


The Challenge of Local Governmental Reorganization



SUBSTATE
REGIONALISM
AND THE
FEDERAL
SYSTEM

Volume III

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

WASHINGTON D.C. 20575


FEBRUARY 1974

A-44



A COMMISSION REPORT

The Challenge of Local Governmental Reorganization



SUBSTATE
REGIONALISM
AND THE
FEDERAL
SYSTEM
Volume III

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20575
FEBRUARY 1974



A-44

PREFACE

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was established by Public Law 380, passed by the first session of the 86th Congress and approved by the President September 24, 1959. Section 2 of the act sets forth the following declaration of purpose and specific responsibilities for the commission:

“Sec. 2. Because of the complexity of modern life intensifies the need in a federal form of government for the fullest cooperation and coordination of activities between the levels of government, and because population growth and scientific developments portend an increasingly complex society in future years, it is essential that an appropriate agency be established to give continuing attention to intergovernmental problems.

“It is intended that the commission, in the performance of its duties, will—

“(1) bring together representatives of the Federal, State, and local governments for the consideration of common problems;

“(2) provide a forum for discussing the administration and coordination of Federal grant and other programs requiring intergovernmental cooperation;

“(3) give critical attention to the conditions and controls involved in the administration of Federal grant programs;

“(4) make available technical assistance to the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government in the review of proposed legislation to determine its overall effect on the Federal system;

“(5) encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation;

“(6) recommend, within the framework of the Constitution, the most desirable allocation of governmental functions, responsibilities, and revenues among the several levels of government; and

“(7) recommend methods of coordinating and

simplifying tax laws and administrative practices to achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship between the levels of government and to reduce the burden of compliance for taxpayers.”

Pursuant to its statutory responsibilities, the Commission from time to time singles out for study and recommendation particular problems impeding the effectiveness of the federal system. In keeping with this responsibility, in 1971 the Commission identified regionalism as an important intergovernmental development and resolved “to assess the record to date, including the use and accomplishments of regional intergovernmental bodies.”

The first phase of the Commission’s work dealt with multistate regional instrumentalities, and a report on *multistate regionalism* was approved at a meeting of the Commission on December 17, 1971. The second phase involves substate regionalism. This is the third of a six-volume report on that subject.

The first volume in this series focused on recent substate districting actions taken by the Federal, State, and local governments in response to jurisdictional fragmentation in both urban and rural areas and to the need for areawide solutions to certain public service problems. The second provided a range of case studies covering all major dimensions of recent substate regional developments. In this volume, the Commission examines various traditional methods of regional cooperation and of local and areawide governmental reorganization. In the remaining volumes of this study the Commission will deal with the assignment of public service responsibilities and the effectiveness of certain regional approaches in Canada.

This volume was approved at a meeting of the Commission on February 14, 1974.

Robert E. Merriam
Chairman

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume was prepared by the Governmental Structure and Functions staff of the Commission. Major responsibility for the staff work was shared by David B. Walker and Carl W. Stenberg—Project Directors for the Commission's substate regionalism report—and John J. Callahan, Bruce D. McDowell, Ruth A. Bosek, Jean M. Gansel, and William T. Harris. Library assistance was provided by Carol J. Monical. The secretarial-clerical services of Mary Fitzgerald, Linda Martinez, Betty Smith, Kim Sowards, Gloria Thomas, and Vicki Watts, were, of course, indispensable. Judith Blakely skillfully and cheerfully performed the task of editing this volume.

Chapter V was prepared by Professor Thor K. Swanson of Washington State University while he was serving as Senior Academic Resident with ACIR during 1972-1973. Chapter III is based on a study of intergovernmental service agreements conducted under contractual arrangements with the Commission by Professor Joseph F. Zimmerman of the State University of New York at Albany. A special note of thanks is due Charles W. Washington who assembled much of the data on single county metropolitan areas and prepared a preliminary draft of Chapter IV during his internship with the Commission in 1971-1972.

The Commission and its staff had the benefit of review and comment on its work by a large number of persons with interest and informed judgement in local government and regional affairs. Those participating in special "thinkers' sessions" held on December 10 and 14, 1972 were: Jacques Avent, John Bebout, Richard Burton, William K. Brussat, Marian Clawson, William G. Colman, Martha Dert-hick, Joseph Doherty, Richard C. Hartman, Raymond Hay, Victor Jones, John Joyner, Ira Kaye,

Mark Keane, Richard Lehne, Norton Long, Ann Macaluso, James Martin, Hugh Miels, Thomas Murphy, Selma Mushkin, James H. Pickford, Robert Steadman, Revan Tranter, George Washnis, and York Willbern.

Other persons who provided valuable assistance during the course of the study, participated in "critics' sessions" on drafts of the issues and recommendations chapters, or commented on various draft chapters appearing in this volume include: John Bosley, William Cassella, Vance Clark, James Dowden, Aliceann Fritschler, James Forkin, John Garvey, James Hoban, Gerald Horton, Dwight Ink, James Johnson, Richard Johnson, Rodney Kendig, Ted Kolderie, Earl Lindveit, Melvin Mogulof, Beverly Osmon, Edward Rizzo, Lawrence Rutter, Frank Sandifer, Walter Scheiber, Lee Schoenecker, J. Fred Silva, Terry Smith, Edward Speshock, Glenn Stine, Charles Warren, Mary Washington, Deil Wright, and Joseph Zimmerman.

The Commission gratefully acknowledges financial assistance received from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development under Section 701(b) of the Housing Act of 1954 as amended. These funds supported much of the survey research and consulting services upon which several chapters are based, and expedited the printing of this volume.

The completion of this part of the study would not have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of the persons and the agency identified above. Full responsibility for content and accuracy rests, of course, with the Commission and its staff.

Wm. R. MacDougall
Executive Director

CONTENTS

| | | |
|---------------------|---|------------|
| Chapter I | Introduction | 1 |
| Chapter II | Assignment of Substate Functions: Local and Areawide | 3 |
| | Present Patterns of Assignment: An Overview | 4 |
| | Recent and Continuing Developments | 5 |
| | Substate Functional Assignment Criteria, Theories and Procedures, Structure, and Functions | 8 |
| | Summary | 26 |
| Chapter III | Intergovernmental Service Agreements and Transfer of Functions | 29 |
| | Cooperation Legislation | 30 |
| | Intergovernmental Service Agreement Activity | 35 |
| | Summary and Conclusions | 50 |
| Chapter IV | The Metropolitan County | 53 |
| | Population Characteristics | 55 |
| | Government Profile | 59 |
| | Intergovernmental Cooperation | 67 |
| | Summary and Conclusions | 75 |
| Chapter V | Annexation, Consolidation, and Federation | 81 |
| | Annexation | 82 |
| | City-County Consolidation | 91 |
| | Metropolitan Federation | 95 |
| | Urban Blacks and Reorganization | 101 |
| | Structural Reform and Fiscal Equity | 104 |
| | Administrative Effectiveness | 105 |
| | Conclusions | 106 |
| Chapter VI | The Non-Metropolitan Governmental Pattern | 111 |
| | Local Governments in Non-Metropolitan America | 112 |
| | Summary and Conclusions | 123 |
| Chapter VII | Local Government Reorganizational Issues | 127 |
| | Local Strategies | 129 |
| | State Strategies | 139 |
| | Federal Strategies | 141 |
| | Lingering Questions | 143 |
| Chapter VIII | Recommendations | 145 |
| | Introduction | 146 |
| | Summary of Findings | 146 |
| | Recommendations | 151 |
| | The State Role | 151 |
| | Recommendation 1. A Comprehensive State Policy and Process | 151 |
| | The Federal Role | 171 |
| | Recommendation 2. A Supportive Role | 171 |

TABLES

| | | |
|--------|--|----|
| II-1 | Direct Expenditure Responsibility by Level of Government and Specific Function: 1970-1971 | 5 |
| II-2 | Direct and Intergovernmental Expenditure Responsibility by Level of Government and Type of Function: 1970-1971 | 5 |
| II-3 | Distribution of Direct General Expenditure in Metropolitan Areas, by Type of Local Government: 1967 | 6 |
| II-4 | Dominant Direct Service Provider, by Type of Government and Selected Function, the 50 States: 1967 | 7 |
| II-5 | Regional Special District Share of Selected Metropolitan Functional Expenditures in the 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970 | 8 |
| II-6 | Function or Activity Ranked by Prevalence of Cooperation: 1972 | 9 |
| II-7 | The Functional Organization of Metropolitan Dade County | 10 |
| II-8 | The Functional Organization of Nashville-Davidson County | 11 |
| II-9 | The Functional Organization of Jacksonville-Duval County | 12 |
| II-10 | The Functional Organization of Indianapolis-Marion County | 13 |
| II-11 | A-95 Referral Activities: 1972 | 16 |
| II-12 | Grant Management Impacts of A-95 Review Activities as Perceived by Regional Councils and Local Governments: 1972 | 17 |
| II-13 | Service Agreements Classified by Provider, 1972 | 18 |
| II-14 | Metropolitan County Involvement in Transfer and Consolidation of Functions, as of 1971 | 19 |
| II-15 | Hypothetical Assignment for Selected Functional Activities | 21 |
| III-1 | General Intergovernmental Cooperation Authorization | 32 |
| III-2 | Constitutional and Statutory Authority for Transfer of Functions: 1971-1972 | 34 |
| III-3 | Municipalities with Agreements for Receipt of Services | 36 |
| III-4 | Municipalities Receiving and Providing a Package of Services | 37 |
| III-5 | Negotiation of Agreements | 38 |
| III-6 | Evaluation of Services | 39 |
| III-7 | Discontinuance of Services | 40 |
| III-8 | Joint Service Agreements | 41 |
| III-9 | Joint Construction and Leasing Agreements | 42 |
| III-10 | Loan of Personnel and Equipment Agreements | 43 |
| III-11 | Municipalities Providing Services to Other Municipalities | 45 |
| III-12 | Counties Supplying Services on a Contract Basis: 1971 | 46 |
| III-13 | Services Provided by Counties on a Joint Basis with Other Local Governments: 1971 | 46 |
| III-14 | Services Provided Jointly with Another County: 1971 | 46 |
| III-15 | Factors Inhibiting Agreements | 48 |
| III-16 | Municipalities Contemplating Agreements | 49 |
| III-17 | State Encouragement of Agreements | 50 |
| III-18 | Federal Encouragement of Agreements | 51 |
| IV-1 | Counties with Overall Population Equal to or Greater than Smallest Designated SMSA, by State: 1971 | 55 |
| IV-2 | Distribution of Single-County and Multicounty Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, by State: 1971 | 56 |
| IV-3 | Size of Unicounty and Multicounty SMSA's: 1960-1970 | 57 |
| IV-4 | Selected Population Characteristics of Unicounty and Multicounty SMSA's, by Size Class: 1970 | 58 |
| IV-5 | Selected Demographic Characteristics of Unicounty and Multicounty SMSA's, by Size Class: 1970 | 60 |

