administrative generalists. Program specialists at all levels of government would then be "on tap, but not on top."

Sections 401 and 402 of the Act best reflect the basic spirit of this new charter. In addition to a national policy for intergovernmental coordination and coopera-

Table V-3

Percentage of Section "204" Reviews Recommending Project Changes: By Functions* 1968 - 1969

Function	Percentage 1969	Percentage 1968
Open space	6	1
Water and sewer	24	5
Waste treatment	27	4
Highways	24	4
Planning	19	0
Hospitals and health	9	1
Airports	18	1
Other transport	38	5
Land and water	41	10
Miscellaneous	11	2
TOTALS	18	5

*Data from 35 areawide review agencies involving 1,383 projects.

SOURCE: U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966: Two Years Experience" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, April 10, 1970), p. 9. Mimeographed.

tion and decentralized decision making, they express what James L. Sundquist has called a policy of deference:

The object of the Federal government must...be to realize the superior potential of the community-level processes. The overriding aim must be to perfect the planning and coordinating machinery in the thousands of communities that comprise the country. Then, *as the machinery begins to measure up to its promise and gains in competence*, the conscious policy of the Federal government as a whole—and, hopefully, the State governments as well—should be *to defer increasingly to local judgments*.¹⁶

Specific components of this national policy embodied in Section 401 include requirements that:

(a) the President establish rules and regulations for uniform application in the formulation, evaluation, and review of Federal programs and projects to ensure the sound and orderly social and economic development of communities in urban and rural areas;

(b) to the extent possible, national, regional, State, and local objectives, needs, and viewpoints be fully considered in planning, evaluating, and reviewing Federal and Federally assisted development programs and projects;

(c) to the maximum extent possible, consistent with national objectives, all Federal aid for urban development purposes be consistent with and further the objectives of State, regional, and local comprehensive planning;

(d) to the maximum extent practicable, each Federal department and agency administering a development assistance program consult, seek advice from, and coordinate with all other significantly affected Federal departments and agencies; and

(e) insofar as possible, systematic planning required by individual Federal programs be coordinated with and made part of comprehensive local and areawide development planning.¹⁷

Section 402 is designed to curb the proliferation of single or limited function special districts. It provides that in cases where both general and special purpose units of local government are eligible to receive grants or loans, in the absence of substantial reasons to the contrary, Federal administrators must give preference to the former.

OMB Circular A-95, issued on July 24, 1969, implemented Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and superseded Circular A-82. It also implemented Section 201 of the Act, requiring Federal agencies to notify, on request, governors, legislatures, or their designees of the purposes and amounts of grants to the State or its political subdivisions.

Unlike Section 204 of the Metropolitan Development Act, the A-95 process has become highly visible to elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. In part, this is because A-95 builds upon the “204” experience, and broadens both the programmatic and jurisdictional coverage of its predecessor. At the same time, however, A-95 has distinguished itself as the embodiment of a new national policy initiative on the intergovernmental relations front. Because it reflects a new “charter” which seeks to couple executive management improvement with decentralized decision making on an intergovernmental and interfunctional basis, A-95 is much more than a set of administrative procedures. This has been recognized by many supporters and critics alike, who have attributed to A-95 a wide range of purposes and meanings, such as “...the Magna Carta of all the development districts in the country,”¹⁸ “...permit[ing] the establishment of a counterforce to Federal program tendencies that augment metropolitan and regional fragmentation,”¹⁹ “...coopt[ing] local government into the Federal decision making process at a very small cost,”²⁰ “one of the regional council’s most important coordinating tools,”²¹ and “...perhaps the single most important statement of Federal policy yet developed [as of 1970] on comprehensive planning for metropolitan areas.”²²

Circular A-95 has four basic parts, dealing with State and areawide agency review of Federal aid applications (Part I), Federal agency consultation with State and local governments prior to undertaking direct Federal development projects (Part II), gubernatorial review of Federally required State functional plans before submission to the Federal funding agency (Part III), and coordination of Federally supported planning programs at the substate regional level (Part IV). The remainder of this chapter will focus primarily on the first part.²³

The Project Notification and Review System

Part I of A-95 establishes a Project Notification and Review System (PNRS), which is an extension and strengthening of the “204” process. PNRS serves as an “early warning system” under which State and local agencies that have decided to apply for a Federally assisted development project are required to notify a State, metropolitan, or regional (non-metropolitan) clearinghouse of their intentions, and to furnish a brief project description and estimated date for submission of the application to the Federal funding agency. The State

clearinghouse then informs State agencies administering programs that might be affected by the proposed project, while the metropolitan or regional clearinghouse notifies local agencies. The clearinghouse has 30 days to indicate its own or other State or local interest in the proposed project and to arrange for a conference with the applicant to explore the project in greater detail, discuss issues, and try to resolve possible conflicts. After the problems have been resolved, or if there is no interest in reviewing the application or no apparent conflicts raised by it, the clearinghouse signs off the project. If issues and conflicts cannot be successfully resolved in the A-95 conference, however, the clearinghouse notifies the applicant that it will have comments to accompany the application. The clearinghouse has 30 days to submit its own views or those of State or local agencies to the applicant, and the completed application is subsequently sent to the Federal funding agency, which considers this material and informs the clearinghouse of its action. Chart V-1 shows the various stages in the operation of this early warning system.

Revised Circular A-95 identifies nine specific areas in which comments could be made regarding the proposed project's consistency with State, regional, and local comprehensive plans and Federal laws: (1) appropriate land uses; (2) wise development and conservation of natural resources; (3) balanced transportation systems; (4) adequate outdoor recreation and open-space; (5) protection of areas of unique natural beauty and historical and scientific interest; (6) properly planned community facilities; (7) high design standards; (8) environmental impact; and (9) balanced settlement patterns and delivery of services to all sectors of the population, including minority groups. Clearinghouses, however, are not required to conduct the reviews themselves.

Unlike the Section 204 review procedure, PNRS focuses on consultation at the beginning of the application process rather than the review body entering after the State or local agency has spent time and money completing the application. According to Dwight A. Ink, the significance of this early warning approach is that it "...permits discussion and negotiations before hard positions have been taken, opportunity for constructive change in the project, and the avoidance of confrontations in most situations. This helps to grease the wheels of intergovernmental cooperation."²⁴ In addition, while "204" agencies received all applications for the more than 30 Federally assisted programs covered by Circular A-82 and had 60 days in which to file comments, in cases where an A-95 clearinghouse has no interest in or no apparent problems with a prospective project, the review time can be cut at least in half. Compared with the Section 204 experience, then, PNRS seeks improved coordination, increased opportunities for constructive change, and reduced processing times for most project reviews. And it broadens the scope of the review process

to include State and non-metropolitan as well as metropolitan areas.

With respect to the impact of clearinghouse comments on Federal agency actions, like Section 204, A-95 is an advisory process. Federal agencies are required to: (1) inform potential applicants that notifications of intent to apply for funds must be submitted to the appropriate State, metropolitan, or regional clearinghouse; (2) take clearinghouse views into consideration during application evaluation, especially when the applicant is a special district and the clearinghouse indicates that a similar application will be submitted by a general purpose unit of local government, which must be given preference in accordance with Section 402 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act; and (3) apprise the clearinghouse within seven days of substantive action taken on the application. Due to the Section 402 preference provision, the A-95 review process may have a few more "teeth" in it than its predecessor, since in these instances clearinghouse comments and recommendations have a binding effect on Federal agencies. For the most part, however, adoption of clearinghouse viewpoints depends on such factors as the good will of the Federal funding agency, the quality of the results of the review and comment procedure, and the political muscle of the applicant and the clearinghouse.


Program Coverage

The initial A-95 circular expanded the programs covered by areawide review requirements to about 50. In addition to the "brick and mortar" projects under Section 204, A-95 included planning assistance programs for health care, law enforcement and juvenile delinquency control, community action, and economic development. In a revised circular issued February 9, 1971, OMB broadened A-95 to cover a total of 99 Federal and Federally aided planning and development programs and projects. The major additions included housing and urban renewal, model cities, education facilities, mental health facilities, and law enforcement action grants. Federal department and agency heads were authorized, if OMB concurred, to exclude certain types of projects from PNRS if they met such criteria as lacking geographic identifiability in terms of their location or effects, being of small scale or size, having an essentially local impact, or possessing other features that would make review impractical. To date, very few exceptions have been requested or granted.

The 1971 revision also contained regulations implementing in part Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,²⁵ which requires Federal agencies to submit to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) information on projects affecting the environment. This section provides further that prior to the submission of environmental impact statements, State or local agencies authorized to develop and enforce

CHART V-1

Project Notification and Review System



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KEY	A Applicant	CH State, Regional, or Metropolitan Planning and Development Clearinghouse
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Source: U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget.

environmental quality standards should be consulted by the appropriate Federal agency and given an opportunity to comment. Under revised Circular A-95, clearinghouses must identify State or local environmental agencies, furnish them with project notifications, and give them an opportunity to review and comment on proposed projects. Clearinghouses also may assist State or local applicants in preparing necessary environmental impact data and take other facilitating action. They may make their own comments on environmental impact matters, which are attached to the draft impact statement when it is distributed for agency review.²⁶

A third major change in program coverage initiated in the 1971 revision modified PNRs for certain HUD housing assistance and mortgage insurance programs. In these cases, developers submit directly to HUD a preliminary application containing a brief project description. A copy of each "feasibility analysis" is sent to the clearinghouse, which then has 15 days to make comments to the HUD area office or insuring agency on its relationship with State and areawide plans and programs and its environmental impact. Conformance with local zoning and subdivision regulations is assured before the feasibility analysis is reviewed by the clearinghouse, since this is part of HUD's housing assistance procedures. According to OMB, while the short-run gains of reviewing such projects are usually limited, the long-range benefits could be significant:

Because of local zoning and subdivision controls or local comprehensive plan requirements, clearinghouse inputs may be minimal with respect to many or most *individual* projects except those of major size or strategic location. The primary value of notifications to clearinghouses is the intelligence they provide of emerging growth patterns that will have to be considered in the areawide comprehensive planning process.²⁷

A second revision of Circular A-95 was issued March 8, 1972. It expanded clearinghouse functions to include providing agencies responsible for enforcing State and local civil rights laws with an opportunity to review the civil rights aspects of the proposed project and make comments and recommendations on the extent to which it contributed to balanced settlement patterns and service delivery systems affecting minority groups and to housing opportunities for all segments of the community. As with the environmental impact statements, the civil rights comments were handled through the standard PNRs procedure, with the clearinghouse arranging conferences and taking other steps to coordinate and expedite project development.

Clearinghouse Profiles

As indicated previously, under A-95, there are three types of planning and development clearinghouses:

—A *metropolitan* clearinghouse in SMSA's recognized by OMB. Most of these are areawide comprehensive planning agencies such as councils of government (COG's) and regional planning commissions (RPC's) that previously were responsible for Section 204 project reviews.

—A *regional* clearinghouse serving non-metropolitan areas. These agencies are designated by the governor and have a comprehensive planning capability. Many are COG's and RPC's, and some are economic development districts.

—A *State* clearinghouse which is designated by the governor and usually is the State comprehensive planning agency.

As of April 1973, 53 State clearinghouses existed (including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and American Samoa). Of the 212 metropolitan clearinghouses, 185 were intrastate and 27 were interstate, while only one of the 238 regional clearinghouses was interstate. The 450 substate and multistate clearinghouses in the United States covered over 2,000 counties, in which an estimated 88 percent of the nation's population lived.

Circular A-95 does not contain a precise definition of "clearinghouse," nor does it prescribe detailed review procedures. The major functions assigned under the circular suggest that clearinghouses should be multi-jurisdictional, possess a comprehensive planning capability, and have some planning and administrative staff. Clearinghouses must (1) receive notifications from prospective applicants; (2) identify appropriate State or local agencies that might have plans or programs affected by the proposed project and disseminate notifications to them for review; (3) provide liaison between such agencies and the applicant; (4) conduct their own evaluation of the significance of proposed Federal or Federally assisted projects in terms of State, areawide, or local plans and programs; (5) send the comments of the clearinghouse and other agencies to the applicant and, if necessary, to the Federal funding agency; and (6) observe the time constraints on the review process so as to avoid undue delays in submitting applications.

The States are not required to create or designate clearinghouses for A-95 purposes. Applications for State-funded programs do not have to be channeled through this review machinery, and only six States—California, Georgia, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia—have adopted such requirements. Direct Federal aid is not provided to operate PNRs. If a governor decides to set up a clearinghouse network, then OMB gives its assurance through the circular that these agencies will have a chance to systematically review and comment on Federal and Federally assisted projects from the standpoint of their impact on State, regional, and local plans and programs. OMB's objective, then, is to provide the

opportunity for achieving greater interlocal and intergovernmental cooperation in the long run and better coordination of specific State and substate planning and development activities in the short run. According to Dwight Ink:

A-95, in effect, forces people who should be talking to each other to talk to each other. Communication is fundamental to coordination. It has been our modest expectation that the intergovernmental dialogues contrived by A-95 would lead State and local governments to an identification of common interest which, quite possibly, would stimulate common enterprises and perhaps even continuing systematic cooperation....In short, we view A-95 and the laws on which it is based as institution building mechanisms—and institution building is a long term enterprise.²⁸

PNRS: A THREE-YEAR APPRAISAL

Most of the efforts by OMB since 1969 to implement Circular A-95 have focused on Part I, the PNRS early warning system. Only in the last year have systematic steps been taken to carry out and monitor the other three parts. In this section, the actual operation of PNRS will be analyzed and its three-year track record assessed. The principal sources of data used in this examination include the results of a 1972 survey of regional councils conducted by ACIR, the National Association of Regional Councils (NARC), and OMB; public interest group evaluations of A-95 as of 1971; and case studies of local government participation in PNRS and clearinghouse decision making prepared in 1971 by a private consulting firm and the Urban Institute.

Clearinghouse Performance

The 1972 ACIR-NARC-OMB questionnaire to regional councils was divided into two parts. The first, developed by ACIR and NARC, asked a number of questions concerning the jurisdiction, structure, functions, and finances of these agencies. The second, developed by OMB, focused only on A-95 clearinghouses. Replies to the ACIR-NARC portion of the survey were received from 253—or 62 percent—of the clearinghouses, while 164—or 40 percent—returned the OMB section. Taken together, the clearinghouse responses give a fairly clear picture of their PNRS performance, although there probably is a built-in favorable bias in their answers.

With respect to the role of prospective applicants in the early warning system, 66 percent of the clearinghouses answering the OMB questionnaire indicated that

most applicants sent in project notifications early enough. Seventy-one percent believed the information provided was generally adequate for review purposes.

After receiving notifications or intent to apply, 90 percent of the clearinghouses distributed them to affected jurisdictions and agencies, but only 56 percent referred notices to State and local environmental agencies and 42 percent to nongovernmental organizations. Seven percent made their own assessment of the environmental impact of a project, and 56 percent assisted the applicant in preparing environmental impact information. Seventy-one percent of 147 A-95 agencies referred notifications of intent to adjoining clearinghouses for review, and 73 percent considered projects received from other clearinghouses. Eighty-seven percent reviewed all applications for HUD housing programs submitted to them.

During 1971, 68 of 154 clearinghouses reported that over 90 percent of their reviews were completed within the initial 30-day period, and 30 reported that from 81 to 90 percent were handled within this time frame. In other words, 64 percent of the respondents signed off the project review in a month or less. At the same time, 65 of 116 clearinghouses indicated that fewer than one-tenth of the notices they received required both the initial and the final 30-day reviews, and 82—or 71 percent—indicated that less than one-fifth required this treatment. Sixty-one of 138 clearinghouses stated that conferences with the applicant were needed in under 10 percent of the cases, and 82—or 60 percent—stated that these were held for under 20 percent of the projects reviewed in that year.

After receiving comments on a prospective project from affected State, regional, or local agencies, 76 percent of the clearinghouses responding to the OMB questionnaire indicated that these were incorporated into their own comments and then passed along to the applicant. Forty-six percent reported that comments were transmitted to the applicant as submitted. Yet 87 of 118 clearinghouses stated that in fewer than one-tenth of the projects, the comments have resulted in the applicant making substantive changes in the application as originally conceived. And 95 of 113 clearinghouses replied that critical or negative comments were submitted to accompany the application in less than one out of ten cases.

These findings are supported and placed in a somewhat broader perspective by Table V-4, which reflects the responses to the ACIR-NARC questionnaire from 243 clearinghouses. This table shows that well over four-fifths of the clearinghouses believed that the formal PNRS process had resulted in a wide range of benefits to both the individual project under consideration and to general interlocal and intergovernmental coordination and understanding in their region. Formal notification, review, and comment, however, were not quite as successful in causing substantive changes in or withdraw-

Table V-4

Impact of Formal A-95 Notification, Review, and Comment Process on Projects: 1972

Type of Impact	Total	A-95 Clearinghouse Response			
		YES		NO	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Provided useful information	243	238	98	5	2
Increased coordination among governments	243	224	92	19	8
Identified possible project conflicts	240	211	88	29	12
Identified weaknesses in project proposals	239	211	88	28	12
Given meaningful feedback from other local governments and State and Federal agencies	238	201	84	37	16
Promoted orderly development	233	201	86	32	14
Made projects more effective	227	194	85	33	15
Identified new project opportunities	231	156	68	75	32
Caused substantive changes in applications	236	129	55	107	45
Caused withdrawals of applications	234	105	45	129	55
Caused consolidations of applications	234	84	36	150	64

Table V-5

Staffing of A-95 Clearinghouses: 1972

Agency Designation	Total Number Responses	Total Professional Staff (A)	Average Clearinghouse Staff	Total Non-Minority Professional Staff		Total Minority Professional Staff	
				N	% of A	N	% of A
A-95 only	7	16	2.3	16	100	0	
A-95 + 1	23	87	3.8	81	93	6	7
A-95 + 2	50	351	7.0	318	91	33	9
A-95 + 3	54	545	10.1	496	91	49	9
A-95 + 4	50	606	12.1	588	97	18	3
A-95 + 5	34	346	10.2	323	93	23	7
A-95 + 6	21	159	7.6	147	93	12	8
A-95 + 7 or more	5	47	9.4	38	81	9	19
TOTAL	244	2,157	8.8	2,007	93	150	7

als or consolidations of applications for Federal and Federally assisted projects. Overall, 45 percent of the respondents indicated that the formal A-95 process had resulted in applicants taking one or more of these actions.

This clearinghouse reluctance to make critical or negative reviews causing major application modifications may be explained by a number of variables, including the submission of high-quality project applications; the absence of areawide plans, policies, or other criteria for evaluating proposals; and the tendency to rubber stamp projects due to limited agency staff, funds, and time. Another important factor is the informal consideration

and modification of projects before they enter the formal review process. It has been argued that often the major tradeoffs and compromises are made at this stage, and that in the absence of the A-95 requirement these adjustments probably would not take place. This contention is supported by the questionnaire replies: As a result of informal A-95 staff activities, 58 percent of 212 clearinghouses indicated that substantive changes had been made in project applications, and 40 percent of 202 agencies stated that applications had been withdrawn.

The ACIR-NARC survey also sheds some light on the size and composition of the professional staff, the

amount of time involved in conducting reviews, and the fiscal impact of PNRs on regional councils. Table V-5 reveals that despite the efforts on the part of some colleges and universities to train more minority planners and public administrators, the professional staffs of clearinghouses are still overwhelmingly white. The 244 reporting A-95 agencies had a total professional staff of 2,157 in 1972, or an average of 8.8 per organization. Ninety-three percent of these personnel were white.

As shown in Table V-6, relatively little staff time was allotted for A-95 reviews by COG's, RPC's, and economic development districts. A total of 78 percent of the clearinghouses responding to this question stated that less than 10 percent of their staff time had been devoted

to PNRs. And, as Table V-7 points out, 82 percent of the reporting A-95 agencies had allocated less than 10 percent of their budgeted funds for operating the early warning system. Replies from 248 clearinghouses indicated that 211,300 staff hours and \$2.1 million were spent in 1971 conducting a total of 14,528 reviews. On the average, each clearinghouse performed 59 project reviews, involving the full-time services of one person for 107 days and costing \$8,500.

A significant financial dimension of A-95 clearinghouse activities is the dollar amounts of projects reviewed and, to the extent it is possible to discern, the cost savings resulting from the reduction of duplication and prevention of poorly conceived and unnecessary

Table V-6

**Regional Council Staff Time Allocated for A-95 Review:
1972**

Total Population in Region	1 - 10%				11 - 20%			
	EDD	RPC	COG	Other	EDD	RPC	COG	Other
1,000 - 75,000	6	16	2	1	0	6	0	0
76,000 - 250,000	17	42	19	5	0	7	1	3
251,000 - 500,000	3	13	7	6	1	1	2	0
501,000 - 1,000,000	2	8	3	1	1	0	2	0
1,001,000 - 2,000,000	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
2,001,000 and over	0	2	4	0	0	0	1	0
Subtotals	28	82	36	14	2	14	6	3
Totals	160				25			
Total Population in Region	21 - 30%				31 - 40%			
	EDD	RPC	COG	Other	EDD	RPC	COG	Other
1,000 - 75,000	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
76,000 - 250,000	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	1
251,000 - 500,000	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
501,000 - 1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1,001,000 - 2,000,000	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2,001,000 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotals	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	1
Totals	9				1			
Total Population in Region	41 - 50%				51% and over			
	EDD	RPC	COG	Other	EDD	RPC	COG	Other
1,000 - 75,000	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
76,000 - 250,000		0	0	0	0	1	1	0
251,000 - 500,000		1	0	0	0	1	0	0
501,000 - 1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1,001,000 - 2,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2,001,000 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotals	2	2	0	0	0	3	2	1
Totals	4				6			

Table V-7

**Regional Council Budgeted Funds Allocated for A-95 Review
1972**

Total Population in Region	1 - 10%				11 - 20%			
	EDD	RPC	COG	Other	EDD	RPC	COG	Other
1,000 - 75,000	1	10	2	1	0	3	0	1
76,000 - 250,000	6	22	10	3	0	4	0	1
251,000 - 500,000	1	8	7	1	0	1	1	0
501,000 - 1,000,000	0	7	6	0	1	0	1	0
1,001,000 - 2,000,000	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0
2,001,000 and over	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotals	8	51	29	6	1	8	2	2
Totals	94				13			

Total Population in Region	21 - 30%				31 - 40%			
	EDD	RPC	COG	Other	EDD	RPC	COG	Other
1,000 - 75,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
76,000 - 250,000	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
251,000 - 500,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
501,000 - 1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1,001,000 - 2,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2,001,000 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotals	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	1				0			

Total Population in Region	41 - 50%				51% and over			
	EDD	RPC	COG	Other	EDD	RPC	COG	Other
1,000 - 75,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
76,000 - 250,000	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
251,000 - 500,000	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
501,000 - 1,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1,001,000 - 2,000,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2,001,000 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotals	0	2	2	0	0	2	1	0
Totals	4				3			

projects. In 1970, NARC found that the 306 regional councils serving as clearinghouses reviewed more than \$15.5 billion in project applications, and saved an estimated \$300 million.²⁹ In 1971, NARC found that more than 400 A-95 clearinghouses had reviewed projects valued at approximately \$25 billion, and that a cost savings of around \$483 million had resulted from the review process.³⁰

The ACIR-NARC survey results suggest that the 1971 estimates of the value of projects reviewed may be somewhat low; 248 clearinghouses reported a total dollar value of projects reviewed in that year of approximately \$19 billion, or an average of \$76 million per agency. In addition, the estimates of the dollar savings resulting from the A-95 process may be suspect,

for reasons pointed out by the Director of the Federal Assistance Review Project:

From the Federal standpoint, it is doubtful if any actual "savings" have been achieved from the operation of clearinghouses. Certainly, the weeding out of bad projects results in the avoidance of waste and the reviews of the clearinghouses help to establish priorities. However, for most Federal grant programs, more applications are received than there are funds available in any given year. Thus, the effect of clearinghouse actions does not directly reduce even the aggravation cost of operating the program.

Table V-8

Percent of Total A-95 Clearinghouse Revenues
From Federal, State, and Local Sources:
FY 1971

Source	Total Clearinghouses Reporting	1-10%		11-20%		21-30%		31-40%		41-50%	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Federal	185	7	4	10	5	11	6	12	6	22	12
State	110	39	35	27	25	14	13	15	14	7	6
Local	200	18	9	39	20	45	23	29	15	18	9

Source	Total Clearinghouses Reporting	51-60%		61-70%		71-80%		81-90%		91-100%	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Federal	185	18	10	46	25	44	24	12	6	3	2
State	110	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Local	200	16	8	8	4	5	3	6	3	16	8

More importantly, the claim for taxpayer savings seems to indicate that the achievement of such savings is a criterion for determining the effectiveness of an A-95 clearinghouse. Nothing could be further from the intent of A-95. The PNRS is designed to further improve the effectiveness of Federal assistance through "increased communication and coordination" on an intergovernmental basis, not necessarily to reduce costs.³¹

The direct or indirect savings to taxpayers that may be attributable to A-95 are particularly significant in light of the fact that in 1971 the 600 regional councils (including both clearinghouses and non-clearinghouses) received less than \$120 million from Federal, State, and local sources.³² Although complete dollar figures are not available, Table V-8 indicates that the Federal government was the major revenue provider for most A-95 agencies, with almost half of the reporting clearinghouses receiving more than 50 percent of their revenues from this source. Local governments also were important

Table V-9

A-95 Clearinghouse Evaluation of Actions
of Various Federal Agencies in Implementing PNRS:
1972

Federal Agency	Total	Excellent		Fair		Poor	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agriculture	124	37	30	60	48	27	22
Commerce (EDA)	107	36	34	52	49	19	18
Defense (Corps of Engineers)	93	23	25	43	46	27	29
Labor	93	12	13	46	49	35	38
Transportation	128	61	48	50	39	17	13
Appalachian Regional Commission	31	19	61	8	26	4	13
Housing and Urban Development	149	75	50	64	43	10	7
Interior	128	63	49	49	38	16	13
Justice (LEAA)	126	40	32	44	35	42	33
Office of Economic Opportunity	121	39	32	45	37	37	31
Water Resources Council	66	22	33	29	44	15	23

Table V-10
A-95 Clearinghouse Recommendations
for Improving PNRs:
1972

Recommendation	Total	YES		NO	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Greater guidance from OMB officials	230	123	53	107	47
More effective State clearinghouse	230	94	41	136	59
Review and veto power instead of review and comment	236	86	36	150	64
Direct financial support from Federal government	236	223	94	13	6
Greater support and feedback from Federal agencies	238	214	90	24	10
More grant programs requiring review and comment	235	165	70	70	30
Fewer grant programs requiring review and comment	225	23	10	202	90
More opportunity for SMSA core city review	183	58	32	125	68

contributors, but only a relatively small number of clearinghouses were heavily dependent on State aid.

A critical aspect of the A-95 process, of course, is the notification of the clearinghouse by the Federal funding agency of action taken on an application and any comments that might have been attached to it. If Federal agencies do not abide by the seven-day notification requirement, or if they appear to consistently ignore clearinghouse views, then it can be assumed that the PNRs will operate at something less than peak effectiveness since the clearinghouse's actions will have lost some of their credibility in the eyes of local, regional, and State officials. Then staff might well be inclined to rubber stamp applications rather than perform a virtually meaningless in-depth review. Unlike the Section 204 period, Table V-9 suggests that this situation has not occurred often in the immediate past. Although their reaction is somewhat ambivalent, possibly reflecting earlier experience, for the most part clearinghouses rate the actions of Federal agencies in implementing PNRs favorably, particularly those involved in "brick and mortar" type projects. The Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and Transportation received the most "excellent" ratings, while the Economic Development Administration, Labor, Agriculture, and the Corps of Engineers were given mainly "fair" evaluations. Agencies responsible for administering human resource related programs—Labor, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the Office of Economic Opportunity—received the largest proportion of "poor" performance ratings.

This ambivalent clearinghouse position on Federal agency action in implementing PNRs is reinforced by data presented in Table V-10. Ninety percent of 238 clearinghouses responding to an ACIR-NARC question

dealing with recommendations for improving Part I of A-95 stated that Federal agencies should give greater support and more feedback. Ninety-four percent believed that they also should provide financial assistance. And half felt that OMB officials should give clearinghouses increased guidance. The clearinghouses indicated a strong interest in expanding the number of grant programs subject to A-95, and even stronger opposition to narrowing its coverage. Yet only a third reported that clearinghouses should have a review and veto rather than review and comment role *vis-a-vis* Federal aid applications.

To sum up, the clearinghouses rate the performance record of PNRs as mixed, and their assessment of Federal agency A-95 activities is somewhat ambivalent. The survey results reveal that some clearinghouses are devoting their professional staff time and State and local funds to establishing an areawide planning and development intelligence system and to making the regional review process work. These bodies have been able to bring about substantive changes or withdrawals of State, regional, or local applications that propose duplicative or poorly conceived projects and indirectly save taxpayers' dollars. And some have provided technical assistance to local governments and educated county and city officials about regionalism and the utilization of Federal resources. At the same time, however, other A-95 agencies have been unwilling or unable to make the necessary staff, time, and financial commitments to the review process, and have done little more than rubber stamp applications.

Clearinghouse Perspectives

The results of four surveys of PNRs operation

confirm the mixed clearinghouse evaluation of A-95 experience. Two of these studies were undertaken by public interest groups representing State governors and legislators and the nation's city managers, one by ACIR and the International City Management Association (ICMA) jointly, and the fourth by a private consulting firm under contract with the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).

In a July 1971 report on the results of its field reconnaissance on Federal and State implementation of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, the Council of State Governments (CSG) indicated that the early warning system part of A-95 had been effective in improving project planning and coordination and strengthening the capabilities of State and local officials to manage service delivery systems:

In general, the PNRS and clearinghouses have been well received and are operating effectively in providing project-by-project planning and coordination. At both State and areawide levels, clearinghouses are identifying potential conflicts, duplication and inefficiencies in proposed expenditures of Federal grant-in-aid funds. In some cases, clearinghouses have become actively involved in the specifics of project planning; lending staff expertise toward better grant application and project operation.³³

It was acknowledged that the "...early warning A-95 review is 'better' than the old 204 review simply because it is earlier."³⁴ At the same time, CSG identified certain problems accompanying PNRS and recommended remedial action. These problems included: (1) inadequate applicant understanding of the nature and purpose of clearinghouse operations; (2) delays in Federal agency central offices communicating A-95 requirements to their regional personnel; (3) reluctance or refusal of Federal agencies to notify clearinghouses of action taken on applications; (4) applicant delays in submitting project notifications; (5) rising costs of operating the review process; and (6) lack of close linkages between A-95 and the grant award notification system set up under OMB Circular A-98.³⁵

In July 1971, ICMA conducted a mail survey of the 823 cities and 357 counties over 25,000 population.³⁶ Two-thirds of the former and two-fifths of the latter provided information regarding their experience with A-95. About 60 percent of the city and county respondents were generally familiar with the circular, and approximately 90 percent of these jurisdictions reported having had grant applications reviewed by a clearinghouse. Twenty-nine percent of the cities and 47 percent of the counties had made changes in their project applications as a result of PNRS, although the significance of these modifications was not revealed. The major accomplishments resulting from A-95, in the

opinion of the respondents, included (1) increased intergovernmental coordination; (2) provision of useful information; (3) promotion of orderly development; (4) feedback to Federal agencies; and (5) identification of possible project conflicts.³⁷

Seven principal types of criticism were made, many of which are similar to those revealed in the CSG report: (1) Local officials were unfamiliar with A-95 requirements; (2) to some the early warning system was only moderately helpful in preparing grant applications, while others felt its overall usefulness was limited; (3) increased time and complexity were involved in formulating and processing project documents; (4) State funded projects were not covered by PNRS; (5) Federal agencies gave inadequate support to and feedback on clearinghouse comments; (6) the review system was being overloaded with projects lacking metropolitan significance; and (7) insufficient funds were being provided by the Federal government.³⁸ ICMA concluded its evaluation with the following recommendation:

...the A-95 process should be organized to give more meaningful support and greater payoff to local government administrators. A-95 has the potential to become an important instrument in local management and metropolitan governance, but responsible Federal, State, and local officials must provide increased financial assistance and administrative and political leadership for A-95 to become a vital management tool.³⁹

A March 1972 ACIR-ICMA mail survey asked the chief executive officers of cities over 25,000 and all counties to assess their experience with regional councils.⁴⁰ The replies received from 55 percent of the cities and 45 percent of the counties suggested that local officials are becoming somewhat more satisfied with A-95 as the clearinghouse operation "shakes down." Review and coordination of applications for Federal grants-in-aid were considered the most successful activities of regional councils, and only about one-eighth of the city and county officials believed the A-95 clearinghouse responsibilities of these organizations should be discontinued. Sixty-four percent of the cities and 69 percent of the counties supported regional councils' retaining their present planning and A-95 functions, but not assuming additional ones. Yet 42 percent of the former and 45 percent of the latter jurisdictions favored empowering regional councils to veto local plans and projects not conforming to areawide plans. And one-third of the city and county respondents felt regional councils should have authority to veto the program plans and capital budgets of single purpose areawide districts and agencies that are inconsistent with adopted regional plans.

A March 1971 report to HUD and HEW by the consulting firm of Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, based on field visits to Richmond, Virginia; New

Orleans, Louisiana; San Antonio, Texas; Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and their State capitals furnishes further documentation of the mixed results of the first two years of A-95 operation.⁴¹ The study consultants found that local government involvement in PNRS had been very limited, partly as a result of the States' regarding clearinghouses as a source of local viewpoints and their discouraging independent local project reviews. Federal agencies were found to be dragging their feet in making serious use of PNRS. Several recommendations in this report were addressed to the desirability of "localizing" A-95 as a means of encouraging meaningful local government participation in application review and enhancing coordination of projects with local objectives:

A "local clearinghouse" function should be established as part of the chief executive office. This function would manage the paperflow for PNRS and various signoff mechanisms, making sure the appropriate city officials receive proposals for review. It could also see that the appropriate local policy people are working with the local government's representatives on various boards and commissions when specific issues in their policy areas arise.⁴²

"LOCALIZING" A-95: THE PLANNED VARIATIONS EXPERIMENT

In July 1971, President Nixon announced a two-year Planned Variations demonstration, which was intended to use Model Cities grants as a way of testing the ability of local governments to manage their affairs and respond to public service needs when they are given the opportunity and resources to do so. The specific objectives include improving city capacities to coordinate Federal urban development programs; bolstering their ability to set priorities; and reducing bureaucratic red tape. In addition to Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC), two other basic variations are part of the experiment. These involve expansion of the Model Cities program to cover all deteriorated areas in a city, and waiver or reduction of administrative requirements pertaining to local grant applications.⁴³

Sixteen cities were selected to participate in the full demonstration program, and four others to take part only in the CERC variation.⁴⁴ The former received additional Model Cities funds amounting to one or two times their regular grants, while the latter each received \$200,000. Over the two-year project period, HUD will provide a total of \$158.8 million to these jurisdictions for their planned variations efforts.

Due to concern on the part of county governments with the "potentially destructive authority of the Mayor's review" of their Federal aid applications, the National Association of Counties (NACO) appealed to

HUD and the Office of Intergovernmental Relations for equal treatment.⁴⁵ In October 1972, NACO was notified that "701" funds would be made available to the 20 county counterparts of the CERC cities to support a county review staff.

Fourteen cities designated the mayor as the local chief executive for CERC purposes, two named both the mayor and the city council, three the city manager, and one the city commission. Either the City Demonstration Agency or a staff office of the mayor was made responsible for setting up the local processing machinery. Only two cities decided not to employ CERC staff; the median number of staff hired by the remaining 18 clearinghouse activities was about five.

Due to its Model Cities ancestry, the Federal program coverage of CERC is much broader than A-95, and focuses on social services and human resources as well as physical development projects. In addition, citizens organizations often are brought formally into the review process.

As of October 1972, half of the cities had begun processing applications through local clearinghouses. The number handled ranged from one to 60, with eight being the median. The CERC unit in 17 cities received project applications and distributed them to local agencies for comment, and in 16 cities it referred them to citizen groups for their reaction. In a few cases, the clearinghouse conducted its own review. With respect to criteria used in evaluating local applications, 12 cities compare them with the Workable Program for Community Improvement, existing city plans, policies, and city council resolutions, and Community Renewal Programs. Seven use duplication or interprogram conflict criteria. During the first year of the demonstration, half of the jurisdictions started to develop a citywide strategy for relating local applications for Federal aid to community problems. The City of Houston, for example, examined 50 grant applications in the first four months of its CERC operation. Thirty-six of these were approved as submitted, while the other applicants were advised to seek additional funding or to broaden their project scope in order to carry out its purposes better.⁴⁶

HUD's report on the first year of CERC operation identified several problems that had accompanied its rather slow implementation.⁴⁷ These included:

—Rivalry between the mayor and city council over their respective roles in the CERC process, on account of the latter's fear that its influence over Federally aided municipal projects would be diminished;

—Confusion over whether the mayor or city manager should be considered the local chief executive for CERC purposes;

—Limited involvement on the part of the mayor in

the consideration of applications, making CERC essentially a staff operation in all but four of the cities;

—Low relative priority given to the CERC variation, as indicated by city decisions to hire only minimal staff and to devote only about two percent of their total Planned Variation budget on clearinghouse operations; and

—City-county conflict generated in a few areas over the scope of implementation authority and service delivery responsibilities covered by CERC, and procedures for city review of county applications for Federal aid.⁴⁸

With respect to the relationship between PNRs and CERC, in addition to reviewing applications by Planned Variations localities for Federally assisted projects covered by Part I of A-95, clearinghouses also refer all applications affecting these jurisdictions to their chief executive officer for review and comment. During 1971, however, the A-95 referral process was not used at all by half of the Planned Variation cities. Seven jurisdictions that supplied information on their A-95 involvement indicated that they received from 20 to 240 applications for comment, or a median of 90. Two of these stated that they had commented on nearly all of the projects, while the remaining five made substantive comments on less than one-fifth of them. At the same time, the HUD evaluation found:

Previous experience with the A-95 process appears to have affected the cities' attitude toward CERC. Although all of the cities see a clear connection between A-95 and CERC, and thirteen of the cities intend to have a working relationship between the CERC mechanism and the A-95 clearinghouse, past experience with the clearinghouses has not been entirely positive.⁴⁹

Problems involving clearinghouses included understaffing, unresponsiveness to local needs, lack of confidence in A-95 on the part of Federal funding agencies, and uncertainty as to specific local benefits deriving from areawide review.

VARIABLES AFFECTING CLEARINGHOUSE SUCCESS

After almost four years, the operation of the A-95 process has met with mixed reactions on the part of both clearinghouses and the agencies and applicants they serve. While pointing out a number of accomplishments of PNRs—such as increased interagency and intergovernmental communication and coordination, elimination of duplicating and poorly conceived projects, and dollar savings to taxpayers—many local and State officials criticize A-95 on several grounds. Among the principal

charges are that (1) the review and comment process in some areas has become overloaded with projects not having areawide significance and with environmental impact and civil rights statements; (2) adequate staff time has not been available to properly review notifications and avoid rubber stamp tendencies and processing delays; (3) insufficient Federal funds have been provided to effectively operate PNRs; and (4) Federal agencies have given feedback only sporadically on clearinghouse comments and recommendations.

Many A-95 clearinghouses share these views, and offer the same types of recommendations for improvement as State and local officials. Most of these prescriptions involve more Federal dollars and better communications, more selective project reviews and better clearinghouse staff capabilities, and more local government participation in the review process and better handling of State-funded projects.

At the same time, others tend to consider Part I of Circular A-95 as providing more than a procedure for systematically reviewing and making advisory comments on Federal and Federally assisted projects. They are aware of the headaches that some participants in the A-95 process are currently experiencing, and generally subscribe to the administrative and financial remedies suggested above. Yet they are searching for a mechanism that will fill the institutional void existing at the substate regional level, establish an areawide decision making process, develop regional political leadership, and restore and reinforce the role of the politically responsible generalists in the intergovernmental service delivery system. And they believe that A-95 can play a critical role in achieving these objectives.

To these observers, the "politics of negotiation" dimension of A-95 takes on a different meaning. In addition to the tradeoffs and compromises that normally grease the wheels of the clearinghouse machinery, those who look at A-95 as an element of the new congressional charter for Federal-State-local relationships are implicitly contending that the clearinghouse should serve as the catalyst for an areawide system for authoritatively allocating resources in accordance with the policy framework of a comprehensive regional development plan. The A-95 clearinghouse would not necessarily have to assume operational responsibilities itself, but could serve as an "umbrella" agency and exercise administrative, personnel, financial, and policy supervision and control over other areawide service delivery units, such as special districts. The clearinghouse would be transformed into a holding-company-type of governance mechanism, and the "politics of negotiation" would involve harder intergovernmental bargaining for higher stakes.

While the pros and cons of the specific issues involved in present A-95 performance and future clearinghouse directions will be discussed in a later chapter, at this point it is appropriate to consider three major variables

which condition both the degree of success a clearinghouse can achieve in operating the A-95 review process and the extent to which it could serve as the catalyst for a regional governance system.

Quality of Regional Planning

If one of the purposes of A-95 is to coordinate proposed local projects with areawide and statewide plans, then the latter must exist and be specific enough so that projects which conform well can be distinguished from those which do not. Based on his field work dealing with COG's in the Sacramento, Puget Sound, San Francisco, Chicago, and Dallas-Ft. Worth areas, the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, and the consolidated government in Jacksonville-Duval County, Melvin B. Mogulof concluded that not only is the art of regional planning in an early stage of development and not taken seriously in some quarters, but this might be precisely the reason why the A-95 process has been able to survive and grow:

There is not much of a body of regional planning to do the reviewing against, with the result that local government officials sitting on COG boards don't have to assess a community's proposed action against non-existent regional planning. As a final touch, some ingenious maker of phrases has coined the ubiquitous review judgment which reads: "This proposal is not inconsistent with regional planning." "Catch 22" is that many COG's have no regional planning to which to be inconsistent.⁵⁰

Moreover, OMB and Federal funding agencies provide no rewards to clearinghouses for formulating quality regional plans and for evaluating applications in light of their contents. Nor does the A-95 process contain any sanctions for perfunctory reviews or for considering

projects in isolation from existing areawide plans and policies.

'Piggybacking'

The recent mushrooming of Federally supported areawide functional planning bodies has been partially offset by the use of existing organizations for such purposes, or "piggybacking." As indicated in Chapter VI, among the 3,879 regional planning districts established by the States as of 1971 under 10 Federal assistance programs, there was an overall 35 percent geographic boundary coincidence and 17 percent organizational coincidence. EDA was the most coincident program with a 64 percent rate, while manpower, community action, and air pollution control were the most separate geographically and organizationally.

Appendix Table V-A shows that a considerable amount of piggybacking of A-95 clearinghouses has occurred. Only four percent of the 239 A-95 agencies responding to this part of the 1972 ACIR-NARC questionnaire stated that they had not been piggybacked for any other areawide planning functions receiving Federal aid. Seven percent are designated as metropolitan or non-metropolitan planning agencies or as transportation planning agencies. Twenty-one percent are piggybacked for two functions in addition to A-95, 21 percent for three, 23 percent for four, and 12 percent for five. In other words, half of the clearinghouses are responsible for from one to three areawide planning programs besides handling PNRS, and nearly the same proportion are responsible for from four to nine additional functions. One-eighth of the A-95 bodies in the sample are designated as the agencies for from six to eight planning programs as well as clearinghouses. The areas most frequently piggybacked are HUD's metropolitan and non-metropolitan planning and State planning districts. With respect to specific areawide functional

Table V-11

A-95 Clearinghouse Piggybacking for Specific Areawide Functional Programs: 1972

Program	Total Number of Areawide Agencies	Total Number of Clearinghouses Piggybacked	Percent of Piggybacking
Law Enforcement Planning	185	127	69
Transportation Planning	134	101	75
Local Development (ARC)	39	26	67
Economic Development	101	65	64
Comprehensive Health Planning	146	61	42
Manpower Planning	126	49	39
Air Quality Control	76	7	9
Community Action	138	5	4

programs, Table V-11 reveals that the most extensive piggybacking occurs in transportation and law enforcement planning, followed by the regional development programs administered by EDA and the Appalachian Regional Commission. Community action and air quality control are most likely to be handled by separate areawide agencies.

As shown in Table V-12, clearinghouse piggybacking occurs most often in smaller, non-metropolitan, and

southern regions. Sixty-eight percent of the 239 clearinghouses designated as the areawide agency for one or more Federally supported programs are found in regions having less than a quarter of a million people. Half of these agencies serve areas of 76,000 to 250,000 population. Forty-one percent of the piggybacked clearinghouses are non-metropolitan, while an additional 18 percent are metropolitan but with a predominantly rural hinterland. Forty-six percent of the piggybacked clear-

Table V-12

**Regional Variations in A-95 Clearinghouse Piggybacking
by Size of Region Served by Agency and Metropolitan Status:
1972**

	A-95 only				A-95+ 1 agency designation				A-95+ 2 agency designation			
	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W
Metropolitan Status												
Same as SMSA	1			2	1	1	2	1	4	9	9	8
Partial SMSA			1								1	
More than one SMSA			1		2	1	3	1	1	2	2	1
Non SMSA		1		5			1	2	6	3	3	5
TOTAL	1	1	2	7	3	2	6	4	11	14	15	14
Region Population												
0 - 75,000				4					6	1	3	7
76,000 - 250,000	1	1	1	3	3		3	2	1	7	7	3
251,000 - 500,000			1			1	1	2		5		3
501,000 - 1,000,000						1	1		2		5	
1,001,000 - 2,000,000							1		1			1
2,001,000 and over									1	1		
TOTAL	1	1	2	7	3	2	6	4	11	14	15	14
	A-95+ 3 agency designation				A-95+ 4 agency designation				A-95+ 5 agency designation			
	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W
Metropolitan Status												
Same as SMSA	3	5	2	2		5	1	5	1	1	1	
Partial SMSA	3	1	1					1				
More than one SMSA	5	6	5	1	4	8	3	2	4	10		
Non SMSA	3	9	8	2	2	14	3	3		14	1	2
TOTAL	14	21	16	5	6	27	7	11	5	25	2	2
Region Population												
0 - 75,000	2	1	3	2	1	1	2	3	1			1
76,000 - 250,000	4	11	7	1	4	16	3	3	2	19	1	1
251,000 - 500,000	3	8	4			4	1	1	1	4		
501,000 - 1,000,000	1	1	1	1	1	4	1	2		2		
1,001,000 - 2,000,000			1					2	1		1	
2,001,000 and over	4			1		2						
TOTAL	14	21	16	5	6	27	7	11	5	25	2	2

Table V-12 (Continued)

**Regional Variations in A-95 Clearinghouse Piggybacking
by Size of Region Served by Agency and Metropolitan Status:
1972**

Metropolitan Status	A-95+ 6 agency designation				A-95+ 7 agency designation				A-95+ 8 agency designation				A-95+ 10 agency designation			
	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W	N	S	NC	W
Same as SMSA				1												
Partial SMSA	1															
More than one SMSA		9			1											
Non SMSA		6	1	3	3		1		1							1
TOTAL	1	15	1	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Region Population																
0 - 75,000		2		1				1								1
76,000 - 250,000	1	8	1	3	3											
251,000 - 500,000		2			1				1							
501,000 - 1,000,000		2														
1,001,000 - 2,000,000																
2,001,000 and over		1														
TOTAL	1	15	1	4	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

KEY:

- N = Northeast
- S = South
- NC = North Central
- W = West

inghouses are located in the South. These size and locational characteristics are generally applicable regardless of the number of agency designations, although clearinghouses piggybacked for from one to three additional functions are often found in the North Central region as well as in the South. On the other hand, the 11 clearinghouses that had not been piggybacked at all are situated mainly in non-metropolitan and western regions having less than 250,000 residents.

Despite the fairly heavy amount of piggybacking that has taken place, it has not yet been proven that the use of existing boundaries and organizations for areawide planning instead of setting up separate ones makes a significant difference in interfunctional planning, coordination, service delivery, or economies of scale. However, if a clearinghouse is expected to evaluate proposed projects in terms of areawide comprehensive plans, then it can be hypothesized that successful performance of this assignment will vary directly with the degree to which the A-95 body has been piggybacked. Although this hypothesis has not been tested systematically except on a limited case study basis, certain common sense assumptions and related ACIR-NARC survey results support its validity.

By using the clearinghouse for areawide functional

planning instead of separate regional agencies, presumably coordination of these plans and integration with or into comprehensive plans would be facilitated. Moreover, the pooling of Federal areawide planning funds could enable the clearinghouse to develop both a common planning staff and a project review staff paid for with Federal dollars. These staff economies could produce better plans, more effective reviews, and faster processing of applications.

With respect to clearinghouse composition and operations, the average professional staff size for the organizations surveyed tended to increase with the number of agency designations (see Table V-5). The extent of piggybacking does not appear to have a significant impact on the proportion of minority staff members. Although the relationship is somewhat weaker, with the exception of A-95 agencies designated for one other areawide function, the median number of projects reviewed and amounts of man hours and funds spent on PNRS rise with the degree of piggybacking. This is particularly evident in clearinghouses responsible for performing from three to five additional regional roles (see Appendix Table V-B).

Piggybacking also seems to affect clearinghouse views on the accomplishments of the formal A-95 process and

Table V-13

Impact of Formal A-95 Review and Comment Process

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting	Identified Conflicts		Identified Weaknesses		Identified New Opportunities		Increased Governmental Coordination	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A-95 only	9	4	44	4	44	4	44	6	67
A-95 + 1	14	14	100	14	100	8	57	12	86
A-95 + 2	51	45	88	40	78	28	55	48	94
A-95 + 3	54	47	87	48	89	38	70	51	94
A-95 + 4	49	45	92	45	92	35	71	46	94
A-95 + 5	33	29	88	30	91	23	70	31	94
A-95 + 6	21	20	95	20	95	16	76	21	100
A-95 + 7	7	7	100	7	100	5	71	7	100
or more									

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting	Made Projects More Effective		Provided Useful Information		Promoted Orderly Development		Given Feedback From Other Governments	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A-95 only	9	3	33	8	89	7	78	7	78
A-95 + 1	14	10	71	14	100	10	71	13	93
A-95 + 2	51	33	65	51	100	38	75	36	71
A-95 + 3	54	44	82	54	100	46	85	43	80
A-95 + 4	49	45	92	48	98	44	90	43	88
A-95 + 5	33	32	97	33	100	29	88	29	88
A-95 + 6	21	18	86	21	100	20	95	18	86
A-95 + 7	7	6	86	7	100	7	100	7	100
or more									

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting	Caused Changes in Applications		Caused Consolidations of Applications		Caused Withdrawals of Applications	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A-95 only	9	2	22	1	11	1	11
A-95 + 1	14	9	64	4	29	8	57
A-95 + 2	51	23	45	9	18	18	35
A-95 + 3	54	32	59	24	44	25	46
A-95 + 4	49	29	59	23	47	26	53
A-95 + 5	33	19	58	13	39	14	42
A-95 + 6	21	11	52	8	38	10	48
A-95 + 7	7	3	43	3	43	1	14
or more							

the success of their planning, coordinating, and programming activities. In general, the greater the number of areawide agency designations, the more favorable the clearinghouse evaluation. Table V-13, for example, reveals that for the most part clearinghouses feel A-95 has resulted in several accomplishments, with a higher

proportion of positive responses coming from agencies that have been more heavily piggybacked. With regard to the substantive change, consolidation, or withdrawal of applications, clearinghouses responsible for three or more functions besides A-95 were much more likely to note these achievements than were the others. Further-

Table V-14

Assessment of Clearinghouse Activities*: 1972

Types of Activity

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting (A)	Communication With Local Officials		Local Government Coordination	
		N ¹	WM ²	N	WM
A-95	11	11	3.8	11	3.5
A-95 + 1	15	15	3.5	15	3.1
A-95 + 2	51	51	3.5	51	3.3
A-95 + 3	56	56	3.9	56	3.7
A-95 + 4	50	50	3.9	50	3.7
A-95 + 5	33	33	4.3	33	3.8
A-95 + 6	21	21	3.9	21	3.8
A-95 + 7	5	5	4.4	5	4.0
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	5.0	2	4.5

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting (A)	Federal Grant Review		State Grant Review	
		N	WM	N	WM
A-95	11	11	4.0	10	3.1
A-95 + 1	15	15	3.7	13	2.2
A-95 + 2	51	51	3.7	42	2.5
A-95 + 3	56	55	4.0	52	2.9
A-95 + 4	50	50	4.1	47	2.9
A-95 + 5	33	33	4.2	31	3.3
A-95 + 6	21	20	4.3	16	3.3
A-95 + 7	5	5	3.8	5	3.0
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	4.0	2	4.0

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting (A)	Comprehensive Physical Planning		Comprehensive Social Planning	
		N	WM	N	WM
A-95	11	10	4.1	11	1.8
A-95 + 1	15	15	3.3	15	2.0
A-95 + 2	51	49	3.7	46	2.2
A-95 + 3	56	55	3.8	55	2.6
A-95 + 4	50	50	3.5	48	2.5
A-95 + 5	33	33	4.1	31	3.2
A-95 + 6	21	20	3.8	20	2.7
A-95 + 7	5	5	3.8	5	2.6
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	4.5	2	3.5

Table V-14 (Continued)

Assessment of Clearinghouse Activities*: 1972

Types of Activity

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting (A)	Functional Planning		Implementation of Plans	
		N	WM	N	WM
		A-95	11	11	3.9
A-95 + 1	15	15	3.5	15	2.7
A-95 + 2	51	50	3.6	49	2.7
A-95 + 3	56	56	4.1	54	3.1
A-95 + 4	50	49	3.7	49	2.7
A-95 + 5	33	33	3.9	31	3.3
A-95 + 6	21	20	4.0	20	3.1
A-95 + 7	5	5	3.4	5	3.4
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	4	2	4

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting (A)	Solutions to Local Problems		Technical Assistance	
		N	WM	N	WM
		A-95	11	11	2.9
A-95 + 1	15	15	3.1	15	3.2
A-95 + 2	51	51	3.1	50	3.4
A-95 + 3	56	55	3.6	56	4.0
A-95 + 4	50	50	3.6	50	4.1
A-95 + 5	33	31	3.6	32	4.2
A-95 + 6	21	20	3.6	20	4.0
A-95 + 7	5	5	3.4	5	4.0
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	4.5	2	4.5

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting (A)	Economic Development Planning		Inform Public on Regional Affairs	
		N	WM	N	WM
		A-95	11	11	2.2
A-95 + 1	15	15	2.2	15	2.6
A-95 + 2	51	46	2.0	49	2.6
A-95 + 3	56	53	3.1	55	3.1
A-95 + 4	50	48	3.1	49	2.7
A-95 + 5	33	32	3.3	33	2.8
A-95 + 6	21	19	3.1	20	3.1
A-95 + 7	5	5	3.0	5	2.8
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	4.5	2	3.5

Table V-14 (Continued)

Assessment of Clearinghouse Activities*: 1972

Agency Designation	Types of Activity				
	Total Number Reporting (A)	Communi-cations with Local Citizens		New Ideas About Local Problems	
		N	WM	N	WM
A-95	11	11	2.6	11	3.1
A-95 + 1	15	15	2.4	15	3.0
A-95 + 2	51	49	2.8	49	3.2
A-95 + 3	56	56	3.1	54	3.7
A-95 + 4	50	49	3.0	49	3.3
A-95 + 5	33	33	2.8	33	3.5
A-95 + 6	21	20	3.2	20	3.7
A-95 + 7	5	5	2.8	5	3.2
A-95 + 8 (or more)	2	2	3.5	2	4.0

¹N = Number

²WM = Weighted Mean

*Respondents were asked to evaluate their success in various areas and activities on a five-point scale—five being very successful and one being not successful. A rating of three, therefore, represents a successful evaluation, but one that is neutral or indifferent as to degree.

more, Table V-14 shows that, excluding public information and communications activities, clearinghouses believe they have been moderately and occasionally very successful in various planning, grant review and coordination, and program and technical assistance areas. Clearinghouses with more areawide agency designations usually gave the highest success scores.

Organizational Structure and Conflict of Interest

The third variable affecting clearinghouse success was made succinctly explicit by one of Mogulof's interviewees: "The reviewed can't do the reviewing."⁵¹ As indicated previously, many of the clearinghouses are COG's with policy boards composed of elected officials representing constituent local governments. As a result, unless the clearinghouse staff conducts reviews in a vacuum, members of the COG policy board must determine whether their projects conflict with regional plans. If the clearinghouse actually struggles with the conformity issue, then the policy board on occasion may be embroiled in controversy, something that can be detrimental to the functioning of an essentially voluntary organization relying on consensus in order to get things done.⁵² If, on the other hand, due to this desire to sustain consensus and to vague or nonexistent

regional plans, every project appears to conform and a "logrolling" type of decision making takes place, then the review process may become meaningless. Mogulof found that a major incentive for some localities joining regional councils was to be a party to the "politics of negotiation" over projects. COG membership was a sort of insurance policy, in the sense of minimizing the chances that a local grant application would be accompanied by unfavorable A-95 recommendations.

To sum up, Part I of A-95 has produced mixed results after almost four years of operation. On the positive side:

- The 452 A-95 clearinghouses have established regional intelligence systems which have helped improve intergovernmental communications and coordinated project development.

- Applicants generally have been cooperative in furnishing adequate project information on a timely basis.

- Clearinghouses have usually processed applications in less than a month, without requiring several conferences.

- Billions of dollars of projects have been

reviewed, and it appears that indirectly taxpayers' dollars have been saved.

—A-95 has not resulted in the establishment of a large regional review bureaucracy, nor has it compelled most regional councils to devote an inordinate amount of their staff time to processing applications.

—An extensive amount of piggybacking of clearinghouses for Federally assisted areawide functional planning has taken place in smaller, non-metropolitan, and southern regions.

—Federal agencies generally have done a fair to good job in implementing PNRs and informing clearinghouses of their action on reviewed projects.

On the negative side:

—The A-95 process lacks coerciveness, in that States are not required to establish clearinghouses or to have applications for State aid channeled through them, no sanctions are provided for perfunctory A-95 reviews and poor regional planning efforts, and clearinghouse comments and recommendations to Federal agencies are advisory.

—Many city and county officials consider A-95 as another layer of red tape which slows the processing of grant applications without producing significant project improvements.

—In only a relatively few instances have clearinghouses submitted negative comments to the Federal funding agency, and in some cases they tend to rubber stamp applications.

—Sufficient Federal financial assistance has not been provided to effectively operate PNRs.

—In a few areas clearinghouses have been overloaded by projects lacking regional significance, or by environmental and civil rights impact statements.

—State-funded projects usually have not been processed through the A-95 machinery.

—The A-95 process has not been closely linked with either the grant award notification system established under OMB Circular A-98 or the Chief Executive Review and Comment system under HUD's Planned Variations demonstration.

Although there are still "bugs" in Part I of A-95, the areawide review process appears to be smoothing out. At the same time, moving the "politics of negotiation" to a higher level of regional comprehensive planning, binding decision making, and authoritative resource allocation depends on at least three critical structural and functional conditions which many clearinghouses may be unable to meet—quality regional planning, extensive piggybacking, and authoritative decision-making.

Footnotes

¹Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View from the States*, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972), p. 170.

²Other OMB circulars implementing the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act were A-96, lifting requirements for States to deposit Federal grants in bank accounts separate from those used for other State administered funds and waiving single State agency restrictions under certain conditions; A-97, authorizing Federal agencies to provide specialized or technical services to State and local governments on a reimbursable basis; and A-98, requiring Federal agencies to furnish a designated central State reception agency with information concerning approvals of grant-in-aid applications.

³See Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, "Comprehensive Planning for Metropolitan Development" (Washington, D.C.: The Center, 1970), pp. 45-53, mimeographed; and Royce Hanson, *Metropolitan Councils of Governments* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966), pp. 27-30.

⁴U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 55.

⁵Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, "Comprehensive Planning for Metropolitan Development," p. 53.

⁶Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, 80 STAT, 1255, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 3301-314 (1966).

⁷Federally assisted projects covered by Section 204 included hospitals, airports, libraries, water supply and distribution facilities, sewerage facilities and waste treatment works, highways, transportation facilities, and water development and land conservation projects.

⁸The rider to HUD's FY 1968 appropriations act was offered by Congressman William C. Cramer of Florida. Subsequently, during consideration of the Johnson Administration's 1968 housing bill, Congressman Cramer and Congressman William B. Widnall of New Jersey attempted to have the House Banking and Currency Committee repeal Section 204. The move failed in committee, but succeeded on the floor of the House. The Senate version of the bill retained Section 204, and the conference committee voted against repeal.


⁹U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204—The First Six Months" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, April 2, 1968), p. 7. Mimeographed.

¹⁰U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Characteristics of Section 204 Metropolitan Review Agencies" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, October 9, 1967), mimeographed; and U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Areawide Agencies Designated Under Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, September 15, 1967). Mimeographed.

- ¹¹U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966: Two Years Experience" (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, April 10, 1970), p. 7. Mimeographed.
- ¹²U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act...", p. 9.
- ¹³U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act...", p. 7.
- ¹⁴U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act...", p. 12.
- ¹⁵U.S. Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, "Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act...", pp. 11-14.
- ¹⁶James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, *Making Federalism Work: A Study of Program Coordination at the Community Level* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 250.
- ¹⁷Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 82 STAT. 1103, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 4201-243 (1970).
- ¹⁸John Fischer, "Georgia: Mother of Social Invention," *Harper's Magazine*, March 1972, p. 20.
- ¹⁹Statement by Dwight A. Ink, Assistant Director, Office of Management and Budget, May 11, 1971, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Urban Affairs, *Regional Planning Issues: Hearings, Part 3*, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 11, 12, 13, and 18, 1971, p. 316.
- ²⁰Melvin B. Mogulof, "Regional Planning, Clearance, and Evaluation: A Look at the A-95 Process," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, November 1971, p. 419.
- ²¹National Association of Regional Councils, "What Regional Councils are Doing, II: Special Report," August 1972, p. 5.
- ²²Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, "Comprehensive Planning for Metropolitan Development" p. 56.
- ²³The three other basic parts of A-95, particularly Part IV, are examined in Chapter VI.
- ²⁴Dwight A. Ink, "Target of Opportunity: Problems of Implementation of OMB Circular No. A-95, Remarks at the 1972 Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, New York City, March 24, 1972, p. 4. Mimeographed.
- ²⁵National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 STAT. 852, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 4321 and 4331-32 (1972).
- ²⁶For a clarification of the relationship between A-95 procedures and environmental impact statements see U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "State and Local Agency Review of Impact Statements" (Washington, D.C.: The Office, January 9, 1973). Mimeographed.
- ²⁷U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "OMB-Circular No. A-95 (Revised): What it is—How it Works" (Washington, D.C.: The Office, no date) p. 9. Mimeographed.
- ²⁸Dwight Ink, "Target of Opportunity: Problems of Implementation of OMB Circular No. A-95," p. 10.
- ²⁹National Association of Regional Councils, *Regionalism: A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1971), p. 17.
- ³⁰National Association of Regional Councils, "What Regional Councils Are Doing, II," p. 5. See also U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Examples of Project Improvement Resulting from A-95 Reviews" (Washington, D.C.: The Office, July 20, 1971). Mimeographed.
- ³¹Letter from Ed Rizzo to David B. Walker, Assistant Director, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, December 22, 1972.
- ³²Letter from Ed Rizzo to David B. Walker.
- ³³Council of State Governments, *Coming Together: The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 - Survey of Federal and State Implementation* (Washington, D.C.: The Council, July 1971), p. 19.
- ³⁴Council of State Governments, *Coming Together: The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968...*, p. 19.
- ³⁵Council of State Governments, *Coming Together: The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968...*, pp. 25-27.
- ³⁶B. Douglas Harman, "Areawide Review of Federal Grant Applications: Implications for Urban Management," *Urban Data Service* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, February 1972).
- ³⁷Harman, "Areawide Review of Federal Grant Applications..." pp. 12-13.
- ³⁸Harman, "Areawide Review of Federal Grant Applications..." p. 19.
- ³⁹Harman, "Areawide Review of Federal Grant Applications..." p. 20.
- ⁴⁰The complete results of this survey are contained in Chapter VIII of this report. See also: Jean M. Gansel and Carl W. Stenberg, "Regional Council Performance: The City Perspective" 1973 *Municipal Year Book* (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1973), pp. 63-76.
- ⁴¹Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, *Local Government Participation in the A-95 Project Notification and Review Systems* (San Francisco: Marshall Kaplan, March 1971).
- ⁴²Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, *Local Government Participation in the A-95 Project Notification and Review System*, pp. 5-6.
- ⁴³U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Planned Variations: First Year Survey*, Community Development Evaluation Series No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: The Department, October 1972), pp. 1-2.
- ⁴⁴The "full variation cities" are: Waco, Texas; Butte, Montana; Patterson, New Jersey; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Tucson, Arizona; Seattle, Washington; Tampa, Florida; Norfolk, Virginia; Des Moines, Iowa; Lansing, Michigan; Erie, Pennsylvania; East St. Louis, Illinois; Dayton, Ohio; Indianapolis, Indiana; Newark, New Jersey; and Fresno, California. The CERC variation cities are: Houston, Texas; San Jose, California; Wilmington, Delaware; and Rochester, New York.
- ⁴⁵*County News*, October 27, 1972, p. 15.
- ⁴⁶Office of the Mayor, Planned Variation Division, *Planned Variations Program: Progress Report I* (Houston: Office of the Mayor, July 31, 1972), p. 2.
- ⁴⁷U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Planned Variations: First Year Survey*, pp. 19-25.
- ⁴⁸See Santa Clara County, "Planned Variations," Presentation at NACO-HUD Conference, Tucson, Arizona, January 7, 1972. Mimeographed.
- ⁴⁹U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Planned Variations: First Year Survey*, p. 24.
- ⁵⁰Melvin B. Mogulof, *Governing Metropolitan Areas: A Critical Review of Council of Governments and the Federal Role* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1971), p. 48.
- ⁵¹Mogulof, *Governing Metropolitan Areas*, p. 48.
- ⁵²In 1971, a State District Court ruled in a case involving an effort by Des Moines residents to stop the planning of a freeway, that the Central Iowa Regional Planning Commission lacked authority to review and comment on applications for Federal aid submitted by its members in accordance with A-95 requirements. In the same ruling, the judge found that a conflict of interest between the Commission and its members was created when it acted as both a planning and review body. See National Association of Regional Councils, *Newsletter*, January 18, 1972, p. 5. See also the examination of the recertification experience of the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER VI

**FEDERAL PROGRAMS SUPPORTING
SUBSTATE REGIONALISM**



Federal aid has grown tremendously in the last decade. Since 1961, when Federal grants to State and local governments amounted to approximately \$7.1 billion and 11 percent of State and local revenues, Federal aid has grown to an estimated \$43.8 billion in FY 1973—over 21 percent of total State and local revenues. The latest *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance* shows 1,069 programs administered by 62 different Federal departments and agencies. These programs cover almost the full alphabet, from airports to welfare, and include almost every major function of government. The types of assistance provided include grants, loans, mortgage assistance, other financial assistance, technical assistance, and training, among others.

Along with this general growth of Federal aid has come a rapid rise in the number of Federal programs which take an areawide approach to community problems. This chapter initially examines the expansion of regionally oriented Federal programs. Then it describes the current provisions and operating characteristics of these programs. Finally, it draws certain conclusions regarding the overall effects of Federal assistance to regional organizations at the substate level.

THE GROWTH OF REGIONALLY ORIENTED FEDERAL PROGRAMS

As Federal areawide programs have grown in number and significance, they have spawned a new network of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areawide agencies across the country. But there has not always been consistency among the requirements of these Federal programs. Thus, in some ways, these new Federal aids have contributed to organizational complexities and administrative or managerial problems for participating State and local governments. After examining the incidence of these new Federal programs, this section will describe some of the emerging problems as they are being felt by State and local governments.

In early 1964, when the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) last took a detailed look at Federal planning requirements for community development, only five programs were taking an areawide approach.¹ As of 1972, there are at least 24 such programs.² These 24 are listed chronologically in Table VI-1. In light of the three new programs enacted in 1972, the areawide approach is clearly enjoying undiminished popularity. Eleven different Federal departments or agencies are now involved in providing these programs.

The total annual investment by the Federal government in areawide planning programs is shown in Table VI-2 at about \$221 million. This planning has a bearing upon the ways in which another \$8,399.5 million in Federal capital and operating program funds are spent in related programs with areawide planning requirements. As later tables and text show, the connection between

the planning and implementation programs varies a great deal from one program to another. While the 24 programs analyzed in this chapter do not include all of the so-called implementation programs, planning requirements relating to this linkage are dealt with for all types of existing programs.

Although the areawide approach began primarily with the urban programs with a metropolitan orientation, it is now just as popular in rural programs with a non-metropolitan orientation. To digress briefly into a matter of definitions, it is recognized that various definitions of “urban” and “rural” have been used in different Federal programs and the Censuses. The dividing line has sometimes been defined in terms of community size—a community of 2,500 people, or 5,500, or 10,000. In other cases a density of 100 persons per square mile has been specified. Since this report deals with regions which usually encompass several communities in an “areawide” manner, the terms used will normally be metropolitan and non-metropolitan. Even this does not completely solve the problem, however, because a number of the substate regions established by the State and local governments for their own purposes or for Federal program purposes include both metropolitan and non-metropolitan territory. No attempt is made in this chapter to solve these definitional problems. The terms “metropolitan” and “non-metropolitan” are used only to describe generally the types of areawide regions being discussed. Presumably, grant consolidation or special revenue sharing will reduce some of these arbitrary distinctions in the years ahead.

The purposes of Federal areawide programs vary widely. As shown in Table VI-3:

—More than half of the programs finance planning activities.

—Others finance land acquisition, construction, and provision of services.

—Several of the programs are multi-functional, while others are single purpose.

—These programs address the subjects of urban development, rural development, economic development, economic opportunities, and the provision of public facilities and services—including open space, transportation, water, health, solid waste, air pollution, manpower, and law enforcement.

—They are targeted variously at the Nation’s urban population, rural populations, river basin populations, the poor, the unemployed and underemployed, the disadvantaged, solid waste management agencies, new community developers, airlines and the flying public, and urban transit companies.

However, most of the programs are designed to benefit the general public.

—About half of the programs provide continuing financial support, while most of the others provide project-by-project funding.

—The A-95 Project Notification and Review Process is specifically designed to help coordinate all of these programs (and many more) with each other and with areawide and statewide planning. This coordination opportunity extends to the determination of geographic boundaries for federally encouraged regions, as well as to the cross-

functional interchange of planning information and reviews.

The geographic and population impact of the Federal areawide programs is shown in Table VI-4. This table shows that:

—Eight of the programs are nationwide in coverage while others cover smaller portions of the Nation; in some cases, the latter contain as little as 9 or 10 percent of the population.

—Two of the Federal areawide programs are urban in their impact, five are rural, and the remainder can be applied in either rural or urban areas.

Table VI-1

Growth of Federal Areawide Programs: 1954-1972

No.	Federal Cat. No.	Name of Program	Federal Agency	Year of Enactment/ Major Amend.
1	14.203	Areawide Comp. Plng. Grants (701)	HUD	1954/1965
2	14.303	Open Space Grants	HUD	1961
3	20.205	Urban Transportation Planning Grants	DOT/FHWA	1962/1970
4	10.901	Resource Conservation & Development Loans	USDA/SCS	1962/1966/ 1970/1972
5	20.505	Urban Mass Transportation Planning Grants	DOT/UMTA	1964/1970
6	49.002	Community Action Grants (CAP)	OEO	1964
7	14.301	Water and Sewer Facilities Grants	HUD	1965
8	10.400	Water and Sewer Planning Grants for Rural Communities	USDA/FHA	1965/1972
9	10.418	Water and Waste Disposal Systems Grants for Rural Communities	USDA/FHA	1965/1972
10	13.249	Regional Medical Program Grants	HEW	1965
11	11.302	Economic Develop. Plng. Grants	Commerce/EDA	1965
12	23.009	Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Grants	ARC	1965
13	66.301	Solid Waste Plng. Grants	EPA	1965
14		New Communities	HUD	1965/1970
	14.125	Land Devel. Mortg.		
	14.207	Loan Guarantees		
	14.208	Supplemental Grants		
15	13.206	Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning Grants	HEW	1966/1967/ 1970
16	----	Project Notification & Review Process (A-95)	OMB	1966/1968
17	66.001	Air Pollution Control Grants	EPA	1967
18	17.205	Manpower Plng. Grants (CAMPS)	Labor	1968
19	16.500	Law Enforcement Plng. Grants	Justice/LEAA	1968/1970
20	20.103	Airport System Plng. Grants	DOT/FAA	1970
21	66.401	Water Quality Management Plng. Grants	EPA	1970/1972
22	----	Rural Development Plng. Grants	USDA/FHA	1972
23	----	Rural Industrialization Loans & Grants	USDA/FHA	1972
24	----	Areawide Waste Treatment Management	EPA	1972

Table VI-2

Funding of Federal Areawide Programs (FY 1972 estimates in millions)

Name of Program	Planning Assistance Funds	Capital and Operating Program Funds	Total
Air Pollution Control (EPA)		\$ 42.9 ¹	\$ 42.9
Airport Systems Planning (DOT)	\$15.0	¹¹	15.0
Appalachian Development Assistance (ARC)	2.0	64.6	66.6
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (HEW 314b)	13.2	¹¹	13.2
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (HUD 701)	35.4 ²		35.4
Areawide Waste Treatment Management (EPA)	50.0 ³	5,000.0	5,050.0
Community Action (OEO CAP)		342.1 ¹	342.1
Economic Development (EDA)	5.5	142.2	147.7
Law Enforcement Planning (LEAA)	14.0 ⁴	¹¹	14.0
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	17.6	¹¹	17.6
New Communities (HUD)		212.2 ⁵	212.2
Open Space (HUD)	⁶	100.0	100.0
Project Notification and Review (A-95)	0	0	0
Regional Medical Program (HEW)		140.7 ¹	140.7
Resource Conservation and Development (USDA)	⁷	20.9	20.9
Rural Development Planning (USDA)	10.0 ³		10.0
Rural Industrialization Assistance (USDA)		100.0 ³	100.0
Solid Waste Planning Grants (EPA)	3.1	¹¹	3.1
Urban Mass Transportation (DOT)	25.0	510.0	535.0
Urban Transportation Planning (DOT)	22.6	1,483.5 ¹⁰	1,506.1
Water/Sewer Facilities (HUD)	⁶	200.0	200.0
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities (USDA)	2.0 ⁸		2.0
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities (USDA)		40.4	40.4
Water Quality Management Planning (EPA)	5.4 ⁹		5.4
TOTALS	\$220.8	\$8,399.5	\$8,620.3

Source: Office of Management and Budget, *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance*, Sixth Edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).

¹Planning funds are included, but the use of funds for this purpose is determined by individual grantees.

²The total appropriation is \$100 million, but much of it goes for local and statewide planning, rather than for areawide or regional planning.

³Grant authorizations enacted for FY 1973.

⁴This represents 40 percent of the \$35 million which the States receive. This percentage is required to be passed through to lower levels of government.

⁵The \$9.8 million in supplemental grants included here was subject to OMB spending constraints.

⁶Planning for these programs is assisted under Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701).

⁷Planning for this program is provided through Federal technical assistance.

⁸These grants are made to areawide bodies whenever possible, but are often made to single counties.

⁹This program will no longer be funded, now that the Areawide Waste Treatment Management Program has been established.

¹⁰Estimated on the basis that the planning funds equal 1.5 percent of the total available in the urban areas subject to areawide planning.

¹¹The related "hardware" programs have been omitted because they are separate from their planning programs and are not usually thought of as areawide programs or allocated through areawide organizations.

Table VI-3

The Purposes of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	General Purpose of Program	Types of Activities Supported	Target Groups	Constancy of Financial Support
Air Pollution Control	To help State, local, regional, and interstate agencies plan, develop, and establish programs for prevention and control of air pollution through implementation of ambient air standards.	Regulation; planning	Primarily urban pop. where pollutants concentrate	Continuing
Airport System Planning	To assist public agencies in planning individual airports and State/regional/metropolitan systems of airports adequate to meet the needs of civil aviation.	Planning	Airlines & the flying public	Project by project
Appalachian Local Development District Planning	To support multi-county districts and develop their planning and development capabilities, as a means of stimulating substantial public investments in public facilities that will start the region on its way toward accelerated social and economic development.	Planning; grant packaging; administrative support	The people of the Appalachian Region (primarily rural)	Continuing
Areawide Comp. Health Png. (314b)	To encourage areawide comprehensive health planning.	Planning	The Nation's total pop.	Continuing
Areawide Comp. Png. (701)	To encourage comprehensive community development (land use, etc.) planning at State, metro, non-metro regional, & local government levels.	Planning	The Nation's total pop.	Continuing
Areawide Waste Treatment Management	To encourage and facilitate the development and implementation of areawide waste treatment management plans.	Planning	Urban-industrial concentrations and other areas with water quality control problems	Continuing
Community Action (CAP)	To eradicate poverty by mobilizing the resources of the Federal, State, and local governments and the private sector.	Grant packaging, project execution (multi-functional)	The poor	Continuing

Table VI-3 (Continued)

The Purposes of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	General Purpose of Program	Types of Activities Supported	Target Groups	Constancy of Financial Support
Economic Development PIng.	To encourage multicounty districts and develop their planning capabilities, assuring effective utilization of resources in creating full-time permanent jobs for the unemployed and the underemployed.	Planning grant packaging	Unemployed & under-employed	Continuing
Law Enforcement PIng.	To support required State and local crime control planning.	Grant packaging; planning	The Nation's total pop.	Continuing
Manpower PIng. (CAMPS)	To help coordinate manpower training and supportive service programs by providing funds for manpower planning staffs and involving executive leadership at State and local levels.	Planning	Unemployed & underemployed	Continuing
New Communities	To encourage the development of new communities.	Land acquisition; private devel; public facility construction	New Community developers & future community residents	Project by project
Open Space	To finance urban parks and open spaces	Land acquisition; physical development	Urban populations	Project by project
Project Notification (A-95)	To give areawide "clearing-house" organizations and State and local govts. an opportunity to comment on proposed Federal aid and direct Federal projects before they are acted upon by the Federal govt.	Information exchange; pIng. review and comment	State & local govts.	None
Regional Medical Program	To help provide the most up-to-date health care services throughout the Nation for persons suffering from heart disease, cancer, stroke, kidney disease, and other disease.	Grant packaging; service delivery; planning	The Nation's total pop.	Continuing
Resource Conservation & Development	To encourage accelerated programs of rural development to increase economic opportunities for local people.	Resource conservation development and utilization; planning	Rural populations	Continuing

Table VI-3 (Continued)

The Purposes of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	General Purpose of Program	Types of Activities Supported	Target Groups	Constancy of Financial Support
Rural Development Png.	To encourage the preparation of comprehensive plans for rural development.	Planning ¹	Non-metropolitan populations	Undetermined
Rural Industrialization	To provide grants to public bodies for rural area pollution abatement and economic development projects, and loans to public and private bodies and individuals for economic development projects and environmental improvement.	Acquisition and construction projects	Non-metropolitan populations	Project by project
Solid Waste Png.	To help develop plans and programs leading to the solution of solid waste management problems.	Planning	Solid Waste Management Agencies (State, interstate, municipal, and inter-municipal)	3 yr. max
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	To encourage sound planning of urban mass transportation projects in a program of unified or officially coordinated urban transportation system.	Planning	Urban populations & transit companies	Continuing
Urban Transportation Png.	To require and finance integrated land-use transportation planning within all urban areas of 50,000 people or more.	Planning	Urban population	Continuing
Water and Sewer Facilities	To help finance construction of water facilities and sewer lines.	Construction	Urban communities exceeding 5,500 population	Project by project
Water and Sewer Png. for Rural Communities	To encourage sound planning for rural water and sewer waste management systems.	Planning	Rural communities under 5,500 population	Project by project
Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities	To help finance construction or improvement of rural water and waste disposal systems.	Construction	Rural populations	Project by project

Table VI-3 (Continued)

The Purposes of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Project	General Purpose of Program	Types of Activities Supported	Target Groups	Constancy of Financial Support
Water Quality Management Prog.	To provide financial assistance to planning agencies for development of comprehensive water pollution control and abatement plans: (1) for basins or other appropriate areas which are portions thereof, and (2) which will meet applicable State water quality planning requirements.	Planning; grant packaging	Populations of river basins	Project by project

¹ Funds have not actually been appropriated, so there is no actual support of this at the present time.

Map VI-1 shows that each State is affected by several of these Federal areawide programs.

In short, these Federal areawide programs affect everyone in the Nation to a greater or lesser degree. Despite some gaps in purpose and geographic coverage, the Federal government now provides a very impressive array of programs for treating areawide problems.

Major Concerns About Federal Areawide Programs

The growth of Federal areawide programs has given rise to at least three major problems to the regional organizations created in response to the Federal initiative. The organizations created are of 13 different types, in accordance with the requirements of 19 of the 24 programs. Some represent general local governments; some represent special sectors of the population or designated functional specialists; and some are largely vehicles of State influence. With the growth of regionalism come rising expectations for regional action, but there also is growing competition among the various regional organizations and a nagging confusion spawned by Federal program complexities and inconsistencies. These three themes recur again and again throughout the evaluation of Federal areawide programs. So before moving into the analysis of the programs themselves, it is wise to describe these themes in greater detail. They provide a useful framework for the later evaluations.

RISING EXPECTATIONS FOR REGIONAL STRENGTH


With the passage of each new Federal areawide

program, and the assignment of responsibilities to specific areawide organizations, there is increasing expectation that national goals will be carried out in substantial coordination with other Federal, State, and local objectives. This seems to continue, despite the fact that neither the Federal programs themselves nor State enabling legislation gives most of these areawide organizations the authority they need to assure such coordination. Thus, a gap is growing between what is expected and what is being delivered by the areawide organizations.

Also contributing to this gap is the geographic unevenness with which Federal areawide programs cover the Nation. While the regionalism movement undoubtedly reaches every corner of the country, and the combined purposes cover a broad range of concerns, the fact remains that program benefits are not being provided uniformly wherever needs for them exist. For example, both the Economic Development District program and the Resource Conservation and Development program have limits on the number of districts to be served. Federal financial limitations and special eligibility requirements result in the uneven application of other programs as well.

All of the Federal areawide programs are available to a region on a project-by-project basis, usually by means of annual contracts setting forth the work to be done for the specified amount of funds negotiated. Such contracts are conditional upon (1) specific program requirements being met on a continuing basis, (2) the availability of Federal funds and matching local funds, and (3) the approval of a Federal program manager who acts on

The Geographic Overlapping of Federal Areawide Programs



his own discretion. Among areawide programs, there is nothing like the “formula grants” that the States receive—whereby regional organizations would be supported on an automatic basis. In other words, the vagaries of grantsmanship determine where Federal areawide programs operate. A regional organization with a good grantsman receives more Federal benefits than one with a poor grantsman.

FERMENT AMONG REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The variety of different geographic and organizational requirements in Federal programs has given rise to competition between the various areawide organizations. Each time a new Federal grant becomes available at the areawide level, there is a scramble to set up the new type of organization required, or to qualify an existing organization. In many cases, this scramble takes place in the absence of clear-cut and consistent Federal and State policies. Federal policy does encourage the States to designate a single set of substate district boundaries

within their borders for use by the various Federal programs, and a majority of the States have done this, or are moving in this direction.

However, this addresses only the boundary question, not the organizational question. As noted later in this chapter, even among those Federal programs which respect the substate district boundaries, many fund separate organizations for their own program purposes. Chapter IX demonstrates the weakness of the sub-state district policy in dealing with competition among regional organizations in interstate areas, where more than a quarter of the Nation’s population resides. As pointed out in Chapter V, even the national policy embodied in OMB Circular A-95 (seeking Federal project reviews by metropolitan and regional clearinghouses composed to the greatest extent possible of elected local officials) is designed to accommodate a wide diversity of Federally supported regional organizations, along with the regular State, local, and other Federal-aid recipients.

These rather open-ended general policies, plus a variety of specific Federal program requirements

Table VI-4

Geographic and Population Impact of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Eligible Areas	Geographic Extent of Present Coverage	No. of Regions Funded or Designated	% of Nat'l. Population Served
Air Pollution Control	States, local govts. & designated regions	Nationwide by virtue of State programs. Designated regions blanket the Nation.	247	100%
Airport System Planning	States & selected regions	Nationwide by virtue of State programs. Regions selected so far are all large metropolitan.	15 ¹	100
Appalachian Local Development District Asst.	13 States & multi-county districts within them.	The whole region is covered, except West Virginia where 7 of the 11 Devel. districts are organized.	70	9
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)	Single & multi-county regions; both rural & urban	Rapidly approaching nationwide coverage; five States had full regional coverage by 1972, while only two had more; supplemented by statewide planning.	198	70
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)	Metro & non-metro plng. dist. and States	Most metro areas are covered, but coverage is less complete in non-metro areas.	466	approx. 90 ²
Areawide Waste Treatment	Urban-industrial & other areas w/ water quality problems	Designated regions receive special attention.	---- ³	---- ³
Community Action (CAP)	States, counties, regions	Nationwide by virtue of State programs. Most urban & many rural areas participate directly.	957	100
Economic Development Plng.	Multi-county districts containing no city over 250,000 population	Mostly in the South. Very spotty in other parts of the Nation.	124	18
Law Enforcement Planning	States, local govts, & multi-county districts	Most of the Nation is regionalized for this program.	481	100
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	States, counties, & major cities (incl. their surrounding labor market areas)	Nationwide by virtue of State programs. Most urban areas have their own committees.	501	100

Table VI-4 (Continued)

Geographic and Population Impact of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Eligible Areas	Geographic Extent of Present Coverage	No. of Regions Funded or Designated	% of Nat'l. Population Served
New Communities Land Devel. Mortg. Insur. Loan Guarantees Supplemental Grants	Worthy projects	This program is not regionalized for funding purposes.	N.A.	N.A.
Open Space	State, local govts., & park authorities	This program is not regionalized for funding purposes, but areawide planning is required.	N.A.	N.A.
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	States, metro areas, & non-metro planning districts.	Nationwide by virtue of State programs. Most urban areas & many rural areas have metro or regional "clearinghouses" designated. (54% of the Nation's areas and 86% of the population).	445	100
Regional Medical Program	As designated by HEW	Nationwide.	56	100
Resource Conservation & Development	Multi-county rural districts	793 counties in 49 States and the Virgin Islands (22% of the total national coverage).	123	10
Rural Development Png.	Rural communities	New program, not yet established.	N.A.	N.A.
Rural Industrialization Assistance	Rural communities	New program, not yet established.	N.A.	N.A.
Solid Waste Png. Grants	State, interstate, municipal, & inter-municipal agencies (priority given for areawide planning)	43 States & 5 interstate agencies.	5	N.A.
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	Urban areas over 50,000	Emphasis on major metro areas.	85	25
Urban Transportation Png.	Urban areas over 50,000	All eligible urban areas covered.	227	70
Water/Sewer Facilities	Public agencies	This program is not regionalized for funding purposes, but areawide planning is required.	N.A.	N.A.

Table VI-4 (Continued)

Geographic and Population Impact of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Eligible Areas	Geographic Extent of Present Coverage	No. of Regions Funded or Designated	% of Nat'l. Population Served
Water & Sewer Plng. for Rural Communities	Public planning agencies for rural areas	This program is not regionalized for funding purposes.	N.A.	N.A.
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities	Public & quasi-public bodies in rural comm.	This program is not regionalized for funding purposes.	N.A.	N.A.
Water Quality Management Planning	River basins & portions thereof		45	100
TOTAL			<u>4,045</u>	

¹ Regions are not formally identified by the Federal government for this program. Most metropolitan areas are planned as part of the statewide airport planning effort.

² Statewide planning coverage is 100 percent.

³ This program is not yet in operation.

stressing the need for special purpose organizations, create competition that more often than not results in the creation of several separate Federally sponsored regional organizations in any given region.

Often the competing areawide organizations are new, poorly financed, and insecure politically. Thus, the acquisition of new Federal programs to bolster them is of prime institutional importance. The relatively small size of most Federal areawide program grants, as well as the meager amount of State and local funds available to supplement these grants, makes it very difficult for regional organizations to aggregate sufficient funds to allow them to cross the threshold between a minimal coordinating operation and a significant professional planning/programming capability. In most cases, this can only be accomplished by aggregating funds from several Federal programs.

An example of these difficulties can be seen by examining the coordinative responsibilities given to many general purpose areawide organizations under OMB Circular A-95. These responsibilities can be carried out only in a mechanical manner, without effective professional evaluation, in the absence of a well established planning staff.

The intensity of this competition and its importance becomes most apparent in analyzing the average budget of the Nation's regional councils, which are the general purpose areawide organizations. These councils, defined as metropolitan or non-metropolitan multi-jurisdictional organizations composed largely or completely of local elected officials, numbered about 600 in 1970 and had an average budget of about \$220,000.³ Sixty percent of

this budget, or about \$132,000, was supplied by the Federal government. Local governments themselves supplied another 34 percent, or \$74,800, while the States supplied only 5 percent, or \$11,000. Thus, without the Federal funding, the average regional council would not have any substantial professional planning capability.

The absence of any substantial State funding in most States for regional councils, or for the substate planning district organizations, makes the competition for Federal funds even more intense than it might otherwise be. In fact, Chapter VII points out that the substate district organizations in some cases have become additional competitors for Federal funds already claimed by preexisting regional councils. Thus, the ferment among regional organizations pits the States against the local governments, the generalists against functionalists, and one Federal program against another.

FEDERAL PROGRAM COMPLEXITIES AND REGIONAL CONFUSION

Each Federal areawide program grew up with its own Federal requirements for organization, geography, planning, and administration. Only recently have Federal efforts to simplify and coordinate these requirements begun to bear fruit. Thus, the areawide organization dealing with several Federal programs has often found itself spending a large proportion of its time and talent on activities commonly referred to as "grantsmanship." This is a confusing and frustrating set of activities for a dedicated group of areawide planners and doers.

To understand the ferment and confusion at the areawide level of government, and to discover what might be done to alleviate it, it is necessary to evaluate systematically some of the major characteristics of existing Federal areawide programs.

Current Provisions and Operating Characteristics

Various Federal areawide programs start with different philosophies and approaches, and then apply a variety of different requirements and facilitative devices to reach their objectives. After describing some of the major approaches, these requirements and devices will be evaluated.

Variety of Approaches.

Table VI-5 shows how the various Federal areawide programs approach the issue of regionalism. Only about one-third of these programs are Federally mandated. The others are optional; they may or may not be used, according to the area's desire or ability to participate. For example, comprehensive urban transportation planning is a requirement for continued eligibility for interstate highway money, while the lack of areawide comprehensive health planning has no consequences whatsoever in terms of Federal aid for health facilities or services.

In programs which are optional at the regional level, such as health planning, the States frequently play an important role in determining participation by a regional organization. In the case of the areawide comprehensive health planning program, the State can veto the application of the regional organization and keep it from being filed with the Federal government. This has actually happened and, as a result, the program does not operate at the regional level in such cases.

Table VI-5 also shows that the various Federal areawide programs take different approaches to the organization, planning/coordination, and financial elements of regional operations.

The organizational approach to areawide problems stresses the need for institution building. For example, Section 701g of the Housing Act of 1954, as amended in 1965, provides general support to councils of government. The thought is simply that having such an organization in a multi-jurisdictional community, with substantial funds available to it, will contribute significantly to the solution of areawide problems. In this case, a clear Federal preference is given for a specific form of organization, composed to the greatest extent possible of the elected officials of the governing bodies of the general purpose local governments (i.e., municipalities and counties). About half of the Federal areawide programs have special requirements for the type of organization eligible to receive their assistance. This shows a strong institution-building desire on the part of

the Federal government, but a closer look shows that six of the 11 major institution building programs are single purpose and that they tend to promote single-purpose regional districts. This raises again the issue of competition between the generalists and the functionalists. More will be said about it later.

A variation on the institution-building theme is an approach which focuses the purposes of the regional organization very specifically on the packaging of grants to be given out by the Federal agency which inspired the organization. While general planning may play a significant role in the organization's program, the basic objective, in some cases, is to produce a consolidated application for Federal funds from a variety of interrelated projects. This kind of institution building tends to produce regional organizations which are direct extensions of the Federal agency—or its State counterpart—rather than regional organizations with a more local orientation. This is the case, more or less, in the following programs: Appalachian Local Development District Assistant, Community Action, Economic Development Planning, Law Enforcement Planning, Regional Medical Programs, Resource Conservation and Development.

Table VI-5 shows two other significant aspects of the institution-building approach. Fourteen of the 24 programs will fund directly only one organization per region. This keeps organizational competition at a minimum at least within the individual programs.

Seven of the 24 programs also give the areawide organization a significant voice in Federal funding decisions—one approaching veto proportions. This is done through the grant packaging mechanism for the most part, and is a very big plus for regional organizations—most of which have little, if any, actual authority. It is a significant step beyond the A-95 review authority which most regional councils count as their major strength. All Federal areawide programs are subject to the A-95 process and a large number (450) of regional organizations have been designated as A-95 clearinghouses.⁴

Another Federal approach to areawide problems is to require "adequate" planning and coordination at the areawide level, without any preferences for the type of planning organization. Among the 21 programs which require such planning, six do not specify any organization preferences. Thus, the emphasis in the planning and coordination approach is not necessarily on institution building.

A technique often used to strengthen planning requirements is the use of a coordinating council composed of all agencies and interests to be affected by or involved in the program. Nearly half of the Federal areawide programs call for the use of such committees, and in several cases (listed below) they need not be legally established entities:

Interstate Air Quality Planning Committee

Table VI-5

Operational Approaches of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Areawide Use of Program	Special Areawide Organizational Requirements	Functional Components of Areawide Programs Other Than Land Use	Areawide Coordinative Mechanisms Used				Federal Funding Channeled through a Single Areawide Agency
				Required Plan	Coord. Council	A-95 Review and Comment	Areawide Authority to Veto Funding	
Air Pollution Control	Optional	Yes	Single	State	No	Yes	No	No
Airport System Planning	Optional	No	Single	State	No	Yes	No	Yes
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.	Optional	Yes	Multiple	State & Area	Yes	Yes	No ⁶	Yes ¹
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)	Optional	Yes	Single	State & Area	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Areawide Comp. Png. Asst. (701)	Required	Yes	Multiple	Area	No	Yes	No	Yes (Except some interstates)
Areawide Waste Treatment Management	Required	Yes	Single	State & Area	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Community Action (CAP)	Optional ⁷	Yes	Multiple	Area	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Economic Development Planning	Optional	Yes	Multiple	Area	Yes	Yes	No	Yes ¹
Law Enforcement Planning	Required	Yes	Single	State & Area	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	Optional	Yes	Single	State & Area	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
New Communities	Optional	No	Multiple	None	No	Yes	No	No
Open Space	Optional	No ²	Single	Area	No	Yes	No	No
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	Optional	Yes	Multiple	None	No	---	---	---
Regional Medical Program	Required	Yes	Single	Area	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Resource Conservation & Development	Optional	Yes	Multiple	Area	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rural Development Planning	Optional	No	Multiple	----- Undetermined -----				
Rural Industrialization Asst.	Optional	No	Multiple	----- Undetermined -----				
Solid Waste Planning Grants	Optional	No	Single	None	No	Yes	No	Yes
Urban Mass Transportation Png.	Optional	No	Single	Area	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table VI-5 (Continued)

Operational Approaches of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Areawide Use of Program	Special Areawide Organizational Requirements	Functional Components of Areawide Programs Other Than Land Use	Areawide Coordinative Mechanisms Used				
				Required Plan	Coord. Council	A-95 Review and Comment	Areawide Authority to Veto Funding	Federal Funding Channeled through a Single Area-wide Agency
Urban Transportation Planning	Required	Yes	Single	Area	Yes	Yes	No	Yes ¹
Water/Sewer Facilities	Optional	No ²	Single	Area	No	Yes	No	No
Water & Sewer Ping. for Rural Communities	Required ³	No	Single	Area ⁴	No	Yes	No	Yes ⁵
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities	Optional	No	Single	Area ³	No	Yes	No	No
Water Quality Management Planning	Required	Yes	Single	State & Area	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Sources: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance*, *Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹Action projects do not follow this pattern.

²An areawide planning organization (of the 701 type) is required, but not an areawide implementation organization. As of 1971, approximately 185 metropolitan planning organizations and 149 non-metropolitan planning organizations were certified as meeting the open space and water/sewer planning requirements. In a few very exceptional cases, a State agency has been recognized on a temporary basis as the planning organization.

³Required only if USDA/FHA funding involves a grant (rather than a loan) for water and waste disposal system.

⁴Most of these plans are countywide, but they may be multicounty.

⁵This agency has usually been the county, but a preference is now stated for multicounty substate districts.

⁶Some States have given this authority to their local development districts (LDD's). In such cases, the LDD veto is honored by ARC.

⁷Although a community action agency is required, it need not be areawide. Indeed, a large number of them are single county or single city in coverage.

Criminal Justice Planning Board

Manpower Planning Committee

Resource Conservation and Development Councils

Urban Transportation Planning Committees

The planning and coordination required by the Federal areawide programs may be primarily for a single areawide function, such as health facilities and services, or it may be of a more general or comprehensive nature, stressing the need for proper relationships among various functional and general areas of concern. Such variations will be treated more fully in a later section of this chapter.

A strictly financial approach to Federal programs is the major basis for general support payments, as in the case of revenue sharing. The thought here is that if sufficient funding is available to the local governments in an area, the area's problems will be solved by these governments. However, none of the revenue sharing proposals presented so far have been designed to go directly to the areawide level,⁵ and the general support payments available to councils of government from HUD's 701g program are now tightly tied to functional certification requirements which determine the specific types of planning to be done.

This quick review of the major Federal approaches to regional problems indicates that areawide programs (1) may or may not exhibit a strong relationship between planning and implementation, and (2) do exhibit significant differences which add to the ferment and confusion among regional organizations. A fuller understanding of these points can be obtained by examining the specifics of each program's organizational, geographic, and planning requirements.

Organizational Requirements

As already seen, there is a strong tendency for most Federal areawide programs to build new organizations or to support the variety of those already built by related Federal programs and by the State. Table VI-6 shows the nature of these Federally encouraged organizations.

—Nineteen of the 24 programs require or allow some sort of areawide organization, though the definition of the word "areawide" varies, and may be the same as local (especially county) boundaries in some of the programs.

—Of these 19, five prefer to use the general purpose comprehensive planning organization for the area; nine prefer specially organized single purpose organizations designed specially for the Federal program involved; and five programs do

not call for any particular kind of areawide organization.

—Thus, if all nine of the programs preferring special organizations, and at least one of the programs preferring the general purpose organization, were operating within a single area—as is entirely possible—there is a clear potential for establishing ten separate Federally encouraged regional organizations in that area. It is also possible that one or more of the five programs which do not specify a type of organization may spawn additional units.

While it is often possible to integrate the special purpose organizations into a general purpose planning agency, various special requirements must be met. The more individual programs that are to be included, the more difficult it becomes for a single organization to meet all of these requirements.

In practice, two of the nine potential special organizations encouraged by Federal areawide programs—air pollution and solid waste—have seldom been set up, while two of the programs preferring general organizations—Appalachia and A-95—call these organizations "local development districts" and "clearinghouses" respectively, regardless of their official names. Consequently, it is not uncommon to be confronted by several—but not all—of the following 11 separate Federally encouraged areawide organizations or names in any given area:

1. Appalachian Local Development District (LDD)
2. Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning Organization (CHP)
3. Areawide Planning Organization (APO)
4. Community Action Agency (CAA)
5. Continuing, Coordinated, Comprehensive Transportation Planning Organization (3C Process)
6. Economic Development District (EDD)
7. Manpower Area Planning Council (MAPC—formerly CAMPS)
8. Metropolitan or Regional Clearinghouse
9. Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board (CJP)
10. Regional Medical Program (RMP)
11. Resource Conservation and Development Council (RC&D Council)

Of the 19 programs requiring areawide organizations, the preferred membership on the governing body—shown in Table VI-7—ranges from exclusively governmental officials in four programs, to a combination of elected officials and citizens in four programs, to "all affected interests" in seven programs, and unspecified members in the remaining four programs. The details of membership are usually specified only in administrative regulations, but in some cases they have been specified in Federal legislation. For example, organizations of "public officials" and several other types of planning organi-

Table VI-6

Type of Organization Required by Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	General Purpose	Special ¹ Purpose	Type Not Specified	No. Area-wide Organizations
Air Pollution Control		X ²		
Airport System Planning	X			
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.	X			
Areawide Comp. Health Plng. (314b)		X		
Areawide Comp. Plng. Asst. (701)	X			
Areawide Waste Treatment Management			X	
Community Action (CAP)		X		
Economic Development Planning		X		
Law Enforcement Planning		X		
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)		X		
New Communities				X
Open Space				X
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	X			
Regional Medical Program		X		
Resource Conservation & Development		X		
Rural Development Planning			X	
Rural Industrialization Assistance				X
Solid Waste Planning Grants		X		
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X			
Urban Transportation Planning			X	
Water/Sewer Facilities				X
Water & Sewer Plng. for Rural Communities			X	
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities				X
Water Quality Management Planning			X	
Totals	5	9	5	5

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ Organizations for carrying out the programs marked in this column may be general purpose or multi-functional in some cases, and they may have policy boards composed partially of local elected officials, but they *do not have to be* general purpose in scope. Other general purpose areawide organizations may exist alongside these special program organizations.

² These regions are seldom funded as separate organizations. Most grants go to the general purpose units of State and local government.

zations are legislatively eligible for HUD comprehensive planning assistance, while administrative regulations require at least two-thirds local elected officials on the governing bodies of all grantees unless otherwise provided by State law. The Community Action program legislatively provides for one-third public officials, one-third representatives of the poor, and one-third general citizens. The Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning organizations are legislatively mandated to be composed of a majority of "consumers." Specific membership requirements in the other programs are determined administratively.

The legal status of the areawide organizations in these 19 Federal programs varies as follows (see Table VI-8): three programs require that they be public agencies; 11 programs allow either public or nonprofit corporations; three require only coordinating committees without

formal legal standing; and the new areawide waste treatment management and rural development programs are still too new to have established a pattern. In most cases, Federal legislation provides very broad eligibility—so these more specific preferences are administratively determined.

Table VI-9 shows that in these 19 Federal programs, the areawide organizations must possess officially recognized authority to carry out the purposes of the program. Eleven require that the areawide organization have only planning authority of an advisory nature, while six programs require the organizations to have both planning and implementation authority of some type—regulatory in the case of air pollution, and service delivery or land acquisition and construction in the case of the others. The solid waste program requires either

Table VI-7

Membership of Federally Encouraged Areawide Organizations: 1972 (19 Programs)

Name of Program	Government Officials Only	Elected Officials & Citizens at Large	All Affected Interests Public & Private	Not Specified
Air Pollution Control	X			
Airport System Planning				X
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.		X ⁷		
Areawide Comp. Health Planning. (314b)			X	
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)		X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management				X ¹
Community Action (CAP)		X		
Economic Development Planning			X ²	
Law Enforcement Planning			X	
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)			X	
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	X ³			
Regional Medical Program			X	
Resource Conservation & Development			X	
Rural Development Planning				X ⁴
Solid Waste Planning Grants				X
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X	⁵		
Urban Transportation Planning	X ⁶			
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities			X	
Water Quality Management Planning		X		
Totals	4	4	7	4

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹Local elected officials or their designees must be included, but others are not specified.

²All EDD's now have governing bodies with majority control held by local elected officials. This program is categorized in this column because it also emphasizes inclusion of the local economic power structure in its regional governing bodies.

³Others may belong; the requirement is "to the greatest practicable extent, composed of or responsible to the elected officials. . ."

⁴Regulations have not yet been issued.

⁵Although official regulations have not been changed to recognize it, current practice is to use the HUD certified areawide planning organization, which normally does provide for citizen representation as well as elected official representation.

⁶While governmental representation is the only type called for, the State and local governments have considerable latitude in designating the areawide organization and its membership. Several such organizations have other members.

⁷While this is true as a matter of general practice and preference, formal requirements do not specify the type of membership.

planning authority alone or planning and implementation authority combined, depending upon the project to be undertaken. It is uncertain at this time what type of authority might be required by the rural development planning program, although the legislation does not require implementation authority. Requirements for type of authority are usually found in the Federal legislation.

The States play a major role in establishing the areawide organizations to carry out most of the 19 Federal programs which require them. As shown in Table VI-10, five of these programs require that the State designate the areawide organization. In six pro-

grams the State is consulted before Federal designation of the areawide organizations, while in three other programs the State belongs to the areawide organizations along with other participating members. The remaining four programs specify combinations of the above roles, depending upon whether the areawide organization is metropolitan or non-metropolitan. State designation plays a major role in all four programs for non-metropolitan organizations, while requiring only consultation with the State for metropolitan organizations. The State role is usually specified in the Federal legislation.

Not to be overlooked in Table VI-10 is the fact that in eight Federal areawide programs, the State is allowed

or expected to do the necessary regional planning in the absence of a locally organized areawide organization. Moreover, in seven of these eight programs, as well as in six additional ones, there are counterpart Federal aid programs operating at the State level.

Regional organizations encouraged by Federal areawide programs are all required to coordinate with related activities in their areas by Federal law, as outlined in OMB Circular A-95. However, in addition, most programs administratively require such coordination on a continuing basis beginning at much earlier points in the planning process. Several programs which do not require such coordination in specific terms nevertheless urge coordination in more general terms. Only two established programs make no mention in their regulations of interagency coordination beyond their own functional

area.⁶ The individual programs in each of these categories are shown in Table VI.11.

All but four of the 19 Federal programs requiring areawide organizations specify certain staffing arrangements.⁷ These specifications are designed to assure adequate professional capability within the areawide organizations themselves. Two specifically require that major portions of the work be done by in-house staff as opposed to consulting firms.

This brief review of organization requirements indicates that Federal areawide programs are a major institution-building force at the substate regional level.

—Not only are a variety of new types of areawide organizations created under these programs, but specific attention is given also to staffing and funding them.

Table VI-8

Legal Status of Federally Encouraged Areawide Organizations: 1972
(19 Programs)

Name of Program	Public Agency	Public or Non-Profit	Coordinating Committee	Regulations Not Yet Issued
Air Pollution Control	X ¹			
Airport System Planning	X			
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.		X ²		
Areawide Comp. Health Planning. (314b)		X		
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)		X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management				X
Community Action (CAP)		X		
Economic Development Planning		X		
Law Enforcement Planning			X	
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)			X	
Project Notification & Review (A-95)		X		
Regional Medical Program		X		
Resource Conservation & Development			X	
Rural Development Planning				X
Solid Waste Planning Grants		X		
Urban Mass Transportation Planning		X		
Urban Transportation Planning		X ³		
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities	X			
Water Quality Management Planning		X		
Totals	3	11	3	2

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ A coordinating committee is acceptable in interstate areas.

² Preferences for a public agency.

³ A coordinating committee is also acceptable, although unusual.

Table VI-9

**Type of Authority Required in Federally Encouraged Areawide Organizations: 1972
(19 Programs)**

Name of Program	Planning Only	Planning and Implementation	Depends Upon the Project
Air Pollution Control		X ¹	
Airport System Planning	X		
Appalachian Local Development Dist. Assistance		X ²	
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)	X		
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Asst. (701)	X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management		X ³	
Community Action (CAP)		X	
Economic Development Planning	X		
Law Enforcement Planning	X		
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	X		
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	X		
Regional Medical Program		X	
Resource Conservation & Development		X	
Rural Development Planning ⁴
Solid Waste Planning Grants			X
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X		
Urban Transportation Planning	X		
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities	X		
Water Quality Management Planning	X		
Totals	11	6	1

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ Planning only in interstate areas.

² Implementation may be only in the sense of administrative support of development facilities.

³ The two types of authority may be vested in separate organizations, but the approved plans control the implementation projects.

⁴ Undetermined; the regulations have not yet been issued.

—The fact that different types of membership in the governing bodies of these new areawide organizations are required or preferred makes it difficult to fit them together under a single organization.

—Many of the specific organizational requirements of the Federal programs are generated by the special purposes which the individual programs are designed to accomplish.

—The requirement for implementation authority in addition to planning authority in certain programs makes it difficult to integrate them into the typical general purpose areawide organization, but provides great strength where it can be realized.

—The roles given to the States in creating (or

helping to create) new Federally required areawide organizations are quite substantial, but they are far from uniform. While at least three of the Federal programs—A-95, Economic Development Planning, and Appalachian District Assistance—strongly encourage it, none of the programs requires statewide substate districting systems to be established by the States; the States themselves must take the initiative in generating such a system.

Thus, it becomes apparent that the organizational requirements in Federal areawide programs contribute to the ferment among regional organizations; they often fail to confer any real strength upon them; and they can confuse efforts to consolidate regional efforts. The A-95 program itself, which is designed to cope with this array of differences, lacks the strength to meet rising expectations or banish competition and complexity.

Table VI-10

State Roles in Federally Encouraged Areawide Organizations: 1972
(19 Programs)

Name of Program	State Designates Organization	State is Consulted before Designation	State is Member of Organization	No State Role Necessary	State Program For Same Function Also Federally Funded	State Assumes Function as Last Resort
Air Pollution Control		X			X	X
Airport System Planning		X			X	X
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.	X				X	
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)		X			X	X
Areawide Comp. Planning Assistance (701)	(nonmetro.)	(metro.)		(metro.)	X	
Areawide Waste Treatment Management	X ¹				X	X
Community Action (CAP)		X			X	
Economic Development Planning		X ²				
Law Enforcement Planning	X				X	
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	(nonmetro.)	(metro.)			X	X
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	(nonmetro.)	(metro.)			X	X
Regional Medical Program			X			
Resource Conservation & Development		X				
Rural Development Planning				X		
Solid Waste Planning Grants	X				X	
Urban Mass Transportation Planning			X			
Urban Transportation Planning	X		X		X	X
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities	(nonmetro.)	(metro.)		X		X
Water Quality Management Planning					X	
Totals	5	6	3	2	13	8

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ If the Governor does not act within 180 days, local officials may act on their own to establish needed organizations.

² Federal designation is at the request of the Governor.

³ Legislation requires no State role, but regulations which could require it have not yet been issued.

One final point should be made with regard to institution building. Two of the Federal areawide programs have limitations on the number of regional organizations which they are allowed to fund. The limitations on EDA's economic development districts have been imposed by OMB as an economy measure, while the limitation on Agriculture's Resource Conservation and Development program has been imposed directly by Congress. Thus, while some Federal programs are busy blanketing the nation, others are consciously held back. In the case of the EDA program, this results in many of the areas eligible for development assistance being set aside for areawide planning assistance until limitations are relieved.

Geographic Requirements

Except for the New Communities program, which only requires coordination with such planning as may exist within its area of influence, and the Rural Industrial Assistance program, the other 22 Federal areawide programs analyzed in this chapter either require in positive fashion, or will fund, areawide planning for specifically delineated geographic regions. The different types of Federally encouraged planning areas are shown in Table VI-12. In 17 of the programs, the area delineated may be either metropolitan or non-metropolitan. Eight of these 17 programs provide for nationwide coverage by means of funding statewide programs which operate in the absence of an areawide program. Another of these programs, the Appalachian Local Development District program, also provides full geographic coverage, but within the more restricted bounds of its particular region. The remaining eight of these 17 programs, all of which operate only if the State or local governments choose, do so only in those regions which are specifically designated below the State level.

Two Federal areawide programs are restricted to metropolitan areas. These are the comprehensive urban transportation planning program of DOT—which is supplemented by State transportation planning programs which provide rural and statewide services—and urban mass transportation planning, which does not operate outside of urban areas for lack of need.

The remaining five programs, all of which are Agriculture Department rural development programs, are limited to non-metropolitan areas.

The drawing of boundaries around regional communities or geographic program areas is, as one might expect, a highly complex and often politically sensitive task. Essentially, the drawing of these boundaries, when matched up with areawide organizations, amounts to establishing a new level or layer of governmental activities. No matter how limited the functions of these areawide organizations may be, they are functions that the State or local governments would otherwise be called upon to provide themselves. Therefore, these new areas

necessitate development of a series of interrelationships between the new organizations and the State and local governments. Thus, the initial political acceptability of these areas is crucial to later success in pursuing program goals.

Despite the crucial nature of State and local politics in drawing geographic boundaries, other major factors must be considered as well. For example, in designating an area for planning the alleviation of social problems, unemployment, intergovernmental fiscal disparities, environmental problems caused by urban population or urban commuting, it becomes important to include the whole area in which these problems exist. The appropriate area may be a whole urban area, a labor market, or a combined urban and rural area which contains the potential both for generating problems and solving them. The economic development programs often focus on a predominantly rural area.

The significant questions, then, become those of deciding who draws the areawide boundaries and who designates the organization or organizations to serve the areas within these boundaries. Such designation is usually done in consultation with many relevant Federal, State, and local interests. But as shown in Table VI-13, the final decision in most cases is made by either the Federal or State levels, or in four cases, by the State and local levels operating together. Only three programs—the New Communities program of HUD, and the Rural Industrialization and Water and Waste Disposal Systems programs of Agriculture—do not require such designations.

Five programs (A-95, Water Quality Management, and the HUD planning, open space, and water/sewer programs) split the authority for designating areas and organizations, depending upon whether the program is operating in a metropolitan or a non-metropolitan area. In metropolitan areas, Federal agencies do the designating. In non-metropolitan areas, this authority is given either to the States or to the State and local governments acting in combination.

A comparison of the 19 Federal areawide programs which clearly lodge designation at one level or another shows a somewhat greater tendency for the Federal agencies to designate the areas, and for the State (or the State and local governments together) to designate the organizations to operate within those areas. With regard to deciding the boundaries—as shown in Table VI-13—the breakdown is eight Federal, four State, and four State and local in combination; with regard to designating the organizations—as shown in Table VI-14—the breakdown is six Federal, five State, and five State and local in combination. Of course, there are cases where geographic boundaries are designated, but regional organizations are not assigned to operate within them. In the following programs, the States carry out the Federally encouraged operations, while in the others, the programs simply do not operate:

Table VI-11

Coordination With Related Activities in Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Specially Required	Urged	Not Required Except by A-95	Regulations Not Yet Issued
Air Pollution Control			X	
Airport System Planning	X			
Appalachian Local Development Dist. Assistance	X			
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)	X			
Areawide Comp. Planning Assistance (701)	X			
Areawide Waste Treatment Management				X
Community Action (CAP)		X		
Economic Development Planning	X			
Law Enforcement Planning	X			
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)		X		
New Communities	X			
Open Space	X			
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	X			
Regional Medical Program			X	
Resource Conservation & Development		X		
Rural Development Planning				X
Rural Industrialization Assistance				X
Solid Waste Planning Grants	X			
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X			
Urban Transportation Planning	X			
Water/Sewer Facilities	X			
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities	X			
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities	X			
Water Quality Management Planning	X			
Totals	16	3	2	3

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register, and program guides and directories.*

Air Pollution Control
 Airport Planning
 Appalachian Local Development
 Community Action
 Areawide Waste Treatment Management
 Law Enforcement Planning
 Manpower
 Project Notification and Review
 Water Quality Management

The special geographic challenge of interstate areas is recognized in 18 of the 24 Federal areawide programs. These programs make some special provision for the designation or encouragement of areawide regions and organizations which encompass whole interstate areas. The six programs (of 24) which do not make such provisions are primarily rural and operating in areas

where close interstate relationships might not be as crucial as in highly complex urban areas.

The special provisions for interstate areas are of three types, as shown in Table VI-15. Seven programs specifically identify interstate organizations as being eligible for Federal assistance. Six programs provide that non-profit organizations having only planning authority will be accepted in interstate areas, whereas they would not be accepted elsewhere. Ten programs mandate that a whole area be covered regardless of State lines, and four urge interstate cooperation. One program, economic development planning, presents a strong incentive for interstate cooperation in those areas where this may be necessary to meet the qualifying standards for an economic development district—two economic development areas and at least one growth center.

Instead of mandating areawide boundaries and organizations covering the whole region, a few programs provide modest financial incentives for geographic amalgamation. Two such programs—Air Pollution Control and Solid Waste Planning—increase the matching ratio of Federal to local funds when two or more governmental units join together for the program,⁸ and another one—Resource Conservation and Development—states a funding priority for multicounty operations. A preference for following State-mandated substate district boundaries is expressed in three programs: Appalachian Local Development, Economic Development Planning, and Project Notification and Review (A-95). In the Economic Development Planning program of EDA, the

Federal field staff considers a regular part of its responsibility to be community organization work designed to bringing adjoining communities together into single areawide organizations serving substate districts.⁹ The Law Enforcement Planning program administratively required the States to subdistrict themselves as a prerequisite to receiving funds for the States' own statewide programs.

Recognizing the diversity of geographic requirements among the 14 Federal areawide programs enacted by 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson asked the Federal departments and agencies to begin working that year with the Bureau of the Budget (now OMB) "to insure the fullest coordination in fixing the boundaries of

Table VI-12

Geographic Coverage of Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Metro.	Non-metro.	Either	Nationwide
Air Pollution Control				X
Airport Systems Planning				X
Appalachian Local Devel. District Assistance			X ¹	
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)			X	
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Asst. (701)			X	
Areawide Waste Treatment Management			X	
Community Action (CAP)				X
Economic Development Planning			X	
Law Enforcement Planning				X
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)				X
New Communities			X	
Open Space			X ²	
Project Notification & Review (A-95)				X
Regional Medical Program				X
Resource Conservation & Development		X ³		
Rural Development Planning		X		
Rural Industrialization Assistance		X		
Solid Waste Planning Grants			X	
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X			
Urban Transportation Planning	X ⁴			
Water/Sewer Facilities			X	
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities		X		
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities		X		
Water Quality Management Planning				X
Totals	2	5	9	8

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ This program provides full geographic coverage of the Appalachian Region where it applies.

² Applies to metropolitan areas and urban areas outside of metropolitan areas, but not to rural areas.

³ Some counties within SMSA's may be included.

⁴ The "urbanized area" is more correct; certain rural portions of SMSA's are not included.

Table VI-13

**Designation Responsibilities for Regional Boundaries in Federal Areawide Programs:
1972**

Name of Program	Federal	State	State & Local in Combination with Federal Approval	None
Air Pollution Control	X			
Airport System Planning			X	
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.		X		
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)			X	
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)	(metro.)	(nonmetro.)		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management		X ¹		
Community Action (CAP)			X	
Economic Development Planning		X		
Law Enforcement Planning		X		
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	X			
New Communities				X
Open Space	(metro.)		(nonmetro.)	
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	(metro.)	(nonmetro.)		
Regional Medical Program	X			
Resource Conservation & Development	X			
Rural Development Planning	X ²			
Rural Industrialization Assistance				X
Solid Waste Planning Grants	X ³			
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X			
Urban Transportation Planning	X ⁴			
Water/Sewer Facilities	(metro.)		(nonmetro.)	
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities			X	
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities				X
Water Quality Management Planning	(metro.)	(basin)	(nonmetro.)	
Totals	8	4	4	3

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ Local governments may designate the regions if the governor fails to act within 60 days.

² While legislation gives this authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, this authority could be delegated by the regulations, which have not yet been issued.

³ This designation must be approved by the State.

⁴ While slight State and local boundary adjusting is allowed, the Federal guidelines require the use of the "urbanized area" plus a 20-year growth area.

multi-jurisdictional planning units assisted by the Federal government." In January 1967, the Bureau responded by issuing Circular A-80. In addition to requiring common jurisdictional boundaries for areawide planning,

this circular urged the use of a common planning base in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, as well as coordinative checkpoint procedures among coexisting planning organizations in these areas.

By 1971, it was recognized that this circular (which has now been incorporated into Circular A-95) had significantly affected only newly formed regions; it had not had much impact on areas designated for Federal assistance prior to 1967 in programs such as Comprehensive Planning, Urban Transportation Planning, Community Action, Health Planning, and Resource Conservation and Development. Therefore, on October 9, 1971, Vice

President Spiro T. Agnew invited the governors of the States to work with the Federal agencies and the Federal regional councils in a concerted effort to bring areawide boundaries of the following ten Federal programs into conformance with the OMB circular requirement:^{1 0}

1. OMB—A-95 Clearinghouse Areas
2. EDA—Economic Development Districts

Table VI-14

Designation Responsibilities for Regional Organizations in Federal Areawide Programs: 1972

Name of Program	Federal	State	State & Local in Combination with Federal Approval	None
Air Pollution Control		X		
Airport System Planning	X			
Appalachian Local Development Dist. Asst.		X		
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)			X	
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)	(metro.)	(nonmetro.)		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management		X ¹		
Community Action (CAP)			X	
Economic Development Planning	X ²			
Law Enforcement Planning		X		
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)			X	
New Communities				X
Open Space	(metro.)		(nonmetro.)	
Project Notification & Review (A-95)	(metro.)	(nonmetro.)		
Regional Medical Program	X			
Resource Conservation & Development	X			
Rural Development Planning	X			
Rural Industrialization Assistance				X
Solid Waste Planning Grants		X		
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X			
Urban Transportation Planning			X	
Water/Sewer Facilities	(metro.)		(nonmetro.)	
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities			X	
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities				X
Water Quality Management Planning	(metro.)	(basin)	(nonmetro.)	
Totals	6	5	5	3

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ Local officials may designate the regional organization if the governor fails to act within 120 days after the area is designated.

² Upon request of the governor.

Table VI-15

Special Provision for Interstate Areas in Federal Areawide Programs:
1972

Name of Program	Specific Eligibility	Non-Profit	Mandate	Interstate	None
		Organization Exception	Areawide Coverage	Cooperation Urged but Not Required	
Air Pollution Control	X	X	X		
Airport System Planning				X	
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Assistance				X	
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)	X				
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)		X	X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management	X		X		
Community Action (CAP)				X ¹	
Economic Development Planning	X				
Law Enforcement Planning				X ²	
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)					X ³
New Communities					X ³
Open Space		X	X		
Project Notification & Review (A-95)			X		
Regional Medical Program			X		
Resource Conservation & Development	X				
Rural Development Planning					X ³
Rural Industrialization Assistance					X ³
Solid Waste Planning Grants	X				
Urban Mass Transportation Planning		X	X		
Urban Transportation Planning			X		
Water/Sewer Facilities		X	X		
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities					X
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities					X
Water Quality Management Planning	X	X	X		
Totals	7	6	10	4	6

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Federal Register*, and program guides and directories.

¹ Interstate operations are primarily for the migrant farm worker program, and other special projects.

² With respect to discretionary grants only, not the State formula grants.

³ Regulations have not yet been issued.

- 3. HUD—701 Metropolitan and Regional Planning Areas
- 4. USDA—Resource Conservation and Development Districts
- 5. HEW—Comprehensive Health Planning Areas
- 6. DOL—Comprehensive Manpower Planning Areas
- 7. DOJ—Law Enforcement Planning Areas

- 8. OEO—Community Action Planning Areas
- 9. EPA—Air Quality Control Districts
- 10. DOT—Metropolitan Comprehensive Transportation Planning Areas

The States were invited to initiate this coordination, using State-established substate districts as the basis. At least 11 States have taken up this invitation. Of these

Table VI-16

Federal Program Areas (FPA) Conforming Under Substate Planning Districts (SPD) by State and by Federal Programs:
1971

State	A-95	EDD	LDD	701	RC&D	Health	CAMPS	LEAA	CAA	AQ	Total FPA=SPD By State
Alabama	3			2				2		1	8
Alaska											
Arizona	2			1		1	1	1		2	8
Arkansas	3	7		3	1	8	8				30
California	2			2		3		4	1	1	13
Colorado								2		3	5
Connecticut	8			8				6			22
Delaware											
Florida	1							4			5
Georgia	18	11	1	11		2		19	4		66
Hawaii											
Idaho											
Illinois											
Indiana							4	3		1	8
Iowa					1		16		1		18
Kansas		1									1
Kentucky	12	9	8	3		4	13	10		2	61
Louisiana	8	3						3			14
Maine											
Maryland											
Massachusetts	1			12				4	2	3	33
Michigan	2	4		5		2	2	10	3	1	29
Minnesota	1	1		1		2		1		2	8
Mississippi	9	7	4	2			1				23
Missouri	18	4		18		2	2	13	6	1	64
Montana											
Nebraska	3			2		2	1	21	4	2	35
Nevada											
New Hampshire											
New Jersey											
New Mexico	2			2		2	6	1			13

Table VI-16-(cont.)

**Federal Program Areas (FPA) Conforming Under Substate Planning Districts (SPD) by State and by Federal Programs:
1971**

State	A-95	EDD	LDD	701	RC&D	Health	CAMPS	LEAA	CAA	AQ	Total FPA=SPD By State
New York	5	2	2	4	1	4	13	13			44
North Carolina		1		4		1	17	4	1	1	29
North Dakota						2					2
Ohio											
Oklahoma	4	5		1	1	1		4	1		17
Oregon	13	1		7		3	14	14	2		54
Pennsylvania	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	1		3	16
Rhode Island	1			1				1		1	4
South Carolina	10	3	1	10		2	10	8		10	54
South Dakota							2				2
Tennessee	5	4	5	4		1	7	7			33
Texas	20	5		7			22	8		4	66
Utah		2		1		1		6	1		11
Vermont	10			10		1	1	14			36
Virginia	13	3	5	6		2	4	14		1	48
Washington	2			6		2			3	4	17
West Virginia	1		5	1		1	4		1		13
Wisconsin	2			1		4		1		3	12
Wyoming											
Washington, D.C.											
Sum of FPA=SPD's by Federal Prog.	192	75	34	137	6	54	149	199	30	46	922
Total FPA's in States with SPD's	314	106	54	275	60	121	356	347	805	233	2,671
Sum of FPA=SPD ÷ Sum of FPA in States with SPD's	61%	71%	63%	50%	10%	45%	42%	57%	4%	20%	35%

Source: Maps contained in *Multijurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States*, Second Edition, May 1971, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration.

States, five have already submitted realignment proposals and six are working on them. (For a fuller description of State established substate districts, see Chapter VII.)

As Table VI-16 shows, in ten programs for which data were available,¹¹ the jurisdictional coincidence between Federal program areas and State substate planning districts was only 35 percent nationwide in 1971. In other words, the Federal programs were using different boundaries than those established by the States in almost two-thirds of the cases.

It should be noted, however, that in 10 percent of the cases, the Federal program areas conformed to the boundaries of the metropolitan area (SMSA) as defined by OMB, even though they did not conform to the substate regional boundaries established by the States (Table VI-17). For some programs, the SMSA may be a more appropriate area than the usually much larger substate district. If these two types of geographic conformance are combined, 45 percent of the Federal program areas are included. Of course, there is some room for debate about whether the substate district boundaries have been properly drawn for purposes of the various Federal programs. The Community Action Program aims at direct involvement of local people and is frequently organized at the individual city or county level—encompassing much smaller areas than either the metropolitan area or the substate district even though the equal opportunities sought may be located throughout a much larger area. Manpower Planning emphasizes the labor market—usually coterminous with the metropolitan area or a somewhat larger region. Air Quality Control emphasizes airsheds, which may be affected by terrain and weather patterns, but the metropolitan area is usually the primary source of the pollutants and the affected area may be larger. If these three programs were omitted from the calculations, geographic conformance would rise still further—to about 65 percent. Nevertheless, this still leaves considerable room for improvement.

Map VI-2 shows the areas of the country in which the reliance on substate district boundaries has occurred. While the map shows that half of the Nation is covered by Federal program areas coincident with substate districts, 72 percent of these geographic areas involved only one or two Federal programs, while the remaining 28 percent involved up to six. Table VI-16 also shows that conformance to substate district boundaries in as many as 50 percent of the cases occurs in only four programs having a generalist (or multi-functional) orientation plus one single-function program: A-95 (61 percent), Economic Development Planning (71 percent), Appalachian Local Development (63 percent), Comprehensive Planning (50 percent), and Law Enforcement Planning (57 percent). Jointly, these five Federal programs have a combined score of 58 percent geographic conformance to substate districts. This highlights the differences in approach between the more generalist

programs, on one hand, and the programs with a single-function orientation, on the other.

Another geographic problem is illustrated by the current differences between HUD and EDA with respect to the division of funding between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. HUD channels its funds in different ways to these two types of areas. The metropolitan planning funds go directly to the metropolitan planning agencies, whereas the non-metropolitan funds are channeled through the States, as provided legislatively. EDA's economic development planning funds, on the other hand, are provided directly to economic development districts which may include both metropolitan and non-metropolitan territories. The result is that HUD may be funding two different planning organizations within the same jurisdiction in which EDA is funding or trying to encourage a single organization. The new Rural Development Planning program is also authorized to push into the fringes of metropolitan areas until it comes to cities of 50,000 population or densities of more than 100 persons per square mile.

It is fairly common for State-established substate districts to include more than an SMSA within a given district. This practice is more in line with the EDA approach than with that of HUD. Thus, strict adherence to SMSA boundaries as the definition of areawidness may create a conflict in terms of establishing a single set of areawide boundaries throughout the States and the Nation.

This review of geographic requirements, like the review of organizational requirements, shows elements of complexity and competition which lead to regional confusion and ferment.

Program Coincidence: Piggybacking Versus Proliferation

Even the modest amount of geographic coincidence among Federal program boundaries and State planning district boundaries may be misleading if taken as an indication of the degree to which common organizations are being funded for multiple purposes by Federal programs. The 35 percent coincidence in geographic boundaries, shown in Table VI-16, drops (as shown in Table VI-18) to 17 percent for those having both geographic and organizational coincidence, while the variance by individual programs drops to a range between 64 percent in the most coincident program (EDA) and zero percent in the least coincident programs (Manpower, Community Action, and Air Pollution Control).

Map VI-3, also based on the 1971 data, shows that a much smaller proportion of the Nation is covered by organizations which have both (1) jurisdictional boundaries common to the substate districts and (2) common organizations being used to fund two or more such programs.

Table VI-17

**Geographic Conformance of Federal Program Areas (FPA) With SMSA Boundaries,
But Not With State Planning District (SPD) Boundaries:
1971**

State	A-95	701	LEAA	CHP	CAA	AQCR	CAMPS	RC&D EDD LDD	Total
United States	74	69	12	8	64	11	27	0	265
Alabama	2	1	1	...	1		5
Alaska									
Arizona	1		1
Arkansas	4	4	1	1	...		10
California	5	1	6	0	4		16
Colorado	2	2	1	...	2		7
Connecticut
Delaware									
District of Columbia									
Florida	6	6	...	2	5	...	2		21
Georgia	...	2	1		3
Hawaii									
Idaho									
Illinois	7	5	4	...	3	1	...		20
Indiana	6	5	...	1	3	1	...		16
Iowa	6	3	1	...		10
Kansas	1	1	...	2		4
Kentucky	3	4	2	...	2	1	...		12
Louisiana	...	3	...	1	4		8
Maine
Maryland									
Massachusetts	1		1
Michigan	5	4	5	1	3		18
Minnesota	1	1	1	...		3
Mississippi	1		1
Missouri	1		1
Montana									
Nebraska
Nevada									
New Hampshire
New Jersey									
New Mexico
New York	3	3	1	...		7
North Carolina	6	6	1		13
North Dakota	1	1	1	1		4

Table VI-17--(cont.)

**Geographic Conformance of Federal Program Areas (FPA) With SMSA Boundaries,
But Not With State Planning District (SPD) Boundaries:
1971**

State	A-95	701	LEAA	CHP	CAA	AQCR	CAMPS	RC&D EDD LDD	Total
Ohio									
Oklahoma	2	3	...	1	1	...	3		10
Oregon	1		1
Pennsylvania	5	6	9	7		27
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee	1	3	3	2	...		9
Texas	...	1	5	1	8		15
Utah	2	1	1		4
Vermont
Virginia
Washington	1	1	2	...	2		6
West Virginia	3	2		5
Wisconsin	2	2	2	...	1		7
Wyoming									
Puerto Rico									
Number of FPA=SMSA ≠SPD	74	69	12	8	64	11	27		265
Total Number of FPA's	314	275	347	121	805	233	356		2,671
% of FPA=SMSA≠SPD	24%	25%	3%	7%	8%	5%	8%		10%

Source: Maps contained in *Multijurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States*, Second Edition (May, 1971), U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration.


However, a closer examination of just those regional organizations whose service areas conformed to substate district boundaries in 1971, and which had been assigned Federal program responsibilities (Table VI-19), reveals that organizations receiving any one of the following designations were also designated for at least one additional Federal program—and more than half the time as many as four: A-95, EDD, HUD/701, LDD. In slightly less than half the cases, a low enforcement designation also coincides organizationally with one through four additional designations. There is later evidence, not constrained by the geographic coincidence criterion, indicating that the transportation planning programs were also lodged in multiple-designated Federal program organizations more than half the time.¹² But despite

significant amounts of geographic conformance, the other five Federal programs subject to A-95, Part IV, are lodged in separate organizations 80 percent or more of the time.

It has been argued by some that programs such as Community Action, Manpower Planning, and Air Quality Control should not be expected to be located in comprehensive areawide planning and development organizations because of their special characteristics. But they are subject to the geographic coordination requirements of Part IV of OMB Circular A-95, and ACIR's 1972 data show that there are a few cases in which this has been accomplished.

In 1972, ACIR cooperated with the National Association of Regional Councils in a questionnaire survey of

Geographic Conformity Between Boundaries of Substate Planning Districts and One or More Federal Program Areas



regional councils which contained questions related to the designation and funding of the various councils for Federal program purposes. Table VI-20 summarizes, by individual States and groups of States, the answers of the 296 responding regional councils (out of a total of some 600). Recognizing that some of the Federal programs have not made organizational designations in all parts of the country, and that where designations have been made regional councils of government have not always been selected, a ratio was computed for all 296 responding COG's showing the percentage of designations going to them. Nationwide, COG's picked up nearly 60 percent of the designations that have been made, according to their own definitions of designation.

Yet less than half of these designations have resulted in Federal funding.

When unfunded designations in the A-95 and RC&D programs are added to the funded figure, because they operate without funding for areawide planning purposes, it appears that these general purpose COG's have become effective vehicles for approximately 46 percent of the Federal programs in their areas. This may show a slight tendency toward greater reliance on general purpose regional councils than was evident in the 1971 data cited above. However, the two sets of data are not directly comparable. Much of the difference may be explained by the fact that the geographic coincidence so important in the 1971 data was ignored in the 1972 survey, and

Table VI-18

Federal Program Areas Which Conform to Substate Planning Districts (SPD's) and in Which Two or More Federal Programs Are Lodged in a Single Regional Organization: 1971

States	Federal Program Areas (FPA's)										Totals
	A-95	EDD	HUD 701	RC&D	CHP	LEAA	CAA	LDD	CAMPS	AOCR	
Alabama	2		2								4
Alaska
Arizona	1		1			1					3
Arkansas	3	7	2	1	7						20
California	2		2								4
Colorado
Connecticut	8		8								16
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia	17	11	11		1	17		1			58
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana	...										0
Iowa	...										0
Kansas
Kentucky	12	9	3					7			31
Louisiana	3	2				2					7
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts	12		12								24
Michigan	2	3	5								10
Minnesota	1		1		1	1					4
Mississippi	9	7	2					2			20
Missouri	17	4	16			11					48
Montana
Nebraska	2		2								4
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico	2		2								4
New York	5	1	4			5		1			16
North Carolina	1	1	1			1					4
North Dakota

Table VI-18-(cont.)

**Federal Program Areas Which Conform to Substate Planning Districts (SPD's) and in Which
Two or More Federal Programs Are Lodged in a Single Regional Organization:
1971**

States	Federal Program Areas (FPA's)										Totals
	A-95	EDD	HUD 701	RC&D	CHP	LEAA	CAA	LDD	CAMPS	AOCR	
Ohio
Oklahoma	4	5	1		1	4					15
Oregon	10	1	4		1	10					26
Pennsylvania	1	2	1					2			6
Rhode Island	1		1								2
South Carolina	10	4	10			8		1			33
South Dakota
Tennessee	5	4	2					4			15
Texas	8	5	7			8					28
Utah
Vermont	9		9								18
Virginia	12	2	6			13		5			38
Washington	1		1								2
West Virginia	1		1								2
Wisconsin	1		1								2
Wyoming
Puerto Rico
Number of Geographic & Organizational Coincident Programs											
Total FPA's in States with SPD's	162	68	118	1	11	81	0	23	0	0	464
% of Coincident Co-funded Programs	52%	64%	43%	2%	9%	23%	0%	45%	0%	0%	17%

Source: Maps contained in *Multijurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States*, Second Edition (May 1971), U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration.

single Federal programs were included in 1972 while omitted in 1971.

According to the 1972 survey, the variability among States with regard to Federal programs' piggybacking in COG's is great. It ranges from a low of 20 percent in California to a high of 80 percent in Montana. These two States reflect their regions of the Nation: the Rocky Mountain States average the highest amount of piggybacking—55 percent, while the Far West averages the lowest—34 percent. Other parts of the Nation fall

inbetween, with the Southwest, Mideast, and Plains States showing greater piggybacking tendencies than New England, the South, and the Midwest. The poor showing of the South in these figures is somewhat surprising since these States are leaders in establishing substate districts, and Georgia and Arkansas are also among the leaders in Federal program piggybacking.

Table VI-21 examines the 1972 piggybacking data by certain types of COG's. From this table, it appears that Federal program piggybacking of these councils is

Table VI-19

**Geographic and Organizational Coincidence of Federal Program Regions
with State Planning Districts: May 1971**

Federal Programs	Number of Federally Designated Organizations							Percent Having 2+ Designations
	Total = SPD Geography	Number of Federal Designations Per Organization					Total 2+	
		1	2	3	4	5		
1. A-95	192	26	83	49	27	3	166	86%
2. EDD	75	7	22	20	23	3	68	90
3. HUD 701	137	19	58	31	26	3	118	86
4. RC&D	6	5	0	1	0	0	1	20
5. CHP	54	43	3	2	5	1	11	20
6. LEAA	199	118	18	3	4	5	81	41
7. CAA	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. LDD	34	11	2	13	4	2	23	68
9. CAMPS	149	149	0	0	0	0	0	0
10. AQCR	46	46	0	0	0	0	0	0
A-95/701	111	0	52	30	26	3	59	53%

Source: Maps contained in *Multijurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States*, Second Edition (May 1971), U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration; and the various Federal program directories.

greater among metropolitan councils and those councils serving a combination of metropolitan and non-metropolitan territories than it is among non-metropolitan and interstate councils. However, the differences are rather small except in the case of the interstate councils where State-oriented Federal programs—such as health, law enforcement, and community action—tend to subregion-alize along State lines.

Thus, the success that Federal agencies have in encouraging new regions, and in building new areawide organizations for their own program purposes, tends more toward increasing the complexity of government than toward providing a single comprehensive coordinating mechanism at the regional level. For example, in the Manpower Planning program where the Federal government designates jurisdictions and the governors and central city mayors determine the organizations to carry out the program, the designated labor market areas do not conform to the regional council boundaries nor to the substate district boundaries, and the general purpose regional planning organizations are not used as the manpower planning organizations. This is a striking contrast to programs such as the Economic Development Administration's planning program in which 71 percent


of the geographic areas coincide and 64 percent of the organization designations coincide with the substate planning districts.

Planning Requirements

At this point, it is pertinent to ask what these organizations do. As already noted, all of them perform a planning function of some sort. In fact, most perform only a planning function. Nevertheless, there are many different types of planning, and the various Federal programs approach planning in different ways and with different degrees of intensity.

HUD, in its so-called "701" program for comprehensive planning assistance, has taken probably the most comprehensive approach to planning requirements. This approach begins with a comprehensive work program on a multi-year basis for the planning agency and progresses through statements of areawide goals and objectives to the preparation of areawide comprehensive plans and a series of functional plans in at least the housing, water and sewer facilities, and open space fields. In addition, the 1972 bill for community development, which did not pass, included a proposal that future 701 planning

**Substate Planning and Development Districts
in which Two or More Federal Programs
Fund a Common Regional Organization**



also include an areawide capital improvements program. For the past two years or so, HUD has been preparing itself for the advent of community development revenue sharing.

This has led to experimentation with concepts such as annual arrangements, chief executive review and comment (CERC), and planned variations. All three of these experiments were designed to test various techniques of extending the comprehensive and functional planning which has traditionally been done under HUD auspices, so that it results in flexible, consolidated applications for HUD hardware grants prepared each year. HUD let a contract in November 1972 under which five regional

councils, in cooperation with the National Association of Regional Councils, would prepare five prototypes, using different approaches to develop regional or areawide capital improvements programs. Thus, Federal planning requirements may begin with very specific relationships to the funding of planning work programs, may progress through more general types of planning, and may result in specific funding proposals for Federal hardware grants. This creates a very definite link between planning and implementation.

Most Federal programs, however, have not included such a broad spectrum of planning requirements. The overall pattern is shown in Table VI-22. While several of

Table VI-20

**Percent Piggybacking of Federal Programs in 296 Regional Councils of Governments
by Individual States and Groups of States:
1972**

State and Region	Regional Councils		State and Region	Regional Councils	
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent
New England & Mideast			Kentucky	11	28
New England		41	Tennessee	4	33
Maine	4	38	North Carolina	13	40
New Hampshire	6	33	South Carolina	9	51
Vermont	3	38	Georgia	7	70
Massachusetts	9	57	Florida	4	50
Rhode Island	Alabama	8	32
Connecticut	8	39	Mississippi	8	32
Mideast		50	Louisiana	4	31
New York	6	40	Arkansas	4	64
New Jersey	3	35	Southwest		51
Pennsylvania	10	43	Oklahoma	9	55
Delaware	*	Texas	14	58
Maryland	2	73	New Mexico	3	43
District of Columbia	*	Arizona	4	48
Midwest			West		
Great Lakes		45	Rocky Mountain		55
Michigan	2	33	Montana	2	80
Ohio	8	40	Idaho	6	50
Indiana	2	60	Wyoming
Illinois	10	50	Colorado	6	47
Wisconsin	3	41	Utah	5	43
Plains		48	Far West		34
Minnesota	2	57	Washington	13	39
Iowa	5	36	Oregon	6	44
Missouri	13	55	Nevada	3	33
North Dakota	*	California	14	20
South Dakota	2	43	Alaska
Nebraska	1	33	Hawaii
Kansas	United States	296	46
South			Interstate	25	38
Southeast		42			
Virginia	14	38			
West Virginia	1	36			

*Regional councils responding in these States are interstate and are included in the interstate figure above.

Source: NARC, "1972 Survey of Regional Councils."

Table VI-21

**Piggybacking of Federal Areawide Programs by Types of Regional Councils:
1972**

Types of Regional Councils	Number of Regional Councils	Average Number of Federal Programs Per Region	Percent Operating Through Regional Councils
All Survey Responses	296	5.7	46
Metropolitan	79	5.6	49
Non-metropolitan	139	5.4	43
Part Metropolitan/Part Rural	78	6.4	49
Interstate	25	7.3	38
Intrastate	270	5.8	46

Source: 1972 Survey of Regional Councils.

the programs end up with a grant packaging document— notably Appalachian Local District Planning, Economic Development Planning, Law Enforcement Planning, Regional Medical Programs, and Resource Conservation and Development—they do not all start from the same basis of detailed work programming and broadly stated community objectives as the HUD program. Five programs do include both general (or comprehensive) planning and functional planning, while five additional programs have comprehensive planning requirements alone. Twelve of the Federal areawide programs require only functional planning, while one required project planning alone and two do not require planning of any sort. Much of the functional planning required, and some of the general planning, results in multi-year programming of projects. But this programming extends only to the advisory level and does not reach the grant packaging stage in half of the cases.

As was noted earlier under organizational requirements (Table VI-9), six of the areawide organizational types are also required to have implementation authority. This probably represents the ultimate in bringing planning together with implementation. Housing them both in the same organization, and requiring that the planning done by the organization be the basis for programs which will be implemented through subsequent Federal financing, establishes the most direct possible link between planning and implementation. Yet this occurs rather infrequently in Federal areawide programs.

Timing of the preparation and updating of plans for Federal areawide programs also varies a great deal. As shown in Table VI-23, 11 of the programs operate basically on an annual updating cycle. Three are more or less continuous, while another four are prepared only

once without provision for an updating cycle under Federal funding arrangements, and still another four have unspecified periods of preparation and updating. The final two are still too new to have regulations which could be analyzed for this purpose.

Among those Federal areawide programs which require general and functional planning and annual updating in the planning process, the following six have also established a rather formal program of annual certifications or recertifications of the planning process and the plans developed at the areawide level:¹³

- Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701)
- Economic Development Planning
- Open Space
- Urban Mass Transportation Planning
- Urban Transportation Planning
- Water and Sewer Facilities

When the recertification date rolls around each year, the areawide organization must submit a revised plan and program, or update the previously certified documents in order for the area and its local governments to remain eligible for Federal funds under specified programs. The intensity of the Federal review prior to recertification, and the degree of adamance exhibited by the Federal officials about how good the planning must be to justify recertification, varies a great deal from one part of the country to another and among the different programs.

Again, HUD has probably taken the most serious view of the recertification process. For example, a recent issue of the ASPO Newsletter¹⁴ described in great detail the certification process as it was being debated back and forth between the Chicago regional office of HUD and the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission, serving the Milwaukee area. In this case, Federal funds were actually cut off for a period of time until

agreement could be reached on the appropriate nature of the housing element in the areawide comprehensive plan for the Milwaukee area. The Chicago and Cleveland areas also lost HUD certification and funding for short periods while their organizational problems were dealt with.¹⁵

Revenue sharing, on the other hand, even of the special variety, tends to move away from this type of relationship between Federal standards and the quality of areawide planning. This poses questions with respect

to those planning concerns which should be retained in Federal areawide programs, and whether sound performance standards can be developed to assure that important national goals and objectives will be met while giving areawide planning and development organizations the greatest possible discretion in deciding how they will be met.

In the last few years, three special features have been added to the planning requirements in many Federal

Table VI-22

**Types of Planning Required in Federal Areawide Programs :
1972**

Name of Program	General or Compre- hensive	Func- tional	Grant Pack- age	Project Plan- ning Only	Multi- Year Work Program- ming	None
Air Pollution Control		X				
Airport System Planning		X				
Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Asst.	X		X			
Areawide Comp. Health Planning (314b)		X				
Areawide Comp. Planning Asst. (701)	X	X			X	
Areawide Waste Treatment Management		X				
Community Action (CAP)	X		X		X	
Economic Development Planning	X		X		X	
Law Enforcement Planning		X	X		X	
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)		X				
New Communities				X		
Open Space	X	X			X	
Project Notification and Review (A-95)						X
Regional Medical Program		X	X			
Resource Conservation and Development		X	X		X	
Rural Development Planning	X ²					
Rural Industrialization Assistance						X
Solid Waste Planning Grants		X				
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X	X				
Urban Transportation Planning	X	X			X	
Water/Sewer Facilities	X	X			X	
Water and Sewer Planning for Rural Communities		X				
Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities		X ³				
Water Quality Management Planning		X				
Totals ¹	9	17	6	1	8	2

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance; Federal Register; and Program Guides and Directories.*

¹ These totals add up to more than 24 because some of the 24 programs require more than one type of planning.

² Legislation would allow this, but regulations have not yet been issued making it certain.

³ This planning is required only if USDA/FHA grant assistance for the system is involved. It does not apply to loan assistance.

Table VI-23

Frequency with Which Plans are Prepared Under Federal Areawide Programs :
1972

Name of Program	Continuing: No			
	Annually	Definite Period	Once Only	Unspecified
Air Pollution Control				X
Airport System Planning				X
Appalachian Local Development District Assistance	X			
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)				X
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701)	X			
Areawide Waste Treatment Management	X			
Community Action (CAP)	X			
Economic Development Planning	X			
Law Enforcement Planning	X			
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	X			
New Communities			X	
Open Space	X			
Project Notification and Review (A-95)	-----	Not Applicable	-----	
Regional Medical Program		X		
Resource Conservation and Development	X			
Rural Development Planning				X ¹
Rural Industrialization Assistance	-----	Not Applicable	-----	
Solid Waste Planning Grants			X	
Urban Mass Transportation Planning		X		
Urban Transportation Planning	X			
Water/Sewer Facilities	X			
Water and Sewer Planning for Rural Communities			X	
Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities			X ²	
Water Quality Management Planning		X		
Totals	11	3	4	4

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance; Federal Register; and Program Guides and Directories.*

¹ Regulations have not yet been issued.

² Plans are required only if projects involve grants (rather than loans).

areawide programs. These deal with citizen participation, civil rights, and environmental impacts.

The civil rights and environmental features have been added to all Federal areawide programs by general legislation, and both have now been incorporated into the A-95 process. However, despite the uniform applicability of these two requirements, there is considerable diversity in the way they are applied.

As shown in Table VI-24, about half the programs

have incorporated specific civil rights requirements into their own regulations and guidelines to promote the objectives of the civil rights acts. The other half do not make any special reference to these requirements, but are covered like the others by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

Table VI-25 shows, with respect to the environmental requirements, that somewhat more than half of the

Table VI-24

**Civil Rights in Federal Areawide Programs:
1972**

Name of Program	Specific Requirements	Follows General Federal Policy	Program Policies Not Yet Issued
Air Pollution Control		X	
Airport System Planning		X	
Appalachian Local Development District Assistance	X		
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)	X		
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701)	X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management		X	
Community Action (CAP)	X		
Economic Development Planning	X		
Law Enforcement Planning		X	
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)		X	
New Communities	X		
Open Space	X		
Project Notification and Review (A-95)	X		
Regional Medical Program		X	
Resource Conservation and Development	X		
Rural Development Planning			X
Rural Industrialization Assistance			X
Solid Waste Planning Grants		X	
Urban Mass Transportation Planning		X	
Urban Transportation Planning	X		
Water/Sewer Facilities	X		
Water and Sewer Planning for Rural Communities		X	
Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities		X	
Water Quality Management Planning		X	
Totals	11	11	2

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance; Federal Register; and Program Guides and Directories.*

programs have taken positive steps in their specific program requirements to implement the objectives of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

Citizen participation is different; it has not been uniformly legislated for all programs. Although a few of the citizen participation requirements are legislative in origin, most have grown out of administrative regulations. Table VI-26 shows that 15 of the 24 Federal areawide programs make some mention in their program guidelines of bringing citizen viewpoints to bear on the planning process. This may be accomplished through such techniques as citizen representation on the governing body of the areawide organization, separate advisory committees attached to these organizations, public infor-

mation programs, and public hearings. The Community Action program of OEO was specifically enacted as an advocate of the poor; and legislation has given consumers a 51 percent controlling membership on areawide comprehensive health planning organizations.

One special aspect of citizen participation should be pointed out. In the rural economic development programs, many program officials feel that private economic development leadership is the key to successful areawide development. While this leadership represents a special type of citizen, frequently in rural areas there are too few leaders to go around, and local governments do not have the needed authority and funds to attract the best leaders. Therefore the Federal programs seek to involve

the most effective leaders available, whether from the public or private sectors.

The philosophies, requirements, and actual mechanisms of citizen participation differ so greatly among the various Federal areawide programs that many regional councils hardly know where to begin in their efforts to respond. While citizen participation in American government has its roots firmly planted in the pre-constitutional town meeting of New England, *areawide* citizen participation—as opposed to local government and neighborhood participation—is something new and difficult. Many people even doubt its usefulness and feasibility at this level. New techniques may need to be developed, and certainly more attention and funding needs to be

dedicated to it, if it is to develop into a meaningful and constructive element in areawide planning. A constructive approach to civil rights and environmental requirements has been the recently used device of impact statements. The environmental impact statements resulting from requirements in the 1969 National Environmental Quality Act have now been firmly established in regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality and the various Federal agencies, as well as in the A-95 comment and review process. Civil rights considerations came into the A-95 process as recently as 1972, and were included for the first time in HUD's 1972 Handbook for its "701" comprehensive planning assistance program.

Table VI-25

**Environmental Requirements in Federal Areawide Programs :
1972**

Name of Program	Specific Requirements	Follows General Federal Policy	Program Policies Not Yet Issued
Air Pollution Control	X		
Airport System Planning	X		
Appalachian Local Development District Assistance		X	
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)	X		
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701)	X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management	X		
Community Action (CAP)		X	
Economic Development Planning	X		
Law Enforcement Planning	X		
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)		X	
New Communities	X		
Open Space	X		
Project Notification and Review (A-95)	X		
Regional Medical Program		X	
Resource Conservation and Development	X		
Rural Development Planning			X
Rural Industrialization Assistance			X
Solid Waste Planning Grants	X		
Urban Mass Transportation Planning		X	
Urban Transportation Planning	X		
Water/Sewer Facilities	X		
Water and Sewer Planning for Rural Communities		X	
Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities		X	
Water Quality Management Planning	X		
Totals	15	7	2

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance; Federal Register; and Program Guides and Directories.*

Table VI-26

**Citizen Participation in Federal Areawide Programs:
1972**

Name of Program	Specially Required	Not Required	Undetermined Approach
Air Pollution Control	X		
Airport System Planning			X
Appalachian Local Development District Assistance	X		
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)	X		
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701)	X		
Areawide Waste Treatment Management			X
Community Action (CAP)	X		
Economic Development Planning	X		
Law Enforcement Planning	X		
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	X		
New Communities		X	
Open Space	X		
Project Notification and Review (A-95)		X	
Regional Medical Program		X	
Resource Conservation and Development	X		
Rural Development Planning			X
Rural Industrialization Assistance			X
Solid Waste Planning Grants	X		
Urban Mass Transportation Planning	X		
Urban Transportation Planning	X		
Water/Sewer Facilities	X		
Water and Sewer Planning for Rural Communities		X	
Water and Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities		X ¹	
Water Quality Management Planning	X		
Totals	15	5	4

Source: *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance; Federal Register; and Program Guides and Directories.*

¹ While there are no general citizen participation requirements, the system funded is required to serve anyone in the area who desires service, and there is advertising of the availability of service.

One final special feature, just now coming into play, is the uniform relocation requirement for all Federal and Federally assisted programs which displace residences and businesses. Growing out of the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970, this requirement only began to take the form of agency and OMB requirements in 1972. Areawide relocation planning, of a relatively undefined nature at this point, and areawide review through the A-95 process of plans for "housing of last resort" are now part of the Federal areawide landscape. Relatively few Federal areawide programs have taken special note of these requirements as yet.

Because of several recent court decisions, it appears

likely that the social implications of areawide planning will take on major new dimensions in the 1970's. School financing disparities, which have been identified as undesirable features within the States,¹⁶ are equally present within areawide communities. The courts have also accepted several cases dealing with exclusionary zoning practices of certain local jurisdictions within substate regions.¹⁷ And HUD housing programs have been scrutinized by the courts because of their unequal distribution within urban areas.¹⁸ Areawide planning organizations could make a unique contribution to solving these three types of problems through Federally required and funded planning.

From the material above it is apparent that a wide variety of planning requirements and planning assistance programs have been spawned by the Federal government, and this variety is difficult to deal with. Through a series of reports dating back to 1961, ACIR has been urging the consolidation and simplification of Federal-aid planning programs, and the unification of planning requirements.¹⁹ On March 24, 1969, a directive from the President to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget pointed out that there were available to regional commissions approximately 36 different types of planning grants from 11 sources, and requested the Director to "... examine the entire spectrum of planning grants with a view to the clarification of planning goals, and elimination of duplication, and the achievement of some simplification." In its reply of April 2, 1969, the Bureau stated, "Closely related to this multiplicity of assistance programs—and a substantially greater concern to State and local governments and regional planning agencies—is the myriad of planning requirements which condition eligibility for a much larger number of aid programs."

In carrying out the Presidential directive, therefore, the Bureau proposed to attack the related problems of planning assistance grant programs and planning requirements simultaneously through the establishment of two interdepartmental task groups. Both groups were established in May 1969. The first, the Intergovernmental Task Group on Planning Assistance Grant Programs, was requested to identify (1) opportunities for joint funding arrangements to simplify administrative requirements of planning assistance grant programs, and (2) logical consolidation of such programs. The second task group, designated the Interdepartmental Task Group on Planning Requirements, was directed to make recommendations for simplifying and rationalizing the planning requirements stipulated in many grant programs.

Both task groups were directed to report to the Bureau of the Budget through the Planning Assistance and Requirements Coordinating Committee (PARC Committee). This interdepartmental committee was established in April 1967 by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to coordinate, monitor, and provide interagency oversight of existing and proposed planning requirements and planning assistance programs. The PARC Committee was made responsible for coordinating the work of the two task groups and for providing liaison between the task groups and participating agencies. The task group reports were completed in October and December 1969, respectively. The PARC Committee reviewed both reports and transmitted the list of its recommendations to the Bureau of the Budget in January 1970.

Public interest groups were asked by the Bureau to review the reports and all submitted comments by April 1970. In addition, the Federal Assistance Review project (FAR) of the Bureau of the Budget began a number of long-range interagency efforts which included a study of

the substantive requirements for planning grants with a view to achieving greater consistency in these grants.

Current Administration proposals for Executive Branch reorganization and grant consolidation through special revenue sharing, are designed in part to reduce the number of separate planning programs and requirements. But little has been accomplished toward these goals up to now.²⁰ As this chapter has already shown, the number of separate Federal-aid planning programs and Federal agencies, and the diversity of Federal planning requirements, have continued to grow since the task groups were established in 1969.

Administrative Facilitation

In addition to the planning provisions cited above, a variety of administrative requirements accompany each Federal grant made to an areawide organization. They include equal employment opportunity goals, personnel procedures, adequate accounting and auditing procedures, and purchasing and contracting standards. An amazing variety of such requirements has grown up among Federal areawide programs as they have proliferated. The often arbitrary differences in administrative requirements from one program to the next have become a major nuisance to grant recipients.

Fortunately, something is being done about it. In 1968, the Office of Management and Budget published Circular A-87, which established a uniform list of eligible and ineligible costs under all Federal grants where legislative restraints were not operative. More recently, at the President's direction, the Office of Management and Budget has been making major strides in simplifying all of the administrative requirements in Federal aid. Recently released OMB Circular A-102 established (as of July 1, 1972) uniform Federal requirements in all Federal-aid programs for such things as cash depositories, bonding and insurance, retention and custodial requirements for records, and waiver of single State agency requirements.²¹ Circular attachments issued since then cover uniform program income and matching share provisions; standard application forms for all programs; financial reporting and requisition procedures; and property management, personnel, and procurement requirements. All attachments became effective January 1, 1973.

In addition, a new auditing process has been developed between the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments and several Federal agencies in which a single CPA audit of the Council's finances is accepted in lieu of multiple Federal audits under individual programs. This audit is performed after the close of the fiscal year and provides a comprehensive report on the status of all of the Council's funds, including separate reports on the status of each Federal grant. HUD has been so pleased with this new procedure that it has issued standard instructions which allow all local public

housing authorities to use a similar type of CPA audit. This procedure is being made available throughout the Nation by A-102 and could be used by regional councils or other areawide bodies effective January 1, 1973.

The advantages of a single CPA audit are great in any situation where the grant recipient may be receiving Federal funds from more than one source. In such cases, the recipient is normally subject to several separate Federal audits. These separate audits are done away with under the single audit procedure—at great savings in time and effort to the Federally funded organization which would otherwise have to assign personnel to show the various Federal auditors through the books of account several times a year, breaking-in a new team of auditors in each instance.

The special revenue sharing and grant consolidation proposals made in the 92nd Congress would have made major strides in the simplification of Federal aid if enacted. By reducing the number of separate Federal programs and increasing the scope of activities which can be carried out under each, the number of separate contracts and separate accounts would have been reduced, and automatic funding by formula would have been provided. If areawide organizations could be funded by such programs, it would be a great advantage to them. While the regular units of State and local government are permanently established and funded primarily from non-Federal sources, the areawide organizations are often voluntarily established and highly dependent upon Federal grants. The current piggybacking of several Federal grants on individual areawide organizations, and the programmatic desirability of encouraging even more piggybacking, place unusually great administrative burdens on such organizations. The types of simplification available through program consolidation and formula funding are essential for the efficient operation of areawide organizations.

In anticipation of Congressional enactment of joint funding legislation,²² the Federal government has been experimenting with several areawide organizations by funding them jointly from several Federal departments and agencies in response to a single application and by means of a single grant contract. These experiments now have been formalized into the Integrated Grant Administration program, which is being carried out under the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget. Participating organizations include the Puget Sound Governmental Conference, the Lane County Council of Governments, and the consolidated City and County of Indianapolis. The experiences gained through these joint funding experiments should be helpful in developing procedures which can be used more widely in the future to simplify Federal support to multipurpose areawide organizations.

Another key to administrative simplification and the expediting of Federal financial assistance to areawide organizations is the decentralization of Federal decision

making. However, decentralization may take several forms, not always consistent with each other. Coordination of decentralization to the "regional office" level has begun, with HUD, HEW, DOL, OEO, EPA, LEAA, and DOT now having regional offices in a standard set of ten Federal regions. This opens possibilities for decentralizing decision making about grant awards at least to this level and establishing close coordination among the Federal offices at locations reasonably near most areawide organizations. Federal Regional Councils have been established in each of the ten regional office cities to help assure Federal interagency coordination.

The programs of Agriculture, EDA, the Appalachian Regional Commission, Interior, and the Corps of Engineers are not represented permanently on the Federal Regional Councils. Even OMB is only tangentially related to these councils. So there is a long way to go before the Federal Government can approach anything like complete coordination of its areawide programs at its regional offices.

Despite this effort to build up the Federal Regional Councils as interagency collaborative mechanisms, coordination of rural area programs was given to the Department of Agriculture by the Rural Development Act of 1972. In Section 306(b) of this Act, "The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to provide leadership and coordination within the executive branch and shall assume responsibility for coordinating a nationwide rural development program utilizing the services of executive branch departments and agencies . . ." This is similar to the urban coordination responsibility given to the HUD Secretary in 1966 by Executive Order 11297.

The Federal Regional Council movement must also cope with the tendency of several departments, notably Agriculture and HUD, to decentralize to even lower-level State, district, or area offices. In some cases, actual decision making authority for funding areawide organizations has devolved to the smallest area closest to the recipient organizations. This dramatically increases, at least potentially, the amount of meaningful interpersonal exchange of views, and may considerably speed up the Federal decision making—assuming, of course, that the decentralized offices can be properly staffed and instructed. HUD, with its area office structure, and Agriculture, with its extension offices and county agents, have probably gone furthest in decentralizing both their personnel and their decision making authority. At the other extreme, perhaps, is the Urban Mass Transportation program, in which all funding decisions are still made at the national level. However, the UMTA program is now taking advantage of planning reviews carried out by HUD at the area-office level.

The unevenness with which decision making authority has been delegated to the field creates difficulties for the Federal Regional Councils. Various department and agency representatives at this level do not have the

comparable authority necessary to effective collaboration. How much difficulty this has caused or may cause is uncertain, but any major attempt to strengthen the Federal Regional Councils should take it into account.

Finally, on this matter of administrative simplification, it is necessary to consider the clarity, simplicity, and helpfulness of program regulations. OMB Circular A-102 is perhaps a model in this regard. It is written in straightforward language, describing the regulations concisely, simply, and clearly. Many regulations, as published in the Federal Register, and the laws themselves, appear in legalistic and technical terms. It takes well-qualified lawyers, accountants, and other experts to decipher them.

Recognizing this problem, several Federal programs have issued supplemental guidelines written and illustrated in layman's terms. Perhaps the two best examples are the program manuals published by EDA for the Economic Development District program, and by Agriculture for the Resource Conservation and Development program. Not only are these manuals readable, but they also explain in detail the philosophy of the program, the methods of carrying it out, and examples of how program objectives can be met.

Unfortunately, such manuals are the exceptions rather than the rule. In many programs the applicant is left to decipher legalistic Federal regulations on his own. He often finds that the Federal personnel available for him to confer with do not have definitive interpretations of the regulations and are not equipped to provide technical assistance. It is quite evident from talking with COG personnel that different interpretations of ambiguous regulations are given by Federal officials in different parts of the country. COG personnel spend a great deal of time finding out precisely what is required after the program requirements and guidelines have been issued. A prime example of such uncertainties, already mentioned, is the case of citizen participation at the areawide level. Requirements for achieving such participation are more evident than suggestions about how it can be achieved constructively under present budget restraints.

Much has been accomplished in administrative simplification in recent years. Yet several recognized administrative problems faced by areawide organizations remain to be resolved.

Technical Assistance

For many years the Federal Government has provided technical assistance to State and local governments, and more particularly to Federal grant recipients. However, such assistance has not always been provided uniformly nor adequately. Areawide organizations are especially in need of technical assistance in three areas: obtaining Federal grants, preparing plans, and managing grant programs. These are highly technical matters because of

the division of authority among the three levels of government, the uncertain role of the areawide organizations in the family of governments, and the administrative/legal problems created by these organizations' overwhelming reliance on Federal grant programs. Outstanding personnel are needed to make areawide organizations function adequately under these circumstances.

The Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) recognized the basic need to improve the capabilities of State and local governments, including areawide organizations, by improving their personnel. This program (1) provides grants for training the personnel of areawide organizations (among others); (2) makes these personnel eligible to attend Federal training courses; and (3) provides for the exchange of personnel between areawide organizations and other levels of government to improve communication, provide a temporary infusion of specialized expertise, and orient personnel from one level of government to the problems and procedures of the other levels. While this program can contribute to the strengthening of all functions of government, its primary thrust is in the fields of personnel management and general management. Thus, the areawide organizations can get some greatly needed Federal help in improving their general managerial capabilities.

Although the amount of such help is still limited by the newness of the program and scarcity of funds, there has been (as of December 1972) significant participation by councils of government, planning districts, and other regional groups. In nine States, for example, regional groups are represented on IPA advisory bodies. Eleven Federal employees on mobility assignments are working with regional groups, and three staff members of regional groups are presently working for the Federal government—a total of 14 assignments. Five regional associations of government received direct grants under the IPA; another 15 were included as subgrantees within statewide plans; and two councils of government were direct beneficiaries of IPA-funded training programs—22 in all. The total amount of grant money involved was nearly \$475,000.

On the subject of technical assistance for grantsmanship, the *Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance* and its companion piece, *The Vice President's Handbook for Local Officials*,^{2,3} constitute major tools provided by the Federal Government. The catalog is now reissued annually and updated continuously by means of a subscription service. Some Federal departments and agencies also hold regional conferences for grant recipients when major new regulations are promulgated. The "cook-book" program manuals referred to in the EDA and Agriculture programs also constitute major elements of technical assistance. Unfortunately, such conferences and manuals are the exception rather than the rule. As a result, many areawide organizations "muddle through," losing grants they might have had or taking longer than necessary to get them.

The outstanding example of Federal technical assistance for areawide planning is probably DOT's program of providing computer programs and free training of State and regional planning personnel in the use of these programs for urban transportation planning. These computer programs are developed and maintained by the national government as a basic resource available to all urban transportation planners. The major expenses of such technological aids need to be supported at the national level because adequate funds are frequently unavailable to individual areawide organizations except in the very largest metropolitan areas. Again, however, DOT's practice is the exception rather than the rule.

No nationally developed areawide housing models, or open space models, or water and sewer planning models are being provided in a comparably systematic way by other Federal agencies. Even the demonstration projects and outstanding planning projects carried out by individual areawide organizations are seldom developed by Federal agencies into widely circulated and validated procedures which are used to improve systematically the state of the art in areawide planning.

In the data field, the Federal Government is probably preeminent. Through its census, labor, and business statistics, income tax records, and social security records, it has access to the largest collection of statistics anywhere in the Nation. But many areawide organizations have great difficulty in obtaining from the Federal Government precisely those data which are needed to carry on Federally sponsored planning efforts.

Two problems are common in the data field. First, readily available data are often not tailored to areawide planning needs. They may not be capable of being broken down into small enough geographic units, and there may be no way of interrelating data from one Federal agency with data from another. The other type of problem is related to confidentiality and the unavailability of certain types of Federal data.

In addition to numerical data of the types referred to above, the Federal government provides a great deal of geological and geographic data, much of it in the form of maps or aerial photography. These types of data are likely to become even more important to areawide organizations in the near future as materials from earth-sensing satellites become regularly available. Such data are clearly useful at the areawide level in monitoring urban growth trends and the environmental impacts of development, such as erosion and siltation.²⁴

Currently, there is no effective point within the Federal government at which all of these different types of Federal data can be coordinated, and which is concerned with making them as useful as possible in an efficient manner for areawide or other State and local planning purposes. There have been recent proposals for a merger of several of the statistical agencies within the Federal government,²⁵ and a Presidential commission has looked into the situation.²⁶ The Census Bureau,

with its recent emphasis on census users committees, computer tapes, local census computer centers, and computerized retrieval programs, is becoming oriented toward technical assistance. But this is not true of most other Federal data sources.

Finally, on the personnel side of technical assistance for areawide planning, some Federal agencies have had a practice of assigning professionals from their own staffs to work in the offices of areawide organizations under the direction of these organizations to help prepare plans in which the Federal government has vital interests. Two Federal agencies also make specific in-service training grants to upgrade the planners working on Federal areawide grant projects. HUD's Title VIII training grants for community development have played a significant part in the comprehensive planning and housing fields, while training grants under the Comprehensive Health Planning program have played an important role in developing, within a short period of time, a whole new cadre of comprehensive health planners. In addition, the air pollution control, urban mass transportation, and water pollution control programs provide courses or fellowships which the personnel of areawide organizations may use to improve and maintain their skills.²⁷

The Agriculture Department probably has the most comprehensive and extensive system of technical assistance in any Federal program. This system reaches right down to the county level. Through its extension agents, soil conservation districts, State land grant college extension services, and State conservationists, the Department has well qualified program personnel on the spot in nearly every situation.

As a result, when the Resource Conservation and Development program came along, Agriculture was able to issue program guidelines which stated that the personnel of the soil conservation program would be expected to take the leadership in organizing and servicing RC&D councils at the areawide level. This leadership from the Soil Conservation Service was to be supported by the other agriculture field agents in each related specialty. Thus, a Federally provided task force of experts became available almost automatically, without separate funding, for purposes of this new areawide program.

The newly enacted Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972 (PL 92-500) also envisions a very strong Federal technical assistance role. In addition to technical assistance from EPA, this Act authorizes a special fund of \$50 million per year to support technical assistance by the Army Corps of Engineers for areawide waste treatment management.

On the whole, however, it must be said that Federal technical assistance in the majority of areawide programs is sporadic at best. One of the few unified attempts to pull together all possible technical assistance and make it readily available to an areawide organization occurred in the case of the Southern Oklahoma Development Associ-

ation (SODA).²⁸ This organization was a small rural regional council which found itself unable to use all of the different Federal programs potentially available to it because it lacked the necessary professional staff expertise. Therefore it asked for Federal technical assistance. The resulting Federal response—under a memorandum of agreement signed by the Secretaries of HUD, Commerce, HEW, Labor, Agriculture, Interior, Army, and Transportation, and the Director of OEO²⁹—has been useful and instructive. It resulted in the preparation of a multi-year work program for SODA generally acceptable to the various Federal departments and agencies, and other improvements in SODA's structure and operating procedures.

But the Federal assistance has by no means solved all of SODA's problems. HUD has not accepted this work program as an adequate basis for funding SODA, and there is still some Federal uneasiness about whether SODA has adequate community participation and managerial capacity. A short-run development strategy has not yet been agreed to, and continuing Federal technical assistance has not materialized on the scale needed to assure SODA's ultimate success.

A SODA-like model rural development program is now being developed for South Dakota's Planning District I under a memorandum of agreement between the regional heads of several Federal departments (Region VIII, Denver) and the governor of the State. Certain other Federal Regional Councils are also beginning to take an active interest in coordinating a wide range of Federal assistance affecting individual regional councils, by establishing regular annualized funding on a unified basis, along with a coordinated Federal presence designed to be helpful rather than overly concerned with administrative processing details.³⁰ Such efforts could play a major role in helping regional councils and other areawide organizations to make the most effective use of Federal funds.

CONCLUSIONS: THE OVERALL PATTERN

The foregoing evaluation of Federal areawide program characteristics has identified several overall patterns of Federal institution building at the substate regional level and raised a number of issues concerning how these institutions could be made more effective.

Summary of Findings.

As background for considering the issues, the major findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:

1. Federal programs have been prime movers in establishing a whole new set of geographic regions encompassing areawide communities, and in establishing areawide organizations to serve these new regions. The

program areas recognized by the 24 Federal areawide programs number 4,045, and 13 different types of Federally encouraged areawide organizations are commonly found serving substate regions in various combinations:

- Metropolitan and Regional Clearinghouses (A-95)
- HUD Areawide Planning Organizations
- DOT Comprehensive Urban Transportation Planning Organizations
- OEO Community Action Agencies
- EDA Economic Development Districts
- Appalachian Local Development Districts
- USDA Resource Conservation and Development Districts
- EPA Air Pollution Control Regions
- EPA Areawide Waste Treatment Management Organizations³¹
- DOL Manpower Planning Organizations
- HEW Comprehensive Health Planning Organizations
- HEW Regional Medical Programs
- LEAA Criminal Justice Planning Organizations

These organizations are encouraged by 19 of the 24 Federal areawide programs concerned with institution-building at the substate regional level. This concern is based largely on the belief that there should be a staff and a representative group of decision makers whose responsibility it would be to consider the whole region—not just a given city or county.

2. The Federally encouraged areawide organizations are performing significant communication, promotional, technical assistance, planning, resource mobilization, coordination, expediting, and service functions in a variety of ways and in differing degrees.³²

—The A-95 clearinghouse function is primarily communications, although many clearinghouse organizations perform additional functions. The clearinghouses are not required by A-95 to prepare plans. They need only: (1) notify other organizations about proposed Federal and Federally assisted projects, (2) develop comments about these projects, and (3) transmit these comments to the Federal government through the project sponsors.

—The other 18 Federal areawide programs concerned with establishing areawide organizations, while expected to improve regional communications, are also expected to prepare plans or strategies for development and/or the delivery of certain services within those regions. These strategies must be comprehensive or general in nature (encompassing a wide variety of considerations) in the case of the following types of Federally encouraged organizations:

HUD Areawide Planning Organizations

DOT Comprehensive Urban Transportation Planning Organizations
OEO Community Action Agencies
EDA Economic Development Districts
Appalachian Local Development Districts

The strategies need be only special purpose (or single functional) in the case of the remaining organizations:

EPA Air Pollution Control Regions
DOL Manpower Planning Organizations
HEW Comprehensive Health Planning Organizations
LEAA Criminal Justice Planning Organizations
HEW Regional Medical Programs
EPA Areawide Waste Treatment Management Organizations
USDA Resource Conservation and Development Districts

Civil rights, environmental, and relocation impacts must be considered in the plans prepared by all of the Federally encouraged areawide organizations.

—The communication role of Federally encouraged areawide organizations is enhanced by Federal requirements in the following ways:

Federally required plans of the following types must be updated and reapproved in some sense each year:

Comprehensive Areawide Development Plans
Comprehensive Urban Transportation Plans
Community Action Plans
Economic Development Plans
Appalachian Local Development Plans
Resource Conservation and Development Plans
Manpower Plans
Urban Open Space Plans
Water and Sewer Plans
Areawide Waste Treatment Management Plans

Additional Federally encouraged plans are to be updated more or less continuously:

Regional Medical Program Plans
Urban Mass Transportation Plans
Rural Water and Sewer Plans

Citizen participation is required in 14 Federal areawide programs, implying two-way communications between the governmental and non-governmental sectors of the community:

Appalachian Local Development District Assistance
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (314b)
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701)
Community Action (CAP)

Economic Development Planning
Law Enforcement Planning
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)
Open Space
Resource Conservation and Development
Solid Waste Planning Grants
Urban Mass Transportation Planning
Urban Transportation Planning
Water/Sewer Facilities
Water Quality Management Planning

The composition of the governing bodies of Federally encouraged areawide organizations is frequently specified so as to provide within these bodies themselves broadly based communication about areawide issues among the various sectors of the community. Local elected officials and citizens—including minorities and the poor—are called for on the governing bodies of the community action, comprehensive areawide planning, and Appalachian local development organizations. The following additional areawide organizations are expected to embrace “all affected interests”:

Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning Organizations
Criminal Justice Planning Boards
Economic Development Districts
Manpower Planning Organizations
Regional Medical Program Boards
Resource Conservation and Development Districts
Rural Water and Sewer Planning Organizations

— Federally encouraged areawide planning and development organizations frequently provide technical assistance to local governments and others in their areas, and promote specific projects as well as more general strategies. However, the emphasis on these activities varies greatly from one areawide organization to another, depending upon local needs and organizational preferences. Generally, technical assistance seems to be most important in rural areas, and in urban ones with a large number of small municipalities, where technical expertise is scarce. With respect to promotional activities, rural programs and programs for the poor or unemployed seem to be the ones with most activity. The programs cited above as including “all affected interests” within their governing bodies seem to be the ones which are most oriented toward promotional activities.

— Mobilization of resources and coordination of Federal-aid projects are activities of a few types of Federally encouraged areawide organizations, including:
Community Action Organizations
Criminal Justice Planning Boards
Economic Development Districts
Appalachian Local Development Districts
Regional Medical Programs
Resource Conservation and Development Districts

Areawide Waste Treatment Management Organizations

These organizations all have authority under Federal programs to prepare consolidated packages of applications for Federal funds with which to implement their plans.³³ These implementation funds are used both by the areawide organizations themselves and by others. But in either case, the resources are centrally mobilized and the projects are coordinated in accordance with areawide planning.

—Only about five types of the Federally encouraged areawide organizations actually perform some of the governmental services which they communicate about, plan, and coordinate:

Air Pollution Control Agencies (intrastate only)
Appalachian Local Development Districts
Areawide Waste Treatment Management Organizations
Community Action Agencies
Economic Development Districts

On rare occasions, the criminal justice planning boards also perform services directly—although such services are usually of the intermediate training or information systems types.

—Frequently, an areawide organization performing technical assistance, promotional, and grant packaging functions is in a position to expedite Federal assistance designed to implement local and regional plans.

3. More often than not the Federally encouraged areas and organizations have overlapped each other and contributed substantially to the complexity of local government in substate regions, and to the competition among regional organizations for the limited funds available. The matching of Federal program area boundaries with State-designated planning district boundaries—as called for by Part IV of OMB Circular A-95—occurs in only 35 percent of the cases, and the use of common organizations for two or more Federal programs in the same area occurs in only 17 percent of the cases. While some Federal programs and a few of the individual substate regional organizations exhibit commendable records of co-funding, the lack of common areas and organizations for Federal program administration occurs to a similar degree in metropolitan, non-metropolitan, interstate, and intrastate areas. The competition for funds thus generated makes it difficult in a large number of regions to amass sufficient funds to support a single strong regional organization.

4. Federal areawide programs, more often than not, have established a wide variety of inconsistent and confusing requirements which necessitate major grantsmanship efforts by areawide organizations. These Feder-

al regulations are often ambiguous, subject to many differing interpretations, and supported by inadequate technical assistance from the Federal departments and agencies. To cite a few of the major variations revealed in this chapter, most of the programs require planning, but some do not. The planning requirements themselves differ from the strong mandatory variety, directly aligned with future Federal grant applications, to the weak variety, where the program is simply admonished to be “not inconsistent” with whatever related planning others might be doing. Some Federal programs require citizen participation, while others do not, and there is little consensus about those techniques which should be used by areawide organizations to get this participation. Policy board representation includes citizens in some cases but not others, elected officials in differing proportions, varying emphases on the poor and minorities, and differing technical and special interests. The areawide organization seeking to combine two or more Federal programs must accommodate these variations.

5. Federal areawide programs, more often than not, have exhibited ambivalence as to the degree to which national objectives are to be carried out, and the degree to which the States and local governments, and the areawide organizations are to be allowed to exercise their own discretion. Those Federal programs which have required areawide planning organizations covering whole areas as a prerequisite to continued Federal “hardware” grants—like the highway program—have promptly and completely blanketed eligible areas with organizations having the specified representational characteristics. Those programs—like comprehensive health planning—which have not provided such strong incentives and directives have taken much longer to develop only partial coverage of their target areas.

6. The Federal government itself has not organized effectively to promote general objectives in substate regions.³⁴ Every Federal areawide program except A-95³⁵ is administered by an individual Federal department or agency with its own priorities and with independently enacted legislation. Separate constituencies have developed around these departments and agencies, their programs, and the responsible Congressional committees, leaving the President and OMB unmentioned. Although the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 sought to give the Executive Office of the President a generalist oversight role with respect to a wide variety of programs, the resulting Circular A-95 has been little match for the vested interests and the special program “turfs” already staked out by them.

The previously cited recommendations of the Planning Assistance and Planning Requirements Task Groups and the PARC Committee evidenced a concensus among Federal departments and agencies that the Executive

Office of the President would have to become involved in a major way if planning assistance programs and requirements were to be unified. Nevertheless, the generalist principles laid out in A-95 are being adhered to only partially, and OMB dares not push compliance too hard.

Even the Federal regional councils, which presumably represent the generalist interest in the field establishment of the Federal government, are headed by the regional administrator of one of the special-interest Federal departments or agencies, and they have no staff except what they borrow on temporary or part-time assignments from these same agencies. When the Southern Oklahoma Development Association requested OMB as the lead Federal agency for demonstrating the benefits of a coordinated Federal technical assistance effort, EDA was selected instead.³⁶ Robert Cox, EDA's lead man for this demonstration, has stated that the project could not be replicated because of the extraordinary amount of time and effort required of EDA in orienting other Federal agencies to the broad objectives of the project.³⁷

7. The States have not taken full advantage of the opportunities given them by OMB Circular A-95 to assure coincidence of Federally encouraged and State established regional program boundaries, and co-funding of a single regional organization in each substate district. While some States and some Federal programs have done a commendable job, boundary coincidence plus organizational co-funding occurs, on the average, much less than half the time.

8. Special provisions to assure an areawide approach in interstate areas are often missing. The A-95 Part IV requirements for coincident program boundaries emphasizes the State role in setting boundaries without establishing any clear policy with regard to interstate areas. Six of the 24 Federal areawide programs make no provisions for interstate areas.

Issues

These basic conclusions raise several issues. The ability of Federal programs to get an areawide response is not in question. What is at issue is whether the Federal government should seek to get a more uniform response, and if so, what that response should be.

— OMB Circular A-95 has already established that there should be a greater degree of conformity among the geographic jurisdictional boundaries of Federal areawide programs, and that the States should play a major role in designating these boundaries. How should interstate boundary questions be resolved, and should there be a greater degree of organizational coincidence in serving these jurisdictions? Should the Federal govern-

ment seek to establish a single umbrella organization in each substate region to coordinate all areawide programs: If so, how?

— How strong should be the relationship between planning requirements and implementation? Should planning tied to implementation be more uniformly comprehensive and general in nature, as opposed to being only functional or special purpose? Should the A-95 clearinghouse at the areawide level be funded specifically for A-95 purposes, and should Federal planning grants in the various fields under which A-95 reviews are made be concentrated in the A-95 organization so that greater capability will be built into the generalist A-95 review staff?

— Should the Federal government provide more uniform standards and greater technical assistance in meeting new elements within planning requirements such as citizen participation, environmental impact statements, civil rights and social impact statements, and relocation planning?

— How much further can the Federal government go, without legislation, in simplifying administrative requirements and providing regularized funding with a minimum of grantsmanship required on the part of applicants? Can legislation be enacted to provide grant consolidation and formula funding for areawide organizations? What should be the role of Federal decentralization and the Federal regional councils in this simplification effort, and in the effort to expedite areawide assistance?

— How can OMB and the Federal regional councils be strengthened to perform more effectively the generalist coordinative functions of government? How can the States join in this effort more effectively, while providing for the special needs of the numerous and significant interstate areas?

— Can the Federal government provide technical assistance of a more comprehensive nature on a more readily available basis?

Federal money, by itself, does not solve all the problems that areawide organizations face. The competition, the red tape, the uncertainties of vague Federal requirements, the lack of capable personnel, and the difficulties of getting help when needed, all impede the effectiveness of these organizations. If Federal areawide programs are to be of maximum effectiveness, they should take these factors into account just as seriously as the financial and organizational factors.

Inevitably, the need to resolve Federal program

inconsistencies, and the need to insist that areawide programs strive consistently to meet basic national objectives, are perceived differently at the Federal, State, local, and areawide levels of government. Successfully answering the questions raised in this chapter

Footnotes

¹ACIR, *Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government Organization and Planning* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964).

²In choosing these programs, judgments had to be made about what constitutes an areawide approach. Probably the least "areawide" of the programs chosen is New Communities. While it does not require anything to be planned on an areawide basis, it does require that if areawide planning is being done, as it is with HUD assistance in well over 400 areas, the project shall be related to it. The areawide nature of the Rural Industrialization Assistance program may also be questioned. It has been included here because its objectives are so similar to the Economic Development Planning and Appalachian programs, which are definitely areawide in scope. There is also a question as to whether planning programs and related "hardware" programs should both be included and counted as separate programs. In some cases this has been done, while in other cases the hardware programs have been omitted—largely because it would add little new information to do so.

³National Association of Regional Councils, "1970 Survey of Regional Councils" (Washington, D.C.: NARC, 1970).

⁴Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Directory of State, Metropolitan, and Regional Clearinghouses Under the Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-95* (Revised), September 11, 1972.

⁵Three of the Administration's 1972 Special Revenue Sharing proposals—Community Development, Transportation, and Manpower—would allow "consortia of local governments" as eligible recipients, and the later two would have provided a 10 percent bonus to encourage such consortia. However, the term "consortia" was not defined to require areawide coverage. The multi-jurisdictional planning districts, into which the States would be divided under the Rural Development and Transportation proposals, would have been served by advisory planning boards, but these boards were not named as being eligible for Federal funds. ACIR, *Special Revenue Sharing: An Analysis of the Administration's Grant Consolidation Proposals* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December, 1971).

⁶The two programs resulting from the Rural Development Act of 1972 and the recently created Areawide Waste Treatment Management program are too new to have specified requirements one way or another.

⁷The exceptions are the A-95 program, which is not specifically funded; the Rural Development Planning program authorized under the Rural Development Act of 1972 and the Areawide Waste Treatment Management Program also enacted in 1972, which are too new to have developed any such specifications; and the program of Water and Sewer Planning for Rural Communities.

⁸The completeness of geographic coverage in the region has no bearing on this reward. The cooperating units may cover a small portion of the area and still get the more favorable ratio.

⁹Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Handbook for Economic Development District Organizations*, I, Part III, Chapter 1, p. 2.

¹⁰The Vice President's letter of October 9, 1971, to the governors was supplemented with a more detailed letter, dated

depends upon reaching accommodations among these different levels, because, at this point in time, the areawide level of government in the United States is highly dependent for its very survival upon the active cooperation and support of all three levels.

October 13, 1971, from the director of OMB with attached "Guidelines for Realignment Effort Under Part IV of OMB Circular No. A-95." A similar letter and guidelines, dated the same day, was also sent from the director of OMB to Federal department and agency heads.

¹¹Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Multi-jurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States*, Second Edition (May 1, 1971). Except for excluding Transportation Planning and including Appalachia, these ten programs are the same ones included in the A-95, Part IV, implementation effort.

¹²National Association of Regional Councils, "1972 Survey of Regional Councils."

¹³The newly enacted Areawide Waste Treatment Management program also contains an annual certification requirement, but its exact nature is still undetermined.

¹⁴American Society of Planning Officials, *Planning*, XXXVII, No. 6 (July 1971), pp. 95-105.

¹⁵National Association of Regional Councils, "NOACA Recertified," *Newsletter*, No. 54 (March 20, 1972), p. 3. American Society of Planning Officials, "A New Serious Look at NIPC," *Planning*, XXXVIII, No. 3 (April 1972), pp. 59-61.

¹⁶*Serrano v. Priest*, 5 Cal 3d 584, 96 Cal Rptr 601, 487 P 2d 1241 (1971); *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District*, 327 F Supp 280 (W.D. Texas 1971); *Van Duzart v. Hatfield*, 334 F. Supp 870 (1971); *Robinson v. Cahill*, 287 A 2d 187 (1972); *Hollins v. Shofstall*, No. C 253652 (Supr. Ct. Maricopa Co. Ariz. Jan 13, 1972); *Caldwell v. the State of Kansas*, No. 50616 (the District Court of Johnson Co. Kansas, August 30, 1972).

¹⁷*James et al. v. Valtierra et al.*, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); *Parkview Heights Corp. et al. v. the City of Blackjack, Mo.*, 335 F Supp 899 (1972); *Crown v. Brown*, 457 F 2nd 788 (1972).

¹⁸*Gautreaux v. Chicago Public Housing Authority*, 342 F Supp 827 (1972), 296 F Supp 907, 304 F Supp 736, 436 F 2nd 306, 448 F 2nd 731. *Shannon, et al. v. Romney*, 305 F Supp 205, 436 F 2nd 809 (1970); *Burks v. Perk*, 339 F Supp 1194 (1972).

¹⁹*Governmental Structure, Organization, and Planning in Metropolitan Areas*, 1961; *Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs on Local Government Organization and Planning*, 1964; *Intergovernmental Relations in the Poverty Program*, 1966; and *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, 1967.

²⁰The HUD Secretary has been given "convenor" authority as provided in Executive Order 11297, "Coordination of Federal Urban Programs," August 11, 1966, and HUD is now party to the following four limited agreements for providing planning advice to other Federal departments and agencies and joint administration of planning assistance: Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Inter-Departmental Coordination in Planning and Programming Reviews—Open Space (HUD) and Land and Water Conservation (Interior) Programs," Regional Circular No. 843, August 26, 1966. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Technical Services Agreement between the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Transportation," September 10, 1969. "Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Agriculture and the Economic Development Administration on Planning Assistance to Substate Multi-Jurisdictional Areas," July 10, 1970. "Joint Agreement for Inter-Agency Coordination in Planning and

Development between the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Environmental Protection Agency," June 7, 1971.

²¹OMB, "Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments," Circular A-102, October 19, 1971.

²²See the proposed Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1972.

²³Office of the Vice President, *The Vice President's Handbook for Local Officials* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1, 1967).

²⁴Harry J. Mallon and Joan Y. Howard, *Benefits from Remote Sensing Data Utilization in Urban Planning Processes and System Recommendations*, Technical Report No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, January 1972).

²⁵U.S. Congress, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Subcommittee on Census and Statistics, *Investigation of Possible Politization of Federal Statistical Programs* (Washington, D.C.: 1972).

²⁶President's Commission on Federal Statistics, *Federal Statistics: Report of the President's Commission, I and II* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

²⁷The training programs referred to in this paragraph and their Federal Catalog numbers are 13.208 Comprehensive Health Planning-Training; 14.202 Community Development Training Grants; 20.503 Urban Mass Transportation Managerial Training Grants; 66.003 Air Pollution Manpower Training Grants; 66.006 Air Pollution Control-Technical Training; 66.403 Water Pollution Control-Direct Training.

²⁸Robert A. Cox, "Summary of Remarks to SODA Executive Committee," December 8, 1971, and "Summary of Remarks at NADI Research Policy Conference," February 10, 1972.

²⁹"Memorandum of Agreement between the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Health, Education, and Welfare, Agriculture, Interior, Defense, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, and the Office of Economic Opportunity Regarding an Intergovernmental Demonstration Program of Development Planning, Programming, and Review in a Nonmetropolitan

Area," signed on various dates April-June 1970.

³⁰*Region X's New Federalism Experiment*, presented to the Urban Affairs Workshop, President's Advisory Council on Management Improvement, September 21-22, 1972. The Federal Regional Council, Region III, *York Metropolitan Area Project*, 1971.

³¹These organizations have just been called for by 1972 legislation (PL 92-500), so have not yet been created.

³²This typology of functions has been borrowed from James L. Sundquist and David W. Davis, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), pp. 216-222.

³³The degree to which these areawide bodies have final say about what is to be included within consolidated applications for Federal implementation assistance has not been systematically researched. However, it is known from a recent evaluation of the LEAA program that the substate planning agencies in 10 of the 18 States responding to the survey "comment upon the allocations of action funds made by the State planning body," and these agencies "make the final decisions on the action fund allocations in their region" in three States. See Laurence Rutter, *The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Validation*, OMB-FAR Contract No. EB-114 (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, June 1, 1972), p. 21.

³⁴Similar conclusions were reached in the following study of Federal assistance to local governments: Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, *Coordinating Federal Assistance in the Community: Local Chief Executive Use of Selected Mechanisms for Planning and Coordinating Federal Programs* (San Francisco, California: December 28, 1971), p. 9.


³⁵OMB's role in the A-95 process, as provided by legislation, does not encompass the substance of projects. The project comments are submitted to and evaluated by the individual Federal departments and agencies. Thus, despite the emphasis on generalist review by State, metropolitan, and regional clearinghouses, the specialists in the Federal agencies are the ones with the final word.

³⁶Cox, *NADI Remarks*.

³⁷Cox, *NADI Remarks*.

CHAPTER VII

**STATEWIDE SYSTEMS
OF SUBSTATE DISTRICTS**



As the Federal and local pressures for substate regional organizations have mounted, the States have become increasingly involved. By 1972, 40 of the States had officially delineated statewide systems of substate regional planning and development districts. Four other States had made tentative delineations, while the remaining six had taken no such action. Map VII-1 depicts this situation.

Most of the substate districts in these systems are multi-county groupings which aggregate local jurisdictions for cooperative action at the areawide level. These district systems have been known variously as "State planning districts," "State planning and development areas or regions," "State administrative districts," and "State subdistricts," as well as the term which is used in this report, "substate districts." While the term "State" is a part of each set of terms, other levels of government have had a significant influence in the establishment of substate districts.

The individual substate districts delineated by this means number 488.¹ Of these 273, or less than 60 percent, are organized—that is, an organization with a governing body has been established to carry out the State-assigned functions. Most of these organizations are staffed.

Substate districts have several types of purpose. They may be confined to simply offering a common set of geographic boundaries to be used for data collection and for carrying out a variety of Federal, State, and local programs. On the other hand, some States place considerable emphasis upon reorganization of State operations to conform to these districts, while still others combine objectives, giving a locally controlled general purpose substate regional organization the responsibility to coordinate a wide variety of Federal, State, and local activities.

In a few cases, the general purpose substate districts came into being before there were many other independently established regional councils and federally encouraged areawide organizations.² But most often they followed the initial burst of regional institution building. They were a State response to the need to "clean up the regional mess." They were designed to bring some simplicity, understandability, accountability, and coordination to a highly complex and confusing set of conflicting boundaries, competing organization, and insulated leaders. This complexity has been greatest in the metropolitan areas where there is a longer history of multiple Federal programs.

In the past five or six years, the Federal government has encouraged the States to play a major role in cleaning up this geography. Part IV of OMB Circular A-95—and subsequent implementation efforts involving the Vice President's office, OMB, and the Federal Regional Councils—envision the use of substate district systems for Federal program coordination purposes.

Generally speaking, substate districts have evolved

and are still evolving from forces at the Federal, State, and local levels. In establishing the typical substate district, there are three sets of roles: (1) the State delineates the district boundaries to encompass the whole State, establishes rules for the organization of such districts, and assists the local governments in establishing the district organization; (2) various Federal agencies provide financial assistance for functional missions, and guidelines for the composition of district organizations; and (3) the local governments establish the district organization to meet State and Federal regulations and operate a variety of programs within the district framework.

For the most part, these substate districting efforts have paid scant attention to the problem of interstate areas. Instead, this districting tends to "sub-regionalize" such areas along State lines, making it more difficult than otherwise might be the case to develop a truly areawide approach in these very significant areas.

Some of the substate districts are urban, some are rural, and some combine both traits. This shows up in differences in program objectives, Federal program eligibility, local leadership patterns, and planning capabilities. Such differences, though referred to briefly at certain points in this chapter, are more fully treated in Chapter VIII.

It is the purpose of this chapter to (1) probe the evolving role of the States in creating and supporting substate regions; (2) examine the issues faced by the States in performing this role; (3) evaluate the effectiveness of current substate districting systems, and (4) draw conclusions that might be useful for future substate districting efforts.

THE STATE ROLE

Obviously, the State role is of major importance to substate regions. If the organizations established to serve these regions are to be given governmental status, they must look to the States for it. The possibility of creating federally chartered corporations like TVA for this purpose, while sometimes proposed, is an unlikely prospect because the functions to be performed are those normally reserved to the States and their local governments. The proposals often heard for metropolitan or regional development corporations are also deficient. While offering a solution to certain land acquisition and development problems under State authorization, such corporations are designed to undertake limited functions only, and have thus far remained relatively infeasible from a political standpoint. Their insulation from the normal political process, and their threat of competition with private developers, make them difficult to establish.

The need for substate regions comes not so much from the discovery of new functions of government, but from the growth and mobility of community popula-

Sub-state Planning and Development Districts, September 1972



Note:
The districts in the States of Nevada, Montana, Maryland, and Ohio were tentative as of September, 1972.
States lacking districts as of September, 1972 were Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Wyoming

Legend:

- State Boundary
- District Boundary
- Subdistrict Boundary (in Texas and Illinois)

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

tions, which have spilled across traditional local boundaries and created interdependencies which did not exist before. If annexation or consolidation of local units had kept pace with the growth and geographic dispersion of interdependent communities, generally, as it has tended to do in such places as Nashville, Miami, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis, this report would be addressed to getting adequate performance from the enlarged city-counties rather than to the establishment and definition of roles for multi-jurisdictional regional organizations. But local boundary adjustments in most parts of the Nation have not resulted in single areawide governments; even some of the expansion cases cited above have become victims of overspilling growth. Furthermore, with the expansion of local governmental units comes the need to decentralize them by establishing neighborhood councils and satellite city halls. The governmental responsibilities which are becoming multi-jurisdictional because of their areawide nature are, for the most part, ones that the States have already delegated, or would normally delegate, to local governments; but to do so in many areas now would mean that the responsibilities would not be met adequately or efficiently because the local governments are too fragmented. In rural areas where population and economic decline have been coupled with ineffective local governments, the districts are sometimes looked upon as a new beginning, whereby enough governmental resources and expertise can be amassed to reverse the situation. For the most part, the States have not assumed those responsibilities which have become areawide, and in a significant number of cases, State lines divide a large number of interstate areas. In short, a governmental vacuum would exist in many areas without regional organizations of a multi-jurisdictional areawide nature at both the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan levels.

In a legal sense, under the Federal system it is the role of the States to fill this vacuum by assigning, or reassigning, those governmental functions which cannot be performed satisfactorily, either by existing local governments or the States themselves, to a multi-jurisdictional regional organization which geographically encompasses the whole areawide community. In practice, five different approaches to this situation have been taken:

1. The States have enacted general interlocal cooperation, interlocal contracting, and joint exercise of powers legislation, enabling local governments upon their own initiative to do with or for each other anything which they had already been authorized to do individually.
2. The States have enacted general enabling legislation, allowing local governments upon their own initiative to join together to establish regional planning commissions or regional councils.

3. The States have specifically created individual regional planning organizations and multi-jurisdictional special districts through special legislation, including interstate compacts in a few cases.
4. The States—by legislation or executive order or both—have established statewide systems or substate districts.
5. The States, in a few cases, have taken no action, or the local governments have not used the enabling legislation provided. In a number of these cases, non-governmental regional organizations have been formed, using the non-profit corporation mechanism or a non-legal entity such as a coordinating committee. The non-governmental approach is especially preferred in interstate areas where the alternative is usually the difficult task of enacting interstate compact legislation.

Often an individual State has taken more than one of these approaches—each at a different time. Except for those few cases where the statewide regional district systems have mandated regional organizations, and the unusual cases of special legislation, all of the approaches cited above depend upon local initiative. This results in a variety of multi-jurisdictional agreements and regional organizations, established at different times and scattered across a State, with little or no thought as to how they might fit within the framework of a substate district system. Since the statewide systems of substate districts are of relatively recent origin, the States often encountered strong pressures to “grandfather in” a number of pre-established regional organizations. This was done in most cases, or existing organizations were modified or disbanded, to avoid a situation in which the statewide system would add another layer of confusing and competing boundaries and/or regional organizations to an already confused governmental landscape.

The States have seldom created interstate regional organizations having governmental jurisdiction over an entire areawide community. West Virginia legislation specifically provides for incorporation of interstate bodies into its districting system, and interlocal cooperation legislation is being used in Texas and Arkansas for interstate district purposes there. But there are numerous examples where State-established regional organizations split the interstate region along State lines, and established sub-regional agencies which compete with the areawide organization for recognition and for scarce funds. Thus, they tend to defeat one of the major purposes for which they were formed—the bridging of fragmented local government boundaries among inter-related communities within a single region. On the other

hand, it is argued by some that where close State linkages are needed, the single-State district may be more effective in developing a "trusted" relationship.