| | | |
|-------|--|-----|
| IV-6 | Unicity SMSA's Forms of Government and Means of Establishment: 1970 | 61 |
| IV-7 | General and Special Purpose Local Governments Within Unicity SMSA's in Selected States: 1967 | 62 |
| IV-8 | Performance of Selected Urban, Regional, and Traditional Services by Unicity and Multicity SMSA Governments: 1970 | 63 |
| IV-9 | Area of Service Delivery in Unicity and Multicity SMSA's | 64 |
| IV-10 | Unicity SMSA Involvement in Zoning and Land-Use Control: 1970 | 65 |
| IV-11 | Unicity SMSA's with Comprehensive Land-Use Plans Involvement in Zoning and Land-Use Control: 1970 | 66 |
| IV-12 | County Revenue Sources by County Type: 1970 | 67 |
| IV-13 | County Expenditures by County Type: 1970 | 67 |
| IV-14 | Unicity SMSA Share of Metropolitan Expenditures by Selected Category: 1970 | 68 |
| IV-15 | Intergovernmental Cooperation in Selected Functional Areas, by Type of Cooperation: 1970 | 69 |
| IV-16 | Functional Reassignments in Unicity and Multicity Areas: 1971 | 70 |
| IV-17 | Lakewood's Contract Services Program: Functions and Recipients: 1972 | 71 |
| IV-18 | Selected Powers of Unicity SMSA's over Special Districts: 1970 | 72 |
| IV-19 | Selected Powers of Multicity SMSA's over Special Districts: 1970 | 73 |
| IV-20 | Patterns of A-95 Clearinghouse and Unicity SMSA Boundary Overlapping: 1970 | 74 |
| IV-21 | Overlapping of Federal Substate Districts and Unicity SMSA Boundaries: 1971 | 75 |
| IV-22 | Unicity Metropolitan Planning Bodies, Selected Characteristics: 1971-72 | 76 |
| IV-23 | Federal Program Responsibilities of Unicity Metropolitan Planning Agencies: 1972 | 77 |
| V-1 | Amount of Functional Consolidation Prior to City-County Consolidation Attempt | 90 |
| V-2 | City-County Consolidations: 1945-72 | 90 |
| V-3 | Numbers of Counties in Regional Units Located in Areas Which Encompass City-County Consolidations: 1970 | 94 |
| V-4 | Metropolitan Councils and Executives | 100 |
| V-5 | Black Population and Council Representation in Major City-County Consolidations: 1962-1972 | 103 |
| VI-1 | Selected Characteristics of Non-SMSA Local Governments—Counties, Townships, Municipalities, and Special Districts, by Geographic Region: 1972 | 113 |
| VI-2 | Government Employment Within and Outside SMSA's | 114 |
| VI-3 | Selected Items of County Government Finance for Population-Size Groups of Counties: 1966-1967 | 115 |
| VI-4 | Forms of County Government, Metro and Non-Metro: May 1971 | 116 |
| VI-5 | Form of Government: 1971 | 116 |
| VI-6 | Summary of Municipal Finance Items by Population-Size Groups Percent of Total General Expenditures: 1966-1967 | 117 |
| VI-7 | Number of Township Governments Within and Outside SMSA's, by Population Size: 1972 | 118 |
| VI-8 | Township Expenditures: 1966-1967 | 119 |
| VI-9 | Average Size of Township Governments: 1967 | 121 |
| VI-10 | Municipalities with Service Agreements: 1972 | 122 |
| VI-11 | Municipalities with Agreements for Receipt of Services: 1972 | 122 |

FIGURES


| | | |
|------|--|----|
| II-1 | Functional Subcomponents of the Family Assistance Function | 22 |
| II-2 | The Community Development Process | 24 |

APPENDIX TABLES

III-A Services Classified by Providers 176
III-B Police Training Agreements 178
III-C Refuse Collection Agreements 179
III-D Solid Waste Disposal Agreements 180
III-E Planning Agreements 181
III-F Sewage Disposal Agreements 182
III-G Who Should Provide the Services? 183
IV-A Single County SMSA's, by State 185
IV-B Selected Characteristics of Responding Single-County SMSA's 188

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION



The first volume of this report examined the various substate districting approaches taken by the Federal, State, and local governments since the early 1960's to meet the need for effective areawide solutions to the problems resulting from rapid population growth and technological change. The Federal government assumed a leadership role in reorganizing local government structure through its financial and administrative support for regional councils, A-95 clearinghouses, and areawide functional planning agencies. This support was largely a response to the failure of most State and local efforts to fill the institutional vacuum existing at the regional level. Yet these Federally encouraged bodies were not governments; their major functional responsibilities were planning, communications, coordination, and grant-in-aid administration.

As indicated in the introductory chapter of Volume I, these recent districting activities have been characterized by fragmentation, ambivalence, and incrementalism. In the absence of a clear and consistent substate regionalism policy to guide districting under Federal and State auspices, the polycentric political system found in most metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas was further fractionalized by the proliferation of single and multi-purpose areawide bodies. As a result, the typical metropolitan area now contains a regional council or A-95 clearinghouse and three or four functional substate districts, in addition to nearly 90 general and special purpose local governmental units.

These trends have been viewed with growing concern by city and county elected officials and governmental reformers. Some feel that districts are well insulated and unresponsive areawide bureaucracies which divert needed financial resources away from local governments and dilute the influence of cities and counties in regional, State, and Federal programs. Others consider them a new breed of special district which, while representing an economically feasible way to perform certain services, could well impede progress toward major local governmental restructuring.

Some observers have a more positive assessment

of these trends. To them districting is a critical transitional stage leading ultimately to more effective regional governance structures. Umbrella regional councils in particular are thought to have the potential to become major institutional catalysts. At the same time, they recognize that in light of the meager accomplishments to date in some places, districting may well be the only politically viable way to meet areawide needs.


The mushrooming of districts and the accompanying debate over the proper nature and direction of local relationships and responsibilities in substate regionalism has detracted attention from the traditional methods of dealing cooperatively with inter-jurisdictional problems. The principal local options include intergovernmental service agreements, functional transfers, the urban county, areawide special districts, annexation, city-county consolidation, and federation. Also often overlooked is the States' role in coming to grips with local fragmentation through boundary adjustment agencies; mandatory performance of functions; assessment of local political, economic, and social viability; and other actions. And, of course, the Federal government's financial incentives and requirements have had significant implications in terms of the structure and operations of local governments.

The above approaches vary widely in the degree of their jurisdictional coverage, functional scope, application to urban and rural areas, and institutional restructuring potential. Moreover, they have not been uniformly or consistently applied on an agency or statewide basis. Yet this "patchwork" arrangement has been successful in preventing the collapse of the fragmented local governmental system.

The purpose of this volume is to examine the various traditional methods of regional cooperation and local and areawide governmental reorganization and to assess their desirability and practicality in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. The relationship between districting and reorganization will be analyzed, and recommendations will be made to guide Federal, State, and local policymakers in establishing a more effective regional governance process.

Chapter II

ASSIGNMENT OF SUBSTATE FUNCTIONS: LOCAL AND AREAWIDE



The assignment of governmental responsibility for urban functions is presently an unsystematic if not haphazard process. These patterns of functional assignment have resulted from national program initiatives; State decisions about whether to perform a service directly, indirectly by mandating it to a lower governmental tier, or through the workings of its intergovernmental aid system; fiscal pressures on State and local governments to assume or transfer services; and the historical and legal status of different types of local governments within a particular State. Since these factors have had different impacts in different States, the American Federal system is composed of 50 patterns of State-local functional assignment and at least as many systems of inter-local allocation of service responsibility.

PRESENT PATTERNS OF ASSIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW

There are two distinct dimensions of functional assignment in the federal system: a division of responsibility among national, State, and local levels of government; and assignment among different kinds of local governments—counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and school districts.

With respect to levels of government, the national government is the foremost direct provider of natural resource development and air and water transportation services. State governments are the major providers of higher education, highway, welfare, and correctional services. Local governments remain the dominant actors in providing education, police, fire, sewerage, refuse collection, parks and recreation, and library services. The hospital function is evenly shared between State and local levels of government.

However, these data do not adequately reflect the true assignment of functions since they do not take into account the impact of intergovernmental aid on these functions. When this factor is considered, the Federal government replaces the States as the major financier of welfare services and supplants local governments as the chief source of funds for housing and urban renewal, while State government becomes a more prominent financier of educational services.

At the local level, the functional assignment pattern is even more complex. As Table II-3 notes, counties are the predominant local providers of welfare, natural resources, and correctional services; school districts predominate in the education function; special districts are most significant in the water transport function. Municipalities and townships play the major role in providing basic police, fire, sewerage, refuse collection, parks and recreation, housing and renewal, parking, libraries, water supply, and electric power services. The health, hospitals, and general public buildings function is roughly apportioned evenly between counties and

municipalities, while the mass transit function is generally divided between municipalities and city-wide or regional special districts.

These generalizations from national data do not reflect regional variations. In general terms, counties are unimportant in the New England States, in contrast to their major roles in California, Maryland, North Carolina, New York, Nevada, and Virginia. Similarly, townships have major functional responsibilities in 11 strong township States,² have only minor ones in another 10,³ and are non-existent in another 29 States. Special districts assume major functional responsibilities in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Washington, but are of only minor import in Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia.

Given these variations, however, a general pattern of functional assignment still can be noted. As Table II-4 suggests, there are several distinct patterns of service assignment in the Nation's State-local systems of government. The State, as already noted, generally takes direct functional responsibility for highways, natural resources, and corrections. Public welfare, hospitals, and health exhibit a State or State-county division of functional responsibility. At the local level the responsibility for general control and general public buildings is usually shared between county and municipal governments, with the county being the more dominant service provider. Airports and libraries are similarly divided, with municipal governments being the major service providers. Funding for the water transport function is shared between municipalities and regional special districts. Education, housing and urban renewal, police, fire, sewage, refuse collection, parks and recreation, parking, and water supply are predominantly performed by municipal governments.

Intergovernmental aid programs also play a major part in fixing patterns of assignment within States. Thus, 19 States channel all their welfare aid solely to county governments as do seven States in the hospital function, 12 States in the health function, and five States in the highways function.⁴ Other patterns of exclusive State aid policy also occur. New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Rhode Island disburse all their highway aid to municipalities or townships. State welfare aid is disbursed solely to townships in Vermont; hospital aid goes solely to special districts in Georgia, and exclusively to municipalities in Nebraska and West Virginia. State health aid is confined to municipalities in Kansas and New Hampshire.

The following generalizations emerge from this overview of the broad functional assignment pattern:

... Federal, State and different types of local governments have both direct and indirect roles in the assignment of func-

tions. Indeed, natural resources, public welfare, correctional, health and hospital, and highway services in a large number of cases are provided directly by State and Federal governments.

... Municipal governments are the dominant service providers in a variety of physical services, namely police, fire protection, sewerage, parks and recreation, and water supply. Larger local governments such as counties tend to be more predominant in the provision of human resource services—welfare, health, and hospital functions. Physical development functions have tended to resist centralization while human resource ones generally have become more centralized.

... The allocation of functions among different levels and types of government occurs in at least two distinct fashions. In one case, the government assumes direct functional

Table II-1

Direct Expenditure Responsibility by Level of Government and Specific Function: 1970-1971

| Function | Percent of Direct Expenditure at: | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Federal Level | State Level | Local Level |
| Local Education | 0% | 1% | 99% |
| Higher Education | 0 | 84 | 16 |
| Other Education | 62 | 38 | 0 |
| Highways | 2 | 67 | 31 |
| Welfare | 11 | 51 | 38 |
| Hospitals | 18 | 40 | 42 |
| Health | 43 | 25 | 32 |
| Police | 9 | 14 | 77 |
| Fire | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Sewerage | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Refuse Collection | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Parks and Recreation | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Housing/Urban Renewal | 43 | 1 | 56 |
| Air Transportation | 67 | 5 | 28 |
| Water Transport | 77 | 7 | 16 |
| Parking | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Corrections | 5 | 60 | 35 |
| Natural Resources | 78 | 18 | 4 |
| Libraries | 0 | 8 | 92 |
| Other & Nonallocable | 59 | 15 | 26 |
| TOTAL DIRECT | 28 | 27 | 45 |

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Governmental Finances in 1970-1971* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table 7.