Yet the governmental status which can be conferred by the State (or by two or more States jointly in interstate areas) is immensely important to areawide regional organization. Such status can replace voluntary participation by localities (which may result in partial representation) with mandated membership, so the organization will not always have to be afraid that controversies will lead to members withdrawing their support and opposing effective legislative lobbying activities. It can replace a voluntary dues structure with a firm revenue system, so that sound financial planning can take place. It can designate the regional organization as the officially recognized Federal grant recipient for a variety of programs, so that time and resources will not be wasted on competitive grantsmanship. It can confer direct links with State decision-making processes, so that the region can influence the delivery of State services to it. It can establish strong financial and technical support from the State level, so that the region will not be overly dependent upon the Federal government. It can even confer actual governmental decision-making and action authority on a regional organization, so that it can rise above a merely advisory role.

These are the kinds of benefits some have expected to emerge from Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 and certain other provisions of Federal legislation which give the governors a coordinating role in the establishment of regions for Federal program purposes. But, on balance, they are not what has been delivered by the States up to this time.

The establishment of the present substate district systems in most of the States came primarily from the impetus of certain Federal grant-in-aid programs enacted in the 1960's—particularly HUD and EDA planning

assistance. The importance of multi-jurisdictional coordination is stressed in certain Federal programs administered by the Departments of Housing and Urban Development; Health, Education, and Welfare; Agriculture; Justice; Labor; Interior; and by the Economic Development Administration, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The enactment by Congress of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 and the issuance by the Office of Management and Budget of Circular A-95 emphasized the importance of areawide coordination and encouraged the States to face up to the task of program coordination presented by the numerous aid programs.

The effect of these Federal programs on the State executive orders and legislation delineating the substate district systems, can be seen in Table VII-1. In citing reasons why the districts were being created, these documents mentioned the Federal impetus 23 times. Coordination of various government activities was second, while the other commonly mentioned reasons—to promote regional planning, avoid duplication, promote efficient government, and assist local governments—lagged far behind.

Early State-Level Experience

Federally encouraged State planning experiments during the New Deal gave the States significant experience with the concept of substate regions. But shifts in national policies brought about by World War II and Congressional disenchantment with planning caused the dissolution of many State planning boards in the early 1940's. The post-war area development movement and the increasing pressures of urban problems began moving States back into the planning field in the 1950's. After the disastrous 1955 floods, the Connecticut Development Commission (CDC) became deeply involved in

Table VII-1

Reasons for Creating Substate District Systems

Region	Promote Regional Planning	Avoid Duplication	Federal Impetus	Assist Local Governments	Coordinate Activities	Promote Efficient Government
United States						
Total	10	9	23	5	19	6
Northeast	0	0	3	0	3	0
South	4	3	9	3	6	3
North Central	4	3	5	2	7	3
West	2	3	6	0	3	0

Source: Executive orders and legislation establishing substate district systems.

planning assistance through the use of Federal "701" funds and the preparation of flood prevention plans for three river valleys. This initial major State-level experience with regional planning proved valuable in illustrating the weakness in planning for only part of the State, and in revealing the need to involve local communities in planning efforts if the program was to have a strong impact on development. Thus, in 1958, the Connecticut legislature authorized CDC to establish regional planning areas and to provide assistance to regional planning agencies.

With enactment of the Housing Act of 1959, "701" planning assistance was made generally available to State planning agencies carrying on statewide or interstate comprehensive planning, and new State interest in planning was aroused.

By the close of 1965, Connecticut's early action had been followed by action in Georgia—which passed legislation authorizing financial assistance to area commissions in 1961—and in California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Shedding their previous passive roles in substate regional planning for more active involvement and support, these States were charting a course leading to creation of a new dimension in substate regionalism soon to be recognized at the Federal level. The State planning agencies fostered in the early 1960's by new Federal aid from HUD's "701" planning assistance program took a self interest in substate districts and established "State planning districts" for carrying out the planning responsibilities by the State planning agencies. The later Federal grant-in-aid programs (mostly since 1964) to multi-jurisdictional areas led to a broadening of the purposes and of the users of substate districts.

Federal Encouragement

In January 1966, shortly after its establishment the Economic Development Administration invited the governors of 37 States to identify districts suitable for establishment of economic development districts. The letter said:

We are also aware that some States may need assistance from us in helping meet our mutual responsibility in getting development districts organized and underway. We will, therefore, consider grants to the States for assisting and organizing district programs. Such grants to the States will be considered only for this initial phase until the districts are fully established and operating; after that we expect that the bulk of our planning grant funds will go directly to approved economic development districts.³

For activities in fiscal years 1967-1969, the Economic Development Administration provided \$1.5 million in grants to some 20 States for the delineation of State

planning districts, and for the identification of an organizational assistance to those districts which were eligible to become economic development districts under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965.

As noted in the previous chapter, the proliferation of new Federal planning grant programs involving areawide planning and development programs by 1965 started to cause considerable concern among Washington officials. In April 1966, ACIR adopted a report in which it recommended that the States create multipurpose regional public agencies to undertake physical, economic, and human resources planning and development programs over multicounty areas. Where States have taken such action, ACIR recommended that Federal agencies responsible for such programs be required to use the same geographic base and, to the maximum extent possible, the same regional agency.⁴

On September 2, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued a special memorandum calling for the coordination of development programs and planning at the Federal level, and for Federal cooperation with State and local agencies in establishing common planning bases and sharing facilities and resources. The memorandum stated in part:

Comprehensive planning covering wide areas is a promising and extremely important beginning to the solution of critical State, metropolitan and regional problems. It is essential that it be done well.

At the Federal level, we must coordinate our efforts to prevent conflict and duplication among Federally assisted planning efforts.

...boundaries for planning and development districts assisted by the Federal government should be consistent with established State planning districts and regions. Exceptions should be made only where there is clear justification.⁵

On January 31, 1967, the Bureau of the Budget issued Circular A-80 to provide guidelines to Federal agencies in carrying out the President's directive. Its basic policy with respect to substate districting was to encourage the States to exercise leadership in delineating and establishing a system of planning and development districts for regions in each State, which can provide a consistent geographic base for the coordination of Federal, State and local development programs.⁶

A stated objective of the circular was "to discourage overlap, duplication, and competition in State and local planning activities assisted or required under Federal programs...." Its issuance is considered by many observers to have been an especially significant step because for the first time Federal policy was issued to help

overcome the problem created by a multiplicity of unrelated Federal areawide programs. Up to this time, each agency had addressed itself to the need for coordination of Federal areawide efforts from its own point of view alone.

Slightly more than a year later, the Department of Housing and Urban Development gave financial support to State districting efforts. HUD's "Planning Agency Letter No. 62," dated February 1, 1968, stated that "State comprehensive planning agencies should proceed at once toward delineation of multi-jurisdictional planning and development districts covering the entire State."⁷ HUD "701" comprehensive planning assistance funds were made available to States for delineation studies that would lead to determining the boundaries of a Statewide system of planning and development areas.

The State Planning Committee of the National Governors' Conference gave strong support to these Federal actions and encouraged governors to take steps to indicate a positive State role in the creation and recognition of substate districts. Although by the end of 1967, 30 States were reported as having State planning district boundaries, Governor Love, chairman of the committee, noted in a letter sent to all the governors on July 9, 1968:

The problem is that only seven of the Governors have made any formal statement (i.e., Executive Orders) relating to this subject. There is an immediate need for Governors to inform the Director of the Bureau of the Budget of his (sic) views, directive and/or Executive Orders concerning multi-county planning within his State.

Within the next nine months, 11 governors issued executive orders delineating the boundaries of the State planning and development areas.

The most recent Federal action affecting substate districting is OMB Circular A-95; it was issued in July 1969 and revised in April 1971. This circular superseded A-80, absorbing its provisions, and implemented certain provisions of three Federal acts: Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, and Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The circular encourages establishment of State and areawide clearinghouses whose purpose is to assist in coordination of Federal or Federally assisted projects and programs with State, regional and local planning. While this circular and its impact on substate regionalism are discussed in detail in a previous chapter, it should be noted here that the State-established areawide planning and development districts designated as A-95 clearinghouse agencies, review applications for Federal assistance in over 100 Federal programs.

As noted in Chapter VI, a special effort was begun by the Federal government in October 1971, to implement

the Part IV provisions of this circular concerning substate districting. Vice President Agnew wrote to all of the governors inviting them to work with OMB and the Federal Regional Councils to make the boundaries of a number of Federally encouraged special districts conform to State-established substate district boundaries.

SUBSTATE DISTRICTING ISSUES

The creation of substate districts has resulted from State actions ranging from the explicit delineation of district boundaries and organization by legislation to gubernatorial orders and persuasion. The legal base for substate districts often distinguishes between the authority for the geographic delineation of district boundaries and the authority for the organization of the areawide agency within the State planning district. Clear authority may be given with respect to the delineation of district boundaries, but the authority given with respect to the creation of areawide organizations may be weak or non-existent. On the other hand, the legislation may establish clear guidelines for creating the organizations, while leaving the boundary questions quite fluid.

Since a substate districting system is to be statewide and comprehensive in scope, someone with comprehensive statewide responsibilities needs to develop a strategy, and then pursue it through all of its legislative, geographical, organizational, financial, and programmatic ramifications. The types of strategies which have been used are described below, and then the major individual issues are examined.

CHOOSING STRATEGIES

The governors and the legislative bodies are the chief actors in establishing substate district systems. In most States, the motivating force for substate districts originated in the States' executive branch. As shown in Table VII-2, 21 States have relied exclusively on executive orders in establishing these systems, while 12 States have used a combination of legislative acts and executive orders, and six States have relied upon legislation alone. Massachusetts created its districts by administrative order.

The Northeast, North Central, and West used the executive order most frequently while the South used a combination of executive order and legislation. In the West, legislation alone was used more than a combination, while in the North Central region not one State relied on legislation alone.

Gubernatorial action alone has its limitations. It can establish boundaries for administrative service areas of the States, require State agencies to use these areas, allocate the executive budget within the districting system, provide State technical assistance on an area basis, and promote or recognize established organiza-

Table VII-2

Method of Creating Substate District Systems

State and Region	Manner in Which Formed		
	Executive Order	Legislation	Combination
United States-Totals	22	6	12
Northeast	3	1	2
Connecticut		X	
Maine			X
Massachusetts	X ¹		
New Hampshire	X		
New Jersey			
New York	X		
Pennsylvania	X		
Rhode Island			
Vermont			X
South	4	3	7
Alabama			X
Arkansas		X	
Delaware			
District of Columbia			
Florida	X		
Georgia		X	
Kentucky	X		
Louisiana	X		
Maryland			
Mississippi			X
North Carolina			X
Oklahoma			X
South Carolina			X
Tennessee			X
Texas	X		
Virginia		X	
West Virginia			X
North Central	8	0	3
Illinois	X		
Indiana	X		
Iowa	X		
Kansas	X		
Michigan	X		
Minnesota			X
Missouri			X
Nebraska			X
North Dakota	X		
Ohio			
South Dakota	X		
Wisconsin	X		
West	6	2	0
Alaska			
Arizona	X		
California		X	
Colorado		X	
Hawaii			

Table VII-2 (Continued)

Method of Creating Substate District Systems

State and Region	Manner in Which Formed		
	Executive Order	Legislation	Combination
Idaho	X		
Montana			
Nevada			
New Mexico	X		
Oregon	X		
Utah	X		
Washington	X		
Wyoming			

¹ Massachusetts formed districts through an administrative order which is shown, but not counted as an executive order.

tions within the areas for State and Federal program purposes.⁸ But gubernatorial action alone cannot require regional organizations to be established, mandate their form, give them governmental authority, make them party to interstate agreements, provide them with State financial support from the general fund, or ensure that a future governor might not abolish the system. State legislative action, then, is required if the substate districting system is to be fully developed, institutionalized, and given permanence. In States like Kentucky, Arkansas, and South Carolina, where the governors initiated the systems, the legislatures subsequently recognized them by statutes.

The role of the governor in initiating substate district systems has been important throughout the Nation. A set of case studies done for ACIR in 12 States which have substate district systems attests to the critical nature of the role played by the governors and the central staffs in the executive branch.⁹ The governor's role in most of the 12 was important both before and after the substate district systems were established. In all of these States, with the exception of Virginia and Georgia, the governor issued an executive order to establish the district systems. In Virginia and Georgia, the governors favored the district system. Even though there is no evidence that any governor has opposed establishing substate districts, gubernatorial opposition alone would probably have prevailed.

Once a district system is established, gubernatorial support is important for several reasons: (1) The governor's designation of a district organization as an A-95 clearinghouse gives it legitimacy and a certain degree of power which will encourage most local governments to join in order to protect their own interests; (2) some pressure from the governor or his representative is usually necessary if State agencies are to comply with an executive order to plan and deliver services on a district basis, or delegate such planning or

service functions to the district organizations; and (3) the governor's backing is required to align Federally encouraged districts with substate districts.

Washington State provides a good example of the importance of the governor's role. At approximately the time the district system was established, economic problems resulting from the loss of defense and civilian contracts for aircraft to be built in the State became serious. This crisis diverted the governor's attention from supporting the districts as he might have done otherwise, and little has been accomplished. Only recently has the economic situation improved sufficiently to allow increased gubernatorial attention to be placed on the district system.

The governors' powers and actions in three States with regard to districts are illustrative of the ways in which the States and the districts may be linked. In Utah, the governor has the authority to approve or disapprove any State agency's requests for Federal funds, and he exercises this authority only after affected substate districts have been consulted. The Wisconsin governor possesses authority to issue executive orders to establish or dissolve regional planning commissions on request of sufficient numbers of local governments. Georgia's governor is attempting to encourage State agencies to use the substate district system for administration and service purposes by persuasion rather than by issuing an executive order. The governors of Virginia and Oregon have issued executive orders directing State departments to coordinate the planning of their programs with substate district organizations.

In Wisconsin, Virginia, Oregon and Texas there is evidence of the governor's immediate staff, as distinguished from the planning staff, becoming significantly involved in district matters. In Wisconsin, the governor's office is reported to be attempting to convert the two remaining metropolitan COG's into larger RPC's. In Virginia, the Secretary of Administration apparently has

been assigned the task of bringing State agency planning into the district framework. In Oregon, the man most directly involved in establishing the districting system was simultaneously an assistant to the governor and head of the Local Government Relations Division in the Executive Department. In Texas, State funding of COG's, as well as Federal funding in the fields of comprehensive health planning, criminal justice planning and programs for the aging, is provided through the governor's office; and the Planning Agency Council for Texas (PACT), composed of the administrative heads of State agencies and staffed by the governor's office, is the official coordinating and planning agency for the State, not only for matters arising among State agencies but also for coordination of State plans and activities with localities, metropolitan areas, regions, and the Federal government. There is little evidence in the other seven States studied that the governor's offices, as such, are significantly involved in substate district matters.

State planning office powers with respect to substate districts are not usually very strong. Of the States studied, Virginia has the strongest planning office. It possesses legal authority by statute to (1) draw and rearrange district boundaries at its own discretion, (2) distribute State funds to the planning district commissions (PDC's), and (3) veto the appointment of any PDC's executive director. Kentucky's planning office has the authority to (1) determine the membership requirements for the district boards, (2) allocate State funds to the boards, and (3) conduct evaluation of performance. Wisconsin has vested limited power in its local planning office in an unusual respect. Each RPC can request a State-employed staff member from the Department of Local Affairs and Development to work full time for it. An argument for this arrangement is that the individual assigned has better access at both the State and local levels. An argument against it is that no man can serve two masters. Since the individual is being paid by the State, he could be subject to influences from the State level.

Most planning offices have some degree of coordinating authority for statewide planning purposes. The extent of this authority does not allow the planning office to have any sort of operational authority over essentially co-equal State agencies. Designation as the State A-95 clearinghouse may provide the planning office with some power; this power, however, is diminished by the widespread practice of approving almost everything that comes through as long as there is no obvious, or blatant, conflict with State policy, even though there may not be any State plans.

Any agency that has its routine disturbed is unlikely to view the cause of that disturbance with favor. The substate district systems have and are causing many routines to be disturbed. The pressures to shift administration, planning, and delivery of services come from various sources. Probably the strongest State pressure

comes from the governor himself or the State planning office. Agencies operating under a modern system of government, characterized by a consolidated executive branch with most units responsible to one of the major department heads appointed by the governor, tend to be easier for a governor to control. If an agency is constitutionally independent, such as those run by an independently elected official, the governor can only try persuasion and the use of A-95 to bring it into line. The planning office usually assists the governor in applying this type of pressure.

Although many State agencies appear to be using substate districts for internal administrative and planning purposes, the 12 case studies produced relatively little evidence that they receive policy inputs from the substate districts or that they make much use of those which they do receive. Oregon, Georgia, Texas, and Utah may be exceptions to this, however. It should also be noted that some of the States within Appalachia— notably Georgia, Tennessee, and Kentucky—now consider their substate districts' plans (also known as Appalachian local development districts plans) as direct inputs to the State development plans used to support funding from the Appalachian program.

The 12 case studies also showed evidence that State agencies thus far have not decentralized the administration of their programs fully to coincide with the substate district boundaries. One of the primary factors affecting the degree of State agency compliance with substate district systems appeared to be population concentration. The case studies concluded that most of these agencies tended to focus the bulk of their attention and activities on the larger metropolitan areas, and less often expanded or altered their activities outside these areas in conformance with the substate district system. Some State agencies did not find that the district boundaries provided the optimum framework for delivery of their services. However, the factor of population concentration does not present an insurmountable obstacle to integration of State agency activity into the substate district system. It seems only a matter of time before local, together with State, pressures reach a point where the agency can no longer justify non-compliance.

Some agencies may continue to have valid reasons for not complying completely with substate district systems. For example, a Marine Wildlife Commission operating in the coastal areas need not concern itself with matters in the mountains. Nevertheless, despite some delays, most States have achieved reasonable success so far in the realignment of State agencies along the lines of substate districts for planning. In most States, the Department of Health and Social Services, or a similar health organization, had either complied with district system boundaries or was in the process of evolving towards compliance.

This same study noted that the legislature in Oregon in addition to the other five States already cited as

having a legislative basis for their districting systems—is moving toward legislation which would back up its governor, judging by the fact that legislation is being prepared that would somewhat strengthen what little authority the State and local planning bodies now have.

On this matter of the legislative role, the report concludes that most legislators have recognized the need for some sort of district system for efficient delivery of State planning services and intergovernmental coordination efforts, and therefore, the conflict in this regard does not concern their existence. Instead it involves how much and how fast power should be shifted to them. This judgment is confirmed by the fact that in August 1972, the National Legislative Conference (representing 7,600 State legislators) adopted a series of policy statements supporting substate district systems.¹⁰

Justifying Substate Districts

Arguments for substate districting, in the 12 States for which case studies were prepared,¹¹ tended to focus on three basic needs: the first was for an areawide planning organization operating within a specific jurisdiction for the purposes of review and comment on applications for Federal programs; the second was to bring order to the chaotic arrangement of districts established and used by State agencies; and the third, to provide local governments with a means for areawide planning and influencing State programs. Most of the States studied relied upon these three basic rationales during the formulation phase of their systems. The States not explicitly using all three rationales most frequently omitted that pertaining to Federal requirements, probably because these requirements were already being met. For example, in Virginia, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Georgia there were regional planning commissions in the major metropolitan areas which antedated the establishment of districts. One State, Georgia, did not mention the second rationale. The three rationales probably are an accurate reflection of ones that would be used to justify substate districts today.

Some arguments have been altered slightly since inception of the district system. For example, in Washington State, the use of the current system for all Federal program purposes is no longer considered a primary purpose. Instead, the Washington substate district system is seen as a developmental structure whose anticipated date of maturity for the purpose of meeting Federal requirements is unknown. Moreover, the enabling act for setting up Virginia's district system also provided for establishment, subsequently, of service districts for the delivery of areawide services. However, since the requirements for creating a service district are so stringent, no action has been taken to create one under the enabling legislation; in a single instance, however, specific State legislation was used to create a service district. Thus, one of the original purposes of the

general legislation has not been realized up to now. An official review of this Virginia situation resulted in recommended simplification for the existing planning district commissions to provide operational services on a voluntary basis in the absence of a service district,¹² but these recommendations have been rejected by the legislature.

In several States other arguments were made for a substate district system. In Virginia, one intention was to stop fragmentation of governmental units and services. In Utah, it was argued that substate districts would prevent further Federal encroachment on local government prerogatives. In South Carolina and Georgia an argument was propounded that substate districts would help revitalize small communities.

Opposition arguments generally centered around charges of "centralization" and "big government." Some individuals and small groups went so far as to term the system a plot to take over local government. The most sophisticated arguments made against a district system were made in Kentucky when the legislature was preparing to give statutory legitimacy to the system set up by executive order. These included (1) that the interests of the poor would not be represented, (2) that the authority of the State Department of Education would be menaced, and (3) that the existence of established metropolitan planning agencies would be threatened. The legislature did write a protection clause for the State Department of Education into the statute but ignored the other arguments.

Integration of State and local planning is easier when the State agencies use regions which conform to the substate district system, when each district possesses a comprehensive plan, and when the State possesses a comprehensive statewide plan. The often noted lack of a complete mesh between State agency and district planning, and the lack of comprehensive plans in many cases at both levels, tend to weaken the districts.

The power that might accrue to a district organization through the preparation and consistent use of a legitimate areawide comprehensive plan could become significant as the district systems become better integrated into State government. Although this could limit the direct access of individual local governments to State agencies, the district organizations would be under the direct control of these local units where COG's are used, and the collective nature of the district's positions is likely to have greater impact on the State than a series of independent and uncoordinated local positions.

A major source of vitality for the substate district systems is the Federal government's requirement for review and comment under the provisions of OMB Circular A-95. This process, when it involves a COG, gives local governments a significant measure of control over areawide projects affecting them. However, the original arguments for district systems as a means for coordinating Federal and State programs are not para-

Table VII-3

**Basic Purpose for Substate District Designation:
May 1970**

	Planning	Development	State Admin- istration of Functional Agencies	Provision of Services	Standardiza- tion of Boundaries For Local and or Federally Supported Organizations	Other
Ranking by States						
First Priority	16	3	2		3	2
Second Priority	6	9		3	5	1
Third Priority	1	2	4	1	8	
Fourth Priority		1	4	4	1	
Fifth Priority		1	3	1	1	
Priority Not						
Differentiated	5	4	3	2	3	
Subtotal	28	20	16	11	21	3
No Purpose Recognized	2	10	14	19	9	27
Total States Reporting	30	30	30	30	30	30
Cumulative Rankings						
First Priority	16	3	2		3	2
First and Second Priority	22	12	2	3	8	3
First thru Third Priorities	23	14	6	4	16	3
First thru Fourth Priorities	23	15	10	8	17	3
First thru Fifth Priorities	23	16	13	9	18	3
Total Mentions	28	21	16	11	20	3

Source: Questionnaires returned on the May 1970 "Substate District Survey," conducted by the National Governors' Conference, the Economic Development Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget.

mount as operating philosophies. Many districts in the States studied focus primarily on obtaining Federal money through various programs to strengthen their staffs, and only secondarily on coordination through A-95 procedures. Thus, it is probably true that the purposes of substate districts are now sufficiently broad and well accepted so that they would continue even if A-95 were de-emphasized by the Federal government.

An earlier evaluation of the reasons for the creation of substate districts, prepared by the Economic Development Administration in March 1969, is helpful in assessing the extent of activities such districts are expected to undertake. Publications of 14 State districting programs were analyzed and statements pertaining to the purposes of each statewide system were grouped into the following categories. While this listing does not purport to be exhaustive, it is illustrative of the many purposes which States hope their districting

systems will serve.

– *Planning by district organizations* through the identification of problems, goals and opportunities and through the integration of State and local development policies and goals at the regional level.

– *Planning by State or Federal agencies* for coordinating major State plans and Federal programs on the regional scale.

– *Promoting economic development* through multi-county planning and development organizations.

– *Achieving economies* by focusing resources available for development (leadership, manpower and money)—an objective especially important in rural areas.

– *Meeting Federal requirements* by fulfilling the requirements of many Federal programs that comprehensive planning be carried out on a multicounty basis, or that a planning area be defined as a pre-condition to financial support.

– *Delineation and standardization of geographic boundaries* by (1) establishing planning jurisdictions suited to the scale of areawide problems, (2) establishing a regional framework for the coordination of functional planning activities of State agencies and as the focus of planning by regional agencies, (3) coordinating Federally sponsored and/or operated programs at substate levels within the State, and (4) creation of common areas for collecting and analyzing information and statistics.

– *Coordination and implementation* of State, Federal, and local planning and development—including physical, economic, health, and welfare—on an areawide basis.

– *Strengthening of county and municipal government* by interrelating appropriate rural and urban concerns, and providing a mechanism for cooperative decision making and action.

– *Provision of services* on a regional basis.

– *Promoting Federal assistance* by assisting local governments and private organizations in obtaining Federal grants and loans.

– *Coordinating administration of State agencies*, by using a regional framework and the focus of planning by regional agencies to help establish priorities, and to minimize overlap, duplication, and competition in State planning and programming activities.

No doubt additional purposes, could be added today to those above. Those States utilizing their substate districts as a framework for covering the State with A-95 clearinghouses would emphasize this activity among their reasons for creation of the districts. Further, at least one State—Oregon—intends to use the State planning district system as the basis for delegating State program planning and development of the governor's executive budget.

Another survey, conducted in May 1970 by the National Governors' Conference, the Economic Development Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget, provides additional information on State purposes in establishing substate districts. The data provide information on the views of State officials on the relative importance of various district agency activities.

The responses from 30 States are summarized in Table VII-3. The table indicates the number of States and the priority ranking given for six categories of purposes in designating districts. The cumulative rankings are scored by the accumulation of priorities and give some idea of the overall preferences among all States among the categories. The first preference of all the States was the category "planning" with 16 States giving it a first priority ranking. The second, "development," received 12 first and second priority rankings, and the third, "standardization of boundaries for local and/or Federally supported organizations," won 16 first through third priority rankings. The fourth preference of all the States was the category "State administration of functional agencies" with ten first through fourth priority rankings; and the fifth category, "government service districts," had nine first through fifth priority rankings. There were three State responses listed in the category of "other," each of which dealt with the use of substate districts to meet specific requirements of the Federal economic development and Appalachian local development district programs.

Another way of ranking the States' preferences for the categories is to array the categories by total number of mentions by the States. When the States' responses are weighted in this fashion, the overall ranking of the categories of purposes for substate districting is essentially the same. The exception is that the category "standardization of boundaries for local and/or Federally supported organizations" has one more total mention than the "development" category. The rankings then would fall in the following order: "planning," "standardization," "development," "State administration of functional agencies," and "government service districts."

Delineating Boundaries

The basis for delineation of substate district boundaries varies considerably from State to State. The executive orders and legislation offer some guide as to what factors were considered in drawing the boundaries. As shown in Table VII-4, demographic considerations, such as population, market areas, and job patterns, were mentioned most frequently, followed by natural features and existing local government boundaries. These findings are not conclusive, however, since many States did not specify the criteria.

The 12 case studies showed that a number of States drew district boundaries along the lines established by Federal program criteria. For example, criteria for establishment of economic development districts by the Economic Development Administration require two or more economically distressed counties to be contained within each EDD. Where EDD's preceded the establishment of substate districts, the EDD pattern strongly influenced the States in their determination of substate districts. This is particularly true in Arkansas where the

boundaries were drawn so that all the districts would be EDD's eligible for EDA funds.

In Georgia, on the other hand, locally initiated areawide agencies known as area planning and development councils (APDC's) already blanketed most of the State prior to creation of State planning districts. The precise boundaries of the APDC's at any given time depended upon the number of participating counties, because the enabling legislation permitted the counties to join or withdraw from the APDC's as they chose. Legislative action in 1970 created a permanent statewide system of State planning districts including every county, and executive action in 1971 established the boundaries.

In those States where there were neither districts created in response to Federal initiatives nor locally generated organizations completely covering the State, two basic approaches were used to delineate districts—hearings and technical studies. The hearing approach was used to determine the existing linkages among the local governments. For example, Virginia conducted approximately 100 hearings in the course of a year's time to determine the appropriate boundaries for its State planning districts. In Oregon, some 500 information meetings were held within a year in all parts of the State. In both cases, issues of compatibility of the units of government which would have to work together were the primary consideration. Questions of resource geography, transportation, market areas, and so on were not ranked as high as a practical assessment of the likelihood of interlocal cooperation. With respect to the 12 States studies for ACIR, major consideration was given to drawing the district boundaries in such a way as to avoid encountering serious opposition from local officials and State legislators.

In other States, such as Texas, Minnesota, Michigan, and Iowa, regional studies were undertaken to determine the appropriate boundaries for delineating State planning districts. In some instances, case studies were made to determine the homogeneity of areas. Other studies focused on regional population centers and their hinterlands. Criteria, such as a desired population size for the substate district, then were established to help sort out the precise boundaries for districts.

Except in New England where townships are used, whole counties always have been combined to make districts, although Florida is considering the possibility of using water resource boundaries.

Even after district boundaries were initially established, many States found that adjustments were necessary because of Federal, State, and local program requirements. A number of approaches have been used to achieve flexibility while preserving the integrity of the system.

The building block pattern, used by Nebraska, does not necessarily require a single areawide body in each district. State and Federal agencies may accept combina-

Table VII-4
Criteria Used to Define Boundaries of Substate Districts as Cited in Executive Orders and Legislation Creating the Statewide Systems

Region	Public Hearing	Existence of Metropolitan Areas	Existing Local Governments	Existing Regional Organizations	Existing State Administrative Districts	Demography	Natural Features	Interstate Areas
United States Total	5	5	10	2	3	15	13	6
Northeast	1	1	0	0	1	3	3	1
South	2	1	5	2	1	5	5	3
North Central	1	2	3	0	1	5	4	2
West	1	1	2	0	0	2	1	0

Source: ACIR tabulation.

tions of two or more whole districts to make up larger regions with which to associate their programs.

A second pattern is where the State specifies that the substate district may be subdivided, but that it is the largest area which a Federal or State agency may use for its program purposes. Oregon allows this approach, and it is being proposed in Indiana as well. The rules in this case usually require that the entire substate district be blanketed with the Federal or State program, even though two or more regional organizations may be used to do this, but that no program organizations may cross the boundary line of a substate district.

A third approach to finding a single multicounty area which is suitable to a wide variety of Federal and State concerns has been developed by a number of States since January 1971—including Georgia, Illinois, Maine, and to a certain extent, Texas. In these cases, substate district systems are based on a tiered system where the first tier (the district) may be subdivided into a specified pattern at the second tier level (subdistricts). No other combinations or subdivisions of State planning districts are envisioned under this approach.

A number of States have faced the problem as to which substate district a particular county should be placed in. In Oklahoma, the solution has been sought through what is called “swing or dual participation counties” where certain counties are given the option of participating with one substate district for one Federal or State program and with another substate district for other Federal or State programs. Although this procedure may cause a certain amount of confusion and duplication of effort, it allows flexibility in qualifying for Federal grants where the Federal program criteria specify certain kinds of boundary configurations.

Several States designated the substate district boundaries on a tentative basis as a first phase of the districting program. The strategy in these cases was to allow a trial period for the counties to determine whether they were getting along well in a particular substate district. State procedures allowed for a readjustment of the district boundaries prior to final adoption of the statewide system, based upon free choice of the perimeter counties to transfer from one district to another. While common in the early stages of substate districting, there is no State now with a provision permitting the boundaries to be adjusted at local option. The State usually has a provision for reconsideration of the boundaries on petition by the local governments, but the State reserves the right to approve or disapprove the request.

The guidelines for implementation of Part IV of A-95 contain provisions regarding realignment of Federal program areas to conform to or be consistent with substate district boundaries. The OMB criteria state, “Two or more Federal program areas may comprise a single State planning district,” and the converse, “two or more State planning districts may comprise a single

Federal program area.” While these guidelines allow the options of either subdividing or combining State planning districts in any State for Federal programs, there are no States that provide for both approaches for the purposes of establishing Federal program area boundaries.

Procedures for forming substate districts for three different situations which have been confronted may be summarized as follows.

Substate Districts from “Scratch.” In this situation the State conducts a study to delineate logical boundaries based on a determination of homogeneity of the region with respect to resources, population, urban and rural characteristics. Then, under existing or newly obtained authority, the State proceeds to draw substate district boundaries. This step includes negotiations with State functional agencies and hearings with localities over the placement of district boundaries. Following agreement on boundary issues, an executive order or other official document is issued that formally recognizes such boundaries, requires State functional program conformity, specifies how to organize an areawide agency within each substate district area, and assigns certain planning and program responsibilities to the substate district organizations.

States which have followed some such procedure include Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

Substate Districts from a Metropolitan (Regional) Planning Base. The existence of several regional planning commissions or councils of governments created under general enabling legislation calls for a different procedure in the statewide districting process. In several States regional planning commissions or councils of government already served most of the State’s SMSA’s and were involved in a number of HUD-funded areawide planning programs. In most such cases, the States retained the jurisdictional boundaries of existing regional planning commissions and COG’s and created new locally based metropolitan and nonmetropolitan planning commissions in the remaining areas. Alternatively, some States contracted or expanded existing regional planning commission and COG boundaries to conform to the new system, then established new regions for remaining areas—usually centered on metropolitan areas—and finally issued executive orders requesting that State functional program agencies observe the statewide boundary pattern thus established.

States generally conforming to this pattern include Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York, Texas, and Vermont.

Substate Districts from a Base of Federally Sponsored Districts. Several States delineated and organized their districts primarily under criteria of one or more Federal programs. Existing Federally sponsored areawide organizations—including regional planning commissions and

Table VII-5

Number of Substate Districts for Which Official State Delineation Action had Occurred:
1965-1972

State	1965	1966	1967	1970	1971	1972
Alabama	---	---	---	---	8	12
Alaska	---	---	---	---	---	---
Arizona	---	---	---	---	6	6
Arkansas	---	---	---	8	8	8
California	---	---	---	---	9	10
Colorado	---	---	---	---	12	12
Connecticut	15	15	15	15	15	15
Delaware	---	---	---	---	---	---
Florida	---	---	---	11	11	11
Georgia	18	17	17	17	19	18
Hawaii	---	---	---	---	---	---
Idaho	---	---	---	---	---	6
Illinois	---	---	---	---	---	7
Indiana	---	---	---	14	14	14
Iowa	---	---	---	16	16	16
Kansas	---	---	---	---	11	11
Kentucky	---	---	15	15	15	15
Louisiana	---	---	---	---	8	8
Maine	---	---	---	---	---	8
Maryland	---	---	---	---	---	---
Massachusetts	7	8	9	12	12	12
Michigan	---	---	---	14	14	13
Minnesota	---	---	---	11	11	11
Mississippi	---	---	---	11	10	10
Missouri	---	---	20	20	20	20
Montana	---	---	---	---	---	---
Nebraska	---	---	---	26	26	26
Nevada	---	---	---	---	---	---
New Hampshire	---	---	---	17	17	17
New Jersey	---	---	---	---	---	---
New Mexico	---	---	---	---	6	6
New York	---	---	---	---	11	11
North Carolina	---	---	---	---	17	17
North Dakota	---	---	---	---	8	8
Ohio	---	---	---	---	---	---
Oklahoma	---	---	---	11	11	11
Oregon	---	---	---	14	14	14
Pennsylvania	13	13	13	13	13	13
Rhode Island	---	---	---	1	1	1 ¹
South Carolina	---	---	---	10	10	10
South Dakota	---	---	---	---	6	6
Tennessee	---	---	---	8	9	9
Texas	---	---	---	21	21	21
Utah	---	---	---	---	8	8
Vermont	---	---	---	---	14	14
Virginia	---	---	---	22	22	22
Washington	---	---	---	13	13	13

COG's—were recognized as substate districts along with new State-sponsored districts. Once this step was concluded, State agencies were asked by executive order to conform to the recognized district system.

States that generally followed this approach include Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Tennessee.

The 12 case studies of substate districting confirm this diversity in approaches to delineating boundaries.¹³ Substate district boundaries, in most of these States, were drawn by a State administrative agency charged with planning community development responsibilities. In one unique case—South Carolina—the important actors on the local scene were the members of the area's State legislative delegation. Although not all of the agencies which drew the boundaries in the 12 States studied held formal public hearings, there always existed some sort of consultation or public relations activities with State officials, local special and general purpose governments, and civic groups. The extent of this type of effort varied considerably, and the degree of acceptance of the district system appeared to be directly proportional to the extent of consultations and public relations efforts.

Regardless of the basic approach followed by any of the 12 States studied, the delineation of boundaries always seemed to consist of a combination of economic, political, geographic, and demographic criteria. Natural trade areas or patterns of commerce and communications were analyzed. In all cases, county boundaries were followed so no county was divided, and political similarities and dissimilarities between nearby communities were noted and evaluated. SMSA's were left intact and not split between districts. Existing areawide organizational boundaries were also taken into account. Several States were concerned explicitly also with interstate effects, although in all probability none of the rest wholly ignored this factor. Geographic factors were important, too, because of the effect of natural obstacles such as mountain ranges or excessive distance.

It appears that most States had relatively little difficulty incorporating pre-existing areawide organizations into their statewide systems. However, in Arkansas, six pre-existing regional planning commissions were left to operate in metropolitan areas independently of the planning and development districts. Wisconsin possesses, in effect, three separate substate district systems—two COG's, 11 regional planning commissions, and eight State administrative districts. In Kentucky, the 15 area development districts coexist with six metropolitan planning agencies which operate independently of the area development districts.

District Number and Distribution

Substate districts as we know them today date from 1957 when Connecticut and Massachusetts established the first of the regional planning areas which were to

evolve into a statewide system. The first State to officially adopt substate districts as a complete statewide system was Kentucky; it did so by means of an executive order dated March 30, 1967.

The earliest survey to determine the extent of multi-jurisdictional planning agencies¹⁴ did not distinguish between those agencies that were recognized by legislative or gubernatorial action and those that had no such designation. This led to an overstatement of the number of substate districts.

Table VII-5 includes reported substate districts from a series of surveys undertaken from 1965 to 1972. It includes all districts reported by all States regardless of the definition applied to them in each State. The total number of districts established by the States as of June 1972 was 488 with 44 States taking action to create statewide systems. As of this date, only Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island,¹⁵ and Wyoming had not taken action. A substantial amount of activity took place within the preceding four-year period. In 1967, only six States had officially established a system of substate districts. By 1970, 23 had a district program. Fifteen more States took such action in the following year.

The pattern for some individual State planning districts is older than the official delineation of the statewide system. To understand the growth of State planning districts over time, it is necessary to look at the individual State districts and pinpoint those which have remained stable up through the present time. Table VII-6 includes a listing of these so-called "carry-over districts" on a State-by-State basis for each of the survey years, indicating which districts were established and carried over into the present system.

Four States had substate districting delineations pending when the September 1972 map by Economic Research Service (Map VII-1) was drawn. These States were Maryland, Ohio, Montana, and Nevada. A number of smaller States have indicated that they are not likely to subdivide the State into substate districts. The State of Delaware has only three counties, and the State of Hawaii has four; neither is likely to combine these counties into substate districts. Other small States with no pending action to delineate substate districts include Rhode Island, which is considered a single district for A-95 purposes; Alaska and Wyoming, both with very low population densities; and New Jersey.

ESTABLISHING AREAWIDE ORGANIZATIONS

The number of organized districts (i.e., those for which regional organizations have been established) is shown in Table VII-7. Of the 488 substate districts reported in 1972, less than 60 percent (273 districts) are organized. Fourteen States reported that all of their substate districts had been organized, and 15 indicated

Table VII-6

Number of State Districts, the Boundaries of which Match the March 1972 Map of "Sub-State Planning and Development Districts"¹ by Year that they were First Reported on Surveys

State	1965 ²	1966 ³	1967 ⁴	1970 ⁵	1971 ⁶
Alabama					4
Alaska					
Arizona					6
Arkansas	1	1		8	8
California	4	7	7	7	8
Colorado					12
Connecticut ⁷	1	12		15	15
Delaware					
Florida				11	11
Georgia	4	5	5	5	8
Hawaii					
Idaho					
Illinois					7
Indiana	8	9		14	14
Iowa			16	16	16
Kansas	2	7	5	11	11
Kentucky			11	15	15
Louisiana	2	2	2	1	8
Maine ⁷					
Maryland					
Massachusetts ⁷	5	7			12
Michigan		8	11	11	11
Minnesota		1	1	1	9
Mississippi				9	10
Missouri		5	14	18	20
Montana					
Nebraska				26	26
Nevada					
New Hampshire ⁷		17	17	17	17
New Jersey					
New Mexico			6		6
New York	4	8	9	13	13
North Carolina					17
North Dakota			2		8
Ohio					
Oklahoma		4	4	8	8
Oregon	6			14	14
Pennsylvania	13	13	13	13	13
Rhode Island ⁸				1	1
South Carolina				10	10
South Dakota					6
Tennessee	2	2	2	6	9
Texas				16	17
Utah	6	2	5	2	8
Vermont ⁷	1	1	1	1	14

Table VII-6 (Continued)

Number of State Districts, the Boundaries of which Match the March 1972 Map of "Sub-State Planning and Development Districts"¹ by Year that they were First Reported on Surveys

State	1965 ²	1966 ³	1967 ⁴	1970 ⁵	1971 ⁶
Virginia				22	22
Washington				11	
West Virginia	3		3		11
Wisconsin				4	8
Wyoming					

¹"Sub-State Planning and Development Districts, March 1972," (Neg. ERS. 7948-72 (3)) map by U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

²*Creative Federalism*, Pt. 1, page following 352 "Sub-state Regions Designated by State".

³"Planning Jurisdictions, State and Locally Established: October 1966." Map published by EDA with assistance from the American Institute of Planners.

⁴David K. Hartley and Eldon Hickey, *Areawide Planning Activity*, October 15, 1967, Council of State Planning Agencies, American Institute of Planners and Office of Policy Coordination, (EDA) U.S. Department of Commerce, February, 1968. Numbers shown for Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia were taken from the map "Development Planning Areas of the United States," Second Edition, January 1968, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration.

⁵"Multijurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States," Economic Development Administration, March 12, 1970.

⁶*Multijurisdictional Planning Areas in the United States*, Second Edition; U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration; and Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, May 1971.

⁷The New England States have used township boundaries for the delineation of substate districts. The maps available for this analysis did not show township detail, so determination of matches by visual inspection may result in error. In some cases no comparison could be made among maps.

⁸The State of Rhode Island has indicated that whole State was a State Planning District for purposes of OMB Circular A-95. While this was not shown on the 1972 map, it is counted as a substate district on this table.

that some of their districts had been set up. However, 11 States which have districted have not yet organized any districts.

In the 12 States for which case studies were prepared, considerable variation was observed in the stages of development of these planning districts. To understand the evolution of these districts in each State, it is important to see how they related to other areawide districts that preceded or followed their formation. These other areawide bodies include the following: regional planning commissions established in the 1950's and 1960's by local governments and private groups; metropolitan and non-metropolitan COG's organized since World War II by local elected officials; decentralized State functional units such as the districts established by the State Highway and Welfare Departments; special purpose districts established for single purposes such as transportation or solid waste; and finally, areawide planning districts for particular functions created in response to Federal programs such as those analyzed in Chapter VI.

Chapter VI has shown how the various Federal programs affect the membership and other characteristics of substate district organizations, and how they

contribute to the principal problems encountered in the 12 substate districting case studies, such as overlapping jurisdictions among general and special purpose planning districts; competing policies of overlapping districts; and competition for funding.

The extent of district development appears to be strongly related to the degree of acceptance by local government and State officials. Hence, one of the first considerations in establishing the district systems in the 12 States was to design a set of purposes for them that would not antagonize local governments by encroaching on their prerogatives, nor upset the operations of State agencies. Unless a State is prepared to exert strong central executive or legislative leadership, as a few may be, this accommodation approach is wise.

Another important consideration was the manner in which the district organizations were established for planning and coordinating purposes. Except for Washington State, which initially sought no district organizations, the other 11 States for which case studies were prepared made membership voluntary. However, the States usually provided incentives for joining by making the district organizations A-95 clearinghouses—and, in some cases, clearinghouses for State programs as well—

Table VII-7

Substate Planning and Development Districts:
1972

State and Region	Number Delineated	Number Organized	Percent Organized
United States	488	273	
New England and Mideast			
New England			
Maine	8	0	0
New Hampshire	17	8	47.1
Vermont	14	0	0
Massachusetts	12	12	100
Rhode Island	0	0	0
Connecticut	15	15	100
Mideast			
New York	11	11	100
New Jersey	0	0	0
Pennsylvania	13	2	15.4
Delaware	0	0	0
Maryland	0	0	0
Midwest			
Great Lakes			
Michigan	13	7	53.8
Ohio	0	0	0
Indiana	14	0	0
Illinois	7	0	0
Wisconsin	8	3	37.5
Plains			
Minnesota	11	2	18.2
Iowa	16	0	0
Missouri	20	20	100
North Dakota	8	0	0
South Dakota	6	2	33.3
Nebraska	26	3	11.5
Kansas	11	0	0
South			
Southeast			
Virginia	22	18	81.8
West Virginia	11	2	18.2
Kentucky	15	13	86.7
Tennessee	9	7	77.8
North Carolina	17	17	100
South Carolina	10	10	100
Georgia	18	18	100
Florida	11	0	0
Alabama	12	12	100
Mississippi	10	8	80
Louisiana	8	8	100
Arkansas	8	8	100
Southwest			
Oklahoma	11	11	100
Texas	21	21	100

Table VII-7 (Continued)

Substate Planning and Development Districts:
1972

State and Region	Number Delineated	Number Organized	Percent Organized
New Mexico	6	6	100
Arizona	6	5	83.3
West			
Rocky Mountain			
Montana	0	0	0
Idaho	6	0	0
Wyoming	0	0	0
Colorado	12	0	0
Utah	8	8	100
Far West			
Washington	13	0	0
Oregon	14	13	92.9
Nevada	0	0	0
California	10	3	30
Alaska	0	0	0
Hawaii	0	0	0

Source: Smith, *et al.*, *Status of Multi-County Planning and Development Districts*, (Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 1972).

and by providing financial and technical assistance to them.

SUBSTATE DISTRICT
ORGANIZATIONS AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

The representativeness of substate district organizations can be considered in terms of local government interests, State interests, citizen interests, and Federal interests. The way most of these organizations have been established in the 12 case-study States, their boards of directors are composed primarily of local elected officials. This provides for local government representation and qualifies the organizations for HUD's "701" planning assistance funds. But, for the most part, the membership and/or voting procedures are not based on the one person, one vote principle. As a result, the larger cities in some of the districts are significantly underrepresented.

With respect to State interests, several of the governors in the 12 States studied are providing continuing strong support, but there was little evidence that legislative relationships or involvements with the districts were significant. Thus, the substate organizations are largely divorced from an important source of State political leadership.

The case studies also found that no citizen constituency exists since the majority of the membership of the boards of directors are elected officials whose main functions are to run local units of government, not regional bodies. There was little indication that the general public, including minority groups, was aware of their regional body or the substate district system of which it is a part, although there is some indication that this is more true in the large metropolitan areas than elsewhere. In rural areas, regional bodies tend to be much more visible.

The Federal interest is usually felt strongly through the provisions of grant contracts and the various Federal program guidelines.

Given these rather complex representational conditions, it is difficult for a regional body to consider itself directly reflective of the body politic. The regional body, therefore, may be open to the charge that it is not responsive to the wishes of the citizens of the region. Accordingly, it is not surprising that little evidence was found in the 12 case studies of the emergence either of a regional political leadership or a sense of regional citizenship.

Nevertheless, some citizens do participate in district activities, generally through their local elected officials. Moreover, some States make special provisions for non-elected persons to participate in district policy-

making. Virginia allows a maximum of 49 percent of the planning district commission membership to be from the private sector. Efforts are being made in the Richmond area to broaden the base of the private sector members as much as possible. Seven of South Carolina's ten COG's have minority groups represented on their councils. Each of the COG's in Kentucky is encouraged to have two minority group and low-income members. Georgia law requires district COG's to hold public hearings annually on future planning activities. In 1971, the governor set up a Goals for Georgia Program in which about 5,000 citizens participated all over the State; later, another 700 were polled to check the inputs gained earlier.

The relative lack of broad-based citizen participation in regional affairs might be expected because, for the most part, activities of many of these districts have yet to noticeably effect most citizens. However, this generalization may be more true in the large metropolitan areas than in smaller areas where local leaders outside of government frequently play larger roles in regional affairs. The relative lack of direct impact on individuals by the districts may be a result of the types of programs they are pursuing. Economic development activities in smaller distressed areas may have much more direct impact on people than general development planning in larger areas where many others are doing similar planning. It should also be noted that most of the substate districts have been assigned neither the programs with direct personal impact—like community action and manpower planning—nor the authority to make binding governmental decisions.

COG's AND SUBSTATE DISTRICTS

As noted earlier, most substate district systems were established after a number of metropolitan planning organizations and Federally encouraged regional organizations already existed. In covering the whole State, these systems have frequently combined metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in the same district. In some of these cases the pre-existing organizations (both metropolitan and non-metropolitan) have continued to exist apart from a district-wide organization. This has led to some conflicts among regional organizations, partly based on the inherent differences between urban and rural needs, and partly on the distinctions made by various Federal-aid programs.

Generally speaking, metropolitan planning got an earlier start than either non-metropolitan planning or substate districting, in large part because of the evolving nature of Federal planning assistance programs. Metropolitan planning under HUD's "701" program was authorized in 1954 and opened up to councils of governments in 1965, while it was not authorized for non-metropolitan regions until 1968. The early areawide planning requirements—involving functional programs

like transportation (1962 and 1965), open space (1961), water and sewer facilities (1965)—only applied to metropolitan areas, while major non-metropolitan planning requirements did not appear until enactment of the Commerce Department's economic development program in 1965. Even the Federal-aid review and comment program began first with the metropolitan requirements under Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, and was expanded in 1968 to include non-metropolitan areas. Thus, metropolitan reviews were being performed throughout the Nation by the older metropolitan planning organizations for one year before HUD planning funds became available for non-metropolitan planning, and two years prior to the nationwide Federal planning incentive of OMB Circular A-95. As a matter of fact, in 1967 when the Section 204 metropolitan review procedures first took effect, only six States had designated their substate regions (see Table VII-3).

The metropolitan areas, of course, are urban oriented, and generally follow SMSA boundaries, while the multi-county substate districts divide the whole State into a manageable number of regions, many of which include metropolitan as well as non-metropolitan territory. Even though large multicounty metropolitan areas may qualify as complete substate districts, the smaller ones—especially the single county SMSA's of which there are over 100—do not. Moreover, HUD does not fund a single planning organization with a single grant for both metropolitan and non-metropolitan planning.

Since the A-95 program grandfathered in the metropolitan review organizations established under the Section 204 program, there are still cases in which metropolitan COG's and the larger substate district organizations encompassing them both have A-95 jurisdiction. This is the case in some interstate areas as well, because of reliance on substate districts which usually stop at the State line.

In five of the 12 case study States—Michigan, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington—existing metropolitan COG's were incorporated into substate districts and either lost their identities or had their boundaries expanded to become the substate district.

In three other case study States—Arkansas, Kentucky, and Wisconsin—substate districts were superimposed over some metropolitan COG's, which continued to operate separately. The competition and conflicts which resulted between regional and metropolitan planners produced opposing arguments concerning the future existence of metropolitan COG's.

The arguments made for eliminating metropolitan COG's were that (1) metropolitan COG's are not sufficiently regionally oriented; (2) local governments should not be required to have their Federal program applications reviewed at both the metropolitan and regional levels; and (3) HUD will not provide "701" funds for two planning organizations in the same area

and the logical recipient is the substate district rather than the metropolitan COG which usually receives these funds. In Kentucky, after a study was made of this problem, the recommendation was to combine the existing COG with its surrounding substate district.

Arguments which were offered for retaining the metropolitan COG's were that (1) they can give emphasis to the metropolitan area where the major problems are located; and (2) they are more competent planning agencies because they have been in operation longer, are better funded, and are able to concentrate on planning rather than on providing technical assistance, which is the major task of non-metropolitan planning agencies.

The dimensions of conflict in metropolitan COG and substate district relationships are defined to some extent by the degrees of urban and rural representation on the governing boards. If a substate district contains both metropolitan areas and rural counties, the arguments against a metropolitan COG will increase in proportion to the number of rural members on the district's governing body. If the district covers a predominantly urban area, metropolitan COG's will probably continue as recognized substate districts because they are already adequately representative. In some States, efforts are being made either to absorb the metropolitan COG's into substate districts or at least to make them subordinate to the district. In Florida, this problem is being dealt with simply by making each SMSA, even single county ones, a separate substate district.

With respect to relationships between metropolitan COG's and substate districts in interstate metropolitan areas, the case studies showed that 11 of the 12 States studied have interstate COG's, and one, Texas, has an international COG. Operations of interstate COG's have become increasingly complicated by the establishment of substate districts. While a few States piggybacked their districts onto interstate COG's, most of them retained the interstate COG's as separate entities, thereby creating a problem of overlapping jurisdiction for the A-95 process and for other coordinative and planning activities. Several of the interstate COG's have made *ad hoc* or informal arrangements with substate districts to avoid duplication of A-95 reviews. Yet apparently because of unresolved political questions, some COG's have not been able to set up any *ad hoc* or informal arrangements for integrating A-95 review or for areawide planning.

FINANCING AND STAFFING

Most district planning bodies receive the bulk of their funds from Federal planning grants. About two-thirds of a typical district's budget is drawn from these sources, with the remainder from State and local sources. However, the trend is toward a faster yearly increase in amounts derived from State and local sources. Twenty States provide regular support money for general pur-

poses, and some States provide grant programs or supplements to Federal grants for which the substate districts may apply.¹⁶ However, the general support funds appropriated by the States total only \$7,721,000 and some of the States provide only token funds. One large State, for example, appropriated only \$30,000 for the whole State for this purpose.

It is difficult to determine the costs of the various functions performed by districts, because of the overlapping nature of these functions, but it appears that planning activities and technical assistance are the primary expenses, with clearinghouse functions accounting for most of the balance.

The case studies noted a predominance of physical planners on many district staffs. This results partly from the fact that Federal programs have stressed this kind of planning much longer and more consistently than others at the regional level, and partly from the fact that until very recently, formal education for planners has been largely dominated by the land-use planning tradition. The other principal type of talent is in the economic development area. However, Federal programs have now expanded beyond the physical and economic development fields into such fields as equal opportunities, manpower, health and criminal justice planning, causing regional bodies to move toward building the larger, more versatile staffs needed for more nearly comprehensive planning and coordination.

ASSIGNING FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The functions and responsibilities of substate district organizations are difficult to describe definitively, because such organizations are frequently established pursuant to (or operate within the framework of) a variety of interlocal cooperation and regional planning acts, and non-profit corporation laws, in addition to their substate district authorizations. Considering only the substate district authorization for the moment, Table VII-8 shows that responsibility for the planning function has been specifically provided in most cases (33 of the 40 States which have substate district systems). This is the only function that is pervasively authorized by the districting movement itself. The provision of basic data services and the performance of A-95 reviews are functions specifically granted in this way by only about one-quarter of the districted States. Fewer than one-quarter of these States authorize their district systems to undertake the functions of coordination, review of non-Federal projects, physical and economic development, and technical assistance. Thus, the statewide districting efforts have been more notable for standardizing regional district geography and designating district organizations than for expanding the functional responsibilities of these organizations.

The primary functions of substate districts—viewed

from a national perspective—are to plan, to provide operational programs and services, to perform A-95 reviews, and to coordinate Federal programs at the regional level. These are each described briefly below.

Planning Activity. All substate district organizations within the purview of the 12 State case studies appeared to be involved in some sort of planning activity, although planning *per se* was only a small part of their total activities. Most of the planning that they were doing was of the regional and functional type; as yet, few, if any, have produced truly comprehensive plans in the sense of providing adequate regional policies broad enough in scope to provide a sound basis for all of their A-95 reviews.

Much of the planning, of course, initially derived from the Federal funds provided by the Housing Act of 1954. The language of that Act concerning comprehensive planning has been used and refined somewhat in the intervening years. Essentially, comprehensive planning (as defined by the 1954 legislation and modified by the Housing Acts of 1959 and 1968) refers to the needs of a particular area, *e.g.*, a single unit of general purpose local government or multi-jurisdictional areas up to and including one or more States. This type of planning involves the preparation of general plans to serve as a guide for governmental policies and actions. Such plans include those relating to the pattern and intensity of land use, provision of public facilities—including transportation and other government services, as well as effective development and use of human and natural resources. Additionally, long-range physical and fiscal plans are to be prepared for realizing the objectives of these plans. Priorities are also to be established with regard to capital improvements, and functional plans are to nest within the comprehensive plan, indicating financial responsibilities for planned activities in the earlier years of a systematic program, and coordinating related plans and activities of the States, concerned Federal agencies, and local governments. The final aspect of this planning is the preparation of regulatory and administrative measures required to implement and support all of its other aspects.

It should be noted that this definition of comprehensive planning still tends somewhat to stress the physical as opposed to the social dimensions of planning, and it is not equally applied in all Federal areawide programs (see Chapter VI). It may also apply somewhat differently in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, depending upon program priorities and organizational responsibilities and capabilities.

The most extensive regional planning activity in the 12 States studied is taking place in the older bodies formed in urban areas some time before substate districts were systematically established. These older bodies had access to Federal planning assistance in a variety of program areas—including airports, sewage

Table VII-8

Functions of Districts

United States Total	Physical & Economic Development	Basic Data Services	Planning	A-95 Clearing- house	Review of Non-Federal Projects	Coordination	Technical Assistance
7	11	33	9	4	4	5	
Region							
Northeast	1	1	5	0	0	0	
South	5	4	13	6	3	4	
North Central	1	5	9	1	1	1	
West	0	1	6	2	0	0	

Source: Executive orders and legislation establishing substate district systems.

systems, highways and other transportation, recreation and open space facilities, and hospitals. Now, however, many districts are giving greater attention to providing services to local governments such as technical assistance in preparing Federal and State program applications. The A-95 clearinghouse functions of some districts are largely perfunctory because of their lack of adequate regional or areawide comprehensive planning at the present time.

The significance or value of any planning activity must be qualified by the separation of planning from operational responsibility. As a general rule the planning bodies studied depend on their constituent local governments to implement their plans. In the 12 States studied, even those districts which possess both planning and operational authority are limited in their fields of operation by legal or political constraints.

There are no legal restrictions on the type of planning that can be done at the substate level in the 12 States, with the occasional exception of environmental protection planning. Most of the planning undertaken seems to be physical and economic planning. Social planning is done to a lesser degree. The emphasis on physical and economic planning may be partly an attempt to plan in rather neutral areas and avoid the more controversial social matters, and partly an outcome of the newness and unfamiliarity of social programs at the regional level where Federal planning requirements are not so definite. Avoiding potentially controversial matters is initially, perhaps, a wise course so the district planning body can establish itself with a favorable image. However, a combination of local and outside forces are moving toward greater involvement of district planning bodies in social planning. The strongest force is the Federal government, although nationally recognized organizations such as those put together by public interest groups cannot be ignored.

Another factor which could have an effect on the future of substate planning bodies is the advent of national and statewide growth policies. While very little definite action has been taken on this front so far, some States are beginning to question unrestrained growth, and a national debate has begun on such subjects as reduced population growth and the proper balance between urban and rural growth.¹⁷ Any attempts to achieve either zero or near-zero growth, or to redistribute growth to a major extent between urban and rural areas, might require greater centralization of planning and policy-making at the State level, and even at the National level, while normal growth could more probably be dealt with adequately on a decentralized—district by district—basis.

Operational Responsibilities. Most substate district organizations in the 12 States studied have not assumed operational responsibilities; however, there are several exceptions. The LENOWISCO district in Virginia possesses specific operational authority for solid waste manage-

ment, small stream maintenance, and flood control, but its authority is based on special, emergency State legislation. In Arkansas, the substate district in the Little Rock area, called Metroplan, has undertaken operation of a bus system. Metroplan's authority for operational activities is derived from an interlocal cooperation act, common to most States, together with a not-for-profit corporation act. One COG in Michigan is operating a transportation system indirectly through a holding company arrangement, a device authorized by State law, and another COG operates a police training academy. The Heart of Georgia APDC is managing a cooperative organized to finance a horticultural business run by poor people to market the flowers they raise. Authority for this activity is based on a State law allowing holding company arrangements within APDC's.

In Texas, the Capital Area Planning Commission is operating a subregional family planning program, and several other regional councils are acting as fiscal agents for Youth Service Bureaus. An experiment is currently being conducted in Utah to determine the feasibility of decentralizing operations of the Utah Department of Social Services. The assumption made in the experiment is that reorganization of the department on a regional basis would facilitate planning and health services delivery. The substate district organizations in Oregon, Kentucky, and Texas were designated to allocate Emergency Employment Act funds. In Appalachia, some of the substate districts also provide regional education services, child development centers, regional crime laboratories, and police training centers.

Thus, it has been demonstrated that substate districts can assume some areawide operating responsibilities, even though most have not been given the opportunity to do so thus far. Reasons for not using the districts this way may stem from the fact that present problems are not severe enough to create a demand for a new approach. In the absence of a clearly defined crisis that could mobilize public support for change, public officials have usually remained reluctant to make an issue of such a potentially controversial question as shifting local responsibilities, and perhaps power, to substate regions.

Overall, there has been relatively little amassing of governmental authority at the substate level. The power possessed by the regional bodies is derived primarily from review and comment functions pursuant to OMB Circular A-95. In Arkansas, Georgia, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia the review and comment authority also includes applications for State programs, giving their districts, at least on paper, some power with regard to State agencies. Wisconsin's RPC's have a measure of power by being relatively independent financially from State and local government. The bulk of their non-Federal budget comes from a few mills on property taxes that are collected and transferred to them by their respective local governments. This method of financing is also used in Minnesota.

The A-95 Process. In many cases, metropolitan clearinghouses that had been set up pursuant to the 1966 Act were integrated into the substate framework of regional clearinghouses created after the passage of the 1968 Act. No Federal funds are provided for performing the A-95 function as such; consequently, costs must be defrayed by funds from other Federal planning grants and from State and local sources.

While compliance with the requirements of the Part I, A-95 project notification and review system (PNRS) has been emphasized strongly from the Federal level on down, considerably less emphasis has been placed on compliance with Part IV of OMB Circular A-95. This part requires Federal agencies to coordinate their area-wide programs through substate district systems in order to avoid overlap, duplication, and competition in State and local planning activities. Despite written complaints to OMB from several governors in the 12 States studied, Federal programs, such as manpower, health, and community action, still are to be planned and executed largely independently of the substate district systems.¹⁸

Approaches to the use of A-95 procedures by the 12 States seemed to fall into two general categories regarding the degree of control exercised by the State government. Two States, Utah and Wisconsin, appear to exercise a greater degree of control than do the other ten. A most significant aspect of the A-95 process in Utah is that State law requires State agencies to procure the governor's approval prior to submitting their Federal grant applications, and the governor has chosen to consider the comments from substate districts before making his decisions. While a number of other States require such prior approval by the governor,¹⁹ it appears unusual for the district comments to receive such formal attention by the governor. In Wisconsin, the State clearinghouse is relatively isolated from local pressures. While most of the 12 States studied designated a single planning office to be concerned with both local and State government interrelationships, Wisconsin's State clearinghouse is located in the Bureau of Planning and Budget, which is in a different department from the Bureau of Local and Regional Planning. This arrangement has been criticized for separating related planning activities, perhaps making it more difficult to obtain coordinated A-95 reviews.

While the procedures in both Utah and Wisconsin increase the exposure of the applications to negative comments, this in turn may give the State a greater degree of explicit control over what its agencies and local governments do, thus potentially increasing State authority. In cases such as these, a local government may base its application more on perceptions of what will receive a favorable review from the areawide and State clearinghouses, rather than on its own needs alone. Furthermore, even though the likelihood of a negative review is remote, some local governments may decide not to submit an application solely because of its poor

chance of being reviewed favorably.

By utilizing A-95, many governors can exercise a somewhat greater degree of control over the activities of State agencies, because of their added ability under State law to veto certain applications. At the substate level, the A-95 process provides the regional organizations with less power because it is strictly advisory and because many such organizations lack adequate planning and are unwilling to make negative reviews. The possible increase in power at the regional level, when State agencies coordinate their plans with the substate districts, may be an important effect of A-95. However, the main significance of A-95 at the present time is that it requires the presence of the districts; the removal of A-95 could mean the end of some of them, and would be a significant loss to most.

As mentioned above, the bulk of the States studied do not exercise any great degree of control over local applications. The State clearinghouses are designated primarily to coordinate, review, and comment on State agency applications; regional clearinghouses perform the same function for their constituent members, with little authority exercised by the State clearinghouse over local applications.

Despite the differences in approach, and the fact that the requirements of OMB Circular A-95 are not being adhered to rigidly, the A-95 process is regarded favorably in most quarters. However, the workload that the A-95 process creates is a cause for complaint in the States of Virginia and Washington. In Virginia, a few clearinghouse staffs have grown to a point where they severely strain the financial resources of the substate districts. In Washington State, representational difficulties have arisen from the fact that individual counties, rather than areawide agencies, have been assigned to perform the clearinghouse role for multicounty regions in some cases. Some confusion over who should exercise A-95 authority has arisen where metropolitan COG's and substate districts have overlapping boundaries such as in Arkansas, Kentucky, and Wisconsin; in some cases an application must receive two regional reviews. South Carolina's areawide review process is unusual in that it allows State legislative delegations to comment on applications.

The general view of A-95 in the 12 States studied is that it is a useful device for receiving and transmitting information about what State and local governments are doing. Complaints, as mentioned above, were concerned primarily with the workload and not with the utility of the process. In Kentucky, the general view was that A-95 review should be expanded to include review of all Federal and State programs.

Coordinative Arrangements. Relationships between Federally sponsored programs and substate district organizations follow one of three models. In the first model, the substate Federal program agency and the district Federally sponsored districts most usually found as an

communication and coordination. In the second model, substate Federal program agencies (as well as regional single purpose, non-Federal agencies) are separate from the district organization, but the district organization assumes a dominant position and reviews the budget and planning actions of these agencies. In this model there may be additional, unofficial ties between the two bodies by virtue of overlapping board members or shared staff personnel. The third model is one where the district organization assumes the total responsibility for the organization, financing, and operation of the Federal areawide programs. Any given region may exhibit elements of all three models. In cases where the substate district organizations have the A-95 function (a common occurrence), there is a tendency to move from the first model to the second. In addition, as shown in Chapter VI, 10 major Federal programs operate at the substate district level through the district organizations in about 17 percent of the cases, and the percentage of cases is much higher in several programs—HUD planning assistance, A-95, economic development planning, Appalachian local development district assistance, and urban transportation planning.

Generalizations about coordinative relationships at the substate level in the 12 States studied tend to confirm the statistics in Chapter VI. Economic development districts and local development districts were the Federally sponsored districts most usually found as an integral part of substate district organizations on the order of model three. No clear pattern emerged in the areas of comprehensive health planning and CAMPS where coordinative arrangements were represented nearly equally under all three models. Law enforcement assistance programs were found in significant numbers both separate from and as a part of the substate district organizations as described by models one and three. The Federally sponsored program having the fewest coordinative relationships with district organizations was community action. Information regarding resource conservation and development districts and air quality control districts was too limited to provide a basis for generalization.

Where Federally sponsored special purpose programs were functioning as part of a multi-functional regional planning council in the 12 States, the staffs cited both advantages and disadvantages to the arrangement. The general advantages are obvious; there are economies in administrative overhead, greater interdisciplinary contacts, more opportunities for cross-functional coordination, and fewer separate regional organizations to deal with. But it is instructive to examine one example in some depth to illustrate what were felt to be disadvantages as well as advantages.

In the case of areawide comprehensive health planning (CHP), staff members considered it advantageous to coordinate the health planning with comprehensive planning in the social, economic, and environmental

areas. Close ties to regional planning councils facilitate such coordination and provide a data base that is often helpful to health planners. Moreover, the review and comment responsibilities of the CHP program in health-related matters can be assisted by the broader interests pertaining to such matters as water and sewer facilities, transportation, and land development, which are dealt with by the regional planning councils. In addition, the integration of areawide health planning with other forms of regional comprehensive planning was seen as enhancing the store of coordinated information available to public officials and interested citizens.

Nevertheless, while some health planners thought that close ties between COG's and CHP's might increase the possibility of implementing plans because of the direct access to government, others disagreed. They based their disagreement on the suspicion that broad public policy considerations might lead elected officials on the COG to hinder health planning. The illustration they gave involved abortion reform. Health planners, perceiving the issue as primarily a health matter, proposed reform of the abortion laws in their State. In reviewing the proposal, the elected officials on the COG tended to regard it as a potentially controversial moral and ethical issue, sensing that endorsing abortion reform would be a matter of some political risk. Thus, they argued, CHP programs based in COG-type structures may be more subject to policy constraints, where the issues under consideration are politically sensitive, than they would be if based in an independent CHP organization. However, it should be noted here that CHP's, whether within a COG or an independent organization, are only advisory. Thus, if their advice is to have an impact on public policy it must ultimately deal with the broader public policy issues in some manner.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUBSTATE DISTRICTS

The hopes held out for substate districting systems by the Federal programs which have encouraged them were that they would make sense out of the geographical and organizational overlapping created by other Federal programs, and that they would provide a consistent regional planning base all across the Nation for coordinating Federal aid and direct Federal projects. To this, the governors added the hope that substate districts would help them to make administrative sense out of State planning, budgeting and service delivery. Local governments hoped to increase the Federal aid they would get and obtain a larger voice in State and Federal decisions affecting them.

It has already been demonstrated above that regional fragmentation still exists—in both the geographical and organizational senses—and that the substate districts have, thus far, achieved relatively little strength. Information has also been cited to the effect that many of the

State governments themselves have made scant use of the substate districts for their own purposes, and that regional planning and coordination are far from adequate. To lend greater weight to these conclusions, several of the major findings from the case studies of 12 substate districting systems are summarized below.

Regional Planning

The regional bodies studies in the 12 States were, with few exceptions, essentially limited purpose physical and/or economic planning organizations. They were the policymaking, planning, and development commissions or councils of governments based in substate districts. Most of them were doing little or no social planning. Few of them had an integrated regional plan, even in the physical or economic sense. Such social planning as was being done on a regional basis was usually being carried out by separate special purpose planning agencies (in fields such as health, manpower, and community action), and was not integrated by the regional body into a comprehensive plan. In short, there was no genuinely comprehensive planning broad enough in scope to serve as an adequate basis for the full scope of A-95 reviews, but there was some movement toward it. A similar lack of comprehensive State planning is found at the present time. To be fully effective, regional planning should be related to, supportive of, and supported by both local and State planning. Hence the present lack of fully developed comprehensive State planning processes limits the scope and usefulness of regional planning.

The governments concerned—national, State, and local—have not shown sufficient interest in comprehensive planning at any level (local, regional, State, interstate, or national) to provide the leadership and money required to nurture it to full strength. Other factors limiting the scope of regional planning were the immediate priorities, interests, and funding conditions of powerful program agencies, and the bias toward physical planning in the training of most planners. These factors have led regional planning staffs to shy away from the social component of comprehensive planning. Moreover, local governments, especially the smaller ones, are most interested in obtaining technical assistance from the regional planning body for local planning projects and assistance in obtaining Federal and State grants. This service is necessary and desirable, but it occupies a substantial part of the time of the modest staff of many regional bodies (especially those in non-metropolitan areas), and reduces their ability to work on comprehensive regional plans.

Regional Coordination

The purpose of comprehensive planning is to inject information and method into the process of policy and program development. This helps to assure the rational

determination of priorities and relationships among programs, and the coordination of activities conducted by different agencies in order to serve the broad purposes of government. This connection between comprehensive planning and coordination at a strategic or convenient substate district level is a major reason for the development of substate regionalism.

Yet the 12 case studies indicate that coordination by regional bodies is only a modest improvement over the situation that existed before these bodies were formed. Of course, many such bodies are still young, but this situation is also partly a result of the inadequacies, up to now, of the States and regions in fully developing their comprehensive planning programs, as well as the fact that the State and Federal governments have not coordinated their assignment of programs and decision-making authority to the substate districts. The proliferation of special purpose organizations, many of which provide planning which is divorced from implementation, is still a problem. In most cases, substate district bodies either have not been authorized to perform significant areawide services or have been reluctant to undertake such services, often allowing establishment of separate agencies for the purpose.

The A-95 review process has given the regional bodies some coordinative role, mainly through exchanges of information on certain Federal and Federally assisted projects, and in some cases the States have included their own projects as well. This review process is not yet functioning fully, however, for a variety of reasons. These reasons include the lack of State or regional plans (or goals, objectives, and priorities) on which to base reviews, inadequate staff resources, and preoccupation with helping local governments get more Federal and State money rather than with fitting individual projects into an overall strategy for regional betterment.

State Use of Substate Districts

The 12 case studies produced evidence that State planning, budgeting, and functional agencies were seldom using the regional bodies in planning State programs or budgets. Indeed, information assembled at the regional level was not really seen as a significant resource for State policy and program development. While State agencies were beginning to use the substate districts as areas for their own planning purposes, few were using the districts for the administration of State programs.

Federally Funded Areawide Bodies

Where a regional body in a substate district existed before a Federal areawide program was developed, the possibility that the responsibility for Federal program planning would fall to the regional body seems to have been greater, in the 12 States observed, than where the

Federal program came first. However, some regional bodies which were primarily concerned with physical planning resisted the addition of non-land-use related programs.

Where separate Federally funded planning organizations were established, there was little indication of coordination between the official substate regional bodies and the separate functional planning organizations. While boundaries of Federally funded planning activities, such as comprehensive health and law enforcement planning, generally conformed to the substate districts or combinations of districts, this was seldom true with respect to the community action agencies and the manpower planning programs. This lack of consistency has impeded the coordination of solutions to problems which encompass issues beyond the scope of physical and economic development; thus representing one of the principal failures of the substate district movement towards comprehensive planning and effective coordination.

Views on Substate Districting

The views of local officials regarding substate districts in the 12 States studied related primarily to the organizations' abilities to acquire Federal and State programs and grants for constituent governments. In all of these States the amount of praise for a regional body seemed to be directly proportional to the amount of money it had brought in.

Other official views were limited. In Georgia, one person commented that the current structure, although weak, was something to build on. In New York State, the district system was viewed generally with favor because it appeared to be neutral and uncontroversial. In Utah, it was felt that the district system had helped to show local governments that they can work together. A civic leader in Washington deemed the district system in that State doomed from the start because it lacked local involvement, legislative backing, and executive follow-through. A minority group leader in Georgia, however, saw districts as another opportunity through which to influence the system.

CONCLUSION: FINDING AND ISSUES

The foregoing evaluation of substate districts has identified a number of findings regarding State institution building at the substate regional level, and raised a number of issues concerning how these institutions could be made more effective.

Summary of Findings

The establishment of substate districts has benefited all levels of government. Through them, local govern-

ments have received technical assistance and planning services needed in securing State and Federal grants, and have been able to exercise somewhat greater control over State and Federal activities within their areas. At the State level the governors have gained an increased measure of control over State activities through the A-95 procedures and the common framework for action provided by the substate district system. With the A-95 process and a variety of planning grants, the Federal government is gradually increasing the ability of regional organizations to coordinate the use of Federal dollars spent at the local level. The increasing coordinative linkages between all levels of government are broadening State and local governments' perspectives.

Nevertheless, there is a wide gap between the rhetoric of regional planning, substate districting, decentralization, and coordination, and the incomplete system of substate regionalism that has developed to date from diverse initiatives with different motives emerging from a variety of national, State, and local sources. Of course, these systems are quite new—mostly developed since 1967—so allowance should be made for some deficiencies at this stage.

As background for considering the issues, the major findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows.

1. *A large share of the nation is now covered by statewide substate district systems.* Forty States have acted officially to accomplish this, and four others have taken tentative action.

2. *Although 488 substate districts have been delineated, only 273 (less than 60 percent) of them are organized and in operation.* Thus, even in those States which have established statewide systems of regional boundaries, many areas are still without the actual mechanism for regional planning and coordination. Only 14 States have organized all of their districts. Nevertheless, considering the newness of many of the delineations, and the progress that has been made on this front in the last few years, it is reasonable to expect that many more districts will be organized in the near future.

3. *While the 273 organized substate districts are performing needed planning, coordination, technical assistance, and— in a few cases—operational functions, they are not yet providing full coordination of Federal, State, and local activities.* Most of these districts co-exist with a variety of other regional organizations in the same area, and do not have planning programs broad enough to encompass the full scope of A-95 reviews. Many of the other organizations have Federally funded planning programs and authority in specific functional fields—such as resource conservation and development, manpower, health, and community action—while the substate districts' planning programs are primarily limited to physical and economic development. On the average, throughout the Nation the substate district organizations have been made responsible for only about one-half of the Federal areawide programs for which the areas are

coincident with the State delineated district boundaries. Thus, none of them has been able, yet, to produce truly comprehensive plans. Those which have come closest usually have been the older, better financed ones in metropolitan areas. Federally encouraged special districts of the single function type, which existed prior to the formation of the multiple purpose substate districts, have seldom melded into the new districts. While some, like comprehensive health planning and criminal justice planning, have tended to conform to the new boundaries, the community action and manpower planning programs have not yet taken this limited step.

4. *The staffs of substate district organizations are skewed by the fragmentation of functions among the various other organizations within the district.*

5. *The State governments have not yet made full use of their substate districts.* While the governors strongly support substate districts in a number of States, there are few political ties between the districts and the legislatures, and the State administrative areas of various departments in many cases have not yet conformed to the new district system. Plans to involve substate districts in State planning and State policy development are still to be realized for the most part.

6. *In some cases, there are still unresolved conflicts between metropolitan areas and the larger substate districts which encompass them.* The melding of divergent urban and rural interests have not always been smooth, and the policies of several Federal programs have contributed to the separation of metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Urban areas tend to be under-represented in large rural districts because they use a representational formula based on local governmental units rather than the one man, one vote principle. However, use of one man, one vote in large urban/rural districts could lead to inadequate emphasis on rural needs.

7. *Special provisions to assure an areawide approach in interstate areas are often missing or inadequate.* Substate districting, with its focus on the State, does not usually overcome the splitting of interstate areas and has sometimes contributed to the problem through "subregionalization."

8. *Substate districts are not recognized by the general public as vital links in the Federal system, and they have little life of their own apart from participating local governments.* They are largely controlled by boards of local elected officials and by the Federal grant administrators who play such a large role in funding them. Relatively little influence over the continuing activities of the districts is exerted by the States, the general

public, minority groups, and the various special interests, except as they act through the local elected officials. Most substate district organizations have not been given the status of political subdivisions of the States, and do not possess authoritative governmental decision-making or operating powers.

The overall conclusion is that there is a significant movement toward statewide systems of multipurpose substate districts for planning and coordination of national, State, and local programs on a regional basis. But this movement is not yet fully developed, even in the vanguard States, several of which were included in the 12 case studies. There is still a gulf between the objectives of substate districting—as articulated in pronouncements from executive offices in Washington and the State capitals—and the performance of the districts. This movement could grow in strength and become an important instrument for making partnership federalism work, if both national and State governments are steadfast in providing leadership—offering financial support and, when necessary, asserting authority to achieve the stated objectives.

Issues

These basic conclusions raise several issues. The fact of substate districting is not in question. What is at issue is whether these statewide systems of districts will live up to their initial promise, and how they can be helped to do so.

— Can and should the Federal government provide additional incentives for the States to complete their substate district systems? Would consolidation of Federal planning grants and special Federal attention to funding the whole system, rather than individual districts, be an appropriate means of doing this?

— Should the States uniformly mandate the creation of comprehensive planning bodies composed of representatives of local jurisdictions covering the whole territory of each substate district, or allow local options as to whether or not individual jurisdictions will join? Should the States require local governments to support these regional bodies financially? Should the States uniformly provide financial support to these bodies?

— Should the States require the piggybacking of all Federal areawide programs on their comprehensive substate district organizations?

— Can and should the Federal government do more, through OMB and the Federal Regional Councils, to piggyback a larger proportion of Federal areawide programs on the substate district organizations? Would this help to diversify and

strengthen the staffs of the substate organizations for their comprehensive planning, A-95 review, and coordinative tasks?

– Should the States uniformly give their substate district organizations A-95 type of review authority over State and local projects, including the projects of special districts and authorities?

– Should substate district organizations be given major new responsibilities such as project veto authority or block grant allocation roles, and should they be assigned operation functions by State and Federal action?

– Should State legislation creating substate district systems provide for sub-districting in the case of metropolitan/non-metropolitan divisions within the larger districts? What should Federal policy be with respect to this issue?

– Should State legislation creating substate district systems provide for single interstate planning organizations, at least in the pertinent metropolitan areas? Should the Federal government have a consistent policy with respect to this problem, which would be applicable to all of its areawide programs? Could the Federal government play a positive role, perhaps through OMB or the Federal Regional Councils, in getting the States together to establish interstate regional districts?

– Should the States themselves make greater use

of their substate (and interstate) districts? If so, how and for what purposes? Should the States develop statewide plans as a framework for substate district planning? Should the substate district organizations be represented officially in State planning and executive decision-making processes? If so, how?

– How should local government and private interests be involved and represented in the substate districts to maximize the districts' significance in local affairs, and to strengthen them in their dealings with the State and Federal governments?

It is clear that the substate districting movement has made considerable progress in the last few years. What is at issue now, in most basic terms, is whether these systems of districts are to be further developed, and the extent to which they are to become the backbone of the whole move toward regionalization at the substate level. This involves the primary relationships among the Federal, State, and local governments. If the Federal government continues simultaneously to strive toward areawide adequacy and increased reliance on the State and local governments for the delivery of major programs of Federal assistance, and if the State and local governments continue to take this challenge seriously, the substate district systems appear to have the potential to become effective coordinating instruments. On the other hand, if these systems are left unattended at their present stage of development, their full potential is not likely to be realized.

Footnotes

¹Smith, Abel, Ben-Rubin, Cheplo and Peak, *Status of Multi-County Planning and Development Districts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, August, 1972).

²Of course, a variety of special purpose State administrative districts (established by individual State departments) usually pre-dated the general purpose substate district systems being described in this chapter.

³Letter from Eugene P. Foley, Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, dated January 14, 1966.

⁴Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Intergovernmental Relations in the Poverty Program* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April, 1966), p. 169.

⁵"Memorandum from the President Requesting Coordination for Development Planning at the Federal Level," September 2, 1966.

⁶Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Coordination of Development Planning for Programs Based on Multijurisdictional Areas," Circular No. A-80, p. 2.

⁷U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Coordination of Development Planning for Programs Based on

Multi-Jurisdictional Areas," *Planning Agency Letter No. 62, Urban Planning Assistance Program* (Washington, D.C., February 1, 1968), p. 1.

⁸This recitation of gubernatorial authority assumes a "strong governor" form of government which does not exist in all States.

⁹The Southwest Center for Urban Research, *Substate Districting Systems in Twelve States* (Houston, Texas: The Center, November 30, 1972). The 12 States included in this study were Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

¹⁰National Legislative Conference, Intergovernmental Relations Committee, *Policy Positions and Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: The Conference, 1972), p. 19.

¹¹Southwest Center for Urban Research, *Substate Districting Systems in Twelve States*.

¹²*Report of the Governor's Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Virginia Area Development Act* (Richmond: The Committee, December 21, 1972), pp. 14-15.

¹³Southwest Center for Urban Research, *Substate Districting Systems in Twelve States*.

¹⁴U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, *Creative Federalism Hearings, Part 1*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), following p. 352.

¹⁵Because of the small size of this State, the State Planning

Department has decided that all of its regional planning should be conducted for the State as a whole.

¹⁶National Association of Regional Councils, "Summary of State Financial Assistance to Regional Councils" (Washington, D.C.: NARC, September 1972).

¹⁷The Commission on Population and the American Future, *Population and the American Future* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972). Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Urban and Rural America: Policies for*

Future Growth (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968). The President, *Report on National Growth: 1972* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).


¹⁸Southwest Center for Urban Research, *Substate Districting Systems in Twelve States*.

¹⁹Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, I* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 215.

CHAPTER VIII

DISTRICTING IN

NON-METROPOLITAN AREAS



In 1970, about half of the population of the United States lived within 50 miles of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Great Lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico¹—the majority of them in densely settled metropolitan areas. Census Bureau figures show that approximately 70 percent of the American people live within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's), which cover less than 5 percent of the Nation's total land area.

Yet talking about the urban majority without taking rural America into account does not give the full picture. The 1970 Census reported some 63.8 million people living outside of SMSA's, approximately 30 percent of the total U.S. population. These non-metropolitan areas face a variety of problems and opportunities—some different than those faced in metropolitan America, some similar but less severe or more severe, and some which vary greatly even among the different types of areas outside the SMSA's.

Non-metropolitan areas hold nearly half of those citizens falling below the poverty level, and they account for less than one-quarter of the total personal income. They possess about one-third of the total housing units in the country, but nearly two-thirds of the housing that lacks complete plumbing. These same areas also contain 85 percent of the nation's county governments, 80 percent of the townships, 70 percent of the municipalities, 67 percent of all local special districts, and 45 percent of the substate districts described in this report. Moreover, non-metropolitan areas encompass most of the Nation's natural resources, agriculture, outdoor recreation, and unharried small-town and rural-living opportunities.

This chapter briefly examines the characteristics of the Nation's non-metropolitan areas and of substate regions in those areas. It focuses primarily on those features which distinguish the non-metropolitan situation from the metropolitan. Emphasis is given to (1) differences between the non-metropolitan and metropolitan settings (economic, demographic, and governmental); (2) differences in how and why substate districting occurred in non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas; and (3) differences in the roles of non-metropolitan and metropolitan substate regions.

The term "nonmetropolitan" is used here as a general adjective to describe areas that do not include a city of 50,000 or greater population, are not adjacent to large urban areas, and are not under the dominant influence of urban areas (i.e., are not subject to strong urban market forces and commuting trends). Unless otherwise indicated the statistics used in this chapter represent an SMSA/non-SMSA breakdown.

While metropolitan areas exhibit obvious regional characteristics—with contiguous populations living closely together in an urban setting and their local governments deeply involved in caring for everyday needs of commuting citizens—non-metropolitan areas are not so obviously of one piece. Whereas local governments in

metropolitan areas are frequently so busy that they get in each other's way and need to be coordinated in an areawide fashion, local governments in non-metropolitan areas have tended to be much less active and less likely to be in contact or conflict with each other. In the non-metropolitan areas, coordination of what is already happening is not as great a concern as banding together to initiate new or better services and facilities by pooling scarce resources. Thus, the brand of regionalism is different in non-metropolitan areas, but it is just as important.

All parts of the country include non-metropolitan areas. Two States, Wyoming and Vermont, have no SMSA's at all, and nearly all of Alaska is non-metropolitan. There are also large non-metropolitan areas in many other States, especially in the South and the West North Central and Mountain State regions.

Statements in this chapter about non-metropolitan areas will be generalizations based on aggregate data for the most part, and they will not describe all the variations among these areas. At the same time, attempts will be made to give a broad description of the basic non-metropolitan trends and features and more specific descriptions of substate regionalism in these areas.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

In a very real sense, non-metropolitan areas are comparatively less affluent than metropolitan areas. As a result, non-metropolitan government officials and private citizens are frequently concerned, first and foremost, with economic development. In non-metropolitan areas per capita income is lower; educational levels are lower; the proportion of poverty-level residents is higher; the percentage of poor quality housing is higher; and unemployment is higher. These non-metropolitan characteristics are compared with the comparable metropolitan data in Tables VIII-1, 2, and 3.

The revolution in agriculture and related industries and the great rural-to-urban migrations have been described and explained by many analysts, historians, politicians, and commentators.² And although these trends have played themselves out considerably in the last few years, their far-reaching effects will be felt in both non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas for some time to come. The forces that caused such changes, then, should be briefly probed.

Advancing technologies have effected an enormous decline in employment in the "natural resource" industries, such as farming, mining, and forestry. These industries were traditionally and almost necessarily located in non-metropolitan areas, and many localities depended on them almost exclusively. Many farmworkers, miners, and others then lost their wage-earning capabilities, and numerous local businesses dependent on their trade lost their markets.

Similarly, advances in transportation and communica-

tions undid many of the ties that bound growers and producers to local businesses. A large producer now can buy all his supplies from a supplier hundreds of miles away and have them sent in by truck, rail, or air. Moreover, he can transport his products to where the buyers or processors are, rather than having them come to him. Technological changes and the accompanying institutional effects, then, helped to bring on the decline of non-metropolitan communities.

To compound matters, there have been few existing or new non-farm, non-resource-related enterprises for the displaced workers and businessmen to turn to in many of these areas. Even if there had been, most workers would not have had the training for them. Recent figures of the Economic Research Service of the Department of Agriculture show that, even now, "those being displaced from agricultural employment are hired farmworkers and small farmers with grade school levels of education compared to an average of 12.2 years of the total labor force with which they must compete for non-farm jobs."³ Many of the workers who were affected took their families to the cities in search of employment; some stayed behind and their children later migrated; still others stayed, as have their children. And quite frequently, those who stayed were some of the least skilled and least trainable. Calvin Beale of the Population Studies Group of the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, has noted that from 1950 to 1960, "the rural and predominantly rural counties of the United States that had net outmigration lost 40 percent of their youth who reached 20 years of age during the decade."⁴

Some of the non-metropolitan areas that were severely affected by the declines in employment in the natural resource industries have been able to attract new industry. But the industries that have come in have often been low-wage, low-growth industries that came primarily to take advantage of the availability of cheap, unskilled, and largely non-union labor. Although they provide work for persons who probably would be unemployed without them, these industries often substitute underemployment for unemployment and have not had as beneficial an effect on local economies as fast-growth industries could have had. In its *Evaluation of Economic Development and Area Planning Programs*, the firm of Robert R. Nathan Associates makes the following comments:

Such industries should not be discouraged, *per se*, because they can generate employment and income where no other is available. On the other hand, they are not a sign of reviving economy. Often they serve as stop-gap employment, buying time while the community adjusts for real development. . . . At worst, they are footloose, moving readily in search of tax and other concessions. By

entering into the competition to lure them, communities tend to confirm their economic lag and to postpone or avoid the adjustments required to remove constraints on development, enhance their competitive advantage, and build an industrial base on high productivity and efficient resource allocation and exploitation.⁵

It also must be pointed out that non-metropolitan areas are finding it harder not to attract even low-wage industries. A cheap, unskilled labor supply is no longer the enticement to industries that it once was, because there are fewer and fewer industries that have large numbers of jobs for such workers. In response, some communities have become more active in providing technical and vocational training for potential workers, so that they can offer prospective industries either trained workers or trainable workers and training facilities.

Another problem with the low-wage, low-technology industries is their failure to help alleviate the shortage of talented, educated professionals in the non-metropolitan communities. While many of the high-technology industries frequently generate satellite industries of relatively high technology, traditional low-growth industries, like textiles or home furnishings, rarely do. Therefore, in a town that has been able to attract a knitting factory, which probably would not generate any higher technology satellite industries, the college-educated professional may be forced to leave.

Over the years, the facilities and services of many non-metropolitan communities also have been declining, or at least not progressing. A large number of the localities have suffered declining populations and declining business activity. For them, it is difficult to maintain present facilities and services, much less to launch new ones. Thus, on the one hand, the facilities they have are not as new and advanced as those of most metropolitan areas, and the services are not as numerous or effectively provided. On the other hand, the facilities they do have are deteriorating, and the services are in many cases no longer adequate.

Yet not every aspect of non-metropolitan life is on the decline. The great contrasts within the non-metropolitan situation cause easy or pat answers to fall short of alleviating the diverse problems faced by those living in these areas. For example, while most of the Nation's growth has occurred in metropolitan areas and many non-metropolitan areas have experienced population declines, more than half of all non-metropolitan municipalities grew during each of the last three decades.⁶ Moreover, in the 1960's, almost 200 non-metropolitan towns of 10,000 to 50,000 population grew by 15 percent or more; that is, at a rate above the national average of 13 percent, thus implying net in-migration. About half of these towns were in the South. Two

Table VIII-1

Selected Characteristics of Non-metropolitan and Metropolitan Areas of the United States

	Total	Metro (SMSA's)	Non-metro (Outside SMSA's)	Non-metro as a % of Total
Population, 1970 ¹	202,534,000	131,519,000	71,015,000	35.1
Persons below the poverty level, 1969 ²	24,280,000 (12.0% of pop.)	12,317,000 (9.4% of pop.)	11,963,000 (16.8% of pop.)	49.3
Average annual income, 1969, per full-time worker ³	\$5,588	\$5,805	\$4,594	
Per capita income, 1970 ⁴	\$3,920	\$4,283	\$3,032	
Number local governments, 1970 ⁵	78,218	22,185	50,033	71.6
Total employment, March, 1972 ⁶	82,359,000	60,396,000	21,963,000	26.6
Total unemployment, March, 1972 ⁷	4,956,000	3,540,000	1,416,000	28.6
Unemployment rate, March, 1972 ⁸	5.6	5.5	6.1	---

¹Bureau of the Census, *Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas: 1970 and 1960* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 24, 1971), p. 1, Table A.

²*Ibid.*, p. 72, Table 19.

³*Ibid.*, p. 68, Table 18. "Full-time" refers to workers who worked 50-52 weeks of the year.

⁴Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May, 1972), p. 36, Table 2.

⁵Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments, I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

⁶Selected items of table produced by Claude Haren, Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

features that characterize many of them are the presence of a State college or university and their location on an interstate highway.⁷

While it is true that many non-metropolitan areas have suffered grave declines in employment, overall non-metropolitan employment has shown fairly healthy growth in recent years. In addition, while the best-educated young residents often have been forced to leave their communities, non-metropolitan employment in manufacturing and construction has been increasing at a faster rate than metropolitan employment in the same industries. The construction boom in rural America is supported in large measure by the second-home and recreational industries, which are growing rapidly as the leisure and affluence of urban populations increase.

Table VIII-4 details the employment situation for both non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas during the ten-year period from 1962 to 1972. In that period, overall employment in non-metropolitan areas increased at an annual rate of 1.7 percent, from 18.8 million to 22 million workers. Farm employment figures are included in the non-metropolitan data, and the 2.9 percent annual rate of decrease in farm employment has considerable

effect on the overall figure. The increase in non-metropolitan nonfarm wage and salary employment actually reached an annual rate of 3.5 percent. Meanwhile, metropolitan employment overall increased at an annual rate of only 2.5 percent. Metropolitan farm employment decreased at an annual rate of 2.4 percent—a rate just slightly less than in non-metropolitan areas. But in contrast to the rural situation, that decrease affected the overall metropolitan employment figures much less because farm employment is so much smaller a proportion of the urban work force.

The gap between non-metropolitan and metropolitan unemployment figures also narrowed considerably in the ten-year period. The spread was 1.7 percentage points in 1962 (7.6 non-metropolitan and 5.9 metropolitan) but only 0.6 of a point in 1972. Although unemployment is still high, the data show clearly that the unemployment rate has been declining more rapidly in non-metropolitan than in metropolitan areas.

These nationwide data about non-metropolitan America, however, do not depict uniform geographic conditions. A large part of the growth in both manufacturing employment and overall non-metropolitan nonfarm pop-

Table VIII-2

**Education:
Years of School Completed for Males 25 to 54 Years of Age: 1969**

Educational Attainment and Year	Metropolitan Areas	Outside Metropolitan Areas
Elementary:		
8 years or less	15%	27%
High School:		
1 to 3 years	17	16
4 years	36	35
College:		
1 year or more	32	21
4 years or more	19	12
Percent completing high school	68	57

Source: Current Population Reports, Special Studies, and Bureau of the Census, "Trends in Social and Economic Conditions in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas," Series P-23, No. 33, September 3, 1970, Table 37, p. 41.

ulation occurred in the South, while other non-metropolitan areas have not been nearly so fortunate. And even the significant inroads made in the South have not always changed real conditions drastically, since non-metropolitan areas in the region still contain a large proportion of the Nation's poverty and substandard housing.

Moreover, according to an Economic Research Service study,⁸ bringing rural and urban per capita incomes and employment-population ratios into balance by the year 2000 would require a doubling of the capacity of the rural economy to absorb idle workers or the addition of about 8.8 million more new jobs than present trends indicate can be expected.

Even those non-metropolitan communities making improvements are engaged in catch-up activities in many

cases. Over the years, their facilities and services declined along with their populations and business activity. Recent growth, after long periods of decline, has not yet improved their community facilities and services to meet current standards.

**NON-METROPOLITAN
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS**

One of the major problems in non-metropolitan areas is local government. The sheer number of these governments is staggering. Of the 78,218 units of local government reported in 1972 by the Bureau of the Census, 56,033 were outside of SMSA's.⁹ That figure might be viewed more favorably if the majority of those governments were operating at maximum effectiveness

Table VIII-3

Selected Characteristics of Housing Units Within and Outside SMSA's: 1970

Percent of housing units that	Within SMSA's	Outside SMSA's
... lack some or all plumbing facilities	3.5	14.1
... have no piped water in structure	0.6	6.5
... have no bathtub or shower	1.7	11.5
... have no flush toilet	1.1	10.2
... have no complete kitchen facilities	2.1	9.4

Source: *General Housing Characteristics, United States Summary* HC(1)-A-1 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1970), Table 10.

Table VIII-4

**Employment and Unemployment: Rural and Other Non-Metropolitan in
Relation to Metropolitan Areas, March 1962-72 Comparisons¹**

Designation	Employment		1962-72 Change
	1972 (Thousands)	1962 (Thousands)	(Annual Percentage Rate)
Nonmetro²			
Total employment	21,963	18,791	1.7
Total nonfarm wage & salary	16,875	12,474	3.5
Nonfarm goods producing ³	6,010	4,671	2.9
Manufacturing	4,887	3,709	3.2
Construction	739	548	3.5
Mining	384	414	0.7
Service performing	9,984	7,005	4.3
Private industries	6,126	4,320	4.2
Government	3,858	2,685	4.4
TCU ⁴	881	798	1.0
Farm	2,433	3,437	2.9
Other nonfarm ⁵	2,655	2,880	0.8
Unemployment	1,416	1,544	0.8
Rate	6.1	7.6	---
Metro			
Total employment	60,396	48,425	2.5
Total nonfarm wage & salary	54,077	41,735	3.0
Nonfarm goods producing ³	16,292	15,088	0.8
Manufacturing	13,627	12,914	0.6
Construction	2,441	1,947	2.5
Mining	224	227	0.1
Service performing	34,248	23,584	4.5
Private industries	24,568	17,252	4.2
Government	9,680	6,332	5.3
TCU ⁴	3,537	3,063	1.5
Farm	797	1,047	2.4
Other nonfarm ⁵	5,522	5,643	0.2
Unemployment	3,540	3,026	1.7
Rate	5.5	5.9	---

¹ Adapted from State employment security agency estimates.

² Areas essentially outside Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area designations of January 7, 1972.

³ Private wage and salary workers only (other nonfarm component included with services).

⁴ Transportation, communications, and utilities industries.

⁵ Self-employed, private household workers, and unpaid family help.

Source: Selected items of table produced by Claude Haren, Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

and efficiency, but that is not the case. In a 1968 report, ACIR found:

Rural governmental institutions are frequently unable to provide the type of public services needed. They were originally designed with less acute problems in an age of greater self-sufficiency. They can adjust only with difficulty to declining population. Local government expenditures per person in such areas are disproportionately high for what frequently are inadequate levels of service. Furthermore, the small local governments are frequently ill-equipped to under-

take the planning and development activities necessary to overcome their handicaps.¹⁰

General Purpose Units

Chapter VI, Volume III, of this report underscores the large percentage of general purpose local governments in non-metropolitan areas which serve small, highly dispersed populations. These include 7,600 counties, 13,050 municipalities, and 13,529 townships.

In examining them, the question of economies or diseconomies of scale inevitably arises. There is no consensus at this time as to precisely what population size or density is most nearly ideal for minimizing per

Table VIII-5

Independent Special Districts Within and Outside SMSA's, Percent Distribution, by Function: 1972

	Number of Districts	Percent of Districts	
		With SMSA's	Outside SMSA's
Total, all districts	23,886	32.8	67.2
Northeast	3,937	52.9	47.1
North Central	8,024	25.3	74.7
South	5,525	24.6	75.4
West	6,400	37.1	62.9
Single function districts	22,983	31.6	68.2
Cemeteries	1,496	10.5	89.5
School building	1,085	57.1	42.9
Fire protection	3,872	38.5	61.5
Highways	698	19.9	80.1
Health	257	39.3	60.7
Hospitals	655	22.9	77.1
Housing & urban renewal	2,270	30.4	69.6
Libraries	498	29.7	70.3
Natural resources, total	6,630	20.3	79.7
Drainage	2,192	19.9	80.1
Flood control	677	19.4	80.6
Irrigation, water conservation	966	28.1	72.0
Soil conservation	2,564	16.2	83.8
Other	231	39.8	60.2
Parks and recreation	749	50.3	49.7
Sewerage	1,406	58.5	41.5
Utilities, total	2,478	37.4	62.6
Water supply	2,323	37.8	62.2
Electric power	74	17.6	82.4
Gas supply	48	14.6	85.4
Transit	33	93.9	6.1
Other	889	37.0	63.0
Multiple function districts	903	60.2	39.8
Sewerage & water supply	629	60.3	39.7
Natural resource & water	67	65.7	34.3
Other	207	58.5	41.5

capita expenses in providing governmental services, or what the upper and lower population levels are at which costs go up.¹¹ Nevertheless, it is generally conceded that very small general purpose local governments almost always suffer diseconomies of scale in providing services.

Independent Special Districts

In addition to general purpose units of local government, two-thirds of the more than 23,000 independent special districts¹² are located in non-metropolitan areas. These are limited-purpose local governments created primarily as devices for providing specific services—often on a regional basis, but each one usually performs only a single function. As corporate entities separate from other local governments, special districts customarily enjoy considerable fiscal and administrative independence. Nevertheless, they are funded by the same local taxpayers and they add to the total burden of public costs. Their very independence, therefore, may thwart intergovernmental coordination and make it impossible for local governments to control the overall level of public expenditures assessed on their citizens.

The unifunctional character of special districts is borne out by Table VIII-5. Ninety-six percent of all special districts and 98 percent of the non-SMSA special districts are unifunctional. There are only 903 multiple-function special districts in the Nation, most of which combine the water and sewer functions, and only 40 percent of these are located outside SMSA's. Thus, special districts are more numerous in non-metropolitan areas, and nearly all of them are single purpose.

The greater number of special districts in non-metropolitan areas is due primarily to the fact that there are more non-metropolitan than metropolitan areas. Actually, on the average there are fewer special districts per county in non-metropolitan (6.1) than in metropolitan areas (18.1).

Table VIII-6 lists the 12 most common functions performed by single-purpose special districts and shows how many of each functional type are located within and outside of SMSA's. The largest of these categories of non-metropolitan special districts are cemetery (1,339), fire protection (2,381), housing and urban renewal (1,579),¹³ drainage (1,755), soil conservation (2,148), and water supply (1,446). Special districts in these six functional categories make up 66 percent of all non-metropolitan special districts. Within SMSA's, the largest functional categories are school building (619), fire protection (1,491), housing and urban renewal (691), sewerage (822), and water supply (877). These make up 57 percent of all SMSA special districts.

Multiple functional special districts make up 2 percent of the non-SMSA special district total, but 7 percent of the SMSA total. In both groups, by far the largest functional category is combined water and sewer. Multifunctional water and sewer special districts account for 69 percent of the non-SMSA and 70 percent of the

SMSA multiple-function special districts.

Table VIII-5 also shows the distribution of special districts within and outside SMSA's by functional category. Non-metropolitan areas account for over half of all cemetery, fire protection, highway, health, hospital, housing, library, drainage, flood control, water conservation, soil conservation, water supply, electric power, and gas supply special districts. Metropolitan areas, in contrast, account for more than half of the special districts in only four categories—school building, parks and recreation, sewerage, and transit.

Most special districts are not coterminous with another unit of local government. However, Table VIII-7 shows that 6,048—25 percent of all special districts—are coterminous with another local government. Over 68 percent of them are in non-metropolitan areas. Wherever these units are coterminous, one of the usual reasons for a special district—geographic flexibility—is not a factor. In many of these cases, constitutional and statutory limitations on the functions that existing general purpose governments could perform and the financial resources that they could command have probably been important factors prompting district establishment.

Non-metropolitan areas have more than twice as many countywide special districts as metropolitan areas. Countywide districts make up about 14 percent of all non-SMSA special districts, but only 6 percent of all SMSA districts. The number of citywide and township-wide special districts is also greater in non-metropolitan than in metropolitan areas. However, the number of citywide and township-wide special districts make up a larger share of the total number of SMSA special districts than of the non-SMSA districts.

NON-METROPOLITAN REGIONAL EXPERIENCE

Thus, the social, economic, and governmental setting for regionalism in non-metropolitan America is different than it is in metropolitan America. The people are separated by greater distances. They do not yet face some of the critical urban problems such as crime, overcrowding, pollution, and the complex interlaying of government to the same extent as the people in metropolitan America. Their governments are still informal, relatively inexpensive, and uninvolved in people's lives. They provide few services, but few have been sought. As a consequence, a political philosophy of small government and individual independence unhampered by governmental restrictions has been more prevalent in non-metropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas.

At first glance, then, there would appear to be little need for regional mechanisms and little sympathy for them, especially as they are conceived in metropolitan areas (SMSA's). But a regional awakening has come to non-metropolitan America (outside SMSA's). To be sure, it has come later and in a somewhat different form, but

Table VIII-6

Incidence of Single-Function Independent Special Districts Within and Outside SMSA's: 1972

Function	U.S. Total	Percent of U.S. Total	Within SMSA's	Percent of SMSA Total	Outside SMSA's	Percent of non-SMSA Total
Total	22,983	100.0	7,298	100.0	15,685	100.0
Cemeteries	1,496	6.5	157	2.2	1,339	8.5
School building	1,085	4.7	619	8.5	466	3.0
Fire protection	3,872	16.8	1,491	20.4	2,381	15.2
Highways	698	3.0	139	1.9	559	3.6
Health	257	1.1	101	1.4	156	1.0
Hospitals	655	2.8	150	2.1	505	3.2
Housing & urban renewal	2,270	9.9	691	9.5	1,579	10.1
Libraries	498	2.2	148	2.0	350	2.2
Natural resources total	6,630	28.8	1,346	18.4	5,284	33.7
Drainage	2,192	9.5	436	6.0	1,755	11.2
Flood control	677	2.9	131	1.8	546	3.5
Irrigation water conservation	966	4.2	271	3.7	696	4.4
Soil conservation	2,564	11.2	416	5.7	2,148	13.7
Other	231	1.0	92	1.3	138	0.9
Parks & recreation	749	3.3	377	5.2	372	2.4
Sewerage	1,406	6.1	822	11.3	584	3.7
Utilities	2,478	10.8	928	12.7	1,550	10.0
Water supply	2,323	10.1	877	12.0	1,446	9.2
Electric power	74	---- ¹	13	---- ¹	61	0.4
Gas supply	48	---- ¹	7	---- ¹	41	0.3
Transit	33	---- ¹	31	---- ¹	2	---- ¹
Other	889	3.9	329	4.5	560	3.6

¹ Less than .05 percent.

Source: Bureau of the Census, 1972 *Census of Governments*, I.

it has come nonetheless. The mass media of communications are raising expectations in many non-metropolitan areas. As a consequence, many rural people, especially the younger ones, are beginning to seek more and better opportunities, expanded governmental services, and more efficient government. And a substantial body of literature is being developed on the subject of non-metropolitan regionalism.¹⁴

Unemployment, poverty, poor health services, inadequate housing, and degradation of environment, while not so concentrated geographically nor so visible as in the urban ghetto or the metropolitan area, nevertheless are sizable and significant problems in non-metropolitan areas. Federal-aid programs to deal with these problems reach into metropolitan America as well as into the metropolitan areas. But, whereas the regional thrust of these programs in metropolitan areas is to coordinate diverse and often overlapping efforts, the regional thrust in the non-metropolitan areas is more directed toward pulling enough resources together in one place at one time to get anything at all going. In other words, economies of scale, often realized by individual local governments in metropolitan areas, and even the simple ability to launch a program, are often realized only at the regional level in non-metropolitan areas. This, in part, accounts for the greater number of special districts in non-metropolitan areas as well as the emergence of regional-council types of organizations.

Non-metropolitan regions have been delineated in different ways for different purposes, and different types of regional organizations have been established to serve them. As pointed out in earlier chapters, most regional organizations have been established for Federal

program purposes or at least have been heavily supported by Federal programs. Some regional organizations have taken on several program purposes and come under the sponsorship of local elected officials; these have become known as regional councils, development councils or councils of governments. At the same time, most of the States have begun to rationalize the boundaries served by regional councils and the other more specialized single-purpose regional organizations by designating official substate districts. These districts are shown on Map VIII-1.

The following sections examine how regions and regional councils in non-metropolitan America differ from those in metropolitan areas in their size, policy body makeup, interstate involvement, activities, staffing, and Federal program relationships. For purposes of describing the size of regions, the official State-designated substate districts are used, while separate surveys of regional councils and their activities are used to describe the organizations serving these or similar districts.

The Size of Regions

As measured by population, metropolitan substate districts, in States which have delineated them, are on the average much larger than those which are wholly or predominantly non-metropolitan. However, as measured by square miles of land areas, the non-metropolitan or predominantly non-metropolitan districts are much larger. The figures showing this situation are contained in Table VIII-8. Table VIII-9 shows that the density of persons per square mile in non-metropolitan areas is only a small fraction of the metropolitan density. The staff of


Table VIII-7

Relationships Between Special District Boundaries and Other Local Jurisdictions: 1972





	Total (A)	Within SMSA's % of (A)	Outside SMSA's % of (A)
Total, all districts	23,886	7,842	16,044
Areas served			
Coterminous with local			
government	6,048	31.7	68.3
Countywide	2,721	15.9	84.1
Citywide	1,949	42.4	57.6
Township-wide	1,378	47.9	52.1
Noncoterminous	17,838	33.2	66.8
Multicounty	2,418	24.6	75.4
Other	15,420	34.6	65.4

Source: Bureau of the Census, Preliminary Data for 1972 Census of Governments, 1.

MAP VIII-1
**Non-Metropolitan Substate Regions
in the United States
1972**



LEGEND

-  State Boundaries
-  Non-Metropolitan Substate District Boundaries
-  Areas Involving One or More Metropolitan Areas in Substate Districts
-  States Not Officially Districted in 1972

SOURCE: Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas defined by the Office of Management and Budget, February 1971 and Substate Planning and Development District defined by U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, September 1972.

Table VIII-8

Size and Density of Substate Regions, by Type

Type of Region*	Number of Regions 1972***	Average Number of Counties (Median)	Number of Square Miles (Median)	Average Density (Median)	Average Population 1970 (Median)
Metropolitan** (Coterminous with SMSA)	21	2	2,113	226	713,376
Predominantly** Metropolitan	29	5	2,997	263	858,008
Half Metropolitan/ Half Non-metropolitan** (by number of counties in or outside of SMSA's)	11	4	2,857	201	517,921
Predominantly Non-metropolitan	120	7	5,079	67	306,663
Non-metropolitan (No metropolitan part)	270	5	4,003	27	101,470

*Determined by number of counties of each type.

**Includes independent cities in Maryland and Virginia. The size of metropolitan areas is somewhat understated in this table because the interstate metropolitan areas are treated as single-State portions in accordance with the substate district boundaries as drawn by each State.

***Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire substate districts are excluded since these New England districts are divided by towns rather than counties. New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Wyoming, Alaska, and Hawaii are also excluded since these States do not have substate districts.

Sources: USDA map of *Substate Planning and Development Districts*, September, 1972.

Bureau of the Census map of *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas*, 1970.

National Association of Counties, *From America's Counties Today* (Washington, D.C.: NACO, 1973).

Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract*, 1971.

a typical non-metropolitan substate districts, on the average, must cope with about twice as much land area, but with less than one-quarter as much population.

As measured by the number of local governments, a non-metropolitan substate district typically has about the same or slightly greater number of counties to deal with. However, as shown by Table VIII-9, the average non-metropolitan regional council includes only half as many municipalities. It also appears from the *1972 Census of Governments* that the non-metropolitan counties making up non-metropolitan substate districts or regional council areas have only one-third the number of special districts.¹⁵ Thus, the governmental pattern with which regional organizations must work is far simpler in non-metropolitan America than it is in metropolitan areas.

Table VIII-10 shows that of the active regional councils responding to the ACIR/NARC survey, 60 percent of the metropolitan ones had populations within their jurisdiction of more than 250,000, while 95 percent of the non-metropolitan councils had fewer than this. As would be expected, this leads to smaller staffs

and smaller budgets in the non-metropolitan areas. Table VIII-11 shows that the average non-metropolitan staff of six is only about half the size of the average metropolitan staff of 13. At the same time, Table VIII-12 shows that the average non-metropolitan budget of \$86,000 is slightly less than one-quarter of the average metropolitan budget of \$381,000. Nevertheless, because of the smaller populations in non-metropolitan areas, the per capita expenditures of non-metropolitan regional councils are nearly twice that of metropolitan councils—75 cents versus 43 cents.

In addition to looking at the average size of substate districts, the range of sizes also should be considered. As Table VIII-13 shows, the largest metropolitan substate district is about 9,000 square miles or roughly the size of Vermont. In comparison, the largest non-metropolitan substate district is over 47,000 square miles or approximately the size of Mississippi. This is over four times the size of the largest metropolitan district. Looking at the upper quartile rather than the highest single case, those districts which are at least half metropolitan averaged the size of the State of Connecticut, while the average

Table VIII-9

Number of Regional Council Local Government Members: 1972

Non-metropolitan				
Local Governments	Number of Councils Reporting	Number of Governments Per Council		
		Low	Mean	High
Counties	119	1	4	14
Municipalities	120	1	16	68
Metropolitan				
Local Governments	Number of Councils Reporting	Number of Governments Per Council		
		Low	Mean	High
Counties	137	1	5	22
Municipalities	141	1	34	121

Source: ACIR/NARC Survey

largest one-fourth of the non-metropolitan districts approximated the size of Massachusetts. Thus, in terms of sheer land area, significant numbers of non-metropolitan districts are large enough that they may well present problems to a staff simply in getting around.

Policy Body Makeup

With some exceptions, areawide or regional planning organizations got their start in metropolitan areas where many local governments are important decisionmakers and service-providers. Therefore, it was natural to give a primary role to local government representatives when new regional organizations, especially those of a general-purpose nature, were formed. However, in the non-metropolitan areas, where local governments frequently are less well established and provide fewer services, it has not been as obvious that local government representatives could provide the leadership needed to make regional organizations effective. Thus, there is a school of thought among some program administrators in EDA and Agriculture which stresses the importance of obtaining regional policy body members from the local business and agricultural communities. While local government representatives are also felt to be important, their significance frequently has not been considered overriding, even though the programs of these two Federal agencies tend to be multi-purpose in nature. Of course, several of the Federally encouraged special-purpose organizations—such as health, law enforcement, and manpower—seek program specialists on their policy boards whether they are metropolitan or non-metropolitan, but these efforts were not conceived as general purpose in character.

As the 701 planning assistance program expanded from metropolitan to non-metropolitan regions, it took with it the requirement that policy bodies be composed of two-thirds elected officials unless otherwise provided by State law. The other one-third of the representation is required by this program to be chosen from among the general citizenry and to include minority and low-income group representation. This is primarily a cross-section philosophy based upon the thought that the “consumers” of governmental services—or the “average citizen”—should have access to the governmental decision making body. The philosophy of some of the EDA and Agriculture officials, on the other hand, is based more on the thought that the real community “power structure” needs to be pulled together if anything productive is to happen. Nevertheless, the HUD guidelines do leave some flexibility for non-metropolitan planning organizations funded by HUD to include representation from the business and agricultural communities, even though they place elected local officials in the predominant position.

In addition to the influence of the HUD guidelines on non-metropolitan organizations, EDA itself has established a policy requiring a simple majority of local elected officials. The Appalachian program, with its local development districts, has also stressed the principle of a majority of local elected officials. These three programs together, along with the substate districting efforts of the States, have established a large number of general-purpose planning and A-95 review agencies throughout non-metropolitan America which are controlled in the main by local elected officials. Although a precise membership breakdown on all non-metropolitan regional councils is not available, the 1973 breakdown of

Table VIII-10

Population of Regional Council Areas by Type of Area: 1972

Population Group	Total		Metro		Non-metro	
	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total
Total, all councils reporting	356	100	196	100	160	100
Over 1,000,000	25	7	25	13	0	0
500,000 - 1,000,000	35	10	35	18	0	0
250,000 - 500,000	65	18	57	29	8	5
100,000 - 250,000	132	37	66	34	66	41
50,000 - 100,000	59	17	10	5	49	31
25,000 - 50,000	29	8	3	2	26	16
10,000 - 25,000	7	2	0	0	7	4
5,000 - 10,000	1	---1	0	0	1	1
Under 5,000	3	1	0	0	3	2

¹ Represents less than .5 percent.
Source: ACIR/NARC Survey and ICMA data file.

members on the boards of the 120 economic development districts¹⁶ shows that 55 percent of the members are local elected officials, while 17 percent comes from the business community and 9 percent represents agriculture. Another 12 percent represents minority and the unemployed or underemployed. The remaining 7 percent represents various professions, civic, and educational groups. Thus, it appears that general-purpose planning organizations in non-metropolitan areas are providing crucial representation for the special types of community leadership important to their success, although some may still argue that this representation is not adequate.

It might be assumed from the membership guidelines in such programs as resource conservation and development and comprehensive health planning that considerably more latitude for involving business, agriculture, and consumers is available. But EDD's success in jointly

funding several programs within a single organization seems likely to be bringing together a more diverse group of interests than might otherwise be the case if each Federal program remained single purpose. In cases where the membership guidelines of different Federal programs are different, it is possible—through the use of advisory committees and interagency coordination agreements—to satisfy the various requirements either within a single organization or within an interrelated set of organizations acting in concert within the same region under interagency coordination agreements.

Interstate Involvement

In metropolitan areas, the basic criterion used to define an interstate region is that the region should represent a single integrated community of people who

Table VIII-11

Number of Full-Time Staff of Regional Councils: 1972

Type of Council	Number of Councils Reporting	Number of Full-Time Staff Per Council			
		Low	Median	High	Mean
Total, all councils	296	1	9	150	14
Metro	159	1	13	150	21
Non-metro	137	1	6	150	9

Source: ACIR/ICMA Survey.

Table VIII-12

Budgeting and Population of Regional Councils: 1972

	Number of Councils Reporting	Population (in thousands)	Budget (in thousands)	Mean Council Budget (in thousands)	Per Capita
Total, all councils	247	136,858	\$63,240	\$256	\$0.46
Metropolitan	142	124,774	54,136	381	0.43
Non-metropolitan	105	12,084	9,104	86	0.75

Source: ACIR/NARC Survey.

are interrelated by their social and economic activities, even though they may live in different States. This criterion seldom applies with equal force in non-metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, there are cases such as Lake Tahoe on the California-Nevada border which do fit. Tahoe is an interrelated community with common recreational interests and environmental problems. The permanent resident population is not sufficient to classify it as a metropolitan area, but the community's needs have developed much as though it were so classified. Indeed, it may soon become a metropolitan area. But for the time being it is a non-metropolitan area which has been tied together with a strong interstate compact authorizing areawide planning and areawide controls over development. It has also been designated as an A-95 clearinghouse—the only non-metropolitan interstate region to be so designated.

Although other cases in non-metropolitan America similar to Tahoe are difficult to locate, various natural resource problems do tie together some non-metropolitan areas that transcend State lines. For example, eight resource conservation and development districts, funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, currently operate across State lines, and another one is currently in the application stage. Moreover, several interstate air quality control regions established by EPA encompass large non-metropolitan areas, although they do not represent interstate organizations. Of course, the several multistate regional river basin commissions subsume large non-metropolitan areas as well as metropolitan areas.

Three non-SMSA councils responding to the 1972 ACIR-NARC survey of regional councils are also interstate: the Mid-Columbia EDD (Washington-Oregon), the First Tennessee-Virginia Development District (Tennessee-Virginia)¹⁷ and the DELMARVA Advisory Council (Delaware-Maryland-Virginia). The New Hampshire-Vermont EDD is the only other interstate EDD. In addition, several other interstate regional councils responding to the survey include jurisdiction over signifi-

cant non-metropolitan territory in addition to their metropolitan portions. Of the 15 interstate comprehensive health planning areas, only two are completely non-metropolitan; eight include both metropolitan and non-metropolitan territory; and five are completely metropolitan. These identified non-metropolitan interstate organizations total about 15, or only about half as many as the 33 such metropolitan cases.

Not to be ignored is the fact that non-metropolitan commuter patterns are frequently interstate. In developing functional economic areas of the United States, Brian Berry has found that 32 such multicounty areas could be identified on the basis of 1960 Census journey-to-work data.¹⁸ By contrast, this analysis showed 65 interstate metropolitan areas described as "real areas of daily journey-to-work interdependence." Map VIII-2 shows these types of natural interstate areas. Some non-metropolitan areas, then, are not totally free of interstate involvement. This involvement may be neither as prevalent nor as crucial as in the metropolitan areas, but it deserves attention.

Regional Activities and Staffing

From the ACIR-NARC survey of regional councils, it appears that on the average non-metropolitan councils undertake eight programs, two fewer than the ten undertaken by metropolitan councils (see Table VIII-14). The policy emphasis in both types of councils is relatively similar. As shown in Table VIII-15, metropolitan as well as non-metropolitan councils have adopted policies in five subjects more than half the time. These programs are land use, water and sewer facilities, open space, transportation, and solid waste. While these are the only subjects in which more than half the metropolitan councils have adopted policies, non-metropolitan councils also have adopted policies on economic development and law enforcement in over 50 percent of the cases. Thus, in terms of active policy development, the

Table VIII-13

Land Area of Substate Regions (Square Miles)

Type of Region*	Number of Regions 1972***	Square Mile Area Per Region				
		Lowest Case	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	Highest Case
Non-metropolitan Predominantly	270	665	2,575	4,003	7,093	47,716
Non-metropolitan Half Metropolitan/	120	1,422	3,558	5,079	8,405	24,882
Half Non-metropolitan Predominantly	11	1,917	2,145	2,857	4,696	12,486
Metropolitan	29	413	2,161	2,997	4,015	38,248
Metropolitan**	21	171	1,218	1,759	4,261	9,240

*Determined by number of counties of each type.

**Includes independent cities in Maryland and Virginia. The size of metropolitan areas is somewhat understated in this table because the interstate metropolitan areas are treated as single-State portions in accordance with the substate district boundaries as drawn by each State.

***Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire substate districts are excluded since these New England districts are divided by towns rather than counties. New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Wyoming, Alaska, and Hawaii are also excluded since these States do not have substate districts.

Sources: USDA map of *Substate Planning and Development Districts*, September, 1972.

Bureau of the Census map of *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas*, 1970.

National Association of Counties, *From America's Counties Today* (Washington, D.C.: NACO, 1973).

Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract*, 1971.

typical non-metropolitan council appears to have a slightly wider scope than the typical metropolitan council.

If one also looks at the policies adopted by 40 to 50 percent of the two types of regional councils, it is found that the non-metropolitan councils were more active in the health and resource conservation fields, while the metropolitan councils were involved in resource conservation, economic development, housing, and airport planning. Thus, at the level of 40 percent and above, both types of councils have adopted policies in the same

number of fields, but with a slightly different emphasis. The non-metropolitan councils deal with health and law enforcement policies more, while the metropolitan councils stress housing and airport planning to a greater extent. Other fields tend to be the same.

These statistics, however, do not fully reflect the differences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan regional councils. It is conceded by most observers that these contrasts are substantial in terms of operating procedures as well as discrete activities. For example, while regional councils in metropolitan areas are almost

Table VIII-14


Average Number of Regional Council Programs: 1972

	Number Councils Reporting	Mean	Number of Programs Per Regional Council				
			Lowest Case	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	Highest Case
Metro	124	9.55	1	7	10	12	19
Non-metro	112	8.68	1	5	8	12	18
Total	236	9.32	1	7	9	12	19





Source: ACIR/NARC Survey

MAP VIII-2

Interstate Areas of Daily Journey-To-Work: Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan



LEGEND

-  Interstate Non-Metropolitan Economic Areas
-  Interstate Metropolitan Economic Areas
-  Division for more than one economic area in a similar geographic area.
-  State Boundaries

SOURCE: Brian J. C. Berry, Et. Al, Metropolitan Area Definition: A Re-Evaluation of Concept and Statistical Practice, Working Paper 28, Figure 18 "Functional Economic Areas of the United States" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, June 1968).

always characterized as regional planning agencies, the non-metropolitan councils are variously characterized as (1) regional chambers of commerce, (2) industrial development organizations, (3) grantsmen and promoters oriented toward the development, design, and funding of individual community improvement projects, or (4) technical assistance agents helping member local governments to carry out their responsibilities better or providing services to them on a joint basis. These characterizations do not imply that many of the non-metropolitan regional councils ignore planning, but only that they frequently take a more active role in and place greater emphasis on other activities as well.

Tables VIII-16, 17, and 18 tend to substantiate this diversified view of non-metropolitan regional councils. They show that the executive directors of non-metropolitan councils spend somewhat more time on local assistance matters and that their councils have enjoyed somewhat greater success in providing local technical assistance and visible services to member local governments. Thus, in the view of some observers, non-metropolitan regional councils, in contrast to their urban counterparts, are more entrepreneurial, more directly

linked with the broader spectrum of community decision making and the every day politics and operations of their member local governments.

Frequently, the regional council in non-metropolitan areas is the only governmental organization with substantial professional and managerial expertise, and is the only logical organization to which new regional functions should be assigned. This contrasts greatly with the situation in many major metropolitan areas, where the regional councils certainly have no monopoly on professional or managerial resources, are assigned more limited roles in relation to the full range of local interests, are confronted with competing regional organizations, and are more involved in the administrative, coordinative, and managerial processes of government than in the political and entrepreneurial.

With these differences in emphasis on programs and processes, it might be expected that there would be some difference in staffing as well. The ACIR-ICMA survey on this subject has shown some differences but many similarities as well (see Table VIII-19). The typical metropolitan staff, of course, is about twice as large as the typical non-metropolitan staff, numbering 13 in the

Table VIII-15

Regional Councils Having Adopted Policies, by Type of Policy: 1972

Program Areas	All Councils		Metro Councils		Non-metro Councils	
	Number	percent of Total	Number	percent of Total	Number	percent of Total
Total, all councils	289	100	156	100	133	100
Land Use	240	83	135	87	105	79
Water/Sewer	240	83	141	90	99	74
Open Space	213	74	127	81	86	65
Transportation	192	66	125	80	67	50
Solid Waste	179	62	98	63	81	61
Economic Development	150	52	75	48	75	56
Law Enforcement	126	44	60	38	66	50
Housing	123	43	76	49	47	35
Resource Conservation	121	42	64	41	57	43
Health	118	41	61	39	57	43
Airport	116	40	73	47	43	32
Manpower	87	30	44	28	43	32
Anti-discrimination	71	25	41	26	30	23
Aged	62	21	25	16	37	28
Air Quality	39	13	26	17	13	10
Drug Abuse	38	13	26	17	12	9
Unemployment	38	13	15	10	23	17
Youth Programs	32	11	11	7	21	16
Anti-poverty	29	10	13	8	16	12
Fiscal Disparity	28	10	16	10	12	9
Other	40	14	24	15	16	12

Source: ACIR/ICMA Survey

Table VIII-16

Average Percent of Executive Director's Time Spent on Local Matters

Location of Regional Council	Technical Assistance to Member Governments		Visible Services to Member Governments	
	#Reporting	Mean%	#Reporting	Mean%
U.S. Total	193	8	148	5
Coterminous w/SMSA	39	5	33	5
Part of SMSA	12	9	10	5
More than 1 SMSA	45	7	37	5
Non-SMSA	97	9	68	6

Source: ACIR/ICMA Survey.

Table VIII-17

Success of Regional Councils in Providing Technical Assistance to Member Governments

Degree of Success		Metropolitan Councils		Metropolitan Councils	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Not Successful	1	39	28.7	13	10.8
	2	30	22.1	19	15.8
	3	31	22.8	41	34.2
	4	26	19.1	24	20.0
Very Successful	5	10	7.4	23	19.2
N=		136	100%	120	100%

Table VIII-18

Success of Regional Councils in Solving Particular Local Government Problems

Degree of Success		Metropolitan Councils		Nonmetropolitan Councils	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Not Successful	1	7	4.9	4	3.2
	2	14	9.9	12	9.5
	3	36	25.4	16	12.7
	4	48	33.8	47	37.3
Very Successful	5	37	26.1	47	37.3
N=		142	100%	126	100%

Source: ACIR/NARC Survey

Table VIII-19

Background of Regional Council Staff Members: 1972

Background	Total (N=313)		Metro (N=166)		Non-metro (N=147)	
	No. of Councils Reporting*	Mean Number of Staff	No. of Councils Reporting	Mean Number of Staff	No. of Councils Reporting	Mean Number of Staff
City Planning	203	3	121	4	82	1
Public Administration	136	1	86	1	50	1
Engineering	108	2	75	2	33	1
Economics	104	1	67	1	37	1
Sociology	104	1	63	1	41	1
Law Enforcement	94	1	47	1	47	1
Accounting	80	1	50	1	30	1
Business	77	2	41	1	36	3
Housing	77	2	48	2	29	3
Environmental Health	62	1	40	1	22	1
Systems Analysis	56	3	42	2	14	5
Math or Statistics	54	1	34	1	20	1
Law	36	1	27	1	9	1
Other **	119	2	66	3	53	1

*No. of Councils = number that have one or more staff members in that background area. Mean number of staff = mean number in those councils reporting such staff.

**About one-third of these were geographers, while the others were scattered among a variety of backgrounds.

Source: ACIR/ICMA survey.

former and six in the latter. Both types of councils employ staff members with widely differing backgrounds, although in over 50 percent of the cases both had at least one planner on the staff. One or more public administrators were on the staff of more than half of the metropolitan councils, but none of the other professions or backgrounds were represented on the staffs of as many as half of either type of council. The metropolitan staff was more likely to have specialized professionals except in law enforcement and business, where the chances of having such types in non-metropolitan staffs were usually comparable. The prominence of law enforcement and business experts on the non-metropolitan staffs coincides with the greater emphasis given to these and related subjects in the non-metropolitan councils.

Because the staffs of non-metropolitan regional councils are spread thinner and have fewer specializations, they may well have a greater need for State technical assistance. While planning staffs in major metropolitan councils are often equal to, if not better than, the planning staffs of the States, this is seldom if ever true of non-metropolitan planning staffs.

Variations also arise in the backgrounds of the executive directors, although over half of the metropolitan directors and nearly two-thirds of the non-metropolitan directors come from the same three categories (see Table VIII-20). These three categories are planning, government and "other." While planning and government characterized the background of more of the metropolitan directors, the "other" category accounted for a third of all the non-metropolitan directors.

Further analysis showed that three-quarters of this catchall category consisted of geographers and agricultural or natural resource experts, backgrounds which might well be appropriate for a non-metropolitan director. Of the remaining council directors, it was found that metropolitan directors were more likely to be architects while non-metropolitan directors were more likely to be businessmen or persons with liberal arts backgrounds. Economics, history, and engineering were about equally likely backgrounds for a small number of directors in both categories, while law, English, journalism, and accounting were the least likely backgrounds for regional council directors in both types of areas. The greater reliance of the non-metropolitan councils on drawing their executive directors from the business, liberal arts, geography, and agricultural or natural resource backgrounds is consistent with their somewhat greater emphasis on economic development and social planning programs.

The educational levels of executive directors varied relatively little between metropolitan and non-metropolitan councils. As shown in Table VIII-21, 86 percent of the metropolitan directors and 80 percent of non-metropolitan directors had either a masters degree, a bachelors degree, or a bachelors degree with some graduate work. Among the other educational attainment levels, the

metropolitan organizations were slightly more likely to choose executive directors with law degrees or doctorates, while the non-metropolitan council was more likely to choose a director with over two years of college work but without a bachelors degree. Very few directors in either type of council had less than two years of college—a bare 2 percent of metropolitan directors and only 5 percent of non-metropolitan directors. Thus both types of regional councils appear to have well educated directors.

Federal Program Relationships

As was pointed out in Chapter VI, Federal programs have been the chief initiators of regional activity in non-metropolitan as well as metropolitan regions. In concrete terms, this means the recent increases in the number of regional organizations, the size of their budgets, and the scope of their activities are directly traceable to the establishment of new Federal programs.

Substantial amounts of Federal areawide program funds, however, became available to the non-metropolitan regions later than they did to metropolitan areas. While comprehensive planning funds, open space planning requirements, urban transportation grants, and mass transportation planning funds all became available in metropolitan areas before 1965, only the resource conservation and development programs introduced areawide planning considerations in non-metropolitan areas prior to 1965. In that year, economic development planning and Appalachian local development district funds were first authorized to bring comprehensive planning activities into non-metropolitan America. Comprehensive planning funds were extended to metropolitan councils of government in 1965, but they were withheld from non-metropolitan councils, for the most part, until 1968. The Section 204 Federal-aid review and comment procedures went into effect for metropolitan areas in 1967, but did not become effective in non-metropolitan districts through A-95 until 1969.

Planning programs and requirements which could apply either in metropolitan or non-metropolitan areas were all introduced in 1965 or later. These covered such programs as water and sewer facilities, solid waste management, air pollution, health, manpower, and law enforcement. The Rural Development Act of 1972 provides some new planning and coordination authorizations which may enable non-metropolitan regionalism to be further strengthened.

Chapter VI indicated (see Table VI-21) that there were slightly fewer Federal programs of a regional nature operating in the average non-metropolitan area as compared to the typical metropolitan area, and that a slightly smaller percentage of these programs relied on a single regional council in the average non-metropolitan area. Specifically, the average non-metropolitan regional

council administered 2.3 Federal programs while its metropolitan counterpart administered 2.7. At the same time, 3.1 Federal areawide programs were administered in the average non-metropolitan area by one or more other organizations, compared to 2.9 of these Federal programs in metropolitan areas.

The Economic Development Administration's program of assistance to economic development districts has been the primary non-metropolitan force for comprehensive multiprogram operations.¹⁹ In 1971, the 100 EDD's surveyed were administering 2.5 Federal programs on the average, a record slightly better than the average non-metropolitan regional council as reported in the early 1972 ACIR-NARC survey. By early 1973, the EDD record had improved to 4.3 programs per district. Unfortunately, comparable data for other non-metropolitan regional councils are not available for 1973. Yet it appears that at least the EDD's in non-metropolitan America are continuing to draw upon diverse Federal areawide programs and are putting themselves in a stronger position to coordinate these efforts. While more than one-third of the EDD's in 1971 administered EDA's program alone, by 1973 only 14 percent of the 120 EDD's surveyed were in this single-program category. Moreover, 93 of the EDD's have been recognized by OMB as official A-95 clearinghouses.

The later beginning of most non-metropolitan councils may account for their lower rate of multi-program operations in 1972 as compared to metropolitan coun-

cils. The recent surge in EDD multi-program operations constitutes a countertrend. But the areawide data on this point are not wholly conclusive since 1973 figures are not available for metropolitan areas.²⁰ In general, then, it can be concluded that non-metropolitan regional councils, spurred along by the Economic Development Administration and funded in recent years also by HUD, are providing non-metropolitan America with general-purpose regional organizations similar to those which have been associated with metropolitan areas for a period of years.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

—Non-metropolitan areas are not without problems needing greater governmental attention. Many such areas have been losing population and job opportunities. Many also have lower per capita incomes, lower educational levels, more unemployment, more poverty, and more poor quality housing than are found in metropolitan areas.

—Despite the relatively small-scale operation of local governments in non-metropolitan areas, the sparseness of their populations, and the limited nature of their functions and capabilities (in fact, partly because of these factors), regionalism has emerged in non-metropolitan America. But the setting and the regional interests are somewhat different from those of urban America.

Table VIII-20

Major Areas of Specialization of Regional Council Executive Directors: 1972

Specialization	Metro		Non-metro	
	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total
Total, all executive directors	230	100	175	100
Planning	51	22	28	16
Political Science, Public Administration, or Government	46	20	27	15
Architecture	25	11	4	2
Economics or History	22	10	24	14
Engineering	20	9	5	3
Business	13	6	10	6
Liberal Arts	10	4	11	6
Law	7	3	4	2
English or Journalism	3	1	4	2
Accounting	0	---	1	1
Other	33	14	57	33

Source: ACIR/ICMA Survey.

Table VIII-21

Education of Regional Council Executive Directors: 1972

Education Level	All Councils		Metro Councils		Non-metro Councils	
	Number	% of Total	No.	% of Total	No.	% of Total
Total, all directors	313	100	166	100	147	100
Masters Degree	131	42	74	45	57	39
BA or BS Degree	73	23	35	21	38	26
Some graduate work (no degree)	55	18	33	20	22	15
Over 2 years college (no degree)	14	4	5	3	9	6
Law Degree	14	4	9	5	5	3
Ph.D. Degree	11	4	6	4	5	3
High School Graduate	7	2	2	1	5	3
1-2 Years of College	4	1	1	1	3	2
Other	4	1	1	1	3	2

Source: ACIR/ ICMA Survey.

Of course, there is the need to meet Federal planning requirements in all areas – metropolitan as well as non-metropolitan. Nevertheless, achieving economies of scale, promoting economic development, and protecting natural resources are the more prominent goals in non-metropolitan areas, whereas metropolitan areas are more concerned with interagency coordination of conflicting governmental plans and programs, the provision of areawide services, and equity considerations.

–Non-metropolitan special districts account for two-thirds of the 23,886 independent special districts in the Nation; they are slightly more frequently single purpose than those in metropolitan areas (98 to 96 percent); however, they average only about six per county as opposed to about 18 per county in metropolitan areas; and non-metropolitan special districts are countywide more often than metropolitan special districts (14 versus 6 percent), while they are citywide or township-wide slightly less often (7 versus 10 percent and 5 versus 7 percent respectively).

–Non-metropolitan regions, as delineated by the States, number 390. On the average, they are twice as large in land area as the metropolitan regions, but their populations are less than half as large, and their population densities are less than one-third as great. While the average regional council budgets in non-metropolitan areas are less than one-quarter of their metropolitan counterparts, per capita expenditures approach twice as much.

–The average staff of a non-metropolitan regional council is about half the size of its metropolitan counterpart (6 versus 13). Yet the non-metropolitan regions have typically adopted policies and programs

involving more functions than those in metropolitan regions (7 versus 5). Non-metropolitan regional councils also tend to spend more time and effort on and have greater success in providing technical assistance to local governments. They also tend to provide more direct services to member governments and, in the view of some observers, to assume a more entrepreneurial role in community leadership.

–A significant number of non-metropolitan regions are large enough in land area (approximately the size of Massachusetts) to present major travel problems and problems of political cohesion in any local sense.

–Although staffing patterns, not unexpectedly, differ between non-metropolitan and metropolitan regional councils in accordance with program differences, the educational levels of the staff directors are roughly comparable to the two types of areas.

–Federal assistance for regional activities and Federal areawide planning requirements generally have been applied later in non-metropolitan areas than in metropolitan ones. The latest figures available on joint funding of a single regional council by multiple Federal programs (1971) show the non-metropolitan regional councils slightly trailing metropolitan councils (2.3 versus 2.7 programs per council). However, later figures (early 1973) for one particular type of regional council—the economic development districts, which are mostly in non-metropolitan areas—indicate 4.3 Federal programs per district. Although the EDA figures count a broader range of Federal programs, they seem to show that at least these non-metropolitan regional councils may have closed the gap in joint funding frequency.

–The policy body makeup of regional councils in

non-metropolitan areas places less emphasis upon local elected officials and more on financial and natural resource specialists and the local private power structure.

—Though fewer than in metropolitan areas, a number of non-metropolitan areas are interstate.

There is as much need to address regional and

multi-jurisdictional problems in non-metropolitan areas as there is in metropolitan areas. The answers to the issues raised in other chapters about appropriate areawide functions, representational patterns, sizes of regions, and levels of Federal and State involvement may be different but the basic issues that need to be addressed are the same.

Footnotes

¹Executive Office of the President, Domestic Council, *Report on National Growth 1972* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February, 1972), p. 12.

²See, for example: Donald J. Bogue and Calvin L. Beale, *Economic Areas of the United States* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 1162.

C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, *Rural Migration in the United States*, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Era of the New Deal Series (New York: DaCapo Press, 1971), reprint of 1939 ed.

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U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, *Rural Development, 1971—a year of listening and watching the development of the growing consensus that something must be done for the people of the American countryside*. Committee print, Washington, May 31, 1972. Richard Irwin, Senator Hubert Humphrey, William S. Bonner, Dr. Peter C. Goldmeir.

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *People of Rural America* by Dale E. Hathaway, J. Allan Bugle, and W. Keith Bryant. Prepared in cooperation with the Social Science Research Council (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau, 1968).

³Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Current Program and Progress Report of the Economic Development Division* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October, 1972), p. 7.

⁴*Population Trends*, Hearings before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Urban Growth of the Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), Part I, p. 476.

⁵Nathan (Robert R.) Associates, Inc., *Evaluation of Economic Development District and Area Planning Programs, I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, December, 1969), p. 8.

⁶Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population and the American Future* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 31.

⁷Economic Development Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, *The Economic and Social Condition of Rural America in the 1970's*, Part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 22.

⁸Alan R. Bird and Melvin L. Cotner, "Breakthrough: Looking Back from 2000," *The Yearbook of Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

⁹Bureau of the Census, *1972 Census of Governments, I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

¹⁰Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 1968), p. 59.

¹¹For a full discussion of this point see Chapter I, Volume IV, of this report.

¹²For a complete discussion of special districts, see Chapter

IV of this report.

¹³"Housing and Urban Renewal" is the functional category established by the Bureau of the Census. Probably most non-metropolitan special districts that are counted in that category are housing authorities.

¹⁴William S. Bonner and Robert K. Middleton, *Regional Communities, A Planning and Development Concept for Non-metropolitan Areas* (Little Rock: Arkansas University, City Planning Division, 1971), p. 18.

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President's Task Force on Rural Development, *A New Life for the Country* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 51.

James L. Sundquist with the collaboration of David W. Davis, *Making Federalism Work* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969).

¹⁵According to the 1972 Census of Governments, metropolitan counties average 18.1 special districts, while non-metropolitan counties average 6.1 special districts.

¹⁶U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, "Emerging Pattern of Coordination of Local, State and Federal Planning Efforts Through Development Districts" (Washington, D.C.: EDA, February, 1973), p. 7. Mimeographed.

¹⁷This area was classified as an interstate SMSA by OMB in April 1973.


¹⁸Brian J. L. Berry, et al., *Metropolitan Area Definition: A Re-Evaluation of Concept and Statistical Practice*, Working Paper 28 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, June, 1968), pp. 28-29.

¹⁹This paragraph is drawn from U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, "Emergency Pattern of Coordination of Local State and Federal Planning Efforts Through Development Districts" (Washington, D.C.: EDA, February, 1973), p. 7. Mimeographed.

²⁰The EDD data are not strictly comparable with the 1972 survey data. The EDD data include certain labor, HEW, and Appalachian Regional Commission programs not included in the survey data. Nevertheless, they do show an increased emphasis by the EDD's upon obtaining joint funding by Federal-aid programs.

CHAPTER IX

INTERSTATE AREAS*



Metropolitan interstate areas now house well over one-quarter of the Nation's population and involve two-thirds of the States.

Some of the means of dealing with areawide issues, and performing areawide services and coordination, normally available within a single State, cannot be used in interstate areas because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, a number of other means are available, although they have not been used extensively. As a result, it is not unusual to find areawide functions treated on a unified basis in intrastate areas, but on a fragmented basis in interstate areas.

This chapter briefly describes the magnitude of the interstate metropolitan area problem in the United States, examines precedents for interstate action, recounts experiences with selected areawide functions in several major interstate metropolitan areas, identifies the devices for areawide action which are not available in interstate regions as well as those which are, and draws conclusions about the special nature of areawide action in interstate areas and the need for wider understanding of it.

THE GROWTH AND IMPORTANCE OF INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN AREAS

There are more interstate metropolitan areas than most people realize, and their number is bound to increase. These areas were not designed to be interstate; they just happened. If political, administrative, and jurisdictional considerations were determinative, the major urban developments that mushroom into metropolitan complexes would be confined within single States, in order to simplify the conduct of State-local relations and the provision of services.

State boundaries were fixed by a variety of unplanned or formerly compelling considerations in which present-day demography and governmental structure were not perceived. For example, many State lines in the East were determined by the colonial grants of English kings who never saw the New World and who could not have envisaged what the land would be in the late twentieth century even if they had wished to consider such a far-off matter. Elsewhere in the country, more often than not, borders were determined by surveyors' lines drawn through largely uninhabited territory. A few boundaries were fixed by the vagaries of war, international politics, and the slavery issue.

Historically, rivers appealed to the political map-makers as preferred boundary lines. They were easy to mark and were traditionally thought of as borders. So the Ohio, Mississippi, Delaware, and Hudson—to name

only a few—became State lines throughout virtually all or at least important segments of their lengths. Communities built along their banks to take advantage of water transport, water supply, and recreational opportunities were almost certain to spill over onto the opposite shores, thereby creating metropolitan Cincinnati, Louisville, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and many more—all interstate socio-economic unities, but politically and administratively segmented by the State line.

On a few occasions, original borders have been adjusted. For example, New York and Massachusetts once exchanged small parcels of land to straighten their boundary at a point where the previous line was inconvenient.¹ Other States have made compacts redrawing boundaries distributed by changes in river courses or rendered ambiguous because of inadequate or lost records.² Also, there are a handful of compacts providing for concurrent jurisdiction over certain aspects of boundary water management.³ But in most cases State lines remain where they were placed in the nineteenth century or earlier.

Cities and their surrounding suburbs have seldom if ever been founded or expanded because the State government consciously selected the site or because of the presence or absence of a State line. The desire to take advantage of a harbor or stream, the presence of a rail junction, or the development of an industrial installation have been among the factors that have dictated population concentration. As reliance on the car and mass transit has made it even less necessary to live close to work and downtown shopping, urban-oriented populations have moved out of or not settled in the central city. Because State lines do not materially disrupt economic patterns or inhibit the free flow of persons, they have influenced individuals or families only moderately in picking their homes or apartment sites or in choosing places of employment. Business enterprises have considered somewhat more consciously the effects of locating factories, warehouses, or offices in one jurisdiction or another, but even their actions have been hardly noticeable in determining whether a given metropolitan region would remain intrastate or become interstate.

As a result, three of the five largest metropolitan areas are interstate and many smaller but increasingly important urban centers are the hubs of interstate metropolitan communities.⁴ The interstate metropolitan area will be with us for the indefinite future and will increase rather than diminish in importance.

Even when originally founded some distance from a State line, the tremendous population growth and redistribution that have been in progress for the past several generations have expanded metropolitan regions to the point where they cross boundaries previously thought to be well beyond metropolitan area limits. In the small States of the New England and Middle Atlantic

*This chapter was prepared, under contract with ACIR, by the firm of Wendell and Schwann, consultants on governmental affairs.

megalopolis, one does not have to go far to encounter a State line, and in many other parts of the country, a central city plus suburbs and satellite cities which encompass an area 50 or more miles across can well push beyond the nearest State border.

For purposes of this chapter the interstate areas considered go beyond the widely used definition of the term "standard metropolitan statistical area," or SMSA. The Office of Management and Budget⁵ defines an SMSA as a county or group of contiguous counties which contain at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more, or "twin cities" with a combined population of 50,000 or more. In addition to the county or counties containing such a city or cities, contiguous counties are included in the SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are socially and economically integrated with the central city. In New England, towns and cities are the constituent units of SMSA's instead of counties. Each SMSA must include at least one central city. Pursuant to this definition, the Bureau of the Census identified 243 SMSA's in the 50 States in 1970. Of these, 30 were interstate in character, including 26 in two States, three in three States and one, Washington, in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. The total population of these 30 interstate metropolitan areas in 1970 was 22,446,008—about 11 percent of that of the entire Nation. One small interstate SMSA—Parkersburg-Marietta in West Virginia and Ohio—has been added since 1970.

However, the OMB definition of an interstate metropolitan area does not reflect the whole story. SMSA's do not necessarily encompass the whole urban area to which important trade, transportation, communication, and cultural links with the largest city extend. Thus New York is a series of single-State SMSA's in OMB terms, but is considered interstate for purposes of this chapter. The same is true of the Chicago area, which now extends into Wisconsin on the north and Indiana on the east. Boston has spilled over into New Hampshire, and Philadelphia has joined Trenton on the north and Wilmington on the south. The Fall River and Providence areas have joined (Massachusetts-Rhode Island). In addition, South Bend (Indiana-Michigan) and Rockford (Illinois-Wisconsin) have spilled across State boundaries. Adding these changes to the official interstate SMSA tabulation gives 33 areas with a 1970 population of 56,657,825—more than two and one-half times the number of those who resided in the officially designated interstate SMSA's. This amounts to 28 percent of the nation's total population and slightly more than 40 percent of the Nation's total 1970 SMSA population of 139,418,811, as shown in Table IX-1.

This is just a taste of what the future holds. It is commonly accepted that by the end of the century the Boston-to-Richmond corridor, probably extended at both ends, will be one heavily populated continuum. Similarly, it is anticipated that the area from west and

north of Chicago to east of Buffalo will be a more or less uniformly and heavily populated region. Another continuous urban region is expected to stretch from east Texas along the Gulf of Mexico into west Florida. Additional, though somewhat less extensive interstate metropolitan regions are expected to exist in a number of other areas. In short, interstate metropolitan areas marked out in this study, although not as large as the illustrations just given, are much more nearly in line with what the immediate future portends than are those that OMB and the Bureau of the Census have defined.

States in which interstate metropolitan areas are located are shown in Table IX-2. By official definitions of interstate SMSA's, 32 States and the District of Columbia have parts of one or more interstate areas. By the definitions used in this study, more States (South Dakota and Mississippi) are involved, although there are 11 additional instances where State lines are crossed. Most of the additional interstate areas are in the Great Lakes States. The Rocky Mountain region is the only part of the Nation completely free of this phenomenon. The States which lead in the number of interstate SMSA's are Ohio with six, Indiana with five, and Illinois, West Virginia, and Kentucky with four each. All of these States have rivers as boundaries.

It is apparent from these statistics that close to half of the Nation's metropolitan problem is an interstate problem as well, and that well over half of the States are affected by interstate metropolitan areas. This chapter examines the special problems created where State lines divide metropolitan areas, and the governmental means by which areawide functions can be maintained despite these divisions.

It can be taken as a premise that at the very least the existence of a State line raises problems of coordination that would be less intense or absent if the same metropolitan region were entirely within a single State. One reason is that within a single State it is easier to create coordinating mechanisms. Another is that the State government itself may provide the service or perform the function on an areawide basis, thereby avoiding the need for interlocal coordination.

The ability of local governments in interstate areas, like those in other parts of the State, to make or participate in extraterritorial arrangements (e.g., interlocal cooperation) is largely determined by the State government. Communities composing an intrastate metropolitan area have a common point of departure. Their powers and responsibilities may be affected by whether they are incorporated as cities, towns or villages, but their frame of reference is a common State law. At any given time, they also deal with a single group of State officials. But communities in different States within the interstate metropolis lack many of these common elements. Two or three sets of State laws and institutions must be considered. In general, the governmental

Table IX-1

Interstate Metropolitan Areas As Defined for This Study

SMSA		1970 Population
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, Pa.-N.J.		543,551
Augusta, Ga.-S.C.		253,460
Binghamton, N.Y.-Pa.		302,672
Boston, Mass.-N.H.		3,896,730
Boston SMSA	2,753,700	
Brockton SMSA	189,820	
Fitchburg-Leominster SMSA	97,164	
Lowell SMSA	212,860	
Worcester SMSA	344,320	
Lawrence SMSA	232,415	
Nashua SMSA	66,458	
Chattanooga, Tenn.-Ga.		304,927
Chicago, Ill.-Ind.-Wis.		9,304,750
Chicago SMSA	6,978,947	
Gary-Hammond-East Chicago SMSA	633,367	
Kenosha SMSA	117,917	
Milwaukee SMSA	1,403,688	
Racine SMSA	170,838	
Cincinnati, Ohio-Ky.-Ind.		1,384,851
Columbus, Ga.-Ala.		238,584
Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, Iowa-Ill.		362,638
Duluth-Superior, Minn.-Wis.		265,350
Evansville, Ind.-Ky.		232,775
Fargo-Moorhead, N.D.-Minn.		120,238
Fort Smith, Ark.-Okla.		160,421
Huntington-Ashland, W. Va.-Ky.-Ohio		253,743
Kansas City, Mo.-Kans.		1,324,855
Kansas City SMSA	1,253,916	
Ray County, Mo.	17,599	
Leavenworth County, Kan.	53,340	
Louisville, Ky.-Ind.		826,553
Memphis, Tenn.-Ark.		806,005
Memphis SMSA	770,120	
DeSoto County, Miss.	35,885	
New York, N.Y.-N.J.-Conn.		18,679,912
New York SMSA	11,571,899	
Dutchess County, N.Y.	222,295	
Orange County, N.Y.	221,657	
Putnam County, N.Y.	56,696	
Jersey City SMSA	609,266	
Newark, SMSA	1,856,556	
Patterson SMSA	1,358,794	
Middlesex County, N.J.	583,813	
Monmouth County, N.J.	461,849	
Somerset County, N.J.	198,372	
Bridgeport SMSA	389,153	
Danbury SMSA	78,405	
Meriden SMSA	55,959	
New Haven SMSA	355,538	

Table IX-1 (Continued)

Interstate Metropolitan Areas As Defined for This Study

SMSA		1970 Population
Norwalk SMSA	120,099	
Stamford SMSA	206,419	
Waterbury SMSA	208,956	
Others in State planning districts:		
Central Naugatuck Valley,		
Greater Bridgeport, Hausatonic		
Valley, South Central,		
Southwestern	124,186	
Omaha, Nebr.-Iowa	540,142	
Parkersburg-Marietta, W.Va.-Ohio		143,978
Wood County, W. Va.	86,818	
Washington County, Ohio	57,160	
Philadelphia, Pa.-N.J.		5,621,375
Philadelphia SMSA	4,817,914	
Trenton SMSA	303,968	
Wilmington SMSA	499,493	
Portland, Ore.-Wash.		1,009,129
Providence-Pawtucket-Warwick, R.I.-Mass.		1,213,399
Providence SMSA	910,781	
Fall River SMSA	149,976	
New Bedford SMSA	152,642	
Rockford, Ill.-Wis.		404,033
Rockford SMSA	272,063	
Rock County, Wis.	131,970	
St. Louis, Mo.-Ill.		2,381,848
St. Louis SMSA	2,363,017	
Monroe County, Ill.	18,831	
Sioux City, Iowa-Nebr.		125,832
Sioux City SMSA	116,189	
Union County, S.D.	9,643	
South Bend, Ind.-Mich.		613,747
South Bend SMSA	280,031	
Elkhart County, Ind.	126,529	
Berien County, Mich.	163,875	
Cass County, Mich.	43,312	
Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke, Mass.-Conn.		1,339,082
Springfield SMSA	529,922	
Hartford SMSA	663,891	
New Britain SMSA	145,269	
Steubenville-Weirton, Ohio-W.Va.		165,627
Texarkana, Tex.-Ark.		101,198
Toledo, Ohio-Mich.		692,571
Washington, D.C.-Md.-Va.		2,861,123
Wheeling, W. Va.-Ohio		182,712
TOTAL		56,657,825

concepts, laws, and administrative patterns in the several parts of an interstate metropolitan area are more alike than dissimilar because institutions and statutes have been liberally transplanted and copied throughout the country. But specific differences are sometimes of crucial importance. The authorizations and operating requirements for waste management districts, for example, may be dissimilar on opposite sides of the boundary.⁶ Permissible methods of financing particular services may also differ. Laws governing the recruitment, qualifications, compensation, tenure, and retirement rights of public employees may be diverse.⁷ All of these elements, and more, may inhibit the development of regional institutions serving entire interstate metropolitan areas.

Furthermore, the fact that lines of authority and political interest run from the local government area to the State capital rather than from St. Louis to East St. Louis or from New York to Jersey City exerts a strong centrifugal force on the interstate metropolis. Local officials may know their counterparts and colleagues on the other side of the State line, but their natural organizational connections and ambitions are usually either tenuous or nonexistent. A mayor of Philadelphia is almost certain to feel a degree of kinship with many of his State legislators and often counts himself a member of the top echelon in one of the State political parties. He may even cherish ambitions to become governor, but there is no office common to the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware portions of his region toward which he can work or to which he is especially beholden.

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to support the view that metropolitan areas should be regarded as basic building blocks in our governmental structure even though State lines may run through them. Starting about a half century ago, our larger cities and their suburban rings began to be viewed as metropolitan regions that could benefit from being considered as socio-economic entities in need of coordinated or even common public services. The New York Regional Plan Association (a private organization) drew a circle with a 25-mile radius from New York City Hall and formulated in the 1920's what is generally credited with being the first metropolitan area regional plan. The region encompassed much territory within New York State (both within and without New York City limits) and substantial area in urbanized and urbanizing northeast New Jersey. Subsequent growth clearly established southwest Connecticut as part of this same metropolitan complex. In the 1930's, a study of Chicago alluded to its Indiana fringe and even suggested that regional government might be instituted by interstate compact.⁸

In an intrastate metropolitan area, if it is so disposed the State can encourage and facilitate areawide approaches to problems. In interstate metropolitan areas, it takes an added measure of cooperation and some specialized mechanisms to accomplish a similar result.

Short of the national level, neither the political parties nor the regular State and local governmental institutions have been given a responsibility to assure such cooperation.

Precedents for Interstate Action

Until very recent times, there have been few precedents for interstate action at the metropolitan level. Such instances as existed had to be understood in the light of their almost unique circumstances and have had limited transferability. Nevertheless, a few historical observations are worth making.

In the past, and even to the present day, a heavily disproportionate percentage of the interstate cooperation relating to metropolitan areas has been in a few centers of the northeastern United States, principally New York and Philadelphia. In part, the reason is that these head the list of the older and larger interstate metropolitan complexes. In part, the explanation is the fact that the formal movement for institutionalized interstate cooperation had its first real development in the Middle Atlantic and New England regions.

These areas continue to produce more than their share of interstate metropolitan area management activities because the pressures of the Boston-Richmond megalopolis are intense. Also, State officials whose large urban constituencies have serious intra-metropolitan boundary problems have had greater exposure than ordinary to compacts and other interstate mechanisms.

The greater New York metropolitan area has five interstate agencies established by compact,⁹ and yet another intergovernmental agency outside the metropolitan area which was brought into existence partly because of the water resources problems created by the New York area.¹⁰ In addition, the Metropolitan Regional Council (MRC) is one of the older interlocal organizations of elected officials in an interstate metropolitan area.

Philadelphia has two agencies established by compact,¹¹ and three compact agencies that operate partly within the area. It has had a number of other institutional arrangements designed to cope on a formal basis with problems resulting from or exacerbated by the interstate character of the region.¹²

There are three interstate compact agencies operating in the Washington area, two of which were established in the last decade.¹³ The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, like MRC in New York, is one of the better established interlocal organizations, but it is a non-profit corporation.

Kansas City has one interstate compact agency and an areawide planning agency established under interlocal cooperation laws. Both of these agencies are recent creations.¹⁴ St. Louis has the only other interstate metropolitan compact agency.

All 12 interstate compact agencies primarily concerned with metropolitan affairs are identified in Table

IX-3 by name, function, and area served. It can be seen from this table that eight of the 12 (two-thirds) are concerned with transportation, and that this function is treated by compact in all five of the areas where metropolitan compacts have been used. Nearly one-half of the metropolitan compacts are in the New York area, while New York and Philadelphia together account for two-thirds of such compacts.

Other interstate metropolitan areas have no compact agencies, but rely solely upon less formally established councils of governments and other coordinating organizations. Thus, one may deduce that there are in these areas insufficiently strong feelings of regional unity to bind together by formal interstate arrangements what the State lines separated. This is not to say that the residents and officials of the Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi parts of the greater Memphis region, for example, failed to understand that they lived in surroundings having a single urban core and ringed by suburban communities whose heart was the central city. That the central city was on their own or the other side of the border in no way obscured their understanding. But they did not perceive the differences that the State line made, failed to connect any really vital community problems with the jurisdictional division, could not successfully mount the extraordinary political effort required to establish a formal compact agency, or merely accepted the multistate character of their metropolis as a

natural or long-standing fact not amendable to change or circumvention. The probability of these assertions may be demonstrated by the circumstances out of which the first major interstate metropolitan area public institutions grew.

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is the oldest interstate agency, having been established in 1921. Moreover, it was created with the specific purpose of attacking a single major metropolitan area problem—transportation. But the Port Authority Compact did not develop from any metropolitan regional consciousness, even though it came into existence at the same time that the private New York Regional Plan Association was producing its pioneering plan. Rather, the problem as seen by the supporters of the Port Authority idea was how to consolidate the terminal facilities of all the long-distance railroads serving the Port of New York and how to bring them into New York City instead of dead-ending most of them on the Jersey side. At that time, the passenger commutation problem was hardly envisaged. Still less was it thought that the Port Authority Compact would later become an instrument for intraregional mass transit and overall transportation coordination—functions which the agency shares with a number of intrastate agencies in New York and New Jersey.

The Delaware River Port Authority exhibited a slightly more noticeable regional cohesiveness in its

Table IX-2

State Involvement in Interstate Metropolitan Areas*

No. of Interstate Areas per State	States Affected	
	Name	No.
6	Ohio	1
5	Indiana	1
4	Illinois, West Virginia, Kentucky	3
3	Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, Georgia, Arkansas	7
2	Connecticut, New York, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee	8
1	New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, District of Columbia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, Oregon	15
	SUBTOTAL	35
0	Maine, Vermont, North Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, California, Alaska, Hawaii	16
	TOTAL	51**

*Areas as defined in Table IX-1.

**Includes the 50 States plus the District of Columbia.

Table IX-3

Interstate Compact Agencies in Metropolitan Areas

Compact Agency	Functions	Area Served
Bi-State Development Agency	Area Transportation	Greater St. Louis
Kansas City Area Transportation Authority	Area Transportation	Greater Kansas City
Delaware River and Bay Authority*	Vehicular Transportation (Bridges)	Southern Part of Philadelphia Metropolitan Area
Delaware River Port Authority	Transportation	Greater Philadelphia
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission	Planning	Greater Philadelphia
Interstate Sanitation Commission	Water and Air Pollution Control	Greater New York City
Palisades Interstate Park Commission*	Parks and Recreation	Parts of Greater New York Area
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey	Transportation	Greater New York City
Tri-State Regional Planning Commission	Planning	Greater New York City
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor	Labor Management Relations In Shipping Industry	Port of New York
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission	Regulation of Privately Operated Transit	Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority	Mass Transit	Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area

*Agency originally not conceived in metropolitan area terms, but performs important metropolitan area functions.

original concept in that mass transit was at least envisaged.¹⁵ But as in the case of the prototype New York Port Authority, the emphasis was most strongly on long-distance transport and on port development rather than on metropolitan area problems as such. Indeed such regionwide concerns as were originally anticipated had to wait a full generation to pass beyond the rudimentary stage of Delaware River bridge crossings.¹⁶ It was not until 1969 that the agency's first mass transit carrier, a rapid rail line between New Jersey points and Philadelphia, opened for business.

Two other general observations emerge from the examination of interstate metropolitan areas. They will be illustrated below, but are set forth here for the sake of convenience. First, if the identification and solution of areal problems are to occur, a large number of participants must be involved. In each instance, these include all or substantially all of the governments of the individual local jurisdictions of the region. In addition, because of the nature and manner of evolution of the Federal system, there are included the States in which the region is located and the Federal government. The proposition that local units of government must partici-

pate needs no elaboration. The relevance of the State and Federal roles may not be so apparent. In brief, the States must be involved if the extent of cooperation across their boundaries is to proceed beyond a certain point. For example, areawide planning can be carried on by local jurisdictions in two or more States without State engagement. Programs which include authoritative or regulatory functions cannot. Here the device required is an interstate compact or an interlocal agreement with the status of an interstate compact. In either case, State action is required.

Of course, other legal devices can be used to carry on public service activities across jurisdictional lines. Among them is the nonprofit corporation. This form has some scattered use in the provision of crime laboratory facilities and perhaps for other functions as well.¹⁷ However, efforts to coopt legal forms of a normally nongovernmental character for the performance of public functions are difficult, largely because the concept of a governmental entity has important implications. To point out the most obvious, a nonprofit corporation cannot assume a regulatory function and cannot exercise taxing authority.

PUBLIC SERVICES AND FUNCTIONS

Federal involvement is increasing in metropolitan activities, including those of an interstate character. Of the greatest significance are requirements of and financial support for areawide planning and the requirement that applications for Federal financial assistance be reviewed by an areawide agency. But with few exceptions, States have not taken the initiative in developing compacts for these purposes. Consequently, interstate area COG's have usually been organized in other legal forms—often as nonprofit corporations. Where difficulties in employing the available techniques to cover all of the interstate metropolitan area have arisen, or where inertia has led to the absence of a suitable areawide agency, Federal agencies have even waived their areawide requirements—something which they do not do as readily in intrastate metropolitan areas.

Second, State and Federal activities, while they have facilitated areawide cooperation on the one hand, have placed barriers in its path on the other. An interstate compact has ordinarily been unifunctional. Such a compact tends to isolate the performance of its function from other areawide services and functions and to accord it a preferred status. The result may be that areawide coordination of a number of related functions and services is made more difficult. With respect to Federal activities, from program to program the value placed on areawide coordination appears to differ. There is a lack of uniformity in the allocation of grants. Some go directly to States and are reallocated with little thought of interstate needs. Others go directly to interstate and intrastate areawide agencies. This subject is examined fully in Chapter VI.

To isolate and assess the peculiar consequences of having a metropolitan community transected by a State boundary, four lines of inquiry are pursued below.

1. What public services and functions should be treated as areawide, and how are they affected by the presence of a State boundary?
2. Which devices for bridging multiple units of government are foreclosed or made more difficult for a metropolitan community by the presence of a State boundary?
3. What procedures and devices can be employed to bridge the State boundary?
4. What effect does the presence of a State boundary have on the institutions of representative government in a metropolitan community?

The scope of this study does not permit examination of these four questions with specific reference to all interstate metropolitan areas. Accordingly, investigation has been concentrated on the Philadelphia and Kansas City regions; somewhat less attention has been paid to the New York and Washington metropolitan areas.

There are advantages to performing certain public services or functions on an areawide basis, even when a State boundary splits the area. The functions and services that governments in contiguous States have approached in an interstate areawide manner include transportation, water supply, pollution control, solid waste management, land use, housing, health services, law enforcement, and comprehensive planning. The record of these interstate activities is examined briefly below as a means of depicting more clearly the problems being faced.

Transportation

Transportation was one of the first functions to receive areawide attention in interstate metropolitan areas. When this attention began—1919-1920—the concern was primarily with port development and improvement. More recently, the burgeoning of the automotive era and its concomitant extension of the suburban reaches of metropolitan areas have exacerbated the problems of commuter transportation and other movements of persons and goods to and from the heavily built-up central districts and within the enlarged metropolitan areas. Concurrently, there has come to be an increased reliance on air transport, and the accessibility and impact of airports within the metropolitan areas.

These developments mean that what could have been regarded at one time as an isolated matter of port development—or port development and associated rail services—has now become a multimodal transportation problem affecting all communities within the area and the interrelated matters of land use and air pollution. The transportation modes which have received interstate attention in metropolitan areas are trunk-line railroads, mass transit, highways, and airports.

Trunk-Line Railroads. The oldest form of commuter transportation is by main- or trunk-line railroads. Most major metropolitan areas at one time were well served by this means. More recently, however, rail passenger service both on a long- and short-haul basis has declined, particularly since World War II. Many areas with a formerly significant commuter rail transportation on the major railroads are now not served at all or have experienced a drastic reduction in service.

Because of the decline in service, and the resulting impact on local transportation systems, there has been discussion of subsidizing with public funds the continuation or expansion and improvement of such service. A few States have provided such subsidies individually, but the difficulty of achieving agreement concerning which government or governments should pay the subsidy and in what proportions is magnified in interstate areas. Not only must it be decided whether the State or the local

governments should pay, it must also be decided which State or which local governments should pay what proportionate shares. If the central city is in one State and the suburban area is concentrated in another, the problem is much more difficult.

In the New York Metropolitan Area, the State of New York by direct appropriations subsidizes commuter rail travel entering New York City from the north and from Long Island.¹⁸ It is party to a compact with Connecticut¹⁹ under which the two States appropriate funds to support commuter rail service to and from points in Connecticut and New York City. In effect, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a joint agency of the two States, subsidizes rail commuter service between points in New York State and New Jersey and New York City by commingling revenues from its profitable and unprofitable operations, including the unprofitable Hudson and Manhattan Tubes.²⁰ Currently the Port Authority is extending rail commuter facilities to serve more points in New York (Long Island) and New Jersey. To what extent either or both will be profitable or unprofitable cannot be foretold at this time.

New Jersey has enacted comprehensive legislation to insure that adequate commuter and other passenger rail and bus services are maintained.²¹ The law authorizes the Commuter Operating Agency in the Department of Transportation to enter into contracts with private rail and motor bus carriers to conserve and improve passenger service in the State or between points in the State and others outside it. This has been done in several instances.²²

Thus, each of the several parts of the Greater New York Metropolitan Area has attacked the commuter rail problem, and a certain amount of interstate cooperation has been achieved. However, it would be incorrect to assume that all of this effort constitutes an approach to metropolitan areawide rail transportation service. Connecticut has concentrated on assuring means of getting its people to and from New York City, and New Jersey has performed in a similar fashion. The city has grappled with the problem of interconnecting railroads with its subway system within its own borders. New York State has also centered its attention on this problem, and on getting people between the suburban and central city points within the State. It has also cooperated separately with New Jersey through the Port Authority on the transit needs of people going between New York City and the Jersey portion of the metropolitan area. But no one has tied the whole effort together.

Once the expanse of water constituting New York Harbor was traversed by the Hudson and Manhattan Tubes, it could be said that the desirability of interconnecting the metropolitan area communities with an interconnected rail and subway system was not to be measured by whether territory and population were in

New York or New Jersey. It might be as reasonable to connect the Bronx and Jersey City so as to have a continuous line for passengers to use without transfer as to have one for travel from the Bronx to Brooklyn. However, it can readily be observed that consolidations and interconnections have occurred within the New York part of the metropolitan area much more readily than between New York and New Jersey points. Surely, part of the reason is that the several New York subway lines, although originally operated as separate entities, are all within the State of New York. Even some interchanges of trackage and rights of way between the subway system and the Long Island Railroad have been made or are under construction.

There is an areawide planning organization (the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission) and there has been no dearth of plans to interconnect the underharbor rapid rail system, the subway system, the Long Island Railroad, and even the commuter services of the Penn Central, New Haven railroad and railroads terminating on the Jersey side, thus producing a consolidated system on which passengers could go anywhere in the entire tristate metropolitan area. However, the only consolidations on the Jersey side have been those forced by bankruptcies and mergers of some of the long-distance railroads, which have resulted in consolidations of terminal facilities. Integration of the several operating lines on a cross-harbor basis is still to be achieved.

A similar situation has emerged in the Philadelphia area. The New Jersey legislation mentioned above applies here as well as in New York. In addition, Pennsylvania has a comprehensive program of assistance for rail and bus mass transit. One law creates the Pennsylvania Transportation Assistance Authority,²³ which is empowered to acquire, construct, improve, equip, and lease, either as lessor or lessee, projects for passenger transportation and to fix rentals, charges, and fees for their use. It may enter into agreements, including agreements for the joint ownership of projects, with any private or public entity, including an interstate compact agency, that performs transportation services in any part of the Commonwealth. It may lease a project to either the Department of Commerce or the Department of Community Affairs or, through either, to a local transportation organization, i.e., a political subdivision or a port or mass transportation authority organized pursuant to State law or an interstate compact.

Complementary to this statute is another which authorizes the Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs to make grants to both public and private carriers rendering service in urban areas,²⁴ the purposes of which are to purchase necessary service if the carrier is taking or will take continuing action to improve service and hold losses to a minimum. The same legislation authorizes any county or municipality in a metropolitan area which is a member of a local transportation organization to make annual grants to the organization

to assist in defraying its operations, maintenance, and debt service costs, and to enter into long-range agreements for these purposes.

These two Pennsylvania statutes provide essentially the same set of approaches to the problem as the single New Jersey law discussed earlier, but Pennsylvania goes one step further and authorizes the creation of a transportation authority,²⁵ an agency of the State, in any metropolitan area.²⁶ The aim is to make possible the development of an integrated mass transportation system in a metropolitan area, including commuter rail, rapid rail, and bus facilities. The legislation also permits counties and municipalities within the metropolitan area to make agreements among themselves and with the authority whereby they will provide for meeting the authority's capital and operating budgets. It was pursuant to this additional law that the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) was established to serve the Pennsylvania portion of the Philadelphia Metropolitan area—composed of the combined City and County of Philadelphia and four other Pennsylvania counties (Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery). A major focus of SEPTA activity has been on improving rail commuter passenger service.

Despite similar legislative approaches in both States and a common planning mechanism—the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission—there is no unified authority in the Philadelphia area concerned with commuter rail travel patterns other than those to the central city; the commuter rail systems in the different States remain separate.

Mass Transit. A goal of transportation planners is the development and implementation of a balanced areawide transportation system. In a metropolitan area, the most pressing need in the achievement of this goal is the realization of an appropriate balance in moving people by private passenger automobile and mass transit. In smaller metropolitan regions, mass transit could be by bus. In larger ones, these means would be supplemented by rapid rail transit systems.

Although passenger service by rapid rail, including subway, has been used for many years in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston, these examples have not been copied widely. The exceptions are of recent date. In Philadelphia, an interstate rapid rail line went into operation in 1969. Also, as previously stated, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is extending its services. The only other interstate subway under construction is a system to serve the Washington, D.C. area. Legal authorization to build such systems exists in only two other interstate metropolitan areas, St. Louis and Kansas City.

The development of a rapid rail system is extremely costly. Commitment of funds of the magnitude necessary is a major problem in any case, but in an interstate metropolitan area working out a satisfactory arrange-

ment among all parties is even more difficult. Strong legal authority is required for success. No voluntary cooperative arrangement of an impermanent nature would be acceptable to secure such financial commitments.

The Washington case shows how difficult it can be to establish an interstate transit authority. Legally the parties to the compact creating the agency are Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.²⁷ But the parties in interest also include the Federal government and the local governments in the two States which, with the District of Columbia, make up the Washington metropolitan area. The Compact became effective in 1966, but its beginnings were much earlier. Not surprisingly, given the number of parties involved and the anticipated magnitude of the proposed undertaking, negotiations were protracted and difficult. Among other things to be settled were the areal jurisdiction of the proposed agency; how and by whom it would be governed; the functions it would perform; the place of the local governments in the scheme of things; the role, if any, of the Federal government; the respective financial responsibilities of the parties and their political subdivisions; and the relationship of the proposed agency to the signatory parties, their political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including joint agencies, the Federal government, and private entities. Perhaps not surprisingly, too, some matters apparently settled in 1966 were altered in subsequent years.

As approved finally, the Compact provided for the creation of a transit zone embracing the District of Columbia; the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax; and the counties of Arlington and Fairfax in Virginia and Montgomery and Prince George's in Maryland. It created an interjurisdictional agency, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). The governing body of the Authority is made up of six members—two each from the District of Columbia, the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission, and the Washington Suburban Transit Commission.²⁸ The latter two organizations were set up pursuant to Virginia and Maryland enactments respectively to cooperate with the WMATA—or Metro as it is better known—in the development and implementation of a transportation plan for the area.²⁹ The laws setting up these special districts and their agencies are not identical, but it is fair to state that they function as coordinating agencies for the general purpose governments in their respective States and as intermediaries between them and Metro. The responsibility to provide funds, however, remains with the several local governments pursuant to such procedures as their respective State laws provide and, in the case of the District of Columbia, as Congress may appropriate. Metro is eligible for Federal mass transit grants, loans, and loan guarantees.

In less than a year, Metro adopted a proposed

regional rapid transit system for presentation in a series of public hearings. On March 1, 1968, following such hearings, the Metro board adopted a 97.2-mile system (subsequently revised to 97.7 miles). In November 1968, referenda in each of five of the suburban jurisdictions approved overwhelmingly the issuance of bonds to finance the respective local shares of Metro capital costs. The county governing body in the sixth took the same action. In February 1969, the Metro board adopted a revised plan calling for 97.7 miles of track at an estimated cost of \$2.495 billion. By June 1969, all of the suburban jurisdictions had signed contracts with Metro obligating them to pay their respective shares toward construction costs. Then in December 1969, legislation was passed to provide \$1.147 billion in Federal funds to Metro over a ten-year period.

But the history of Metro has been one of recurrent crisis because of the special role of Congress in the District of Columbia. In August 1968, Congress approved the District of Columbia appropriations act without providing funds for the District of Columbia's fiscal year 1969 capital contribution to Metro. The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968 had required that the District of Columbia move ahead on several highway projects, including construction of the Three Sisters Bridge to carry Interstate Highway 266 across the Potomac River from Arlington County, the Potomac River Freeway, also a section of Interstate 266 located entirely within the District of Columbia, and two segments of Interstate Highway 95, the Center and East Legs of the Inner Loop.³⁰ The latter two projects represented highway extensions entering the District of Columbia from Maryland.

These projects were highly controversial both within the city and in the suburban jurisdictions through which they were intended to pass, in particular the Three Sisters Bridge, which was taken to court in 1969.³¹ In any event, dissatisfied with the progress—or lack of it as seen by Congress—its appropriations action amounted to its holding Metro construction funds hostage to District of Columbia compliance with the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act directive. Not until late 1969 did the City Council vote under great pressure to proceed with the Three Sisters Bridge and study further or take action on the other projects. The Secretary of Transportation approved the bridge construction, the impasse over construction funds was broken, and fiscal year 1969 and 1970 funds were appropriated.

However, in June 1970, the D.C. Court of Appeals handed down a decision halting construction of the Three Sisters Bridge, and the House of Representatives again refused to appropriate money for the District of Columbia's share of construction costs. This time the Congressional attitude brought threats from other jurisdictions to withhold their contributions. This rerun of the previous controversy was not resolved until

December 1971, when the House of Representatives, after two futile attempts by Metro proponents, finally reversed itself by appropriating money for both fiscal year 1971 and 1972.

While this situation was unique to the Nation's capital, a similar situation could occur whenever one or more State legislatures become involved in providing direct appropriations to a compact agency. This is simply a result of the normal legislative process, but in interstate areas the opportunities for disagreement increase proportionately to the number of States involved.

Two other matters should be mentioned in connection with Metro, because of their relevance to problems faced by other large interstate areas. Legislation enacted in the waning days of the 92nd Congress authorized Metro to purchase and to operate the several private bus companies providing commuter service in the Washington area.³² Earlier both Maryland and Virginia had enacted legislation to amend the compact to this end.³³ Although this was a logical step in coordinating rapid rail and bus operations, it was the financial problems of the private bus companies, not logic, that supplied the real impetus to action in the Washington area.

Another matter resolved in the second session of the 92nd Congress was Federal guarantee of Metro bonds.³⁴ The construction financing plan for the system contemplates the issuance of \$882 million of such bonds. Because deficits are normal in mass transit operations, such bonds, unless backed by a Federal, State, or other general government guarantee, do not represent attractive investments. In this case, it was felt that they could not be sold without such a guarantee. The Federal role in providing this guarantee made it unnecessary to obtain such guarantees from the individual States. However, under present circumstances, an important difference between Federal and State guarantees should be noted. Where States have provided guarantees for bonds of authorities or subdivisions, an element of their attractiveness to investors has been their tax exempt status. Metro bonds carry no such exemptions.

In Philadelphia, the Lindenwold-Philadelphia rapid transit facility did not have such a stormy course as the Washington Metro. Legal authorization for rapid rail transit construction and operation was contained in the Delaware Port Authority (DPA) Compact as originally enacted in 1931, but it was not until the early 1960's that serious interest was expressed in such an undertaking. From then until the rapid rail line was opened in early 1969 matters moved without the fits and starts that characterized the Washington Metro experience. One reason for this was that an interstate agency with legal authorization was already in being. There was no need to go through the extensive process of negotiation, proposal, counter-proposal, and inevitable compromise. Moreover, the agency had an extended record of achievement in other aspects of transportation. It

operated two major bridges and a ferry and had undertaken a host of activities to improve and promote the Ports of Philadelphia (now called Ameriport). It had a record so far as investors were concerned and it could pledge a portion of the revenues from its profitable bridge operations for payment of the bonds it needed to issue to build the rapid rail line.³⁵

However, proposed extensions of the line and even the purchase of new cars to improve service or to handle an increase in patronage on the existing line will not be possible from current Port Authority surpluses. It may be that, after the Philadelphia-Pennsauken and Chester-Bridgeport Bridges are opened in 1974 and producing significant toll revenues, the Port Authority will be in a better position financially. Nevertheless, the regional plan calls for 50.7 miles of additional track in the interstate DPA system at an estimated cost of \$189 million in 1968 dollars.³⁶ The Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission³⁷ has also projected major extensions and other capital improvements for the other rapid rail systems operated by SEPTA and the City of Philadelphia. Thus, it is likely that Federal or State bond guarantees and/or grants will be needed to make the proposed extensions and other improvements feasible.

Interestingly, one project in the regional plan would provide a downtown subsurface connection between the Penn Central and Reading rail terminals. It would permit travelers on either line to continue their journeys on the other without having to change trains.

Still, there appear to be no definite commitments at the present time to make the several rail and rapid rail systems operable as an integrated unit, or even to do so with respect to the rapid rail lines operated by Philadelphia, SEPTA, and the Delaware Port Authority. As a matter of fact, except for one current rail connection between Camden and Philadelphia, at which point the Penn Central runs northward from Philadelphia on the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware River until it crosses at Trenton, the 1985 plan includes no interstate rail connection. Regarding rapid transit, the only present and projected boundary crossing is that of the Lindenwood-Philadelphia line. It is almost as if there were two separate mass transit plans to serve the Philadelphia-Camden area—one for the Pennsylvania portion and the other for Jersey.

Given the magnitude of the sums involved, it may be unrealistic to contemplate anything more by 1985 than what the mass transit plan includes. This may be a necessary compromise with reality, but the plan will do little to facilitate movement in the Philadelphia area from a point on one side of the river to a point on the other side. Rail connections between the States in the Philadelphia-Camden area will continue to be limited to two. By contrast, as will be discussed below, there will be three new highway bridge crossings and a circumferential highway around the Philadelphia-Camden area, spurred by strong Federal interstate highway policies

unmatched in the transit field.

The situation with respect to commuter travel by bus is analogous in many respects to that of commuter travel by main- or trunk-line railroad. Although the reduction in service due to loss of patronage has not been so severe, the difficulty of working out arrangements to increase patronage, improve service, and strengthen the financial position of the carriers, including the employment of subsidies, applies as well to bus as to commuter railroad operations. There are, however, many fewer examples of subsidies for commuter bus operations in interstate metropolitan areas. In major part, this is due to the fact that most such operations are carried on solely, or for the most part, in the central city or other large cities of such complexes. These operations are now publicly owned and are able to make up deficits from other municipal revenues. As a matter of fact, until the end of 1972, Washington was the only large interstate metropolitan area in which private bus companies operated commuter services, and their losses were a major factor in the legislative decision to authorize their being taken over by a public agency.³⁸

One example of an interstate metropolitan area commuter bus operation involving a subsidy is furnished by the Kansas City Area Transportation Agency. It illustrates vividly the difficulties of working out an adequate cost-sharing arrangement satisfactory to the jurisdictions served. The Kansas City Area Transportation Agency came into existence in 1965 pursuant to an agreement entered into by Missouri and Kansas.³⁹ The Area Transportation Agency (ATA) is empowered to "... plan, construct, operate and maintain, or ... lease ... for operation and maintenance, passenger transportation systems and facilities, either upon, above or below the ground."

An early decision of ATA was to acquire the several bus companies operating in the area with the help of a grant from the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Allocations of the local matching funds were made on the basis of a formula which combined population and existing public transit service in the ten local jurisdictions included. Just over two-thirds of the total was allocated to Kansas City, Missouri. No other allocation amounted to as much as ten percent. Overall, Kansas jurisdictions had to bear only 20 percent, while Missouri jurisdictions had to bear the balance. By 1970 ATA had acquired all the transit companies operating in the area and consolidated them in one system.

Even before it completed its acquisitions, however, it was obvious that ATA was in financial difficulties. Its 1969 operations resulted in a loss.⁴⁰ In January 1970, it was forced to raise fares. Not surprisingly, this led to a reduction in the number of passengers carried. Early in 1971, a drastic reduction in service was instituted. Also, in 1971, legislation was introduced in both Kansas and Missouri to authorize ATA to levy a tax within the area of the transit district. The Kansas legislature adjourned

without taking action, but the Missouri legislation passed a law to enable Kansas City to levy a one-half cent sales tax to subsidize ATA capital expenditures and operations.⁴¹ Kansas City enacted such an ordinance, effective July 1, 1971, through December 31, 1971, and it has been extended twice since the latter date. The ordinance required as conditions that Kansas City representatives participate in all ATA Commission meetings and approve in advance any expenditure for funds from the revenues realized from the sales tax.

The Kansas City action was predicated on the hope that other jurisdictions served by ATA would make contributions. So far this hope has proved to be largely illusory. Only Independence has voted a subsidy, although the ATA resident manager stated in mid-August 1972 that up to \$100,000 might be realized in that year from such contributions.⁴² A measure of the need for the sales tax revenue and additional subsidization may be obtained from his estimate made at the same time that in 1972 the system would earn \$6.2 million from farebox revenue and receive \$4.6 million from Kansas City, Missouri. Operating expenses were anticipated to be \$10.3 million.

To reduce its losses, placate Kansas City, and bring in those jurisdictions not contributing, ATA has reduced services drastically in such jurisdictions. It has instituted a downtown Kansas City, Missouri, shuttle-bus system with a nominal fare. It inaugurated a number of express runs, reduced the number of other runs, and rerouted many more. It has purchased 110 new buses for service beginning in January 1973.⁴³ While these are worthwhile actions, they do not solve the problems of ATA. For example, to what extent can the Authority reduce or eliminate service in outlying jurisdictions without doing injury to commuter operations that benefit Kansas City?

The ATA dilemma has produced a spate of activity at the State level in Missouri. The House of Representatives set up a special committee to study ATA operations and try to devise solutions for its problems.⁴⁴ The Governor created a task force with a broader mission, *i.e.*, to study all municipal transit systems. He called on the governors of Kansas and Illinois to join in this effort in the bistate areas of Kansas City and St. Louis respectively.⁴⁵

It is impossible to foresee what will be resolved by all this activity. While it would appear from preliminary indications that the combination of the fare increase in 1971 and the reductions in service in both 1971 and 1972 has benefited the financially hard-pressed agency, it is even more apparent that stronger measures will be required to improve service, replace equipment, increase patronage, and insure a profitable operation. There must be assistance between the Federal government, the States, or the jurisdictions which make up the transit district. The Missouri law pursuant to which Kansas City levies its sales tax in support of the system is due to expire September 1, 1973. Some sharing of the load by

other jurisdictions in both States must be achieved. It should be pointed out that, although the Kansas legislature refused to act on the proposal that ATA be empowered to tax, it passed a law in 1970 to authorize its local jurisdictions served by ATA to levy a property tax the proceeds of which would go to the Transit Authority.⁴⁶ None as yet has levied such a tax.

Subsidization is but one aspect of the common carrier problem, however. Service, fares, financing, and other matters are subject to regulation. Generally speaking, interstate operations are under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, while intrastate operations are under the jurisdiction of those States in which they take place. Unless special arrangements can be worked out, the integration of rail or bus passenger transportation operations and service in an interstate metropolitan area is much more difficult to achieve than in an intrastate metropolitan area. The Washington metropolitan area furnishes the only example of a mechanism for doing so. There the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, set up by interstate agreement among Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, is empowered, with certain exceptions, to regulate fares, services, and other matters incident to transportation of persons for hire within the district created by the compact.⁴⁷ However, bus and subway operations owned by WMATA are not subject to such regulation pursuant to Article XVI, 77, of the Compact.

To achieve maximum economy in operations and optimum service to passengers, the several types of transit should be either unified or coordinated. This is an objective of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended.⁴⁸ This Act sets forth requirements that must be met to establish eligibility for two-thirds Federal funding for capital grants for mass transportation facilities and equipment in metropolitan areas. These include specific planning requirements. They are that (1) the project must be part of a short-term, areawide transit development program; (2) the transit development program must be based on long-range areawide transportation planning which covers both transit and highways; (3) transportation planning must be part of long-range comprehensive planning; and (4) comprehensive planning must be conceived and carried out to attain urban area goals and objectives under the policy direction of local elected officials.⁴⁹ The "areawide" requirement must be met despite the splitting of a metropolitan area by State lines.

To further the achievement of this planning, the Department of Transportation in the latter half of 1971 instituted a system of consolidated grants for technical studies in mass transportation planning. This action represents a recognition that there is in the typical metropolitan area an array of agencies with planning, regulatory, and operational responsibilities for mass transportation. By centralizing the flow of Federal planning grants through one agency for the whole area

DOT intends to achieve coordination of the transit-related activities of several agencies.

An illustration of how this consolidated grants program helps to unify an interstate area is furnished by the Washington metropolitan area. In that region, nine agencies whose jurisdictions cover all or major parts of the area have transit-related responsibilities.⁵⁰ The Metropolitan Washington COG is the instrument that has been selected to administer the consolidated grant for the whole interstate area, even though several of the agencies sharing in the work program have responsibilities only within a single-State portion of the area. The work includes: (1) improvements to the existing bus system; (2) consolidation and integration of the existing system with the rapid rail system under construction; (3) transit station impact studies; (4) transit station access studies; and (5) development of new programs. The several studies are being made or managed variously: by COG alone, jointly by COG and one or more of the other agencies with transit-related responsibilities, or by one or more of such other agencies pursuant to agreement with COG.

Similar interstate arrangements have been negotiated in the New York metropolitan area with the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, in the Kansas City area with the Mid-America Regional Council, and in the Philadelphia area with the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission. Of these, that of New York represents the closest approximation to date of the aim of the Department of Transportation to secure true intermodal transportation planning. Toward that end, DOT has established an Intermodal Planning Group in each of its ten regional offices. A primary aim of these groups is to find a single agency in each metropolitan area to and through which grants can be made to develop a unified transportation planning work program.

Highways. By far the greater number of persons who commute do so in private automobiles. Decisions concerning the location of major highways which carry much of the commuter traffic are made by State highway departments, subject to the approval of the U.S. Department of Transportation when Federal aid is used.⁵¹ In less densely populated regions, these decisions can be made on the basis of fewer or less complex considerations than must be observed in metropolitan areas. In heavily built-up areas, there is an increasing popular concern with social and physical environmental effects to the extent that proposed highway locations are being protested successfully, and certain projects have even been halted after construction has begun.

If only one State is involved, the possibility of resolving such controversies is better than if the policy making bodies and citizenry of more than one State must be satisfied. In the latter case, finding "trade-offs" on which to build a satisfactory solution is much more difficult.

The difference can be seen clearly, for example, by

comparing the intrastate Baltimore metropolitan area with the interstate Washington metropolitan area. A circumferential route encircles the urban core in both areas. The Baltimore metropolitan area has done markedly better than the Washington area in fashioning its circumferential route.

The reason is not hard to find. In the planning, design, and construction of the Baltimore circumferential highway, substantial control was exercised by the State Roads Commission because the road is entirely within the State of Maryland. Where the road was sited, how many lanes it would have and where there would be interchanges were among the matters that the State agency could decide or press to resolution. In the Washington area, on the other hand, jurisdiction was divided between Maryland and Virginia. One result of this sharing is that the Maryland portion of the beltway consists of six and even eight lanes, while the Virginia portion is four for the most part. Although the decision has finally been made to widen the Beltway in Virginia, it will be many years before this decision can be fully implemented. Thus, the major functions—enabling through traffic to bypass the city and facilitating movement within the area without penetrating the core—is not fully realized by such a circumferential highway.

The State is a regional government under our system. It exists, and it has a full component of powers, an organized apparatus, and orderly procedures for implementing comprehensive metropolitan transportation plans. By contrast, at best what is accomplished in an interstate metropolitan area must be achieved by agencies with no power to compel, or by those created for a specific purpose or purposes and endowed with limited powers. Under the circumstances, what has been achieved in such areas is cause for approbation, not the reverse. Where an interstate body with power to adopt an official highway plan exists, it can produce a measure of coordination normally available in intrastate areas. In the New York, Philadelphia, and Kansas City areas, the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, and the Mid-America Regional Council⁵² respectively, are interstate agencies recognized by State laws for the performance of the planning function.

Comprehensive areawide transportation planning is required in all urban areas of more than 50,000 population, including interstate areas, to qualify for Federal highway construction grants. The law stipulates that such grants not be approved unless they are "based on a continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by State and local governments . . ."⁵³ As with Federal urban mass transportation planning requirements, the areawide dimension must be satisfied despite the intervention of State lines.

This, of course, is a Federal requirement, not of State

or local law, and much of the resulting interstate planning has not been recognized by State laws. Apart from such coercive force as there may be in the Federal law impelling them to consider the highway plans for their respective metropolitan areas, State and local highway construction agencies are not bound by such plans. Presumably they would be guided to a degree, but, particularly in the matter of priority in construction, there would be competition for funds from other quarters. Projects in other parts of a State, for example, have been known to take precedence over metropolitan area projects in the view of the highway agency of one State or the other. Also, a bond issue for metropolitan area projects might be approved in one State, defeated in the other.

Although the Federal Highway Administration plays a role in the implementation of areawide plans, it is an informal and limited one. Staging of construction, unlike standards of construction, is not subject to Federal review. Nevertheless, because of the intimate relationship of one to the other, plans for both receive Federal comment long before project plans are presented for approval. At such times and because they are aware of planning in each of the several State portions of the area, there are opportunities for Federal officials to try to secure such staging of projects as will contribute to the early development of a regionwide system.

However, despite the Federal role, much can occur in either of two States, or in their political subdivisions, to make impossible or to delay the implementation of coordinated transportation plans. To use a musical analogy, what is sought is harmony by a chorus which has no director. There is no agency in an interstate metropolitan area comparable to the State in an intrastate metropolitan area, which can, if it chooses, coerce orderly implementation.

Airports. Although the regional impact of airports has been recognized for many years, in only one interstate metropolitan area (New York) is there an overall airport service agency—the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. In only one other interstate metropolitan area, that of St. Louis,⁵⁴ is it even possible to establish a system to serve an entire region under present legal authorization.

In the Kansas City metropolitan area the transportation plan takes cognizance of the Kansas City International Airport that opened in November 1972, but that facility is owned and operated by Kansas City, Missouri.⁵⁵ It is not a regional institution legally, although it is obvious that it will serve the rest of the metropolitan area as well as Kansas City.

In the Washington area there are three major airports. Washington National and Dulles International Airports, both owned by the Federal government, are located in Virginia. Friendship International Airport was owned and operated by the City of Baltimore until recently when, after experiencing financial difficulties for years,

it was taken over by the State of Maryland, at least in part to relieve Baltimore of the burden. Coincidentally, the Federal government has proposed selling its airports, the only such commercial facilities it owns. Efforts to establish an interstate airport agency or to make it possible in any way to operate the three airports as elements of a regional utility have elicited almost no interest.⁵⁶ In fact, they have been opposed by some who support their operation by individual States or local governments.

The development of larger aircraft capable of flying greater distances between stops has brought about a reduction in the number of markets served by such planes but an expansion of the size of the market areas. Under these circumstances, the refusal of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area to understand, or at least to act on the understanding, that airports are a regional utility produces some obvious inequities.

When Friendship International Airport was owned and operated by Baltimore it served that city and its environs, but it served also, and to substantial extent, the Washington metropolitan area. Why should Baltimore have borne the entire operational and financial burden for these services? The change of ownership to the State of Maryland tips the scales but does not balance them. The State can justify its assuming the responsibility of assuring air services to the Baltimore metropolitan area and the Maryland suburbs of Washington, but the District of Columbia and its Virginia suburbs continue to benefit at no cost to themselves. Should, as has been proposed,⁵⁷ an agency of Virginia or of the Virginia portion of the Washington metropolitan area purchase and assume operational responsibility for Washington National and Dulles International Airports, an equally incongruous situation would be produced. Then that State or portions of it would furnish the District of Columbia and its Maryland suburbs service without charge.

In the Greater Philadelphia metropolitan area there are four airports—Philadelphia International, North Philadelphia, Mercer County (Trenton) and Wilmington. From none of the latter three is it possible to schedule a long, non-stop flight. In other words, convenience dictates that anyone residing in the respective areas served by the three smaller airports use Philadelphia International Airport for much if not most of his air travel. What the situation amounts to is that the City of Philadelphia owns and operates a facility—Philadelphia International—that serves the entire metropolitan region.

Until areawide airport planning and implementation programs are realized, the inequities described above will remain uncorrected. In the New York metropolitan area the first step has been taken. There, operational control of the major facilities—LaGuardia, Kennedy, and Newark Airports—is exercised by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Even that step is incomplete, however, in that the smaller airports—Westchester

County and Islip, both in New York—are not operated by the Port Authority. In addition, Connecticut, the third State in the tri-State region, is not party to the Port Authority Compact.

Integration of airport planning into metropolitan area intermodal transportation planning has not progressed very far. No grants so far awarded by the Federal Aviation Agency have been commingled with others toward this end, presumably FAA procedures will be made to accommodate to the departmental goal in the reasonably near future.

Housing

There has seldom been satisfaction of the areawide need for provision of a sufficient number of safe, sanitary housing units of adequate size available to households of all income levels located within reasonable access to job opportunities. The first areal approach was that of the Dayton metropolitan area—an intrastate region. More recently, at least two other intrastate metropolitan complexes have initiated serious work on the problem—Sacramento and the southeastern Wisconsin region. The first interstate region to act was the Washington metropolitan area, joined now by the Kansas City and Philadelphia interstate metropolitan areas.⁵⁸

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments has developed a “fair share housing formula,” the purposes of which are stated in a series of related principles.⁵⁹ They are:

1. All residents of a local jurisdiction should have the opportunity to be accommodated in housing units which are comfortable, safe, and sanitary.
2. All residents of a local jurisdiction should have the opportunity to be accommodated in housing units of adequate size.
3. Those persons who work in a local jurisdiction should have the opportunity to live there if they so desire.
4. The number of households which should be accommodated in a local jurisdiction should be limited to those which could feasibly be absorbed in the jurisdiction in terms of vacant land or unutilized housing stock in the jurisdiction.
5. The number of low- and moderate-income households located in a local jurisdiction should be proportionate to the jurisdiction's ability to pay for the needed public services which accompany these units.
6. Low- and moderate-income housing should be located within easy access of job opportunities.

7. Over-concentrations of low- and moderate-income housing should be avoided.

These principles address housing problems which are current in most if not all metropolitan areas of significant size. They indicate that metropolitan housing problems are not soluble unless specific action is taken in furtherance of housing policy objectives in an interjurisdictional manner. Because the subsidized housing units to be distributed are provided through local initiative almost exclusively with Federal funds, the States have not been involved significantly up to now. Thus, there is little difference at present between intrastate and interstate areawide housing programs. As the States develop their own housing programs, the special interstate implications may become more significant. An areawide housing policy may become more difficult to follow in an interstate metropolitan area than in one located entirely in one State. For example, in the Washington area, Maryland has recently enacted a mortgage assistance program to fill the gap between the Federal programs and the private market, but Virginia and the District of Columbia have not. In the New York area, the New York State Urban Development Corporation has a major program of housing dispersal, which is unmatched in either the New Jersey or Connecticut parts of the region.