Table II-2

Direct and Intergovernmental Expenditure Responsibility by Level of Government and Type of Function: 1970-1971

| Function | Percent of Direct (D) or Direct & Intergovernmental (D,I) Expenditure Disbursed At: | | |
|--------------------------|---|-------------|-------------|
| | Federal Level | State Level | Local Level |
| Education (D) | 7% | 25% | 68% |
| Education (D,I) | 8 | 44 | 48 |
| Highways (D) | 2 | 67 | 31 |
| Highways (D,I) | 29 | 53 | 18 |
| Welfare (D) | 11 | 51 | 38 |
| Welfare (D,I) | 59 | 32 | 9 |
| Health/Hospitals (D) | 24 | 36 | 40 |
| Health/Hospitals (D,I) | 30 | 35 | 35 |
| Housing/Renewal (D) | 43 | 1 | 56 |
| Housing/Renewal (D,I) | 79 | 0 | 21 |
| Air Transportation (D) | 67 | 5 | 28 |
| Air Transportation (D,I) | 69 | 4 | 27 |
| Natural Resources (D) | 78 | 18 | 4 |
| Natural Resources (D,I) | 82 | 14 | 4 |
| Other & Combined (D) | 32 | 16 | 52 |
| Other & Combined (D,I) | 36 | 20 | 44 |
| TOTAL EXPENDITURE (D) | 28 | 27 | 45 |
| TOTAL EXPENDITURE (D,I) | 41 | 30 | 29 |

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Governmental Finances in 1970-1971* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), Table 6.

responsibility. In another it delegates functional responsibility but maintains some measure of policy control indirectly through regulations and/or its intergovernmental aid system. It may even use its aid systems to solidify a pattern of functional assignment. Thus, the Federal government promotes State performance of welfare function, local performance of the housing and urban renewal function, and, to some degree, special district performance of the sewerage function by its aid policies and administrative regulations.

RECENT AND CONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS

This brief statistical outline does not fully portray the complexity of substate public service assignment. As Chapters II, III, VI, and VII of Volume I note, a number of both new-style and more traditional metropolitan institutions now exercise new or ex-

panded substate functional responsibilities. A functional assignment policy must take their activities into account.

New-style Federal and State substate districts play a secondary though significant role in performing urban functions. All have planning responsibilities, some have project and grant review powers, and still others perform auxiliary technical assistance that aids the planning and fund raising activities of established units of government. Only a few of these mechanisms directly deliver services or exercise regulatory controls over the programs of established substate jurisdictions. However, the success that various regional councils and State and Federal substate districts have had in their planning and grant-management activities has led some States to consider the eventual transformation of these instrumentalities into full-scale regional governmental units.

Another recent development in the assignment of functions is the continued popularity of the regional special district. In the 72 largest metropolitan areas,

the number of these bodies has increased from 39 in 1957 to over 94 by 1970. Their significance in functional matters is illustrated by Table II-5, which indicates that in at least half of all surveyed cases, regional special districts account for more than 40 percent of total outlays for certain functions in their metropolitan areas. These units are most important in health and hospitals, sewerage, and utility functions.

The popularity of these specialized regional mechanisms attests to the functional limitations of more established units of local government. Most of these newer substate bodies have been established by Federal and State governments to promote regional comprehensive planning and to assist in the management of the Federal grant process. Their coordinative, planning, and technical assistance capabilities are intended both to supplement the functional activities of traditional local governments and to insure that aided local programs do not conflict at the regional level. Use of the more traditional regional special district, on the other hand, underscores the

Table II-3

Distribution of Direct General Expenditure in Metropolitan Areas, by Type of Local Government: 1967

| Function | Percent of Direct General Expenditure Made By: | | | |
|------------------------------|--|------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | Counties | Municipalities/ Townships | School Districts | Special Districts |
| Local Schools | 5% | 17% | 78% | 1% |
| Higher Education | 8 | 26 | 66 | 0 |
| Highways | 32 | 65 | 0 | 3 |
| Welfare | 60 | 40 | 0 | 0 |
| Hospitals | 39 | 47 | 0 | 14 |
| Health | 45 | 53 | 0 | 2 |
| Police | 15 | 85 | 0 | 0 |
| Fire | 4 | 92 | 0 | 4 |
| Sewerage | 8 | 69 | 0 | 23 |
| Refuse Collection | 4 | 95 | 0 | 1 |
| Parks & Recreation | 16 | 73 | 0 | 10 |
| Housing/Renewal | 0 | 61 | 0 | 39 |
| Air Transportation | 23 | 51 | 0 | 27 |
| Water Transport | 0 | 34 | 0 | 66 |
| Parking | 0 | 93 | 0 | 7 |
| Corrections | 65 | 35 | 0 | 0 |
| Natural Resources | 56 | 0 | 0 | 44 |
| Libraries | 18 | 74 | 0 | 8 |
| Public Buildings | 45 | 55 | 0 | 0 |
| Water Supply | 5 | 75 | 0 | 20 |
| Power | 0 | 82 | 0 | 18 |
| Transit | 1 | 59 | 0 | 40 |
| Total Direct | 17 | 41 | 36 | 5 |
| Total Direct Noneducation | 28 | 61 | 2 | 9 |

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Local Government in Metropolitan Areas, V, 1967 Census of Governments* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), Table 9.

Table II-4

Dominant Direct Service Provider* by Type of Government and Selected Function, the 50 States: 1967

| Function | Type of Dominant Service Provider | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| | State | County | Municipality/ Township | School District | Special District | More than One Main Provider |
| Education | 1 | 3 | 4 | 40 | 0 | 2 |
| Highways | 46 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Public Welfare | 35 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Hospitals | 28 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 6 |
| Health | 29 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| Police | 1 | 0 | 47 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Fire | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sewerage | 0 | 0 | 41 | 0 | 3 | 6 |
| Refuse Collection | 0 | 0 | 49 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Parks & Recreation | 0 | 2 | 44 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Natural Resources | 48 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Housing/Renewal | 2 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 22 | 4 |
| Airports | 5 | 8 | 29 | 0 | 6 | 2 |
| Water Transport** | 12 | 0 | 21 | 0 | 11 | 1 |
| Parking | 0 | 0 | 48 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Corrections | 46 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Libraries | 1 | 14 | 30 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| General Control | 5 | 28 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
| General Public Buildings | 3 | 29 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| Water Supply | 0 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 2 | 3 |

*A dominant service provider is one that accounts for more than 55 percent of the direct general expenditure in a particular function.

**Only 45 State-local systems exhibit this function; consequently dominant producers only total 45 whereas in all other functions they total 50 for the 50 State-local systems under consideration.

Source: Derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Compendium of Government Finances*, V, of the 1967 Census of Governments (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) Table 46, 48.

limited geographic reach of traditional counties and municipalities and the need to have certain physical development and human resource services provided on a uniform basis throughout a metropolitan area. Finally, the few substate bodies that exercise regulatory-style responsibilities provide a system of regulation in which special districts and local governments do not act as their own judges in all cases.

Two other developments concerning substate allocation of functions should be noted. The first involves intergovernmental service agreements and transfers and consolidations of functions that occur among and between local governments in metropolitan areas. As other chapters in this volume and Volume IV note, almost 60 percent of all local governments surveyed have been involved in a formal or informal intergovernmental service agreement, especially in the areas of public health services, planning, police, jails and detention homes, refuse collection, sewage disposal, solid waste disposal, water supply, and libraries (see Table II-6). As Chapter III notes, more governments than are actually involved in intergovernmental service agreements favor shifting of selected functions to larger units of government. Intergovernmental service agreements, then, are a

primary mechanism for reallocating functions in the absence of wholesale structural change.

Finally, major institutional change has occurred in a few metropolitan areas, chiefly Miami, Jacksonville, Indianapolis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Nashville-Davidson. In these areas, unified or two-tier governments have been created, with resultant reassignment of functional responsibilities. The scope of some of these specific functional reassignments is illustrated in Tables II-7 to II-10.

All these developments are clear evidence that functions are continually being assigned and re-assigned in an urban federal system. Frequently, however, these same developments also indicate that such allocations or reallocations are only of a partial character. Wholesale functional reassignment is the exception rather than the rule on the substate regional scene. Instead, parts of individual functions and activities (*i.e.*, funding, training, regulation, standard-setting, etc.) are frequently assigned to a wide variety of institutions in many substate regions. How the various institutional actors interact in the performance of a function, then, is of the utmost importance. Indeed, the predominant concern of substate intergovernmental relations appears to revolve around

Table II-5

**Regional Special District Share of Selected Metropolitan Functional Expenditures
in the 72 Largest SMSA's: 1970**

| Function | Percent of Metropolitan Functional Expenditure | | | | | Total No. of Cases |
|--------------------------|--|--------|--------|--------|---------|-----------------------|
| | 0-20% | 21-40% | 41-60% | 61-80% | 81-100% | |
| Education | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Highways | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Health/Hospital | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 8 |
| Sewerage | 5 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 15 |
| Parks/Recreation | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| Natural Resources | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| Housing/urban Renewal | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 8 |
| Water Transport | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 7 |
| Library | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Utility | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 17 |
| TOTAL | 28 | 12 | 15 | 12 | 11 | 78 |
| % of Distribution | 46 | 15 | 19 | 15 | 15 | 100 |

Source: ACIR Tabulation

efforts to promote more functional cooperation and to reduce the servicing conflict that may be produced by widely varying patterns of functional assignment.

SUBSTATE FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA, THEORIES AND PROCEDURES, STRUCTURE, AND FUNCTIONS

The previous analysis suggests in national terms a fairly clear functional assignment among the Federal, State, local, and interlocal levels. At the same time, this pattern is flexible and dynamic, since it is subject to a variety of intergovernmental forces: fiscal transfers, fiscal pressures, structural modifications, procedural adaptations, and program developments. Any attempt to clarify and to rationalize these diverse and frequently conflicting conditions of the substate regional governance system must come to grips with the basic components of a conscious assignment of functions policy.

Volume IV of this report points out there are three main components of a performance of functions policy: formulating criteria by which urban functions can be assigned, assessing the capabilities of the various institutional and procedural means of delivering assigned services, and determining what aspects of a function should be assigned to different types and levels of substate government. How these components are handled in a substate regional context will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

Assignment Criteria

Assignment criteria are useful both for classifying functions and for evaluating institutional candidates for delivering a particular service.

The ACIR report *Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide* constituted the first real effort to develop guides to political judgments about whether to allocate functions to an areawide or local unit of government. The study specified seven criteria for the assignment of urban functions,⁵ arguing that the application of these criteria would permit more effective provision of urban services. The criteria were applied to 15 selected urban functions which then were classified as local, areawide, or intermediate. The report further differentiated among the tasks involved in a given function and suggested a parcelling out of subfunctions or components of a single function among levels of metropolitan government. It noted that certain activities could be performed equally well at one or another level of government. Speaking of the need for adequate capacity to finance a given function, the report stated:

... Because of the great diversity of economic characteristics among the jurisdictions within a metropolitan area, efficient allocation of responsibilities does not necessarily coincide with distribution of economic resources needed to sustain the appropriate package of public services. . . . In any case, application of the economic criteria for allocation of functional responsibilities must be modified to take account of the large intercommunity variations in tax bases and qualitative and quantitative demands for public services.⁶

While technically a particular function could be defined as generally areawide or local in nature, the

Table II-6

Function of Activity Ranked by Prevalence of Cooperation: 1972

| No. of Service Agreements | ACTIVITIES | | | | FUNCTIONS | | |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------|--|---|---|--|---|
| | Data | Legal | Fiscal | Personnel | Areawide | Shared | Local |
| 300+ | Crime Lab | Sup- portive | | Police Training | Sewage Disposal Solid Waste | Jails Libraries | Street Lighting Refuse Collec- tion Animal Control |
| 200+ | Police Comm. Planning Engineering Service Crime Identifi- cation Fire Comm. | Legal Services | Assessing | | Water Supply Electric Supply Civil Defense | Ambulance Public Health | Schools Fire Services |
| 100+ | | | Tax Collection Utility Billing Payroll | Fire Training | Air Pollu- tion Abate- ment Health Hospitals Mosquito Cont. Flood Control Water Pollution Abate- ment Nursing Services Soil Con- servation Service Trans. Museums Irrigation | Police Mental Health Housing Juvenile Delinquent Welfare Proba- tion | Street Construct. Water District Parks Mapping Plumbing Sewer Lines Alcohol Rehab. Traffic Control |
| 100 | Civil Defense Comm. Microfilm Services Public Relations Record Mainte- nance | Licensing | Treasury | Civil Defense Training Personnel Services Transpor- tation Manage- Services | | Zoning Urban Renewal Noise Pollut. General Develop. Work Release | Cemeteries School Guards Police Patrol Building Inspect Snow Removal |

Source: 1972 ACIR-ICMA Survey of Intergovernmental Service Agreements, responded to be 2,375 of the over 5,900 municipalities having more than 5,000 population.

report was careful to point out that the balancing of the assignment standards was ultimately a matter of local political determination. Some areas might wish to provide minimum levels of public service to all communities under the fiscal or operational aegis of an areawide unit while others might permit service levels to be exclusively determined at the local level.⁷ In either case, however, "... political choice will affect the application of economic criteria for allocation of functions in any given metropolitan area."⁸ In short, political values would weight the various assignment criteria and ultimately determine the allocation of functions.⁹

Table II-7
**The Functional Organization
of Metropolitan Dade County**

| Function | Municipalities | Dade County | Other Governments |
|----------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Education | | | X |
| Health | X | X | |
| Hospitals | X | X | |
| Welfare | | X | |
| Police | X | X | |
| Fire | X | X | |
| Highways | X | X | |
| Mass Transit | | | X |
| Airports | | | X |
| Planning | X | X | |
| Zoning | X | X | |
| Housing | | X | |
| Urban Renewal | | X | |
| Sanitary Sewerage | X | | X |
| Drainage | | X | |
| Refuse Collection | X | X | |
| Refuse Disposal | X | X | |
| Water Supply | X | | X |
| Parks and Recreation | X | X | |
| Libraries | | X | |
| Courts | X | X | |
| Jails | X | X | |
| Personnel | X | X | |
| Purchasing | X | X | |
| Records | X | X | |
| Assessment | X | X | |
| Taxation | X | X | |
| Borrowing | X | X | |

Source: William H. Wilken, *Metropolitan Service Centralization: Its Impact and Future* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1973), p. 11.