To a greater or lesser extent, the metropolitan areas are composed of heavily urbanized cores largely populated by those whose incomes are low to moderate. Surrounding the core, both inside and outside of the central city, are generally more affluent households. Such housing and related programs as slum clearance, urban renewal, public housing, and housing mortgage guarantee and direct loan activities have tended to exacerbate this situation until recently. Meanwhile, the stepped-up Federal highway building program inaugurated in 1956 facilitated the movement of industry and commercial sites (and jobs) outside the more heavily urbanized areas.⁶⁰

Suburban policies regarding land use control and building codes have contributed to the disparity in types and income levels of housing between the central city and its environs. Concerning the last, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations published a report in 1966 describing the anarchy among jurisdictions in their code requirements.⁶¹ A year earlier ACIR dealt with such matters as using the power to zone to make available more housing for low-income households and means to disperse such housing.⁶²

While the Federal government might well have a significant impact on achieving a fair distribution of new low- and moderate-income housing through its own funding decisions, the local initiative must also be cultivated throughout the metropolitan area. Constitutionally there is no barrier to a local housing authority being interjurisdictional and even interstate. Special

districts can be established across State lines as they have been in other functional fields. But while there are a few interjurisdictional (county) housing authorities, to our knowledge no proposal has ever been made seriously for the creation of an interstate housing authority. The significance of this from an areawide point of view is that central cities almost always have housing authorities, while many suburban jurisdictions do not. Thus, even an agreement about dispersing low- and moderate-income housing units may not be sufficient to get them built.

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments was realistic in designing its approach to implementation of the fair-share principles through individual localities. This does not disguise the difficulty of achieving the fair-share housing proposal, however. The concept was accepted in principle by eight of its 15 member jurisdictions within nine months, and a detailed allocation agreement has been worked out between the local governments and HUD. HUD promised additional units to help this agreement work by assuring that despite the redistribution, no jurisdiction would receive fewer units than it had in the past.⁶³ Prior to impoundment of Federal housing funds, it was thought that the last remaining hurdle to realizing an interstate redistribution of the HUD housing units in metropolitan Washington was to generate enough local applications to use up the allocations.

Land-Use Planning and Control

Land-use control measures and building codes are matters within the purview of the States, but the general policy has been to delegate to local jurisdictions the power to exercise these controls. Still there is a Federal ingredient:

Certainly the Federal influence is significant in the establishment of building materials and products standards, in the home mortgage guarantee programs respecting building code requirements and in the encouragement of development and adoption of local building codes and even in their enforcement. Statewide industrialized housing laws have been enacted in several States because of the expressed interests of the Federal government, and a number of States now have statewide building codes which take effect where local codes are absent or inadequate.

Concerning land-use control, in addition to the requirements of the Federal Flood Insurance Act that there be flood plain management in an area as a condition precedent to issuance of insurance, Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954 has spurred local planning and zoning and regional planning activities. It may be anticipated that the recently enacted Coastal Zone Management Act⁶⁴ will increase markedly the Federal influence over land development control in

coastal areas, through State involvement. It should also be noted that national land use policy legislation is now pending in Congress, and several States have already begun preparing to take on the enlarged State role anticipated by this legislation.

The diversity in building codes and land-use controls from jurisdiction to jurisdiction has limited or made impossible the achievement of more nearly balanced housing, land development, and property tax patterns over an urbanized area—major aims of a comprehensive land-use program. The diversity is greatest in interstate areas because of differences in State enabling acts for local action. Now that the States are becoming more directly involved in these matters through their own action, there is added potential for different approaches being followed within a single metropolitan area. The entrance of the States into this field may mean that interlocal coordination by itself will not be sufficient to achieve comprehensive land-use program coordination.

There is an accelerating trend for the State to assume some of the zoning function. Although Hawaii is the only State so far to have effectively assumed the zoning authority, Alaska and Oregon have moved in that direction. Massachusetts was among the first in asserting what amounts to zoning control over estuarine areas. Maine and Vermont pioneered with respect to large-scale development.⁶⁵ Even before the enactment of the Federal Flood Insurance Act⁶⁶ in 1968, at least 15 States had laws governing encroachment on and use of land in flood plains. Following the Federal enactment, Texas was the first State to approve legislation to qualify its residents for flood insurance.⁶⁷ In 1972, Florida enacted a statewide land and water management act to define areas of critical State concern and to regulate their growth and development. Local and regional implementation is provided subject to State control.⁶⁸

At the interstate level, the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, pursuant to Article 6.2 of the Compact among the United States and the States of Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania, has the authority to delineate lands subject to flooding and establish standards for flood plain use throughout the basin.⁶⁹ The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (California and Nevada) is also empowered to develop enforceable land-use plans.⁷⁰ These are the only current instances of interstate land-use control authority.

Far greater State and Federal involvement in land-use planning and control will result from the recently enacted Public Law 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280. It authorizes Federal grants to States to develop and administer coastal zone management programs. The coastal zone, as defined by statute, includes coastal and Great Lakes waters and adjacent shorelands which strongly influence each other. These are areas where the great interstate megalopolises are developing.

To be eligible for grants, States must submit to the

Secretary of Commerce plans which, among other things, provide that the State is responsible for land-and water-use planning and regulation in the coastal zone. States may elect to act directly or to review actions of others, including local governments. With respect to interstate areas, Public Law 92-583 requires merely that a State coordinate its plans with those of appropriate areawide, regional, and interstate agencies, and permits it to delegate to such agencies implementation responsibilities subject to their acting in accordance with the State plan. Otherwise, except to the degree that the Federal framework might facilitate interstate coordination, the law is oriented toward action by individual States.

The 92nd Congress failed to pass a comprehensive land-use measure, although both Houses took significant steps to do so.⁷¹ It appears likely that similar proposals will receive serious consideration in the 93rd Congress. In anticipation of that, Public Law 92-583 provides for coordination of coastal zone management with any Federally supported overall land-use program.

Concerning the impact on metropolitan areas of the coastal zone act, and overall land-use management legislation when and if enacted, some of the States may delegate their planning and regulatory responsibilities wholly or partly to their substate districts. Despite the fact that several States are currently evidencing interest in getting into this field directly themselves, such delegation is favored by two factors: (1) the States' inability to perform the whole task directly, and (2) the reluctance of regional and local interests to surrender to the States complete control over decisions so important to them. Presumably State management plans, incorporating any metropolitan or regional elements resulting from such delegation, would be fitted into a Federal framework.

The difficulty of reaching agreement on areawide plans within this framework almost surely will be greater than at present. Two reasons account for this. First, in addition to all parties now participating, more will be involved—the States and Federal agencies whose activities must comport with State plans. Second, such plans are to be the bases for enforcement through regulation and other means of management. Generally speaking, their enforcement potential will be far greater than that of present plans. In short, the stakes will be higher and the seriousness of the players may be expected to be greater.

By contrast, plan implementation might be strengthened. Presently, there are few cases of significant achievement in implementing areawide plans as would be expected under these national programs. There is now a history of cooperation in most interstate metropolitan areas. Conceivably, common interest in some of them would be sufficient to initiate efforts to secure stronger and, in most cases, more formal ties.

With few exceptions, interstate metropolitan area

land-use planning now is performed by councils of governments. Almost surely these agencies would require firmer legal foundations than they possess currently if they are to develop enforceable land-use plans. It is not a question of their being replaced—although that is a possibility—but of their being established by interstate compact, interlocal cooperation laws, or some other means to enhance their standing as governmental agencies. Because it would be in the planning phase that the most significant decisions would be made, there would have to be provision for State and Federal agency participation.

Land-use control may also be exercised through land ownership. While it is not a common practice, there are instances of ownership by one jurisdiction of land in another, even though the latter is in a different State. Compulsory acquisition of such land is another matter, however. Although it is rarely conferred, in a number of instances States have permitted local governments to exercise the power of eminent domain outside their territorial limits. It is simply not possible for a State to confer on itself or one of its political subdivisions the power of eminent domain exercisable in another State. This power may be conferred by interstate compact, but even that is rare. Except for certain water apportionment compacts among western States,⁷² to our knowledge the only such provision of the right of a State to take land in another State is that authorized by a provision of the Kansas and Missouri Waterworks Compact. It grants to each State and the two Kansas cities the power to condemn land in the other State.

For practical purposes, land ownership of sizable parcels is unlikely ever to be achieved on an interstate basis except by interstate compact or interlocal agreements which bridge State lines. There are of course a large number of examples of land ownership pursuant to such documents which fulfill in part interstate metropolitan area land-use plans, but in most cases antedate them. Some of them have been cited, e.g., the new Lindenwold Subway owned by the Delaware River Port Authority, the two bridges the Authority is now constructing, and the Washington area rapid transit system.

One other instance might be given because it illustrates a different use for which land ownership may be employed to effectuate an interstate area plan. As it happens, the area in question is not one recognized by OMB and the Bureau of the Census as an interstate metropolitan area. It is, however, part of the Greater New York metropolitan area. Located in New York and New Jersey, the Palisades Interstate Park, pursuant to a Compact entered into by the two States, is operated by an interstate commission.⁷³ Since the Compact became effective in 1937, the park commission has developed the Palisades so as to exploit its recreational potential and preserve its scenic attractions. This Compact served

as precedent for four similar interstate agreements, one of which is located in an interstate metropolitan area.⁷⁴

Transportation, water supply, and waste management decisions may also be used to control the use of land. Unless transportation routes and water and waste management services comport with land-use policy, they can distort or destroy it. The interstate implications of these programs have been covered earlier.

The location of public facilities such as schools and hospitals also effects land use. These facilities are capable of giving character to surrounding areas. For the most part, their location is of only intrastate significance, but potentially the services of a general hospital or a college could have an interstate effect. For example, a few years ago, in considering the establishment of several junior colleges, the Illinois legislature took account of the location and plans for location of junior colleges in its neighboring States. The legislative reasoning was that, because most junior college students commute, agreement with these States on the location of facilities close to the border would be mutually advantageous, *i.e.*, Illinois and Iowa should not site junior colleges in an area on either side of the border that would compete with each other. Formal agreement was desirable because it could provide for reduction of out-of-State tuition fees. So far nothing has come of this effort, but it is an obvious way to stretch the higher education dollar. It is equally obvious that location of such facilities is dependent on the potential market for them, *i.e.*, they must be sited in an urban area of sufficient size to furnish the necessary college-age population.

The principal means that must be relied upon to implement a land-use plan or similar document is regulatory control—zoning and subdivision ordinances. In a metropolitan area, the effectiveness of this tool is virtually always dependent on the cooperation of local jurisdictions which make up the area.

It would appear that implementation of a land-use plan is less difficult in an intrastate than in an interstate region. For one thing, in the former all the subdivisions are subject to the law of one State. Where there are no laws requiring them to adopt and enforce zoning ordinances, some States confer on major cities the power to zone on an extraterritorial basis.

There is only one example of an interstate agency which possesses the power to zone. The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact authorizes the commission created by the document to plan and to exercise zoning authority.⁷⁵ Although the Tahoe bi-State area is not a metropolitan region, the principle under which the Compact was entered into could serve as the legal basis for a similar agreement in a metropolitan area.

Up to this point discussion has dealt with land-use controls because that is where most of the difficulty lies. Federal funds and requirements for areawide planning have been such that land-use planning is now almost

universal in metropolitan areas, including those which are interstate. The metropolitan areas studies for this chapter—Philadelphia, New York, Kansas City, and Washington—all have well developed areawide planning processes and a variety of adopted planning policies.

In itself the technical development of a plan is no more difficult in an interstate than in an intrastate region. It seems clear, however, that a metropolitan complex located in but one State should more easily find ways to realize its goals than one located in two or more States. Implementation is the key, and this is easier to accomplish in intrastate than interstate areas. In the Washington area, however, even the normal advantages of an adopted plan are foregone because of the non-profit status of the planning organization. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Government's plan does not have legal standing viewed in the context of State law. Maryland and Virginia laws provide that plans of other bodies are to be observed by jurisdictions in the respective States. Implementation of the COG plan, therefore, depends on the agency's A-95 authority—an uncertain and circuitous route to implementation—and the exercise of local government and citizen interest in furthering the plan's objectives—a route even more uncertain and circuitous.

In the Philadelphia and Kansas City areas, the planning agencies are the legally recognized bodies for this purpose and for A-95 review also. Time will tell, but the prognosis should be that they will have greater success in securing land-use plan implementation than Washington. None of the three agencies has any power to control land use or implementation in any way.

Water Supply and Waste Management

Next to transportation, the water supply and waste management functions are probably the most obviously areawide of all. Municipal water is frequently brought in from far away and discharged into water bodies that are used as jurisdictional boundaries or that flow from one jurisdiction into another. In a number of cases State boundary rivers are used, making the function interstate immediately. Likewise, air pollution once emitted does not recognize political boundaries. Ever increasing solid wastes are exhausting local disposal sites and intensifying the need to look across political boundaries to find new ones.

Water Supply. Communities in the Kansas City area obtain most of their water from the Missouri, Kansas, and South Grand Rivers and the tributaries which flow into them within the metropolitan region, but the region is not served by a single system. The river systems are large and dependable in flow, so there has been no need to construct a collection system to bring the supply from distant sources. Groundwater serves as the source of supply in some of the less densely populated portions of the region.

The greatest measure of consolidation has been brought about by the fact that Kansas City, Missouri, has expanded to cover so much of the region that its provision of customary municipal services within its own corporate limits responds to much more of the need than might be the case in another metropolitan complex. In addition, it is the source of supply for many of its neighboring jurisdictions. On the Kansas side there has been less consolidation.

The *Water and Sewerage Development Plan*, published in 1971, recognizes the limitations in the present system.⁷⁶ It urges the jurisdictions in the metropolitan area to work toward greater consolidation or more extensive use of interconnection of lines through any one or more of three devices: intergovernmental agreement, formation of a county water and/or sewerage agency, and establishment of a regional or metropolitan water and/or wastewater agency. The plan suggests that the first device might be employed to combine the supply services of a jurisdiction or water district with those of adjacent jurisdictions and districts. A county agency might serve places located outside incorporated areas. Should the regional agency option be chosen, it would make possible an economy of scale infeasible under any other arrangement. Health considerations, the serving of other water uses, and coordination in planning are other ends this device would serve.

The Philadelphia metropolitan area draws most of its water from the Delaware River and its tributaries, including some taken from impoundments outside the metropolitan area. Two Pennsylvania counties tap large groundwater supplies. On the New Jersey side, groundwater is a far more significant source. Only in the Trenton area is surface water used for municipal purposes.

The water supply plan,⁷⁷ developed by the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission after consultation with all affected parties, including the Delaware River Basin Commission,⁷⁸ proposes that by 1975 there be a greater measure of interconnection between the systems in the area, and that by 1985 regionalization of facilities be achieved. However, there is no indication how this will be accomplished. By that time, additional sources both inside and outside the metropolitan area probably will be required. A somewhat greater exploitation of groundwater, particularly in New Jersey, a greater reliance on diversions from the Susquehanna River, and obtaining water from projects authorized but not yet constructed are counted on as the most likely possibilities to meet 1985 requirements.

The aim of the plan is to develop a regionwide supply system, but that aim may be thwarted from either of two directions. There are on one side the jealousies and suspicions among water supply purveyors—the municipal departments, private water companies, and water authorities. On the other is a larger-than-metropolitan-area interest which, over the years has brought the regional

character of the water supply problem into focus and has resulted in some concerted regional action.

Greater Philadelphia's water supply situation has already been affected by its location in the middle of the East Coast megalopolis. In the future it may experience even greater effects. River systems cut through the coastal plain at short intervals from one end of the megalopolis to the other. One of them bisects greater Philadelphia and provides its obvious source of municipal water. The next major basin to the north is the Hudson, which cuts through another interstate metropolis. But New York City did not copy Philadelphia in tapping the nearest river. Instead it went to the upper Delaware for a large part of its supply.

As early as the 1920's, this gave Philadelphia cause for concern. One source of apprehension was that in extremely dry years there might not be enough water left after the New York City diversions to supply downstream needs, including those of the Philadelphia area. But long before the Delaware might run dry, another danger would appear. Depletion of the fresh water flow in the middle and lower reaches of the Delaware would cause salt water intrusion to advance upstream and render the municipal intakes for Philadelphia unusable. This almost happened in the mid-1960's.

The next major river to the southwest is the Susquehanna, which lies in the last remaining largely undeveloped great basin of the Middle Atlantic States. Baltimore, although outside the Susquehanna basin, already draws water from the river. Washington also faces a growing water crisis which might be solved by development of Potomac River resources or possibly by diversions from elsewhere.

The New York City diversions from the Delaware prompted two suits in the Supreme Court of the United States.⁷⁹ From the point of view of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey litigants, the object was to limit New York City title to Delaware River water and to require seasonal releases that would assure minimum flows sufficient to protect the downstream interests of the Philadelphia area. In each case New York City received an allocation of water.

The movement for an interstate compact on the Delaware was partly sparked by the desire to replace litigation over water supply with a workable system of administrative controls. Ultimately, it succeeded in creating intergovernmental machinery when the Federal-interstate Delaware River Basin Compact came into existence in 1961.⁸⁰ It established a commission composed of the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware and a representative of the President of the United States. The commission has comprehensive powers to manage the planning, development, conservation, and use of basin waters.

Two aspects of this Compact are of particular interest in connection with metropolitan area regionalism. One is

the express requirement of the Federal-interstate agreement that existing agencies of the signatory parties and their subdivisions be utilized and that in most matters the Commission act only if these other bodies are unwilling or unable to take necessary action. The other is that the Compact is at the State-Federal level rather than at the metropolitan area level. Placing primary reliance for most activities on other agencies of the local, State, and Federal governments affords the opportunity for State, municipal, or metropolitan-oriented institutions to function and to carry as much of the burden by themselves as they can.

The Compact and related legislation provide a measure of local representation by requiring the presence in an advisory status of New York City and Philadelphia representatives. Such provision was made in recognition of the importance of the Delaware River to these municipalities and perhaps equally as a recognition of the political necessity for including these two cities directly in any mechanism designed to regulate the use of the basin for water supply. No express recognition is given to either the New York or Philadelphia regions as entities. In part this resulted from the absence of any suitable metropolitan areawide governments that could make the claim and in part from the circumstances in New Jersey.

That State contains parts of both metropolitan areas. It does not view its water supply problems, nor even that element of them connected with the Delaware, as either a greater New York or greater Philadelphia matter. Its share of Delaware water is viewed by the State government as a resource that should be more flexibly available to help in meeting the needs of important areas elsewhere in New Jersey as well as those at its northeastern and southwestern extremities.

It is also important to note that the Delaware River Basin Compact defines its region to be an entire river basin, including a portion of one State which is not in the greater Philadelphia region at all, and much territory in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware that is also outside it.

Still further evidence that the water supply problem is conceived in regional terms much larger than metropolitan areas is to be found in a similar compact for the Susquehanna⁸¹ and in Congressional action. The Delaware and Susquehanna compacts both contain provisions giving their commissions the power to make agreements for transbasin diversion of water. If any such agreements were consummated, they almost certainly would involve the interests of several metropolitan areas, both interstate and intrastate, as well as the interests of much intervening non-metropolitan territory.

In 1965 Congress enacted a statute authorizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to study the water supply needs of an area stretching from the James and Potomac Rivers north to Canada and having an east-west width that includes all of the coastal megalopolis and much

besides.⁸² Moreover, this Act raises the express possibility that in the future the Army Engineers may be asked to build and operate water supply projects involving transbasin diversions in the region.⁸³

The Kansas City and Philadelphia areas are unusual in having had significant interstate facilitation of their water supplies by agreements developed specifically to ameliorate or overcome attendant problems. Their situations may be contrasted with that of Boston.

When the Boston metropolis sought a new source of supply, it could properly be regarded as an intrastate urban region. Yet its distance from water-rich areas in New Hampshire was less than from its own Connecticut River Valley. Nevertheless, the site chosen for the new reservoir was 100 miles away at the central Massachusetts location. Aside from other considerations, it can be observed that construction of impoundments and aqueducts requires use of the police and eminent domain powers, both of which are based in State authority. By interstate compact, the necessary arrangements can be made to implement such activities across State lines. But such complex arrangements would be in addition to the problems that must be overcome in bringing a municipal water system into existence. Accordingly, as the Boston case shows, the presence of a State line must be viewed as an obstacle to be confronted only if there are compelling reasons to do so.

Water Pollution Control. Both the Kansas City and Philadelphia metropolitan areas have regional water pollution control plans. They propose extensive additions to and upgrading of existing collection, treatment, and disposal facilities, intended to meet current and future State and Federal water quality standards. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the individual States have initially made the standards, but they have been submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency for approval. To the extent that the States themselves may not have coordinated their standards for an interstate metropolitan area, EPA has an opportunity to promote such coordination through the approval process. Implementation of these plans would also complement and aid in the realization of regional land-use and other development plans. Because major rivers mark much or all of the State boundaries in the Kansas City and Philadelphia areas, there are no proposals for collection of waste on one side of a border for treatment and disposal on the other.

With reference to the Philadelphia area, both the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (DVRPC) and the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) have a stake in water pollution control. As a matter of fact, taking its 11-year history as a whole, this subject has received more attention by DRBC than any other. The DVRPC water pollution control plan was prepared in close cooperation with the Delaware River Basin Commission and New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

In the Washington area, a large share of the sewage

from the Maryland suburbs and some from Virginia is treated at the District of Columbia plant. Detailed agreements govern the allowed flows to the plant and provide for appropriate financial contributions. But the expansion of the plant has lagged behind need, and increasing flows from the suburbs have overflowed into the Potomac River. The Federal government had to call an enforcement conference and the States invoked moratoriums on suburban development in certain locations. The District's plant cannot be expanded much more, so the emphasis is now on the development of new regional plants outside of the District.

Solid Waste Management. Solid waste management is the subject of areawide study in both the Kansas City and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. While the Philadelphia study is just getting under way, that for Kansas City has been completed. To assist municipalities in implementing certain aspects of the latter area's plan, a sample local ordinance has been prepared. The major institutional recommendation of the Kansas City plan is the creation under the auspices of the Mid-America Regional Council of an areawide interstate solid waste agency empowered to purchase, develop, and operate sanitary landfills; issue revenue bonds; develop a 20-year regional sanitary landfill program; identify and acquire sites on a five-to ten-year basis and take options on sites needed beyond that period; coordinate the planning and other waste management activities in the region; and educate disposal plant operators.⁸⁴

Both Kansas and Missouri regulate solid waste management.⁸⁵ Both States permit counties and municipalities to contract with a central agency for solid waste disposal, including one located outside the State.⁸⁶ Although the proposed *Solid Waste Management Plan* relies on local governments' contracting with the regional agency, it recognizes that "... it is doubtful that 95 municipalities and seven counties would contract with such an agency without State pressure in the form of [mandatory] legislation."⁸⁷

Mandatory legislation has not been enacted by either State. The first opportunity for the Missouri legislature to consider such legislation subsequent to publication of the plan in May 1971 will be in its 1973 regular session. Meanwhile, however, there was placed in operation in Kansas City, Kansas, in 1972 a model 50-acre sanitary landfill which serves area communities in both States. Among other things, it is hoped that successful operation of the demonstration project, will aid in creating a legislative climate conducive to the enactment of appropriate mandatory legislation.

The Metropolitan Washington Waste Management Agency was set up by the COG in 1967 to supplement the efforts of local governments in liquid and solid waste management. A nonprofit corporation, it has essentially the same jurisdictional boundaries as the Washington COG. Its governing board consists of COG's Board of Directors and Health and Environmental Protection

Policy Committee. The agency has a broad mandate to (1) identify areawide waste management problems; (2) prepare a waste management plan and program; (3) develop cooperative arrangements for implementation of such a plan and program; and (4) acquire, develop, and manage facilities pursuant to contracts with local governments.

For reasons beyond the scope of this study, the Waste Management Agency has never been considered seriously as an active operating agent in solving the area's liquid waste management problems. It has, however, after a delayed start, begun to establish a record of achievement in solid waste management. For example, it served as agent for Arlington and Fairfax Counties and the Alexandria Sanitation Authority to gain access to a landfill owned by the District of Columbia in northern Virginia. It arranged, also, for the establishment of a transfer station to be used jointly by Arlington County and Alexandria.

This comparatively modest record does not measure the agency's full potential for accomplishment. The amount of solid waste collected and the necessity for longer and longer hauling inevitably will increase. Under such circumstances, the services this agency can supply and the intergovernmental arrangements it can facilitate may prove increasingly attractive to local governments.

Air Pollution

Although air pollution is apt to be severe in metropolitan areas because of the range and intensity of man's activities, relatively few interstate metropolitan area agencies have active programs intended to aid in solving or ameliorating air pollution.

In the Kansas City area, for example, a regional air pollution control program appears to be barely in its infancy. In recent months the Mid-America Regional Council has organized a forum for the discussion of air pollution problems on an interjurisdictional basis, but this activity is still in the beginning stages. In 1967, a conference held under the Federal air pollution control statute produced a recommendation that a Federal-interstate compact be developed to regulate air quality in the Kansas City area,⁸⁸ but interest was short-lived at the Federal, State, and local levels. From time to time, State officials in Kansas and Missouri also have considered the possibility of an interstate air pollution control compact, but nothing has happened.

There appears to have been little more attention given to approaching the greater Philadelphia air pollution problem on a regional basis by the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission or any other agency. The proposed Mid-Atlantic Air Pollution Control Compact made both Pennsylvania and Delaware optional but eligible parties. Neither exhibited any interest in joining. One reason was that Pennsylvania and New Jersey considered their State mechanisms to be the appropriate

ones to deal with the problem. Delaware simply indicated that it would not participate in the compact. As already pointed out, that State has never really become convinced that any of its territory should be included as an integral part of any areawide governmental apparatus based on Philadelphia.

The New York metropolitan area has no agency designed exclusively for regional air pollution control activities. However, the Interstate Sanitation Commission, an agency established by compact⁸⁹ to carry on water pollution monitoring, regulating, and coordinating responsibilities with respect to tidal waters of the tri-State area, was assigned in 1962 the additional duty of air pollution control research and monitoring. Following the delineation of the New York Air Quality Control Region in 1967, the States designated the Commission as the interstate coordinating agency.

In the Washington area, too, some activity has taken place on an interstate basis. The agency is the Interstate Air Quality Planning Committee, created by agreement among the governors of Maryland and Virginia and the mayor of the District of Columbia. It is staffed by the local COG. Its program elements include evaluating air quality standards and implementation measures and developing improvements if current standards and measures are found inadequate; furnishing ambient air quality data to appropriate agencies and the public; improving interjurisdictional coordination; assuring that air pollution factors are included in regional transportation and land-use planning; and assisting in the A-95 review process.

Health Planning and Services

Comprehensive areawide health planning assistance is provided by Federal law.⁹⁰ However, it has received relatively little attention from interstate metropolitan comprehensive planning agencies; the major contact ensues when such agencies perform the A-95 review function. Among the several interstate metropolitan regions to which significant attention has been paid in this chapter—Philadelphia, New York, Washington, and Kansas City—only the comprehensive planning agency of the last is furnishing important leadership in this functional area.

This relative lack of attention is due to a number of reasons. One is that in almost no instances have the general planning agencies been designated as the official planning agency for comprehensive health care. The orientation is toward State plans. Although grants are authorized for regional, metropolitan, or other local area plans, they are made subject to the approval of the State, and the States, by and large, have preferred to designate organizations within their own boundaries. Another reason is that health facilities and services do not loom so large in determining area physical development as facilities for such services as waste management

and transportation. State control reflects the manner in which the medical professions are organized and represents a barrier to dealing with this matter on an interstate basis. This has the effect of bringing about the location of medical facilities on either side of a State boundary with little regard to service potentialities embracing the entire area, thus furthering an unnecessary duplication of facilities.

A case in point is the current situation in the Kansas City metropolitan area. Construction plans of area hospitals over the next ten years would add about 1,500 beds to reach a total of 8,340, or almost three times the number generally considered adequate and economic. Inevitably this would mean a further sharp increase in hospital rates. Other expansion plans—an increase in the number of intensive care units and specialized treatment facilities—are in formative stages. The reconciliation of needs with facilities is the major responsibility of the metropolitan area health planning body, the Mid-America Comprehensive Health Planning Agency—a responsibility that presently by its own admission it is unable to fulfill for the following reasons.

1. The agency, since its creation three years ago, has been faced with such a large backlog of plans to review that to this day it has not been able to assemble the data and take the other steps necessary to prepare guidelines for a comprehensive health care plan.
2. The agency is underfunded and consequently understaffed. Federal assistance is given on the condition that it be matched equally. In 1971, local efforts fell short by more than one-third in meeting the matching requirement.
3. Planning body members tend to be representative of their own interests (those who provide health care and those who receive it) or fail to participate (*government representatives*). Although they constitute a majority on the council, the health consumers and government representatives have not been able to establish a community of interest. The result is that the broad regional goal of improvement of the area health status is not achieved.
4. The University of Kansas Medical School Hospital (250-300 planned bed expansion) derives its funds from the State, so technically its activities are not subject to review by MACPH. It should be added that the University of Kansas Medical School views its role as extra-community in nature. It feels that its expansion is justified to enable it to provide the clinical facilities needed to train more students. The Medical School Hospital serves as a referral facility for a 200-mile radius in

eastern Kansas, most of which is outside the metropolitan region, and it is the only hospital in the State which meets the criteria for tertiary care—highly sophisticated with all specialties covered.

This description of the Kansas City situation is not an isolated case. The Kansas City health planning agency is regarded as one of those that comes closest to meeting its responsibility to influence health services planning.⁹¹ But the separation of many health functions from the regular bodies of government is an underlying phenomenon. Over the years, the several branches of the medical fraternity have been able to win from States the authority to regulate themselves. This is not an unbridled authority, but for the most part the professional determines the requirements for education and training and prescribes and enforces standards for practice—matters which for most other vocations, the bar excepted, are subject to direct State authority.

A serious effort has been made by the overall area planning agency in Kansas City to overcome some of these inhibitions to cross-boundary cooperation and intergovernmental coordination. Although, as noted above, the Mid-American Comprehensive Health Planning Agency is the official health planning body for the Kansas City metropolitan area, the Mid-America Regional Council for over a year has been actively involved in planning and implementing a comprehensive system of emergency medical services. Rebuffed by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in its request for \$8.8 million for an ambitious, three-year program, MARC turned for assistance to the Missouri State health agency, which had encouraged MARC to submit its request.

The current, much-scaled-down proposal is to develop (1) a universal, continuous communications system to link mobile and fixed base emergency units; (2) a dispatching center capable of continuous radio communications with all emergency medical service components; (3) two-way radio voice communications between mobile and fixed base emergency units and the dispatching center; (4) mechanisms to provide two-way radio voice communications associated with physiological monitoring between mobile and fixed base units; and (5) expanded citizen awareness of the seven digit number currently available for emergency medical services.⁹² Although this proposal has been submitted to Missouri for funding, the system would function across State lines. Its total cost, about \$225,000, reflects only capital and installation expenses. Personnel and maintenance costs would be borne by those institutions and agencies furnishing the emergency medical services.

The larger proposal submitted to HEW would have involved utilization of a greater number of mobile emergency units, aid in staffing base units, aid in training paramedic technicians, and the installation of the emer-

gency 911 telephone dialing system throughout the area. Despite the lack of HEW support MARC is working on its own to implement the 911 and training recommendations. Nevertheless, MARC has not yet become a major force in the health field.

The non-involvement of the general purpose interstate metropolitan area planning agencies in health services planning and coordination makes it more difficult to coordinate health care with other services. This is probably a less severe handicap in intrastate metropolitan areas because those who make the decisions are part of the same institutional structure (*e.g.*, the county or State health officer who has an official relationship with the policy making bodies of the county and State and many private practitioners who serve on hospital boards or are otherwise connected to the structure). Although the private portion of the medical professions may enjoy considerable independence from the political establishment, in the final analysis its relative freedom can be curtailed by that establishment. Such a sanction is not even remotely possible in interstate metropolitan areas.

An example of how difficult it can be to develop a comprehensive health planning program on an interstate regional basis is furnished by the Washington metropolitan area. In 1966-67, a proposal for an areawide comprehensive health planning agency was prepared by the staff of the COG working with the public health personnel of the region. The District of Columbia gave its assent to the submission of the proposal to HEW. Maryland also sanctioned submission on the condition that Virginia give its approval. The last could not be obtained, however. The Northern Virginia Medical Society was adamant in opposition and, in effect, cast a veto through the State government.

In 1970, the COG Board of Directors requested that the effort be revived, but it was found that the opposition of the Medical Society and the Commonwealth of Virginia continued unabated. Subsequently, the Northern Virginia Planning District Commission and the Northern Virginia Medical Society came to an understanding, and a comprehensive health planning proposal for that area was submitted to HEW by the planning commission. Meanwhile, representatives of the District of Columbia and the two Maryland counties that make up that State's portion of the metropolitan area explored the possibility of establishing a nonprofit corporation to serve their combined jurisdictions. Still more recently, there has been discussion of this function being performed by COG on an areawide basis with each of the several jurisdictions drawing up its own plan and then advising COG on the preparation of an areawide plan. Virginia has yet to consent to the last, however. Meanwhile, Group Hospitalization, Inc, the Blue Cross-Blue Shield organization in Washington, has given COG a grant for developing areawide health information.

What will ensue from these activities is not known.

The Virginia proposal has not been approved. On the other hand, a genuine metropolitan areawide approach does not seem to be appreciably closer than it was five or six years ago.

Law Enforcement

The statement above concerning the near non-involvement of general purpose interstate metropolitan area planning agencies in matters relating to the health planning and services is equally true with respect to law enforcement. Law enforcement officials derive their authority from State law, and there are neither interstate metropolitan area laws nor officials to enforce them. Police officers are selected, trained, and perform their duties pursuant to State law. Courts are set up and function as State laws prescribe. Similarly, correctional policy and administration follow State prescription. There is of course a large body of Federal law and appropriate personnel and institutions, but in no sense is there an orientation toward interstate metropolitan areas as such.

Because of the large number of jurisdictions involved, each with its own body of law and institutions, and the relative noninvolvement of the Federal government, a relatively large number of interstate compacts have been enacted. Their development represents recognition that transportation, communications, life style, and population growth have caused crime to flow across State and local boundaries with great frequency. Most of these agreements among States, however, have no more applicability to interstate metropolitan areas than to other parts of the States party to the compacts.

Unique among interstate agreements dealing with law enforcement is the Waterfront Commission Compact.⁹³ It was entered into by New York and New Jersey to deal with a specific problem in the New York metropolitan area—the intrusion of criminal elements in the port area. The Commission licenses and regulates longshoremen. The rationale for conferring this authority on the agency was that a single body could perform this activity more efficiently under a single law than two or more bodies could perform it even if they operated under parallel laws. Legislation to obtain consent to amend the Compact to permit its extension to cover those who handle cargo at the several airports in the region failed to pass in the 92nd Congress.⁹⁴

In further recognition of the relative rigidity of the Federal structure so far as law enforcement is concerned and the need for cooperation, police personnel have developed a host of informal agreements that operate across State lines. These may take a variety of forms, including exchanges of information and records and requests for cooperation in the surveillance and apprehension of fugitives. Such agreements often are of an emergency nature or sporadic in operation.

At the State level some of the physical problems

caused by jurisdictional lines have been ameliorated by permanent statutes. For example, fresh pursuit laws, virtually universal throughout the United States, directly provide or lay the basis for law enforcement personnel of one State or municipality to cross community lines when immediately engaged in a chase. This can generally be done even when the communities involved are on opposite sides of a State boundary. These statutes and the fresh pursuit procedures employed as a result are significant aides to police work in an interstate metropolitan area.

Nothing so far devised is more than a palliative, however, in meeting the severe law enforcement problems in interstate metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area is “where the action is.” It is there that crime can be made to pay.

Yet in an interstate metropolitan region, the ordinary pattern is that police radios do not operate on the same frequency, report forms differ, and records are not readily and regularly exchanged. Command and communication channels are not toward the hub of activity, but away from it—toward city hall, the county seat, or the State capital. Those engaged in criminal activities are free to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the police are inhibited by State lines. If they are aware of widespread criminal activities, they are apt to be in the unenviable position of the several blind men in the fable who formed several quite different mental pictures of an elephant from grasping his trunk, body, tail and other parts respectively.

Perhaps a better appreciation of some of the problems in law enforcement in interstate metropolitan areas can be obtained by looking at a specific situation. The staff of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, not the law enforcement planning agency for the region (there is none), prepared a draft application for assistance from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice to establish a Metropolitan Intelligence Group (MIG). It was endorsed by the police chiefs of the area, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the COG Public Safety Policy Committee. The proposal involved the collection by individual police departments of information on the organized crime structure of the area as it relates to illegal traffic in narcotics. This information would be fed to a Metropolitan Intelligence Group (MIG) for analysis. Such analysis, it was hoped, would indicate where it might be profitable to concentrate investigative efforts and ultimately when and where prosecution might be advisable. To augment local investigative efforts, the proposal was that each of ten jurisdictions assign one police officer to MIG. These officers would act purely as investigators. They would not have the power to arrest outside their own jurisdictions.

Despite the impressive list of supporters the proposal ran into a storm of protest from both citizens and public officials, and it was never submitted. Thus, despite

substantial evidence that the illegal distribution and sale of narcotic drugs is increasing throughout the region, there is presently no means by which the intelligence data can be assembled. Each of the three major jurisdictions—Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia—has its own law enforcement planning agency. Police officials exchange information, but not on a systematic basis. No police agency in the area possesses an adequate intelligence capability—with the possible exception of the District of Columbia, whose jurisdiction of course is limited, as is its view of the metropolitan-wide situation. Without any question, State boundaries in interstate metropolitan areas are a major barrier to effective law enforcement.

Comprehensive Planning

Comprehensive (general purpose) planning is of major importance in interstate metropolitan areas because there are needs for the performance of governmental functions, as illustrated above, and needs for inter-functional coordination, while at the same time there is no areawide government. It has been shown above that most areawide interstate governmental units are responsible only for single functions. The regions emphasized in this chapter are the ones where the widest range of interstate activity has taken place, illustrating how incomplete and uncoordinated the situation is.

It was against this background of relative interstate inactivity that the Federal government moved in the last decade. Such intergovernmental machinery for comprehensive planning as exists in most interstate metropolitan areas is heavily subsidized by the Federal government. The planning has been established on an advisory basis, because it is not then usually considered a major threat to the decision making powers of participating governments. It leaves the manner and extent to which areawide policies will be realized as matters basically within the control of State and local governments. This is not to say that their decisions will not be influenced by the plan, but it will be *their* decisions and not those of the planners that count.

In the 1960's, Congress began to make comprehensive areawide planning a condition of eligibility for Federal aid in such programs as transportation, water and sewer facilities, open space, and economic development. In 1964, metropolitan area planning agencies were made eligible to receive planning grants under Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954.⁹⁵ In addition, Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966⁹⁶ and Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968⁹⁷ require that all applications for a wide variety of Federal grants and loans be submitted for review to an areawide agency which, to the greatest extent possible, is composed of or responsible to elected officials of general local governments.

These actions helped to assure that a general purpose

council of governments, or its equivalent, would become the most widely used instrument to undertake comprehensive planning in metropolitan areas, including those of an interstate character.⁹⁸ In 25 of the 33 metropolitan areas considered in this chapter to be interstate, the Office of Management and Budget has recognized areawide planning agencies to perform the A-95 review function for their respective interstate areas. Twenty are councils of government.⁹⁹ Two appear to be agencies set up pursuant to parallel State laws, similar to the Metropolitan Planning Commission in the Kansas City Region.¹⁰⁰ Two were established by interstate compact.¹⁰¹

The Lesson of These Precedents

What emerges from the preceding reviews of how areawide functions are being approached in interstate metropolitan areas is a pattern of extraordinary complexity. Such authoritative governmental arrangements as have been worked out on an areawide basis in these areas have been difficult to obtain. They have been specially tailored to the individual circumstances of the areas to which they apply, and they have usually been applicable only to single functions. In many cases, areawide functions in interstate metropolitan areas have been approached awkwardly and incompletely through regular State laws and programs designed to meet areawide problems in areas contained wholly within a single State.

The only "easy solution to interstate metropolitan problems has been the voluntary, informal approach to non-controversial problems, or the advisory planning approaches, where the exercise of strong governmental authority is not required. This has been achieved through the mechanisms of a non-profit corporation, contracting for services, and the joint exercise of powers under interlocal agreements.

Where Federal policies have required an areawide approach to metropolitan problems despite the splitting of such areas by State lines, interstate planning of an advisory nature has been obtained. The urban transit and highway planning programs of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the comprehensive planning program of HUD are major examples where a strong Federal influence has brought about an interstate response. Most other Federal areawide programs have placed less emphasis on the need for interstate coverage and have produced single-State responses.

EVALUATION OF MECHANISMS FOR BROADENING POLITICAL JURISDICTIONS

To furnish the services and functions just discussed, as well as others normally associated with local government, it is necessary to have organizations which

comport reasonably well with the appropriate territorial and functional jurisdiction. General purpose local governments have the requisite range of functional authority, but they are usually deficient in territorial jurisdiction. A special district may be drawn to fit territorial requirements, but its effectiveness is also dependent on the powers conferred upon it and upon its relationships with the general purpose governments in the area. Theoretically, it should be possible to expand the territorial jurisdiction of local governments across State lines, but no such undertaking has yet received serious consideration and many obstacles are in the way. Interstate special districts have been created, but the question of the powers that the governments concerned are willing to confer on them is more difficult than in intrastate areas.

Devices Not Available for Interstate Action

Organizational devices which have not been used to bridge interstate boundaries are examined first below, followed by an examination of the available interstate devices. Annexation, consolidation, federation, extraterritoriality, and independent taxing authority are mechanisms which cannot be used across State lines.

Annexation. Annexation is a simple organizational solution. If extensive enough it removes the interjurisdictional features of a metropolitan area and provides a single general purpose local government. This has happened in a few small metropolitan areas within a single State (see Volume III Chapter V), but never in an interstate area. In no interstate metropolis has annexation across State lines been attempted. The procedures for it are not to be found in any existing State law. Nor has any conceptual framework been developed to work out the relationships that would exist between the interstate city and its parent States.

The question of compulsory annexation—at least so far as city-building against the will of the State governments is involved—is probably an insoluble one. The Federal Constitution provides that the territory of no State may be altered without its consent.¹⁰² Thus, while it is possible for States to agree to cessions and exchanges of territory and even to concurrent jurisdiction over boundary areas, it is not contemplated by the Constitution that any State could be forced to make an interstate metropolis whole by relinquishing some or all of its jurisdiction.

Consolidation. Closely related to annexation is consolidation. In the former case, an incorporated place annexes an unincorporated area. In the latter, two or more incorporated places are joined. The discussion in connection with annexation of the difficulty of effectuation, the basic authority of State law, the relationship of the combined entity to the State, and the nonemployment of the device across State lines applies equally to consolidation.

Federation. Examples such as those furnished by Dade County and Toronto have excited interest in the possibilities of metropolitan area federation. This device involves delegation to an areawide government of the responsibility to perform those functions and services which can best be undertaken on a regional basis. Others continue to be performed by local governments. This device, too, is useful in intrastate but not interstate regions.

Extraterritoriality. A more limited device is that of conferring extraterritorial jurisdiction on particular local governments. There are two types, one for regulatory purposes, the other for provision of a service.

Extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction is conferred on municipalities to enable them to protect themselves against detrimental land uses in unincorporated areas immediately adjacent to their borders. The purpose served is similar to establishing an enforceable master plan for land-use control throughout an entire metropolitan area. Within a single State, constitutional provision or statute can confer extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction, but no State can unilaterally project such authority beyond its own borders.

A typical statute of this type is that of Kansas.¹⁰³ It permits a city to adopt zoning regulations within three miles of its boundary subject to certain conditions and limitations. Missouri has no general legislation on this subject. Thus, in the Kansas City area it would not be possible to build on existing State statutes to produce areawide land-use regulation.¹⁰⁴

The other type of extraterritoriality invariably has a consensual element. One community may provide fire protection, water supply, or some other municipal service to its neighbors. In order to do so, it may exercise sufficient operational jurisdiction to carry on the work within the territory of the communities being served. Such arrangements are possible across State lines, but they are more difficult to consummate than within a single State. Among problems that can be more difficult to resolve are the authority of personnel and liability for accident, injury, or damage when the laws of more than one State are involved.

Independent Taxing Authority. True unification of a metropolitan area probably cannot be achieved unless the powers of taxation and incurring of indebtedness are exercised on an areawide basis. Without such revenue coordination, some communities within the metropolitan region are bound to have superior capacities to support governmental institutions and public services and are virtually certain to protect their prosperity against burdens that might be imposed in meeting the needs of less affluent parts of the metropolitan area.

Within a single State, a number of equalizing devices are customarily employed. State law generally mandates minimum levels of services to be provided by local governments. States level the peaks and valleys by

equalization grants and by direct and compensatory provision of services in areas where local governments are unable to perform a given function at a sufficient level.¹⁰⁵

Questions of public finances are of great importance to the provision of areawide services and to any possibility of governing an entire metropolitan area through a more cohesive structure than voluntary cooperation among separate local governments. A distribution of State and local revenue sources and yields can be and is made pursuant to State law.

While difficulties in dealing with taxation and borrowing for an interstate municipality probably could be resolved by a carefully drawn compact, there are no examples of efforts to do so. Both the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor and the Potomac River Fisheries Commission¹⁰⁶ have taxing power of a limited kind conferred upon them by their respective compacts. The Waterfront Commission supports itself by a tax which it levies on shippers using the Port of New York. The Potomac Commission has similar authority to impose and collect a tax on certain fishery operations in its area. However, neither of these instances can be considered interstate taxation for the support of general local government. It may be concluded that such taxation could be authorized, but the political and legal problems to be worked out in particular cases would be intricate.

Devices Available for Interstate Action

In most cases, interlocal cooperation, non-profit corporations, financial support from higher levels of government, and direct operations of the Federal government or a Federal corporation are as useful in an interstate area as they are within a single State. Only three mechanisms are uniquely interstate: interstate compacts, parallel State legislation, and the commissions on interstate cooperation.

Efforts to bridge State lines can proceed at any one of the traditional levels of the Federal system. Interlocal and interstate cooperation can be employed. Conceivably, the Federal government could undertake to perform functions directly for interstate areas that, except for the existence of a State line, would be performed by State or local entities. If such a course were followed, the Federal government would be acting as States do when they perform normally local functions in areas too poor or too sparsely inhabited to justify maintenance of a full set of local services. The Tennessee Valley Authority, of course, is an example. Each of these mechanisms is examined below.

Interlocal Cooperation. Interlocal cooperation has had a long history. Before there was any systematic body of thought dealing with it, there were felt needs. A smaller community might contract with an adjacent larger one to receive such services as water supply, fire

protection, or treatment and disposal of liquid wastes. In each case a separate negotiation was required of the parties, followed by separate legislative acts.

To simplify this torturous procedure, the States began to enact joint exercise of powers acts.¹⁰⁷ Briefly stated, such statutes permit political subdivisions to engage jointly in any activity they may undertake separately. Then the Council of State Governments developed its model Interlocal Cooperation Act,¹⁰⁸ later refined by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.¹⁰⁹ Forty-two States have adopted some general interlocal cooperation legislation. Twenty-nine of these permit their local governments to cooperate with units in other States.

Such acts permit local governments to act in concert with each other if they each possess the power to act (or if only one does in ten States). The model acts also permit cooperative arrangements with State or Federal agencies.

However, these agreements do not have the permanence of an interstate compact. While interlocal agreements are potentially useful devices to employ in interstate metropolitan areas, some States and localities could be reluctant to entrust to an interstate agency established this way the stronger powers they would confer on an intrastate body or a permanent interstate compact body.

Non-Profit Corporations. Where interlocal cooperation acts do not apply or cannot be used for some reason, a non-profit corporation may be used instead. Probably the interstate situation presents the most common need for this approach. The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments provides an example of this mechanism. While a non-profit corporation can accomplish most of what would be expected of an interlocal cooperation agency, it shares the same basic weaknesses—voluntary participation and potential impermanence. In addition, it lacks governmental status, and cannot participate fully in public policy issues in the legislatures and Congress without endangering its tax exempt status.

Financial Support. In passing, references have been made to the financial support of agencies that operate across State lines. Some additional discussion of this subject is necessary.

Interstate metropolitan area agencies derive their financial support from a variety of sources. Major operating agencies, such as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Delaware River Port Authority, depend almost exclusively on user charges. Some other agencies—the Interstate Sanitation Commission is an example—obtain most of their revenues from regular State appropriations.

By far the larger number of interstate metropolitan area agencies, however, do not conduct continuing major operating or regulatory activities. Most of them have as their function planning and coordinating of programs

carried on by other units of government and special districts. Although their undergirding finances are provided by local governments with some State contributions in a few cases, they depend heavily (60 to 70 percent) on Federal grants. Federal grants for comprehensive planning and for transportation planning are the most significant, although a variety of other Federal grants are available. As a rule, money to match these grants is furnished by local governments, but there may be some State funding as well. Another significant source of revenue is from contracts, usually with Federal agencies, pursuant to which the recipient undertakes to complete a stated task.

State funds, generally speaking, do not constitute a significant source of revenue. There are exceptions. Maryland has assumed most of the burden for paying the local share of the Washington Metro rapid rail transit capital cost. The Mid-America Regional Council was able to turn to the Missouri Health Department for aid to support its emergency medical services program. As a rule, however, significant State grants in interstate metropolitan areas are in support of public and private entities for operations wholly within the State. The discussion of transportation describes a number of such instances in the New York, Philadelphia, and Boston metropolitan areas. Local contributions, as a rule, are limited to ongoing administrative expenses and to matching grants.

Commissions on Interstate Cooperation. Each State has had a Commission or Committee on Interstate Cooperation for 30 years or more. Their membership is drawn substantially from the legislature, but frequently includes other State officials. A Commission on Interstate Cooperation is charged with considering any matter of an interstate character. Usually, it is also empowered to consider Federal-State and State-local relations. Such commissions frequently originate or sponsor legislation dealing with interstate problems. Accordingly, they could be of significance to interstate metropolitan areas.

However, except for their formal sponsorship of occasional interstate compacts to deal with a specific problem of a specific metropolitan area, none of these commissions has shown more than a passing interest in the peculiar needs of interstate metropolitan centers. Probably the most important reason for this is that, with rare exceptions, they have been afforded little more than secretarial assistance and a limited amount of professional staff service. As a result, they have seldom been able to develop programs of their own. Other legislative committees have exercised jurisdiction over municipal affairs and have not distinguished between wholly intrastate municipalities and those whose environs extend into another State.

The Pennsylvania and New Jersey Commissions on Interstate Cooperation, for example, have virtually no record with respect to the Philadelphia metropolitan area. On February 3, 1967, however, the Pennsylvania

Commission held a meeting (attended also by New Jersey and Delaware representatives) to consider the Philadelphia area air pollution problem. At that time, the Mid-Atlantic Air Pollution Compact had just been proposed for a region made up of all of five States—Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. While the focus of the proposal was clearly not on greater Philadelphia, it would have been encompassed in the larger territory. For this reason, even more than because of its effect on all of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Commission decided to hold an exploratory meeting. Although enacted by Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York, the compact never became effective because Congress did not act—Federal participation was essential by the terms of the agreement.¹¹⁰ The Pennsylvania Commission did not pursue the matter further. No other instance of commission action particularly relating to Philadelphia has occurred in recent years. The same can be said of both the New Jersey and Delaware commissions.

A similar situation prevails with respect to the Kansas and Missouri Commissions on Interstate Cooperation. Each of these bodies meets periodically to consider matters relating to intergovernmental affairs. However, these meetings have not included subjects of special concern to the Kansas City region.

Parallel Legislation. The provision of services or performance of functions requires an administrative apparatus. Generally speaking, this is done by statute. Within a single State, the statute is an enactment of the State legislature. If the area involved encompasses parts of more than one State, the legal basis required must come from enactments of each of the State legislatures concerned. Experience shows that in most instances a compact is the appropriate device. However, it is possible to create some structures by unilateral but meshing legislation of the separate jurisdictions. Such enactments need not be identical, provided that each law furnishes a sufficient and consistent basis to support the joint program or agency.

A Philadelphia instance is especially valuable for analytical purposes. After the initial effort to put a Delaware River compact into effect came to naught in the 1920's, the four States of that basin decided to proceed in a less binding way. In 1936, they established the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin (Incode). Like its present-day successor, Incode dealt with the whole basin, but its activities were obviously intended to have an effect on the water problems of the greater Philadelphia area. The interstate agency was established by a process that can be called an agreement only in the loosest sense. New York acted through its Joint Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation by allocating funds for the use of Incode. The other States participated by combinations of unilateral statutory and administrative action.

If this cooperative undertaking had been a regulatory

one, or if any large operational or property owning function had been involved, it is doubtful that the arrangement could have worked. However, Incodel was a recommendatory body with some modest data gathering and research activities. It was originally thought that it might deal with the full gamut of water problems, but it came to concentrate on pollution. For its time, the agency's accomplishments in getting the States to view the Delaware's water quality problems as a whole were significant. However, when the States decided to move to a regulatory program, Incodel was supplanted by a compact—in this instance with the Federal government also participating.

Councils of governments in interstate metropolitan areas have a variety of legal underpinnings. In some instances they function pursuant to resolutions of the governing bodies of the constituent local jurisdictions. Others have been established under agreements authorized by interlocal cooperation statutes. As already noted, the model interlocal cooperation act has a feature authorizing agreements across State lines. Laws patterned after it make it possible for affected communities, if they so desire, to undertake operational or regulatory functions on an areawide basis. These statutes can also support agreements of the COG type. In the Kansas City region, Metroplan, one of the constituent units of the Mid-America Regional Council, has such a legal basis.

The twin cities of Texarkana in Texas and Arkansas have probably developed the parallel legislation method to a higher degree than any other two communities which form an interstate metropolis. They have established a continuing relationship between their local governments which is carried forward by the development of common statutes which each community then takes to its State legislature for enactment. However, these communities do not rely entirely on parallel statutes. Their regional planning agency is established pursuant to interlocal cooperation statutes.

There are two main disadvantages of these arrangements for metropolitan area government. The first is that they are potentially too unstable to support major undertakings on a long-term basis, especially if capital investments are involved. Any party can withdraw without notice or so modify its participation as to affect the entire enterprise. The other disadvantage is that however parallel or even identical the separate enactments may be, they are not sufficient to confer extraterritorial or multi-jurisdictional powers to perform regulatory functions. In contrast, the interstate compact can produce an areawide governmental apparatus of whatever size and elaborateness the States or communities involved can agree to establish and maintain.

Compacts and Special Districts. It would be redundant to set forth the uses which have been made of compacts in metropolitan areas. Specific compacts have been mentioned already and their activities described.

An ACIR report goes into even greater detail on this subject.¹¹¹ Accordingly, it is only necessary to note those compact characteristics which can be employed to further the performance of functions on an interstate areawide basis.

The compact is the legal mechanism through which an interstate area can be made into a single jurisdiction. Of course, this is characteristically done only for the limited purposes set forth in the instrument. However, it may provide that for its purposes, the interstate area will have a common administrative apparatus.

The compact may also write a single law applicable throughout the area. This has been done most widely in the western States with respect to the allocation of waters from interstate streams. In a metropolitan area it has been done most notably by the Waterfront Commission Compact for New York Harbor, wherein the law for the hiring of waterfront labor has been unified throughout the bi-State port district.

If the governmental functions involved are to be regulatory or compulsory, none of the other intergovernmental devices available at the State or local levels can supply the coercive element. A compact is a binding obligation of the States entering into it and can also be made to bind their subdivisions. The basic constitutional authority of State and local governments—the police power—can be delegated to an agency established by interstate compact.¹¹²

The Federal Role. At present, the interstate metropolitan problem has been left primarily to State and local governments, to some extent influenced differentially by various Federal programs as noted in earlier sections of this chapter and in Chapter VII.

In recent years, Congress has sought out a significant number of occasions to favor interstate regional approaches. But in a number of instances important to metropolitan areas the regional concept applied has not centered on the metropolitan complex. For example, the Water Resources Planning Act¹¹³ and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act¹¹⁴ both place emphasis on river basins as regions.¹¹⁵ For an even longer period of time, the Army Engineers have similarly concerned themselves with planning and building for basins. In these instances, hydrologic factors vital to resources development and management have been the controlling considerations. Economic development programs for Appalachia and a number of other multistate regions have fostered interstate commissions with direct Federal participation. The Federal government takes the leadership role in designating the boundaries and convening the States to organize the commissions.

At the metropolitan level, no such strong role has been taken by the Federal government, except perhaps in the comprehensive urban transportation planning program. In this program, every urban area of 50,000 population or more—interstate or not—was required to

establish an areawide planning body by July 1, 1965, if Federal highway funds were to continue to flow into the area. Federal highway personnel actively helped to establish these organizations by the deadline and have participated in them ever since.

HUD-sponsored metropolitan planning bodies were established primarily with local rather than Federal leadership and under no deadline, but HUD eligibility criteria required an areawide approach in metropolitan areas. A-95 metropolitan clearinghouses were simply designated by the governors or the Federal government from among the most appropriate existing organizations—with preference for interstate bodies where they existed in interstate areas. Fortunately, the HUD and DOT metropolitan planning programs had already produced many such organizations, so with few exceptions the A-95 organizations are truly areawide, even though interstate. In almost every instance where there is not an interstate agency designated for A-95 purposes, the reason lies in one or more of the States' choosing to provide that the State be organized into in-State planning districts.

The Federal air pollution program has designated interstate air quality control regions in appropriate areas, but has not actively sought to develop interstate planning bodies for them. The governors are responsible for designating the newly required areawide waste treatment management bodies under the 1972 Federal water pollution control amendments, so obtaining areawide results in interstate areas may require some Federal leadership. Other Federal areawide programs have simply accepted interstate bodies as applicants where they have appeared naturally.

There has never been a TVA-type Federal corporation established with a broad role in the affairs of a metropolitan area. However, in the Washington metropolitan area—the Nation's capital—the Army Corps of Engineers operates the water supply system for the central city and wholesales water to several suburbs. There was also a temporary Federal agency (the National Capital Transportation Agency) in charge of establishing the rapid transit program for several years while the interstate compact agency was being formed. In addition, the regional planning agency in Washington was a Federal agency from 1952 until 1966 when the COG took over this function. A Federal agency is currently one of several proposals being considered for unifying the diverse water quality management activities in the Washington area. It seems likely, however, that this kind of direct Federal role in interstate metropolitan affairs will be limited to the Nation's capital. Even there, where its interest is greatest, it has used this option only in emergencies and has bowed out in favor of locally controlled organizations when they have become adequate.

REPRESENTATION ON INTERSTATE BODIES

There are three basic ways to achieve popular representation for regions. One is to create a body of directly elected officials and to give them functional responsibilities for the metropolitan area; the second is to build the body from persons already elected or appointed to high positions in the participating State and local governments; and the third is for the participating governments to appoint laymen holding no other public offices.

Councils of governments consist of elected officials from the constituent local governments of a region; they serve on the COG by virtue of the local offices they hold. Regional planning commissions and special districts frequently are composed of specially appointed laymen or a combination of laymen and local elected officials. Direct election of metropolitan officials has been proposed in a few places, but had never been tried as of 1972.

Usually, representation on a metropolitan body is determined proportionate to the number of units of local government or the populations within such units. Interstate compact bodies, however, normally have a different representational pattern, based upon equal representation of the States which are party to it.

There is no reason why a voluntary council of governments, composed of the elected officials of the units of general local government in the area, cannot function as effectively and representatively for an interstate area as for an area within a single State. If the objective is to have a forum, and if a satisfactory level of funding is forthcoming on a voluntary basis or from grants and donations, a COG qualifies as a representative institution by definition. But another important ingredient of effective representation is having responsibility and authority to carry out the will of those who are being represented. This is where the interstate problem is at its most difficult and where the COG mechanism in its present form provides only a step toward an answer. Any consensus reached by a voluntary COG must be implemented by the individual governing bodies and administrators of each affected local government. Therefore, it has no real authority and does not raise the need to confront the one person, one vote question, nor the "equal vote of each State" question appropriate to the interstate compact situation. Both of these representational issues will have to be resolved if interstate metropolitan bodies take on the status of general purpose governmental compact organizations.

In the past, interstate compacts for metropolitan areas have provided services that have been sold on a user charge basis and which could therefore support bond issues that did not directly obligate the taxpayers of the metropolitan area or of the States. Thus, they have been legal and administrative mechanisms designed

to provide specific services on an areawide basis rather than vehicles for the creation of representative policy-making institutions. As with administrative bodies generally, any representative qualities they may have are derivative. The governors of the States concerned, and in one or two instances the elected heads of local governments, choose the commissioners or board members who head the interstate agency. These persons in turn select a staff head. The process is not materially different from that which characterizes the selection of personnel having responsible positions in other agencies of State or local government, except that it is partly accomplished in each of two or more jurisdictions.

Nevertheless, there have been isolated instances of experimentation with devices intended to bring the intergovernmental agency into closer connection with the elective policymaking process. The fact that the Delaware River Basin Commission is composed of the four governors and a representative of the President makes it four-fifths an elected body. True, it comes by this character in an *ex officio* way rather than by an express elective procedure. Of course, in this case the region is not confined to the interstate metropolitan area, but the same observation would be valid if the Commission's only jurisdiction were in greater Philadelphia and if its members were governors, mayors, or county commissioners.

A second possible device to bring representativeness to bear upon these organizations is that written into the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority Compact. Under it, the governors of the two States appoint equal numbers of the authority's board members. The authority acts by vote of its board, but any action reported in the minutes of the board may be vetoed by either governor, in which case the authority may not undertake the action. This power has been rarely used, but from time to time the threat of its employment has been a real force. On the other hand, this is an extraordinary control and would not be practical if there were too frequent a need for it. The same kind of device could be written into agreements establishing operating authorities on whose boards might sit persons appointed by mayors or county executives, but in such cases the same proviso as to practicability would be in order.

Undoubtedly, a variety of arrangements could be devised to make interstate metropolitan area agencies representative of or responsible to the metropolitan region as a whole. Before any such arrangement can become feasible or appropriate, however, it must be responsive to a felt need in the community. In this connection, it should be remembered that a metro government such as that instituted for a Toronto, Dade County, Nashville-Davidson County, or Minneapolis-St. Paul has never been attempted, nor has there yet been any serious support for trying it in an interstate metropolitan.

Consequently, perhaps the most pertinent inquiry is whether an administrative agency is particularly advantaged by being constructed as a representative body. Within single jurisdictions, standard principles of government and public administration seem to hold that it is not advantageous. For this reason, no effort will be made here to proliferate hypothetical representation schemes.¹¹⁶ However, unlikely as a metro government is to develop for any interstate region in the near future, the conceptual considerations involved can be set forth briefly by detailing the legal and procedural ingredients that would be required to establish such an institution.

If the fashioning of representative institutions for a metropolitan region as a whole is the goal, the policy-making parts of the governmental structure become the essential points of concentration. These are the local legislative functions and the top level of executive leadership. The vital powers are to make the local laws and the more important administrative regulations that determine the rules in accordance with which the public life of the metropolitan community will proceed.

Constitutionally, this kind of power resides in the States. They exercise parts of it directly and parts of it by constitutional or statutory delegation to their subdivisions. The creation of a representative government across State lines would involve the delegation of this policymaking power as well as of operational or regulatory authority. The obstacles to any such arrangement are more political than legal.

An interstate compact or an interlocal agreement made pursuant to State statutes conferring compact status on such an agreement could achieve the result. It is clear that a compact can delegate both operating and regulatory powers in whatever number and of whatever importance the parent States may agree; establish a body with lawmaking authority; determine the composition of such a body and fix the procedures for its selection. If the compact were so to provide, it could confer the full range of municipal powers and could provide that an executive officer and legislative organ be chosen by popular election. Alternatively, the compact could specify that the metropolitan legislative body be composed of the elected officials of the general local government in the affected area.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing evaluation of needs, precedents, and mechanisms for interstate action has identified several overall patterns and raised a number of issues. These are examined below.

Summary of Findings

The major findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:

1. The extent of interstate metropolitan areas is

greater than has been generally realized. Over 25 percent of the nation's total population—and 40 percent of the nation's metropolitan population—lives in interstate metropolitan areas. Two-thirds of the States are involved in one or more such areas. Many of the Nation's largest metropolitan areas are interstate.

2. Interstate metropolitan areas have special problems in achieving interlocal cooperation and providing for the performance of areawide functions because of the presence of State lines. Interstate metropolitan areas have the same needs as single-State areas, but the nature of our constitutional system lessens the effectiveness of some coordinating devices developed to meet interlocal problems and sometimes even precludes their use. Unless special arrangements are made to overcome differences among the two or three sets of State laws and institutions which apply within these areas, the development of areawide coordinating mechanisms is inhibited.

Local governments are severely limited in what they can do alone to ameliorate or solve areawide problems in the face of a fractionalizing State line. The power to project regulatory functions across the State boundary is not within their constitutional reach, unless delegated or at least substantially aided by the parent States. The problem of homogenizing or at least coordinating the legal and financial systems which provide the framework and underpinning for public services and institutions is also largely beyond their grasp. Consequently, interlocal, as distinguished from interstate, entities in interstate metropolitan areas have been confined to planning. Implementation remains the province of the individual local governments and produces areawide coordination only to the extent that each such jurisdiction is persuaded and motivated to carry out the plans.

3. There are numerous, though scattered, precedents for interstate action in metropolitan areas. However, most of these precedents have been limited in either their functional scope, their degree of governmental authority, or both. The State is supposed to be the coordinator of local governments. This role has been fulfilled only in part by the States, especially in interstate areas. Nevertheless, there are instances where the parent States in which an interstate metropolitan area lies have created interstate instrumentalities to serve regional needs. The jurisdictions in the regions of New York, Philadelphia, Washington, DC., and Kansas City—in that order—have seen most of this kind of State activity.

In most interstate metropolitan areas, areawide planning of an advisory nature has been quite commonly instituted, but only compacts have been concluded for exercising governmental authority across State lines. Ten of these 12 interstate compact organizations, involving five metropolitan areas, are unifunctional, while the other two are for comprehensive planning. Eight of the functional organizations operate in the field of transpor-

tation. The other two are in the fields of water and air pollution and parks and recreation. This unfunctionality has produced coordination or unification across State lines within the individual functions, but in some instances it has made multifunctional areawide coordination more difficult.

4. Several of the traditional legal mechanisms for adjusting local geographic boundaries to keep pace with a growing community within a single State cannot be used in interstate areas. For example, there are no local governments established or expanded (through annexation or consolidation) across State lines. Metropolitan reforms, such as those instituted in Miami, Nashville, Indianapolis, Jacksonville and the Twin Cities, all have occurred within individual States. Neither extraterritorial powers (like zoning) nor independent taxing authority has been authorized across State lines.

5. However, several other mechanisms are available for use in authorizing governmental action on an interstate basis. A number of interlocal agencies function across State lines pursuant to interlocal cooperation agreements or parallel legislation. Others are organized under nonprofit charters. While adequate for planning advisory functions and non-controversial service functions, these mechanisms are inherently unstable and frequently relatively impotent.

Building stronger areawide institutions in interstate metropolitan areas encounters a series of problems. There is dichotomy between the central cities and suburban areas; home rule has popular support; and State sovereignty is inviolate. How and to what extent administrative structures should be organized to be representative institutions is a perplexing question. Nevertheless, if there is a sufficient feeling of political community, ways can be devised to meet recognized needs. An interstate compact can give real governmental authority to an interstate body.

6. The Federal government has played an important but somewhat ambivalent role in interstate metropolitan areas. In recent years, Congressional enactments and administrative policies have given increasing attention to the encouragement and financing of comprehensive areawide planning, urban transportation planning, and A-95 review and comment procedures encompassing whole interstate metropolitan areas. Comprehensive planning agencies in interstate metropolitan areas generally owe their existence to Federal funding requirements of individual Federal laws that there be comprehensive areawide planning as a condition precedent to the receipt of Federal grants, and their designations as A-95 review agencies.

However, in most interstate metropolitan areas, comprehensive health planning, although it is supported by Federal financial assistance, is not performed on an areawide basis. Moreover, in most such places, it is performed by bodies independent of the regional com-

prehensive planning agency, thus making it difficult to coordinate health care with other services. In addition, there are no interstate law enforcement planning agencies even though this activity, too, is supported by Federal financial aid. Also, in a number of instances Federal programs emphasize States or special regions such as river basins, even though they vitally affect programs having metropolitan areawide significance or addressed to many problems of particular metropolitan concern.

Because of the intensified jurisdictional problems faced by interstate metropolitan areas, and because of the importance of the Federal role in urban affairs, the development of a consistent set of national policies in support of interstate metropolitan areas could be especially helpful.

7. If areawide action in interstate metropolitan areas takes on some of the responsibilities of general purpose government, some special issues of representation will be raised. A strong sense of community nourishes areawide government, either by creating new institutions or coordinating the activities of existing ones. But attachments to existing local governments and the divergent interests of inner cities and suburbs make it difficult to establish this sense of community for a whole metropolitan area. The centripetal tendencies are even greater when the metropolitan area is interstate. State interests as well as local interests need to be represented, and there may sometimes be a need to provide a place for Federal participation. Special devices of formal intergovernmental cooperation, such as compacts, face these representational questions when they are formed. Usual-

ly their representational patterns have been designed to represent the cooperating governments, but if they take on major governmental policy making functions the need for greater recognition of the one person, one vote principle may loom more important.

Issues

These findings raise the following intergovernmental issues:

1. What should be the relative role of the Federal, State, and local governments in creating and supporting viable interstate metropolitan areawide organizations?

2. How can arrangements currently in use within the United States and those which permit activities to be carried on across State lines be adapted to meet interstate metropolitan areawide requirements?

3. In what functional and service fields is it appropriate or desirable to delegate policy making authority to interstate metropolitan agencies?

4. How can there be achieved in given functional and service fields a greater measure of cooperation and coordination among activities performed by local governments, metropolitan regional organizations, the States, multistate regional agencies, and the Federal government?

5. How might multifunctional coordination be improved across State lines in interstate metropolitan areas?

6. What means might be employed to stimulate popular awareness and understanding of interstate areawide problems and support for needed institutions to work toward their solution?

7. How might these interstate institutions be made appropriately representative of both the cooperating governments and the populations they serve?

Footnotes

¹Massachusetts-New York Boundary Compact; for text, see 10 Stat. 602 (1855).

²The Virginia-Tennessee Boundary Compact was litigated in *Virginia v. Tennessee*, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), text of the compact appears at p. 511 and p. 514, the Virginia and Tennessee enactments respectively. Missouri-Iowa Boundary Compact of 1939, 53 Stat. 1345 (1939). Indiana-Kentucky Boundary Line Compact of 1943, 57 Stat. 248 (1943). Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 1943, 57 Stat. 494 (1943).

³Delaware River Jurisdiction Compact, 34 Stat. 858 (1905). Columbia River Compact, 40 Stat. 515 (1918). Potomac River Compact, 76 Stat. 797 (1962). Kansas-Missouri Waterworks Compact, 42 Stat. 1058 (1922). Pymatuning Lake Compact, 50 Stat. 865 (1937), amended 59 Stat. 502 (1945).

⁴The five largest metropolitan areas according to the 1970 Decennial Census were New York (18,679,912), Chicago (9,304,757), Los Angeles (7,032,075), Philadelphia (5,621,375), and Detroit (4,199,131). The New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia population figures are for interstate metropolitan areas as delineated in this study. Those for Los Angeles and Detroit are taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Final Report PC(1)-A1*, Table 32 Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary.

⁵Bureau of the Budget, *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 1967* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

⁶For example, to take the three States in which the major part of the Philadelphia metropolitan area is located, Delaware has a very specific and unusual referendum requirement with respect to setting up water and sewer authorities, 16 Del. C. Sec. 1401 *et seq.*, not matched by either Pennsylvania or New Jersey. It provides for weighted voting based on municipal taxes paid, *i.e.*, one vote for each dollar of taxes. Delaware has debt limits specified in its code, 9 Del. C. Sec. 1522 and 9 Del. C. Sec. 830; Pennsylvania, pursuant to Article 9, Sec. 10, of its constitution, authorizes the General Assembly to prescribe debt limits for all units of local government which might or might not be consistent with what is permitted in the other two States; and there appear to be no general debt limitations in New Jersey. Concerning what areawide authorities or similar bodies might undertake, again there are differences. Under 16 Del. C. Sec. 1401 *et seq.*, water and/or sewer authorities may be established; New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 40:14B-1 *et seq.*, permits the combination of water supply and liquid and solid wastes collection, treatment, and disposal services; Pennsylvania, Article 9, Sections 5 and 7 of the constitution, is not specific in what service coverage is contemplated.

The two States in which the Kansas City metropolitan area is located both have complicated but dissimilar debt limitations, Missouri Constitution, Article 6, Section 26 (a), (b), (c), and (d) and K.S.A. 10-302, 10-302(a) and 10-303. What is true with respect to the dissimilarity between the two States and among the different types and sizes of subdivisions in both with respect

to debt limitations is equally true in terms of services for collection, treatment, and disposal of wastes. See, for example, V.A.M.S. Sec. 49.303, 64.460 *et seq.* and 71.680, and K.S.A. 12-2102 and 12-2104.

⁷Joint activities which must be staffed on a regular basis are required to accommodate to practical problems connected with the employment of personnel. Compensation, tenure, working conditions, and fringe benefits for public employees are fixed or regulated by law. For local government employees, a large part of the governing law is usually local ordinance or administrative regulation, but State law is also important. The personnel laws and practices of no two States are identical, nor can it be assumed that rates of compensation and benefits are identical or even substantially similar on either side of a State line. Interstate agencies solve these problems in a number of ways, but until solved, they present obstacles to joint undertakings on a regional basis.

⁸Charles E. Merriam, Spencer D. Parratt, and Albert Lepawsky, *The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 156.

⁹Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (formerly Port of New York Authority), 42 Stat. 822 (1921); Interstate Palisades Park Commission, 50 Stat. 719 (1937); Interstate Sanitation Commission, 49 Stat. 932 (1935); Tri-State Regional Planning Commission (formerly Tri-State Transportation Agency), C.G.S.A. Sec. 16-339 *et seq.*, N.J.S.A. Sec. 32:22B-1 *et seq.*, N.Y.-McK. Unconsol. Laws Sec. 8301 *et seq.*, and Water-front Commission, 67 Stat. 541 (1953).

¹⁰Delaware River Basin Commission, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).

¹¹Delaware River Port Authority, 47 Stat. 308 (1932), amended 66 Stat. 738 (1952), 66 Stat. 747 (1952) and 78 Stat. 215 (1964); Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, 73 Stat. P.S. Sec. 701 *et seq.*, N.J.S.A. 32:27-1 *et seq.* Operating partly within the area are the Delaware River Basin Commission; the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, 49 Stat. 1051 (1935), amended 61 Stat. 752 (1947) and 66 Stat. 28 (1952); and the Delaware River and Bay Authority, 76 Stat. 560 (1962).

¹²The predecessor to the Delaware River Basin Commission was the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin. The latter agency functioned on the basis of parallel statutes and authorizing resolutions in the four basin States. In addition, the greater Philadelphia area has had a number of civic and private organizations which have functioned on a "Delaware Valley" or "Delaware Valley and South Jersey" basis. Despite these broader sounding descriptions of geographic constituencies most of them have really centered on Philadelphia, Camden, and their surrounding communities.

¹³Operating within the region are the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 76 Stat. 764 (1962), and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966). Operating both within and without the metropolitan area is the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, 54 Stat. 748 (1940), amended 84 Stat. 856 (1970).

¹⁴Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, 80 Stat. 826 (1966), amended 82 Stat. 338 (1968) and the Metropolitan Planning Commission—Kansas City Region (which with the Mid-America Council of Governments now makes up the Mid-America Regional Council).

¹⁵Delaware River Port Authority, 47 STAT. 308 (1932) Article I (j).

¹⁶The Compact became effective in 1922.

¹⁷An interesting variation in the use of the form of interjurisdictional cooperation is furnished by the Metropolitan Washington Waste Management Agency. Sponsored by the Metropolitan Washington COG, this nonprofit corporation was set up to plan, develop, and operate liquid and solid waste treatment facilities in the metropolitan area.

¹⁸One part of the New York program, authorized by Unconsolidated Laws, Sec. 6771 *et seq.*, McKinney's *Consoli-*

dated Laws of New York, provides for the acquisition of passenger cars and locomotives by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey for use on commuter railroads operating in the State. Dating from 1962, when the State guaranteed a bond issue of up to \$100 million by the Port Authority, the program has resulted in the purchase and delivery of rolling stock to both publicly and privately owned railroads.

¹⁹For text of compact see 83 Stat. 441 (1969).

²⁰This is in fact a rapid-rail facility, but it is discussed here because it was built and operated for many years by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.

²¹N.J.S.A. 27:1A-15 *et seq.*

²²*Report of Operations 1970.*

²³66 P.S. Sec. 1901 *et seq.*

²⁴66 P.S. Sec. 1951 *et seq.*

²⁵66 P.S. Sec. 2001 *et seq.*

²⁶A county of the first class, 1,800,000 people or more, and all other counties located in whole or in part within 20 miles of such county.

²⁷For text of Compact see 80 Stat. 1324 (1966).

²⁸Article II, Section 5.

²⁹Chapters 630 and 631, Acts of Assembly 1964 and Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Edition), Articles 16 and 17, Sections 73A and 83A respectively.

³⁰82 Stat. 827-828.

³¹*D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe*, D.D.C., 308 F. Supp. 423 (1970).

³²Public Law 92-517.

³³Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Edition), Article 41, Secs. 317-41 and 317-56 and Acts of Assembly 1970, Chapter 449.

³⁴Public Law 92-517.

³⁵Delaware River Port Authority Annual Reports for 1970 and 1971.

³⁶Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission *Annual Report 1970-1971*, p. 15. Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, *The Delaware Valley Plan*, March 1970, p. 27.

³⁷Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, *Capital Improvement Program, 1971-1976.*

³⁸*Supra*, note 33.

³⁹*Supra*, note 14.

⁴⁰Kansas City Area Transportation Authority 1969 Annual Report.

⁴¹V.A.M.S. Sec. 92.400 *et seq.*

⁴²*Kansas City Star*, August 21, 1972.

⁴³*Kansas City Star*, August 21, 1972.

⁴⁴*Kansas City Star*, May 1 and 16, 1972.

⁴⁵*Kansas City Star*, July 21, 1972.

⁴⁶K.S.A. 12-2535.

⁴⁷For text of Compact see 80 Stat. 1324 (1966).

⁴⁸49 U.S.C. 1601.

⁴⁹Urban Mass Transportation Planning Requirement Guide, February 1, 1966, and Supplements.

⁵⁰Agencies with areawide jurisdictions include the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Planning agencies of the component elements of the metropolitan area are the National Capital Planning Commission, the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission, and the Northern Virginia Planning District. Other agencies include the Maryland Department of Transportation, the Northern Virginia Transportation Commission, and the Washington Suburban Transit Commission (Maryland).

⁵¹23 U.S.C. 105, 106.

⁵²In late 1971, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, then the planning agency for the metropolitan area, and the Mid-America Council of Governments were combined to form the Mid-America Regional Council, which succeeded Metroplan as

the planning agency.

⁵³23 U.S.C. 134.

⁵⁴64 Stat. 568 (1950).

⁵⁵The Kansas City Municipal Airport, which will no longer be used for commercial aviation, is also a Kansas City, Missouri, facility.

⁵⁶S. 1098, 92nd Congress.

⁵⁷Proposed by Representative Joel T. Broyhill, Virginia, but no bill was offered.

⁵⁸Summary of statement of Richard C. Van Dusen, Under Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, made to Challenge of Change Conference in Kansas City, Missouri, March 9, 1972, p. 7. Factual information on the Philadelphia situation was obtained from a DVRPC staff member, November 21, 1972.

⁵⁹*Fair Share Housing Formula* (Washington, D.C.: Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, January 1972).

⁶⁰*Building the American City*, Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems, December 1968. See in particular Introduction and Summary, pp. 13-16 and 18-20, and Part II, p. 56 *et seq.*

⁶¹*Building Codes: A Program for Intergovernmental Reform* (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1966).

⁶²*Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs* (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, 1965).

⁶³Statement of George Romney, Secretary of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, addressed to Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, October 27, 1971.

⁶⁴Public Law 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280.

⁶⁵38 M.R.S.A. Sec. 481 *et seq.* and 10 V.S.A. Sec. 6001 *et seq.*, respectively.

⁶⁶42 U.S.C. 4001-4127.

⁶⁷The material in this paragraph is taken largely from *Federal, State, and Local Laws and Tax Policies Affecting the Use of Estuarine Resources*, written by the present authors as Element III-C, pp. A-2 and A-4, of the *National Estuary Study* of the U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, January 1970.

⁶⁸Chapter 72-317, 1972 Regular Session.

⁶⁹For the text of the Compact see 84 Stat. 1509 (1971).

⁷⁰For the text of the Compact see 83 Stat. 360 (1969).

⁷¹S. 632 was passed by the Senate; H.R. 7211 approved by committee in the House.

⁷²Two forms have been followed in these compacts. One permits either State to exercise in its own name the power of eminent domain in the other. This is the procedure authorized by the South Platte River Compact, 44 Stat. 195 (1926); the Republican River Compact, 57 Stat. 86 (1943); the Belle Fourche River Compact, 58 Stat. 94 (1944); and the Yellowstone River Compact, 65 Stat. 663 (1951). Under the other alternative, one State requests the second to exercise its powers of eminent domain to secure land in the latter State. This feature appears in the Snake River Compact, 64 Stat. 29 (1950), and the Klamath River Basin Compact, 71 Stat. 497 (1957).

⁷³For text of Compact see 50 Stat. 719 (1937).

⁷⁴The several compacts are the Pymatuning Lake Compact, 50 Stat. 865 (1937), amended 59 Stat. 502 (1945); the Cumberland Gap National Park Compact, 57 Stat. 85 (1943); the Breaks Interstate Park Compact, 68 Stat. 571 (1954); and the Falls of the Ohio Interstate Park Compact, 84 Stat. 832 (1970). The last is in the Louisville Metropolitan Area.

⁷⁵For text of compact see 83 Stat. 360 (1969).

⁷⁶Adopted by Metroplan, it is now available from the Mid-America Regional Council.

⁷⁷*The Regional Water Supply and Water Pollution Control Plans*, December 1969.

⁷⁸The Delaware River Basin Commission is the water management agency for its entire basin. The plan contemplates

an increased use of water from the Susquehanna River. At the time it was approved, however, the Susquehanna River Basin Commission, a Federal-State agency similar in authority to the Delaware River Basin Commission, was not yet in existence.

⁷⁹*New Jersey v New York*, 283 US. 336 (1931), and *New Jersey v New York*, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).

⁸⁰*Supra*, footnote 10.

⁸¹For text of the Delaware River Basin Compact, see 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).

⁸²79 Stat. 1073.

⁸³79 Stat. 1073, Sec. 101(b).

⁸⁴*Solid Waste Management Plan* (Kansas City: Metropolitan Planning Commission, May 1971), pp. 3-4. Now available from the Mid-America Regional Council

⁸⁵K.S.A. 65-3401 *et seq.* and V.A.M.S. Sec. 64.460 *et seq.*

⁸⁶K.S.A. 12-2119 and V.A.M.S. 70, 230

⁸⁷*Solid Waste Management Plan*, p. 82.

⁸⁸Transcript of Kansas City Air Pollution Control Conference, January 23-24, 1967.

⁸⁹49 Stat. 932 (1935).

⁹⁰42 U.S.C. 246.

⁹¹The seriousness of the situation in the Kansas City metropolitan area was explored in depth in an article in the *Kansas City Star*, September 17, 1972, from which most of this material was taken.

⁹²Emergency Medical Communications Proposal, Kansas City Metropolitan Area, submitted by the Mid-America Regional Council to the Missouri Division of Health, August 1972.

⁹³67 Stat. 541 (1953).

⁹⁴H.J. Res. 375 was reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary; hearings were concluded by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 54.

⁹⁵78 Stat. 769, 792 (1964).

⁹⁶42 U.S.C. 3334.

⁹⁷42 U.S.C. 4231-4233.

⁹⁸As Chapter X makes evident, various Federal planning grants have encouraged delineation of the jurisdiction of metropolitan areawide planning agencies to include an interstate dimension.

⁹⁹The definition we have followed is that of the National Association of Regional Councils, *i.e.*, that more than 50 percent of the agency's board of directors consists of elected officials of local governments.

¹⁰⁰Because of its merger with the Mid-America Council of Governments to form the Mid-America Regional Council, which now performs the A-95 review function, the Kansas City area is counted among those where a council of governments has this responsibility.

¹⁰¹There are no OMB-recognized interstate metropolitan area A-95 review agencies in the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, Binghamton, Boston, Chicago, Hartford-Springfield, Parkersburg-Marietta, Providence, and South Bend areas. Parallel legislation is the legal basis for the OMB-recognized agencies in the Huntington-Ashland, Steubenville-Weirton and Wheeling regions. In the New York and Philadelphia regions the areawide planning agencies were organized pursuant to compact.

¹⁰²Article IV, Section 3.

¹⁰³K.S.A. 12-715(b).

¹⁰⁴V.A.M.S. Sec. 89.145 confers extraterritorial jurisdiction on a constitutional charter city with a population of 65,000 or more located wholly within one county (this is special, not general, legislation).

¹⁰⁵This is particularly true in rural areas.

¹⁰⁶76 Stat. 797 (1962).

¹⁰⁷West's Ann. Gov. Code, Sec. 6500 *et seq.* (California) and Nevada Revised Statutes 277.080 *et seq.* are two early examples.

¹⁰⁸*Suggested State Legislation for 1957* (Lexington: Council for State Governments, 1957), p. 93.

¹⁰⁹*1968 State Legislative Program* (Washington, D.C.: ACIR,

1968), p. 499.

¹¹⁰There were also some differences among the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut versions.

¹¹¹*Multistate Regionalism* (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, April 1972), p. 137 *et seq.*

¹¹²*State ex rel Dyer v Sims*, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).

¹¹³42 U.S.C. 1962, 1962-1, 1962a, 1962a-1 to 1962a-4, 1962b, 1962b-1 to 1962b-6, 1962c, 1962c-1 to 1962c-6, 1962d, 1962d-1 to 1962d-3.

¹¹⁴42 U.S.C. 1151 notes, 1152, 1156, 1158, 1160-1175.

¹¹⁵But see Section 208 of Public Law 92-500, 86 Stat. 839, amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, in which


there is an emphasis on planning for urban regions.

¹¹⁶In the case of the proposed Potomac River Basin Compact, Edwin T. Hoefle, writing in the *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation*, May-June 1969, XXIV, No. 3, suggested that its governing body be elected from basin districts equal in population, and that the customary equal representation of the party jurisdictions be rejected for two reasons. First, the disparity in population in the basin is too great among jurisdictions, ranging from 3.7 to 36.1 percent. Second, in all jurisdictions but one, commission members would represent parties in which populations outside the basin would be in the majority.

CHAPTER X

ISSUES IN

SUBSTATE REGIONAL DISTRICTING



The decade of the 1960's witnessed increased governmental fragmentation in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Fragmentation has taken five principal forms: some proliferation of general purpose local governments; the steady growth of non-school special districts and public authorities; the rapid increase of Federally supported and State-mandated areawide planning and development agencies; the duplication of certain city and county functional responsibilities; and the expansion of metropolitan areas over State boundaries. As a result, problems have arisen in the decision making process at the areawide as well as the local levels; in the efficient and economical delivery of those public goods and services requiring areawide treatment; in the continuing economic and social disparities among central city, suburb, and rural community; and in the development of a genuine sense of regional identity or citizenship.

During the second half of the 1960's and continuing through the early 1970's, accelerated jurisdictional fragmentation was in part a by-product of the Federal government's assuming a leadership role in encouraging regional action on some urban and rural needs. In part, Federal action was a response to the earlier failure to achieve major institutional reform, with the exception of a handful of city-county consolidations and urban counties, and to the inability of some local governments to meet certain growing public service demands accompanying urbanization.

Through requirements and incentives for areawide planning, grant application review, and districting, 24 Federal programs sought to fill the institutional vacuum at the substate level. With State acquiescence for the most part, they brought into existence and nurtured approximately 1,800 areawide functional planning districts, ranging from air quality and health to economic development and transportation, and 450 A-95 clearinghouses. At the same time, 40 States set up substate district systems for State planning, development, and administrative purposes, involving over 480 multicounty organizations. And cities and counties established over 600 regional councils of elected local officials, largely in response to Federal areawide planning funds and grant review requirements. Although there are some exceptions—notably A-95 bodies and regional councils—most of the Federally encouraged districts tend to the specialist-oriented while State planning and development districts, clearinghouses, and regional councils tend to be generalist-oriented.

The performance of these recently established areawide bodies has been mixed. Some observers believe they are effective in formulating regional comprehensive and functional plans, that they are successfully uniting the talents of generalists and specialists, and that they are providing a politically viable alternative to institutional restructuring. Others, however, counter these statements, pointing out that areawide planning in the

absence of implementation authority is virtually meaningless, that too often multicounty organizations are isolated and unresponsive regional bureaucracies, and that they are undermining the city-county consolidation movement and other efforts to achieve basic structural changes in the local government landscape.

Little by way of a clear substate regionalism policy has been systematically developed by the Federal or State governments to guide their respective districting efforts. Instead, for the most part each Federal agency has pursued its own areawide strategy, even though the general provisions of Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 require Federal agencies administering substate regional programs to utilize State-designated districts as the basis for areawide planning. States have had difficulty getting their own functional departments to take seriously their districting efforts. And both the States and localities have encouraged further special district growth. In general, then, ambivalence has characterized the approaches taken by the Federal, State, and local governments. In most metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, this tendency has led to programs operating at cross-purposes rather than being well coordinated; tensions between generalists and specialists being exacerbated rather than reduced; relationships between general and special purpose local units being strained rather than smoothed; and power and responsibility at the substate regional level being dispersed rather than consolidated, or at least coordinated.

Recent areawide activity raises again many of the fundamental questions that accompanied the evolution of our Federal system, including centralization-decentralization, accountability, representation, and responsiveness. This chapter probes these questions in terms of specific substate districting problems and issues involving regional councils, A-95 clearinghouses, areawide planning districts, and special districts and public authorities.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND TRENDS

The background chapters of this volume contain an abundance of information concerning areawide approaches to meeting the needs accompanying population growth and technological change short of major local governmental reorganization, which is the subject of Volume III. A review of the principal findings of these chapters and an analysis of recent substate districting trends provide a useful backdrop for a consideration of the intergovernmental problems and issues raised by these developments.

The Changing Substate Regional Scene

A central theme of this report concerns the implications of the accelerating pace of institutional change at the multicounty level, especially in metropolitan areas. The number and extent of SMSA's is increasing; organi-

zations, procedures, and mechanisms created to deal with metropolitan and certain non-metropolitan problems are proliferating; traditional local governmental structure is straining; functional assignments are shifting.

Consider first the rate of metropolitan growth. In 1950, 168 metropolitan areas covered approximately 281 county areas. By 1972, 269 SMSA's encompassed 506 county areas, representing a 60 percent increase in the number of metropolitan areas and an 80 percent rise in the number of metropolitan counties over a 22-year time span. According to estimates made by the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, by the year 2000 there will be well over 300 SMSA's, and about 25 percent of the Nation's 3,146 county areas will lie within the bounds of a metropolitan complex. Moreover, the size as well as the total number of SMSA's has been steadily rising. In 1950, only 14 metropolitan areas had a population of more than one million persons. By 1970 there were 33 such areas, and by the year 2000 there will be at least 50. At the end of the century most SMSA's will have merged into large metropolitan regions, 15 of which will each contain at least 2.5 million persons. These tremendous growth rates will lead to increased density and interaction of local governments within the metropolis.

Despite metropolitanization, by 2000 more than 85 percent of the Nation's land and 75 percent of all county areas will still be found in non-metropolitan America. Currently, rural areas contain 67 percent of all special districts, 80 percent of all county and multi-county special districts, and about 45 percent of all substate planning districts.

Accompanying these developments, there has been a marked increase in organizations created to deal with urban and rural affairs crossing county boundaries. At the present time, over 1,800 separate Federal, State, and locally established substate district bodies exist, not counting traditional special districts and public authorities. Over half of these are located in metropolitan areas, meaning that an average SMSA probably has about eight districts.

The growth of substate districts has been rapid. With respect to Federally encouraged bodies, between 1969 and 1972 Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System Councils (CAMPS) grew by 141 per year. Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning Agencies (CHP's) have increased by 35 every year since 1968, and Economic Development Districts (EDD's) by 20 per year since 1967. State and local substate bodies have expanded at a similar rate. The number of State planning and development districts has risen from 44 in 1965 to 482 in 1972, and regional councils have increased by well over 300 between 1965 and 1972.

Accompanying the proliferation of these quasi-

governmental mechanisms has been a continued growth of non-school special districts, by more than 30 percent since 1962. Two-thirds of these bodies are in rural areas. However, large operating areawide districts in metropolitan areas are gaining popularity; in the 72 largest SMSA's, for example, their number rose from 39 in 1957 to 89 in 1972.

Not only have district organizations flourished in recent years, but there also has been a steady development of procedures having a pronounced substate regional impact. For instance, the number of Federal grants-in-aid covered by areawide review and comment requirements doubled between 1966 and 1972. And 24 Federal programs contained requirements for areawide planning activity.

Areawide procedures have been developed by the States as well. At least five require that their planning and development districts screen applications for State categorical grant programs. And six others assign a review and approval power over such applications to some or all of their district organizations or councils.

In sum, all three levels of government have established organizations and procedures designed to bring an areawide focus to certain problems confronting urban and rural areas. The Federal government has prompted the creation of both single and multipurpose substate regional bodies for planning, program development, and grant management; State governments have created multicounty districts to bring about a greater State presence in substate regional affairs; local governments have continued to form regional councils to plan and develop approaches to common problems; and both the States and localities have continued their major role in the creation of special purpose districts and public authorities.

Complexity and Confusion in Substate Regionalism

With all three levels of government responding to substate regional needs, sometimes in different fashions, problems in coordinating and controlling the various districting organizations and procedures are bound to develop. Generally, these problems center around fragmentation, policy inconsistencies, and administrative complexities.

Fragmentation. One of the chief characteristics of substate districting is geographic, jurisdictional, and functional fragmentation. Perhaps the most notable example is district geography, since there appear to be three levels of coverage. Community Action Agencies and CAMPS are the least areawide of all districts, often covering only one or two counties. Organizations most

frequently coterminous with SMSA's are A-95 clearinghouses, regional councils, and metropolitan planning agencies, which on the average have jurisdictional area of 4.5 counties. Districts that are generally supra-metropolitan—covering six to seven counties—are CHP's, Local Development Districts (LDD's) and EDD's, and State planning and development districts. Finally, the Nation's 247 Air Quality Regions encompass an average of 13 counties.

These boundary configurations help explain why low levels of organizational coterminality (or "piggybacking") often are found among substate districting programs. Districts least likely to follow metropolitan or multicounty area designations are also least likely to be joined with State or local multipurpose bodies such as regional councils.

In large measure, the lack of boundary conformance and organizational coterminality among substate districts reflects the tendency of these mechanisms to serve and be supported by specific clientele groups outside the local governmental structure. CAA's, for example, formally encourage participation of the poor on a co-equal basis with local officials, and attempt to mobilize financial resources for certain portions of a metropolitan area. CAMPS, on the other hand, operate largely through the office of a local chief executive, although their constituency is often the same as that of a CAA. Both LEAA districts and CHP's provide for substantial representation of affected functional interests, but the former encourages local official representation and the latter emphasizes regionwide citizen involvement.

Along with differing clientele and representational bases, some districts exhibit somewhat duplicating functional responsibilities and conflicting priorities. CAA's are interested in community health programs, while CHP's are responsible for adopting regional health care facility plans. In the same manner, the employment priorities of CAMPS bodies may be at variance with anti-poverty goals of CAA's.

Policy Inconsistencies and Program Gaps. A second problem affecting districting efforts is raised by the inconsistency in their authority and purposes. This often produces gaps in the coverage of areawide planning and programming. Much like the traditional areawide special districts, the tasks of single-function bodies are relatively clearcut. The role of multifunctional organizations in regional affairs, however, is less precise.

The A-95 clearinghouse offers a case in point. Directed to review and comment on Federal grant applications in order to increase interjurisdictional communications and prevent duplication and conflict, clearinghouses are sometimes unable to perform their func-

tions effectively because they lack adequate plans on which to base their reviews. In other cases, they may not have adequate personnel and time to do more than "rubber stamp" applications. And their comments may be completely ignored by Federal funding agencies. Furthermore, A-95 procedures are not well integrated with the provisions of OMB Circular A-98 relating to grant award notifications. While reviews may provide substantial benefits to Federal executive branch efforts to simplify and coordinate the grant process, in the absence of direct Federal aid A-95 must be heavily supported from local and to some extent State funds.

Similar anomalies face other types of substate district organizations. Only eight Federal areawide programs expect districts to both plan and implement their functional responsibilities. Those with only planning power have difficulty ensuring that their plans will be carried out by local governments. Yet those with implementation power sometimes supplant rather than cooperate with local governments in performing their responsibilities.

In the case of other regional mechanisms, different kinds of policy inconsistencies are apparent. CHP's in 10 States play a key role in the certification of need process; in the remaining 40 States, this power is either lacking or the CHP's are not involved. With respect to substate planning and development districts, in 19 States these organizations were intended to play a prominent role in regional affairs. Yet 11 of these States created districts solely by executive order, a process sharply limiting their potential to achieve prominence or continuity. Furthermore, while 20 of the 40 States with organized substate districts make annual appropriations to sustain them, only 11 allocate as much as \$200,000 per year for this purpose.

Representational structure is another source of inconsistency among single and multipurpose districts. CAA's and CHP's, for instance, have representation formulas that ensure in most cases that less than half of all governing board members will be elected local officials. The reverse is true with respect to regional councils and State planning and development districts, resulting in much less organized citizen participation. Conflict can and does result from these differences. CHP's often have complained that their grant review activities are bypassed by CAA's embarking on community health projects. Similarly, in several States with substate districts, tension exists between State planning and development units and regional councils which are separate organizationally and have different boundary configurations.

Administrative Complexities. Administrative com-

plexities pose other difficulties in substate districting. At the regional level, for example, A-95 application reviews can involve a local government, a functional substate district supported by Federal funds, a metropolitan or regional clearinghouse, and on occasion a State clearinghouse. Some observers question whether, in light of their reluctance to make negative comments on applications, A-95 agencies have become merely “rubber stamping” bureaucracies that only lengthen processing time. In a few areas, the review process has become even more complicated with the introduction of Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC) procedures by HUD. This localized A-95 process is not looked on favorably by many affected clearinghouses because it essentially duplicates their efforts and further delays applications.

Other administrative complexities include the need to modify the representational bases of single-function substate districts when they are piggybacked on regional councils and State planning and development districts; the differing budget cycles and procedures of Federal agencies, State legislatures, substate districts, and local governments; and the sometimes erratic flow of information between substate districts and parent State and Federal agencies concerning guidelines for functional or comprehensive planning.

The Rationale for Districting

The proliferation of substate districts under Federal and State auspices is a relatively recent phenomenon. The years since 1965 have witnessed the establishment of over seven-eighths of the Federally supported areawide functional planning districts, over seven-tenths of the regional councils, all of the A-95 clearinghouses, and more than four-fifths of the substate district systems for State planning, development, and administrative purposes. These districts have been aimed at differing clientele groups, armed with varying legislative mandates, and influenced by different levels of government.

In view of the problems of fragmentation, policy inconsistencies, program gaps, and administrative complexities inherent in substate districting, why have such efforts been tried in the first place? A review of the rationale for creating substate districts suggests a variety of functional, fiscal, and managerial reasons.

Functionally, due to limitations on county and city boundaries, powers, and finances, traditional multijurisdictional special districts are often the only operational mechanisms that can provide regional services. Consequently, areawide functions such as mass transportation, water and air pollution control, and airport development have increasingly become the responsibilities of large regional special districts, as in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New York, St. Louis, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington. In a few cases, multifunctional regional

special districts have been established, as in Portland and Seattle. In non-metropolitan areas, countywide and multicounty special districts play an important role in natural resource development (soil conservation, water supply, and irrigation), which is central to the economy of rural America.

Substate districts have been used to deliver services to areas previously neglected by local governments—such as the activities of CAA’s in urban communities and, to some extent, EDD’s in rural areas. These districts are used as comprehensive and functional planning vehicles by the three levels of government, and their plans can be used to coordinate Federal and State programs. In a few cases, State planning and development districts have participated in State-regional budgeting and have mediated interlocal planning conflicts. Substate regional districts, then, generally have been regarded as suitable servicing, planning, and mediating mechanisms for functional assignments that prove difficult for traditional units of local government or special districts to perform.

Fiscal benefits have been sought through substate districting as well. Economies of scale have been achieved occasionally through creation of regional special districts, most notably those involved in water pollution control. A few regional councils have attempted to solve problems relating to metropolitan fiscal disparities, such as the “fair-share” housing programs undertaken by regional councils in Dayton, Denver, and Washington and the areawide tax-base sharing plan formulated by the Metropolitan Council in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Other substate districts—LEAA’s, CHP’s, EDD’s, and LDD’s—sometimes serve as screening mechanisms by reviewing, approving, and regulating Federal and State grant-in-aid flows in their functional areas. A-95 clearinghouses monitor Federal grant applications seeking to prevent overlap, waste, and conflict.

Substate districts have been used to mobilize resources for their clienteles. For example, in 1971 102 EDD’s had a total budget of \$26 million, of which only 19 percent came from the Economic Development Administration. The remainder came from other Federal, State, local, and private sources. In somewhat the same manner, 591 CAA’s were found to have obtained \$751 million in non-Federal funds for the poor between 1965 and 1972. CHP’s and CAMPS exist, in large measure, to induce private contributions for the functional planning and action programs that they sponsor.

Some substate districts have developed decision making processes permitting greater citizen influence over regional priorities and programs. CAA’s and CHP’s, for example, provide for majority citizen representation on their governing boards to encourage heightened public interest in health care and anti-poverty planning, rather than leaving such tasks to public officials who might not be totally aware of or sympathetic to the

demands of these groups. EDD's, LDD's, and CAMPS encourage business participation in economic development and manpower programs benefiting citizen and business community alike.

Federal, State, and Local Encouragement

Federal Promotion. To date, the national government has been the prime mover in substate regionalism. Currently, it supplies the bulk of the financial support for single-function areawide planning districts; it provides 60 percent of regional council revenues; and it underwrites part of State multicounty planning and development district efforts. The Federal government also gives considerable financial assistance to regional special districts and public authorities, especially in the transportation and water pollution areas.

Nonfiscal forms of Federal involvement also have had a marked impact on substate regional developments. Section 204 of the 1966 Demonstration Cities Act and Title IV of the 1968 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act have been instrumental in the establishment of areawide review and comment procedures. Federal legislation, of course, also initiated many of the single-function substate districts, but Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 has been the central coordinating tool and consolidating lever in connection with the activities of both single-function and multipurpose regional organizations.

Federal participation in substate regionalism has created some stress, due to its relatively short time-span and the differing philosophies behind the Federal agencies involved. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Agriculture, and OEO are using their designated districts as a way of decentralizing national agency programs to the field. Agriculture, through its extension program, frequently designates soil conservation districts as Resource Conservation and Development (RC&D) units; EPA plans to use its 247 air quality regions as vehicles for implementing national standards; and OEO has used CAA's as outreach mechanisms to poor people. In contrast, HUD, Commerce, and Labor programs have generally set up their areawide mechanisms to be controlled by locally elected officials and responsive to needs they identify and articulate.

A number of factors suggest that Federally supported areawide bodies will continue to multiply during the 1970's. Legislative proposals introduced in the 92nd Congress dealing with rural community development revenue sharing, transportation revenue sharing, allied services, water quality, and coastal zone management—and enactment of the latter two bills—demonstrate the continuing popularity of the substate districts in the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government. In the 93rd Congress, the Nixon Administration reintroduced the allied services measure as well as a transportation bill that seeks to improve the highway

planning process in metropolitan areas and to beef up the capabilities of areawide agencies to implement such plans. In addition, the law enforcement special revenue sharing proposal has been re-introduced, the President plans to reorganize manpower programs administratively to resemble revenue sharing, and community development revenue sharing will be sought to begin in Fiscal Year 1975. To varying degrees, all of these programs have regional organizational, functional, and fiscal components.

State Reaction. Most States have reacted to, rather than initiated, substate districting. They have supplied relatively little fiscal assistance and most have not used these mechanisms for State agency decentralization or State grant-in-aid review. Moreover, over 40 percent of all State substate districts lack policy bodies—they are merely geographic designations.

At least 17 States have designated regional councils or Federally encouraged substate districts as the institutions on which to build a substate planning, development, and administrative system for State purposes. Like many local jurisdictions, most states seem unwilling to vest these mechanisms with any significant operational or servicing responsibilities. And many States have yet to take full advantage of Part IV of A-95 and seek conformance of all Federally encouraged district boundaries to those of their substate districts; the overall geographic coterminality between State planning districts and other Federally encouraged districts ranges from 20 percent in California to 80 percent in Montana.

Local Participation. While the Federal government has legislatively and fiscally promoted regionalism, and States have reacted organizationally to it, local governments have been the key policy makers on the substate districting scene. Their officials constitute the bulk of the representation in most substate district organizations, regional councils, and A-95 clearinghouses. Furthermore, local action is responsible for the creation of over 60 percent of all regional special districts that provide areawide services in the 72 largest metropolitan areas.

Local governments, by law and administrative regulations, are guaranteed participation in all 11 major Federal districting programs. They are assured a voice in the operation of substate planning and development districts in the 11 States that have mandated local representation in the formation of such bodies.

Although these facts indicate a local willingness and ability to play a major role in substate districting undertakings, there are still a number of problems involved in county and city participation. Responses to a recent ACIR-ICMA survey from 1,453 city and county chief executive and administrative officials, for instance, found that although three-fourths favored the establishment of an "umbrella" regional council, only one-fifth supported its assumption of areawide servicing responsibilities. One-third agreed that this body should be

authorized to veto the plans and capital budgets of special districts, and two-fifths felt that it should be empowered to veto local plans and projects. These attitudes indicate that while local governments feel that regional councils should be converted to umbrella agency status, there is strong resistance to giving them much authority as service delivery and supervisory units. The survey findings also suggest that many local officials are simply not troubled by the existence of large special districts and public authorities.

Patterns of Substate Regionalism

The degree to which metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have multijurisdictional, multipurpose agencies to respond to areawide problems may be roughly marked on a continuum which extends from fragmented, highly polycentric models; to weak, moderate, and strong confederal models; to federated and unitary models.

Polycentric and Confederal Models. Historically, governance structures in urban and rural communities alike have been highly fragmented (or polycentric) and made up of a patchwork of local governments, special districts, and interlocal contracting arrangements. Few had an overarching multipurpose areawide organization.

Federally sponsored efforts during the last decade to establish multijurisdictional bodies resulted in a slight shift away from the older dominant polycentric model. A large majority of the metropolitan and the bulk of the non-metropolitan areas in the country now can be characterized as confederal.

Before the Federal government, and to a lesser extent, the States, provided the fiscal impetus for the organization of COG's, there were about 35 in the entire Nation. Today the more than 600 regional councils represent the most visible response to demands for multijurisdictional action. They are separate from, but usually controlled by, the local governments in the area which choose to be members. They lack the power to implement plans and make binding decisions and therefore must operate usually by consensus.

In spite of their limited authority, regional councils achieve at least some of the ends sought by those pressing for more governmental integration. Virtually all of them facilitate communication among participating local units and provide a forum for them to discuss common problems. Many develop at least embryonic plans for the optional use of governmental officials at all levels. Where consensus is achieved, regional councils also may furnish technical assistance, operational services, and "good offices" for the negotiation of contracts, agreements, and disputes among local governments. These voluntary organizations are most often the only general purpose mechanisms available to address areawide problems.

For most regional councils, the power of review and

comment under Circular A-95 provides their most effective leverage. Nearly all of the councils of governments and regional planning agencies in metropolitan areas, and about half of those in non-metropolitan areas, are armed with this authority. Although clearinghouses are in theory voluntary organizations, local governments seeking favorable grant reviews generally feel it necessary to join to protect their own interests.

These confederal systems range widely in the extent to which National programs are piggybacked (see Chart X-1). In the weak confederal model, only one or a few of the Federal areawide programs have been brought under the direct coordinating authority of the regional council. Within this category, 8 percent of the SMSA's have multijurisdictional agencies with A-95 powers alone, and 56 percent also are used for one or two Federally encouraged areawide functional programs. The moderate confederal model includes those regional councils which are piggybacked for A-95 clearinghouse responsibilities, plus three or four Federal functional programs; 5 percent of the SMSA's are in this category. Only about 5 percent of the Nation's metropolitan areas have strong confederal systems, in which a regional council has been piggybacked for A-95 clearinghouse activities as well as five or more single-function areawide programs.

Overall, a higher degree of piggybacking exists in metropolitan than in non-metropolitan areas—49 percent and 43 percent, respectively.

Federated and Unitary Models. Areawide general purpose governments or authoritative regional councils are found at the federated-unitary end of the continuum. Because they are likely to produce significant shifts in local power, they have not been popular approaches for meeting regional problems. A fuller discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these models is contained in Volume III.


Federated systems depend upon patterned relationships between upper and lower tiers. The upper level exercises controls over the lower governments, over areawide special purpose districts, or over both. These upper-tier responsibilities may be new regional functions, existing activities transferred from the lower tier, or they may take the form of a cluster of policy making powers that directly or indirectly affect the activities of other regional units or of localities.

The federated model, like the confederal model, is theoretically adaptable to a variety of local political arrangements and to diverse urban-rural conditions. Unlike its confederal counterpart, however, it cannot cross State lines without an interstate compact or similar legislative bridge. To date, none has been built.

Contrary to what might be expected, federation has been a less common occurrence than city-county consolidation. Three organizational forms in the United States aspire to the federative approach. These are the metropolitan multipurpose district, the State-established and

CHART X-1

Percentage of SMSA's by Degree of Influence of General-Purpose Areawide Agencies



*Confederal multi-jurisdictional agencies are classified as weak, moderate, or strong on the basis of the numbers of the following programs, with A-95, attached to them: 701, LEAA, CHP, CAMPS, EDD, LDD, UMTA, RC&D, AQC, and CAA.

supported umbrella regional council, and the comprehensive urban county.

In practice, the metropolitan multipurpose district fits least easily within the general model. Although State legislation may allow these jurisdictions to engage in a range of activities, the multifunction criterion has been met by only a few operational districts, and their evolution into more general purpose, upper-tier governments has been barely perceptible.

The State-created and supported umbrella regional council, as found in the Minneapolis-St. Paul and the Atlanta areas, represents the decade's chief innovation in federative structures in the United States. In the Twin Cities prototype, the State legislature established a general purpose policy making body which is responsible for developing areawide plans, coordinating major independent functional agencies within the region, and controlling the development of the metropolitan area. In addition, the Council also has demonstrated an ability to resolve intrametropolitan conflict and to influence State legislation affecting the area. But the Metropolitan Council is not directly an operating agency. It steadfastly has avoided being drawn into the actual implementation of programs on a day-to-day basis, preferring to work through subordinate service delivery mechanisms and to focus on overall policy making for the region.

Dade County, Florida, is the sole representative of the federative approach in which an upper-tier county government was assigned simultaneously by charter a number of urban powers. All pre-existing cities retained their corporate status and became the lower tier of the federation. Over time, a number of functional responsibilities have drifted from municipalities to the county. Cities have willingly allowed the county to assume some services, particularly those which imposed a drain on the municipal budget, while in other areas, a shift has occurred only after conflict and negotiation. Dade County has not fully utilized its powers to set municipal performance standards.

When contrasted with the universe of possible city-county consolidations, few have taken place. In only 19 areas have mergers occurred; of these, only 12 have involved the SMSA central city. An increased interest in this approach to metropolitan governance, however, is evidenced by the fact that during the past decade a greater number of consolidations took place than occurred during the entire period preceding 1962. City-county consolidation has generally brought increases in the quantity and quality of public services, more efficient and effective administration, and some equalization of services. Financial resources have been enlarged through more orderly tax administration, increased Federal funds, stable property tax rates, and more non-property tax income. Yet no great redistribution of resources has occurred. Apparently little accessibility has been lost due to consolidation, although

generally the attitudes of many black and rural white citizens toward merger are more antagonistic than those of other citizens.

In practice, federated systems and city-county consolidations present fewer contrasts than at first appear. For example, the Dade County federation is a unitary government for the 600,000 residents in the unincorporated areas of the county. On the other hand, the city-county consolidations of the past quarter century have been limited. Usually a few small municipalities and other jurisdictions, notably special districts, have remained in a semi-independent and/or lower-tier relationship with the upper-tier county.

SUBSTATE DISTRICTING ISSUES

These findings underscore the ambivalence of the efforts to date by Federal, State, and local governments to grapple with the jurisdictional and servicing implications of population growth. They highlight some of the major problems that have arisen as a result of the lack of a systematic national substate regionalism policy and State and local components thereof. And they imply that some of the areawide approaches taken in the past and presently to meet urban and rural needs have exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problems of these areas.

The remainder of this chapter probes the major current intergovernmental issues that condition the future course of substate districts. These issues are organized into seven broad subject areas: fragmentation vs. coordination; assignment of substate functions and activities; areawide planning, coordination, and implementation; boundary and related organizational designations; authority and character of substate district organizations; representation and voting; and financing substate districting. They attempt to put in analytical perspective the wide range of critical problems involved in recent districting developments and approaches. Moreover, they raise a number of basic questions concerning the present status and future directions of substate regionalism, including:

- Is a regional approach necessary or desirable to achieve efficient and effective program administration and service delivery?
- Can areawide planning responsibility be separated from implementation authority?
- To what extent should Federal areawide planning requirements be consolidated?
- Are the goals of Federal and State districting efforts compatible with one another, with those of regional councils and A-95 clearinghouses, and with general purpose local governments?

- Should regional councils assume a more authoritative role as “umbrella” agencies in coordinating and monitoring special districts, approving local projects, making land-use decisions, and performing operational responsibilities?
- Is the A-95 device an effective way to bring about areawide coordination of planning and programming efforts?
- Under what circumstances should regional councils be required to adopt the one-man, one-vote representation system?
- Do interstate-intrastate differences constitute real or imagined factors requiring a uniform of differentiated substate districting strategy?
- Should the Federal government continue to have prime responsibility for initiating substate regional developments, or should the States and localities assume a more vigorous role?

Fragmentation vs. Coordination

Jurisdictional fragmentation has become the dominant characteristic of the local government landscape in the Nation’s urban and rural areas. The typical metropolitan area, for example, embraces two counties, 13 townships, 21 municipalities, 18 school districts, 31 special districts and public authorities, and four Federally supported areawide planning districts. In interstate areas, fragmentation is furthered by the presence of two or more State governments and the possibilities that different rules of interjurisdictional cooperation among the units apply within different States and that State and Federally encouraged districting efforts frequently stop at State lines.

Paralleling this mushrooming of local governmental and areawide quasi-governmental bodies has been a growth in the number of public service needs and problems that transcend the boundaries of individual jurisdictions. In response to both the need for coordinated areawide remedial action and the difficulty of achieving major local government reorganization, two areawide approaches have been taken. Both of these produce advisory, non-binding decisions and actions. Organizationally, comprehensive regional planning bodies or regional councils have been established. These include councils of governments, regional planning commissions, planning district commissions and substate planning and development districts. Procedurally, a Federal aid application review and comment process has been set up under OMB Circular A-95 which, in a few cases, has been supplemented by authority to review State-funded projects. A-95 reviews are handled by clearinghouses, most of which are regional councils.

Most localists argue that these two coordination

mechanisms should continue to be limited to advisory status. They concede that regional organizations should be responsible for formulating comprehensive plans and policies to guide areawide development, and for reviewing Federal aid applications for consistency with them. Most adhering to this general viewpoint contend, however, that these bodies should not perform areawide services or operate regional programs, nor should they have decision making powers with the force of law or veto authority over Federally funded local capital projects. Such authority should be reserved to single-purpose regional organizations, special districts, and public authorities, or general purpose units of local government. These units, after all, are closest to the point of impact and have power to implement plans they or a regional council prepares. To give multipurpose regional planning bodies and clearinghouses an authoritative coordination role vis-a-vis the activities of special districts and general purpose local governments, so this argument runs, would hinder effectiveness and cloud responsibility. Moreover, these organizations would not be sensitized to unique and diverse local needs and conditions affecting plan implementation and service delivery. Thus, it is claimed, the coordination role of regional councils should continue to be advisory and non-binding.

Some critics question the utility of even this restricted approach to coordination, pointing out that many units of government receiving advice from regional councils would have asked for it, except for the presence of a specific Federal or State requirement to do so. Hence, they may feel little compulsion to pay heed to recommendations which may be offered. It is also most difficult, they note, for regional councils to develop the expertise and technical capability to give adequate advice in the many program areas for which they are responsible, because the planning funds for these functions are usually allocated to special purpose organizations. While there are cases in which the Federal planning assistance for several functional programs has been given to a regional council, in their judgment the degree of coordination achieved to date has not been particularly impressive.

Defenders of the regional council record contend that the mandate for areawide coordination is not clear. Despite the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, upon which OMB Circular A-95 is partially based, and several years of Federal funding of comprehensive regional planning by such programs as HUD’s “701” grants and EDA’s economic development district assistance, many other Federal areawide programs still are cast in uni-functional molds. While these may be incorporated into the regional council organization and applicants for certain financial aid must seek the advice of this body in accordance with A-95, it is noted, their own special interests remain paramount due to Federal requirements and priorities. Hence, the claim is made

that the regional council has relatively little legal or fiscal leverage to apply to bring about effective areawide coordination.

This districting dilemma is part of a much larger issue. In the American Federal system, intergovernmental financial assistance programs are frequently the transmitters of the policies of higher levels of government which are to be carried out by subordinate levels. The transmission is clear and direct with conditional categorical grants, while it is diffuse and indirect when strings are not attached. Thus, Federal block grants or revenue sharing funds which are to be allocated within regions by State and local generalists acting in their own wisdom may not always achieve national objectives, while highly delineated categorical grants make the role of these officials perfunctory, largely devoid of broad policy making and essentially a technical matter to be addressed by the functional experts. The problem, then, is one of balancing the importance of national objectives against the importance of regional goals, deciding what role the generalists should play at the regional level, and how the Federal government should divide the responsibility for its areawide programs between the region's generalists and specialists. The States face the same dilemma as the Federal government when they serve as partners with the Federal government in many of these programs or where they delegate authority to their regions or provide financial assistance to substate organizations.

Some observers question whether the ambivalence and ambiguities involved in these generalist and specialist activities at the substate level are really worth worrying about. After all, they assert, most of the new Federally encouraged districts and regional councils hardly qualify at the present time as a level of government. Instead, they argue, the primary issue concerns tensions with respect to the extent to which a given geographic area should be treated as a whole for certain types of public policies and programs.

Attempts to settle the areal dimension of this question have been pursued in two general ways, which are designed to standardize or hold constant the geographic factor so that the functional coordination problem can be brought into focus. One involves the use of standard criteria or definitions—such as the “SMSA” or the “urbanized area”—and the other relies on the States to create substate district systems which allocate their total geographic areas to one or another district on a more or less permanent basis for a wide range of purposes. These two methods have overlapped in some places, notably in the large substate districts, which are partly metropolitan and partly non-metropolitan, and in the interstate metropolitan areas, which are split by substate district boundaries. Such overlapping defeats their purpose. But the use of one or the other approaches, in most cases, has greatly simplified the regional coordination problem and directed it to the

single issue of relationships between generalists and functionalists within the standardized multijurisdictional area.

Regionalists point out certain precedents for stronger generalist coordination of functional activities than afforded by the usual planning/advisory mechanism. The Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities area in Minnesota, for example, exercises budget and personnel controls over the various areawide special districts in its jurisdiction. In a few cases, a regional planning body has also taken on certain limited line responsibilities, such as Metroplan in Little Rock, Arkansas, which operates a regional bus system, and the LENOWISCO district in Virginia, which performs solid waste removal, small stream maintenance, and flood control. And at the Federal level, some contend, the new Areawide Waste Treatment Management Program appears to establish a situation in which a number of regional councils will be designated to prepare areawide waste treatment management plans and funding programs which will not be overturned by Federal funding decisions; in other words, this planning will take on the authority of a project veto. While these mechanisms are not being used widely at the present time, they clearly pose the issue of how much influence the generalists should have over the coordination of functional programs. If more influence of this nature is desired, so the argument runs, there are methods of obtaining it, even at the substate regional level.

Assignment of Substate Functions and Activities

Substate districting efforts raise a number of questions about the performance of governmental functions. Do the new districts perform functions in the same way as traditional special districts and public authorities? In what manner do the activities of substate districts affect the delivery of public services? Do these activities serve an areawide need or merely the requirements of higher-level governments? Do regional servicing and management needs warrant substate districting efforts or a major overhaul of local governmental structure?

Presently both substate districts and special districts perform a variety of governmental services on an areawide basis. Traditional special districts and public authorities exist in virtually all metropolitan and most non-metropolitan areas. These bodies are responsible for such areawide services as transportation, natural resource development, soil conservation, water supply, and sewage disposal. They usually deliver only the services they are assigned, since most are created by local or State action in response to a specific functional problem requiring regional handling.

On the other hand, recently established substate districts have generally been vested with only selected components of a function along with a cluster of coordinating and servicing activities. For example, re-

gional councils usually perform a mix of areawide functional and comprehensive planning; A-95 clearing-houses review and comment on applications for over 100 different Federal grant programs; State substate districts generally perform some combination of the above and, in some cases, attempt to coordinate State line agency efforts in the field and to review State aided programs and projects; and Federally encouraged substate districts have a variety of specific functional responsibilities as well. All of the last group have planning powers, those in eight program areas possess operational responsibilities, and those in another eight have authority to veto specific Federal grants that do not conform to areawide functional plans.

Critics of the newer style of substate districts feel that these organizations, their procedures, and the responsibilities they exercise are just another obstacle to the effective performance of areawide functions. They point to the fact that in one examination of over 3,100 A-95 reviews, only 18 percent produced recommendations that grant applications be modified. They feel the claim that such reviews have saved taxpayers' dollars is misleading since the absence of sufficient money to cover all applications would ensure that Federal agencies would not approve funds for poorly conceived or duplicating project proposals. Skeptics also note that even when negative reviews have been made, they occasionally have been overridden by Federal agencies. Thus, the Federal government frequently ignores the advice of coordinating mechanisms established under its auspices.

In the same vein, although Part IV of A-95 seeks conformance of Federal substate districts to State-sponsored areawide units, the boundary coincidence figure is only about 35 percent, and the instrumentality conformance figure is about 18 percent. Moreover, it is noted that while 20 States have annually funded their State substate districts, only 11 of these have allocated more than \$200,000, and less than half of all State substate districting programs are used for decentralizing State services.

The most telling point these critics maintain is that substate districts have not markedly changed the pattern of functional assignments. The same organizations that performed regional functions before the arrival of the new districts still perform them. All that has changed, they claim, is that more complexity has been injected into the substate regional scene; more planning and coordination efforts have been mounted by agencies that lack the authority to do either effectively; and the real providers of services—units of general local government, special districts, and public authorities—have been saddled with the arduous job of working through a maze of areawide agencies, mechanisms, and procedures to secure the vital intergovernmental fiscal assistance that is needed to get the job done.

In short, some observers believe that most of the

recent Federally and State encouraged or mandated regional planning, programming, and coordinating efforts through substate districting have either had a complicating effect or no real impact on the service delivery systems at the areawide and local levels. Others maintain that the emergence of regional bodies that perform coordinative and servicing activities is but a subterfuge and a delusion. While conceding that they may be facilitative, these critics stress that such activities are not genuine governmental functions.

Substate districting proponents view the record differently and contend that there have been real changes in performance of functions as a result of the emergence of these units. Many new districts have been assigned functions that previously were not performed in their area. In some places, for instance, districts are the only public bodies now providing neighborhood health centers, legal services, fair share housing programs, and certain economic development efforts. In these areas, then, the package of services available to citizens has been enriched in a direct and operational fashion by these district undertakings.

Supporters also point out that a cluster of auxiliary and supportive activities and services has been provided to units of general local government by regional councils, LEAA districts, LDD's, and EDD's. Training, communications, information collection and dissemination, technical assistance, and help in grant application drafting are but a few of the activities that these agencies perform—to greater or lesser degrees—which in turn relieve localities of various kinds of management headaches. To ignore these auxiliary activities, proponents claim, is to overlook one of the quiet, but significant ways that recent regional efforts have subtly modified the service delivery system in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.

A third basic regionalist contention is that the A-95 review process, combined with a cluster of other powers—such as the certificate of need procedure in the hospital area, a veto over certain functional plan components, the authority to package grant applications, the capacity to mobilize an area's fiscal resources in a particular program area, and the use of a single grant application—all contribute to substate district influence over certain aspects of areawide resource allocation decisions and the performance of certain functions. Of course, the degree to which these powers are accumulated in one regional body varies greatly. Moreover, some of the above powers have not been extended on a nationwide basis. But areawide advocates stress that these present and evolving developments still must be considered before any final judgment is made regarding the lack of authoritativeness on the part of regional bodies, especially regional councils.

As back up to their line of argument, they note that:

— CHP's have used certificate of need legislation to

promote hospital mergers in 10 States.

– A-95 activities in 1970-71 resulted in an estimated cost savings of nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars through elimination of duplicative grant applications.

– CAA's raised an estimated additional \$1.3 billion in financial resources for inner-city and rural poor between 1965-72.

– EDD's and LDD's have similarly augmented financial resources in rural areas and have established grant funding priorities for Federal agencies operating in their jurisdictions.

– At least seven Federal substate programs authorize regional bodies to prepare consolidated packages of grant applications, and these funds are then used by the organizations themselves or other recipients to implement areawide plans.

Some critics of recent Federal and State substate regional efforts focus on the fact that existing governmental units and traditional approaches to reorganizing such units have been largely bypassed. Thus, State subordinate units, they point out, could perform regional services in many metropolitan areas, and State agencies could routinely decentralize their operations on an areawide basis. State-authorized multifunctional servicing districts and a concerted State effort to reorganize and consolidate counties, they note, are two other basic options that have been largely ignored. At the same time, they emphasize, local governments have adopted a considerable number of intergovernmental agreements, and with suitable State legislation, regional special districts could be made into subordinate interlocal service authorities. Moreover, local efforts that have achieved or attempted city-county consolidations have not been exploited for their full regional potential.

Defenders of recent districting developments take issue with those who complain about bypassing, noting that the creation of various substate district organizations and procedures is merely a continuation of the traditional process in American federalism whereby the void caused by the unwillingness or inability of existing governmental units to meet service demands is filled by those willing and able to provide new or improved services. These observers assert that districting has been encouraged by Federal fiscal and administrative policy, and that many States or local governments would not have created these or other mechanisms or performed the services the new units now handle without Federal prodding. Yet once prodded, proponents stress, States and localities sometimes have used these regional organizations and procedures to their own advantage, tapping new sources of functional expertise and meeting

citizen demands for services that were previously non-existent or poorly provided. Bypassing, so their argument runs, often provides the incentive for existing units of government to take on functions they otherwise would not have performed or, at the very least, it gives functional responsibilities to units that are capable of exercising them.

These observers also question the feasibility of most reorganization approaches. They underscore the meager number of successful city-county mergers, the pair of State-supported regional councils, the weaknesses of counties in a majority of States, the limited application of the multifunctional servicing district concept, and the rhetoric of State line agency decentralization efforts. They point out that the recent substate districting efforts are about all that realistically could be expected at this point in time in regions plagued by interjurisdictional conflict and semi-chaos. In the long run, they argue, some of these activities are compatible with local or State instigated governmental reorganizations in metropolitan or non-metropolitan areas. As a matter of fact, they maintain, substate districting may well be the harbinger of such developments at some future time.

Areawide Planning, Coordination, and Implementation

Areawide planning and areawide coordination are two functions commonly assigned to substate regional organizations. Yet both are still issues, not settled matters, in current developments at this level.

The Implementation Gap. The word "coordination" means to make consistent, and this word is a key one in defining the purposes of most Federal planning requirements and Federal planning assistance programs. As was noted earlier, it is also one of the key purposes of certain substate district organizations and procedures. Nevertheless, "to make consistent" is usually left to others; regional planning usually is given only the role of showing others how programs and projects could be made consistent.

This gap is well recognized by those who are most closely involved in regional affairs, but there is much debate between those who consider it to be proper and those who believe that there should be a more definite link between planning and implementation. The former contend that in the policy area there are frequently overriding public objectives which may make it unwise to follow strictly a predetermined course of action as specified in a more or less long-range set of planning objectives. In the jurisdictional area, they contend that giving implementation authority to generalist regional bodies would take it away from the duly constituted local governments. In other words, it would constitute a challenge to local home rule and local self determination.

Those who argue for linking implementation author-

ity with the planning function at the regional level point out that preparation of plans is a waste of time and effort unless they can be carried out. They also assert that regional objectives in multijurisdictional areas cannot be met by separate and diverse decisions of the various local governments. Moreover, they stress that by giving control of the regional council policy board to local elected officials who represent the city and county governments in the region the principle of local home rule is respected to the maximum extent consistent with the overriding needs of the whole area. In short, they contend that local home rule must be harmonized with regional home rule with respect to regional matters.

There are cases where regional planning and implementation powers or binding decision making authority have been combined, more or less, in the same district organization. Perhaps the most obvious examples are the regional councils in Atlanta and Twin Cities, which seek to ensure the conformance of local plans and programs having a spill-over effect to regional policies and to regulate the operations of special districts. In addition, there are certain Federally supported functional areas—like law enforcement, intrastate air and water pollution control, community action, economic development, urban mass transportation, and resource conservation and development—in which the planning and either the implementation or development of applications for Federal funds takes place in a single regional organization. Thus, some contend that it is possible to establish direct linkages between planning and implementation at the regional level on a wider scale than is currently the practice.

What Kind of Areawide Planning? Just as the mandate for implementation for regional plans and policies by general government officials is not clear, neither is the call for comprehensive areawide planning. In fact, one of the two chief regional coordination mechanisms, the A-95 review process, does not specifically require that areawide planning be done. And there is no Federal program which, as a matter of course, funds consistently comprehensive areawide planning bodies—the second of the two chief coordination mechanisms—throughout the Nation. Although many such bodies are financed by HUD, and a few by EDA and the Appalachian Regional Commission, the award of grants is subject to administrative discretion and the amounts appropriated by Congress have never been large enough to cover the whole Nation. As indicated previously, while over four-fifths of the States have delineated statewide systems of substate planning and development districts, only three-fifths have established functioning comprehensive planning organizations in their districts, and only one-fifth have provided regular financial support for such organizations.

In terms of functional planning, critics contend that a great deal of activity is both required and financially supported by the Federal government, but its areawide

aspect is not always clear. For example, manpower planning is aimed at whole labor markets—typically a metropolitan area—but the planning funds are usually made available to the central city mayor, and inclusion of the entire area with major involvement of the multijurisdictional planning body is more the exception than the rule. Community action planning, while spoken of as regional or areawide, is usually single-county in scope. The Comprehensive Areawide Water and Sewer Planning program of the Farmers Home Administration has been, up to now, mostly a single-county one, although new guidelines preferring multicounty planning have recently gone into effect. Other Federal areawide programs—such as air pollution control, airport development, and the regional medical program—while multijurisdictional, do not necessarily follow SMSA or substate district boundaries. Two Federally encouraged areawide planning programs—comprehensive health and law enforcement—usually stop at State lines, even when they deal with a metropolitan area which is interstate.

The functional planning currently being done at the regional level, then, is much less consistently areawide than the comprehensive regional planning. However, it has been argued in the case of community action that a regional multijurisdictional approach is appropriate only where the sparseness of population requires it as an economy measure. In other cases, the direct relationship to an individual local government and closeness to the poor who are being served are factors outweighing considerations such as the areawide opportunities which might be tapped through a multicounty or metropolitan approach. It also has been contended that a substate district dealing with only one State might be trusted more and be able to develop a more direct relationship for State-oriented programs like comprehensive health and law enforcement planning. This would not be the case with an interstate district which had to deal with two or more States. Of course, the opposing point is that the interstate district would deal more efficiently with the movement of criminals and hospital patients within the interstate region. It also has been argued that the air pollution, airport development, and regional medical programs have special needs which require differentiated areas if the problems they address are to be adequately encompassed. Those who agree with these points frequently assert that functional planning should be done in a different organization than comprehensive planning and under less direct generalist guidance.

Can Areawide Planning Be Simplified? Another frequently cited difficulty with areawide planning involves the diversity of Federal requirements. This affects not only the subject matter of the planning, but also the amount of duplicate documents submitted to various Federal agencies, the separate applications filed for regional planning funds, and the various types of membership composition formulae for policy bodies that oversee these diverse planning efforts. Not until

1972 were several of the administrative requirements—like financial reporting, auditing, and purchasing—consolidated, but the success of this effort is still unknown. Thus, in many respects, the funding of areawide planning is still a complex and arduous task.

There are those who argue that this funding process should be greatly simplified, that functional planning grants as well as comprehensive planning grants should be made to the same regional body, and that substantive planning requirements should be consolidated so that a single set of Federal planning certifications would qualify a region for all appropriate Federal assistance programs. In fact, a Federal interagency task force set about to develop uniform planning requirements in 1969, but it found the task difficult, if not overwhelming. There were too many narrowly defined categorical planning programs in too many different Federal departments and agencies. Nevertheless, some progress has been made since that time in arranging intergovernmental agreements between HUD, the Departments of Transportation and Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency, under which certain HUD planning certifications are accepted by the other agencies as a valid basis for supplemental certifications and program funding. If areawide planning assistance programs were consolidated, and the Federal government were reorganized into fewer but broader departments, need for more such interagency agreements would be reduced.

On the other hand, some observers contend that the differences between and among the existing categorical grants having planning components are significant. They point out that these should be preserved as a means of furthering the national objectives embodied within them, even though doing so might result in extra costs and greater coordination difficulties. For example, what usually goes by the name of comprehensive planning is oriented toward physical development activities, such as transportation, water, sewer, open space, and rural conservation and development. Economic development and manpower planning are oriented toward job creation activities; community action planning is oriented toward family and individual income expansion; law enforcement planning is oriented toward the reduction of crime; and health and air pollution control planning programs are oriented toward improving the purity of the environment and the health of the public. Undoubtedly there is overlap among these activities, but the focus of each is different, and it is feared that the different foci would be lost if the planning components of these programs were lodged in one program, a uniform set of requirements, or a single regional organization. The same fears are expressed, of course, in the consideration of Federal grant consolidation or executive agency and Congressional committee reorganization proposals. The basic issue is whether generalists can be trusted to give simultaneously proper emphasis to all these specific objectives.

Can Different Kinds of Areawide Planning Be Done in the Same Regional Organization? There are less than a score of “comprehensive” regional bodies which are simultaneously performing planning activities under as many as eight, nine, or 10 Federal programs. Most are limited to three or four—usually including the HUD, DOT, EDA or Appalachian, and A-95 cluster of relatively generalist and more physical-development-oriented programs. Planning in the so-called “social” fields has seldom been attempted at the regional level. In those few cases where it has been tried, it is still too new to be well developed. Nevertheless, there are cases, few to be sure, where social planning has not only been undertaken, but where it has been done within regional bodies which are also involved in physical development planning. Based on this experience, some argue that there is no inherent reason why social and physical planning cannot be performed by the same regional organization. This can be expected, they believe, because local governments themselves commonly deal with both types of programs and local elected officials hold the majority of seats on the governing bodies of most regional councils.

In light of these expectations, some feel areawide generalist organizations could and should deal with a wider array of Federal programs. They note that the A-95 process is rooted in the notion that it is only these multipurpose bodies, tied directly to local elected officials, that can effectively perform this task. Unfortunately, as others point out, most of those organizations with the broad A-95 review responsibilities do not currently have equally expansive areawide planning programs. For example, they may plan for physical and economic development alone, while trying to review not only projects falling in these areas but also those designed to improve the delivery of health services, promote equal opportunities, and reduce crime. Critics maintain that there may be very little basis for the review of these latter projects. Without consistency between the breadth of their review responsibilities and the scope of their planning capabilities, so the argument runs, it is difficult for the comprehensive regional organizations—even with elected officials of general local government at the helm—to act in a coordinated fashion.

Thus, the issue is posed: Should the generalist regional organizations be assigned functional program responsibilities? If so, in what ways can the appropriate functional specialists have direct access to and influence over these activities, consistent with general coordination requirements? In response to these questions, regional council supporters point out that in those organizations where such combinations of functions have occurred, the use of functional advisory committees which report directly to the governing body has been found to be a satisfactory solution—legally as well as politically. The mechanisms are available, but the

decision to combine programs remains to be made in many cases.

Boundary and Related Organizational Designations

As was noted with respect to the areawide planning, coordination, and implementation issues, the delineation of appropriate substate district boundaries is a complex problem. No single set of criteria is applicable in all cases, and there is no one best procedure for setting boundaries. Among Federal areawide programs, only the two dealing with urban transportation are limited to urban areas, and only the five rural development programs of the Department of Agriculture are confined to non-urban areas. The other 17 programs can be applied to either urban or rural communities where they may be needed. While administrative guidelines frequently urge inclusion of the "whole area" for planning purposes and sometimes mention the SMSA definition, no Federal areawide program studied in this volume—with the exception of air pollution control—requires as a matter of national policy that regional boundaries follow any previously determined lines in a precise manner. In other words, with this one exception, the boundaries are negotiable, at least within limits. Of course, some are more negotiable than others.

Recognizing this situation, most Federal areawide programs in some way specify who has the final responsibility for determining regional boundaries. Sometimes it is retained by a Federal official, while in other cases it is given to the State governor, another State official, or a combination of State and local officials. For 10 of these programs, OMB has given the governors responsibility for setting regional boundaries under Part IV of A-95, if they wish to exercise it. But regardless of who is ultimately responsible, there usually are opportunities for others to be involved before the final decision is made.

Most of the States have taken up the boundary delineation challenge offered through A-95, and have established statewide systems of substate districts. Many of these systems have resulted from procedures which included one or more elements such as public hearings, tentative delineations for a trial period, and the accommodation of pre-existing organizations. A variety of geographic, population, transportation, governmental, and other factors have been considered in the course of the delineation proceedings. All of the finally adopted boundaries have been based upon aggregating whole counties (towns and cities in New England).

The span of control concept appears to have been important in delineating the substate district systems. Most States do not want to deal with too many small districts; hence 90 percent of the districted States have between six and 20 districts. Some even allow their districts to be combined into a few larger areas for certain programs, while others permit them to be

subdivided when necessary. Both options are allowed under Part IV of A-95.

Another important criterion has been the growth center concept. In some States, one or more metropolitan areas, or other centers of population or economic promise, was chosen as a focus for each district. Depending upon the sparseness of a State's population, this concept may lead to some very large rural districts with relatively smaller urban centers.

Apart from purely local concerns, four basic questions have arisen in the boundary delineation process: (1) Should a given program cover the entire State or just certain types of areas? (2) Is a single set of boundaries suitable for any given areawide program? (3) Can rural and urban interests be satisfactorily combined in a single district? and (4) Are interstate areas adequately encompassed?

Coverage. The types of areas to which a program should apply is largely a question of legislative priorities as to what problems are greatest at any given time and how much money is available for remedial action. Federal areawide programs as a group, however, now cover the Nation, and each one individually is subject to the A-95 review process. Some observers argue that in order to achieve at least a minimum of coordination among these programs, areawide comprehensive planning assistance and requirements should apply nationwide. Beyond this, they contend, each program should be evaluated separately. The most narrowly defined ones, like urban transportation and rural development, obviously relate to only parts of the Nation and only part of some substate districts, unless they are redefined as components of broader programs like transportation without the "urban" modifier or community development without either the "urban" or "rural" modifiers. The broader functional programs, these observers note, are also more generally applicable to all regions because of the greater discretion allowed regional leaders in tailoring the use of funds to their own needs. Therefore, they maintain, these programs could be administered more uniformly throughout the Nation without the need for detailed eligibility findings by the administering agencies. At the same time, they recognize that programs like air and water pollution control must apply everywhere in order to protect the environment and the health of the Nation's population.

Standard boundaries. Some students of substate regionalism underscore the fact that the suitability of a single set of regional boundaries for all areawide districts stirs a good deal of debate in programs like community action, air pollution control, regional medical services, and water resources. They note that such features as watersheds, airsheds, medical service areas, the location of poor people, and county boundaries, which are used to delineate substate district boundaries, do not coincide. Others, however, stress that population centers and

the local governments which serve them not only create the resource and service demands and the pollution effects to which such programs are directed, but also offer the only practical organizational means of rectifying deficiencies and controlling pollution. Thus, in their view, if one must make a choice—for the sake of coordination and political responsiveness—the multijurisdictional, multipurpose approach should be favored rather than the single-purpose, natural problem-shed approach.

Still other observers believe that major sacrifices may not have to be made at all, even if standard boundaries are used as a basis for multiple programs. This group asserts that a moderate amount of both organizational and boundary flexibility can overcome most difficulties. A natural program area larger than one substate district, but smaller than the whole State, they note, might well be addressed by a combination of individual districts, with representation from each. Such a district could be served by a State staff, the staff of one of the districts (under an interlocal contracting type of arrangement), or a task force composed of staffs from each district. Conversely, these observers explain, if a sub-area within a substate district needs special services, part of the district's staff might be delegated to serve on a reimbursable basis under the guidance of a special committee of the district's board members representing the smaller area directly involved. Alternatively, there might be two separate policy boards for each of the two sub-areas, which would sit in combined session for matters pertaining to the whole district, and be served by a single integrated staff having maximum strength but minimum overhead. It is even possible, these pragmatists contend, for a substate district organization in special circumstances to provide services which may extend partly into another district, when the other district agrees. Thus, a single district organization could let its boundaries "float" for specified purposes by common consent. Active State planning staffs could provide assistance and coordinative services wherever overlaps occur with river basins, statewide planning, or the activities of other districts.

Supporters of the above arrangements point out that they all have been used successfully in some places, and are available wherever a general substate district system needs geographic flexibility. At the same time, they stress, if the need is simply to adjust the permanent boundaries, then this should be done. Most substate district systems embody procedures to accomplish such a redrawing.

Rural, Urban, and Interstate Interests. Probably the two most common situations requiring boundary flexibility are the districts which contain major metropolitan and non-metropolitan portions and those which are part of larger interstate areas. In both cases, there can be a single staff and a multi-purpose body to maximize coordination and technical competence and to minimize

overhead. In the metropolitan and non-metropolitan situation, the policy body of the district organization might have a metropolitan affairs committee and a non-metropolitan committee. Alternatively, some have proposed a bicameral structure, with an upper house based on the local government unit vote and a lower chamber based on the one-person, one-vote principle. These procedures could apply to a single county SMSA within a multicounty district or to a multicounty SMSA within a still larger multicounty district, so long as the full district does not interfere in the purely internal affairs of the constituent sub-districts. Some point out, however, that this whole situation might be avoided if the districts could appropriately be drawn at the outset without the urban/rural dichotomy. In the interstate situation, the policy boards of the substate districts could become constituent committees of the full policy board of a single interstate organization.

Authority and Character of Substate District Organizations

A crucial issue in the development of substate districting systems is the degree of authority regional organizations should possess. One school of thought believes that in view of local attitudes and wholesale failure of metropolitan-wide reorganization efforts, substate district mechanisms should remain pretty much as they are and work within the framework of established local governments. Another school, however, maintains that the accomplishments of the few authoritative regional decision-making units that have been established to date demonstrate the need for more such bodies.

Proponents of regional voluntarism point to certain factors that make it inadvisable for generalist substate organizations like regional councils to exercise any significant amount of power vis-a-vis local or other areawide units. The first is the extensive functional intergovernmental cooperation that already exists in most metropolitan areas. This, they claim, proves that local governments can develop joint solutions to common problems without having a regional council assume or regulate their operations. They cite in evidence the fact that a recent survey found that 63 percent of 2,375 cities were engaged in interlocal contracts or joint service agreements. These supporters of voluntary regionalism also stress that regional special districts are frequently used as mechanisms to solve pressing areawide service problems which are not amenable to interlocal cooperation, as evidenced by the addition of 55 large special districts in the 72 largest SMSA's between 1957 and 1972.

Critics of strengthened regional councils and substate districts also point to the precarious institutional base of these bodies. Several exist to serve a relatively small clientele; most are virtually invisible to the general electorate; and many are lightly staffed. As presently

constituted, they contend, these organizations could not effectively perform expanded responsibilities, but rather are best equipped to support rather than supplant the program activities of local governments. According to this view, metropolitan affairs are best served when local governments, independently or in cooperation with one another, operate regional programs. Regional councils and substate districts are most helpful in pointing out the problems that local governments will have to face and in proposing solutions to them.

Contrasting opinions are voiced by those who see local governments as unwilling to engage in full-scale cooperation with one another. This reluctance, they stress, is reflected in the widening fiscal and socio-economic disparities among metropolitan jurisdictions, particularly between central cities and suburbs. Moreover, these observers assert, interlocal cooperation tends to be scarce in controversial functional areas and is practiced most extensively among jurisdictions that have relatively similar populations in terms of income, race, and values. Local officials, as they view them, sometimes perceive existing substate districting mechanisms as more of an obstacle than an aid to resolving areawide problems, and are reluctant to endow such mechanisms with operating or regulatory powers that might lead to control over certain local activities. Some also point out that at least one-third of all regional special districts in the country's 72 largest metropolitan areas have been imposed by State rather than local action. All things considered, so their argument runs, local governments are reticent to develop a program for ameliorating regional conflict.

Opponents of substate voluntarism also note the positive experience with some of the more authoritative areawide approaches. A regional council controls areawide special districts in Minneapolis-St. Paul; another is the focal point of all planning efforts in Atlanta; and eight Federal districting programs regulate Federal and State grant flows by requiring plan conformance before funds can be received.

Basically, then, critics of the present system divide themselves into two camps. One contends that voluntary, consensual, advisory organizations are most appropriate at the substate regional level, and operational and regulatory responsibilities are best left to local governments, special districts, or the State government. The other asserts that regional councils can exercise authority to a positive end, especially with the backing of parent agencies at the Federal, State, or local levels. With such power and backing, solutions to metropolitan problems can be achieved; without them, such solutions would not occur or be heeded, given the reliance on general local governments or on special districts and public authorities. In short, these critics see the substate region as the place where new and more effective modes of functional cooperation and conflict resolution can occur. Many of the specific concerns of both schools of

thought are raised in connection with the umbrella regional council approach.

The Umbrella Approach. Regional councils have assumed a wide range of planning and program responsibilities. They have been piggybacked heavily for some Federally supported areawide functional planning—such as economic development, transportation, and law enforcement—and lightly for others—such as community action, air pollution control, manpower, and comprehensive health. They have provided several types of services and assistance to their membership, especially in the land-use and physical planning, water and sewer, housing, open space, and transit areas. Most have assumed A-95 clearinghouse responsibilities.

The limited pattern of piggybacking, the emphasis on non-operational types of services, and a built-in conflict of interest in the A-95 review process, however, have created some disillusionment with this areawide confederal arrangement. The specific problems identified by critics include a lack of coordination bordering on competition between the piggybacked and non-piggybacked functions; conflict between generalists and specialists over the kinds and scope of programs to be undertaken, their respective policy decision making roles, and accountability; a gap between regional planning and implementation; and an inability to control special district activities effectively.

Some observers believe that in light of these factors areawide confederalism should be considerably strengthened. They advocate the official designation of a single umbrella multijurisdictional organization in each substate region. According to their strategy, this agency would be both a creature of local government and, for certain purposes, an arm of State government. A majority of the organization's policy board would consist of elected officials of general purpose local governments in the area. Proponents have not arrived at a consensus on the degree of political autonomy the umbrella organization should possess, whether membership of constituent local units should be mandatory and votes binding, the extent to which "one person, one vote" should apply, the feasibility of direct election of policy board members, or the desirability of State government representation. They have reached some agreement, however, on certain functions and powers of the umbrella agency.

The umbrella approach involves both organizational form and functional substance. At the core of the concept is the evolution of regional councils into multifunctional agencies which would serve as the preferred vehicle for Federally supported areawide planning and other regional efforts; substate planning, development, and administrative activities under State auspices; and A-95 review and comment functions. An umbrella agency would emerge when a regional council received direct or indirect authority from Federal, State,

and local sources over the planning, budgetary, personnel, and programming activities of single-purpose substate districts, special districts, and public authorities. Outright consolidation would not necessarily have to take place, provided that the separate areawide bodies are subordinate to the umbrella agency.

Supporters of this approach claim that the umbrella designation would end the Federal government's ambivalence over the proper multijurisdictional planning mechanisms for certain functions and thereby help curb the proliferation of substate regional bodies that has occurred since the mid-1960's. They feel that it also would enhance coordinated planning and integrated management at the areawide level, and provide the basis for an authoritative regional decision making, implementation, and (eventually) service delivery system. They point to the accomplishments of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council as illustrative of what the umbrella organization structure could achieve in other parts of the country. They cite the results of a recent survey indicating that four-fifths of 850 city and 532 county chief executive officers favored the umbrella approach, and stress that the umbrella agency is a politically feasible and functionally workable solution to the problems stemming from jurisdictional fragmentation, as well as a viable alternative to the difficulties of bringing about major institutional reform of local government.

Skeptics consider the umbrella concept as representing only a slight functional strengthening of regional councils, hence an approach which fails to come to grips with the fundamental structural weaknesses inherent in the confederal model. They question those who believe it both desirable and feasible to piggyback a regional council extensively, arguing that there is no conclusive evidence that piggybacking has been successful in realizing economies of scale, cost savings, staff improvements, and the other claims made by advocates of this approach. Moreover, they have serious doubts as to whether single-purpose areawide planning bodies and special districts can be subordinated to the umbrella organization in light of the former's well-entrenched and politically potent functional bureaucracies, whose interests would be jeopardized by reorganization. This objective would be especially hard to attain, they assert, if mandatory local membership, proportional representation and voting, binding decisions, and other political hurdles are not overcome in setting up the umbrella agency.

They underscore the general public's hostility to areawide government—as evidenced by the dismal city-county consolidation record. They note the strong resistance from elected local officials to bodies that potentially threaten their autonomy and prestige, as shown by survey findings that only one-fourth of 833 city and one-sixth of 535 county chief executives favored regional councils' assuming operational responsibility for certain functions being performed by indi-

vidual local governments. These critics predict that realistically the umbrella organization at best would be only a slightly beefed-up version of present regional councils. More than likely, in their opinion, it would be viewed simply as a useful facilitator, planner, reviewer, and coordinator for Federal and State areawide grant program and local assistance purposes. But such an umbrella agency, in their estimation, could not become a planning or policy implementation body, a service delivery mechanism, a vetoing agency, or a regional government.

Relationships With Special Districts and State Aid Programs. A particularly sensitive aspect of the umbrella approach is the advisability of assigning these agencies regulatory responsibilities. Two areas where the debate over this issue is most pronounced are the controls over regional special districts and the review and comment powers with respect to State aid programs.

While some State and many local officials feel that there should be relatively stringent special district controls, they are less certain of the form they should take. Some favor creation of a specialized State or regional agency that can devote full time to analyzing the problems of local government viability and district formation. Others support vesting special district control powers with a regional council or umbrella agency. Still others note that a legal analysis of 94 large regional special districts reveals that effective local controls may already exist: over one-third have governing boards controlled by local officials, another 40 percent have governing boards subject to local election, 47 percent are denied the power of local taxation, and 32 percent must submit their bonds to local referenda.

In light of the relative lack of experience to date with vesting special district controls in regional councils, some observers feel that more direct approaches appear to be most promising. They point out that a few States—including California, Washington, Oregon, and Colorado—have enacted legislation authorizing formation of multifunctional special districts at the substate level, and argue that attempting to control regional special districts through an umbrella agency or regional council might deter aggressive State action on this other front.

Opponents of the State-controlled approach stress that the number of truly multifunctional districts is quite small and that most metropolitan areas have a configuration of areawide special districts that could not be easily fused into a multipurpose areawide authority. They also note the positive experience with control over areawide special districts in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area by the Metropolitan Council, and indicate that vesting an umbrella agency with such powers might be the first step toward developing a truly authoritative regional governance process. They note that granting special district controls to such generalist organizations would be essential to the successful implementation of area-

wide plans, a key component of any strengthened regional council. Others feel that controls represent one stage in the evolution of regional councils, with the weakest ones exercising only planning and grant review powers, stronger ones having umbrella and special district control functions, and the most authoritative ones having direct or indirect operational responsibilities.

Similar arguments are raised with respect to the issue of granting regional councils review powers over certain State-aided projects and programs. Opponents of such action note the problem of obtaining an impartial review from a body that is essentially controlled by local governments vying for State aid. It would be all too likely that county and city members would encourage, through log-rolling, a regional council rubber-stamping of their State grant-in-aid applications. If the regional council took its State aid review responsibilities seriously, it might even generate conflict between those receiving and those losing funds, and thereby possibly jeopardize its future influence in regional affairs. Some also assert that if too much attention is given to handling State and Federal grant applications, regional councils would probably not be able to complete the comprehensive and functional plans against which they must base their reviews, as occasionally happens in the A-95 process.

Proponents argue that State grant review is another way of emphasizing the significance of a regional council. Survey data indicate, for example, that one of the main reasons for regional council formation is its pivotal role in the Federal grant system. Indeed, without a grantsmanship role, there is doubt about the continued viability of some regional councils. State grant review would bolster their strength. These advocates also emphasize that in the two-dozen States which view the substate districting movement as a means of State service decentralization, State grant review would be a significant implementing move. Finally, some believe that vesting such power in regional councils could give States an opportunity to test attempts at greater regional self-governance. If successful, the State could promote other forms of substate regional and local government reorganization.

Generalist vs. Specialist Strategies. At the root of the preceding discussion of the merits and drawbacks of strengthening regional confederalism through the umbrella agency approach are fundamental questions regarding whether substate districting policy should embody a generalist or a specialist strategy. Basically, proponents of the former approach contend that greater efficiency, effectiveness, and objectivity could be achieved in a consolidated substate organization wherein truly comprehensive and multijurisdictional activities are performed. Supporters of the latter focus on the widely differing areas and clientele groups served by regional councils and substate districts and argue that generalist mechanisms might well lose support for the "target" and

innovative programs that functional districts now provide.

With respect to the generalist line of thought, it is assumed that establishment of a unified substate regional organization like an umbrella agency would permit resolution of multijurisdictional conflict between State substate districts and regional councils. In the States that have not uniformly designated existing regional councils as substate planning and development districts, it is pointed out, program and funding competition sometimes occurs between these areawide units. Generalists also believe that designation of a single regional body to handle all Federal and State substate planning programs is preferable to continuation of the present proliferation of functional bodies that often have a limited perspective on the operational problems of local governments and the interrelated servicing needs of their citizens. An areawide generalist organization also is considered to be a way of more efficiently administering certain Federal and State programs, achieving better integration of grant-in-aid applications, and mobilizing more non-Federal resources to meet regional needs. Generalist mechanisms, it is felt, also would develop more in-depth comprehensive plans, thereby providing a better benchmark for A-95 reviews. Moreover, these regional plans, if adopted by constituent local governments, would serve as more authoritative guides for future areawide development decisions.

Critics of the generalist strategy point to the widely differing aims of functional substate districts and the virtual impossibility of fusing these mechanisms into a generalist framework. They contend, for example, that anti-poverty planning is most appropriately handled by the poor, who are in the best position to judge what their needs are; that health planning requires the input of private health producers, who know the practical dimensions of regional health problems; and that regional law enforcement planning can effectively proceed only with the insight of professionals, who can accurately judge the resource requirements of their task. Folding these programs into a generalist regional organization controlled by local officials would submerge the viewpoints of both the substate service providers and consumers. The present proliferation of areawide units, then, allows multiple access to the substate decision making process, thereby permitting a greater variety and relevance of regional programs than would be the case with a single generalist body.

Representation and Voting

Representation and voting formulas are sensitive issues confronting many regional councils and substate district organizations. They are particularly troublesome where the regional policy body is located in an area that is experiencing strained relationships between the central city or county and outlying suburban or rural areas.

With respect to Federally encouraged and State mandated areawide functional planning districts, local elected official involvement is usually legislatively or administratively mandated or strongly encouraged. Of the 19 Federal programs requiring areawide organizations, for example, the preferred membership on the governing body ranges from exclusively government officials in four programs to a combination of elected officials and citizens in four others, to "all affected interests" in seven other programs. Only four of these programs do not specify the composition of the governing body.

Some observers believe that the general issue of representation is perhaps most critical when the Federally supported areawide functional planning district is separate from a regional council or other generalist-oriented organization. Even though citizen representatives and local officials serve on these bodies, often they are outnumbered by program specialists, as in the substate law enforcement planning districts and the 314(b) comprehensive health planning councils. In each case, it is charged, the influence of police personnel and physicians is pervasive, and local officials and citizens are placed at a severe disadvantage when attempting to broaden the policy perspectives of the areawide organization.

Professional administrators and their associations counter this position with statements that because of their education and experience, they are best equipped to identify priorities, set service levels, manage programs, and evaluate performance. While conceding that elected local officials and citizens should be represented in decision making, these specialists claim that those with the functional expertise should play the lead role. After all, they contend, this was one of the main reasons for setting up a separate areawide organization.

Even where piggybacking of a regional council has occurred, the representation issue is often raised. By definition, the policy boards of these organizations are composed of a majority of elected local officials and citizen participation is usually required, thereby ensuring a strong generalist voice in regional affairs. Yet questions arise over the proper allocation of voting power between member local jurisdictions.

The most commonly used formula assigns an equal number of representatives or votes to each member jurisdiction. Less than one-quarter of the regional councils surveyed have adopted a system of population-weighted representation and voting in the general assembly and executive committee. Increasingly, a combined method has been employed, under which certain matters of particular interest to the larger jurisdictions are decided on a weighted vote, while normal business is conducted along one-unit, one-vote lines.

Both the one-unit, one-vote and population approaches raise problems for large and small communities alike. These become especially acute as the regional

council assumes greater grant review and service delivery roles and responsibilities. When a regional council uses a straight one-unit, one-vote formula, central city representatives generally believe that they are under-represented, since their vote counts the same as that of a much smaller local unit. In some human resources and capital facilities programs targeted for core cities, such as law enforcement, manpower training, health care, and housing, it is argued, that they are often outvoted by a coalition of suburban and sometimes rural communities which have different program preferences. To illustrate the fact that central cities do not exercise voting power commensurate with their share of the region's population, they point out that while the 10 largest central cities in the country have from 23 to 49 percent of the regional population within their boundaries, half of them belong to regional councils which have adopted a formula giving each member the same number of votes. Even though the remainder have allotted a proportionately greater number of votes to the central city, usually this merely has involved assigning it an extra vote or two or allowing weighted voting on a few issues.

On the other hand, smaller municipalities feel threatened by a population-weighted voting system because of the dominance of the central city. They emphasize that the areawide interests of central city, suburb, and rural area are not as dissimilar as one-person, one-vote advocates contend, and that to give the largest city or county voting strength in accordance with its population size might well jeopardize years of labor to develop workable interlocal strategies for dealing with common problems. Furthermore, they contend that in many public service areas the needs of suburbs and rural jurisdictions, especially older and rapidly growing ones, are just as important as those of central cities, and that the movement to provide proportionate representation through a weighted voting system might well create serious servicing inequities in communities outside the core city. Finally, they note that both the Tahoe and Hartford decisions—the only cases adjudicated to date—found it unnecessary to apply the one-person, one-vote principle to regional council governing boards. One decision was based on the appointive rather than elective nature of the board and the other on the nongovernmental character of the regional council. Since virtually all regional councils fall into one of these two categories, it is argued that no compelling legal reason exists to adopt weighted voting.

Another dimension of the representation issue involves interstate areas. Some contend that where regional councils or districts cross State lines, the State governments affected should be directly represented on the governing body because of the compact or parallel State legislation usually required for its creation. Opponents of such a State role assert that regional councils and districts are primarily local in their membership and program impact, and that the States to date have done

little more than authorize the creation of these organizations. When State governments begin to contribute sizable amounts of funds to interstate regional bodies and to utilize them for planning, development, and administrative purposes, then the representation question should be raised and seriously considered.

Still another facet of the representation question arises when the functional and decision making implications of the umbrella multijurisdictional organization idea are considered. Since an umbrella body would be responsible for exercising certain types of governmental or quasi-governmental powers—such as approving local and special district project applications, making certain land-use decisions, and delivering services—one-person, one-vote would become a critical issue. In particular, questions relating to whether representatives on the policy board of the umbrella agency should be appointed from constituent local governments, or the State, or be directly elected would have to be resolved by the State and local governments and the courts.

Financing Substate Districting

A variety of issues are involved in the financing of regional councils and substate districts. Questions arise about the relative shares of Federal, State, and local support; the form of external assistance; and the internal nature of regional finances.

Both single and multipurpose substate district organizations are largely supported by Federal funds. The Federal government contributes, on the average, 60 percent of all regional council funds. It also covers a major share of the funding of the 19 Federal programs that encourage substate districts. However, the nature of Federal support causes some concern. The low level of Federal matching for CHP's, for example, compels those organizations to spend considerable time in the pursuit of local funds to meet matching requirements; their fiscal task is even further complicated by the desire to keep private contributions low enough to reduce the chance of special interest dominance of CHP operations. Even where Federal assistance is automatically offered, as in the case of LEAA block grants, the differences in funding cycles of State, substate, and Federal agencies can cause difficulties. It is not uncommon for a year to be half over before the annual Federal appropriations are received. At the same time, the Federal government offers no direct aid to A-95 agencies, requiring those activities to be financed largely from local funds, even though one of their chief purposes is improved Federal grant management. Consequently, many authorities maintain that the extent, form, and timing of Federal aid to substate organizations could and should be improved.

Another issue involving Federal funding concerns special districts. Pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, Federal policy favors

general- over special-purpose units of local government in awarding Federal grants. Yet regional special districts still capture considerable Federal aid, particularly in the water pollution control and transportation areas. Backed by Federal assistance, these special districts have become even more entrenched in their position, while alternative institutional approaches to providing similar services have not been forthcoming. Thus, some feel that Federal money unwittingly may sustain many of the Nation's larger regional special districts.

Some observers have claimed that the Federal government should encourage by fiscal devices the consolidation of functionally oriented districts with generalist mechanisms, such as regional councils and State substate districts, thus converting them into umbrella agencies. Yet evidence relating to selected Federal-aid flows to piggybacked and non-piggybacked regional councils reveals that the typical consolidated regional council received no more in selected per capita Federal aid than did a unit that faced competition from Federally encouraged districts which existed apart from the generalist body. Thus, while Federal policy formally encourages organizational conformance, there are no fiscal preferences given to those councils that are of a strong confederal variety.

At the State level, the nature and extent of State funding of State substate districts is particularly sensitive. The Federal government, as previously noted, has supplied the bulk of financial assistance for State planning and development districts, and only 20 States now make annual appropriations for these units. Moreover, the State aid generally accounts for less than 10 percent of the average regional council budget. Yet many States claim that these units will be the keystone of eventual State administrative decentralization efforts.

On the other hand, some critics note that some States do provide substantial financial support to regional special districts and more are responsible for the creation of at least one-third of all large public authorities surveyed in the 72 largest metropolitan areas. Indeed, 65 percent of these 94 districts received some form of State intergovernmental aid in 1970. Certain States, then, may be reserving the bulk of their funds for regional operational units, in effect leaving the financing of planning and coordination functions in the hands of Federal and local agencies.

Local governments are the second largest source of regional council funding. By 1971, 26 percent of 225 surveyed regional councils were receiving a majority of their funds from their members. Half of the member local governments contributed to these regional councils on a per capita basis. But at least 13 percent of the regional councils provided for local contributions on the basis of assessed valuations. Survey data also indicate that regional councils may be under some pressure to hike local funding, since inadequate State and Federal

fiscal support are two of the most frequently cited obstacles to the expansion of regional council activities. Greater local financial assistance is viewed by some as desirable, especially by those who see present patterns of regional council funding as too heavily dependent on Federal grants for physical development. Broadening local support, they feel, would diversify regional council program concerns and make their operations more visible to the public.

Contrary to these viewpoints are those calling for reduced local fiscal involvement in regional council and substate district programs. Some see these mechanisms basically as implementors of State and Federal policies, not local, and feel that they should be predominantly or fully financed by these higher levels of government. They also point to the fact that Federal planning requirements are one of the main inducements to formation of and membership in regional councils. Without these, they maintain, it is unlikely that many local governments would continue their regional involvement.

Still others claim it is entirely possible that present types of Federal funding and planning assistance could be more efficiently channeled to general purpose local governments—like urban counties and large metropolitan municipalities—through such programs as general and special revenue sharing. In somewhat the same vein, some observers note that regional special districts which are mandated by the State or encouraged by Federal action also should be financed from general State and Federal appropriations.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of recent substate districting trends and issues contained in this volume clearly demonstrates that a quiet revolution has occurred on this front in less than a decade. No treatment of this topic in the early 1960's would have been as long, as complex, or as urgent in terms of immediate intergovernmental impact.

All levels of government have been involved in this transformation of that still difficult-to-define level—below the States and above the cities and most counties.

Yet uncertainty, uneasiness, and an unusual degree of ambivalence dominates the present response and attitude of all three of the traditional governmental levels to this fairly dramatic development. An no wonder! The substate regional area has, in fact, become a new testing ground:

—between generalists and politically accountable officials, on the one hand, and program specialists and functionalists, on the other;

—between those who seek to achieve greater decentralization in the system and those who urge more centralization;

—between and among standpatters, gradualists, and radical reformers;

—between advocates of local home rule and advocates of regional home rule;

—between and among those seeking a major Federal initiative in this areas, those adhering to a State-local position, and those seeking a joint Federal-State-local attack on the problem;


—between and among those who accept a polycentric or crudely confederal model of substate regional governance, those who idealize some form of two-tier or federated model, and those who endorse a unitary approach; and finally

—between those who recognize that a substate governance system has emerged in most metropolitan and some non-metropolitan areas and those who ignore it or deny its significance.

These are but some of the major sets of antagonists that recent substate districting developments have generated. They are found at nearly all of the traditional levels of government, to greater or lesser degrees. And the outcome of their debate will condition the substate shape of the American Federal system in the future.

CHAPTER XI

RECOMMENDATIONS



In this first report of its five-volume substate regionalism study, the Commission has focused primarily on and probed in some depth the Federally encouraged and State-sponsored areawide planning, programming, coordination, and districting undertakings which have emerged over the past decade. Old-style multi-jurisdictional special districts and authorities also have been included in this first phase of the Commission's study, because they are a major part of the mosaic of districting mechanisms operating at the substate regional level and because they have experienced a fairly rapid rate of growth since 1957. In short, at this first juncture the Commission is confronting chiefly new-style mechanisms, procedures, and districts that have emerged since the early and mid-sixties and largely as a result of Federal and State actions.

We focus on these recent, primarily districting, issues at this point because they are of immediate concern to the Nation's mayors, county executives and commissioners, State legislators, governors, members of Congress, and the Executive Office of the President, especially the Office of Management and Budget. These officials, after all, are grappling daily with the many difficult questions raised by the rapid transformation of the metropolitan and multicounty levels over the past decade.

The second phase of this study, appearing in volume III, will deal with the long-range and more elemental questions subsumed under the general heading of local and areawide governmental reorganization. In the Commission's view, no analysis of the complexities and challenge of recent substate regional developments would be complete without confronting this bedrock issue. New-style districts, old-style special districts, regional councils, coordinative areawide procedures and devices, the cry for county reform, and the push for transfers of functions are all merely one huge footnote to the fact that the present jurisdictional map at the substate level, in all but a handful of instances, is markedly dysfunctional and increasingly undemocratic. Clearly, local governmental modernization and areawide governmental reform must be major items on any real agenda of substate regionalism's unfinished business.

This in no way denigrates the constructive role that can be assumed by the revitalized regional councils that emerge from the pentagon of recommendations advanced in this volume. If properly established and empowered, such councils can and should meet various immediate and pressing problems caused by the continuing proliferation of Federal, State, and local undertakings at the substate regional level. Such councils can give meaning to a term that usually lacks it—areawide coordination. They also can help provide some overall direction to certain basic regional developments and trends.

Though the questions raised by recent districting activities are new, the forces at play here are old, raising

the specter of old wine in new and artfully designed bottles.

—There is the conflict between generalists and politically accountable officials on the one hand and program specialists on the other.

—There is the conflict between regionalists and localists.

—There is the conflict between and among Federal goals and objectives, those of many States, and those of local governments.

—There are urban-rural, interstate-intrastate, and single county-multicounty differences, which generate conflict and confusion.

—Finally, there is the conflict between the advocates of incremental change and the proponents of drastic reforms.

None of these antagonisms is new to the American Federal system. But with the recent rash of districting developments, they now have a new substate regional area within which to operate. And this course of events necessarily confronts us with new questions, despite the familiarity of the old forces. In one sense, then, the seventies require answers to questions raised by the sixties; the recommendations proposed in this chapter provide these answers. But in another sense, the seventies need answers to questions that have been with us for the better part of this century. Volume III of this report deals with these long-term issues.

This volume helps identify the crucial substate districting issues, nail down the salient facts, and provide some constructive solutions to the immediate challenges facing the entire system and its citizenry at this new level of intergovernment confrontation—below (and sometimes between) the States and above the cities and most counties.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A summary of the basic findings suggested by the experience to date of old-style, operating special-purpose districts and authorities, Federally encouraged substate regional programs and institutions, State-mandated substate districts, the A-95 review process, regional councils, and local officials' attitudes about regional developments provide a background for the recommendations and the issues subsumed under them.

Traditional Special Districts

—Special districts have grown at a rate of 93.6 percent between 1952 and 1972. This rate of growth surpasses that of any other type of local governmental unit. Over two-thirds of all special districts are found in non-metropolitan areas, and over 80 percent of all countywide and multicounty districts are located in

rural America. Such areawide districts comprise 13 percent of all metropolitan special districts and the number of large regional special districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas has more than doubled since 1957.

—All three levels of government have encouraged the growth of special districts. The Federal government continues to provide incentive for special districts in many of its transportation, housing, natural resource, and public facility construction grant programs. It also aids about 50 percent of all large areawide districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas. Many State governments provide an incentive for special district creation through maintenance of tax and debt restrictions on local government, lack of strong municipal and county home rule laws, and permissive State legislation on special district creation. Local governments, in turn, often encourage the use of independent special districts to provide a number of areawide services that traditional local governments are unwilling or unable to perform. Some local governments, however, still maintain some control over certain districts.

—Perhaps alarmed at the continued growth of special districts, all three levels of government have taken some steps to curb their creation. Section 402 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 provides that preference be shown to general-purpose local governments in Federal grant-in-aid applications. This law has been implemented through the A-95 process, which is operative on a substate basis in over 60 percent of the Nation's counties.

—Five States—California, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington—permit State or local boundary commissions to review and control the creation, consolidation, dissolution, and territorial expansion of special districts. Another State, Minnesota, authorizes policy controls over regional special districts through the State-created Twin Cities Metropolitan Council. In the five States with boundary commission control, special districts actually decreased at a 3.9 percent rate between 1967 and 1972 while nationally special districts were increasing at a rate of 12.3 percent.

—Local governments, though not necessarily curbing the growth of special districts, still exert strong controls over their operations in many instances. Local appointment of regional special district governing boards occurs in over one-third of all cases (32 out of 94) in the 72 largest metropolitan areas. In these same areas, in 27 of 94 cases, regional special districts receive interlocal financial aid. In 30 instances, local referenda are required for approval of their bonds.

—In spite of the disparate efforts to control special district growth, they continue to be used in a number of situations for a variety of purposes. Less than 25 percent of all special districts are coterminous with a unit of general-purpose local government. Thus, special districts are often used to provide a service within or across local government boundaries, the notable exception being in

interstate metropolitan areas where there were only 14 special districts in 1972.

—Special districts continue to be principal purveyors of a number of urban and rural services. In 1967, for example, they accounted for over 40 percent of all State-local expenditures for water, transportation, and housing and urban renewal. They also accounted for over 20 percent of all State-local expenditures in the airport and sewerage function. In both urban and non-metropolitan areas, water supply and fire districts play a vital role in the performance of these functions, while in non-metropolitan areas irrigation and soil conservation districts are prominent.

—Some signs indicate that control of traditional single-purpose special districts may be entering a new phase. The number of multifunctional districts has increased by over 55 percent since 1962. State legislation in Washington, Oregon, and Colorado permits the creation of multifunctional regional service authorities, and at least three States—Arkansas, Minnesota, and Virginia—provide that State substate districts can eventually be utilized as regional service units. Together with Federal encouragement of the State substate districting movement, this may mark the beginning of an era of multifunctional regional service districts, a proposal of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations since 1961. At the same time, one can expect considerable local and minority opposition, as evidenced by the overwhelming opposition of local officials in our survey to the assumption by consolidated regional councils of a service role in metropolitan areas.

Federally Encouraged Substate Districts

—Agencies of the Federal government have helped establish a wide, new range of geographic regions and multi- and single-function organizations to serve these regions. Twenty-four Federal areawide programs recognize 4,045 geographic program areas. Substate areas are commonly served by many of the following 11 types of Federally encouraged areawide organizations: Metropolitan and Regional Clearinghouse (A-95), HUD's Areawide Planning Organizations, DOT's Comprehensive Urban Transportation Planning Organization, OEO's Community Action Agencies, EDA's Economic Development Districts, Appalachia's Local Development Districts, USDA's Resource Conservation and Development Districts, EPA's Air Pollution Control Regions, EPA's Areawide Waste Treatment Management Organizations, DOL's Manpower Planning Organizations, HEW's Comprehensive Health Planning Programs, and LEAA's Criminal Justice Planning Organizations.

—Various functions are performed by the Federally encouraged areawide organizations. All aim to improve regional communications. All but A-95 clearinghouses are charged with preparation of either comprehensive or single-purpose plans, with consideration of civil rights

implications in programs reviewed and, where pertinent, with assessment of environmental and relocation needs. Frequently, technical assistance to local governments is provided by these Federally encouraged areawide planning and development organizations; some mobilize local resources in particular program areas, coordinate Federal aid projects, and prepare consolidated packages of applications for Federal funds. About half a dozen Federally encouraged areawide organizations actually execute the programs that they plan and coordinate.

—For the most part, Federally encouraged areawide programs have added to the complexity of metropolitan and multicounty jurisdictional systems. Matching of Federal program area boundaries with State substate district boundaries occurs in only 35 percent of the possible cases, and the piggybacking of State district organizations occurs in 17 percent of all possible instances. When the poverty, manpower, and air quality control programs are excluded, however, the boundary conformance figure reaches the 55 percent mark and the mechanism conformance figure rises to 36 percent.

—Both the Federal government and the States have sought to cope with the proliferation of Federally assisted programs, districts, and policies at the substate regional level; both have an assignment here because the bulk of these programs are joint Federal-State undertakings, with the States, usually through their governors, having a role in 16 out of 19 district producing programs. The Federal government's efforts to date are largely embodied in Part IV of the A-95 Circular and OMB follow-up action, with support from the Vice President's Office. While boundary and mechanism figures (see the statistics above) are better today than they were a few years ago, much remains to be done at both the Federal and State levels, especially with reference to districts established prior to State efforts to launch substate districts.

—Organizational requirements of Federal areawide programs vary widely, both in statutory language and in interpretation. Most programs call for planning; some do not. In the former, planning requirements may be spelled out precisely and used to evaluate future Federal assistance applications, or they may simply require that the program be "not inconsistent" with whatever related planning others might be doing. A number of Federal programs require citizen representation on policy boards; others call for bodies composed entirely of local officials. Most call for a mix of citizens and officials. The background or occupational requirements for citizen members vary, as do the mixes of city, county, and other local government officials.

State Substate Districts

—Substate district systems have been formally established on a statewide basis in 40 States, and at least four other States have taken tentative action. The multi-juris-

dictional boundaries of 488 substate districts have been delineated, but only about 60 percent of these have district organizations functioning. Only 15 States have organized all of their districts.

—Substate districting has been largely a response over the last five years to some two dozen Federal assistance programs having an areawide thrust. The movement leading to substate districting was given further impetus by Congressional enactment of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 and the issuance by the Office of Management and Budget of Circulars A-80 and A-95, which in part encouraged the States to tackle the task of substate regional program coordination presented by these largely joint Federal-State undertakings.

—Reasons for substate districting by the States are found at each governmental level. For the national government, it was hoped that substate districting would reduce the geographic and organizational overlapping created by the numerous single-function Federal efforts and that it would provide a common framework for regional planning and programming across the Nation, which could serve as a basis for coordinating Federally assisted areawide programs.

—Since States are charged with a major role in shaping the execution of at least 16 of these joint programs, governors have tended to look to substate districts as official vehicles for receiving grants and for bringing to a variety of Federal-State programs an ordered relationship at the areawide level. Moreover, some saw in these districts a means of better organizing State service delivery systems and of obtaining regional inputs into State planning and budgeting processes.

—The local governments looked to substate districting as a device through which they would obtain a larger voice in Federal and State decisions in their areas and through which they might increase their share of Federal grant money.

—This mix of Federal-State-local efforts has combined to produce 44 district systems and greater boundary and mechanism conformance between Federal-State programs with a substate regional impact and substate districts. Yet even where substate districts have been delineated, there remain some inconsistent regional boundaries for State administrative purposes, as well as for some Federal program purposes, and there are still multiple regional organizations. These inconsistencies vary greatly for the different Federal programs but, on the average, only 35 percent of the Federal program areas use the same boundaries as the substate districts, and only about half of those whose boundaries match make use of the district organization.

—Generalizing upon substate district performance in 12 States, it would appear that most of the 282 organized substate districts are making useful, if limited, contributions to planning, coordinating, and providing technical assistance within their areas. The councils of governments or planning and development commissions

servicing as substate district organizations carry out mostly physical or economic planning functions, and generally do not undertake social planning. Few have produced integrated regional plans, even for physical and economic development. Only a handful of States have begun to use substate districts for budgeting purposes or for the administration of State programs, although agencies in more States are beginning to use them for their own planning purposes.

—Substate districts have contributed to a more effective review of State and Federal grant proposals, and generally greater control over State and Federally aided activities within regions. The governors of States where substate districting is operational have gained greater authority over State activities both through A-95 procedures and the common framework provided by the substate district system. In addition, the increasing coordinative linkages among agencies at all levels have helped to broaden the perspectives of states and local governments.

The A-95 Process and Agencies

—Part I of OMB Circular A-95 was originally promulgated in 1969. As revised, it has resulted in a system of clearinghouses for reviewing grants for over 100 Federal and Federally aided planning and development programs and projects. As of April 1973, there were 53 State clearinghouses (including those of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and American Samoa), 212 metropolitan, and 238 regional clearinghouses. Together, the 450 areawide clearinghouses encompass more than 1,800 counties, in which 85 percent of the Nation's population lives.

—The A-95 review process has aided in the development of regional intelligence systems in many areas and better coordinated project development. Forty-five percent of the clearinghouses surveyed indicated A-95 had brought about substantial changes in, consolidations of, or withdrawals of local government applications which were duplicative or ill-prepared.

—A-95 review requirements have not created substantial delays in application processing; 64 percent of the clearinghouses surveyed signed off the project review in a month or less.

—A large regional bureaucracy has not been a by-product of A-95. Over 80 percent of the clearinghouses devote less than 10 percent of their staff time and budgeted funds to the review process, although this proportion is significant in light of the fact that no Federal funds are provided directly to operate this "early warning system." In 1971, over 211,300 staff hours and \$2.1 million were spent by clearinghouses on over 14,000 reviews of projects totaling \$25 billion. The typical review agency considered 58 applications annually, involving the services of one person for 107 days and costing approximately \$8,500.

—For the most part, clearinghouses rate favorably the

actions of Federal agencies on notifying regional review bodies of their funding decisions. HUD, Interior, and DOT receive the highest performance evaluations, while Labor, LEAA, and OEO receive the lowest.

—A considerable amount of piggy-backing of A-95 clearinghouses has occurred; only four percent has not been used for other Federally supported areawide programs. This piggybacking has taken place most often in smaller, non-metropolitan, and southern regions. The generalist activities most frequently piggybacked have been HUD's metropolitan and non-metropolitan planning and State planning districts, while transportation and law enforcement planning are the functional programs most often assigned to clearinghouses.

—In many cases, the performance of the A-95 clearinghouse function has not been especially effective. There may be no areawide plan upon which the clearinghouse can base its decision when reviewing and commenting. Some A-95 clearinghouses have been unwilling or unable to devote the necessary staff, time, and other resources to do more than "rubber stamp" applications. The Federal government has not provided adequate funding. Negative reviews by clearinghouses have been uncommon.

—The review process also has been overloaded occasionally with projects lacking areawide significance and by environmental and civil rights impact statements.

—City and county chief executives and administrators generally support existing A-95 activities. Only about one-eighth of those surveyed believed clearinghouse activities should be eliminated. Sixty-four percent of the city officials and 69 percent of the county spokesmen favored retention of present A-95 and planning functions, but not additional ones. However, 42 percent of the former and 45 percent of the latter supported the power to veto local plans and projects not conforming to areawide plans. One-third of the respondents of both jurisdictions indicated that regional councils should have authority to veto those programs and capital budgets of single-purpose areawide districts and agencies which are inconsistent with regional plans.

Regional Councils

—Regional Councils are basically organizations that exist to bring together local government officials within an area at regular intervals and on a voluntary basis to discuss common problems, exchange information, and develop a policy position on matters of mutual interest. These councils—which are usually councils of governments, regional planning commissions, or multi-functional development districts—basically represent a consensual, confederal approach to substate regionalism.

—Organizations similar to present-day regional councils have existed in this country since approximately 1902. Yet as of 1950 there were fewer than 25 of these confederal regional bodies; by 1972, there were 352 regional councils (having a majority membership of

elected officials, assuming multifunctional responsibilities, and covering multi-jurisdictional areas). The ACIR-NARC survey of regional councils found that 46 percent of the surveyed organizations were regional planning commissions while 30 percent were councils of governments, 14 percent were economic development districts, and 10 percent other types of areawide bodies.

—Regional councils have been the object of a variety of Federal policies which have sought to create a substate regional device for areawide planning and grant review. These began with Section 701(d) of the 1954 Housing Act and continued with the Housing Acts of 1961 and 1965, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Over 45 percent of the councils surveyed were formed between 1966 and 1972, reflecting “701” areawide planning incentives enacted in 1965, the Section 204 grant review requirement, and implementation of Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.

—Federal statutes creating other types of Federally encouraged substate districts have provided in many instances increased Federal assistance to regional councils that assumed these responsibilities. Federal attention to regional councils has been supplemented by action in 17 States that resulted in the designation of regional councils as State substate districts.

—The typical regional council membership in 1972 consisted of 19 municipalities, five counties, two school districts, and three special districts. Overall, however, less than 25 percent of all regional councils reported special district membership. Within their membership structure, 50 percent of all councils operated basically under a one unit, one vote representation formula and nearly one-quarter relied on differing formulas for differing purposes. At the same time, over 25 percent had moved to a total or partially population-based representation formula, thereby making the council more amenable to the interests of larger jurisdictions. This latter development is especially noteworthy given the conflict that jurisdiction-based representation has engendered in such areas as Cleveland, Detroit, Hartford, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, among others.

—Regional councils generally receive the bulk of their funding from Federal and local resources. Thus, 66 percent of the councils surveyed received 50 percent or more of their funding from Federal sources. Twenty-six percent of all such mechanisms received the majority of their funding from local governments, while only eight percent received majority fiscal support from the State. Overall, 57 percent of all the regional councils surveyed received 20 percent or less fiscal support from State sources.

—The largest share (43 percent) of regional council funding from Federal sources came through HUD “701”

comprehensive planning grants, followed by DOT mass transportation and highway planning (21 percent) and LEAA law enforcement planning assistance (10 percent). Less than 20 percent of all Federal regional council funding occurs in social planning programs. The influence of Federal funding seems substantial, given the fact that one study of regional councils found that less than five percent of all councils had undertaken program action outside of Federally assisted areas.

—Regional council programs tend to be concentrated in physical development areas. Over 50 percent of all surveyed councils have program operations in the housing, water and sewer, land-use, and open space functions. One-third or less of all councils have comprehensive health, manpower, and drug abuse programs. Less than half of all surveyed regional council directors felt they offered significant assistance to local governments in the areas of manpower, health, community action, and juvenile delinquency prevention programs.

—The regional council directors indicated that the three most prevalent and persistent problems now facing regional council operations are implementation of comprehensive and functional plans, the conflicting thrust of various Federal programs with a regional impact, and council relationships with other areawide bodies. Internal council matters such as voting apportionment, committee structure, and staff policy relationships generally were found to be issues of minimal significance at this point.

—The problems facing regional councils sometimes vary according to the council’s age and population size. The most severe problems for small regional councils (serving under 75,000 people) were implementation, legal relations with the State, and the powers of the policy board and its officers. Those of medium-sized organizations (serving between 75,000 and 250,000 people) were mainly limited to voting and special district relationships prior to 1969 and to implementation and policy board powers after that time. The largest regional councils in 1965-1967 experienced severe problems with voting formulas, debates over the dominance of the regional body by a single member, and the powers of the policy board and officers. In 1968-1969, these shifted to due assessment, representation, and voting; and in 1970-1971, implementation, dominance questions, and relations with other areawide bodies became crucial.

—One-third to 45 percent of all 312 surveyed council directors identified two problems as the most significant obstacles to future regional council action on areawide problems: local political traditions opposing metropolitan and regional government, and lack of Federal and State financial support for regional council activities.

Attitudes of Local Public Officials Toward Substate Regionalism

—Over 85 percent of more than 3,800 surveyed local officials within regional council jurisdictions indicated

that they had decided to join a regional council. The most frequently cited reasons for council formation and creation were desires to formulate cooperative solutions to areawide problems and to meet Federal aid planning requirements. Officials of less than six percent of all surveyed cities and counties indicated that they would not join regional councils. The most frequently cited reasons for non-membership were fear of council domination by the largest central county or city and a local feeling that the planning and delivery of public services are best performed at the local level.

—Though representation and voting issues are the cause of serious conflict in some of the larger regional councils, the overwhelmingly preponderance of local officials indicated no dissatisfaction with the representation policies employed in their councils. Survey data also indicate that for a little over one-fourth of the officials surveyed, their regional councils used a population-weighted formula for voting and representation.

—In functional terms, local government officials noted that regional councils generally offered most assistance to local governments in the areas of water and sewer, law enforcement, and physical planning. Minimal assistance occurred in such functions as joint purchasing, highway safety, education, and air pollution abatement. Except for a few functions (transportation and open space), large cities and counties generally had the least favorable perception of the significance of regional council functional assistance. Review and coordination of State and Federal grants as well as communication among local officials were regarded as the most successful of regional council activities, while the least successful activities were in matters of comprehensive social planning and communication with local citizens.

—Local government officials generally viewed their local traditions of opposition to metropolitan or regional government as the single most important barrier to expanded regional council action on local and areawide problems. At least 35 percent of all surveyed officials mentioned plan implementation as a serious operational problem facing most regional councils. At the same time, only about 20 percent of these local officials favored vesting councils with operational authority.

—Forty-three percent of the local officials favored vesting regional councils with the power to veto local plans and projects that are not in conformance with a regional plan. About 33 percent would extend these veto powers to plans and capital budgets of special districts. About one-fourth of the city officials and one-sixth of the county spokesmen favored giving regional councils an operational role for certain functions presently handled at the local level, if at all.

Four-fifths of the officials surveyed agreed that regional councils should perform the duties of an umbrella agency vis-a-vis Federally encouraged districts and review and coordinate the plans and programs of special districts and authorities.

—Surveyed black elected city officials believed the foremost reason for council membership was to obtain Federal funds; the next most frequently cited reason was the belief that the regional council might contribute to the solution of areawide problems. In addition, black county officials felt regional council membership was necessary for their government to obtain State funds.

—Black elected officials generally found the social programs of regional councils ineffective. County respondents felt transportation and housing programs were the most ineffective, while city officials felt that education, housing, and manpower training programs were most ineffective. The only function deemed fairly effective was the water and sewer program.

—The active participation of black elected officials in regional councils was low. Only 28 percent of the respondents were members of a policy board. Policy board membership was found predominantly among the black mayors and vice mayors, but even this group did not have 50 percent representation.

—More than half of the black local government officials (58 percent) believed the regional council approach may help somewhat to solve some of the problems of blacks. A significant minority of these officials (37 percent), however, viewed regional councils as an actual or potential threat to blacks. Generally, those considering regional councils as a threat look upon these organizations as the first step toward a regional government.

Non-metropolitan Districting Patterns

—The sparseness and small size of many non-metropolitan populations and the limited nature of their governments' functions, resources, and capabilities have combined to give multicounty regionalism a special sense of urgency in non-metropolitan America. But the setting and regional concerns are somewhat different than those in metropolitan areas. Achieving economies of scale, promoting economic development, and protecting natural resources are the prime interests of these areas, whereas interagency coordination of conflicting governmental programs, the provision of areawide services, and equity considerations dominate the urban regional scene.

— Non-metropolitan special districts account for two-thirds of the 23,886 independent special districts in the Nation; they are slightly more single purpose in character than those in metropolitan areas (98 to 96 percent), but they average only about six per county as opposed to about 18 per county in metropolitan areas. In addition, non-metropolitan special districts are more often countywide than their metropolitan colleagues (14 as against 6 percent), but slightly less citywide or township-wide (7 vs. 10 percent and 5 vs. 7 percent, respectively).

— Non-metropolitan regions, as delineated by the States, now number 390. On the average, they are twice

as large in land area as the metropolitan regions, but their populations are less than half as great, and their population densities are less than one-third as great. A significant number of non-metropolitan regions are large enough in land area (approximately the size of Massachusetts) to present major problems and political cohesion in any local sense.

– The typical regional council budget in non-metropolitan areas is less than one-quarter of its metropolitan counterpart, but average per capita expenditures are nearly twice the urban figure.

– The average staff of a non-metropolitan regional council is about half the size of its metropolitan counterpart (six vs 13). Yet the non-metropolitan council typically has involved itself in more functional areas than the average metropolitan body (seven vs. five).

– While staffing patterns not unexpectedly differ between non-metropolitan and metropolitan regional councils, the educational levels of the staff directors are roughly comparable in the two types of areas.

– Federal assistance for regional activities and Federal areawide planning requirements generally have been applied later in non-metropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas. The latest available figures (1971) indicating joint funding of a single regional council by multiple Federal programs show the non-metropolitan regional councils trailing metropolitan councils slightly (2.3 vs. 2.7 programs per council). However, later figures (early 1973) for the EDA-assisted economic development districts, which are mostly in non-metropolitan areas, indicate 4.3 Federal programs per district organization. Although the EDA figures cover a broader range of Federal programs, they suggest that non-metropolitan EDA's serving as regional councils may have closed the gap in joint funding frequency.

– The policy body makeup of regional councils in non-metropolitan areas places somewhat less emphasis upon local elected officials than their metropolitan counterparts, while giving more emphasis to financial and natural resource specialists, as well as to representatives of the local private power structure.

– Though fewer than the metropolitan areas, some non-metropolitan areas are interstate in character.

Interstate Metropolitan Areas

– Over 25 percent of the Nation's total population—and 40 percent of the Nation's metropolitan population—live in 33 interstate metropolitan areas. Two-thirds of the States are involved in one or more such areas, and five of the Nation's 10 largest metropolitan areas are interstate.

– Interstate metropolitan areas have special problems in achieving interlocal cooperation and providing for the performance of areawide functions because of the presence of State lines. Such areas have the same needs

as intrastate urban areas, but the very nature of our constitutional system lessens the effectiveness, and sometimes even precludes the use, of some of the coordinating devices developed to meet interlocal problems in these areas. Unless special arrangements are made to overcome differences between and among the two or three sets of State laws and institutions which apply within these areas, the development of areawide coordinating mechanisms is inhibited.

– Numerous, though scattered, precedents exist for interstate action in metropolitan areas, but most have been limited in their functional scope, their degree of governmental authority, or both. The State is supposed to be the coordinator of local governments. To date, this role has been fulfilled only in part by the States in interstate areas. Nevertheless, there are instances where the parent States in which an interstate metropolitan area lies have created interstate instrumentalities to serve regional needs.

– In most interstate metropolitan areas, areawide planning of an advisory nature has been quite commonly instituted, but only 12 compacts have been concluded for exercising governmental authority across State lines. Ten of these 12 interstate compact organizations, involving five metropolitan areas, are unfunctional, while the other two are for comprehensive planning. Eight of the functional organizations operate in the field of transportation, while the remaining deal with water and air pollution and parks and recreation, respectively. These compact bodies have produced a unity of effort across State lines within the individual functions but, in some instances, they have made multifunctional areawide coordination more difficult.

– Several of the traditional legal mechanisms for adjusting local geographic boundaries to keep abreast of urban growth within a single State cannot be used in interstate areas. For example, no local governments have been established or expanded (through annexation or consolidation) across State lines. Metropolitan reforms, such as those instituted in Miami, Nashville, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, and the Twin Cities, all have occurred within individual States. Neither extraterritorial (like zoning) nor independent taxing powers have been authorized across State lines.

– Other mechanisms are available for use on an interstate basis. A number of interlocal agencies function across State lines pursuant to interlocal cooperation agreements or parallel legislation. Others are organized under nonprofit charters. While adequate for planning advisory functions and non-controversial service functions, these mechanisms are frequently unstable and relatively impotent. However, when a bistate or tristate consensus emerges on a particular regional issue, an interstate compact can be instituted to provide real governmental authority to an interstate body.

– The Federal government has played an important but somewhat ambivalent role in interstate metropolitan

areas. In recent years, Congressional enactments and administrative policies have given increasing attention to the encouragement and financing of comprehensive areawide planning, urban transportation planning, and Circular A-95 Federal-aid review and comment procedures encompassing whole interstate metropolitan areas. Comprehensive planning agencies in interstate metropolitan areas generally owe their existence to certain Federal comprehensive areawide planning requirements and grants, and to their designations as A-95 review agencies.

— In other Federal programs having a regional thrust, the State portion of an interstate metropolitan area is the focal point of attention. Comprehensive health planning, for example, is rarely performed on a regional basis in such areas. Moreover, there are no interstate law enforcement planning agencies, even though this activity is supported by the Federal Safe Streets program.

Assignment of Functions and Districting Developments

— Newer style substate institutions and procedures have added a dimension to the substate performance of functions. The A-95 process has promoted more interlocal communication regarding Federal grant-in-aid matters at the substate regional level. A substantial minority of the local government officials surveyed indicated that the process has identified conflicts or weaknesses in grant applications or afforded new opportunities for other grant applications. A majority of such officials agreed that the process had increased coordination in the grant application process, provided useful information, and helped promote more orderly development.

— State substate districts and regional councils have performed useful auxiliary tasks in the performance of functions. They have raised the level of comprehensive planning in substate regions, provided a forum for interlocal communication on pressing functional matters, and better identified the goals and objectives of various regional functions. Some have monitored other regional organizations and directly provided controversial substate functions.

— Federal substate districts have played several distinct roles in the performance of functions. All such agencies prepare comprehensive or functional plans in order to formulate project funding priorities within their jurisdictions. Some districts also mobilize funds for their program purposes, as reflected in the facts that Community Action Agencies (CAA's) are estimated to have mobilized \$1.3 billion for anti-poverty purposes between 1965-72, and that Economic Development Districts (EDD's) received over 85 percent of their project monies from non-EDD sources. Federal substate districts have had other functional impacts as well, ranging from Local Development Districts' (LDD's) actually implementing economic development programs to Comprehensive Health Planning Agencies' (CHP's) playing a central role

in the certification of need procedures for hospital construction in 10 States. In addition, most Federal substate districts have supplied significant functional technical assistance to local governments in their jurisdictions.

— Regional special districts and authorities remain important service providers in many metropolitan areas. Over half of all such districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas were responsible for more than 40 percent of all metropolitan expenditures in their particular area of functional responsibility. Health and hospital, sewerage, and utility districts were most important in this regard.

Recent developments relating to special districts and authorities, Federally encouraged districting programs, State-mandated substate districting systems, regional councils and similar bodies, as well as the A-95 review process, clearly have generated a marked increase in activity at the substate regional level. Some of this activity has been constructive; some of it, confused; and most of it, without a clear sense of overall regional purposes. The five recommendations that follow are geared to ending the confusion, strengthening the bases for developing a balanced perspective on regional goals, and making existing areawide efforts even more constructive.

INTRASTATE DISTRICTING MECHANISMS, PROCEDURES, AND PLANNING

Recommendation I. The Federal Role: A Uniform, Comprehensive Policy

The Commission finds that the national government, in fact, has assumed a prime role, especially during the past decade, in substate regional planning, programming, coordination, and institution-building developments both in rural and urban areas within the States. It believes that most of these efforts, along with new ones even now on the horizon, are likely to continue. Yet the Commission is aware of the adverse effects on State and local governments as well as on substate regional instrumentalities that have arisen from the overlap, inconsistencies, and absence of concerted purpose and policy among the existing two dozen Federal programs with an areawide thrust. Hence . . .

The Commission recommends that Congress and the President enunciate a consistent, comprehensive Federal substate regional policy geared to providing a common framework for and a general purpose to existing and future Federal assistance programs—whether in the categorical, block grant, or special revenue sharing sectors—having substate regional planning, programming, coordination, and/or districting provisions. With reference to the specific components of this policy, the Commission recognizes that some may be achieved by Executive Order, but others will require

Congressional enactment. The Commission believes that such a national policy, at a minimum, should include the following:

A. A firm requirement, set forth in an amended Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-95, that, to the extent practicable, all existing and future categorical and block grants and, potentially, special revenue sharing programs which encourage or mandate areawide planning, programming, coordination, and/or districting, rely in each substate region on an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization officially designated by the State and/or its localities or, when both fail to act, by OMB for implementation and/or areawide policy-development purposes; where statutory requirements relating to the composition of areawide bodies conflict with this goal, adoption of a binding OMB policy that permits specially constituted advisory councils to the multi-jurisdictional organization to satisfy the requirements of the law.¹

B. Energetic encouragement of all States, save perhaps for the smallest in area and the most sparsely settled, to adopt a substate districting system whose boundaries recognize topographical, economic, social, communication, political, and jurisdictional factors, and whose purposes and district organizations are geared at least as much to State and local substate regional needs as they are to those of Federally assisted areawide programs; and positive assurance, in the form of a strengthened Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 and effective OMB follow-up action, that such Federal programs will align their boundaries to conform to or be consistent with those of State-delineated substate regions and rely primarily on officially designated district multi-jurisdictional organizations to permit maximum Federal-State-Local coordination of these joint undertakings.

C. Enactment of legislation that revamps and consolidates all areawide planning requirements associated with Federal categorical and block grants, and potentially special revenue sharing programs, with a view toward achieving a clear focus on:

- 1. substate districts as the primary substate areal concept,*
- 2. the preferred multi-jurisdictional organization within each substate region as the basic policy-developing and/or, where designated by law, implementing institution, and*
- 3. the linkage of comprehensive and functional planning as a means of achieving a better balance among and blending of areawide activities that most often, at present, are not consistent with each other.*

D. Enactment with bonus provisions for State

buying-in of a consolidated grant program of general planning, programming, and coordinative management assistance to officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations and a corresponding repeal of existing comprehensive and functional areawide planning assistance programs.

E. Amendment of Section 402 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 to give officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations the power to review and approve or disapprove grant applications covered by the A-95 process which emanate from multi-jurisdictional special districts and authorities operating within these organizations' respective substate regions.

F. Amendment of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 to give officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations the authority to review grant applications covered by the A-95 process emanating from units of general local government within each organization's jurisdiction and to resolve any inconsistencies between such applications and officially adopted regional policies or plans, such applications to be processed by the pertinent Federal departments and agencies only when these inconsistencies have been resolved. The umbrella organization should exercise a similar role with reference to grant applications of State agencies for major capital facilities not having a multi-regional impact located within each organization's substate region.

G. Amendment of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 to require that any major capital facilities projects having a pronounced areawide impact or intergovernmental effect, whether sponsored by a State agency, a multi-jurisdictional agency or authority, or a unit of general local government, must be reviewed and any inconsistencies between such projects and officially adopted regional policies or plans must be resolved by the officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization in the substate region wherein the project is scheduled to be located, provided Federal funds from block grants, or potentially from special revenue sharing programs, are involved.²

At this point in time, nothing short of a full-fledged, uniform Federal substate districting policy will discharge adequately the Federal role in this area of crucial intergovernmental concern. The hallmarks of such a policy should be consistency, comprehensiveness, and a clear focus on the needs of generalists at all levels, of politically accountable elected officials at the State and local levels, and of multi-purpose mechanisms and organizations at the substate regional level.