The Commission report provided a detailed set of economic, political, and administrative criteria on which public service assignments could be based. It applied these criteria to selected functions to suggest how they might be allocated among local and area-wide bodies. The Commission, however, did not judge the relative importance of these criteria nor recommend a particular governance system to embody them. Such matters were to be subject to local determination. At the same time, these criteria provided a technical yardstick by which to evaluate the functional assignments of whatever metropolitan governance system an area chose to institute.

Although the Commission's original criteria have stood up rather well, they can now be restated to guide contemporary functional assignment decisions. More specifically, four main standards might guide functional assignment policy: economic efficiency, equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness.

Economic Efficiency. In specific terms, functional efficiency can occur with conditions of economies of scale, public sector competition, and public service pricing.

Economies of scale are realized in a function when jurisdictional size is increased or reduced and the resulting unit cost of a function is lowered. For instance, highly technical but standardized functions such as water supply, sewerage disposal, or highways can be performed at a lower unit cost in larger jurisdictions. The same can be said for supportive services such as communications. Such economies of scale result from (1) employment of technological advances, (2) greater specialization and division of labor, (3) more ability to adjust for public service certainties, and (4) more ability to take advantage of pecuniary savings involved in large-scale purchasing.

On the other hand, the unit cost increases when coordination costs are high, when a service requires more labor than capital inputs, or when it is not susceptible to standardization. Most often, human resource services fall into these categories when performed in larger jurisdictions. They are probably best provided at lower tiers of government.

Another aspect of the efficiency criterion involves public sector competition. With this some seek to provide some public services by approximating private market techniques so that the individual taxpayer can consume just those services that he desires and at the lowest possible cost. While provision of all public goods in this manner is impossible, there are several ways of developing some public sector competition. Numerous local governments can be established to provide different "baskets" of public goods which taxpayers then consume by simply moving into the locality that best reflects their pref-

Table II-8

The Functional Organization of Nashville-Davidson County

| Function | Urban Services District (Nashville) | General Services District (Davidson County) | Excluded Local Governments |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Education | | X | |
| Health | | X | |
| Hospitals | | X | |
| Welfare | | X | |
| Police | X | X | X |
| Fire | X | Private | Private |
| Highways | X | X | |
| Mass Transit | | X | |
| Airports | | X | |
| Planning | | X | |
| Zoning | | X | X |
| Housing | | X | |
| Urban Renewal | | X | |
| Sanitary Sewerage | X | | |
| Drainage | X | | |
| Refuse Collection | X | Private | Private |
| Refuse Disposal | | X | |
| Water Supply | X | Private | Private |
| Parks and Recreation | | X | |
| Libraries | | X | |
| Courts | | X | |
| Jails | | X | |
| Personnel | | X | X |
| Purchasing | | X | X |
| Records | | X | X |
| Assessment | | X | X |
| Taxation | X | X | X |
| Borrowing | X | X | X |

Source: William H. Wilken, *Metropolitan Service Centralization: Its Impact and Future* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1973), p. 11.

erences. Incentives can be set for both local governments and private parties to act as contract service providers for other units of local government, or cash transfers can be made to individuals so that they can directly consume only those goods that they most desire.

A final aspect of public sector efficiency deals with pricing policies for public goods. The pricing technique permits more efficient production and distribution of public goods, since consumers will only purchase as much of the particular public good as they need or desire at the specified price. Consequently, pricing will cut down on unnecessary production of a good as well as curtail consumption patterns that may be socially undesirable.

In sum, the economic efficiency standard may call for taking advantage of economies of scale in a function, for promoting public service competition by different types and levels of local government, and for using market-type pricing policies in the delivery of public services when feasible. These components

may be used separately or in combination, although conflict may occur when economies of scale and public sector competition are applied simultaneously.

Equity. Another important assignment criterion is public service equity. Specifically, the equity standard is met when economic externalities or spillovers in a function are reduced and when inter-personal and interjurisdictional equalization occur in the financing of a function.

Avoidance of economic externalities was a criterion in the first Commission report. Then as now, inter-jurisdictional spillovers produce uncompensated costs or benefits for parties that do not directly produce or consume a public good. In concrete terms, residents of rural areas do not benefit from the educational investment they provide to children who subsequently migrate. Central city taxpayers have economic costs imposed by concentrations of poor populations with high-cost service needs. Similarly, a downstream community incurs the costs of upstream population.

Externalities hinder the production or consumption of a public good. Thus, when a community loses benefits from the production of a good, it will produce less of the good. When it does not bear the full costs of the good, it may overproduce the good due to its artificially low price. Conversely, when a community receives the benefit of a good that another community produces, it is receiving an economic windfall; when it incurs a cost spillover, it is being taxed, in effect, for benefits enjoyed by others. Interjurisdictional fiscal inequities then arise from spillovers. Thus, it is a matter of basic fairness that a jurisdiction be compensated for the service benefits it provides others and be liable for the costs it imposes on others.

The equity principle also deals with the distribution of economic or fiscal capacity among individuals and political jurisdictions. Put simply, poor individuals or jurisdictions cannot always provide the essential goods that they require. Consequently,

fiscal equalization policies are required to insure that a jurisdiction or individual can buy a level of public service at a price that is not more burdensome than the price that most other jurisdictions or individuals would pay for that service.

As the research of ACIR attests, fiscal capacity is unequally distributed among both individuals and jurisdictions. In the absence of compensatory adjustments, this distribution of economic resources means that some individuals and jurisdictions can purchase only minimal levels of essential public services, such as education, under an exorbitantly high burden. Equalization of fiscal capacity among individuals or jurisdictions, therefore, remains a key problem in functional assignment.

Political Accountability. Another criterion for functional assignment deals with accountability in public goods provision. This criterion emphasizes both giving the individual citizen a choice in con-

Table II-9
The Functional Organization of Jacksonville-Duval County

| Function | Urban Services District (Jacksonville) | General Services District (Duval County) | Excluded Local Governments | Other |
|----------------------|--|--|----------------------------------|-------|
| Education | | | X | X |
| Health | | X | | |
| Hospitals | | | X | |
| Welfare | | X | | |
| Police | | X | | |
| Fire | | X | X | |
| Highways | X | X | X | X |
| Mass Transit | | Private | | |
| Airports | | X | | X |
| Planning | | | X | X |
| Zoning | | X | X | |
| Housing | | | | X |
| Urban Renewal | | X | | |
| Sanitary Sewerage | | X | | |
| Drainage | | X | | |
| Refuse Collection | X | X | | |
| Refuse Disposal | X | X | | |
| Water Supply | X | Private | | |
| Parks and Recreation | | X | | |
| Libraries | | X | | |
| Courts | | X | | |
| Jails | | | | |
| Personnel | | X | | X |
| Purchasing | | X | | X |
| Records | | X | | X |
| Assessment | | X | | X |
| Taxation | | X | X | X |
| Borrowing | | X | | X |

Source: William H. Wilken, *Metropolitan Service Centralization: Its Impact and Future* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1973), p. 11.

Table II-10

The Functional Organization of Indianapolis-Marion County

| FUNCTION | Special District, Independent Authority, or Board | City of Indianapolis (Marion County) | Excluded Local Governments |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| Education | X | | |
| Health | X | | |
| Hospitals | X | | |
| Welfare | X | | |
| Police | | X | X |
| Fire | | X | X |
| Highways | | X | |
| Mass Transit | | X | |
| Airports | X | | |
| Planning | | X | |
| Zoning | | X | X |
| Public Housing | X | X | |
| Urban Renewal | | X | |
| Sanitary Sewerage | | X | |
| Drainage | | X | |
| Refuse Collection | | X | X |
| Refuse Disposal | | X | |
| Water Supply | Private | Private | Private |
| Parks and Recreation | | X | X |
| Libraries | X | | X |
| Courts | | X | |
| Jails | | X | |
| Legal Services | | X | |
| Personnel | | X | X |
| Purchasing | | X | X |
| Records | | X | X |
| Assessment | | X | |
| Taxation | | X | X |
| Borrowing | | X | X |

Source: William H. Wilken, *Metropolitan Service Centralization: Its Impact and Future* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1973), p.11.

suming only those goods that he desires and holding governments directly responsible for the quality of the services rendered.

More specifically, there are two distinct aspects to this standard. The first is the need for citizen access and periodic control. The second is direct citizen participation in the delivery of a service.

Electoral, judicial, and other governmental processes allow citizen access and control over the workings of a governmental system. In this respect, such processes are useful in indicating to public officials the nature of services that citizens desire as well as the methods by which services are to be produced and delivered.

Patterns of political access and control differ from community to community. In some areas, there is heavy emphasis on direct access and control through referenda. In others different types of governing bodies and political party structures affect citizen

control. Electoral processes and judicial systems also determine the character and scope of access and control.

The importance of this standard is that it affects the governing process generally and also particular functions. Access and control can be especially important in functions affecting individual lifestyle or human resources such as education, housing, welfare, and health. To be performed effectively, these functions should be assigned to governments that provide easy citizen access and ready political accountability in a function.

Accountability may also require direct citizen participation in a function. Many regard citizen participation as a key factor in a constructive relationship between an individual and his government. Many also feel that it contributes to a heightened sense of community, better relationships with bureaucracies, and a better understanding of the service

delivery process. Moreover, citizen participation can give the citizen a direct hand in designating the services that he or his community most desires.

Citizen participation experiments have met with mixed success. On the positive side, participation has prompted individuals and community groups to develop new service programs or to voice grievances regarding the functioning of existing governmental systems. It also has created more public understanding of the difficulties often involved in public service delivery. On a less constructive note, however, participation has sometimes produced factionalism among different citizen groups, as well as program demands that were conflicting, ill-considered, or narrowly defined. Thus, citizen participation is a workable though delicate and cumbersome process.

The accountability criterion, then, means that there must be continuous citizen feedback as to the propriety of the functional assignment. Access, control, and participation should guarantee that the assignment of functions meets the wishes of the individual citizen and his immediate community.

Administrative Effectiveness. A final criterion for assignment is the effectiveness of functional performance. This criterion has several distinct components, including considerations of legal and geographic adequacy, management capability, and the need for general purpose government and intergovernmental flexibility in the performance of a function.

To perform a function effectively, a government must have the requisite legal authority to perform the tasks inherent in that service. Without such authority, a function cannot be expeditiously performed and other less effective means of service delivery may develop. Indeed, the lack of legal adequacy is probably a main factor in the proliferation of special purpose governments, which has hindered local flexibility in dealing with areawide service problems.

In the simplest terms, legal adequacy means that local governments should be free of fiscal, functional, structural, and personnel constraints that prevent them from effectively administering public service assignments in an innovative and expeditious manner. It is a factor to be considered in the assignment of new functions to traditional governments or to new-style units that may be only quasigovernmental in nature.

General purpose governments should also have a high priority in a functional assignment policy. A citizen is served by his governments in a variety of ways and expects them to balance competing public service demands. This balancing occurs most prominently in general purpose governmental units which have a wide variety of functional responsibilities. Granting functions to general purpose governments also promotes greater citizen interest in the workings

of government and, therefore, closer popular scrutiny of governmental policies. General purpose governments also can reconcile the divergent functional interests of their respective policies and set better service priorities.

Another traditional component of the effectiveness criterion concerns geographic adequacy. This concept, never easy to define, calls for a government to have a service area large enough to encompass the service problems that it has to deal with—river basins, commuter areas, air sheds, etc.—within which the respective public service will be performed. While this criterion is difficult to put into practice, it argues for governmental structure to be organized around the solution of real functional problems rather than the maintenance of jurisdictional prerogatives. Certainly it is a major factor underpinning the recent areawide developments explored in this report.

Another basic component of this standard is management capability. To be functionally effective, local governments should successfully identify functional problems, set service goals, design and effectively operate service delivery systems, and openly evaluate their functional performance. These processes may help a government to understand better the resource requirements for service delivery, appraise the value of alternative methods of service delivery, and determine when functional performance has been successful. With management capability governments and their constituencies will become increasingly concerned with the effectiveness of service delivery.

Finally, constructive intergovernmental relations are essential. All levels of government play some part in almost every substate function. To coordinate their functional responsibilities, different levels of government would be aided by an intergovernmental relations policy that promotes functional cooperation and ameliorates functional conflict. Different levels and types of government, after all, must be brought into play to meet areawide, community, and individual service needs without any of them being hamstrung by the jurisdictional isolationism of other units. This component guarantees that local and areawide governments, singly or jointly, will have appropriate intergovernmental procedures and mechanisms at their disposal by which to facilitate the provision of public services to their citizens.

To sum up, a standard of administrative effectiveness calls for assigning local governments a variety of functions, vesting them with legal authority to perform their assignments, establishing adequate boundaries within which to perform their services, and providing for the management capability and the intergovernmental flexibility to meet their functional assignments effectively.

Some Suggested Criteria. In specific terms, these four basic assignment criteria might be summarized in this fashion:

1. **Economic Efficiency:** Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions large enough to realize economies of scale and small enough not to incur diseconomies of scale, (b) to jurisdictions willing to provide alternative service offerings to their citizens and to provide these public services within a price range and level of effectiveness acceptable to local citizenry, and (c) to jurisdictions that adopt pricing policies for appropriate functions whenever possible.

2. **Equity:** Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions large enough to encompass the cost and benefits of a function or willing to compensate other jurisdictions for the service costs imposed or benefits received by them, and (b) to jurisdictions that have adequate fiscal capacity to finance their public service responsibilities and that are willing to implement measures that insure interpersonal and interjurisdictional equity in the performance of a function.

3. **Political Accountability:** Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions controllable by, accessible to, and accountable to their residents in the performance of their public service responsibilities, and (b) to jurisdictions that maximize the conditions and opportunities for active and productive citizen participation in the performance of a function.

4. **Administrative Effectiveness:** Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are responsible for a wide variety of functions and so can balance competing functional interests, (b) to jurisdictions that encompass a geographic area adequate for effective performance of a function, (c) to jurisdictions that explicitly determine the goals and means of discharging public service responsibilities and that periodically reassess program goals in light of performance standards, (d) to jurisdictions willing to pursue intergovernmental means of promoting interlocal functional cooperation and reducing interlocal functional conflict, and (e) to jurisdictions with adequate legal authority to perform a function and to rely on this authority in administering the function.

Theories and Procedures

Assigned functions are performed by various types and levels of substate institutions. Effective use of the foregoing criteria requires an understanding of

the different systems and functional capabilities of substate mechanisms and governments.

Chapter II of Volume IV of this report describes three distinct approaches to schemes for substate assignment of functions. One school favors a decentralized and *ad hoc* or polycentric approach to functional assignment; another argues for federation with a clear-cut division of responsibilities between area-wide and local units of government; a third would vest all functional assignments within one consolidated metropolitan government. All three approaches have their theoretical bases and have been models for functional assignment in many metropolitan areas.

Polycentricity. Polycentrists favor an *ad hoc*, bargained approach to assigning urban services. They agree that any areawide tier of government should have few preordained or formally defined functional responsibilities, allowing most functions to be performed by lower-tier governments directly or by contract with other, larger units of government. In this manner, citizens will receive only those services they desire from lower- and upper-tier governments, including special districts.

Accordingly, polycentrists generally favor a fragmented metropolitan governance set-up with large-scale, upper-tier governments performing only those services that are bid for by local governments and with lower-tier governments providing all other services. When regulation of local government is desired, bargaining among affected local governments or intervention by State government or the courts is relied on. The polycentric approach is basically a market model for allocating functions to different levels of government. Functions—local and areawide—are provided only by the governments that citizens choose to perform them.

Most metropolitan areas exhibit a polycentric form of metropolitan functional allocation. Governments frequently perform services at the behest of other units or directly perform those services required of them by their constituents. Functional cooperation between service providers and contractors is common in most metropolitan areas and special purpose districts which provide individual services to particular areas abound.

Yet, there are constraints in polycentric functional assignment. Citizens can not always freely move to communities where they would like to live. Cooperation tends to occur most frequently among homogenous jurisdictions and only in selected, non-controversial functions. Moreover, special district accountability is not always direct or apparent. Thus, polycentrism does little to ease interlocal functional conflict; indeed it permits it to become institutionalized and puts pressure on external agents—the State and Federal government—to resolve such con-

flict. And it does not always heighten citizen choice or provide accountability.

Federation. A number of observers argue for a formal, two-tier system of functional assignment. They favor the creation of a general purpose areawide government which performs functions solely for and in conjunction with lower-tier governments. Federationists contend that unsystematic assignment of functional responsibilities will frequently produce too little centralization of areawide functions, sometimes overcentralization of local ones, and too little coordination of both. They approve of the establishment of an areawide government that determines priorities among regional functions, mediates interlocal functional conflict, and coordinates local decision making.

Limited experience with two-tier government in Miami-Dade County and Minneapolis-St. Paul shows that areawide governments have assumed a number of areawide functions and raised and standardized the scope of other public services. However, areawide governments have not always mediated interlocal functional conflict. Indeed, their reluctance to mediate conflict has led overlying governments, particularly States, to assume directly or rely on other regional bodies for the performance of areawide functions. Also, two-tier arrangements do not always result in the establishment of a general purpose areawide unit but sometimes one which has

merely budgetary and regulatory controls over other areawide bodies.

Consolidation. Another theory of functional assignment states that all substate functions are best performed by a single unit of government. Unified government, proponents argue, will produce economy, greater service integration and coordination, better public control over service delivery, more efficient administration, and more equitable financing of public services. Consolidationists contend that governmental fragmentation is at the heart of metropolitan service problems since local governments will not always cooperate and since fragmentation creates excessive variations in local capabilities to meet complex service problems.

Where governmental consolidation has occurred, the quantity and quality of some public services has improved and services have been expanded into fringe areas. Elimination of service duplication and somewhat greater fiscal equity in financing also has occurred. On the other hand, consolidations are still beset with vexing political problems. Political representation remains a source of conflict, pressures for service decentralization persist, and minority groups — on the fringe and at the center — feel that their political and functional interests have suffered.

While all these general assignment models offer a systematic guide to designing functional assignment systems, most frequently assignment decisions

Table II-11

| A-95 Activity | A-95 Referral Activities: 1972 | | |
|---|--------------------------------|--|--|
| | All Clearinghouses (N=163) | High Coordinated Clearinghouses (N=24)* | Low Coordinated Clearinghouses (N=13)** |
| | Percent Affirmative | | |
| Distribute A-95 Notifications to Affected Jurisdictions | 90% | 95% | 92% |
| Distribute A-95 Notifications to Nongovernmental Agencies | 42% | 54% | 23% |
| Transmit A-95 Comments to Grant Applicants | 46% | 34% | 54% |
| Incorporate Outside A-95 Comments into Clearinghouse Review | 76% | 92% | 91% |
| Refer Environmental Impact Statements to State and Local Environmental Agencies | 61% | 65% | 57% |
| Distribute Environmental Impact Statements For Review | 53% | 48% | 38% |
| Refer Human Resource A-95 Reviews to Human Resource Agencies | 53% | 57% | 31% |

* Clearinghouses with responsibility for A-95 review and administration of six or more Federal substate programs.

** Clearinghouses with responsibility for A-95 review only or A-95 review and administration of only one other Federal substate program.

Source: OMB supplement to NARC-ACIR regional questionnaire.

Table II-12

**Grant Management Impacts of A-95 Review Activities as Perceived by Regional Councils and Local Governments:
1972**

| | Identified Conflicts | Identified Weaknesses In Grant Applications | Identified New Opportunities | Increased Coordination | Provided Useful Info | Provided Orderly Development | Changes | Caused Grant Application Consolidation | With- drawals |
|---|-------------------------|---|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|--|------------------|
| A-95 Clearinghouses (N=238) | 89% | 87% | 54% | 93% | 99% | 84% | 54% | 36.1% | 43.1% |
| Lo Piggyback Clearinghouse* (N=23) | 78 | 78 | 52 | 78 | 96 | 74 | 48 | 22 | 39 |
| Hi Piggyback Clearinghouse** (N=28) | 96 | 96 | 75 | 100 | 100 | 96 | 50 | 45 | 39 |
| Cities (N=267-281) | 39 | 30 | 25 | 67 | 59 | 56 | NA | NA | NA |
| Counties (N=70-83) | 74 | 59 | 45 | 92 | 81 | 79 | NA | NA | NA |
| Cities and Counties (N=337-364) | 47 | 36 | 29 | 73 | 64 | 61 | NA | NA | NA |

*Regional councils with responsibility for (1) A-95 review alone or (2) A-95 review and one other Federal-substate program.

**Regional councils with responsibility for A-95 review and six or more other Federal substate programs.

Source: NARC-ACIR Regional Council Survey; ICMA, *Areawide Review of Federal Grant Applications* (Washington, 1972) Urban Data Service Report.

are not made on this basis. Instead, less drastic procedural and structural adaptations are adopted. Three general types of substate procedures affect the assignment of a function: intergovernmental service agreements, transfer and consolidation of functions, and the A-95 process.

The A-95 Process. This procedure has made a distinct impact on substate functional assignment. It has expanded the level of interlocal information about local government activities and made State and Federal governments more aware of the impact of their grant-in-aid policies. Indeed, A-95 clearinghouses now serve as important regional devices for disseminating grant information to a wide variety of State, regional, and local bodies (see Table II-11). These referral activities in turn have made a modest impact on grant application activity: 30 to 50 percent of surveyed local government officials indicated that A-95 activities had resulted in identification of functional conflicts, weaknesses, or new opportunities in project grant applications (see Table II-12). In short, the process has raised the level of information in the grant-in-aid process and permitted, to some degree, better project priorities by grantor governments. At the same time, the advisory nature of the process and the lack of effective comprehensive planning by Federal, State, and local governments have limited the functional impact of the A-95 process.

Intergovernmental Service Agreements. Data from Chapter III of this volume attest to the importance

of the intergovernmental service agreement. Survey data indicate that 61 percent or 1,343 local governments were involved in service agreements, an average of 8.6 agreements per participating local government. Physical development services and auxiliary support activities in data and personnel matters were the areas of most frequent cooperation, although cooperation was more apt to occur in areawide rather than local functions.

Intergovernmental service agreements are made with a variety of providers. Areawide and local services are more apt to be provided by municipal governments and private firms, and "shared" functions by counties and municipalities. Support activities, particularly those of a personnel nature, are most often provided by State governments. The large-scale public and private producers, including special districts and councils of government which are involved in intergovernmental service agreements, afford a means of changing functional assignments without modifying local governmental structure (see Table II-13).