The Commission adopts this general position for

various basic reasons. First, it was the enactment of 24 separate programs over the past decade which put the Federal government in the role of a prime initiator of many of the metropolitan and multicounty developments during this period. Second, these programs have been enacted largely in a piecemeal fashion with special-purpose goals in mind; these, in turn, have added to the inconsistencies, confusion, and program, as well as institutional, conflict at the substate level. Third, the Federal government cannot retreat from this issue, given its continuing concern with and push for areawide planning, programming, coordination, and districting . . . evidenced by measures even now pending in the Congress relating to transportation, community development, and prospectively allied services. That there should be a uniform Federal policy in this field is beyond debate, in our opinion. Regarding its specific planks, the following policy components represent the Commission's considered judgment as to what should be included in this proposed policy.

The first component (A) is geared to establishing a clear and consistent Federal policy of relying, to the extent practicable, on one preferred umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization (UMJO) in each substate region for all present and future Federally assisted programs having an areawide thrust. The method advanced here of amending OMB's Circular A-95 is rooted in the fact that Part IV of the circular already contains elements of such a position. What is sought in this component is a more clear and complete enunciation of the preferred instrumentality principle and a more vigorous OMB implementation of it.

The Commission's survey of local public officials discovered overwhelming support for the umbrella multi-jurisdictional concept among the respondents. Resolutions of practically all of the national associations of generalist-oriented public officials have endorsed the proposition, and a recent draft report of the "Big Seven" public interest groups focused on this concept as the basis of its policy recommendations.³

Under this proposal, the States would be assigned the initiative in making the preferred multi-jurisdictional organization designations. Only in those cases where States or localities fail to move on this front would OMB pick up any discretion in the process.

As a practical matter, the designation procedure should cause few difficulties. The A-95 clearinghouse designation process already has led to the identification of and reliance on generalist-oriented areawide bodies in 212 metropolitan areas on 238 non-metropolitan regions. The governors already have a designating role under the existing circular for both categories of clearinghouses, with greater discretion given in the case of non-metropolitan areas, where clearinghouses are not required, but merely encouraged.

The real difficulty lies with getting the agencies and Congressional committees to adhere to the preferred

instrumentality concept. The fact that A-95 clearinghouses have been increasingly piggybacked by other Federally assisted areawide programs, however, does indicate the viability of this concept. On the average, piggybacking of other Federally assisted area programs on A-95-designated regional councils now occurs some 45 percent of the time.

Where the representational provisions of Federally aided district programs appear to conflict with this goal of relying on single multi-jurisdictional organizations, it is our contention that a system of advisory councils would provide an adequate and legal solution to the question. The composition of such councils should meet the statutory requirements, but their position should be subordinate to that of the umbrella organization. The CHP's and CAA's most frequently have caused the greatest difficulties in this respect. Yet even in these districting programs, our survey indicates that there has been respectively a 42 percent and 4 percent reliance on A-95 clearinghouses.

In short, the Commission believes the preferred instrumentality principle must be one of the basic planks in a comprehensive Federal policy on substate districting and that the States and localities should play a dominant role in the designation process. In large measure, this simply involves the strengthening of existing procedures and a concerted effort on the part of the Executive Office of the President and Congress to achieve consistent adherence to this principle. Without such actions, the concept of an umbrella areawide unit loses most of its practical effect.

* * * *

In the second component (B) of the recommended Federal policy, the Commission calls for an even more strenuous effort by the national government to encourage and support States in their substate districting efforts. Part IV of OMB Circular A-95 already does this to some extent and OMB, as well as Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, have sought to accelerate Federal and State action on this front. In some cases, the problem rests with the failure of States to delineate the boundaries of a system; at this point 44 have. In others, it stems from gubernatorial approval of certain Federal district boundaries and/or mechanisms prior to the establishment of the State system and failure to take corrective action after its establishment. In several instances, the difficulty lies with still other Federally encouraged districts set up prior to a State's district system and the less-than-successful efforts of both OMB and the States to achieve boundary and/or mechanism conformance on the part of these older districts. Still another dimension of the difficulty relates to the differing areal needs of certain Federally assisted or required substate regional programs in specific functional areas.

The Commission believes that the difficulties gener-

implementation of this policy component. After all, even with existing efforts, the boundaries of 35 percent of the districts in 10 key Federally assisted areawide programs conform to those of State subdistricts (where such exist) and this figure passes the 50 percent mark if the poverty, manpower, and air pollution programs are excluded. Moreover, 17 percent of these Federally aided district programs had both geographic and organizational conformance; when the three most non-congruent programs are excluded, this proportion more than doubles.

The Commission, then, is convinced that Federally assisted programs with an areawide thrust should be required to make their boundaries conform with those of State-delineated substate regions and to rely primarily on the substate district umbrella organization for regional implementation purposes. The record to date indicates that such a requirement is both possible and practicable for most such programs.

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The third component (C) of this uniform comprehensive policy deals with the two dozen different Federally assisted areawide programs with planning and/or organizational requirements for the substate regional level. These programs have been probed at length in this report and the available evidence suggests that they...

- embody significantly fewer than 24 different purposes;
- are partly for planning purposes and partly for action programs;
- exhibit varying degrees of linkage between planning and implementation;
- have resulted in the creation of multiple regional bodies with overlapping geographic boundaries, some of which are of a relatively generalist nature while others are basically single purpose;
- specify differing patterns of membership on regional bodies;
- tend to duplicate the planning processes and paperwork involved in meeting diverse Federal program requirements;
- engender competitive relationships among regional bodies; and
- require burdensome efforts by regional bodies to achieve adequate funding.

This proposal would reduce the complexity of these Federal programs as they apply in the field. Simplifica-

tion would be achieved along the lines already begun by administrative action. OMB Circular A-95 now gives the governors the option of influencing the boundaries of Federal program areas by establishing statewide systems of substate districts. With encouragement and financial assistance from HUD and EDA, 40 States have now developed such systems and four others have systems under consideration. Officially recognized comprehensive regional planning and development organizations have been established to serve these districts in approximately 60 percent of the cases, and some of these organizations simultaneously serve the purposes of two or more Federal areawide programs.

Nevertheless, certain programs use the districts less than others, and many of the Federally encouraged organizations established earlier than the State districts have not yet conformed to the new districts. In October 1971, the Vice President and OMB initiated a State-by-State effort to bring about greater boundary conformance of the following 10 Federal programs.

1. OMB - A-95 Clearinghouse Areas
2. EDA - Economic Development Districts
3. HUD - 701 Metropolitan and Regional Planning Areas
4. USDA - Resource Conservation and Development Areas
5. HEW - Comprehensive Health Planning Areas
6. DOL - Comprehensive Manpower Planning Areas
7. DOJ - Law Enforcement Planning Areas
8. OEO - Community Action Planning Areas
9. EPA - Air Quality Control Districts and
10. DOT - Metropolitan Comprehensive Transportation Planning Areas

As a result, some progress on the boundary question is being made. At the same time, the Commission is convinced that more progress would be likely if specific legislation favoring it were on the books.

With regard to using the official multi-jurisdictional substate district organizations more fully for Federal areawide program purposes, the goal here is to increase coordination and to take advantage of certain economies. These organizations are usually controlled by the elected officials of general local governments, who are responsive to the needs of the general electorate. They are directly on the local scene where they deal with planning problems on a daily basis. Moreover, they are conversant with the needs and procedures for making choices among priorities in competing fields of public policy—precisely what is needed for coordination of Federally aided areawide programs. The greater the number of Federal programs with which these officials are directly related, the more effective they can be in coordinating them.

Economies in overhead can result from a reduced number of regional organizations. Administrative staffs would not have to be duplicated, and the fruitless

competition for funds could be avoided. Thus, combining comprehensive and functional planning in the same organization, and giving the organization an implementation role, would combine greater effectiveness with greater efficiency.

To date, one of the great difficulties in consolidating planning requirements among the variety of areawide programs has been disagreement about the kind of areawide planning body that should be encouraged. With different types of district bodies in mind for different Federally assisted planning efforts, and often a variety of options within any given program, the variables become so numerous that coordination of geographic and functional overlaps becomes almost impossible. Moreover, the complexities of conceptualizing the coordination of conflicting planning requirements actually seem small when compared to the realities of how cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive the actual coordination would be in the field. The coordination effort becomes larger than the planning effort—a classic case of red tape. With only a single set of areawide boundaries and regional organizations for Federal planning requirement purposes, as recommended here, the coordination task would become more manageable. In addition, the perennial conflict between comprehensive and functional planning would be reduced to sensible proportions, once both sets of protagonists have been forced to focus on the same areawide implementing organization.

The consolidation of planning requirements was recommended by this Commission in its 1967 report *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*. The basic features of that recommendation were that each program should require functional planning to be related directly to comprehensive planning under the auspices of the “top policy-makers at the local, areawide, and State levels.” The substate district systems which have been developed almost totally since 1967 appear to be a very practical vehicle for achieving this goal, provided they become the primary focus of all Federally encouraged and required areawide planning requirements.

* * * *

The fourth component (D) of this recommendation seeks to provide the official substate district organizations with the strength they would need to carry out their responsibilities under component (C). As the organizations responsible for meeting all Federal planning requirements—functional as well as comprehensive—they would need a continuing source of funds on which they could count to support an adequate technical staff. As things stand now, the successful district organizations are those which have managed to pull together Federal planning funds from several different programs and have cleverly devised ways of focusing them to maximum advantage within a unified work program carried out by a single staff. The typical

regional council gets three-fifths of its funding from Federal assistance programs. HUD's 701 program provides 43 percent; DOT's mass transportation and highway programs allocate 21 percent; LEAA contributes 10 percent; and the remainder comes from 14 other possible grant sources.

This funding pattern creates a cluster of problems, given the differences in the guidelines and philosophies of the various planning assistance programs. Yet it is necessary to rely simultaneously on several programs because none is large enough by itself to support the level of technical expertise needed to meet the present profusion of Federal areawide program requirements. Environmental impact statements, relocation plans, the civil rights implications of various projects, and citizen participation, not to mention the basic planning itself, all require the attention of well qualified—and highly paid—technicians. Yet under the present system of piecemeal planning grants, first priority goes to hiring an expert and highly paid grantsman to attract the Federal funds in the first place.

Repealing the separate areawide planning grant programs and combining those funds into a single support grant for official multi-jurisdictional substate district organization would have three major benefits. First, it would assure that all of the planning funds would be combined for unified and efficient use within a single organization responsive to local elected officials. Second, it would greatly reduce the funding uncertainties now experienced in the competitive grant system and the need for grantsmen on the regional staff. Finally, since these organizations are also the A-95 Federal-aid review agencies, it would help to assure a technically sound planning basis for the full scope of programs to be reviewed—not one skewed by which functional planning grants the organization might have been able to get in open competition with other regional bodies.

The bonus for State buying-in is rooted in a pair of earlier Commission recommendations.⁴ Unlike the earlier proposals, we move here out of the largely physical development program areas into the realm of planning, programming, and coordinative management. But the goal here of encouraging State fiscal participation in a program area of vital concern to the States is fully consistent with the underlying rationale for the earlier recommendations. Moreover, in this case the effort is geared to prompting the States to support bodies which in most instances are part and parcel of State-established systems.

The State of Georgia provides a good example of how these areawide planning assistance programs can work together to the benefit of all. There, it has long been the policy to channel all of the Federal substate regional programs into the Area Planning and Development Commissions, to provide substantial State aid, and to encourage State agencies to work through these commis-

sions wherever feasible. Texas and Virginia have similar policies and, of course, a number of individual regional councils in many other parts of the Nation also demonstrate the feasibility of this proposal.

* * * *

Component (E) of this uniform Federal substate districting policy seeks to strengthen a familiar regional coordinative device—the review and comment procedure—as it relates to certain Federal assistance applications submitted by multi-jurisdictional special districts. Implicit in this component are certain basic assumptions . . . assumptions with which this Commission fully concurs. It is rooted in the belief that the time has come to bring certain activities of regional special districts and authorities under the policy direction of a generalist-dominated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization. It accepts the proposition that the Federal government, through its categorical and block grant application procedures, is in a position to aid—indeed, has a responsibility—to help further this goal. It clearly is designed to strengthen the generalists and elected officials of units of general local government by arming their multipurpose regional organizations with greater authority vis-a-vis multi-jurisdictional special districts. It is based on an awareness that regional plans and guidelines are of little consequence if implementing authority is lacking; local officials in our survey focused on this implementation issue more than any other when citing the basic problems confronting regional councils. Finally, the concept of an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization takes on substantive meaning with the assignment of this authority. Without it, the “umbrella” would lack one of its most vital spokes.

What are some of the real world factors that should be considered in assessing the practicality and worth of this proposal? At the outset, it should be noted that Section 402 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 already gives preference to units of general local government in situations where special districts and such units submit grant applications for similar projects. In one sense, the action called for here merely amends this section to give it greater force. At the same time, it is apparent to some that the existing section has not been vigorously enforced, that at least half of the multi-jurisdictional special districts in the largest metropolitan areas rely on and receive, to a greater or lesser extent, Federal financial assistance, and that both State and local governments, for a variety of reasons, have encouraged the use and growth of special districts. In addition, only a third of the local elected officials in our survey approved giving regional councils the power to veto the plans and capital budgets of districts operating in their respective areas.

At the same time, four-fifths of these same officials gave strong approval to the umbrella organization idea; a

comparable proportion endorsed a review and coordinating role for such organizations vis-a-vis the programs and projects of special-purpose districts. Moreover, under the existing A-95 procedures, many clearinghouses already exhibit a fairly strong tendency to review the grant applications of such districts with a more critical eye and a more authoritative manner than usually is the case with applications from other jurisdictions. Finally, as the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council indicates, the power proposed here is a vital factor in making the sometimes abstract notion of a metropolitan perspective a reality.

In short, the issue here becomes a matter of judgment as to whether the regional umbrella needs this spoke, whether the Federal government should help provide it, and how large a spoke it should be. Giving a veto over all special district applications covered by the A-95 review process, of course, provides a big spoke. The disapproval would be final and, given the more than 100 programs now covered by the A-95 procedure, few if any applications would by-pass the umbrella organization. This position, in our opinion, is the logical outgrowth of the assumptions cited at the outset. The concept of an authoritative umbrella organization is reduced to a futile hope without the scope of the power contemplated here. In our judgment, the Federal government has a basic responsibility to provide it.

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The sixth policy component (F) provides for a somewhat different authority over certain grant applications of units of general local government and of State agencies. Here a “review and resolve differences” approach is adopted, all with a view toward recognizing that general governments are being dealt with, not single-purpose units. Moreover, these governments are below and above the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization, not on the same level; both the State and the local jurisdictions are constituent members of the organization. For these reasons, the Commission sanctions the “review and resolve differences” formula. Under it, the regional organization would serve as a deliberative body for working out any inconsistencies between the A-95-covered applications of its local general governments and officially adopted regional plans or policies. A similar role would be assumed in cases where State agency applications for major capital facilities assistance involved projects slated for location in the umbrella unit’s region. In either situation, the project proposal might be modified to conform to the plan or the plan might be adjusted to cover the questions raised by the conflicting application. Regardless of the outcome, however, no such application would be acted upon by the Federal agency in question until the inconsistencies had been resolved.

Like its predecessor, this component rests on certain

basic assumptions. . .some of which parallel those relating to special districts and others that relate wholly to the different approach and jurisdictions involved here. The proposal assumes that to be effective an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization must be empowered to resolve any conflicts that might arise between its areawide plans and policies and certain proposed governmental actions, whether State or local, that have an areawide impact. It envisions the umbrella agency as an authoritative broker rather than a weak facilitator. It seeks to link comprehensive areawide planning with certain decisions, especially in the physical developmental area, that directly affect such plans. It assumes that the States are serious about their substate regional districting efforts and that cities and counties recognize the shortcomings of jurisdictional isolationism when it comes to actions having a multi-jurisdictional impact. It presupposes a regional organization that is simultaneously a part of a State-established substate district system with State members and fully representative of elected officials of general local government. It assigns a basic role in this matter to the Federal government because substate regional organizations have become a vital link in the network of contemporary intergovernmental relations. But it also recognizes that the generalists' portion of that link at present is weak and that the generalists must resolve their differences within a common regional council framework if this link is to be significantly strengthened.

These are some of the assumptions underlying this policy component. To what extent are they relevant, realistic? In terms of attitudes, two-fifths of the local officials participating in our survey were willing to empower regional councils with a veto power over local plans and projects not conforming to areawide plans; seven-eighths sanctioned the umbrella council concept. Regarding existing procedures, the overwhelming majority of the respondents felt that the A-95 clearinghouse process should continue. Yet implementation of comprehensive and functional plans was identified as the most crucial single hurdle facing regional councils.

Regarding review and approval of State agency applications for major capital facility assistance, in very few instances are State-funded projects or State projects per se processed through the regional A-95 machinery. When it does occur, the local officials surveyed indicated satisfaction with the procedure. There are no data available to provide a clear picture as to how State officials would react to the empowering action proposed here. One can assume with some safety that State line-agency officials would not be friendly. In the case of the governors and their core management staffs, a different reaction might be possible, depending on how seriously substate districting efforts are viewed—particularly as they relate to decentralizing certain aspects of State decision-making, planning, and budgeting. Not to be overlooked here is the proviso in this component

which excludes State projects of a multiregional or statewide character.

The intent here is to protect the integrity of those State-sponsored capital facilities that are part of a statewide program or are multiregional in their impact. This protection ought to reassure State officials, especially governors and their program and planning staffs, and provide the basis for a positive reception of this recommendation.

To sum up, the empowering features of this component are geared to adding two more spokes to the multi-jurisdictional organization's umbrella of authority. These spokes concern a resolution of policy conflicts and decision making, not direct operational responsibilities. At the same time, they help provide an essential means of taking regional guides and plans off the drafting tables and out of the file cabinets and applying or modifying them to meet areawide needs.

The final component of this uniform Federal policy is designed to cope with those emerging situations where State agencies, special districts, and units of general local government may receive Federal financial assistance from sources outside the categorical sector. Block grants, as presently authorized, would be covered by the previous two components. But given the push for new forms of more discretionary intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the Federal level, the question of grant applications in the more traditional sense may not arise in various future cases. This component, then, is designed to assure that proposed major capital facilities in a substate region, regardless of the prime governmental sponsor, are subjected to the same kind of authoritative regional agency review and conflict resolving process as those State and local applications covered by the previous component. The basic condition, of course, is that a portion of the funding for these facilities must come from non-categorical Federal assistance monies.

The reasons for this proposal have been cited for the most part in the previous pair of components. But one additional argument needs mentioning. This recommended policy plank is rooted chiefly in the belief that no Federal assistance funds, whether geared to narrow or broad program purposes, should be disbursed in a fashion that undercuts orderly planning and program implementation at the substate regional level.

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Recommendation 2. The State Role: A Comprehensive Consistent Substate Districting Policy

The Commission concludes that the role of the States in substate regional developments has become pivotal. As a partner, albeit the lesser one in far too many instances with approximately two-thirds of the Federally assisted programs having an areawide component, as the

prime giver of life to special districts and authorities, as the paramount drafter of the governmental map at the local and substate regional levels, and as the ultimate arbiter of the governmental functions and powers conferred on the jurisdictions at these levels, the States are in a strategic position to help clarify, reconcile, and resolve the public policy and public administration questions raised by the substate regional planning, programming, coordination, and districting undertakings of the past 10 years. Hence. . .

*The Commission recommends that the governors and legislatures of all applicable States, after appropriate and adequate consultation with representatives of units of general local government and their respective State associations, develop and enact a consistent, comprehensive statewide policy to provide a common framework and a clear set of State and local purposes for existing and future substate regional planning, programming, coordination, and districting undertaking. The Commission further recommends that, at a minimum, such State action should provide for. . .*⁵

A. *The establishment of a formal procedure, involving participation by units of general local government, for delineating and revising the boundaries of substate regions, relying on specific topographical, economic, social, communication, political, and jurisdictional criteria specified in legislation.*

B. *The required use of substate regional boundaries, insofar as is practicable, established pursuant to legislation by all State agencies to the extent that their implementation of State and/or Federally assisted State programs requires the geographic division of the State for administrative or other purposes.*

C. *A specific process, involving the governor and the units of general local government in a substate region, which results ultimately in the designation by the governor of a single umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization in each region, with such designation conferring the legal status of an agency of local governments.*

D. *A membership formula which requires that there be State representation on each umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization but that at least 60 percent of the membership of each such organization be composed of elected officials of units of general local government within the substate region and that all such units must belong to their officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization.*

E. *A voting formula which requires a dual system involving the application of the one-government, one-vote principle in most voting matters, but permitting certain larger local constituent jurisdictions to overrule this procedure on certain issues, thus bringing a proportionate or weighted voting procedure into operation.*

F. *Adoption and publication by each officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization of regional policies or plans and of a program for their implementation.*

G. *Reliance by all State departments and agencies on the officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations for any substate regional planning, programming, coordinative management, and districting activities in which they might engage pursuant to their assigned responsibilities under State or Federally-aided State programs.*

H. *Planning and programming inputs into the State planning and budgeting process on a systematic basis from officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations.*

I. *State designation of all official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations as the A-95 clearinghouse for their respective substate regions.*

J. *Conferring on all officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations the power to review and approve, in light of adopted regional policies and plans, all proposed major capital facility projects of State departments and agencies which are slated for location in the organizations' respective substate regions.*

K. *Review and comment by officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations on locally funded major capital facility projects proposed or authorized by units of general local government within their respective substate regions.*

L. *Assignment to each officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization of a policy controlling role with respect to the operations of multi-jurisdictional special districts and authorities functioning within their respective substate regions to assure conformance with adopted regional policies and plans.*

M. *Promotion of mutual problem solving by officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations and rendering by these organizations of such services as may be requested individually*

or jointly by member units of general local government.

N. *Authorization for officially designated multi-jurisdictional organizations to assume a region-wide operating responsibility with financing as provided in State legislation, subject to approval of a majority of member units of general local government representing at least 60 percent of the substate region's population.*⁶

O. *A State program of financial assistance, on an on-going basis, to officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations.*

P. *Gubernatorial authority to disapprove any actions of an officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization after making a finding that such actions are in conflict with officially adopted State plans, policies, or actions having a statewide impact or in conflict with officially adopted plans, policies, or actions of another umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization.*

* * * *

The basic strategy underlying this second omnibus recommendation is that regardless of the policy or policies adopted by the Federal government in this area, the States are in a pivotal position to resolve both immediate and long-term difficulties at the substate regional level. Any or all of the components of the State policy set forth in this recommendation would complement Federal initiatives advanced under the first recommendation. The development of this State policy inevitably would require extensive consultation and collaboration with city and county spokesmen, as well as their respective State associations. After all, the ultimate purpose of this endeavor would be the establishment of a common framework and a clear set of both State and local purposes for existing and future substate districting undertakings.

* * * *

Component (A) of this recommendation, relating to boundary delineation, simply recognizes the usual practice followed in most of the States which have already established statewide systems of substate districts. Involvement of the units of general local government is not meant to exclude consultation with citizens, State officials, or others who have major interests in the system and its fruits. It is meant only to emphasize the great importance of recognizing that the substate districts delineated by the State will have their most immediate, pressing, and continuing impacts on local governments, and will be controlled largely by them. Thus, it is essential to draw the boundaries so that they encompass local governments which can work together.

The objective criteria cited are also significant,

because they help to identify and define the resources, problems, common interests, and objectives of the various areas. This type of analysis gives focus to the question "Why regionalize?" It tends to pinpoint the benefits to be gained and helps to establish the work program of the regional body so as to focus upon the practical and highest priority needs of the area.

The governors of the States, of course, have usually made the final delineations, even where the systems of substate districts have been authorized by State legislation. If these districts are to serve State purposes, as well as local, then it is incumbent upon the governors to consult at length with affected State departments and agencies, as well as the legislature, about the boundaries, and then balance State and local needs insofar as possible. Nevertheless, in the case of irreconcilable differences, the greatest weight probably should be given to local government views. Whole counties (cities and towns in New England) should be used as the building blocks for the substate districts except in the most unusual circumstances. Where counties are unusually large, or very different in character from adjoining counties (urban and rural), single-county multi-jurisdictional districts would be appropriate, but generally these districts should be multicounty.

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Regarding State use of substate district boundaries (B), it is common in States which have already districted to find some reference to the use of the substate district boundaries for such purposes as State planning, programming, budgeting, and the delivery of services. Thus, component (B), like component (A) of this recommendation, recognizes and seeks to generalize a common practice. Of course, most substate district systems are quite new and major successes in State use of them are still relatively few. But the potential value of this practice is clear: From the State point of view, it allows the State to use, rather than duplicate for its own purposes, the planning and information gathering performed by the regional organizations serving the districts, and it provides a generalist mechanism at the regional level to help the governor coordinate State programs having an areawide thrust. From the local point of view, it provides clearer, better organized, and more effective access to the State government.

If the recent record can be used as a guide, it may well take some time to align existing State administrative boundaries, of which there usually are several sets used by different State departments and agencies. In a few cases where existing boundaries are set by interstate compact or by other means for special purposes affecting only part of a given State, it may not be feasible to conform completely to the substate districts. But for the most part, the substate districts should be drawn in consultation with the various State agencies and these

agencies should be required to use them for their own substate regional purposes.

* * * *

The process for designating appropriate organizations to serve the substate districts, recommended in component (C), recognizes the important stake that the local governments have in this end-product. The proportionate degrees of control to be exercised by State and local officials, representation among the various local interests, the manner in which the various citizen and functional interests are to be accommodated, and the issue of legal status are all crucial to the designation process.

Most of these matters are essentially political and can be dealt with most appropriately by negotiations among the parties involved. Yet there is a need to resolve any differences which may become apparent in a timely fashion and get on with the important areawide programs. Thus, the final decision-making authority should be given to the governor. Like its predecessors, this component pretty much follows existing practice.

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The membership formula (D) advanced in this recommendation requires State representation on each umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization, but stipulates that at least three-fifths of the membership of each organization must be elected officials of units of general local government. Moreover, all such local governments are required to join the regional body.

The balance achieved here on the membership question merits examination. Turning first to the State representation issue, 44 States now have districted their States and 29 have designated multi-jurisdictional units to serve, to greater or lesser degrees, as vehicles for the decentralization of State services, the coordination of State and local substate regional programs, the development of coordinated growth policies, and in some instances the policy control of actions of regional special districts and local units of government. These developments point to an increasing State role in substate organizations. Consequently, to protect its policy interests and promote more integrated State-local policies in the operations of these units, the Commission believes that State representation is both necessary and desirable.

At the same time, we are convinced that the traditionally local orientation of these mechanisms must be respected and that at least 60 percent of the membership of such organizations should be composed of elected officials of units of local government in the region. To further strengthen local representation, as well as the regional unit, States should mandate membership of all units of general local government in the substate district. This local membership formula im-

proves on the more traditional one by curbing the secessionist tendencies that have plagued substate bodies in such areas as Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. By this mandating, State government also signifies the importance of the regional organization by insuring that its operations will be applicable to all and not just some of the local governments in its area.

By providing for State as well as local membership, recognition is given to the possibility that the substate region may be an arena where both levels of government ultimately may have to agree on even more fundamental issues of multi-jurisdictional reorganization. That being the case, the joint membership of this body will be a factor in preventing State-imposed or solely locally determined policies of governmental reorganization. This formula, then, has the strength of building on the accountability of recognized State and local representatives. This surely will increase the visibility of the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization and permit it to move easily into the role of an authoritative substate regional body. In short, this joint membership formula looks to the future as well as to the present.

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Component (E) recommends a dual system of voting apportionment for an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization. The one-government, one-vote principle would be applied in most voting matters, but any constituent jurisdiction could overrule this procedure on certain issues, thus bringing a proportionate or weighted voting procedure into operation. The Commission recognizes that a majority of regional councils operate on the one-government, one-vote principle. That formula strengthens the consensual nature of the multi-jurisdictional organization. At the same time, larger units of local government have sought and won approval of weighted voting procedures in at least 25 percent of all regional councils. Moreover, an equal proportion of the councils use differing voting formulas for different situations. In short, the present variety of voting formulas indicates the need for a structured, yet somewhat flexible system of voting apportionment.

To achieve this goal, the Commission recommends that a two-stage voting process be followed. For the majority of umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization actions, a one-government, one-vote procedure would be used. Thus in actions that are of an advisory or technical nature, this voting rule might permit the fashioning of a consensus which would determine the basic scope of umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization planning activities. In other matters where the multijurisdictional organization has to act in an authoritative fashion, such as actions that would affect the finances and operations of constituent local governments, a proportionate, population-weighted rule might apply. And given the role and representation of the State, some special application of

this weighted voting option would have to be devised to cover situations involving paramount State concerns.

This dual voting procedure would permit a balancing of State and local concerns, of large and small jurisdictional concerns, in the formulation of the multi-jurisdictional organization's policies and plans. It might also prove an incentive for more constructive State and large unit participation in substate regional activities and allay the fears that these jurisdictions sometimes have about an expanded regional council role. It also would provide a protection against using the multi-jurisdictional organization as a device to dilute central city and minority political power.

In short, a dual voting formula would permit a desirable blend of majority and confederal rule in multi-jurisdictional organizations. Representatives could develop ground rules for applying the weighted voting procedure, and use such rules accordingly. Indeed, the presence of such voting rules might well encourage member jurisdictions to reach a consensus on substate issues and to avoid relying on this protective device. Moreover, the possibility of using these alternative voting rules might well prevent charges that the multi-jurisdictional organization is an unconstitutional device for some forms of substate regional governance. For all these reasons, the Commission endorses this dual formula and urges the States in their substate districting legislation to make provision for it.

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The sixth component (F) recommends that each umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization adopt and publish a set of regional plans and policies and a program for their implementation. This proposal recognizes that such policies, plans, and implementation programs are the principal basis for various organization efforts geared toward regional coordination of State and local government public policies and toward minimizing the extent of State and local interjurisdictional policy conflict in the area.

Where umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations have been used in the past, plans and policy guides have been a key element in their existence. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, the Metropolitan Council has used its development guide as the basis for controlling the actions of such regional special districts as the Metropolitan Airport Commission and the Metropolitan Sewer Board. The guide also is used as one basis for mediating interlocal planning conflicts. Under other less authoritative arrangements, regional councils are required to base their Federal and, in some cases, State grant application reviews upon their relevant comprehensive and functional plans. Indeed, the lack of fully developed regional plans has been a major source of weakness in much of present-day A-95 activity. So regardless of whether the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization has advisory, regulatory, or

operational responsibilities, or a combination, it needs plans and policies upon which to base its activities. But where the organization is assigned the authoritative role contemplated by this overall recommendation, such a planning base is indispensable.

Over 80 percent of some 1,300 surveyed local officials favored the creation of a unified substate regional planning agency to handle Federal and State substate planning programs. Thirty to 45 percent of these same officials approved the organization's use of a regional plan as the basis for approval or disapproval of special district and general local government plans and projects having an areawide impact. Without regional policies, plans, and implementation programs, the substate regional organizations would have little basis for accepting such additional authority.

Ordinarily, and without the block grant Federal-State support called for in this report,⁷ it is difficult to develop adequate areawide comprehensive and functional plans, because of financial, time, and knowledge constraints. Differing levels of Federal functional planning assistance presently result in the more highly aided functions dominating the comprehensive planning efforts of the existing umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations. Over 60 percent of total Federal support for their activities is derived from HUD and DOT planning assistance programs concerned with substate regional physical development programs. In sharp contrast, these councils generally receive less than 10 percent of their Federal planning assistance for health, manpower, or antipoverty purposes. Quite naturally, then, regional councils do not rank high as organizations that have substantial social planning capabilities. In most cases, State funding is too small to take up the slack, and local funding, while substantial, is fully committed to matching Federal funds, and is thereby limited significantly to

deral program purposes. All this suggests the need for block grant support, cited earlier, if the comprehensive planning role of these generalist organizations is to become effective.

In short, the Commission believes that a State-designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization should adopt both comprehensive and functional regional policies and plans and a program for their implementation. We recognize the complexity involved in such a regional process, but expect that such plans and policies will be of sufficient latitude to permit them to be used in coordinated decision making by State and local governments within the region. Moreover, we are convinced that these guidelines would be flexible enough to retain the support of the jurisdictions affected by them.

Without such policies, plans, and programs, we believe the organization will lose its credibility and authority in the region. With these instruments the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization will be an effective vehicle for the planning, coordination, and delivery of various substate services.

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Component (G) is designed to achieve the adherence of State agencies to the preferred district organization principle in all of their substate regional activities. It is a logical outgrowth of any serious State effort to utilize substate districts for certain State purposes and eventually to provide the governors with a generalist tool for coordinative management at the regional level. This proposal points the way to a regularized regional input in the development of State program policies and better coordination of services at this level.⁸

At present, 23 States require those departments and agencies using administrative districts to follow the boundaries of the designated umbrella organizations. A small number of States require that these councils participate in agency or central executive programming and planning activities, and a handful use them for management coordination.

The intent of this proposal is to encourage fuller use of officially designated umbrella organizations in carrying out State field responsibilities. The Commission believes that implementation of this component can reduce the extent of duplication of regional planning and information gathering activities, and in some instances, provide such services to the State. Not to be overlooked is the fact that without some such requirement as is proposed here, State agencies will continue to feel free to ignore one of the chief reasons for the States' launching a substate districting system: to bring some order out of the administrative chaos that exists in most substate regions at the present time. If the State is committed to this goal, then this mandate to its agencies is essential.

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Component (H) is geared to integrating substate regional planning and programming outputs with counterpart State efforts. In many ways, this proposal merely reaffirms Commission positions adopted in recommendation three of its 1968 report *Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth*.⁹

State planning and budgeting processes have been subjected only slightly to a coordinated regional point of view. With the growth of regional councils in the past decade, a few States, particularly in the South and in the Appalachian region, directed that regional councils be given an opportunity to be heard in the budget preparation process. A regional perspective is injected in a few States by requiring State agencies to submit their budgets to the governor's budget office on a substate district basis.

The Commission believes one important means through which the substate regional point of view can be brought into the public policy arena is through the programming-budgeting process. Since no State pro-

grams of substance may be provided without funding, the process by which funds are allocated becomes a critical one.

Critics of this proposal for greater regional inputs in State budgeting and programming see functional expertise being watered down in the process, the consultative process consuming much time in a restricted budget preparation period, and budgeting on a substate district basis as establishing categories that are not very meaningful for program budgeting.

Yet these arguments ignore the benefits that a well developed substate regional planning and programming operation can bring to State efforts. They ignore the vital role that properly empowered umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations can play—as regional decision-makers, arbiters, and priority-setters. They clearly overlook the fact that various State agencies are groping for means of achieving decentralization. For these and other reasons, the Commission believes that this provision must be a basic component of any comprehensive State policy in this area.

* * * *

Component (I) recommends that the States designate all official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations as the A-95 clearinghouses for their respective substate regions. This proposal recognizes the proven value of the A-95 review process and that all officially designated district organizations should have this responsibility as a natural complement to their other assignments.

As Chapter V notes, the A-95 process has facilitated the screening of Federal grant applications for program duplication and inconsistencies. In 1970-71, it is estimated that A-95 reviews in 350 to 400 regional councils resulted in an estimated fiscal savings of close to three-quarters of a billion dollars. Also noteworthy is the fact that the reviews of 238 A-95 agencies caused changes in Federal grant applications in 54 percent of all regions surveyed; grant consolidations in 36 percent of all surveyed agencies; and withdrawals of grant applications in 43 percent of all cases. At the Federal level, one survey has indicated that A-95 reviews resulted in Federal agency recommendations for project grant modifications in 18 percent of over 1,300 project applications.

Over 400 regional councils already have A-95 responsibilities. If these councils were to be the State-designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations, they would have had a long experience with this grant review process. To deny a district organization this responsibility would deprive it of a useful coordinating tool that could be used in conjunction with its other review powers. Granting the multi-jurisdictional organization the A-95 designation also would clear up the administrative complications caused presently when a grant is sometimes subjected to both metropolitan and regional grant reviews before it is forwarded.

Critics of this recommendation note that States in many cases already adequately handle A-95 review for many non-metropolitan areas. This proficiency in the process might argue for letting them continue this task. In the case of non-metropolitan umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations, the State might wish to follow a wait-and-see process and only assign A-95 review powers after they have adequately fulfilled their other statutory responsibilities. The Commission also takes note of the development of Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC) activities under the HUD Model Cities Planned Variations Program and of the increasing willingness of Federal Regional Councils to participate in the A-95 review process. Both of these developments might indicate that the present substate A-95 process could be handled by a combination of these Federal and local bodies along with the State clearinghouses. If that were the case, some would contend that the A-95 review and comment process might not have to be vested in the multi-jurisdictional organization.

Notwithstanding these objections, the Commission favors State designation of its umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations' clearinghouses. The process has been a major factor in generating what coordination there is in most substate regions, and the substate district organizations called for in this recommendation certainly would need its authority.

* * * *

The tenth component (J) of this recommended State policy is designed to strengthen further the review role of officially designated substate district organizations. By empowering the umbrella organization to review and resolve differences between certain proposed State agency capital facilities and formally adopted regional policies and plans, still another solid spoke is inserted in the organization's umbrella.

The Commission believes it both desirable and feasible for umbrella organizations to be given the power to review all capital facility projects proposed for their regions by State departments and agencies—save for those which are part of a statewide or multi-regional program—and to resolve any inconsistencies between them and regional plans and policies. The impact of State construction on regional development is a major one, and inevitably and importantly conditions the physical and social contours of the substate regions.

In general and not simply for the purposes of this particular proposal, the kind of major capital facility that we believe should come under the revamped regional council's scrutiny includes any structure or physical facility that has a pronounced areawide impact, a significant spill-over effect, or a vital intergovernmental influence on the implementation of the substate district organization's regional policies. Clues as to what is of areawide or regional significance could include projects

that are located near or at boundaries between local jurisdictions; that are part of an areawide system, such as highways, rapid transit, or water and sewer facilities; that are of such magnitude as to generate new areas of population or economic growth, or enough new activity to have a major impact on regional systems of transportation or utilities; or that affect the areawide distribution of such things as employment, housing, public services, and public revenues.

State capital facilities typically are planned by specialists without considering the total range of costs and benefits they generate for a region. Supra-agency review of capital construction is typically a function of the governor's budget staff, which may include less than complete and balanced consideration of regional factors.

Those who oppose giving officially designated regional councils this power to review and resolve differences with respect to State capital facility projects in light of adopted areawide plans or guides, argue that to give them this power could at best delay, and at worst, disperse authority and prevent the effective development of State facilities in certain functional areas. Regional councils, some argue, are not in a position to weigh all the factors entering into a State decision to locate a capital facility in a particular area.

On balance, the Commission endorses this specific recommendation as necessary to carry out the basic planning and control functions necessary for integrated areawide development. At least seven States already have conferred the power of review and approval of State projects on some or all of their regional councils. Moreover, adequate protection is provided in this component for major State capital facility projects that are part of a larger interregional or statewide effort. Not to be overlooked is the fact that the State has members in each of the umbrella organizations, hence a means of effectively representing the State's interests when deliberations arise concerning its proposed projects. The Commission, then, considers this component a sound and balanced approach to further strengthening the umbrella role of the multi-jurisdictional organization.

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Component (K) of this recommendation adds still another spoke to this areawide unit's umbrella. It does this by urging State action authorizing the conferring of a State review and resolving policy differences authority with respect to major local government capital facility projects. This parallels the action urged in the previous component regarding certain State agency capital facilities.

Review of certain Federally aided projects, no matter who the applicant, is quite common under the A-95 process, and most local planning enabling legislation passed by the States since the 1920's has contained "mandatory referral" provisions which accomplishes the

same purpose with regard to local government projects. In addition, some States have required review and even approval of certain State projects by substate district organizations, as was noted above. Nevertheless, few States thus far have extended this substate district review authority to include local government projects not receiving Federal or State aid. Thus, coordination among the projects of the different levels of government cannot be accomplished uniformly through the officially designated substate districts.

To remedy this situation, this component recommends the necessary extension. Even though A-95 goes well beyond capital facility projects, the fact that the current capabilities of substate districts are primarily limited to physical and economic development planning suggests that it is appropriate at this time to limit this review of local projects only to major capital facilities. Indeed, only major facilities with multi-jurisdictional or areawide significance would fall within the competence of these planning and coordinative management bodies.

* * * *

As with the previous proposals that sanctioned the "review and resolve policy differences" formula, certain actions of general governments are being dealt with here. And, in the Commission's judgment, such governments must be accorded a different status in the review process than that accorded to special districts and authorities. The resolving of differences between locally initiated major capital facility projects and officially adopted regional plans and policies is viewed as a deliberative process wherein all of the substate district localities along with the State members on this revamped regional council, with the technical assistance of staff, would identify the points in controversy, weigh the regional and local interests affected, and strive for a settlement. In the process, regional policies and plans might be modified, the proposed capital facility might be reworked, or elements of both actions might transpire. The regional council, however, would serve as the basic forum wherein the conflict-resolving efforts would occur; this, we believe, is as it should be. After all, the regional council would encompass all units of general local government as well as State interests and the voting procedures would be geared to achieving a proper balancing of these interests. Given these practical considerations, the Commission is convinced that satisfactory compromises would arise, compromises that sacrifice neither the integrity of regional plans nor the vital interests of the local governments affected.

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Component (L) assigns to officially designated multi-jurisdictional organizations a controlling policy role in the activities of multi-jurisdictional special districts, thus

giving further substance to the umbrella concept.

The number of large regional special districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas in the United States has more than doubled since 1957; the rapid growth of these districts generally has been fully documented in Chapter II. The problem of coordinating their separate but interrelated functions has grown correspondingly. The Commission recommends that the umbrella regional council be given policy control over such districts and authorities. Since the boundaries of these areawide special districts extend beyond those of general-purpose local governments, no general-purpose unit short of the State itself is capable of coordinating their work. The officially designated multi-jurisdictional organization, we believe, can fill this void at the substate regional level, as the only agency charged with coordinating a range of areawide public functions.

The need for coordination of areawide special districts is an especially pressing one since these bodies focus upon particularly narrow goals. The emphasis on a single functional purpose often results in decisions which have side effects on other areawide policies, programs, and jurisdictions. For this reason, a generalist-oriented and dominated multipurpose regional agency must have authority not only to plan, but also to set basic policy for special districts that transcend city and county boundaries. To deny this power would leave the only genuine operating governments at the substate regional level to their own particularistic course of action.

Critics of this proposal demur chiefly because they believe that the making of policy cannot be separated so sharply from its execution. They hold that the two functions require common central authority. They contend that the two are so interrelated that separation would distort the process of execution and result in destructive antagonisms and inefficient slippages.

Although the Commission recognizes possible difficulties in separating policy making from execution in areawide special district functions, it sees a clear advantage in shifting the making of basic policy for single-function authorities to an areawide body which must balance the benefits and costs of providing the many other services and controls needed within its region. Moreover, the example of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council provides ample proof that the separation can be done and with good results.

The specific means of securing policy control are numerous, including appointment of the special district's policy board by the regional council, review and approval of the district's budgets and basic policies, assignment to the council of the power to halt temporarily or permanently any proposed district project, and empowering the council to serve as the districts' fiscal agent for bonding and related purposes, along with variations of the above. In drafting this section of an omnibus bill, the legislature could utilize one or more of these devices to give the official umbrella multi-jurisdic-

tional organization the basic policy control it needs over the large special districts in its region.

The entire concept of an umbrella organization loses much of its meaning if it has no real authority vis-a-vis multi-jurisdictional special districts. As was noted previously, only about one-third of the local officials surveyed favored this proposal. Yet more than four-fifths sanctioned the umbrella organization idea. The Commission believes that no umbrella unit can ward off the gusty blasts of special district activities without the strong spoke this provision would provide. In many respects, it is one of the most vital in the entire umbrella. To carry the analogy even further, some would consider it the handle, not just a spoke.

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The thirteenth element (M) in this recommended State policy on substate districting is one of the least controversial advanced here. The use of regional councils for mutual problem solving and the performance of such services as may be requested by member units of general local government is fairly common practice. It amounts to little more than a general authorization to the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations to facilitate interlocal cooperation and contracting. The latter already is sanctioned in about four-fifths of the States, but assigning a role in this area to the designated substate district organizations simplifies still further the procedures for such cooperation. Moreover, such an assignment could well expand its application by relying in part on an already established organization, one that is eager to promote such cooperation and contracting. Not to be ignored here is the continuing multi-functional relationship among the local units that this form of collaboration would generate; this is likely to make them individually more aware of the opportunities for and benefits of such cooperation.

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Component (N) recommends that States authorize designated multi-jurisdictional agencies to assume a direct operating responsibility for a regionwide function, subject to such fiscal constraints as may be provided in the legislation. The Commission also recommends that such legislation should stipulate that no multi-jurisdictional organization may assume such an operational role unless a majority of its local members representing at least three-fifths of the substate region's population concurs.

This State action would permit a multi-jurisdictional organization to operate a regionwide service when there is no other institutional candidate for the task. Depending on the scope of the State legislation, it also might be used to consolidate the operations of existing regional special districts, to establish subordinate operating agencies, and to permit States, on occasion, to use the

multi-jurisdictional organization as a subordinate State regional agency. None of these operational options, however, could be used in an individual regional situation if local members representing at least 60 percent of the population did not sanction it. The Commission's judgment here is that serious problems of a practical and political variety would arise if this type of responsibility were assumed without specific local member government approval. At the same time, and given the constraints specified in this component, the Commission believes this empowering action is crucial to curbing the growth of unfunctional regional authorities.

Regionwide services are now provided in a variety of ways. In some areas, State-imposed regional special districts perform certain functions; in others, locally controlled joint service authorities or locally sponsored special districts perform the areawide tasks; in still others, subordinate State agencies are the operational institution. Yet the process of creating such entities is usually difficult, time consuming, and sometimes unproductive. Authorization for a regional State subordinate agency might not be forthcoming because of opposition from State legislators outside of the affected region. Formation of a regional special district may be difficult due to the need for State legislative action or the need for concurrent majorities in local referenda creating such an organization. Authorizing an officially State-designated multi-jurisdictional body to exercise this responsibility would remove these and various other obstacles. And above all, it would curb uncoordinated areawide activities of special authorities.

The Commission also advocates this action because it is in keeping with its 1961 recommendation that States enact legislation permitting the creation of multifunctional authorities. To date, at least three States—Washington, Colorado, and Oregon—have adopted that type of legislation. This component would permit State-designated multi-jurisdictional organizations to take advantage of such State action. Authorizing official multi-jurisdictional organizations to assume operational responsibilities also would permit these bodies to assume the operating programs of at least eight types of Federally encouraged districts having them. Since the programs of these districts are often ones that could not be assumed by existing regional special districts, this authorization is essential to the continuance of these substate ventures and to furthering the drive for merging them with generalist-oriented multi-jurisdictional organizations. Not to be overlooked in this connection is the continuing concern of various Federal and State agencies in having possessors operating authority as well as the other roles detailed in this overall recommendation. This concern, we believe, is not likely to disappear.

Critics of this recommendation argue that the proposal would dilute the effectiveness of the regional organization's planning and policy-making process. They

point to the fact that even such an authoritative regional body as the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council has been denied operational responsibilities by the State legislature. Also, they note that only 18 percent of over 1,300 surveyed city and county officials favored vesting regional multi-jurisdictional organizations with operational assignments. Clearly, they contend, present public sentiment does not favor this action. Moreover, so their argument runs, vesting the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations with operational powers would place it in direct and unnecessary competition with regional special districts.

While noting these arguments, the Commission is convinced that officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations should be assigned the authority to take on areawide operating responsibilities when the need arises. Such authority should be carefully spelled out in the authorizing State statute, including specific provisions to cover the financing of any assumed operating function and to give local governmental members of each multi-jurisdictional organization a chance to react to and approve each proposed direct servicing role. Without this authority, the specter of an ever increasing number of special districts, admittedly of the subordinate variety,¹⁰ looms large on the future regional horizon. Such a development would complicate unduly the basic regional policy-directing and coordinating roles that this omnibus recommendation assigns to the umbrella organizations. To maintain existing special districts in a separate operational status is one thing, but to assign the same status to new districts is quite another. The Commission is mindful of this basic distinction in urging the authorization, under certain constraints, of operational assignments to the officially designated umbrella organizations.

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Component (O) in this proposed omnibus State statute deals with funding. States have a critical interest in the development of officially designated umbrella regional organizations because of the potential contributions the latter can make to the coordinated planning, programming, and delivery of areawide services. Yet at present the State's financial contribution to the operation of umbrella organizations is less than that of the Federal and local governments. A recent survey revealed that 66 percent of the regional councils received at least half of their support from Federal sources, that 26 percent received a majority of their funds from local governments, while only 8 percent relied on State governments for most of their fiscal needs. Ten States presently provide funds on a continuing basis to regional councils.

The Commission believes that all States should provide continuing fiscal support to their officially designated umbrella organizations. It belabors the obvi-

ous to note that the chief lubricant of intergovernmental relations is money. Most Federal monies for regional programs are earmarked for special purposes. Although these funds contribute to the development and strength of the councils, a major need exists for a solid floor of general support for the multi-jurisdictional organization, as a body charged with generalist and coordinative functions. It is unlikely that Federal and local jurisdictions have as much incentive as the States for providing funds for overhead and general institutional development of the umbrella organizations.

Some of those opposed to State financial assistance to umbrella organizations take the stance that these organizations should be fundamentally local in orientation and in funding. Others claim that most of these bodies have been established as a result of or in reaction to Federal programs and requirements; hence, the chief outside funding for them should come from Federal sources.

These arguments, the Commission believes, are invalid. The States—not local governments—are the constitutional repositories for non-delegated powers under the Constitution, and have a basic responsibility for ordering local and regional governance systems. The fact that States historically have been slow in reordering the pattern of local government responsibilities does not excuse them from now assuming the development of viable multi-functional regional institutions through the judicious and continuing allocation of funds.

Finally, the Commission wishes to underscore the fact that most of the organizations to be aided are part and parcel of a State substate districting system. This system, in many instances, is slated to meet State as well as local needs at the regional level. To leave the funding of these instrumentalities with these purposes and with the representational formula called for here¹¹ to the localities involved and to the Federal government, in our opinion would be an abdication of State responsibility in an area where it must grasp the mantle of leadership.

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The final plank in this recommended substate districting policy for the States is designed to provide a means of protecting certain State plans and policies as well as those of another districting organization from the potentially undermining and uncoordinated actions of an officially designated umbrella organization. By urging the inclusion in a State's substate districting legislation of a provision that permits the governor to veto such actions, the Commission believes that potential conflicts between and among the policies of the different substate district organizations and between them and those of the State will be minimized. Moreover, the Commission is convinced that the practical effect of stipulating this last resort mechanism in the enabling legislation would be a strengthening of the linkages between the State and its

substate districting organizations—a commendable result, in our judgment.

Given the presence of State members on each district organization, the Commission believes that most potential State-substate regional policy conflicts would be worked out within the confines of each organization's deliberative process. Interregional conflicts, however, are another matter and it is our conviction that the State should play the needed role of authoritative arbiter when disputes of this kind arise. In general, however, the authority proposed here may be viewed as a last resort, impasse-resolution device—only to be used after an official finding has been made that an umbrella organization's policies, programs, or actions are conflicting with officially adopted statewide policies or programs or with those of another officially designated substate districting organization. Without it, controversy and confusion could easily emerge to complicate further the tough assignment the multi-jurisdictional organizations must carry out. With it, the relations between the State and its substate regional organizations are likely to be more positive, productive, and peaceful. For all these reasons, the Commission urges the States to include this protective mechanism in their substate districting statutes.

Recommendation 3. The Local Government Role: Official Substate Regional Policies for Local Governments

The Commission believes that the cities and counties in most States have a major role to play in developing an immediate intergovernmental strategy for coping with substate regional planning, programming, coordination, and districting difficulties. In the final analysis, the activities of these governments are as much—if not more—affected by these substate regional efforts as those of any other level. Hence . . .

The Commission recommends that cities and counties, where relevant, adopt official policies that:

A. Support establishment of and participation in umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations in their respective substate regions as an effective vehicle through which their area's elected officials of units of general local government can exercise a direct role in Federally assisted and State planning, programming, coordination, and districting efforts.

B. Provide for regular financial contributions to their umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization.

C. Encourage designation of their respective umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization as the policy board of any and all multi-jurisdictional efforts organized pursuant to State interlocal

cooperation or contracting legislation, and the use of the organization's staff to perform services incident thereto.

D. Fully recognize any policies or plans officially adopted by their designated multi-jurisdictional organization as a guide for the programming, planning, and implementation activities of their pertinent departments and agencies.

E. Require, where applicable, their representatives on the boards of any multi-jurisdictional special district or authority to seek designation of their substate region's official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization as the policy board of any such district or authority.

The first component (A) of this locally oriented recommendation calls for the adoption by cities and counties of official policies that support the creation of and membership in umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations in their respective regions. The active support of local governments in umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations is essential to their success. For the most part, those which are in operation now have such support; frequently they were initiated by the local governments. In fact, prior to the last seven years, the vast majority of such organizations grew wholly out of local initiatives. Where initiatives have come from others, the local governments usually have been eager to participate to protect their own interests. Local government support for establishing and belonging to these organizations, then, is a reasonable goal.

The need for faithful participation and full cooperation must be emphasized, however. Membership alone, even when mandated by State legislation,¹² is not the same as effective and eager representation. Such representation takes energy and constancy at the meeting table. It also requires some modification of the spirit of jurisdictional isolationism prevalent in so many sectors of local officialdom and a corresponding stress on regional collaboration.

As the activities of the areawide organization become more significant, it has been found that the continuing support of the members grows and they begin to exercise an increasingly significant role in coordinating Federally assisted and State planning, programming, and coordination efforts in their region.

At the same time, secessionist movements have plagued certain regional councils, generating attempts to get OMB or the States to mandate membership. Yet even with State mandating, units of general local government in a region must recognize what joining and supporting an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization really entails. Without their strong commitment, no effective agency representing elected local officials and their generalist allies can function at the areawide level. This would leave the field pretty much to program specialists and their special-purpose mechanisms, as well as to higher governmental levels. The Commission is con-

vinced that these options are unacceptable.

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The second component (B) sanctions regular local financial support of umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations. The second largest source of funds for regional councils, at the present time, is local government. Since most Federal funds to these organizations are available only on a matching basis, local funds have been the mainstay of substate regionalism. Even with the pressures on local revenues (especially the local property tax), regional activities are significant enough to local governments to command funding priority. General revenue sharing and other types of state and Federal aid are likely to help local governments to maintain regular financial contributions to their regional body.

This generally favorable overall record to date should not lead to over-optimism. Some members of existing councils are more fiscally responsive than others. Some councils have had to depend much more heavily on Federal assistance—and a few on State aid—than on a balanced fiscal mix with local funds constituting a significant share. Moreover, with the advent of new and reformed regional councils, as is contemplated by this overall package of recommendations, steady and sizable local financial support may be more difficult to attain.

At the same time, the umbrella type of multi-jurisdictional body, in our opinion, should represent a “best bet” for local governments. It is after all, basically under their own control and it can take advantage of economies which would be lost with multiple regional organizations working at cross-purposes and duplicating overhead costs. Not to be overlooked is the strong probability that if local fiscal support falters, the umbrella organization is likely to become, in practice, a creature of the States and/or Federal agencies.

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Component (C) of this recommendation is designed to improve the linkages between umbrella organizations and those interlocal contracting efforts which produce a separate administrative body or mechanism. Most States already have authorized their local governments to cooperate and contract with each other (and local governments in other States as well, in some cases) for purposes otherwise authorized. The umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations provide a convenient vehicle for promoting and achieving such cooperation and contracting without establishing any new and separate organization to oversee the activity.

Of course, there may be cases in which not all of the jurisdictions in an umbrella organization are involved in any given interlocal activity. In these instances, it may be necessary to have the activity financed in a special way and overseen by a subcommittee of the broader

multi-jurisdictional policy board. But certainly in cases where all are involved and a policy board is needed for the activity, it would be preferable to avoid the creation of a new organization by designating the policy board of the umbrella organization to oversee the activity and to assign its staff to perform any necessary interjurisdictional administrative services.

* * * *

The fourth plank in this recommended local policy deals with the relationships between the policies and plans of multi-jurisdictional organizations and their general local governments. All umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations prepare areawide plans and policies or work toward this as a goal. Elsewhere in this report, the Commission has urged a strengthening of this effort.^{1 3} Most regional councils already devote substantial portions of their budgets to this task. It is profoundly wasteful, therefore, not to make use of these plans and policies in the implementation of related governmental programs within the affected region.

One of the basic problems facing regional councils today is their weak follow-up action on the plans and policies they have adopted. The local officials surveyed for this study underscored this. Given the local ascendancy in most councils, the Commission believes the time has come for cities and counties to adopt such policies and plans as guides for the programming, planning, and implementation efforts of their respective departments and agencies.

At this point in time, we sanction the use of these regional plans as guides for pertinent local agency actions. To make them formally binding would ignore the fact that sometimes such plans and policies are not carefully enough drawn nor closely enough related to the needs and responsibilities of the individual local governments. The approach urged here recognizes these conditions as well as local sensitivity regarding these plans. Yet it still provides a regional input into the decision making process at the grassroots.

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The final component (E) in this recommendation is designed to link special districts having local governmental representation with an umbrella multi-jurisdictional body. Planning and implementation have usually been separated at the substate regional level except in narrow functional fields. Typically, the general planning function has been given to a regional body which has only advisory status, while areawide implementation functions (like transportation, water supply, sewage treatment and parks) have been given to a series of independent single-purpose special districts or authorities.

The whole concept of an umbrella multi-jurisdictional

organization implies a pulling together of the separate implementation functions, combining them with the regional planning function, and achieving superior coordination under the guidance and control of the elected official of general local governments of the region acting together. This arrangement would not necessarily change the existing earmarkings of funds for the individual functions, nor would it ignore the vital technical advice and assistance of the functional experts who would become important advisors within the umbrella organization. But it would provide the opportunity to consider together the scheduling and location of the several types of functional projects and to resolve any conflicts within the purview of policymakers who are responsive to the general electorate.

The proposal advanced here recognizes a not-so-well known fact: General local governments have representatives on, and in some cases dominate, the boards of some special districts and authorities. One-third of the 94 regional districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas have local government members on their governing boards. And over one-fifth of these districts are controlled by such members. Local governments, then, in these and other areas are in a position through their board membership to urge—even demand—a special district policy of designating the region's umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization as the district's policy board.

The Commission endorses this policy and approach. It would end the ambivalence of many general local governments regarding the role of multi-jurisdictional districts and it would add another, much-needed spoke to the multijurisdictional organization's umbrella.

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Recommendation 4. Direct Local Action in Establishing a Designated Umbrella Multi-jurisdictional Organization

The Commission believes that the cities and counties in the Nation's substate regions should be empowered to take the initiative in achieving official designation of their multi-jurisdictional organizations as the preferred areawide instrumentality for Federal programs having a substate regional thrust. This by-passing of the States, however, should only occur when the States have failed to take action in this area. Hence. . .

The Commission recommends that in instances where the States have failed to develop and enact a comprehensive substate regional statute and where a majority of the counties and cities accounting for two-thirds of the population within a proposed substate region join in petitioning for an alternative course of action, the Congress and the President should include in the Federal substate

regional policy provisions that would:

A. Permit such units of general local government to join collectively and designate their own preferred umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization;

B. Grant to such locally initiated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations the same rights and benefits that are conferred on umbrella multijurisdictional organizations designated under State-adopted substate districting systems.

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The Commission notes that at least six States have not adopted State substate districts and that over 40 percent of all designated State substate districts have yet to be organized. Moreover, the 600 regional councils presently in existence have been formed largely through a combination of Federal aid and administrative requirements and local willingness to institute a regional planning and coordinating body. States, in most instances, have not shown the inclination to develop comprehensive substate regional bodies comparable to those proposed in Recommendation 2.

This recommendation, then, is geared to giving the general local governments in multicounty or metropolitan areas the kind of opportunity offered the States in Recommendation 1. This proposal in no way compromises the prime designating position assigned to the States under the procedure set forth in this earlier recommendation. All that is sought here is a safety valve to eliminate potentially explosive situations in which a State fails to take the initiative and the localities in a region seek the benefits of official designation for their multijurisdictional organization.

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The first component (A) authorizes joint local government initiatives under these circumstances. Some 44 States have adopted a State substate district policy, but only 15 have both designated and organized their entire territory with substate districts. Consequently, a large number of local areas are not part of an organized substate district. These local areas, then, are either not part of any multi-jurisdictional organization or are encompassed by one of the more than 300 multi-jurisdictional regional councils that exist across the country, but are not part of a substate districting system.

In the absence of State designating action, the Commission recommends that it be Federal policy to recognize the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization designated by a majority of the area's general local governments representing at least a majority of the region's population. This proposal is in keeping with the seven Federal districting programs that assign to local governments at least partial designation responsibilities

for such areawide bodies. It also is in accord with the provisions of two recent pieces of Federal legislation—the Water Pollution Control and the Coastal Zone Management statutes of 1972—which permit local designation of multi-jurisdictional organizations where States have not so acted.

The Commission feels this recommendation in no way diminishes State initiative in substate districting. Indeed, since State substate units frequently have been built around existing councils of governments, local designation of a multi-jurisdictional organization should not be viewed as an impediment to any future State policies in this field. At the same time, local designation and OMB recognition of a substate unit would compel Federal agencies to focus their regional policies on a locally chosen multi-jurisdictional unit when a State tacitly sanctions this approach by a policy of inaction.

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The second component (B) in this fourth recommendation gives locally initiated and OMB-designated umbrella organizations the same rights and benefits that are conferred on officially designated district organizations within a State system. At a minimum, this would mean boundary and mechanism conformance on the part of Federally aided programs having a regional component. As a maximum, it would involve those other powers relating to review and approval or resolving policy differences that the Commission has sanctioned in the first recommendation for umbrella substate district organizations designated pursuant to a State districting policy.

The basic goal is to put locally sponsored umbrella organizations on an equal footing with those sponsored under a State districting system, insofar as Federal efforts to apply a preferred regional instrumentality policy are concerned. The reasoning is that the needs of the two categories of areawide organization are the same, the impact of differing Federal regional programs is in no way necessarily different in the two sets or regions, and their coordination and consistency needs are about the same. Hence, the Commission urges the extension of the preferred instrumentality principle to certain umbrella organizations outside of State districting systems.

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INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN DISTRICTING: MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES

Recommendation 5: A Joint Federal- State-Local Strategy

The Commission finds that a special set of areawide difficulties arises as a consequence of transecting State

boundaries within over 30 of the Nation's metropolitan areas. The Commission concludes that both the Federal and State governments in their respective areawide planning, programming, coordination, and districting undertakings have given inadequate attention to the unique problems associated with this jurisdictional fact. Hence . . .

The Commission recommends that:

A. The Federal government and the affected States join with the localities involved in developing a strategy leading to agreement on the boundaries of the interstate metropolitan areas and to establishment of a single officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization in each of these areas.

B. The affected States formally recognize in their substate districting statutes the existence and integrity of interstate metropolitan areas and specifically consider these factors when delineating the boundaries of substate regional districts.

C. The President initiate changes in OMB's Circular A-95 to require conformance, to the maximum extent possible, of all Federally assisted areawide planning, programming, coordination, and districting programs in interstate metropolitan areas to the boundaries resulting from joint Federal-State-local action; and the President mandate a policy of relying on the officially designated interstate umbrella organization as the sole policy board for those Federally assisted undertakings that are interstate metropolitan in scope and as the ultimate policy review and coordination board for those assisted activities which focus more on single State portions of the metropolitan area, provided that until the pertinent States have joined in designating such an organization, this policy would permit a majority of the counties and cities accounting for two-thirds of the population in the affected interstate metropolitan region to join in establishing their own preferred interstate umbrella organization and to request its official OMB designation for the purposes cited above.

D. The affected States initiate and Congress subsequently approve amendments to all interstate compacts whose implementation has an interstate metropolitan area impact with a view toward conferring on the officially designated interstate umbrella organization the power to review and approve all capital facility programs and projects initiated by interstate compact bodies.

E. Congress amend the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 to give officially designated interstate umbrella organizations, ¹⁴ in metropolitan areas the power to approve or disapprove

grant applications for major capital facilities assistance emanating from multi-jurisdictional special districts and authorities operating either within a single State's portion of or across State boundaries in an interstate metropolitan area and from units of general local government in the area.

F. The Federal government and the affected States, after appropriate consultation with the localities involved, join in drafting and enacting Federal-multistate compacts which define the legal status of umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations operating in interstate metropolitan areas; spell out their general planning, programming, coordinative management, and other pertinent powers and functions; detail a membership formula which takes into consideration appropriate local, State, and Federal representation.

G. The Federal government and the affected States make adequate provisions for the fiscal support of officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations in interstate metropolitan areas, including locally initiated umbrella organizations by stipulating such support in the Federal-multistate compacts establishing such organizations and by earmarking for such organizations an appropriate portion of a general Federal-State block grant program of planning, programming, and coordinative management assistance to all interstate as well as intrastate organizations. In instances where localities have been obliged to initiate their own preferred interstate umbrella organization, the Federal government should make arrangements for direct provision of financial support to such organizations.

* * * *

Various findings of this report underpin this interstate districting recommendation. Over 25 percent of the Nation's population lives in interstate metropolitan areas, and two-thirds of the states are involved in one or more such areas. Many of these interstate regions are among the Nation's largest metropolitan areas.

The presence of State lines running through metropolitan areas increases the difficulty of effectuating intergovernmental cooperation and coordination to accomplish areawide goals. Special arrangements are needed to satisfy two or three sets of State laws and institutions.

In most interstate metropolitan areas, at the present time, advisory planning without the authority of law is almost the only generalist activity being conducted across State lines. Most of the few interstate compacts which have been established within metropolitan areas have been unifunctional. They have produced some limited coordination and unification in a few cases within single functions across State lines. But little

progress has been made toward the larger goal of areawide multifunctional coordination.

Comprehensive planning agencies in interstate metropolitan areas generally owe their existence to heavy Federal funding, the comprehensive areawide planning requirements in certain Federal grant programs, and designation as Circular A-95 review agencies. Most of the interlocal planning agencies functioning across State lines are set up pursuant to interlocal cooperation agreements or parallel legislation; a few are organized under nonprofit charters.

The influence of the Federal areawide planning grant programs and the A-95 review procedure has not extended to most other Federal areawide programs. Instead, other programs have promoted their multi-jurisdictional goals mostly within the State portions of the regions, thanks largely to the fact that many of these are really joint Federal-State efforts. Examples include law enforcement assistance, comprehensive health planning, and community action.

Establishing umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations in interstate metropolitan areas raises not only the overall problems of the central city-suburban dichotomy and the popularity of the home rule concept, but also the difficulty of reaching concurrent agreement on an official designation by two or more States. No single State can solve this problem alone, and the local governments cannot achieve formal status for their interstate umbrella organization without State action. Thus, what may be achieved rather simply within a single State becomes a much more elusive and difficult problem at the interstate level.

In light of these unique features, the Commission believes that a combined Federal, multi-State, local strategy is required to come up with sensible solutions to the distinctive districting problems facing interstate metropolitan areas.

* * * *

Component (A) of this recommendation provides for joint action by the Federal government and the States in delineating the boundaries of interstate metropolitan areas and officially designating a single umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization to serve each such area. Experience with Federal areawide programs to date has shown that those programs which have emphasized a single organization for the whole metropolitan area, regardless of State lines, have succeeded to some degree in establishing areawide organizations. At least seven of the 24 Federal areawide programs specifically encourage formation of interstate districts.

On the other hand, those Federal programs which have been linked to State planning and counterpart State programs commonly have resulted in regional organizations which stop at State lines. Moreover, with only a half-dozen exceptions, the State legislation and other

instruments establishing systems of substate districts have not provided for interstate districts. As a result, the lowest level of piggybacking of regional councils by Federal districting programs is found in interstate areas.

All this clearly suggests that the Federal role here is a key one if interstate metropolitan areas are to be treated as a single territory. The role of the affected States, however, is equally significant, because only these States can bestow the necessary authority upon interstate umbrella organizations if they are to be anything more than Federal grant reviewers and spenders. In short, only joint Federal-multi-State action can begin to make interstate umbrella organizations whole.

The Commission therefore recommends that through joint action the Federal and pertinent State governments recognize the territorial integrity of the 33 interstate metropolitan areas with their combined population of over 56.5 million and settle upon an umbrella multi-jurisdictional body for regional planning, coordinating, management, and operational purposes in these areas.

The Commission recognizes that the development of interstate metropolitan institutions has never been an easy task. However, to ignore the need for areawide planning, coordinating, and management institutions in these areas would be to encourage the proliferation of intrastate multi-jurisdictional organizations in these locations. Areawide districting conflict would then ensue, at a time when such institutional conflict was being resolved in intrastate metropolitan areas. Clearly, any comprehensive national or State substate districting policy must make a place for the organizational needs of interstate metropolitan areas.

* * * *

The second component (B) of this recommendation focuses on State substate districting efforts as they impact on interstate metropolitan areas. The Commission urges the relevant States to provide carefully for the interstate situation in their substate districting statutes and subsequent designation actions. As was noted previously, only seven have done this, but even this record shows that it can be done.

Since 40 of the States have now districted themselves, and four more are about to do so, the substate districting movement has the potential of defeating this recommendation. This component then is designed to avoid such a result. Under this arrangement, the affected States would simply recognize the interstate areas and organizations as their own and take joint action to treat each region as a totality.

* * * *

The third component (C) applies the boundary conformance and preferred instrumentalities doctrines as they involve Federally areawide programs, to interstate metropolitan areas and their umbrella organizations. One

goal of this Commission proposal is to encourage areal conformance of federally assisted programs to the boundaries of the interstate district in the same way that it is proposed that substate district lines be followed in Federally assisted programs in intrastate regions. All the arguments, cited earlier, supporting the conformance of such programs to boundaries in intrastate districts apply with equal force to interstate districts. Moreover, there are the added legal and political complications involved in dealing with multiple State and local jurisdictions. On this point, it should be noted that the variety and number of areawide and sub-areawide regional programs in interstate areas suggest that settling the boundary issue may be more crucial here than in intrastate regions.

A second basic purpose of this Commission proposal is to apply the umbrella concept to this special category of metropolitan areas. The Commission fully recognizes the complications involved in establishing such interstate bodies, but stresses that some precedents have been set in this regard. It further realizes that, because of political, program, and legal factors, the umbrella interstate organization may not always be able to serve as the immediate policy board for all Federally assisted areawide activities in its region. A number of these activities may relate peculiarly to that part of a region which is within a single State. The sub-areawide, single-State-portion districting patterns of most Federally assisted efforts involving the States have already been underscored.

To resolve this problem, the Commission recommends that the umbrella council serve as the ultimate policy review board, but not necessarily the immediate agency, for those activities which focus on programs relating to single-State portions of the district. At the same time, the interstate umbrella organization would act as the direct policy review board for Federally assisted programs which encompass the entire interstate area. In short, it would be the policy board for metropolitanwide, Federally assisted programs; but would serve only as the higher-tier review and coordinating body for subregional programs which relate solely to single-State portions.

This formula, it is believed, would help to maximize the effectiveness of the umbrella organization within the limitations imposed by the multi-State nature of the district. It would provide a realistic answer to the subregional/regional program conflicts that afflict most interstate metropolitan areas. It also would establish an ultimate arbiter of conflicts between and among districts, whether they are intrastate or interstate in nature. The Commission is convinced that these areas have a desperate need for such a mechanism.

* * * *

The fourth component (D) of this recommendation is designed to bring some of the activities of compact

bodies under the purview of interstate umbrella organizations. In the 33 interstate metropolitan areas, 14 interstate special districts presently operate. Most of these (12) were established by interstate compact; the remainder were created by action of each State legislature or by Congress.

The Commission believes that these and future interstate special districts should be brought under the umbrella of the officially designated interstate organizations. The difficulties of controlling interstate special districts are greater than those relating to intrastate special districts since more than one State, and at times the Federal government, may be involved. The Commission believes the right to review and approve capital projects proposed by interstate districts and authorities would inject a more representative point of view into their policy process, and provide a broader range of policy considerations.

Critics of the interstate umbrella council idea point to the added complexity such a mechanism would bring to regional decision making, particularly to its need to conform to the laws of at least two States. They also note the strong Federal-single-State focus of most Federally assisted areawide programs and stress that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to shift the focus of all these efforts.

The Commission believes that the interstate umbrella council would simplify and order metropolitan arrangements. It would be the only agency in the interstate area with physical development plans for the region and it should have the ability to guide development in accordance with these plans. Moreover, given the interstate collaboration on the boundary and umbrella organization questions contemplated under this Federal-multi-State strategy, it can be assumed that the old Federal-single-State relationship in various joint program endeavors would shift and the special character of interstate metropolitan areas would gain increased recognition.

The States are left with the initiative here to modify the interstate compact bodies in a fashion that would put a legally binding spoke in the regional organization's umbrella. Congress is urged to ratify any and all such proposed changes to compacts to which it had given prior approval. Such action would be wholly in keeping with the role assigned to Congress under this recommendation of helping to devise a sensible Federal-multi-State strategy in order to bring greater rationality to regional undertakings in our interstate metropolitan areas.

* * * *

Component (E) of this recommendation seeks to strengthen an established regional coordinative device—the review and comment procedure—as it relates to certain Federal assistance applications submitted by

multi-jurisdictional special districts in interstate metropolitan areas. With this proposal, the Commission again accepts the proposition that the Federal government, through its categorical and block grant application procedures, should give generalists and elected officials of units of general local government, through multipurpose regional organizations, greater authority vis-a-vis the operations of multi-jurisdictional special districts. This recommendation is based on an awareness that interstate regional plans and policies are of little consequence if implementing authority is lacking. Local officials in our survey focused on this implementation issue more than any other when citing the basic problems confronting regional councils. Thus, the concept of an interstate umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization takes on added substantive significance with this proposal.

Most of the reasons for endorsing this proposal have already been cited in defense of the parallel plank relating to intrastate umbrella units in Recommendation I, Component (E). All that needs underscoring here are the facts that at least half of the multi-jurisdictional special districts in the largest metropolitan areas apply for and receive Federal financial assistance and that both State and local government (especially the former in interstate areas) have encouraged the use and growth of special districts.

The Commission believes that giving a veto over all special district applications covered by the A-95 review process is essential. It would provide considerable authority to the umbrella organization; the disapproval would be final; and, given the more than 100 programs now covered by the A-95 procedure, few—if any—applications would slip by the umbrella organization.

This component also sanctions assignment of a "review and resolve inconsistencies" authority with respect to grant applications covered by A-95 that emanate from the region's units of general local government. The process contemplated here is the same as that envisaged for intrastate umbrella organizations.¹⁵ Moreover, the arguments cited earlier in support of this particular type of review power as it relates to units of general government also clearly apply with even greater force to this interstate situation. The particularly enfeebled condition of most existing councils in these areas attests to the need for this strengthening action. Moreover, the Commission emphasizes that the time has come for the Federal government to cease assisting projects in interstate metropolitan areas that undercut orderly areawide development.

* * * *

The sixth component (F) grapples with the complex, long-term questions of the legal status and powers of the proposed interstate umbrella organizations. The very nature of these areas requires that these issues be faced

squarely. Moreover, the previous components in this recommendation provide only partial or interim answers to these questions.

The approach adopted here looks to the Title II river basin commissions and the Title V and Appalachian economic development commissions with their Federal-multi-State membership for some answers to the quandary confronting interstate metropolitan areas. But it focuses even more on the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions with their Federal-multi-State representational and compact bases as an institutional formula that, with adaptations, would be suitable for interstate metropolitan areas. Not to be overlooked here is the provision in the Delaware compact for representation, but not voting rights, for the two largest cities most directly affected by the Commission's undertakings, Philadelphia and New York.

Why turn to these water resources and economic development areas for insights and possible institutional models? In the first place, they suggest that a Federal-multi-State partnership approach is a practical, not an impossible, relationship. They show that representational and voting arrangements can be worked out to the mutual satisfaction of both categories of members. In the case of the two compact commissions, they demonstrate that the Federal member can protect national interests, and at the same time serve as the focal point of coordination of all Federal program activities in the respective river basins. In the case of State members on these two commissions, improved interstate comity and steady legislative support have been basic by-products of their participation. Finally, the compact base of these two commissions has given them a legal standing, a power of veto and enforcement, and a capacity to bind both Federal and State agencies, that merits the attention of those seeking improved coordination in interstate metropolitan areas.

Critics can raise numerous feasibility and other questions regarding this proposal. Can a mechanism that has been applied largely to non-metropolitan interstate regions be transferred to metropolitan areas? Can such a mechanism with its largely single broad purpose thrust be adapted to the multipurpose and umbrella roles of the interstate organizations contemplated by this overall recommendation? Can Federal membership in such organizations assure the same kind of Federal inter-agency coordination that occurs in the compact river basin commissions? And how does one develop membership and voting formulas that give adequate consideration to local interests?

These are but a few of the questions that skeptics and critics can raise, and rightfully so. No such body, after all, exists at the present time in any of our interstate metropolitan areas. The jurisdictional, programmatic, political, and fiscal conflicts in these areas are infinitely more abrasive, agonizing, and varied than those of non-metropolitan areas. Above all, perhaps, interstate

urban-type challenges, because of their interrelatedness and heavy intergovernmental overtones, lack the focus that frequently is found in other regions and in more narrowly defined programs.

Yet the Commission is convinced that the time has come for dramatic institutional innovations in the Nation's interstate metropolitan regions. Ample evidence exists to demonstrate that present arrangements are totally inadequate. None of the generalist members of the *de facto* partnership that exists in these areas is really satisfied with things as they are. Neither the Federal government, nor the affected States, nor certainly the units of general local government are in a position to exert regional leadership. But with the institutional formula advocated here, with its compact base, its Federal-State-local members and its umbrella powers, a decision-making mechanism would be provided that could begin to address the long-range needs of each interstate metropolitan region.

Federal membership is crucial, because this government has a basic and direct role to play in such areas, given their unique jurisdictional features. State participation is essential, given the major role and legal position these governments have assumed in these areas. And local membership is vital, to end the present situation in which they feel left out of basic decisions affecting the region as a whole. The specific voting formula is left to the parties to the compact. But to be viable, it would have to recognize the special position of both the Federal government and the States involved, while providing for an adequate base for the representation of local views.

All this clearly involves experimentation on a grand scale. But nothing less will suffice to bring a firm sense of direction and purpose to the anarchic conditions of the Nation's 33 interstate metropolitan regions.

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The final component (G) in this volume's final recommendation focuses on the fiscal factor from two different angles. Throughout both, however, runs a common theme: the need to provide adequate funding support for interstate umbrella organizations on an on-going basis. Developing adequate fiscal support for interstate bodies has been a potential obstacle to the creation of such umbrella organizations. Diverse evidence attests to this: Only 14 regional special districts now operate in the Nation's 33 interstate metropolitan areas, piggybacking of regional councils is lowest in these areas, and only six States have taken interstate areas into account in their substate district systems. Yet as this Commission noted in its recent report, *Multistate Regionalism*, interstate bodies such as the Delaware River Basin Commission, which have a guaranteed level of Federal-State support, are among the more effective of these bodies. Consequently, the Commission sees adequate,

strongest terms possible the basic Federal-State fiscal commitment to these organizations.

In addition, the Commission believes that all interstate umbrella organizations—whether on a compact basis or not—should be eligible for assistance under the general block grant of planning, programming, and coordinative assistance called for in Recommendation 1, Component D. In short, all district organizations—whether interstate or intrastate—that are the preferred instrumentalities of Federal and State areawide programs should be covered by this joint Federal-State program. Support for the interstate bodies would be achieved by earmarking a certain proportion of the block grant funds for them.

The basic purpose of this approach is to avoid enactment of a narrow program of support solely for interstate umbrella organizations. In all likelihood, Congressional action of the kind called for here would be part of a broader effort to assist officially designated umbrella organizations across the board. State participation in the program is contemplated here for assistance to their interstate as well as intrastate organizations.

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REFORMED REGIONAL COUNCILS: A BRIEF ANALYSIS

What do these five recommendations with their total of three dozen components call for? What assumptions do they rest upon? And, if they were fully implemented, what manner of mechanism would they create?

Regarding the basic thrust of these recommendations, the Commission believes that all are geared to bringing greater order, accountability, and sense to the increasingly active and generally fragmented substate regional scene by establishing or transforming existing generalist-dominated areawide bodies into effective umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations (UMJO's) through concerted Federal-State-local action. This is the fundamental goal that forms and fuses this pentagonal pattern of reform proposals.

Certain assumptions regarding substate regionalism underpin these recommendations. These assumptions underscore the basic reasons for the Commission's adoption in this first volume of its broader "Substate Regionalism and the Federal System" study of a comprehensive intergovernmental strategy that focuses on the general need for effective multi-jurisdictional umbrella units. The assumptions include the following:

(1) Substate districting is here to stay; all manner of Federal, State, and local activities combine to suggest that the recent mushrooming of planning, programming, coordinating, districting, and even servicing developments on this front are not part of a passing fad, but a response to real problems—albeit chaotic, frequently ineffective, and uncoordinated, for the most part.

(2) Institutional developments at the substate level

more times than not have favored program specialists, technicians, and special-purpose functionalists—not politically accountable elected officials, their generalist nor the public directly; some of this is due to the relative lack of power of existing councils of government and some of it stems from the general absence of a governmental unit at this level that possesses adequate area, powers, finances, and electoral accountability.

(3) Present efforts to dovetail multiple Federal and State efforts at the substate regional level have been only partially successful; boundary and mechanism conformance has been achieved in only a minority of possible instances, thus attesting to the continued strength of the program specialists and thus continuing the confusion facing cities and counties when they attempt to confront and cope with the substate regional governance system above them.

(4) Where mergers of Federal and State districting efforts have occurred, only meager evidence suggests that the existing regional councils can handle effectively the multiple responsibilities assumed as a consequence of piggybacking; the compartmentalized operations and funding sources of such councils, the continued separation of planning responsibilities and the power to implement planning policies, the voluntary nature of membership, the still essentially aloof position of special districts and authorities, and the heavy dependence on Federal support form a potent coalition of opposing forces that mocks the assumption that a simple piggybacking operation will convert a regional council into an effective areawide decision-making body.

(5) The raw materials for reform are already in place in most substate regions; regional councils, A-95 agencies, substate district organizations—sometimes singly, sometimes in combined form—provide generalist-dominated institutions to build upon, while the proliferation of autonomous, single-purpose, old- and new-style districts provide the most compelling reason for seeking reform.

(6) Finally, nothing in these proposals runs counter to local, State, or Federally supported efforts to achieve local governmental modernation and areawide governmental reorganization; the UMJO strategy is an immediate effort to meet pressing, mostly districting problems; the local and areawide governmental reform strategy is a long-range goal, requiring difficult and sometimes drastic actions. Both are needed, but political feasibility, along with the urgent needs of the moment, combine to force a districting decision now, while simultaneously beginning to move on the broader, more controversial governmental reorganization front. When the basic recommendations of this report are linked with those of Volume III¹⁶ and probed for their interrelationships, the conformance of all of these action proposals to this two-phase strategy will be fully demonstrated.

What then is an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization as it emerges from these recommendations? Basic-

ly, it is a multi-jurisdictional organization composed of State and mostly local general government representatives which has policy control over all areawide planning, programming, and policy development programs in its region, along with comparable authority over basic decisions of special districts and with lesser, but significant power over certain local government and State agency actions having an areawide impact.

Who determines its boundaries and areal reach? Boundary designation is basically a State responsibility and is linked to the process of establishing substate districting systems. In the absence of State action, local governments may join to seek OMB designation of a locally established council for the purpose of Federally encouraged areawide programs.

What is the relationship between the councils' boundaries and those of Federally supported districts, special districts and authorities, and State agency areawide undertakings? The objective here is to establish a common set of boundaries for all of these substate regional efforts with each region having a single umbrella unit as the preferred instrumentality for any or all of these Federal, State, or even locally initiated areawide activities.

What is the essential nature of an UMJO? The fundamental legal status of an intrastate unit would be determined by the State legislation establishing the organization as an agency of local governments. The body would be composed of State and local general government representatives with the latter having at least three-fifths of the membership. It would possess full local government membership since State law would require it. Its deliberations would be governed by a dual voting system including population-weighted voting on certain issues, with the specific procedure to be spelled out in the State legislation or left to individual UMJO's. Although essentially an agency of local government, in many respects it would be a mixed unit—mixed in membership, voting procedures, and in its concern for large jurisdictions, small jurisdictions, and the State. In short, it would strike a balance between population strength and jurisdictional identity and among local, areawide, and State interests.

What would be its basic functions? Thanks to combined Federal-State-local action, the umbrella organization would:

- adopt and publicize regional policies and plans along with a program for their implementation;
- provide planning and programming inputs into the State's planning and budgeting process;
- serve as the region's A-95 review agency;
- assume the responsibility for implementing all Federally encouraged areawide planning, program-

ming, coordination, districting, or even servicing programs, as well as all similar State undertakings;

—act as the basic policy board for multi-jurisdictional special districts;

—promote mutual problem solving among counties, cities, and towns and provide such services as these units may request singly or jointly;

—resolve differences between regional policies or plans and certain projects and actions of State agencies and local governments having a spillover effect;

—in certain instances, assume direct operating responsibilities under terms set in the State authorizing legislation, including the provision that at least a majority of the member local units representing three-fifths of the region's population must concur.

The UMJO then would be a comprehensive and functional planning, coordinating, programming, servicing, and implementing body—in short, a regional council with some meaningful, but limited authority.

What would be the source of its powers to carry out these difficult functional assignments? A mix of positive Federal-State-local actions are recommended to provide the needed arsenal of powers to guide substate regional development.

(1) The UMJO would become the preferred implementing instrumentality for all Federally assisted districting programs, thanks to State legislation establishing a comprehensive substate districting system and to the promulgation of a new OMB directive covering all Federally assisted areawide programs.

(2) It would be assigned a decisive policy-guiding—but not operating—role vis-a-vis regional special districts and authorities by (a) a proposed amendment to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 giving such councils a review and approval authority over special district applications covered by the A-95 process; (b) State legislative action converting such councils into the basic policy board for special districts via assignment of one or more controlling powers (appointment of the district's policy board, review and approval of district budgets and/or projects, project suspension authority, etc.); and (c) concerted efforts on the part of local governmental representatives on special districts to have their umbrella unit designated as the policy board of such districts.

(3) The UMJO would be assigned special review authority over State agency actions having a regional impact. Two amendments are proposed to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 to accomplish this. They would empower the organization to review State agency-sponsored major capital facility projects slated for its region and to resolve inconsistencies between them and regional plans and policies (provided the former are subject to the A-95 process or are financed in part by Federal block grant or, potentially, special revenue sharing funds). Moreover, pursuant to recommended State legislation, the UMJO would be authorized to review all such State agency projects and resolve any differences in light of adopted regional plans and policies. At the same time, the governor would be authorized to veto any umbrella organization's actions that conflict with State plans or policies having statewide application or with policies or actions of another regional council.

(4) The UMJO also would be assigned special review authority over certain local government actions having a multi-jurisdictional impact, including the powers to: (a) review and resolve inconsistencies in A-95 covered applications submitted by constituent localities, pursuant to a proposed amendment to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act; (b) review any proposed major capital facility of a local jurisdiction having a pronounced areawide impact that is to be funded partially or wholly from a Federal block grant or any special revenue sharing program and to resolve any inconsistencies between the proposed project and regional policies, under another proposed amendment to this Federal legislation; and (c) review and comment on all locally funded major capital facilities, as a consequence of recommended State legislative action. In addition, the UMJO would have its officially adopted regional policies or plans recognized as guides for pertinent local governmental programming, planning, and implementation activities, pursuant to proposed action by the governing bodies of its local jurisdictions.

Such would be the powers conferred on these reformed regional councils by Federal-State-local actions. With them, an UMJO could speak with authority. Without them, its areawide policy making and implementation roles would be faltering and feeble.

But what of its funding? Three sources are recommended: a consolidated Federal program of general planning, programming, and coordinative management assistance, an on-going State program of substantial fiscal support—possibly as part of a joint Federal-State effort—and local provision of regular financial contributions.

These then are the essential features, functions, funding sources, and powers of the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations. For the most part, they apply with equal force to those in interstate as well as intrastate regions. But there are some inevitable differences. The interstate councils, in those instances where programs focus more on single State portions of the area, would be the ultimate policy review and coordination mechanisms, leaving decisions not having interstate impact to middle-tier bodies at the single-State level where necessary. Moreover, the compact amendment approach is relied on to achieve UMJO policy control over existing interstate compact bodies. The legal status, powers, and functions of the interstate UMJO would be detailed in a Federal-multistate compact. And this approach, of course, suggests a final differentiating factor: in addition to State and local members, Federal representation is called for.

This Commission's strategy for reforming regional councils is not an idealized dream of regionalism, but is rooted in the real world of substate development.

—Regional councils with A-95 review and comment authority already exist in 212 metropolitan and 238 non-metropolitan areas.

—Two-thirds of the 488 substate districts established in 40 States now are organized, and action is underway in four additional States.

—The boundaries of eight of the most significant of the Federally encouraged districting programs coincide (or are in harmony) with those of the State-established substate districts in about 50 percent of the cases. The Federal government has relied on substate districting organizations in more than one-third of the possible cases in these eight program areas.

—Approximately half of the regional councils already are the preferred unit for from four to nine of the Federally encouraged areawide districting programs operating in their respective regions.

—Seven States have given review and approval authority over certain State projects to some or all of their regional councils.

—Four-fifths of the 3,800 city and county officials surveyed by the Commission agreed that regional councils should perform the duties of an umbrella agency, especially with regard to the activities of independent special districts.

—The Metropolitan Council in Minnesota's Twin Cities area and the Atlanta Regional Council, along

with at least 5 to 10 percent of the other existing councils, already possess many or most of the proposed powers and functions assigned to the reformed regional councils under the Commission's recommendations.

The Commission's proposed reforms for regional councils rely heavily on the building blocks already in place at the substate level. But they go well beyond the status quo in their systematic effort to provide an effective umbrella unit that can cope with the growing demand for better management, coordination, implementation—in short, decision making—in those programs

and institutions that are areawide in nature.

* * * *

This brief analysis provides a composite view of the need for and nature of the umbrella organization strategy embodied in this volume's five recommendations. As was noted at the outset, however, this is only the first phase of a broader design that also is geared to looking at the long-range governmental reorganization issues confronting substate regions and their local jurisdictions. The second phase of the Commission's action agenda is covered in the third volume of this series on "Substate Regionalism and the Federal System."

Footnotes

¹Governor Evans did not concur in that portion of this component which provides for an ultimate OMB designating role in this process.

²Governor Evans dissented to that portion of this component which covers State agency projects on grounds that such projects may be part of an interregional or statewide program.

³This report is now (June 1973) being considered by the membership of these public interest groups prior to final consideration in their respective annual conventions.

⁴See ACIR's *Impact of Federal Urban Development Programs—Local Government Organization and Planning*, pp. 30-31, and *Federal Approaches to Aid State and Local Capital Financing*, p. 16.

⁵Secretary Weinberger abstained from voting on all components of this recommendation on the grounds that they are

primarily matters for State and local determination.

⁶Senator Brown, Representative Kurfess, and Mayor Lugar dissent from that portion of this component which calls for an extraordinary majority vote of approval, noting that a majority vote of the member units representing 51 percent of the region's population should suffice.

⁷See Recommendation 1, Component D.

⁸See subsequent Component (H).

⁹ACIR, Report No. A-32, pp. 134, 135.

¹⁰See Component (L) above.

¹¹See Component (D) above.

¹²Called for in Recommendation 2, Component (D).


¹³See Recommendation 2, Components (F), (G), (H), and (I).

¹⁴As provided in Component (C).

¹⁵See Recommendation 1, Component (F) and Recommendation 2, Component (K).

¹⁶See Chapter VIII of this later volume.

APPENDIX
TABLES



Appendix Table II-A

Number of Special Districts:
1972, 1967, 1962, and 1952

State and Region	1972	1967	1967-72 5-year Change (%)	1962	1962-72 10-year Change (%)	1952	1952-72 20-year Change (%)
United States	23,886	21,265	12.3	18,322	30.4	12,339	93.6
Northeast	3,937	3,724	5.7	3,399	15.8	1,789	120.1
Maine	126	127	-0.8	125	0.8	128	-0.2
New Hampshire	94	89	5.6	85	10.6	78	20.5
Vermont	74	72	2.7	72	2.7	70	5.7
Massachusetts	268	247	8.5	194	38.1	220	21.8
Rhode Island	73	67	9.0	56	30.4	49	49.0
Connecticut	230	221	4.0	204	12.7	166	38.6
New York	954	965	-1.1	970	-1.6	968	-1.4
New Jersey	341	311	9.6	295	15.6	81	321.0
Pennsylvania	1,777	1,625	9.4	1,398	27.1	29	6027.6
North Central	8,024	7,020	14.3	6,028	33.1	4,622	73.6
Michigan	139	110	26.4	99	40.4	84	65.5
Ohio	275	228	20.6	177	55.4	140	96.4
Indiana	832	619	34.4	560	48.6	293	184.0
Illinois	2,407	2,313	4.1	2,126	8.8	1,546	55.7
Wisconsin	121	62	95.2	68	77.9	73	65.8
Minnesota	211	148	42.6	115	83.5	71	197.2
Iowa	305	280	8.9	263	16.0	170	79.4
Missouri	820	734	11.7	742	10.5	886	-7.4
North Dakota	561	431	30.2	246	128.0	94	496.8
South Dakota	136	106	28.3	80	70.0	56	142.9
Nebraska	1,081	952	13.6	752	43.8	485	122.9
Kansas	1,136	1,037	9.5	800	42.0	724	56.9
South	5,525	4,515	22.4	3,485	58.5	2,288	141.5
Delaware	78	65	20.0	63	23.8	40	95.0
Maryland	229	187	22.5	176	30.1	158	44.9
District of Columbia	2	1	100.0	0	0
Virginia	58	48	20.8	46	26.1	42	38.1
West Virginia	172	120	43.3	55	212.7	23	647.8
Kentucky	446	273	63.4	179	149.2	130	243.1
Tennessee	457	386	18.4	268	70.5	85	437.6
North Carolina	248	215	15.3	126	96.8	106	134.0
South Carolina	184	148	24.3	142	30.0	78	135.9
Georgia	366	338	8.3	301	21.6	154	137.7
Florida	315	310	1.6	264	19.3	188	67.6
Alabama	286	251	13.9	202	41.6	70	308.6
Mississippi	282	272	3.7	266	6.0	254	11.0
Louisiana	419	334	25.4	241	73.9	144	191.0
Arkansas	366	352	4.0	299	22.4	231	58.4

Appendix Table II-A (cont'd.)

State and Region	1972	1967	1967-72 5-year Change (%)	1962	1962-72 10-year Change (%)	1952	1952-72 20-year Change (%)
Oklahoma	402	214	87.9	124	224.2	94	327.7
Texas	1,215	1,001	21.4	733	65.8	491	147.5
West	6,400	6,006	6.6	5,330	20.1	3,640	75.8
New Mexico	99	97	2.1	102	-2.9	78	26.9
Arizona	90	76	18.4	52	73.1	34	164.7
Montana	258	209	23.4	192	34.4	133	94.0
Idaho	543	513	5.8	469	15.8	395	37.5
Wyoming	203	185	9.7	144	41.0	91	123.1
Colorado	812	748	8.6	566	43.5	297	173.4
Utah	176	163	8.0	142	23.9	106	66.0
Washington	1,021	937	9.0	867	17.8	644	58.5
Oregon	826	800	3.3	727	13.6	407	102.9
Nevada	134	95	41.1	85	57.6	44	204.5
California	2,223	2,168	2.5	1,962	13.3	1,390	59.9
Alaska	0	0	6	11
Hawaii	15	15	0.0	16	-6.3	10	50.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

Appendix Table II-B

Number of Special Districts Created by Special
and General Statutes: 1962 and 1967

State and Region	General Laws			Special Laws		
	1967	1962	% Change	1967	1962	% Change
United States	*20,558	*17,700	16.1	*691	*623	10.9
Northeast	* 3,377	* 3,056	10.5	*347	*343	1.2
Maine	222	19	15.8	105	106	-0.9
New Hampshire	88	84	4.8	1	1	0.0
Vermont	72	72	0.0	0	0	0.0
Massachusetts	157	97	61.9	90	97	-7.8
Rhode Island	17	7	142.9	50	49	2.0
Connecticut	* 133	* 126	5.6	* 88	* 78	12.8
New York	* 957	* 964	-0.7	* 8	* 6	33.3
New Jersey	* 307	* 290	5.9	* 4	* 5	-20.0
Pennsylvania	1,624	1,397	16.2	1	1	0.0
North Central	* 6,986	* 6,087	14.8	* 18	* 21	-14.3
Michigan	109	98	11.2	1	1	0.0
Ohio	228	177	28.8	0	0	0.0
Indiana	619	560	10.5	0	0	0.0
Illinois	2,307	2,119	8.9	6	7	-14.3
Wisconsin	* 61	68	-10.3	* 1	0
Minnesota	* 146	113	29.2	* 2	2	0.0
Iowa	* 278	* 261	6.5	* 2	* 2	0.0
Missouri	* 732	* 740	-1.1	* 2	* 2	0.0
North Dakota	430	245	75.5	1	1	0.0
South Dakota	106	80	32.5	0	0	0.0
Nebraska	936	751	24.6	0	1
Kansas	1,034	* 875	18.2	3	* 5	-40.0
South	* 4,238	* 3,264	29.8	*277	*222	24.8
Delaware	64	63	15.9	1	0
Maryland	* 157	166	-5.4	* 30	10	200.0
District of Columbia	0	0	0.0	* 1	* 1	0.0
Virginia	36	38	-5.3	12	8	50.0
West Virginia	118	53	122.6	2	2	0.0
Kentucky	* 272	178	52.8	* 1	1	0.0
Tennessee	385	267	44.2	1	1	0.0
North Carolina	207	115	80.0	8	11	-27.3
South Carolina	118	109	8.3	30	33	-9.1
Georgia	327	290	12.8	11	11	0.0
Florida	174	159	9.4	136	105	29.5

Appendix Table II-B (cont'd.)

State and Region	General Laws			Special Laws		
	1967	1962	% Change	1967	1962	% Change
Alabama	250	202	23.8	1	0
Mississippi	268	263	1.9	4	3	33.3
Louisiana	298	217	37.3	36	24	50.0
Arkansas	* 351	* 299	17.4	* 1	0
Oklahoma	214	123	74.0	0	1
Texas	* 999	* 722	38.4	* 2	* 11	-81.8
West	* 5,957	* 5,293	12.5	* 49	* 37	32.4
New Mexico	96	102	-5.9	1	0
Arizona	75	51	47.1	1	1	0.0
Montana	209	192	8.9	0	0	0.0
Idaho	513	469	9.4	0	0	0.0
Wyoming	185	144	28.5	0	0	0.0
Colorado	* 742	562	32.0	* 6	4	50.0
Utah	163	142	14.8	0	0	0.0
Washington	* 935	867	7.8	* 2	0
Oregon	799	726*	10.1	1	1	0.0
Nevada	94	83	13.3	1	2	-50.0
California	* 2,131	* 1,933	10.2	* 37	* 29	27.6
Alaska	0	6	0	0	0.0
Hawaii	15	16	-6.3	0	0	0.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments*, I, 1962 and 1967.

*Estimates.