Intergovernmental service agreements generate some problems in the allocation of functions. Since different service providers are often involved in an interrelated function, coordination problems can result. Thus, hospital services are frequently the responsibility of a private producer while mental health services are usually the responsibility of State and local agencies. In similar fashion, water supply often is provided by a special district while water

distribution may involve a private contractor. Similar situations occur in refuse collection and solid waste disposal and in particular subcomponents of the police and fire functions.

Another problem is the lack of cooperation in certain urban jurisdictions. Localities below 25,000 population, for example, many of which are in metropolitan areas, tend not to enter into service agreements, particularly in areawide services. These jurisdictions may not have sufficient personnel or support services to monitor agreements even though they could benefit by them. In a similar fashion, many central cities do not enter into service agreements, possibly because of their unwillingness to serve suburban communities or because of suburban reluctance to cooperate with cities on other issues. In either case, many central cities which could be major service providers are not fully engaged in the cooperation process.

Transfer and Consolidation of Functions. Transfers and consolidations of functions are another way of changing functional assignments. However, they are generally less widely practiced than intergovernmental service agreements. Data from Chapter II of Volume IV indicate that they generally comprise only about 10 percent of the total of the 11,585 intergovernmental service agreements identified in the ACIR-ICMA survey.

Data derived from the ACIR-ICMA-NACO survey of county government indicates that while functional transfers and consolidations are not frequently used, both enjoy equal popularity when employed. Occasional misuse of the transfer and consolidation procedure is suggested by the data, *i.e.*, sometimes essentially local functions are centralized, areawide ones are decentralized or operated on a shared basis, and "shared" functions with an areawide and local dimension are transferred completely upwards to county government (see Table II-14).

To sum up, these three types of procedural adaptations have changed functional assignments on a voluntary basis, but they have not involved all functions or all jurisdictions.

Structural Approach

As Volumes I and III of this report note, the key structural means of changing functional assignments include Federally and State-encouraged substate districts, councils of government, regional special districts, the metropolitan county, and city-county consolidation or federation.

Substate Districts and Regional Councils. These regional planning bodies are generally responsible for areawide comprehensive planning though the functional components of such planning may differ among States and regions. As communication agents,

Table II-13

Service Agreements Classified by Provider: 1972

| Function And/Or Activity ^a | TOTAL Agreements | Local Gov't Other Than County | County | COG, Regional Unit Or Special District | State/Fed Gov't | Private Firm | Other |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|--|-----------------|--------------|-----------|
| Data | | | | | | | |
| Supportive | 1939 (100.0) | 481 (24.8) | 334 (17.2) | 182 (9.4) | 378 (19.5) | 453 (23.3) | 111 (5.7) |
| Legal | | | | | | | |
| Supportive | 238 (100.0) | 53 (19.9) | 14 (5.0) | 1 (—) | 16 (5.7) | 191 (68.0) | 6 (2.1) |
| Fiscal | | | | | | | |
| Supportive | 813 (100.0) | 259 (31.8) | 229 (28.2) | 50 (6.2) | 25 (3.1) | 238 (29.2) | 12 (1.5) |
| Personnel | | | | | | | |
| Supportive | 855 (100.0) | 190 (22.2) | 90 (10.5) | 116 (13.6) | 382 (44.7) | 29 (3.4) | 48 (5.6) |
| All | | | | | | | |
| Activities | 3888 (100.0) | 983 (25.3) | 667 (17.2) | 349 (9.0) | 801 (20.6) | 911 (23.4) | 177 (4.6) |
| Areawide | | | | | | | |
| Functions | 2741 (100.0) | 726 (26.5) | 459 (16.7) | 460 (16.8) | 337 (12.3) | 687 (25.0) | 72 (2.6) |
| Shared | | | | | | | |
| Functions | 2580 (100.0) | 754 (29.2) | 866 (33.5) | 257 (10.0) | 362 (14.0) | 261 (10.1) | 80 (3.1) |
| Local | | | | | | | |
| Functions | 3425 (100.0) | 1201 (35.1) | 458 (13.3) | 353 (10.3) | 259 (7.6) | 1111 (32.4) | 43 (1.3) |
| All | | | | | | | |
| Functions | 8746 (100.0) | 2681 (30.7) | 1783 (20.4) | 1070 (12.2) | 958 (11.0) | 2059 (23.5) | 195 (.02) |
| Total | 12634 (100.0) | 3664 (29.0) | 2450 (19.4) | 1419 (11.2) | 1759 (13.9) | 2970 (23.5) | 372 (2.9) |

^a See Table II-6 for an enumeration of functions and activities.

Source: ACIR Compilation.

Table II-14

Metropolitan County* Involvement in Transfer and Consolidation of Functions: 1971

| Function | Functional Transfers | | Functional Consolidations | | Total |
|----------------|----------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------|
| | To County | To Municipality | With Local Government | With Other County | |
| Local | (30) | (4) | (31) | (5) | (70) |
| Police | 10 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 24 |
| Fire | 6 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 10 |
| Education | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
| Refuse | | | | | |
| Collection | 6 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 15 |
| Parks | 3 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 11 |
| Shared | (74) | (8) | (46) | (20) | (148) |
| Welfare | 7 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 11 |
| Libraries | 19 | 3 | 19 | 3 | 44 |
| Health | 22 | 0 | 6 | 9 | 37 |
| Housing | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 7 |
| Correction | 16 | 1 | 10 | 5 | 32 |
| Roads | 6 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 17 |
| Areawide | (42) | (4) | (36) | (31) | (113) |
| Sewers | 12 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 26 |
| Hospitals | 8 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 17 |
| Natural | | | | | |
| Resources | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Transportation | 3 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 7 |
| Power Supply | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Water Supply | 4 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 10 |
| Planning | 15 | 2 | 12 | 11 | 40 |
| Other | 29 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 31 |
| Total | 175 | 17 | 122 | 48 | 362 |
| | (48.3%) | (4.7%) | (33.7%) | (13.3%) | (100.0%) |

*213 metropolitan counties.

Source: ACIR compilation from questionnaires in the 1971 ACIR-ICMA-NACO survey of county governments

they increase the level of awareness among localities of substate functional matters. They also provide substantial technical assistance to local governments in developing programs to implement regional policies. Other responsibilities include establishment of nonprofit institutions to deliver regional services, mobilizing funds for regional services through the Federal grant-in-aid process, and, in some cases and where the law allows, directly providing substate services.

Substate districts and regional councils are relatively new actors on the local scene; most have been created since 1965 to satisfy State or local desire to participate in, to better control, and to meet the legal requirements of certain Federal substate programs. Once created, these bodies have served a useful, if sometimes limited, purpose in substate regional administration. They have increased the quantity and quality of technical resources in substate areas, provided a forum for local governments to influence State policy and meet certain State/

regional purposes as well, raised grant monies for regional programs, and improved the quality and scope of the information base on which local governments make policy decisions.

More recently, these bodies have been proposed for other, more authoritative purposes: mediating interlocal conflict, supervising subordinate regional agencies, and even performing regional services when no other entities are available. Thus, while these bodies are now basically auxiliary actors in the assignment of urban functions, they may become more important in the future.

Federal Substate Districts. These districts play a distinct role in substate functional matters through their funding, planning, and, in some cases, implementation and service delivery activities.

Federal substate districts generally engage in several types of funding activities, namely receipt and disbursement of Federal aid, mobilization of fiscal resources, and setting priorities for Federal aid. In fiscal year 1972 the 14 main Federal substate

programs received \$221 million in planning funds and had some direct or indirect influence over the disbursement of over \$8.4 billion in related Federal construction and operating project grants. Community action agencies (CAA's) and economic development districts (EDD's) have been successful in mobilizing other fiscal resources in their respective functional areas: In 1972-73, 84 percent of EDD budgets were derived from non-EDD sources while from 1965-72 591 CAA's mobilized over \$1.3 billion in fiscal resources from non-Federal sources for anti-poverty efforts.

Federal districts have not made much progress in setting funding priorities to guide Federal area-wide programs slated for their regions for numerous reasons: rising Federal agency concern with their own program priorities, district unwillingness or inability to ration funds for projects within a district, and lack of greater Federal funding for district planning efforts. They also have an uneven record in functional planning, which is impeded by its narrow gauge, its lack of relationship to implementation, poorly managed or ill-considered citizen participation, contradictory or vague legal requirements, and planning conflicts among various types of Federal and State encouraged districts. At the same time, some of these districts, notably comprehensive health planning agencies (CHP's), and economic development districts (EDD's), have made progress in coordinating the various functional activities of established local governments.

Some Federal substate districts directly condition the performance of a function or deliver services themselves. Thus, in 10 States CHP's play a central role in certifying need for hospital construction or renovation. Local development districts (LDD's) deliver economic development services throughout Appalachia, and CAA's directly deliver anti-poverty services in some poorer communities. More importantly, however, some Federal districts, notably CAA's and EDD's, have insistently pressured local governments to adopt new services for their constituents. Generally, Federal substate districts have been helpful in suggesting new, more coordinated services for established areawide and local governments to deliver.

Regional Special Districts. These mechanisms exist in almost every region in the country, with more than 1,000 countywide or multicounty special districts in metropolitan areas alone as of 1972. As Table II-5 notes, regional special districts frequently account for a major share of metropolitan expenditures in their particular functions and are most prominent in the public health and hospital, sewage, and utility functions.

Special districts continue to be favored for eco-

nomie and some political reasons and opposed for other political ones. In economic terms, they take advantage of economies of scale, attract better trained personnel, and adopt more advanced management practices than smaller units of government. In political terms, they can isolate a sensitive program, provide the means of appearing to keep local budgets down, and avoid the issue of regional government while performing a regional function.

Nevertheless, the isolation of most of these mechanisms from general purpose governments has sometimes limited their effectiveness. They forfeit centralized purchasing, budgeting, and personnel management services offered by larger general purpose units. They do not always account for or understand their impact on related services. They tend to pay higher capital costs, fail to coordinate their work with general local governments, and are frequently inaccessible and unaccountable to the metropolitan political process.

The desire to retain the operational advantages of regional districts yet constrain their political and administrative defects has led some States to treat their operations more stringently. Recent studies in California, Massachusetts, and Michigan have called for the abolition of these bodies or their continuance as State administrative arms. Other States have set up boundary commissions, strengthened regional councils, or multifunctional service districts to oversee the formation of or to regulate the operations of special districts within their jurisdiction.

Regional special districts apparently will continue to be utilized for the performance of areawide functions because of the economic advantages ascribed to their operations. However, their administrative and political deficiencies are leading to different patterns of political control.

The Metropolitan County. The metropolitan county is another traditional structural alternative for changing functional assignments. Here the emphasis has been on creating an areawide general purpose government that can perform selected regional and urban functions.

The functional performance of the metropolitan county, as detailed in Chapter IV, has been of rather mixed quality. The bulk of metropolitan counties still concentrate on performing traditionally State-assigned functions, though reorganized counties tend to provide more urban and regional services (see Table II-15).

County emphasis on traditional functions stems from a variety of reasons. Among them are the lack of county functional home rule provisions in most States; the counties may be legally prohibited from assuming new urban or regional services. Counties also frequently cannot use nonproperty tax sources, essential to broadening their fiscal capacity.

Table II-15

Hypothetical Assignment for Selected Functional Activities

| Activity Component | Areawide | Shared | Local |
|-------------------------|----------|--------|-------|
| PLANNING | | | |
| Intelligence | x | | |
| Forecasting | x | | |
| Plan Formulation | | x | |
| Operations Review | | x | |
| Liaison/Coordination | x | | |
| FINANCING | | | |
| Revenue Raising | | x | |
| Revenue Distribution | x | | |
| Fiscal Control | | x | |
| Budgeting | | | x |
| STAFFING | | | |
| Selection | | | x |
| Recruitment | | x | |
| Training | x | | |
| Appointment/Removal | | | x |
| ADMINISTRATION | | | |
| Supervision | x | | |
| Management Analysis | | x | |
| Productivity Analysis | | x | |
| Technical Assistance | x | | |
| STANDARD SETTING | | | |
| Formulation of Rules | | x | |
| Rule Interpretation | x | | |
| Rule Adjudication | x | | |
| Rule Evaluation | | x | |
| Rule Amendment | | x | |
| Rule Enforcement | | | x |
| ENFORCEMENT | | | |
| Investigation | x | | |
| Inspection | x | | |
| Licensing | x | | |
| Certification | x | | |
| SERVICE DELIVERY | | | |
| Operations | | | x |
| Construction | | | x |
| INFORMATION | | | |
| Record-Keeping | | x | |
| Communication | | x | |
| Data Collection | | x | |
| Reporting | | | x |
| Public Relations | | | x |
| EVALUATION | | | |
| Fact-Finding | x | | |
| Public Hearings | | x | |
| Testing/Analysis | x | | |
| Consultation | | x | |

Source: ACIR Tabulation

Municipal-county functional conflict also prevents counties from assuming more functional responsibilities in metropolitan areas. Some State municipal home rule statutes (such as Ohio's) give exclusive jurisdiction to municipal governments in selected functions. In other cases, municipalities encourage the county to confine its services to unincorporated areas where it acts as the first tier of government. In still other cases, counties perform considerable municipal service contracting rather than assuming a function on a countywide basis, although transfers to counties sometimes occur, as Table II-14 notes.


If counties are sometimes unable or unwilling to perform more urban and regional functions, they also usually do not act as an authoritative voice vis-a-vis other regional units. As Chapter IV indicates, they frequently do not or cannot exercise strong controls over constituent special districts. Even in the 20 States that give counties the legal authority to create subordinate service districts special districts still abound. Moreover, few counties are empowered or desire to supervise the functional performance of lower levels of government. Only one—Miami-Dade—can set performance standards for municipal functions; other counties that have proposed such charter amendments have seen them defeated at the polls.

In short, counties have been unwilling or unable to act as dominant urban-regional service providers or to supervise performance of local functions, though strong urban counties in a few selected States—California, Florida, Maryland, New York, and Virginia—have assumed a number of urban and regional functions.

City-County Consolidations and Federations.¹⁰ Chapters III of Volume IV and V of this volume assess the functional experience with full-scale American metropolitan governmental reorganization. As with partial functional reallocation policies, the record is mixed. In general, reorganizations have tended to improve the quality and raise the level of some public services, contribute to some measure of fiscal equity, and provide for greater administrative coordination of services. However, political access to the governmental systems has not always been improved, nor have the service needs of distinct minorities always been satisfied. Moreover, most consolidations continue to face the problem of developing a lower tier of administration for the delivery of certain services.

In all three recent major consolidations and in the single federated county case, a number of previously localized functions have been centralized. In the consolidations, almost all functions are centralized and only a few, like refuse collection and street cleaning, are decentralized through the operations of urban services districts, as in Nashville and Jacksonville. At the same time, proposals have been

FIGURE II-1
Functional Subcomponents of
the Family Assistance Function



Source: Joint Legislative Committee to Revise the Social Services Law of New York State, *Public Welfare in Transition* (Albany, 1969), p. 183.

made to reinvigorate the local tier of government, as evidenced by the passage of "mini-gov" legislation in Indianapolis and the Dade County proposal to incorporate all unincorporated areas so that the county could provide only regional services and not serve as the first tier of government for these areas.

With centralized administration has come better financing procedures by the areawide governments. They have expanded grants-in-aid for their jurisdictions, utilized greater amounts of nonproperty taxation, and reduced past financing policies that were inequitable to central cities. However, they have not totally changed the functional emphasis of previous city administrations nor provided substantially greater amounts of redistributive services. Indeed, voters in some cases and legal restrictions in others have sometimes prevented consolidated or federated governments from expanding their functional mix of services or enlarging the territory of their urban service districts. Some examples of these constraints are the decision not to merge education in the Indianapolis consolidation and voter reluctance in Miami-Dade to allow greater county housing production of low- and moderate-income units.

Federated county and city-county consolidation reforms have not always resulted in a fully authoritative and areawide organization. Areawide and regional special districts still exist in some of these jurisdictions, as do smaller municipalities that were exempted from consolidation. Some of these new general purpose governments, moreover, have not gained full control over all Federal and State substate districts operating within their jurisdiction.

Functions In An Assignment Policy

The third component of a functional assignment policy concerns the function itself. Here consideration must be given to (1) analyzing the nature of the function and its discrete components and (2) specifying the criteria most important in the performance of the function. With such analyses, a judgment can be made whether to perform the urban function on a local or areawide basis.

Assignment policies not only involve functions, but subfunctions and activities that comprise a function as well. These components of a function need not be assigned exclusively to a local or an areawide jurisdiction. Police services, land-use controls, and family assistance services provide examples of the complexity inherent in given functions. While some aspects of these functions may be provided best at the local level, others may be better performed at another level.

Some components of a function appear to be logical responsibilities of higher levels of government. Assignment of funding to larger governments, for example, may produce fiscal equity and reduce

economic externalities in the performance of a function. On the other hand, funding sometimes can and should be wholly local—especially when individual benefits from a function are readily identifiable and when the interlocal effects of service provision are minimal.

Activities common to a function that are performed at different levels also are good candidates for reassignment to a single provider. The training activity in the police function, for example, is common to State, county, and city agencies. Yet the present structure of police training is characterized by a substantial amount of jurisdictional duplication. Assigning this activity to a single areawide or State authority would not only produce cost savings, but also result in more training standards. This aspect of the police function, then, could be separated from that of basic police protection.


Family assistance provides another illustration of the many components of a function. Within the general function, whose subfunctional components are illustrated in Figure II-1, there are a variety of program planning efforts. Yet, since the target population is the same—the family in need of assistance—planning activities might be assigned to a single areawide or local government. Consolidated planning might promote better interprogram coordination and permit more sophisticated budgeting within a particular functional component. This, in turn, would permit local governments to take maximum advantage of Federal and State grant-in-aid systems and to forecast the fiscal requirements of the complete family assistance function.

While a number of activities and subfunctions might be candidates for assignment to areawide units, others might be more logically performed by lower-tier units (see Table II-15). Program execution, for example, is a logical local activity. For example, a State might set standards for waste treatment and also train waste treatment operators, but leave waste treatment operations in local hands.

A function, then, may have a variety of activities and subfunctional components relating to its delivery. All are essential to final delivery of the service, but individual components may have greater or lesser extralocal impact, depending on the intrinsic nature of the subfunction or activity and on the way that it is administered. Figure II-2 indicates over 80 distinct steps in the community development process. All these steps, however minor, are essential, but some components, such as land acquisition and site preparation, may be of only local importance, while others are of interest to the larger community. The zoning, public works, and utility supply aspects of the community development process will concern surrounding governments whose land-use and public facility needs may be affected by these actions.

The Community Development Process

FIGURE II -2



Source: American City Corporation, *The Greater Hartford Process* (Columbia, Md., 1972), pp. 24-25

← **Development** →

Detailed Land Development Programs

7

1. Detailed program of uses, including community facilities and institutional uses
2. Area to be developed
3. Site development specifications
4. Land development schedules
5. Land development budgets
6. Land disposition prices and schedules
7. Financing requirements, program
8. Detailed marketing program
9. Program building and operating of community facilities

Detailed Site Analysis

8

- (Final Determination of Site Conditions)
1. Detailed topographic studies
 2. Drainage
 3. Bearing capacity studies
 4. Site values, i.e., wooded areas, stream valleys, views, north-south exposure
 5. Legal constraints, i.e., final title search
 6. Negotiations re: community facilities, requirements & responsibilities

Site Planning & Engineering

9

- (May include steps, i.e., "Sketch", "preliminary", "final".)
1. Land use plans
 2. Other plans for landscaping, lighting, signing, etc.
 3. Site engineering, i.e., roads, water, sewer, grading, electric, telephone
 4. Final cost estimates and schedules
 5. Street names, post office boxes, etc.
 6. Legal maps for subdivision, redecoration, etc.
 7. Public approvals, i.e., subdivision approval

Disposition of Land

10

1. Finalize marketing strategy
2. Select method for land disposition, i.e., in-house sales force and/or brokers
3. Prepare sales agreements, including liens and covenants
4. Dispose of land
 - a. sales to outside builders
 - b. deed to entity for community facility and open space
 - c. dedicate to local government
 - d. sale or contribute to institutions
5. Community facilities agreements

Site Improvements—Construction

11

1. Final construction specifications, bid packages
2. Detailed construction schedule, i.e., CPM
3. Select contractors and negotiate contracts
4. Obtain final public approvals, i.e., building permits
5. Supervise and coordinate construction, roads, water, sewer, gas/electric, telephone, CATV, major site clearing and grading
6. Quality control
7. Cost control and final accounting
8. Establishment of Social systems operating processes

Evaluation of Programs, Plans

12

- Evaluation of:
1. Land development costs
 2. Land sale pace and prices
 3. Home sales by individual builders
 4. Commercial and residential rents
 5. Employment and shopping patterns
 6. Population profile
 7. Community facilities and services
 8. Net contribution to local government
 9. Etc.

Continuing Development Plans

13

- Repeat and refinement of activities 7 through 11 detailed phase by phase through completion

Functions are really packages of subfunctions and activities, many of which need not be performed by the government that delivers the end service. Activities that might be centralized include financing, standard-setting, training, planning, and coordination. On the other hand, administration, budgeting, personnel section, and local supplementation of financing, standard-setting, and planning policies may still occur at the local level.

SUMMARY

There are myriad patterns of substate functional assignment, most of which are *ad hoc* and unsystematic in nature. Consequently, a major task in substate regionalism is the development of more comprehensive and systematic policies for assignment of functions among areawide and local governments. This task requires (a) consideration of criteria or rules for functional assignment; (b) appraisal of the procedural and structural means of allocating or reallocating functional responsibilities; and (c) an understanding of the exact nature of the functions, subfunctions, and activities which must be assigned. To understand how functions are or might be allocated in a substate regional framework, the following should be noted:

—Functions are allocated among the three basic levels of government, Federal, State, and local, as well as among different types of local government. In general, human resource services such as health and hospitals, welfare, and higher education are centralized at the county or State levels while the bulk of physical development and public safety services such as police, fire, sewerage, and parks and recreation are provided at a local level.

—Policies which have a significant impact on the allocation of functional responsibilities include intergovernmental aid channeled to preferred jurisdictions; the development of new-style Federal and State districting mechanisms that have assumed components of certain functions; and the availability of different structural and procedural means for changing or conditioning functional assignments.

—Four main guides to functional assignment emerge as pivotal considerations: fiscal equity, economic efficiency, administrative effectiveness, and political accountability. The specific components of economic efficiency include the conditions

of economies of scale, public sector competition, and public service pricing. Fiscal equity is concerned with reduction of economic spillovers and implementation of interpersonal and interjurisdictional fiscal equalization policies. The main facets of political accountability subsume citizen access to, control of, and sometimes participation in the performance of a function. Administrative effectiveness centers on the legal authority, management capability, geographic reach, and intergovernmental cooperation a government exhibits in meeting its functional responsibilities.

—A functional assignment policy frequently hinges on the procedural and structural means of allocating functions. Procedural mechanisms include the A-95 process, the intergovernmental service contract, and transfer and consolidation of functions. All these measures have permitted voluntary and *ad hoc* changes in functional assignments. Structural means of changing functional assignments include Federally and State encouraged substate districts, regional councils, regional special districts, and metropolitan counties. New-style districting mechanisms usually perform activities instrumental to the delivery of a service, while traditional districts actually deliver the service itself. Both new and traditional structures have met with only limited success. New-style mechanisms often must be more closely coordinated with local government, while the legal base and functional responsibilities of regional special districts and metropolitan counties must be broadened if they are to make a more significant impact on substate functional assignments.

—Full-scale metropolitan governmental reorganizations have been the most systematic and sweeping approaches to changing substate functional assignment. They generally have resulted in centralization of both areawide and local services, raised the level and scope of a number of services, and introduced more administrative effectiveness and somewhat more fiscal equity into a function. Yet most reorganizations face the problem of structuring a lower tier of government for the delivery of local services. Also, most still must better coordinate, control, and supervise the functional operations of other regional and lower-tier units of governments.