Appendix Table II-C

Number of Different Types of Special Districts
Authorized and Operative: 1962 and 1967

State and Region	Number of Types Authorized			Number of Types Operative		
	1967	1962	Number Change	1967	1962	Number Change
United States	693	635	+58	578	513	+65
Northeast	94	88	+6	74	69	+5
Maine	15	14	+1	10	11	-1
New Hampshire	4	4	0	4	4	0
Vermont	5	4	+1	4	3	+1
Massachusetts	15	13	+2	11	10	+1
Rhode Island	6	5	+1	5	5	0
Connecticut	6	6	0	5	5	0
New York	10	10	0	9	9	0
New Jersey	26	25	+1	21	17	+4
Pennsylvania	7	7	0	5	5	0
North Central	161	149	+12	137	119	+18
Michigan	7	7	0	5	6	-1
Ohio	12	11	+1	10	9	+1
Indiana	12	12	0	10	9	+1
Illinois	28	26	+2	25	23	+2
Wisconsin	9	8	+1	7	5	+2
Minnesota	12	12	0	10	10	0
Iowa	9	8	+1	8	8	0
Missouri	17	11	+6	15	10	+5
North Dakota	8	9	-1	8	7	+1
South Dakota	9	9	0	7	5	+2
Nebraska	19	19	0	16	14	+2
Kansas	19	17	+2	16	13	+3
South	244	210	+34	196	165	+31
Delaware	5	3	+2	5	2	+3
Maryland	11	11	0	11	11	0
District of Columbia	1	1	0	1	1	0
Virginia	16	12	+4	15	9	+6
West Virginia	9	7	+2	7	6	+1
Kentucky	15	13	+2	10	8	+2
Tennessee	13	9	+4	7	6	+1
North Carolina	17	15	+2	12	10	+2
South Carolina	16	17	-1	14	15	-1
Georgia	19	16	+3	17	15	+2
Florida	27	26	+1	27	26	+1
Alabama	14	11	+3	10	7	+3

Appendix Table II-C (cont'd.)

State and Region	Number of Types Authorized			Number of Types Operative		
	1967	1962	Number Change	1967	1962	Number Change
Mississippi	17	9	+8	9	7	+2
Louisiana	24	18	+6	22	13	+9
Arkansas	18	20	-2	8	8	0
Oklahoma	9	8	+1	8	7	+1
Texas	13	14	-1	13	14	-1
West	193	187	+6	170	159	+11
New Mexico	6	5	+1	5	4	+1
Arizona	12	12	0	9	7	+2
Montana	9	9	0	8	8	0
Idaho	15	15	0	14	13	+1
Wyoming	13	14	-1	11	11	0
Colorado	21	21	0	19	17	+2
Utah	10	11	-1	10	10	0
Washington	23	21	+2	19	18	+1
Oregon	21	21	0	19	19	0
Nevada	16	16	0	12	13	-1
California	46	40	+6	43	37	+6
Alaska	0	1	-1	0	1	-1
Hawaii	1	1	0	1	1	0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments*, I, 1962 and 1967.

Appendix Table II-D

Number of Special Districts Located Within and Outside of SMSA's:
1962, 1967, 1972

State and Region	Within SMSA's			Outside SMSA's		
	1962	1967	1972	1962	1967	1972
United States	5,410	7,580	7,842	12,912	13,685	16,044
Northeast	1,762	2,240	2,081	1,637	1,484	1,856
Maine	8	19	8	117	108	118
New Hampshire	3	10	6	82	79	88
Vermont	0	0	0	72	72	74
Massachusetts	116	207	159	78	40	109
Rhode Island	36	47	47	20	20	26
Connecticut	98	139	138	106	82	92
New York	447	512	497	523	453	457
New Jersey	175	252	111	120	59	230
Pennsylvania	879	1,054	1,115	519	571	662
North Central	1,244	1,757	2,032	4,864	5,263	5,992
Michigan	30	33	50	69	77	89
Ohio	64	114	133	113	114	142
Indiana	102	231	321	458	388	511
Illinois	704	881	973	1,422	1,432	1,434
Wisconsin	23	35	31	45	27	90
Minnesota	23	29	38	92	119	173
Iowa	66	66	65	197	214	240
Missouri	59	98	115	683	636	705
North Dakota	13	19	24	233	412	537
South Dakota	2	3	6	78	103	130
Nebraska	108	177	193	644	775	888
Kansas	50	71	83	830	966	1,053
South	647	1,131	1,357	2,838	3,384	4,168
Delaware	1	4	4	62	61	74
Maryland	23	26	28	153	161	201
District of Columbia	0	1	2	0	0	0
Virginia	10	12	17	36	36	41
West Virginia	18	38	55	37	82	117
Kentucky	29	53	81	150	220	365
Tennessee	37	57	60	231	329	397
North Carolina	18	39	44	108	176	204
South Carolina	38	63	82	104	85	102
Georgia	42	45	51	259	293	315
Florida	78	145	155	186	165	160
Alabama	20	53	62	182	198	224

Appendix Table II-D (cont'd.)

State and Region	Within SMSA's			Outside SMSA's		
	1962	1967	1972	1962	1967	1972
Mississippi	2	9	10	264	263	272
Louisiana	34	68	61	207	266	358
Arkansas	64	79	70	235	273	296
Oklahoma	19	34	63	105	180	339
Texas	214	405	512	519	596	703
West	1,757	2,452	2,372	3,573	3,554	4,028
New Mexico	7	4	4	95	98	95
Arizona	31	40	41	21	31	49
Montana	28	29	27	164	180	231
Idaho	0	31	32	469	482	511
Wyoming	0	0	0	144	185	203
Colorado	194	275	269	372	473	543
Utah	44	65	69	98	98	107
Washington	289	331	365	578	606	656
Oregon	247	350	257	480	450	569
Nevada	19	24	26	66	71	108
California	894	1,300	1,279	1,068	868	944
Alaska	0	0	0	6	0	0
Hawaii	4	3	3	12	12	12

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures; also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

Appendix Table II-E

Level of Government Establishing Special District by General Legislation

State	Cemeteries	Fire Protection	Highways	Health	Hospital	Housing and Urban Renewal	Libraries	Natural Resources	Parks and Recreation	Sewage	Soil Conservation and Water	Utilities
Alabama					LH	L					SHR	L-LH LRH
Arizona					LRH			LRH		LH		
Arkansas		L	LH			L		LH-L			SR	
California	LRH	L-LR	LR	LR	LR	L	LR	L-LR-LH	LR	LR	LRH	LR
Colorado	L	LRH		LRH		LH		LR	LH	LRH	LR	LH-LRH
Connecticut		LR				L				LR		
Delaware						S		LH	LR			
Florida					LR	L		LH-LR			SR	
Georgia					L	L					SR	
Hawaii											SHR	
Idaho	LR	LR	*		LH	L	LHR	SH-LR-LH	LR	LR	S	LR
Illinois	LRH	LR		LR	LR	L	LR	LRH-LH	LR	LR	SR	LRH-LR
Indiana					L	L	L	LH-L		LH	SHR	L
Iowa		LH				L	LR	LH		LRH	SH	LH
Kansas	L				LR	L	LR	SH-L-SR		L	S	SR-LH
Kentucky		LH	LH		L	L	LR	SH-LH	L	LH	SHR	LH
Louisiana						L		L			SHR	L
Maine						L					SHR	LH
Maryland						L					SHR	LH
Massachusetts						L					S	
Michigan					LR	L			LR	L-SR	SHR	**
Minnesota					L-LR	L					SR	SH
Mississippi						L		LH-L			SR	LH
Missouri					LRH	L	LR-L	L		LH	SR	LRH
Montana	LRH	LR	L-LR	LHR	LRH	LH		L-LH			SRH	LR
Nebraska	L	LH	LRH	LR	LRH	L		L-S-LRH	LR	LR	SRH	S-LR-L
Nevada		LH	L		LRH	L		LR		L	SRH	S-LH-LRH
New Hampshire		LR				LR				LR	S	LR
New Jersey		L				L				L		L
New Mexico								LH-LR			SR	
New York		LH		S	L	L		L		SH	SR	L
North Carolina		LH				L		SHR	L		SR	SH
North Dakota					LR	S	L	LH	LH	LH	SR	LH
Ohio		LRH				LR		LR-SH-LH		LRH	SR	LH
Oklahoma		LRH			LR	L		LRH-LH-L	LHR	LRH	SHR	SR-LRH
Oregon	LRH		L		LR	L						

Appendix Table II-E (cont'd.)

State	Cemeteries	Fire Protection	Highways	Health	Hospital	Housing and Urban Renewal	Libraries	Natural Resources	Parks and Recreation	Sewage	Soil Conservation and Water	Utilities
Pennsylvania		L	L		L	L		L	L	L		L
Rhode Island						L					S	
South Carolina		**				L		LR		**	SR	
South Dakota						L		L-LR		LR	SR	S-LRH
Tennessee						L		SR			SRH	SH-L
Texas		LRH			LR	L		LH-LRH		LR	SR	LR
Utah	LR	LRH			L			L-LRH	L	L	SR	LR-L
Vermont		L				L				L	SR	
Virginia				L	L					LR	SR	
Washington	LRH	LRH			L	L	LR	SR-LRH-LR	L-LRH	LRH		LRH-LR
West Virginia						L				LRH	SR	LRH
Wisconsin						L		LR	LR	SH		
Wyoming	LR	LRH			LR			LH		LH	SRH	S-LH-LRH

S - State

SR - State with local referendum

SH - State with public hearing

SRH - State with referendum and public hearing

L - Substate

LR - Substate with local referendum

LH - Substate with public hearing

LRH - Substate with referendum and public hearing

* - No provisions for creation of more districts

** - No method indicated

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

Method of Selecting Member of Special District Board by Function by General Legislation

Appendix Table II-F

State	Alabama	Arizona	Arkansas	California	Colorado	Connecticut	Delaware	Florida	Georgia	Hawaii	Idaho	Illinois	Indiana	Iowa	Kansas	Kentucky	Louisiana	Maine	Maryland	Massachusetts	Michigan	Minnesota	Mississippi	Missouri	Montana	Nebraska	Nevada	New Hampshire	New Jersey	New Mexico	New York	North Carolina	North Dakota	Ohio	Oklahoma	Oregon						
Soil Con- servation and Water	AS	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	E	ASO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO				
Utilities	AO	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO				
Housing and Urban Renewal	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	ASO	AO	AO-ASO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO			
Libraries	AO	E	E	E	E	E	E	AO	E-AS	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO			
Natural Resources	E	E	AO-E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	E-AS	E-AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO		
Park Recreation	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO		
Sewage	E	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	E	E	E	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO		
Fire Protection	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AS	AO	AS	AS	AS	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	
Highways	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	
Health	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	AO	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	
Hospital	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AS	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	
Health	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AS	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	
Fire Protection	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AS	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO
Cemeteries	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AS	AO	E	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	AO	

Appendix Table II-F (cont'd.)

State	Cemeteries	Fire Protection	Highways	Health	Hospital	Housing and Urban Renewal	Libraries	Natural Resources	Parks and Recreation	Sewage	Soil Conservation and Water	Utilities
Pennsylvania		AO	AO		AO	AS-AO		AO	AO	AO		AO
Rhode Island						AO					AS	
South Carolina		E				AO		E		E	AE	E
South Dakota						AO		E		E	E	E
Tennessee						AO		E			AE	AO-E
Texas		AO			AO	AO		AO-E		E	AE	E
Utah	E	E			AO			E-AO	AO	AO	AE	AO
Vermont		E				AO				E	AE	
Virginia				AO	AO					AS	AE	
Washington	E	E			E	AO	AO	E	E-AO	E		E
West Virginia						AO				AO	AE	AO
Wisconsin						AO		AO	E	AO		
Wyoming	E	E			E			E-AO		E	E	E

E = Elected

AS = Appointed at State level

AO = Appointed at other than State level

AE = Some members appointed and some elected

ASO = Some members appointed at State level and some appointed by lower level

EO = Ex-officio

V = General law does not determine specific member selection method

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

Appendix Table II-G

Sources of Revenues for General Legislature Special Districts

State	Cemeteries	Fire Protection	Highways	Health	Hospitals	Housing and Urban Renewal	Libraries	Natural Resources	Parks & Recreation	Sewerage	Soil Conservation and Water	Utilities
Alabama					CT	CO					O	CO-TO
Arizona					CTO					O		CTO-O
Arkansas		CO	CTO			CO		CTO-O			CO	
California	T	T	CTO	T	CO	CO	TO	CTO-CO	CTO	CO	T	CTO
Colorado	T	TO			CTO	C		CTO-CO	TO	CTO	TO	CTO
Connecticut		CT				CO				CT		
Delaware						CO		CO	CTO			
Florida					CTO	CO		O-TO			O	
Georgia					CO	CO					C	
Hawaii											O	
Idaho	T	T	TO		CTO	CO	TO	CO-TO		CT	O	CT-TO
Illinois	TO	TO		TO	CTO	CO	T	T-CTO	TO	CTO	CT	CTO
Indiana					CTO	CO	TO	TO-C		TO	CO	CTO
Iowa		TO					T	CO		CTO	O	CTO
Kansas	T				CTO	CO	TO	CTO			O	CO
Kentucky		T	TO				TO	TO		CO	TO	CO
Louisiana		TO			CTO	CO		CTO-TO	TO	CTO		CTO-CO
Maine						CO					O	
Maryland						CO		TO			O	TO
Massachusetts						CO					O	
Michigan					O					CTO	O	CTO
Minnesota					CTO	CTO		CTO	CTO		O	TO
Mississippi						CO		TO			O	TO
Missouri		TO	TO	CTO	CTO	CO	T	TO		CTO		CO
Montana	T				CT	CO		TO			TO	CO
Nebraska	T	T	TO	TO	CT	CO		CTO-TO		CTO	O	CTO-TO
Nevada		TO	CT			CO		CT		CTO	O	CO-CT
New Hampshire		TO				CO				TO	O	TO
New Jersey		TO				CO				CO		CO
New Mexico								CTO-TO			TO	
New York		TO		T								
North Carolina					CO	CO		TO		CTO	O	CO-CTO
North Dakota						CTO		CTO	TO		O	T
Ohio					TO	CO	T	CTO	TO	CTO	TO	TO
Oklahoma		TO				CO		CTO-CT		CTO	O	CO
Oregon	T	TO	T		CTO	CO		CTO-CO	TO	CTO	O	T-CTO

Appendix Table II-G (cont'd.)

State	Cemeteries	Fire Protection	Highways	Health	Hospitals	Housing and Urban Renewal	Libraries	Natural Resources	Parks and Recreation	Sewerage	Soil Conservation and Water	Utilities
Pennsylvania		CO	CO		CO			CO	CO	CO		CO
Rhode Island						CO					CTO	
South Carolina		CTO				CO		TO		CTO	O	
South Dakota						CO		TO-T		TO	O	CO
Tennessee						CO		TO			O	CO
Texas		T			CTO	CO		TO		CTO	O	TO
Utah	T	T			CTO			CTO-TO	CTO	CTO	O	CTO
Vermont		TO				CO				TO	O	
Virginia				CO	CO					CO	O	
Washington	TO	TO			CTO	CO	TO	TO	TO	TO		CT-CTO
West Virginia						CO				CO	O	CO
Wisconsin						CO		TO	TO	CTO		
Wyoming	TO	TO			CTO			CTO-TO		CTO	O	CO-CTO

C = Charges and fees

T = Tax and assessments

O = Other (most local governments can accept grants although it is not always stated)

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1967*, I.

Appendix Table II-H

Areawide Metropolitan Special Districts:
1972

State and Region	Number of Metropolitan Special Districts	Metropolitan Areawide ¹ Special Districts	
	(A)	No.	% of (A)
United States	7,842	1,028	13.1
Northeast	2,081	133	6.4
Maine	8	2	25.0
New Hampshire	6	1	16.7
Vermont	0
Massachusetts	159	7	4.4
Rhode Island	47	1	2.1
Connecticut	138	0
New York	497	14	2.8
New Jersey	111	8	7.2
Pennsylvania	1,115	100	9.0
North Central	2,032	372	18.3
Michigan	50	24	48.0
Ohio	133	69	51.9
Indiana	321	44	13.7
Illinois	973	150	15.4
Wisconsin	31	2	6.5
Minnesota	38	16	42.1
Iowa	65	10	15.4
Missouri	115	12	10.4
North Dakota	24	3	12.5
South Dakota	6	1	16.7
Nebraska	193	17	8.8
Kansas	83	24	28.9
South	1,357	291	21.4
Virginia	17	13	76.5
West Virginia	55	10	18.2
Kentucky	81	13	16.0
Tennessee	60	19	31.7
North Carolina	44	19	43.2
South Carolina	82	13	15.9
Georgia	51	22	43.1
Florida	155	29	18.7
Alabama	62	25	40.3

Appendix Table II-H (cont'd.)

State and Region	Number of Metropolitan Special Districts	Metropolitan Areawide ¹ Special Districts	
	(A)	No.	% of (A)
Mississippi	10	8	80.0
Louisiana	61	4	6.6
Arkansas	70	13	18.6
Oklahoma	63	15	23.8
Texas	512	75	14.6
Delaware	4	1	25.0
Maryland	28	11	39.3
District of Columbia	2	1	50.0
West	2,372	232	9.8
New Mexico	4	2	50.0
Arizona	41	3	22.0
Montana	27	3	11.1
Idaho	32	11	34.4
Wyoming	0
Colorado	269	42	15.6
Utah	69	8	11.6
Washington	365	21	5.8
Oregon	257	28	10.9
Nevada	26	5	19.2
California	1,279	109	8.5
Alaska	0
Hawaii	3	0

¹ Areawide metropolitan includes all districts which are countywide or multicounty and are located in an SMSA.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, preliminary 1972 figures.

Appendix Table II-1

Areawide Special Districts in 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970

State	Northeast SMSA	Areawide Special District
Connecticut	Hartford	Hartford Metropolitan District
Delaware	Wilmington	Delaware River Bay Authority
District	Washington	None
Maryland	Baltimore	None
Massachusetts	Boston	Metropolitan Transit Authority
Massachusetts	Springfield	Hampden Soil Conservation District*
New Jersey	Jersey City	Port of New York and New Jersey Authority
New Jersey	Newark	Waterfront Commission of New York Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission Port of New York and New Jersey Authority
New Jersey	Paterson-Clifton-Passaic	Waterfront Commission of New York Passaic Valley Water Commission Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission Port of New York and New Jersey Authority Waterfront Commission of New York
New York	Albany-Schenectady-Troy	Albany Port District
New York	Buffalo	Albany Port District
New York	New York City	Port of New York and New Jersey Authority Waterfront Commission of New York
New York	Rochester	Genesee Valley Regional Market Authority*
New York	Syracuse	Central New York Regional Market Authority*
Pennsylvania	Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton	Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority
Pennsylvania	Harrisburg	Harrisburg Area Community College
Pennsylvania	Philadelphia	Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission Delaware River Port Authority
Pennsylvania	Pittsburgh	Allegheny County Port Authority Allegheny County Sanitary Authority Pittsburgh-Allegheny County Auditorium Authority
Rhode Island	Providence	Northern Rhode Island Soil Conservation District*
State	North Central SMSA	Areawide Special District
Illinois	Chicago	Chicago Regional Port District Greater Chicago Metropolitan Sanitary District Metropolitan Fair Exposition Authority
Illinois	Gary-Hammond-East Chicago	None
Indiana	Indianapolis	Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority
Kansas	Wichita	Sedgwich County Soil Conservation District*
Michigan	Detroit	Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority
Michigan	Flint	Genesee Soil Conservation District*
Michigan	Grand Rapids	Northwest Kent Soil Conservation District*
Minnesota	Minneapolis-St. Paul	Henepin Soil and Water Conservation District* Henepin County Park Reserve District Nine Mile Creek Watershed District* Minneapolis-St. Paul Airports Commission Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District Metropolitan Mosquito Control District Lower Minnesota River Watershed District*

Appendix Table II-I (cont'd.)

State	North Central SMSA	Areawide Special District
Missouri	Kansas City	Jackson County Library District
Missouri	St. Louis	Bi-State Development Agency Metro St. Louis Sewer District
Nebraska	Omaha	Metropolitan Utilities District Omaha Public Power District Douglas County Weed Control Authority* Douglas County Soil and Water Conservation District*
Ohio	Akron	Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority Akron Metropolitan Park District Summit Soil and Water Conservation District*
Ohio	Cincinnati	Hamilton County Library District Hamilton County Park District Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority
Ohio	Cleveland	Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority Cleveland Metropolitan Park District Cuyahoga County Soil Conservation District*
Ohio	Columbus	Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority Columbus Metropolitan Park District Franklin Soil-Water Conservation District* Scioto Conservancy District*
Ohio	Dayton	Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority Dayton-Montgomery County Public Library District Miami Conservancy District Stillwater Sanitorium District Montgomery County Park District
Ohio	Toledo	Toledo Area Sanitary District* Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority Toledo Metropolitan Park District*
Ohio	Youngstown-Warren	Mahoning Valley Sanitary District* Mahoning County Soil Conservation District* Warren Metropolitan Housing Authority
Wisconsin	Milwaukee	Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewer District
State	South SMSA	Areawide Special District
Texas	Dallas	Dallas County Levee Improvement District* Dallas County Flood Control District* Dallas County Hospital District Dallas County Levee Improvement District #5* Dalworth Soil Conservation District* Trinity River Authority
Texas	Houston	Harris County Hospital District Harris County Navigation District
Texas	San Antonio	Alamo Soil Conservation District* Bexar County Hospital District Bexar Metropolitan Water District San Antonio River Authority Edwards Underground Water District*
Texas	Fort Worth	Dalworth Soil Conservation District* Tarrant County Water Control Improvement District #1 Tarrant County Hospital District

Appendix Table II-I (cont'd.)

State	South SMSA	Areawide Special District
Virginia	Norfolk-Portsmouth	Elizabeth River Tunnel Commission Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District
Virginia	Richmond	James River Soil Conservation District*
Alabama	Birmingham	Jefferson County Soil Conservation District*
Alabama	Mobile	Mobile County Hospital District Mobile County Soil Conservation District*
Florida	Jacksonville	Duval County Hospital Authority
Florida	Miami	Central and South Florida Flood Control District Florida Inland Navigation District
Florida	Tampa-St. Petersburg	Hillsborough County Soil Conservation District* Southwest Tampa Storm Sewer Drainage District* Southwest Florida Water Management District West Coast Inland Navigation District Pinellas Soil Conservation District* Pinellas County Mosquito Control District*
Georgia	Atlanta	Atlanta Soil Conservation District* Fulton County Hospital Authority Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority Jefferson County Sanitation District*
Kentucky	Louisville	Orleans Levee District
Louisiana	New Orleans	Guilford County Soil Conservation District* Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority* Forsyth County Soil and Water Conservation District*
North Carolina	Greensboro-Winston/Salem- High Point	Oklahoma County Soil Conservation District* Miscellaneous Districts* (3) Knoxville County Soil Conservation District* Shelby County Soil Conservation District* Nashville Housing Authority
Oklahoma	Oklahoma City	
Oklahoma	Tulsa	
Tennessee	Knoxville	
Tennessee	Memphis	
Tennessee	Nashville-Davidson	
State	West SMSA	Areawide Special District
Arizona	Phoenix	Salt River Agricultural Improvement District
California	Anaheim-Santa Ana- Garden Grove	Orange County Water District Orange County Municipal Water District Orange County Sanitation Districts Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
California	Fresno	Fresno Irrigation District Fresno Metropolitan Flood Control District
California	Los Angeles-Long Beach	Southern California Rapid Transit District Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Central West Basin Water Replenishment District
California	Sacramento	Sacramento Municipal Utility District Sacramento-Yolo County Mosquito Abatement District Sacramento-Yolo Port District

Appendix Table II-I (cont'd.)

State	West SMSA	Areawide Special District
California	San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario	San Bernardino County Housing Authority Western Municipal Water District
California	San Diego	San Diego County Water District San Diego Unified Port District Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
California	San Francisco-Oakland	East Bay Municipal Utility District Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District East Bay Regional Park District Bay Area Air Pollution Control District San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Alameda County Mosquito Abatement District*
California	San Jose	Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation District Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
Colorado	Denver	Metropolitan Denver Sewerage Disposal District Moffat Tunnel Improvement District
Oregon	Portland	The Port of Portland
Utah	Salt Lake City	Salt Lake County Water Conservation District Central Utah Water Conservation District Salt Lake City-Suburban Sanitary District
Washington	Seattle	Port of Seattle District Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle

*"Small" areawide districts

TABLE III-A

Regional Planning Enabling Legislation

Alabama: T 37, sec. 809	Montana: 11-3801
Arizona: 11-951 ¹	Nebraska: sec. 81-1211
Arkansas: Act 118, Session Laws of 1969, V.II	Nevada: Ch. 278-090
California: sec. 65600 ¹	New Hampshire: Ch. 36:45
Colorado: 106-2-1	New Jersey: 40:27-9
Connecticut: sec. 8-31a	New Mexico: 14-57-1
Delaware: 22 sec. 701 ² ; 29 § 4913 ¹	New York: Gen. Mun. Law, sec. 239-b
D.C.: § 1-1007	North Carolina: sec. 153-276
Florida: Ch. 160	North Dakota: 11-35
Georgia: § 40-2917; 69-1201	Ohio: sec. 713.21
Hawaii: § 46-5 ²	Oklahoma: 19 sec. 866.1 ² ; 74 sec. 1001 ¹
Idaho: 50-1101	Oregon: sec. 215.020 ² ; sec. 190.003 ¹
Illinois: 34 § 3001	Pennsylvania: 53 sec. 491
Indiana: § 53-1301	Rhode Island: 25-22.1-1
Iowa: sec. 473 A.1	South Carolina: sec. 14-341
Kansas: 12-716	South Dakota: 11-2-1
Kentucky: 100.111	Tennessee: 13-1401
Louisiana: 33 sec. 131	Texas: Art. 1011m
Maine: 30 sec. 4501	Utah: sec. 17-27-1 ² ; sec. 11-13-1 ¹
Maryland: Art. 78D sec. 1	Vermont: 24 sec. 4341
Massachusetts: Ch. 40B sec. 1	Virginia: sec. 15.1-1400
Michigan: 5.3008	Washington: 35.63.070
Minnesota: sec. 462.371; § 462.381	West Virginia: sec. 8-25-1
Mississippi: 2890.5-01	Wisconsin: 66.945
Missouri: sec. 251.150	Wyoming: 18-281; 18-289.2; 15.1-71 ² ; Ch. 239, session laws of 1971 ¹

¹Interlocal Cooperation Statute.

²Local Planning Legislation; combined with the Interlocal Cooperation Statute, this can provide authorization for regional planning.

APPENDIX

Table III-B

Regional Councils With an Adopted Plan or Policy

Classifications	No. of Councils Reporting	Economic Develop- ment	Health	Law Enforce- ment	Resource Conser- vation	Air Quality	Man- power	Aged	Air Pollu- tion	Airports	Trans- portation	Youth Pro- grams
Total, All Councils	289	52%	41%	44%	42%	12%	30%	21%	13%	40%	66%	11%
Non A-95 (1)	30	50	43	45	33	3	17	7	7	27	40	7
A-95 (1)	247	43	20	30	43	13	30	23	13	40	66	11
Interstate	40	53	43	55	45	13	33	35	18	35	78	25
Non-interstate	249	50	39	41	41	12	29	18	12	40	64	89
Population Group												
Over 500,000	46	39	37	37	57	28	24	11	30	46	83	0
250,000 - 500,000	53	49	42	49	42	17	38	23	17	51	79	15
100,000 - 250,000	114	58	46	51	39	8	37	27	8	36	62	11
50,000 - 100,000	44	59	41	41	32	2	16	20	7	36	59	14
25,000 - 50,000	22	41	41	27	50	5	23	14	9	32	55	5
10,000 - 25,000	8	38	0	13	38	25	25	25	25	38	38	38
5,000 - 10,000	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0
2,500 - 5,000	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Graphic Region												
Northeast	53	53	34	30	51	9	15	11	9	30	66	8
North Central	64	50	30	33	36	13	22	14	14	39	78	5
South	115	61	57	62	40	15	43	33	15	44	63	17
West	57	35	26	32	44	9	28	16	14	42	61	11
Metro Status												
Coterminous with SMSA	62	35	34	31	47	11	18	15	15	48	89	8
Part of SMSA	18	61	22	33	28	11	28	11	17	44	83	0
More than SMSA	76	55	47	46	39	16	37	18	18	46	72	8
Non SMSA	133	56	43	50	43	11	32	28	10	32	50	16

(1) Not all the respondents who noted an adopted plan or policy indicated if their council was an A-95 agency.

APPENDIX—Table III-B
(cont.)

Classifications	Housing Dispersal	Solid Waste	Open Space	Water/ Sewer	Unem- ployment	Drug Abuse	Land Use	Fiscal Disparity	Anti- poverty	Antidis- crimination	Other
Total, All Councils	43%	62%	74%	83%	13%	13%	83%	10%	10%	25%	14%
Non A-95 (1)	30	40	40	53	10	10	50	13	7	7	14
A-95 (1)	42	62	75	83	12	14	83	9	10	24	17
Interstate	53	63	85	90	10	23	88	8	13	28	18
Non-interstate	40	60	71	80	13	12	81	10	10	24	13
Population Group											
Over 500,000	57	63	87	89	7	17	89	13	7	30	7
250,000 - 500,000	42	66	77	89	13	17	79	17	11	28	19
100,000 - 250,000	46	61	80	85	15	11	85	4	11	27	14
50,000 - 100,000	25	66	66	82	11	16	84	11	7	14	18
25,000 - 50,000	32	55	45	68	18	5	68	14	9	18	5
10,000 - 25,000	38	50	13	38	25	0	88	0	25	13	25
5,000 - 10,000	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0
2,500 - 5,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geographic Region											
Northeast	57	70	70	70	9	13	75	8	11	19	13
North Central	38	66	86	89	6	6	83	6	8	25	9
South	44	62	77	85	19	19	86	12	10	32	13
West	32	51	58	75	12	9	84	11	11	14	21
Metro Status											
Coterminous with SMSA	58	68	87	92	5	21	94	10	3	24	13
Part of SMSA	39	78	83	89	17	6	83	0	6	17	11
More than SMSA	43	55	76	89	12	16	82	13	13	30	18
Non SMSA	35	61	65	74	17	9	79	9	12	23	12

(1) Not all the respondents who noted an adopted plan or policy indicated if their council was an A-95 agency.

Appendix Table IV-A

Local Government Responses to Questionnaire:
1972

Classification	Number of Cities Surveyed (A)	Cities Reporting		Number of Counties Surveyed (B)	Counties Reporting	
		No.	% of (A)		No.	% of (B)
Total, all jurisdictions	3,817	2,081	55	3,047	1,384	45
Population Group						
Over 500,000	26	20	77	58	36	62
250,000 - 500,000	30	18	60	70	48	69
100,000 - 250,000	98	69	70	185	114	62
50,000 - 100,000	255	153	60	326	153	47
25,000 - 50,000	518	332	64	566	300	53
10,000 - 25,000	1,345	677	50	998	391	39
5,000 - 10,000	1,545	812	53	844 ¹	342 ¹	41
Geographic Region						
Northeast	1,167	580	50	196	117	60
North Central	1,131	632	56	1,051	541	52
South	999	534	54	1,379	518	38
West	520	335	64	421	208	49
Form of Government						
Mayor-Council	1,810	763	42	909 ²	541 ²	57
Council-Manager	1,611	1,033	64	281 ³	173 ³	62
Other	396	285	72	1,857 ⁴	670 ⁴	36
Metropolitan (status)						
Central	349	235	67	358 ⁵	254 ⁵	71
Suburban	1,996	983	49
Independent	1,472	863	59	2,859	1,130	44

¹ 539 counties are between 5,000 and 10,000 population, the remaining 305 counties are under 5,000 population. 199 counties between 5,000 and 10,000 population responded to the survey, the remaining 143 counties are under 5,000 population.

² County Council with no administrator.

³ County Council with an administrator.

⁴ Form of government unknown.

⁵ Central and suburban counties have been combined. 273 central counties and 185 suburban counties were surveyed.

Appendix Table IV-B

**Local Governments Located Within Boundaries of Regional Council
and Membership to Council:
1972**

Classification	No. of Cities Reporting (A)	Cities Located Within Boundaries		Cities Belonging to Council		No. of Counties Reporting (C)	Counties Located Within Boundaries		Counties Belonging to Council	
		No. (B)	% of (A)	No.	% of (B)		No. (D)	% of (C)	No.	% of (D)
Total, all jurisdictions	2,081	1,142	55	987	86	1,384	746	54	668	90
Population Group										
Over 500,000	20	18	90	17	94	36	30	83	26	87
250,000 - 500,000	18	15	83	15	100	48	38	79	35	92
100,000 - 250,000	69	53	77	48	91	114	77	68	74	96
50,000 - 100,000	153	107	70	96	90	153	99	65	91	92
25,000 - 50,000	332	190	57	163	86	300	167	56	155	93
10,000 - 25,000	677	359	53	311	87	391	195	50	172	88
5,000 - 10,000	812	400	49	337	84	342 ¹	140 ¹	41	115	82
Geographic Region										
Northeast	580	167	29	131	78	117	51	44	43	84
North Central	632	307	49	254	83	541	194	36	168	87
South	534	392	73	350	89	518	380	73	344	91
West	335	276	82	252	91	208	121	58	113	93
Form of Government										
Mayor-Council	763	315	41	264	84	541 ²	270 ²	50	245 ²	91
Council-Manager	1,033	688	67	608	88	173 ³	120 ³	69	115 ³	96
Other	285	139	49	115	83	670 ⁴	356 ⁴	53	308 ⁴	87
Metropolitan (status)										
Central	235	162	70	157	97	254 ⁵	187 ⁵	74	174 ⁵	93
Suburban	983	547	56	443	81
Independent	863	433	50	387	89	1,130	559	50	494	88

¹199 counties reported between 5,000 and 10,000 population. The remaining 143 counties are under 5,000 population.

²County Council with no administrator.

³County Council with an administrator.

⁴Form of government unknown.

⁵Central and suburban county have been combined.

Appendix Table IV-C

Reasons for Local Non-membership in Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Number Reporting (A)	Loss of Autonomy			Weakened Influence in State & Federal Policy Decisions			Unnecessary Red Tape Delaying Funding of Local Programs			Council Receives Federal & State Funds Allocated to Local Governments								
		Number Responding			% of (A)			Number Responding			% of (A)			Number Responding			% of (A)		
		City	County	City	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City
Total, all cities & counties	155	49	40	3	26	6	11	6	7	12	32	16	21	33	4	4	4	3	8
Population Groups																			
Over 1,000,000
500,000 - 1,000,000	1	2
250,000 - 500,000	2
100,000 - 250,000	5	1	1	...	20	3	...	60	
50,000 - 100,000	11	4	7	1	64	25	1	...	9	...	6	1	55	25	
25,000 - 50,000	27	9	9	...	33	...	2	...	7	...	7	3	26	33	
10,000 - 25,000	48	13	12	...	25	...	2	2	4	15	6	6	13	46	3	4	6	31	
5,000 - 10,000	63	7	11	...	18	...	6	2	10	29	10	3	16	43	1	...	2	...	
Under 5,000	...	11	...	2	...	18	...	2	...	18	...	3	...	27	
Geographic Region																			
Northeast	36	4	7	...	19	...	2	...	6	...	6	1	17	25	1	1	3	25	
North Central	53	16	14	...	26	...	5	1	9	6	14	6	26	38	1	1	2	6	
South	42	25	7	3	17	12	3	5	7	20	5	9	12	36	2	2	5	1	
West	24	4	12	...	50	...	1	...	4	...	7	...	29	
Form of Government																			
Without administrator	51	19	10	2	20	11	5	2	10	11	6	5	12	26	...	2	...	11	
With administrator	80	30	26	1	33	3	3	4	4	13	23	11	29	37	3	2	4	7	
Other	24	...	4	...	17	...	3	...	13	...	3	...	13	...	1	...	4	...	
Metropolitan (status)																			
Central	5	8	1	...	20	1	...	13	
Suburban	104	...	31	...	30	...	7	...	7	...	23	...	22	...	2	3	4	7	
Independent	46	41	9	7	20	7	4	6	9	15	8	16	17	39	2	3	4	7	

Appendix Table IV-C--(Cont.)

Reasons for Local Non-membership in Regional Councils*
1972

Classification	Number Reporting (A)		Planning and Services Performed Better at Local Level				Too Costly to Taxpayers				Domination by Largest County/City				Domination by Many Smaller Governments			
			Number Responding		% of (A)		Number Responding		% of (A)		Number Responding		% of (A)		Number Responding		% of (A)	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
Total, all cities & counties	155	49	33	23	21	47	30	15	19	31	36	20	23	41	4	...	3	...
Population Groups																		
Over 1,000,000
500,000 - 1,000,000	1	2	...	1	...	50	1	...	100	...
250,000 - 500,000	...	2
100,000 - 250,000	5	1	2	...	40	2	1	40	100
50,000 - 100,000	11	4	4	3	36	75	4	...	36	...	2	1	18	25
25,000 - 50,000	27	9	6	5	22	56	8	3	30	33	7	2	26	22	1	...	4	...
10,000 - 25,000	48	13	9	5	19	38	7	5	15	38	10	6	21	46	1	...	2	...
5,000 - 10,000	63	7	12	4	19	57	11	2	18	29	15	4	24	57	1	...	2	...
Under 5,000	...	11	...	5	...	45	...	5	...	45	...	6	...	54
Geographic Region																		
Northeast	36	4	6	...	17	...	5	...	14	...	6	1	17	25	1	...	3	...
North Central	53	16	15	8	28	50	9	4	17	25	16	7	30	44	1	...	2	...
South	42	25	4	14	10	56	9	9	21	36	8	10	19	40	1	...	2	...
West	24	4	8	1	33	25	7	2	29	50	6	2	25	50	1	...	4	...
Form of Government																		
Without administrator	51	19	13	7	26	37	11	6	22	32	9	8	18	42	1	...	2	...
With administrator	80	30	18	16	23	53	15	9	19	30	21	12	26	40	2	...	3	...
Other	24	...	2	...	8	...	4	...	17	...	6	...	25	...	1	...	4	...
Metropolitan (status)																		
Central	5	8	1	4	20	50	1	2	20	25	1	...	20	...
Suburban	104	...	22	...	21	...	25	...	24	...	28	...	27
Independent	46	41	10	19	22	46	5	15	11	37	7	18	15	44	3	...	7	...

**"Other" responses: city, 56 (36%); county, 22 (45%).

Appendix Table IV-D

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Forming Regional Councils*

Classification	Number Reporting		Initiate Cooperation on General Regional Problems				Meet Serious Problem in Specific Functional Area			
			Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
Total	987	629	829	531	1.5	1.5	228	153	2.4	2.5
Population Group										
250,000 - 500,000	15	35	14	29	1.9	1.8	...	4	...	2.3
100,000 - 250,000	48	71	42	66	1.7	1.6	5	19	2.2	2.5
50,000 - 100,000	96	89	84	75	1.6	1.5	19	27	2.4	2.5
25,000 - 50,000	163	145	133	121	1.5	1.5	37	35	2.5	2.2
10,000 - 25,000	311	160	267	133	1.5	1.5	73	34	2.4	2.6
5,000 - 10,000	337	62	279	51	1.6	1.3	91	19	2.5	2.7
Under 5,000	...	41	...	33	...	1.3	...	9	...	2.4
Geographic Region										
Northeast	131	42	115	35	1.3	1.7	45	10	2.5	2.3
North Central	254	157	213	130	1.6	1.5	68	34	2.4	2.5
South	350	321	275	290	1.5	1.4	74	79	2.6	2.5
West	252	109	211	91	1.6	1.7	41	30	2.1	2.3
Form of Government										
Without administrator	264	227	212	182	1.5	1.5	63	52	2.4	2.5
With administrator	608	402	519	349	1.5	1.5	137	101	2.4	2.5
Other	115	...	98	...	1.7	...	28	...	2.5	...
Metropolitan (status)										
Central	157	170	129	101	1.7	1.6	25	29	2.4	2.5
Suburban	443	...	380	51	1.4	1.6	129	8	2.4	2.1
Independent	387	459	320	379	1.6	1.4	74	116	2.5	2.5
Jurisdictional Boundaries										
Interstate	67	37	55	30	1.6	1.7	18	2	2.7	3.0
Non-interstate	920	592	774	501	1.5	1.5	210	151	2.4	2.5
Council Formation²										
Pre - 1953	5	1	5	1	1.6	3.0	1	...	1.0	...
1954 - 1961	55	32	49	32	1.3	1.3	12	11	2.2	2.1
1962 - 1965	136	61	125	55	1.5	1.5	36	18	2.5	2.3
1966 - 1968	346	201	295	168	1.5	1.6	81	46	2.4	2.6
1969 - 1972	300	265	257	217	1.6	1.5	70	57	2.4	2.5
Membership Council³										
Pre - 1953	4	1	4	3	1.3	1.7	1	2	1.0	3.0
1954 - 1961	40	25	36	25	1.4	1.2	8	8	1.9	2.1
1962 - 1965	100	59	275	46	1.5	1.6	33	13	2.5	2.1
1966 - 1968	396	189	338	160	1.6	1.6	94	43	2.4	2.5
1969 - 1972	...	318	...	265	...	1.5	...	76	...	2.5

¹ Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why their regional council was formed (one being the most important reason, 2 and 3 the next most important reasons).

² 145 cities and 97 counties indicated the reason for formation of regional council but did not indicate year of formation.

³ 122 cities and 72 counties indicated the reason for formation of regional council but did not indicate the year they joined.

*"Other" responses: city, 79 (8%); county, 49 (8%).

Appendix Table IV-D--(Cont.)

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Forming Regional Councils*

Classification	Formalize Previous Informal Cooperative Agreements				Offset State Action or Threats			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
Total	282	160	2.6	2.5	94	64	2.3	2.3
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	3	...	3.0	...	3	...	1.0
500,000 - 1,000,000	7	5	2.3	2.0	1	4	3.0	2.5
250,000 - 500,000	7	8	2.6	2.8	1	3	2.0	1.7
100,000 - 250,000	13	21	2.5	2.4	7	5	2.0	2.8
50,000 - 100,000	28	32	2.5	2.6	9	11	2.0	2.4
25,000 - 50,000	44	32	2.7	2.5	26	13	2.2	2.5
10,000 - 25,000	99	36	2.5	2.5	29	13	2.6	2.5
5,000 - 10,000	84	17	2.6	2.6	21	7	2.5	2.3
Under 5,000	...	6	...	2.8	...	5	...	2.2
Geographic Region								
Northeast	50	12	2.5	2.3	9	2	2.2	2.0
North Central	71	43	2.5	2.7	11	13	2.5	2.5
South	97	82	2.6	2.5	20	20	2.5	2.5
West	64	23	2.7	2.6	54	29	2.1	2.2
Form of Government								
Without administrator	79	56	2.6	2.6	16	20	2.3	2.3
With administrator	169	104	2.6	2.5	72	44	2.2	2.4
Other	34	...	2.5	...	6	...	2.3	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	46	31	2.5	2.5	14	12	2.3	2.0
Suburban	135	20	2.5	2.5	50	3	2.1	2.3
Independent	101	109	2.6	2.6	30	49	2.4	2.4
Jurisdictional Boundaries								
Interstate	16	...	2.4	...	2	...	3.0	...
Non-interstate	266	160	2.6	2.5	92	64	2.3	2.3
Council Formation²								
Pre - 1953	2	...	2.5
1954 - 1961	17	14	2.7	2.6	9	5	2.4	2.2
1962 - 1965	34	14	2.7	2.6	19	6	1.9	2.2
1966 - 1968	97	48	2.5	2.5	28	15	2.4	2.3
1969 - 1972	93	71	2.6	2.6	29	34	2.3	2.4
Membership to Council³								
Pre - 1953	2	1	2.5	2.0
1954 - 1961	12	12	2.6	2.7	6	4	2.5	2.3
1962 - 1965	25	12	2.8	2.7	15	6	2.1	2.2
1966 - 1968	118	47	2.6	2.5	29	13	2.3	2.5
1969 - 1972	...	78	...	2.5	32	38	2.3	2.3

¹ Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why their regional council was formed (one being the most important reason, 2 and 3 the next most important reasons).

² 145 cities and 97 counties indicated the reason for formation of regional council but did not indicate year of formation.

³ 122 cities and 72 counties indicated the reason for formation of regional council but did not indicate the year they joined.

*"Other" responses: city, 79 (8%); county, 49 (8%).

Appendix Table IV-D-(cont.)

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Forming Regional Councils*

Classification	Compliance with Planning Requirements of Federal Grant-in-Aid Programs				Compliance with Areawide Review Requirements under Section 204 & Circular A-95			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
Total	723	498	1.8	1.9	295	199	2.4	2.4
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	4	...	2.3	...	2	...	2.5
500,000 - 1,000,000	10	12	1.9	2.0	5	6	2.0	2.2
250,000 - 500,000	12	28	1.7	1.9	9	15	2.0	1.9
100,000 - 250,000	37	60	1.8	1.8	24	22	2.3	2.5
50,000 - 100,000	71	74	1.8	1.8	27	33	2.4	2.3
25,000 - 50,000	108	113	1.9	1.9	43	47	2.2	2.5
10,000 - 25,000	230	124	1.9	1.8	87	49	2.4	2.5
5,000 - 10,000	255	48	1.8	1.9	100	13	2.4	2.8
Under 5,000	...	35	...	1.8	...	12	...	2.6
Geographical Region								
Northeast	72	31	1.8	1.9	22	14	2.4	2.0
North Central	173	122	1.8	1.7	73	47	2.3	2.5
South	281	267	1.8	1.9	119	102	2.4	2.6
West	197	78	1.8	1.8	81	36	2.3	2.1
Form of Government								
Without administrator	185	177	1.8	1.8	67	70	2.4	2.4
With administrator	461	321	1.8	1.9	196	129	2.4	2.5
Other	77	...	1.9	...	32	...	2.2	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	121	91	1.8	1.8	61	42	2.2	2.4
Suburban	293	43	1.9	1.8	108	18	2.4	2.2
Independent	309	364	1.8	1.9	126	139	2.4	2.5
Jurisdictional Boundaries								
Interstate	50	2	1.6	1.0	28	...	2.2	...
Non-interstate	673	496	1.8	1.9	267	199	2.4	2.4
Council Formation²								
Pre - 1953	2	1	2.0	1.0	1	...	2.0	...
1954 - 1961	28	18	1.9	2.3	6	5	2.8	2.6
1962 - 1965	105	51	1.9	1.9	34	20	2.4	2.5
1966 - 1968	270	162	1.8	1.8	114	71	2.4	2.4
1969 - 1972	231	211	1.8	1.9	110	87	2.3	2.4
Membership to Council³								
Pre - 1953	1	2	3.0	1.5	...	1	...	2.0
1954 - 1961	19	14	1.8	2.3	6	2	2.7	3.0
1962 - 1965	75	43	1.9	1.9	20	16	0.4	2.6
1966 - 1968	249	154	1.8	1.8	104	64	2.3	2.4
1969 - 1972	306	254	1.8	1.9	136	107	2.4	2.4

¹ Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why their regional council was formed (one being the most important reason, 2 and 3 the next most important reasons).

² 145 cities and 97 counties indicated the reason for formation of regional council but did not indicate year of formation.

³ 122 cities and 72 counties indicated the reason for formation of regional council but did not indicate the year they joined.

*"Other" responses: city, 79 (8%); county, 49 (8%).

Appendix Table IV-E

**Reasons Given by Local Governments for Joining Regional Councils:
1972**

Classification	Number Reporting		Forum for Discussion of Regional Problems				Possible Contribution to Solution of Areawide Problems			
			Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	810	573	413	277	2.0	1.9	564	407	1.8	1.8
Population Group										
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	6	...	1.3	...	5	...	2.2
500,000 - 1,000,000	15	19	7	13	2.0	1.9	10	14	1.7	1.8
250,000 - 500,000	13	32	6	24	1.7	2.4	11	20	2.1	1.6
100,000 - 250,000	46	68	27	40	2.1	1.8	29	51	1.7	1.8
50,000 - 100,000	86	87	53	40	2.0	2.0	65	69	1.8	1.7
25,000 - 50,000	136	132	84	57	1.9	1.8	98	95	1.9	1.8
10,000 - 25,000	251	135	119	59	1.9	2.0	180	91	1.8	2.0
5,000 - 10,000	263	54	117	24	2.2	2.1	171	39	1.8	1.8
Under 5,000	...	39	...	14	...	1.9	...	23	...	1.6
Geographic Region										
Northeast	116	38	74	19	2.0	1.8	88	23	1.8	1.7
North Central	203	137	93	57	1.9	1.8	133	97	1.7	1.9
South	287	297	122	151	2.0	2.0	194	210	1.8	1.7
West	204	101	124	50	2.0	1.9	149	177	1.8	1.9
Form of Government										
Without administrator	208	201	77	93	1.9	2.1	128	138	1.9	1.8
With administrator	516	372	295	184	2.0	1.9	376	269	1.8	1.8
Other	86	...	41	...	2.0	...	60	...	1.7	...
Metropolitan (status)										
Central	145	109	79	67	1.2	2.0	102	79	1.8	1.8
Suburban	335	52	200	30	1.9	1.8	244	39	1.8	1.8
Independent	330	412	134	180	2.1	1.9	218	285	1.8	1.8
Jurisdictional Boundaries										
Interstate	52	...	22	...	2.0	...	35	...	1.8	...
Non-interstate	758	573	391	277	2.0	1.9	530	407	1.8	1.8
Council Formation²										
Pre - 1953	5	2	3	1	1.7	1.0	4	...	1.8	...
1954 - 1961	52	31	36	27	1.7	1.7	36	25	1.8	1.8
1962 - 1965	130	50	77	27	2.0	2.3	99	46	1.6	1.7
1966 - 1968	331	183	162	91	2.0	2.0	226	129	1.8	1.8
1969 - 1972	292	233	135	105	2.1	2.0	199	165	1.9	1.8
Membership to Council³										
Pre - 1953	4	3	3	1	1.7	1.0	3	2	1.3	1.5
1954 - 1961	36	24	28	21	1.8	1.6	26	20	1.8	1.8
1962 - 1965	97	46	61	28	2.0	2.2	74	36	1.7	1.6
1966 - 1968	306	174	161	84	2.0	1.9	214	124	1.9	1.9
1969 - 1972	367	287	160	129	2.1	2.0	247	200	1.8	1.8

¹ Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why they joined the regional council (one being the most important, 2 and 3 the next most important reasons).

² 74 county respondents indicated the reason for joining the regional council but did not indicate the year of formation.

³ 39 county respondents indicated the reason for joining the regional council but did not indicate the year they joined.

Appendix Table IV-E - (Cont.)

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Joining Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Possible Contribution to Solution of Local Problems				Improved Cooperation between Central City and Suburbs				Regionalism Necessary for Obtaining Federal Funds			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	322	272	2.1	2.0	169	83	2.3	2.6	463	393	1.8	1.8
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	2	...	3.0	3	...	1.3
500,000 - 1,000,000	3	4	2.7	2.3	5	8	2.0	2.5	5	10	1.4	1.6
250,000 - 500,000	2	5	3.0	2.2	3	5	2.3	2.4	11	21	1.5	1.4
100,000 - 250,000	14	23	2.4	2.3	16	21	2.1	2.7	31	44	1.8	1.9
50,000 - 100,000	29	41	2.1	2.1	23	13	2.3	2.8	44	61	1.8	1.8
25,000 - 50,000	51	66	2.1	2.0	28	16	2.4	2.7	78	93	1.9	1.9
10,000 - 25,000	113	75	2.1	1.9	53	16	2.3	2.5	136	94	1.9	1.8
5,000 - 10,000	110	31	2.0	1.8	41	3	2.4	2.7	158	40	1.8	2.0
Under 5,000	...	25	...	2.1	...	1	...	2.0	...	27	...	2.0
Geographic Region												
Northeast	60	15	2.0	2.3	22	3	2.3	2.7	46	24	2.0	1.8
North Central	78	66	2.2	1.9	49	16	2.2	2.7	102	109	2.0	1.9
South	134	155	2.1	2.0	58	43	2.3	2.6	181	194	1.8	1.9
West	50	36	2.2	2.1	40	21	2.5	2.6	134	66	1.7	1.6
Form of Government												
Without administrator	91	108	2.1	2.0	48	25	2.3	2.6	111	139	1.8	1.8
With administrator	192	164	2.1	2.0	101	58	2.3	2.6	310	254	1.8	1.9
Other	39	...	2.0	...	20	...	2.5	...	42	...	1.9	...
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	42	34	2.2	2.2	38	31	2.2	2.6	91	67	1.7	1.7
Suburban	122	19	2.1	2.1	89	11	2.4	2.7	153	32	1.9	1.8
Independent	158	219	2.1	2.0	42	41	2.3	2.6	219	294	1.8	1.9
Jurisdictional Boundaries												
Interstate	16	...	2.5	...	15	...	2.7	...	35	...	1.7	...
Non-interstate	306	272	2.1	2.0	154	83	2.3	2.6	428	393	1.8	1.8
Council Formation²												
Pre - 1953	2	...	2.0	...	1	...	3.0	...	2	1	2.0	2.0
1954 - 1961	15	14	2.3	2.2	14	8	2.3	2.6	18	10	2.1	2.3
1962 - 1965	56	24	2.2	2.0	26	11	2.3	2.8	76	36	2.0	1.8
1966 - 1968	128	80	2.1	2.0	77	29	2.4	2.7	191	131	1.8	1.7
1969 - 1972	121	119	2.1	2.1	51	29	2.3	2.6	176	166	1.8	1.9
Membership to Council³												
Pre - 1953	2	2	2.0	3.0	1	...	3.0	...	1	2	3.0	1.5
1954 - 1961	11	12	2.4	2.4	12	5	2.3	2.4	12	8	2.1	2.6
1962 - 1965	42	19	2.0	2.1	20	10	2.5	2.9	55	29	2.1	1.8
1966 - 1968	116	77	2.1	2.0	69	27	2.3	2.6	179	123	1.8	1.8
1969 - 1972	151	142	2.1	2.0	67	35	2.3	2.6	216	202	1.8	1.9

¹ Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why they joined the regional council (one being the most important, 2 and 3 the next most important reasons).

² 74 county respondents indicated the reason for joining the regional council but did not indicate the year of formation.

³ 39 county respondents indicated the reason for joining the regional council but did not indicate the year they joined.

Appendix Table IV-E--(Cont.)

Reasons Given by Local Governments for Joining Regional Councils:
1972

Classification	Regionalism Necessary for Obtaining State Funds				Concurrence Despite Doubts of Real Local Benefit			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	146	124	2.2	2.3	104	73	2.4	2.4
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	2	...	2.0
500,000 - 1,000,000	2	2	2.5	2.0	...	3	...	2.3
250,000 - 500,000	3	9	2.3	2.0	3	5	2.7	2.2
100,000 - 250,000	9	111	2.3	2.0	6	5	1.8	2.0
50,000 - 100,000	12	21	2.3	2.2	10	9	2.7	2.9
25,000 - 50,000	17	27	2.3	2.3	16	13	2.3	2.4
10,000 - 25,000	39	37	2.3	2.3	36	14	2.4	2.4
5,000 - 10,000	64	8	2.1	2.5	33	9	2.4	2.2
Over 5,000	...	9	...	2.2	...	13	...	2.4
Geographic Region								
Northeast	12	10	2.3	2.2	6	6	2.8	2.0
North Central	33	25	2.1	2.2	26	18	2.3	2.6
South	62	62	2.2	2.3	34	34	2.3	2.3
West	39	27	2.3	2.2	38	15	2.4	2.5
Form of Government								
Without administrator	37	44	2.3	2.1	24	29	2.0	2.5
With administrator	94	80	2.2	2.3	71	44	2.5	2.3
Other	15	...	2.4	...	5	...	2.7	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	24	21	2.4	2.0	13	12	2.5	2.3
Suburban	34	10	2.1	2.0	56	7	2.4	2.4
Independent	88	93	2.2	2.3	35	54	2.3	2.4
Jurisdictional Boundaries								
Interstate	10	...	1.8	...	4	...	2.5	...
Non-interstate	136	124	2.3	2.3	100	73	2.4	2.4
Council Formation²								
Pre - 1953	1	...	2.0
1954 - 1961	7	1	2.0	2.0	9	4	2.4	2.5
1962 - 1965	11	10	2.2	2.2	20	7	2.5	2.1
1966 - 1968	54	38	2.3	2.2	40	21	2.3	2.3
1969 - 1972	73	61	2.2	2.3	35	27	2.4	2.6
Membership to Council³								
Pre - 1953	...	1	...	2.0
1954 - 1961	5	...	2.0	...	5	3	2.4	2.3
1962 - 1965	8	6	2.1	2.2	11	6	2.5	2.2
1966 - 1968	45	39	2.3	2.2	34	20	2.5	2.4
1969 - 1972	88	73	2.2	2.3	50	37	2.3	2.5

¹ Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance the three major reasons why they joined the regional council (one being the most important, 2 and 3 the next most important).

² 74 county respondents indicated the reason for joining the regional council but did not indicate the year of formation.

³ 39 county respondents indicated the reason for joining the regional council but did not indicate the year they joined.

Appendix Table IV-F

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Number Reporting		Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice				Manpower			
			Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	987	668	628	398	3.4	3.5	411	166	2.4	2.9
Population Group										
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	4	...	2.5	...	3	...	3.3
500,000 - 1,000,000	17	19	13	10	2.9	3.2	10	8	1.8	1.5
250,000 - 500,000	15	35	11	22	3.4	3.0	6	17	2.3	2.0
100,000 - 250,000	48	74	28	45	3.2	3.4	23	32	2.5	3.1
50,000 - 100,000	96	91	60	55	3.1	3.5	37	33	2.1	2.9
25,000 - 50,000	163	155	94	105	3.3	3.7	57	66	2.3	3.0
10,000 - 25,000	311	172	211	96	3.5	3.4	138	66	2.5	2.8
5,000 - 10,000	337	70	211	33	3.5	3.5	140	24	2.5	2.9
Under 5,000	...	45	...	28	...	3.9	...	17	...	3.6
Geographic Region										
Northeast	131	43	78	24	3.5	3.3	49	13	2.0	2.5
North Central	256	168	139	82	3.1	3.2	92	54	2.1	2.6
South	350	344	265	230	3.7	3.7	182	159	2.8	3.1
West	252	113	148	62	2.9	3.1	88	40	2.2	2.7
Form of Government										
Without administrator	264	115	148	143	3.2	3.5	98	102	2.4	2.9
With administrator	608	553	421	255	3.4	3.5	268	164	2.3	2.8
Other	115	...	59	...	3.3	...	42	...	2.6	...
Metropolitan (status)										
Central	157		107	72	3.2	3.4	71	54	2.4	2.8
Suburban	443	174	264	35	3.2	3.0	156	23	1.9	2.6
Independent	387	494	257	291	3.6	3.5	184	189	2.8	2.9

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F--(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Health				Community Action			
	Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	402	273	2.3	3.0	352	225	2.3	2.9
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	3	...	4.0	...	2	...	3.0
500,000 - 1,000,000	11	10	2.4	2.4	10	8	1.8	2.3
250,000 - 500,000	10	15	2.5	2.9	7	15	2.1	2.2
100,000 - 250,000	27	35	2.4	3.1	19	29	2.5	2.9
50,000 - 100,000	37	38	2.3	2.8	33	26	2.4	2.7
25,000 - 50,000	61	70	2.6	2.8	58	54	2.3	2.9
10,000 - 25,000	126	62	2.2	3.0	112	55	2.2	3.1
5,000 - 10,000	130	25	2.4	3.3	113	22	2.5	3.0
Under 5,000	...	15	...	3.4	...	14	...	2.9
Geographic Region								
Northeast	54	16	2.5	3.3	49	12	2.6	3.1
North Central	99	59	2.1	2.8	84	48	2.3	3.0
South	168	153	2.4	3.1	135	129	2.4	2.8
West	82	45	2.2	2.8	85	36	2.2	2.7
Form of Government								
Without administrator	106	100	2.6	2.9	94	88	2.6	3.0
With administrator	251	173	2.2	3.0	216	137	2.1	2.8
Other	45	...	2.5	...	42	...	2.9	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	83	57	2.6	2.9	67	46	2.4	2.5
Suburban	160	22	2.0	3.1	155	20	2.2	2.3
Independent	159	194	2.5	3.0	130	159	2.5	3.0

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Air Pollution Abatement				Water Pollution Abatement				Conservation			
	Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	367	186	2.3	2.3	448	253	2.9	2.9	353	211	2.3	2.7
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	1	...	1.0	...	4	...	3.0	...	5	...	2.6
500,000 - 1,000,000	9	9	1.9	2.4	9	14	2.9	3.0	11	8	2.3	2.4
250,000 - 500,000	8	19	1.9	2.2	8	21	1.9	3.0	6	16	1.5	2.6
100,000 - 250,000	20	31	2.1	2.7	23	40	2.8	3.3	18	32	1.9	3.0
50,000 - 100,000	31	23	2.2	2.4	42	33	3.3	3.1	36	30	2.7	3.1
25,000 - 50,000	61	42	2.5	2.2	75	54	3.0	3.0	60	44	2.4	2.6
10,000 - 25,000	123	39	2.2	2.3	153	53	2.8	2.7	108	44	2.2	2.6
5,000 - 10,000	115	14	2.4	1.8	138	19	2.9	2.4	114	20	2.9	2.6
Under 5,000	...	8	...	1.8	...	15	...	2.4	...	12	...	3.0
Geographic Region												
Northeast	49	8	2.5	2.0	63	19	3.2	3.3	57	21	2.8	3.4
North Central	92	51	2.3	2.6	109	65	2.9	3.0	93	52	2.3	3.0
South	132	97	2.1	2.2	172	126	2.9	2.8	119	103	2.1	2.5
West	194	30	2.4	2.2	104	43	2.9	3.0	85	35	2.2	2.6
Form of Government												
Without administrator	96	68	2.2	2.3	111	94	2.9	3.0	93	75	2.5	2.9
With administrator	226	118	2.2	2.3	287	154	2.9	2.8	214	136	2.1	2.6
Other	45	...	2.7	...	50	...	3.2	...	46	...	2.7	...
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	67	52	2.2	2.5	83	66	3.0	3.0	70	49	2.5	2.7
Suburban	180	19	2.5	2.4	196	30	2.8	3.4	156	23	2.2	2.8
Independent	120	115	2.0	2.2	169	157	3.0	2.8	127	139	2.3	2.7

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F--(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Economic Development				Transportation			
	Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	447	283	2.7	3.1	503	260	2.9	3.0
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	3	...	1.7	...	6	...	3.7
500,000 - 1,000,000	11	10	2.5	2.4	14	16	3.9	3.6
250,000 - 500,000	10	18	2.0	2.6	11	26	3.0	3.5
100,000 - 250,000	30	41	2.9	3.0	36	46	3.6	3.2
50,000 - 100,000	34	37	2.7	3.4	60	39	3.4	3.4
25,000 - 50,000	72	69	3.0	3.3	100	53	3.1	2.8
10,000 - 25,000	142	65	2.6	3.0	153	46	2.7	2.5
5,000 - 10,000	148	25	2.8	3.3	129	15	2.5	2.1
Under 5,000	...	15	...	3.9	...	13	...	2.9
Geographic Region								
Northeast	62	22	3.0	3.3	74	21	3.0	3.5
North Central	117	67	2.5	3.2	127	68	3.1	3.1
South	170	145	3.0	3.2	171	123	2.7	3.0
West	98	49	2.4	2.7	132	48	3.1	2.8
Form of Government								
Without administrator	115	110	3.0	3.0	120	86	3.1	2.9
With administrator	279	173	2.5	3.2	323	174	2.9	3.1
Other	53	...	3.2	...	60	...	3.1	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	88	62	2.9	2.9	116	72	3.4	3.6
Suburban	189	21	2.4	2.2	233	38	3.7	3.1
Independent	170	200	3.0	3.3	154	150	2.5	2.7

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F--(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Housing				Education				Open Space			
	Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	477	276	2.6	2.9	327	189	2.1	2.6	512	260	2.9	3.1
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	5	...	3.2	...	3	...	2.0	...	4	...	4.5
500,000 - 1,000,000	13	12	2.5	2.7	8	7	1.9	2.0	12	15	3.2	3.1
250,000 - 500,000	9	24	1.9	2.8	5	16	1.6	2.4	12	28	2.5	3.5
100,000 - 250,000	32	46	2.7	3.1	19	28	2.4	2.5	34	48	3.0	3.4
50,000 - 100,000	46	38	2.9	2.9	28	23	1.9	2.6	57	40	3.2	3.3
25,000 - 50,000	86	60	2.7	2.9	49	41	1.9	2.6	99	46	3.2	2.9
10,000 - 25,000	147	60	2.4	2.8	116	46	2.1	2.6	159	46	2.7	2.7
5,000 - 10,000	144	18	2.5	3.1	102	17	2.2	2.9	139	19	2.8	2.7
Under 5,000	...	13	...	2.8	...	8	...	2.0	...	14	...	3.1
Geographic Region												
Northeast	62	20	2.8	3.2	38	17	2.3	3.2	62	22	3.1	3.5
North Central	131	68	2.6	2.8	83	45	2.0	2.4	135	76	2.3	3.3
South	179	140	2.5	3.0	128	96	2.2	2.7	176	123	2.7	3.0
West	106	48	2.6	2.7	78	31	1.9	2.0	140	39	3.1	3.1
Form of Government												
Without administrator	121	98	2.6	2.9	88	69	2.3	2.5	126	86	3.0	3.1
With administrator	299	178	2.5	2.9	206	120	2.0	2.6	325	174	2.8	3.1
Other	57	...	2.8	...	33	...	2.4	...	61	...	3.4	...
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	102	70	2.6	3.0	61	43	2.1	2.5	104	75	3.1	3.5
Suburban	192	32	2.4	2.8	147	20	2.0	2.1	231	35	2.9	3.1
Independent	183	174	2.6	2.9	119	126	2.2	2.6	177	150	2.8	2.9

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F--(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Water & Sewer Systems				Solid Waste Disposal			
	Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	618	384	3.5	3.7	494	313	2.9	3.3
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	6	...	3.7	...	5	...	2.6
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	16	3.2	3.3	12	13	2.6	3.2
250,000 - 500,000	10	28	3.1	3.4	12	25	2.8	3.3
100,000 - 250,000	34	56	3.4	4.0	26	50	3.0	3.4
50,000 - 100,000	60	56	3.7	3.5	47	45	3.0	3.2
25,000 - 50,000	106	92	3.5	3.8	83	79	3.0	3.6
10,000 - 25,000	193	81	3.3	3.8	152	60	2.8	3.2
5,000 - 10,000	199	30	3.5	3.2	162	23	3.1	3.2
Under 5,000	...	19	...	3.8	...	13	...	3.1
Geographic Region								
Northeast	84	24	3.3	4.0	83	24	3.5	3.5
North Central	148	96	3.4	3.8	119	80	2.6	3.4
South	233	202	3.6	3.7	184	159	3.0	3.3
West	155	62	3.5	3.4	110	50	2.7	3.2
Form of Government								
Without administrator	155	140	3.5	3.8	116	116	2.9	3.6
With administrator	388	244	3.4	3.7	309	197	2.8	3.1
Other	75	...	3.5	...	68	...	3.4	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	120	90	3.6	3.7	92	81	3.0	3.3
Suburban	254	45	3.2	3.6	215	33	2.8	3.1
Independent	244	249	3.6	3.7	187	199	3.1	3.3

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F-(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Recreation			Juvenile Delinquency			Land Use and Physical Planning					
	Number Ranking	Weighted Mean ²	Number Ranking	Weighted Mean ²	Number Ranking	Weighted Mean ²	Number Ranking	Weighted Mean ²				
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County				
TOTAL	446	275	2.7	3.1	344	228	2.3	2.7	571	338	3.2	3.4
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	5	...	3.6	...	1	...	1.0	...	5	...	4.4
500,000 - 1,000,000	10	8	2.3	2.1	11	9	1.9	2.7	15	14	3.0	3.3
250,000 - 500,000	10	21	2.2	3.1	7	18	1.9	2.8	13	28	2.7	3.4
100,000 - 250,000	22	49	2.5	3.0	18	35	2.3	3.1	33	52	3.1	3.4
50,000 - 100,000	44	36	2.7	3.2	30	31	2.4	2.8	57	51	3.3	3.7
25,000 - 50,000	78	63	2.7	3.3	56	55	2.5	2.8	110	82	3.3	3.4
10,000 - 25,000	136	58	2.5	3.1	111	47	2.3	2.5	171	72	3.0	3.2
5,000 - 10,000	146	19	2.8	3.4	111	18	2.3	2.6	172	19	3.2	3.2
Under 5,000	...	16	...	3.2	...	14	...	2.9	...	15	...	2.8
Geographic Region												
Northeast	54	18	2.8	2.8	44	17	2.4	2.9	75	26	3.3	3.2
North Central	105	68	2.6	3.4	84	51	2.2	2.5	142	85	3.2	3.6
South	176	139	2.7	3.2	139	124	2.4	3.0	203	162	3.0	3.2
West	111	50	2.6	2.8	78	36	2.3	2.1	152	65	3.3	3.5
Form of Government												
Without administrator	102	101	2.7	3.2	81	83	2.4	2.6	135	117	3.2	3.4
With administrator	290	174	2.6	3.1	225	145	2.4	2.8	359	221	3.1	3.4
Other	54	...	3.1	...	38	...	2.0	...	77	...	3.5	...
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	89	65	2.7	3.1	66	51	2.4	3.0	122	79	3.2	3.6
Suburban	187	29	2.5	2.7	149	27	2.2	2.3	240	42	3.1	3.3
Independent	170	181	2.8	3.2	129	150	2.4	2.7	209	217	3.2	3.3

¹The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.
² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-F-(Cont.)

Areas in Which Regional Councils have Provided Assistance and Significance in Meeting Local Government Problems:
1972

Classification	Joint Purchasing				Highway Safety			
	Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²		Number Ranking ¹		Weighted Mean ²	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	338	154	1.9	1.8	335	161	2.1	2.3
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	2	...	1.0	...	2	...	4.0
500,000 - 1,000,000	8	7	1.3	1.3	8	8	2.3	2.4
250,000 - 500,000	5	13	1.4	1.8	4	13	1.5	2.2
100,000 - 250,000	18	20	1.6	1.8	20	27	2.4	2.3
50,000 - 100,000	29	18	1.7	2.1	30	22	2.3	2.6
25,000 - 50,000	51	34	1.8	1.6	58	38	2.2	2.3
10,000 - 25,000	114	35	1.9	1.6	107	33	1.9	2.1
5,000 - 10,000	113	16	2.1	2.2	108	11	2.2	1.8
Under 5,000	...	9	...	2.0	...	7	...	2.1
Geographic Region								
Northeast	60	7	2.6	1.7	42	11	2.4	2.4
North Central	79	39	1.7	1.7	90	40	2.0	2.3
South	132	83	1.8	1.9	122	82	2.1	2.4
West	68	25	1.4	1.4	81	28	2.1	1.9
Form of Government								
Without administrator	87	57	1.8	1.6	92	61	2.4	2.2
With administrator	212	97	1.8	1.9	201	100	1.9	2.3
Other	39	...	2.3	...	42	...	2.6	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	59	35	1.7	1.7	62	40	2.4	2.5
Suburban	159	15	2.1	1.5	153	21	2.0	2.0
Independent	120	104	1.6	1.9	120	100	2.2	2.2

¹ The number ranking assistance differs from the number reporting since some respondents merely indicated a program as providing assistance but did not rank the response.

² Respondents were asked to evaluate areas in which their regional council has provided assistance to the local government on a five-point scale (one being no significance and five being of great significance).

Appendix Table IV-G

**Local Government Evaluation of Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972**

Classification	Number Reporting		Communications Among Local Officials				General Local Government Coordination			
	City	County	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
			City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	987	668	901	568	3.5	3.7	890	562	3.1	3.4
Population Group										
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	7	...	3.6	...	7	...	2.7
500,000 - 1,000,000	17	19	16	19	3.6	3.3	16	19	2.7	3.0
250,000 - 500,000	15	35	14	35	3.6	3.5	13	35	3.2	3.0
100,000 - 250,000	48	74	44	69	3.3	3.7	44	69	3.0	3.3
50,000 - 100,000	96	91	93	81	3.5	3.7	93	80	2.9	3.4
25,000 - 50,000	163	155	153	134	3.4	3.8	153	134	3.0	3.4
10,000 - 25,000	311	172	286	136	3.5	3.8	283	134	3.1	3.6
5,000 - 10,000	337	70	295	54	3.5	3.8	288	52	3.2	3.6
Under 5,000	...	45	...	33	...	3.8	...	32	...	3.5
Geographic Region										
Northeast	131	43	123	38	3.6	3.6	119	39	3.2	2.9
North Central	254	168	225	132	3.3	3.4	225	130	2.9	3.2
South	350	344	319	299	3.6	3.8	313	294	3.2	3.6
West	252	113	234	99	3.4	3.9	233	99	3.0	3.4
Form of Government										
Without administrator	264	245	226	196	3.6	3.8	217	194	3.1	3.5
With administrator	608	423	572	372	3.4	3.7	570	368	3.0	3.3
Other	115	...	103	...	3.6	...	103	...	3.4	...
Metropolitan (status)										
Central	157		149	111	3.5	3.7	147	111	3.1	3.2
Suburban	443	174	407	55	3.4	3.2	403	54	2.9	3.0
Independent	387	494	345	402	3.6	3.8	340	397	3.3	3.5

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council activities on a five-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Appendix Table IV-G--(Cont.)

Local Government Evaluation of Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972

Classification	Review & Coordination of Applications for Federal Grants-in-Aid				Review & Coordination of Applications for State Grants-in-Aid			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	880	556	3.9	4.0	838	526	3.6	3.8
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	3.4	...	7	...	2.6
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	18	3.9	4.0	14	17	3.7	3.6
250,000 - 500,000	14	35	4.1	3.7	12	34	3.7	3.3
100,000 - 250,000	44	69	4.0	4.3	41	65	3.3	3.9
50,000 - 100,000	89	78	3.9	3.9	83	70	3.5	3.7
25,000 - 50,000	150	131	4.0	3.9	139	126	3.6	3.8
10,000 - 25,000	279	131	3.8	4.2	269	126	3.6	4.0
5,000 - 10,000	288	54	3.9	4.0	280	52	3.6	3.6
Under 5,000	...	32	...	4.3	...	29	...	4.2
Geographic Region								
Northeast	114	36	3.7	4.0	111	34	3.3	3.9
North Central	216	132	3.7	3.7	209	123	3.4	3.4
South	315	293	4.0	4.3	305	283	3.8	4.0
West	235	95	4.0	3.8	213	86	3.7	3.6
Form of Government								
Without administrator	219	193	3.8	4.0	215	183	3.5	3.8
With administrator	559	363	3.9	4.1	524	343	3.6	3.7
Other	102	...	3.9	...	99	...	3.9	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	147	109	4.0	4.0	134	103	3.5	3.5
Suburban	393	55	3.8	4.1	376	51	3.5	3.7
Independent	340	392	4.0	4.0	328	372	3.7	3.9

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council activities on a five-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Appendix Table IV-G--(Cont.)

**Local Government Evaluation of Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972**

Classification	Comprehensive Physical Planning				Comprehensive Social Planning				Economic Development Planning and Programming			
	Number		Weighted Mean ¹		Number		Weighted Mean ¹		Number		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	822	483	3.1	3.3	789	439	2.3	2.4	787	463	2.6	3.1
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	2.7	...	7	...	1.4	...	7	...	1.7
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	18	3.1	3.1	15	17	2.0	1.9	15	14	1.9	2.1
250,000 - 500,000	14	35	2.7	3.4	14	32	2.0	2.0	13	30	2.1	2.2
100,000 - 250,000	44	63	3.0	3.4	42	55	2.3	2.3	41	57	2.5	2.7
50,000 - 100,000	87	73	3.2	3.4	86	68	2.2	2.5	86	71	2.3	2.9
25,000 - 50,000	143	111	3.2	3.2	137	101	2.4	2.4	135	105	2.6	3.2
10,000 - 25,000	264	105	3.0	3.4	251	99	2.3	2.6	246	108	2.6	3.3
5,000 - 10,000	254	43	3.1	3.1	244	36	2.4	2.8	251	45	2.8	3.6
Under 5,000	...	24	...	3.3	...	24	...	3.0	...	26	...	3.5
Geographic Region												
Northeast	103	33	3.0	3.1	102	31	2.3	2.5	99	31	2.6	2.9
North Central	204	112	3.0	3.2	195	99	2.3	2.2	197	105	2.5	2.8
South	300	253	3.2	3.4	288	236	2.5	2.7	292	246	3.0	3.3
West	215	85	3.1	3.2	204	73	2.1	2.1	199	81	2.2	2.6
Form of Government												
Without administrator	195	167	3.2	3.4	182	148	2.5	2.5	185	160	2.9	3.2
With administrator	536	316	3.0	3.3	522	291	2.3	2.4	514	303	2.5	3.0
Other	91	...	3.2	...	85	...	2.4	...	88	...	2.8	...
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	145	105	3.1	3.3	141	98	2.2	2.2	136	93	2.4	2.6
Suburban	363	51	3.0	3.4	355	47	2.3	2.4	350	49	2.4	2.3
Independent	314	327	3.1	3.3	293	294	2.4	2.5	301	321	3.0	3.3

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council activities on a five-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Appendix Table IV-G—(Cont.)

Local Government Evaluation of Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972

Classification	Development of Specific Functional Plans				Implementation of Comprehensive and Functional Plans			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	812	475	3.3	3.6	791	457	2.5	2.8
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	3.3	...	7	...	1.6
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	17	3.3	3.5	16	17	2.1	2.1
250,000 - 500,000	14	35	3.4	3.5	14	35	2.3	2.3
100,000 - 250,000	42	64	3.5	3.8	41	63	2.4	2.9
50,000 - 100,000	87	73	3.2	3.7	85	70	2.4	2.9
25,000 - 50,000	142	111	3.4	3.4	139	102	2.5	2.8
10,000 - 25,000	258	104	3.3	3.6	247	102	2.6	3.0
5,000 - 10,000	253	41	3.4	3.6	249	38	2.7	3.1
Under 5,000	...	23	...	3.6	...	23	...	3.0
Geographic Region								
Northeast	107	35	3.5	3.4	104	35	2.6	2.5
North Central	201	114	3.2	3.6	194	111	2.5	2.8
South	294	243	3.4	3.7	288	232	2.7	3.0
West	210	83	3.3	3.2	205	79	2.4	2.6
Form of Government								
Without administrator	190	163	3.3	3.6	188	163	2.7	3.0
With administrator	534	312	3.3	3.6	514	294	2.5	2.8
Other	88	...	3.7	...	89	...	2.8	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	143	105	3.4	3.6	140	104	2.5	2.6
Suburban	365	52	3.3	3.8	353	51	2.5	2.5
Independent	304	318	3.3	3.5	298	302	2.7	3.0

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council activities on a five-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Appendix Table IV-G--(Cont.)

Local Government Evaluation of Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972

Classification	Solution of Particular Local Government Problems				Technical Assistance to Member Governments				Education of the Public on Metropolitan or Regional Affairs			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	813	475	2.5	2.9	812	493	3.0	3.5	814	470	2.5	2.7
Population Group												
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	2.3	...	7	...	2.8	...	7	...	2.4
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	18	2.1	2.4	16	18	3.2	3.1	16	18	3.1	2.9
250,000 - 500,000	14	35	2.3	2.5	13	35	2.7	2.9	14	35	2.5	2.6
100,000 - 250,000	42	65	2.3	2.8	41	67	3.2	3.3	43	64	2.6	2.9
50,000 - 100,000	88	69	2.4	2.9	87	71	2.9	3.9	88	70	2.5	2.9
25,000 - 50,000	146	105	2.5	2.8	146	115	3.0	3.5	144	109	2.5	2.7
10,000 - 25,000	258	108	2.6	3.0	257	109	2.9	3.7	259	103	2.5	2.5
5,000 - 10,000	249	43	2.7	3.0	252	43	3.2	3.7	250	40	2.6	2.9
Under 5,000	...	24	...	3.2	...	28	...	3.7	...	24	...	2.8
Geographic Region												
Northeast	109	37	3.0	2.6	108	37	3.2	3.4	109	36	2.7	2.8
North Central	201	112	2.5	2.7	199	115	2.9	3.3	199	113	2.5	2.7
South	293	245	2.7	3.0	291	256	3.2	3.8	291	238	2.7	2.8
West	210	81	2.2	2.6	214	85	2.7	3.2	215	83	2.3	2.6
Form of Government												
Without administrator	189	164	2.7	3.0	190	179	3.1	3.7	186	169	2.6	2.8
With administrator	533	311	2.4	2.8	529	314	2.9	3.4	537	301	2.5	2.7
Other	91	...	2.9	...	93	...	3.4	...	91	...	2.6	...
Metropolitan (status)												
Central	144	108	2.4	2.8	141	109	3.1	3.3	145	106	2.6	2.8
Suburban	367	49	2.4	2.2	364	51	2.8	3.1	366	51	2.5	2.8
Independent	302	318	2.7	3.0	307	333	3.2	3.7	303	313	2.5	2.7

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council activities on a five-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Appendix Table IV-G—(Cont.)

Local Government Evaluation of Success of Regional Council Activities:
1972

Classification	Communications with Local Citizens				Generation of New Ideas About Local Problems			
	Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹		Number Ranking		Weighted Mean ¹	
	City	County	City	County	City	County	City	County
TOTAL	813	489	2.3	2.7	815	482	2.8	3.1
Population Group								
Over 1,000,000	...	7	...	2.1	...	7	...	2.8
500,000 - 1,000,000	16	18	2.4	2.7	15	18	2.9	2.7
250,000 - 500,000	14	35	2.0	2.5	14	35	2.1	2.9
100,000 - 250,000	43	67	2.4	2.7	42	67	2.5	3.2
50,000 - 100,000	86	71	2.1	2.8	88	70	2.6	3.0
25,000 - 50,000	146	109	2.2	2.7	148	111	2.8	3.1
10,000 - 25,000	257	111	2.3	2.7	258	106	2.7	3.1
5,000 - 10,000	251	44	2.4	3.0	250	41	2.9	3.4
Under 5,000	...	27	...	2.6	...	27	...	3.4
Geographic Region								
Northeast	109	36	2.3	2.7	108	38	3.0	3.2
North Central	199	117	2.3	2.6	202	112	2.8	3.1
South	289	251	2.5	2.8	293	248	2.8	3.2
West	216	85	2.0	2.6	212	84	2.6	2.8
Form of Government								
Without administrator	187	175	2.4	2.8	188	170	2.9	3.2
With administrator	534	314	2.2	2.7	534	312	2.7	3.1
Other	92	...	2.4	...	93	...	3.0	...
Metropolitan (status)								
Central	144	111	2.3	2.7	144	110	2.7	3.0
Suburban	365	51	2.1	2.6	365	51	2.8	2.9
Independent	304	327	2.5	2.8	306	321	2.8	3.2

¹ Respondents were asked to evaluate the success of their regional council activities on a five-point scale (one being not successful and five being very successful).

Appendix Table IV-H

Response Table

Classification	Number Surveyed	Number Responded	Percent
Total	2,215	436	20%
U.S. Congress	12	4	33
State legislators	203	33	16
Statewide officials	2	2	100
County officials	167	38	23
Mayors/vice mayors	86	33	38
Councilmen	778	170	22
Other municipal officials	83	12	14
Judges, magistrates	141	29	21
Constables, marshalls	67	6	9
Justices of the peace	50	3	6
School board	613	100	16
College trustees	9	2	22
Other	4	4	100
Geographic Region			
Northeast	418	68	16
North Central	558	117	21
South	1,060	213	20
West	179	38	21

Appendix Table IV-I

Profile of Respondent

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>		<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Total, all respondents	436	100	Metro Status		
Number of Years in Office			Central	187	43
Less than a year	54	12	Suburban	89	20
One to two years	107	25	Independent	155	36
Two or three years	94	22	Unknown	5	1
Four or more years	165	38	City Population		
Did not respond	16	4	Over 1,000,000	28	6
Geographic Region			500,000 - 1,000,000	38	9
Northeast	68	16	250,000 - 500,000	33	8
North Central	117	27	100,000 - 250,000	63	14
South	213	49	50,000 - 100,000	46	11
West	38	9	25,000 - 50,000	49	11
Office			10,000 - 25,000	66	15
U.S. Congress	4	1	5,000 - 10,000	113	26
State legislators	33	8	Sex		
Statewide legislators	2	...1	Male	400	92
County officials	38	9	Female	36	8
Mayors/vice mayors	33	8	County Population²		
Councilmen	170	39	Over 1,000,000	7	18
Other municipal officials	12	3	500,000 - 1,000,000	3	8
Judges/Magistrates	29	7	250,000 - 500,000	4	11
Constables/Marshalls	6	1	100,000 - 250,000	6	16
Justices of the Peace	3	1	50,000 - 100,000	3	8
School Board	100	23	25,000 - 50,000	1	3
College trustees	2	...1	10,000 - 25,000	9	24
Other	4	1	5,000 - 10,000	5	13

¹ Represents less than 0.5%.

² Includes only the population of counties where county officials responded.

Appendix Table IV-J

Regional Council Members

	Respondents	Council in Area		Member		Nonmember	
	(A)	No. (B)	% of (A)	No.	% of (B)	No.	% of (B)
Total, all respondents	436	367	84%	273	74%	94	26%
Geographic Region							
Northeast	68	48	71	27	56	21	44
North Central	117	101	86	77	76	24	24
South	213	182	85	141	77	41	23
West	38	36	95	28	78	8	22
Metro Status							
Central	187	159	85	120	75	39	25
Suburban	89	79	89	56	71	23	29
Independent	155	126	81	94	75	32	25
City Population							
Over 100,000	162	139	86	108	78	31	22
25,000 - 100,000	95	78	82	54	69	24	31
5,000 - 25,000	179	150	84	111	74	39	26
Local Government Officials							
County officials	38	37	97	35	95	2	5
Mayor/vice mayor	33	29	88	25	86	4	14
Councilmen	170	149	87	119	80	30	20
Other municipal	12	8	67	5	63	3	38

Appendix Table IV-K

Population of Local Governments Represented in the Survey

Official	Number Reporting		Over 100,000		25,000-100,000		5,000-25,000	
	(A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	
Total, all local officials	183	62	34	40	22	81	44	
County officials	34	16	47	4	12	14	41	
Mayor/vice mayors	25	6	24	9	36	10	40	
Councilmen	119	40	34	27	23	52	44	
Other municipal	5	0	...	0	...	5	100	
Nonmembers								
Total, all local officials	69	12	17	15	22	42	61	
County officials	3	1	33	0	...	2	67	
Mayor/vice mayors	8	1	13	2	25	5	63	
Councilmen	51	9	18	12	24	30	59	
Other municipal	7	1	14	1	14	5	71	

Appendix Table IV-L

Black Elected Official Evaluation of Regional Council Problem Solving

Program Areas	Federal and State General		Local Government General		Law Enforcement		Education	
	Number Reporting	Weighted Mean ¹	Number Reporting	Weighted Mean ¹	Number Reporting	Weighted Mean ¹	Number Reporting	Weighted Mean ¹
Law enforcement and criminal justice	18	3.4	121	2.9	9	3.2	22	3.3
Health problems	14	3.5	102	3.1	7	3.7	22	3.2
Air pollution	14	3.6	83	3.4	6	3.7	16	3.4
Water pollution	14	3.1	89	3.1	7	2.9	15	3.3
Manpower	12	4.3	74	2.9	5	3.8	13	3.5
Conservation	9	4.1	73	3.5	4	3.3	17	3.1
Economic development	13	3.5	92	3.3	7	3.0	24	3.1
Transportation	18	3.0	85	3.3	5	3.0	20	3.5
Housing	12	4.3	88	3.5	4	3.0	23	3.5
Education	13	3.8	63	4.0	5	2.8	26	3.0
Open space	10	2.8	74	3.5	5	4.2	13	3.2
Water and sewer systems	14	2.9	110	2.6	6	1.8	19	3.3
Recreation	11	3.4	81	3.3	5	3.6	21	3.6
Juvenile delinquency	12	4.0	67	3.5	5	2.6	16	3.5
Land use and physical planning	12	3.6	106	3.0	5	3.2	20	3.1
Highway safety	14	3.7	76	3.2	5	3.0	14	3.5

¹ Respondents were asked to indicate and evaluate the effectiveness of regional council programs (one being very effective and five being very ineffective).

Appendix Table IV-M

Black Elected Officials' View Toward Regional Councils (all respondents)

Classifications	Number Reporting	Clear Threat		May Be Threat		Irrelevant		May Help Somewhat		Will Help	
	(A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)	No.	% of (A)
Total, all respondents	399	51	13	103	26	18	5	140	35	87	22
Geographic region											
Northeast	61	9	15	15	25	1	2	23	38	13	21
North Central	111	21	19	33	30	4	4	31	28	22	20
South	192	18	9	40	21	7	4	80	42	47	24
West	35	3	9	15	43	6	17	6	17	5	14
Membership status											
Member	251	31	12	70	28	15	6	88	35	47	19
Nonmember	148	20	14	33	22	3	2	52	35	40	27
Metro status											
Central	170	25	15	54	32	9	5	48	28	34	20
Suburban	82	9	11	26	32	4	5	28	34	15	18
Independent	143	16	11	20	14	5	3	64	45	38	27
Unknown	4	1	25	3	75	0	...	0	...	0	...

Appendix Table V-A

A-95 Clearinghouse Piggybacking: 1972

Areawide Agency Designations*	No. of A-95 Clearinghouses
A-95 Clearinghouse only	11
Subtotal	11
% of N	4
2 Agency Designations	
A-95 +	
HUD	15
TPA	2
Subtotal17
% of N	7
3 Agency Designations	
A-95 – HUD +	
TPA	25
SPR	19
LEAA	3
EDD	1
A-95 – SPR +	
EDD	3
TPA	1
LDD	1
Subtotal	53
% of N	21
4 Agency Designations	
A-95 – HUD – SPR +	
LEAA	16
TPA	17
LDD	5
EDD	4
CHP	2
RCD	2
MAPC	1
A-95 – HUD – EDD +	
LEAA	2
TPA	1
A-95 – HUD – LEAA +	
TPA	2
CHP	1
Subtotal	53
% of N	21
5 Agency Designations	
A-95 – SPR – LEAA – HUD +	
TPA	12
EDD	9
CHP	7
RCD	2
A-95 – SPR – EDD – HUD +	
TPA	2
LDD	2

Appendix Table V-A (Continued)

A-95 Clearinghouse Piggybacking: 1972

Areawide Agency Designations*	No. of A-95 Clearinghouses
A-95 – SPR – LEAA +	
EDD – LDD	2
EDD – CHP	2
MAPC – HUD	2
A-95 – HUD – CHP – LEAA – TPA	2
A-95 + 4 other agency designations	16
Subtotal	58
% of N	23
6 Agency Designations	
A-95 – SPR – HUD – LEAA +	
EDD – CHP	6
TPA – CHP	5
EDD – LDD	4
LDD – CHP	2
CHP – MAPC	2
A-95 – HUD – EDD – CHP – LEAA – RCD	2
A-95 + 5 other agency designations	9
Subtotal	30
% of N	12
7 Agency Designations	
A-95 – SPR – HUD – MAPC +	
CHP – LEAA – TPA	6
CHP – LEAA – EDD	3
LEAA – TPA – LDD	2
LEAA – TPA – AQC	2
A-95 + 6 other agency designations	8
Subtotal	21
% of N	8
8 Agency Designations	
A-95 – SPR – HUD – LEAA – MAPC +	
EDD – LDD – RCD	2
CHP – TPA – EDD	2
A-95 and 7 other agency designations	1
Subtotal	5
% of N	2
A-95 + 8 other agency designations	1
A-95 + 9 other agency designations	1
TOTAL (2 or more agency designations)	239

N=250

KEY

- SPR = State Planning Region or District Agency
- EDD = Economic Development District
- LDD = Local Development District
- CAA = Community Action Agency
- CHP = Comprehensive Health Planning Agency
- LEAA = Law Enforcement Planning Agency
- RCD = Resource Conservation and Development Project
- AQC = Air Quality Control Agency
- TPA = Transportation Planning Agency
- MAPC = Manpower Area Planning Council
- HUD = Metropolitan Planning Agency and/or Non-metropolitan Planning Agency

Appendix Table V-B

Percent of Staff Time and Budgeted Funds Allocated to A-95
Review and Comment Process During 1971

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting	Man Hours					
		Total Reporting	Low	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	High
A-95 only	10	10	3	40	74	250	500
A-95 + 1	12	12	80	133	525	1,000	17,000
A-95 + 2	47	44	5	48	140	800	9,600
A-95 + 3	46	44	30	160	460	1,029	6,400
A-95 + 4	48	42	25	200	520	1,500	11,000
A-95 + 5	25	23	60	200	500	1,040	5,532
A-95 + 6	18	18	80	160	285	1,344	5,000
A-95 + 7	5	5	250	300	425	440	2,000
A-95 + 8	1	1			500		
A-95 + 10	1	0					

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting	Dollar Outlays					
		Total Reporting	Low	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	High
A-95 only	10	8	\$100	\$ 300	\$1,250	\$ 300	\$ 3,500
A-95 + 1	12	12	600	3,836	6,383	10,000	150,000
A-95 + 2	47	43	23	500	2,000	9,935	120,000
A-95 + 3	46	45	210	1,960	4,500	10,000	34,000
A-95 + 4	48	44	210	2,273	6,000	19,000	65,000
A-95 + 5	25	25	600	2,500	5,000	12,500	112,061
A-95 + 6	18	17	40	1,000	2,500	15,000	40,000
A-95 + 7	5	5	500	1,500	3,600	3,960	12,000
A-95 + 8	1	1			4,000		
A-95 + 10	1	0					

Agency Designation	Total Number Reporting	Number of Reviews					
		Total Reporting	Low	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	High
A-95 only	10	6	3	3	18	48	76
A-95 + 1	12	10	16	26	34	71	348
A-95 + 2	47	47	2	10	20	43	900
A-95 + 3	46	46	3	24	40	65	1,557
A-95 + 4	48	48	4	20	48	84	240
A-95 + 5	25	25	20	30	48	84	435
A-95 + 6	18	15	10	30	43	84	300
A-95 + 7	5	5	10	19	36	40	52
A-95 + 8	1	1			62		
A-95 + 10	1	1			36		

GLOSSARY

A-95

An areawide comprehensive planning organization or State agency officially recognized by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to notify other affected local or State governmental units of proposed Federal-aid or direct Federal projects before they are funded, and to perform reviews of such projects and comment upon them as to their consistency with areawide or State policies. This process is established by OMB Circular A-95, pursuant to Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 and Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968.

Areawide

Refers to the geographic territory which encompasses the whole area of influence of a program, or the whole area of impact of a problem to which planning is to be addressed, usually transcending the boundaries of any single unit of local government.

Block Grants

Matching grants for broad purposes, usually subject to general planning requirements and other flexible conditions which leave a good deal of discretion to the grantee with respect to how the funds are to be used within the broad category specified.

Buying-In

State financial contribution to non-Federal matching requirements in what previously had been largely Federal-local programs. The State is generally able to channel Federal funds as a consequence of "buying-in."

Categorical Grants

Matching grants of the usual type, restricted to use in a single functional field for narrower purposes (categorical expenditure limits) than block grants. Categorical grants are usually subject to very specific planning requirements and other conditions on their use.

Comprehensive Planning

A process by which the general policies of a unit of government are interrelated over a period of time extending into the future. Such planning is done for the purpose of coordinating more detailed functional planning.

Coordinative Management Assistance

Financial assistance to support activities of a State, a political subdivision thereof, or a regional

council, for purposes of consistent implementation of specified programs.

Economic Development District (EDD)

An Economic Development District is a multi-county organization serving areas of the country with unemployment that is substantially above the national average. These districts are designated concurrently by the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the Department of Commerce and State government. EDDs have the primary responsibility for developing an Overall Economic Development Program (OEDP) which is a comprehensive plan designed to stimulate and sustain economic growth in these depressed areas. Their operations are funded from a variety of Federal, State, and local sources, and their governing board is made up of locally elected officials and citizens within the district.

Elected Officials of Units of General Local Government

For purposes of this report, includes only the elected chief executive (mayor, county executive, etc.) and members of the local unit's governing body.

Federal Program Piggybacking

The funding of an organization for purposes of a Federal program when that organization also serves the purposes of other Federal, State, or local programs. Multiple piggybacking is possible and not unusual.

Federal Regional Council (FRC)

A committee of the heads of the regional offices of certain specified Federal domestic departments and agencies. One of the regional office heads is appointed by the President as chairman. The purpose of the FRC's is to coordinate the related activities of the various Federal members without involving their Washington headquarters whenever possible, and to facilitate relationships with State and local governments. They are not independently staffed.

Functional Planning

Development of a single purpose plan such as transportation, housing, open space, or water resources management.

General Revenue Sharing

Formula distribution of money from one level of government to another without matching require-

ments, special conditions with respect to the purposes for which it can be spent, or planning requirements.

Grant Consolidation

The combining of two or more narrow categorical grant programs into a single program with broader purposes and with greater discretion vested in the grantee to decide the nature of specific projects. Commonly refers to combining "categorical" grants into "block" grants.

Grant Packaging

The process of combining grants from several sources into a single funding plan for an individual grantee (as in the Integrated Grant Administration Program); or the process of combining two or more projects into a single application for funds from a given grant program, where the application may encompass all of the projects for a given area or region during a considerable time span such as a year or a full funding cycle.

Integrated Grant Administration Program

A simplified administrative procedure for funding a unified work program from several different sources of Federal funds, using a single application from the prospective grantee.

Interstate Compact Body

An organization set up to perform governmental functions for a specified geographic area including jurisdiction in two or more States. They are almost always created by parallel acts of State legislatures or an identical compact to which Congress gives its subsequent approval.

Joint Funding

Funding a single grantee from several Federal grant sources by means of a single application and single contract, as in the Integrated Grant Administration Program.

Major Capital Facility

Any structure or physical facility which has a pronounced areawide impact or intergovernmental effect on the implementation of policies for the development of a substate district. Areawide or regional significance might be defined to include projects which:

- (1) are located at or near the boundaries between local jurisdictions,
- (2) are part of an areawide system such as highways, rapid transit, or water and sewer facilities,
- (3) are of such magnitude as to establish new directions in the growth of the area or gen-

erate enough new activity to have a major impact on areawide systems of transportation or utilities, and

- (4) are related to the equitable or desired areawide distribution of such things as housing, employment, public services, and public revenues.

Multi-Jurisdictional Organization

An organization, whose area encompasses the jurisdiction of any two or more governmental units, but whose responsibilities are limited to certain functional planning and programs and do not include comprehensive planning or coordinated policy control of a general nature over functional programs, as is the case in an *umbrella* multi-jurisdictional organization.

Regional Council

An organization of local governments established to foster cooperative approaches to matters of areawide concern. Its activities involve more than one policy or program area and its membership generally consists predominantly of elected officials or appointed representatives of constituent local governments.

Special District

A limited purpose governmental unit which exists as a separate corporate entity and which has considerable fiscal and administrative independence from general purpose governments.

Special Revenue Sharing

Formula distribution of money from the Federal Government to State and local governments without matching funds required; expenditures are limited to specified though broad purposes. Special revenue sharing programs may consolidate and supersede a series of categorical grants. Planning requirements and other conditions may be attached to special revenue sharing, unlike general revenue sharing.

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)

An SMSA is designated by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget as an area with a dominant central city or cities having a (combined) population of at least 50,000 with a surrounding urbanized community that is economically and socially integrated to the central city. In all areas of the country except New England, SMSA's must be composed of at least a single county. In New England, SMSA's are composed of a series of urbanized and inter-connected municipalities and townships. For a more technical definition of SMSA's see Circular No. A-46, Transmittal Memo No. 18, June 25, 1973.

State Channeling

The process by which Federal funds for use by local or substate agencies are given first to the States and then reallocated by the States to the subunits, usually with some degree of control over the funds exercised by the States.

Substate Districts

Geographic areas into which a State may be subdivided for such purposes as facilitating State administration and achieving areawide program, planning,

and policy development. Such districts are usually multicounty.

Umbrella Multi-Jurisdictional Organization (UMJO)

A multi-jurisdictional organization which has area-wide comprehensive planning responsibility and policy control over one or more functional planning and policy development programs. Ideally, an UMJO would exercise policy control over all, or most, of the multi-jurisdictional functional programs operating within its area of jurisdiction.

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The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) was created by Congress in 1959 to monitor the operation of the American federal system and to recommend improvements. ACIR is a permanent national bipartisan body representing the executive and legislative branches of Federal, State and local government and the public.

Of the 26 Commission members, nine represent the Federal government, 14 represent State and local governments and three represent the general public. Twenty members are appointed by the President. He names three private citizens and three Federal executive officials directly and selects four governors, three State legislators, four mayors and three elected county officials from slates nominated, respectively, by the National Governors' Conference, the Council of State Governments, the National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of Counties. The other six are Members of Congress—three Senators appointed by the President of the Senate and three Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House. Commission members serve two-year terms and may be reappointed. The Commission names an Executive Director who heads the small professional staff.

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