—Analysis of individual functions is important to a functional assignment policy. Functions are composed of numerous sub-functions and activities, all or part of which may be assigned to one or another level of government. While it is difficult to describe fully the characteristics of a local or area-wide function, local services tend to focus on the individual or his immediate neigh-

borhood, or to have minor impact on surrounding communities or the performance of other functions. Areawide functions have the opposite characteristics. In more general terms, areawide functions generally have a redistributive or regulatory dimension, while local ones are those where social control and program choice are more significant.

Footnotes

¹This chapter is a summary of Volume IV of the Substate Regionalism report, *Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide*.

²The six New England States and Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

³Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Washington.

⁴U.S. Bureau of the Census, *State Payments to Local Governments, 1967 Census of Governments*, VI, No. 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), Table 6.

⁵ACIR, *Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 41.

⁶ACIR, *Performance of Urban Functions*, p. 47.

⁷ACIR, *Performance of Urban Functions*, p. 48.


⁸ACIR, *Performance of Urban Functions*, p. 270-271.

⁹ACIR, *Performance of Urban Functions*, p. 49.

¹⁰The analysis here is confined to the consolidations of Nashville-Davidson, Jacksonville-Duval, and Indianapolis-Marion County and the county federated reorganization in Miami-Dade.

Chapter III

**INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SERVICE AGREEMENTS
AND TRANSFER OF
FUNCTIONS**



*This chapter was prepared under contract with ACIR by Joseph F. Zimmerman, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany. The author acknowledges a special debt of gratitude to graduate assistants Richard J. Guastello and Albert C. Hyde for their assistance in tabulating data for this chapter and to Ruth Bosek of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations for reviewing questionnaire returns prior to key punching and preparing the table on interlocal cooperation laws.

For many years local governments have entered into formal and informal agreements for the provision of services on a regular or standby basis to their citizens by other local governments and private firms, and by the joint provision of services with other governmental units. Since they facilitate the solution of problems, including ones transcending local political boundaries, without structurally reorganizing the governmental system of the area, we may view service agreements as an adaptive procedural response to problems, particularly those associated with urbanization.

Although it is impossible to trace the origin of the first informal agreement under which one local governmental unit provided a service to another unit, it is reasonable to assume that such agreement existed in the colonial period. Statutory authorization for interlocal service agreements is at least 121 years old. In a study of interlocal cooperation in five States—Alabama, Indiana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—Professor John E. Stoner of Indiana University found an 1852 Indiana statute authorizing “any jail to be used to house a fugitive from justice, and entitled the jailor to collect reasonable compensation from the officer having the prisoner in custody.”¹ The oldest written intergovernmental service agreement turned up by our survey dates from 1889 (Ludlow, Massachusetts). Older unwritten agreements were reported by Ogden, Utah (1855), Manitou Springs, Colorado (1876), and Modesto, California (1884).

Intergovernmental service agreements are popular for several reasons. The agreements in some cases allow a local government to obtain a service, such as sewage disposal, or a product, water for example, which the locality cannot produce itself or could produce only at a prohibitively high cost. In other cases, a municipality is able to lower the cost and improve the quality of a service or a product by obtaining it from another unit or private firm. Service agreements also can allow a local government providing a specific service to lower the cost of providing that service to its citizens by taking advantage of economies of scale.

Political feasibility is another reason for the popularity of service agreements. A problem affecting several local governments can be solved by interlocal agreements without changing the basic structure of the local government system. Agreements do not significantly restrict the freedom of action, or autonomy, of the recipient governments, and do not require voter approval in most cases. They usually can be terminated on relatively short notice, and the municipality can either provide the service itself, contract with another governmental unit or private firm for the service, or join a service district. Consequently, service agreements can be a flexible

method of obtaining services as needed, and the supplier can provide the services in an area with flexible boundaries.

Of course, not all local governments have the option of producing a service or obtaining it from another producer. In certain areas one municipality may have a monopoly on a basic resource such as water, and the isolated location of some communities (particularly in Alaska) makes it impossible for them to obtain services from another unit. Furthermore, the extensive use of annexation by the central city in certain areas has resulted in a situation where there are few units of local government in an area other than the central city and the county. Lincoln, Nebraska, for example, has annexed five other municipalities, and increased its area from 20 square miles in 1950 to 51 square miles in 1972.

An earlier Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) study identified two patterns of contracts and agreements.² A “vertical” system involves agreements between upper- and lower-tier governments such as the States and cities. A “horizontal” system involves agreements between units of the same tier, *i.e.*, agreements entered into by cities, towns, and villages, or agreements entered into by counties.

While most service agreements are voluntary, some local governments have been ordered by the State to provide a service to a neighboring municipality. Milford, Connecticut, for example, has “been ordered by the State to provide waste water treatment for an adjoining community that presently has no sewer facilities.” In a few States, Texas as an example, counties are required by statute to provide certain services as requested to do so by a city. And the county in several States is required by statute to provide certain services—assessing, tax collection, election administration—which are the responsibilities of cities, towns, and villages in other States.

Intergovernmental service agreements are sometimes confused with the transfer of functions, such as from the city to the county levels. In theory, however, there are two major differences between these approaches: (1) the transfer arrangement is usually permanent, while an intergovernmental contract or agreement is normally in effect for only a limited period of time; and (2) unlike the contract or agreement, a functional transfer involves a shift of policy control and fiscal responsibility as well as operational authority.³ A better understanding of the differences between these two approaches may be obtained by examining the pertinent State legislation.

COOPERATION LEGISLATION

The Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Govern-

ments in 1957 drafted a model interlocal contracting act, and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations endorsed the act in 1961.⁴ Forty-two States currently have enacted all or part of this act or their own general statute (see Table III-1). Thirty States authorize local governments to cooperate with local governments in other States, and Michigan permits its local governments to cooperate with Canadian governments.

One of the broadest grants of power to local governments to cooperate with other governments is found in the New York State constitution.

Local governments shall have the power to agree, as authorized by act of the legislature, with the Federal government, a State or one or more other governments within or without the State, to provide cooperatively, jointly, or by contract any facilities, services, activity, or undertaking which each participating local government has the power to provide separately.⁵

Most States have granted blanket authorization to their local units to provide services to other units or jointly provide services. However, a number of States still have specific statutory provisions authorizing such agreements. Minnesota currently has approximately 110.⁶

Although the State of Rhode Island lacks a joint exercise of powers act, the General Assembly on April 28, 1972, followed the lead of a few other States by enacting a general law specifically authorizing cities and towns to establish regional councils of governments. The law contains an unusual provision: A "council may, by appropriate action of the governing bodies of the member governments, exercise such other powers as are exercised by the member governments and necessary or desirable for dealing with problems of mutual concern."⁷

Statutory Impediments and Incentives

General interlocal cooperation acts often contain two provisions impeding the ability of local governments to cooperate with each other. First, in 31 States a power can be exercised jointly by two local governments only if each possesses the power. In other words, a city and a town may be interested in jointly exercising a power, but they would not be allowed to do so if only the city was legally authorized to exercise the power. While a State may feel it desirable to prevent a municipality from exercising a power it does not possess, this stipulation is often overly restrictive. For example,

... in Missouri, first class cities are empowered to acquire land outside the city limits for the establishment of a city park and to operate and maintain such a park. Second class cities do not have such a

power, but may operate parks within the city limits. The first and second class cities could jointly exercise only a power that was exactly equally possessed by both, they could not jointly acquire the land, build and operate a park outside the city limits of the second class city. . . .⁸

A second type of impediment, found in the general interlocal cooperation statute in 13 States, stipulates that it does not supersede individual statutes authorizing interlocal cooperation in a specific functional area. Several States have a large number of specific statutes still on the books, and in many instances these statutes contain detailed procedural requirements which limit the opportunity to employ the more flexible general interlocal cooperation statute. The New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission in 1970, for example, reported the existence of 200 such statutes.⁹

Not to be overlooked when considering State legislation in this area is whether there is an active State policy of encouraging the use of a general cooperation statute rather than a specific one. In response to a question put by the ACIR to the attorneys general of the 42 States having a general law authorizing such cooperation, four stated that they had no policy of encouraging local governments to use either general or specific cooperation statutes. One (Tennessee) indicated it encouraged cooperation under the general law and one (Wisconsin) replied that from a review of past formal opinions, it would seem that its general law "has been consistently interpreted in a way that could be considered restrictive. The opinions have expressed doubt as to whether the language of sec. 66.30 is sufficient to be a general grant of power for all purposes."

These findings, coupled with the fact that the general laws of several States have clauses attached making the general law supplemental or subordinate to the specific laws, indicates that the mere existence of a broadly phrased law is no guarantee of legal ease in setting up a joint operation.

Transfer of Functions

In contrast with interlocal contracting, as of 1971 only ten States had general constitutional or legislative authorizations for the transfer of functions.¹⁰ Four had solely constitutional authority, one had only statutory authority, and five had a combination (see Table III-2).

Constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with the transfer of functions fall into two main groups, those requiring voter approval—Florida, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—and those that do not—Alaska, California, Illinois, Michigan, and Virginia. Alaska, California, Michi-

Table III-1

General Intergovernmental Cooperation Authorization

| | Gen. Law Citation or Code Refer. | Cooper. Power* | Contract Power** | Across St. Lines | Local Unit W/Home St. | Local Unit With U.S. | Power of Only One Unit. Neces. | Requires Action of Govern. Bodies | Approval of Attorney G. | Other Statutes Unaffected | Renovation or Termination | Respon- sibility Clause |
|----------------------|--|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| United States | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Alabama | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Alaska | C.X. Sec. 13 | X | | | X | X | X | | | | | |
| Arizona | Sec. 11-951 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Arkansas | Sec. 14-901 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | X | X |
| California | Gov. 6500 | X | X ² | X | X | X | | X | X | | X ⁴ | |
| Colorado | 88-2-1 | X | X | X | X | X | | | | X | | X |
| Connecticut | Sec. 7-339a | X ¹ | X ¹ | X | X | | | X | X | | | X |
| Delaware | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dist. of Columbia | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Florida | Sec. 163.01 | X | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X ⁴ | X |
| Georgia | Sec. 2-5901 | X | | | X | | | X | | | | |
| Hawaii | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Idaho | 67-2319 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | X | |
| Illinois | 24 Sec. 1-1-5 | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | | |
| Indiana | Sec. 53-1104 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | | X |
| Iowa | Sec. 28E.1 | X | X | X | X | X | X ³ | X | | X | X | X |
| Kansas | 12-2901 | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X |
| Kentucky | 65.210 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | | X | X |
| Louisiana | 33 Sec. 1321 | X | | | | | X | X | | | | |
| Maine | 30 Sec. 1951 | X | | | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X |
| Maryland | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Massachusetts | Ch. 40 Sec. 4a | X | X | | | | | X | | | X | |
| Michigan | 5.4088 | X | X | X | X | X | | | X ⁹ | X | X ⁴ | |
| Minnesota | Sec. 471.59 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | X | X | |
| Mississippi | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Missouri | Sec. 70.210 | X | X | X | X | | | X | | | X ⁴ | |
| Montana | 16-4904 | X | X | | X | | X | X | X | | X | |
| Nebraska | Sec. 23-2201 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | | X | X |
| Nevada | 277.080 | X | X | X | X | X | X ³ | X | X | | X | X |
| New Hampshire | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| New Jersey | 40:48B-1 | X | | | | | | X | | X | X | |

| | Gen. Law Citation or Code Refer. | Cooper. Power ⁺ | Contract Power ⁺⁺ | Across St. Lines | Local Unit W/Home St. | Local Unit With U.S. | Power of Only One Unit. Necess. of Govern. Bodies | Requires Action of Approval of Attorney G. | Other Statutes Unaffected | Renovation or Termination X ⁺ | Respon- sibility Clause |
|-------------------|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| New Mexico | 4-22-1 | X | | X | X | X | X | | | | |
| New York | Gen.Munic.Law Art. 56 | X | | X | | | | | | | |
| North Carolina | Sec. 160A-460 | X | X | X | | | X | X | | | |
| North Dakota | 54-40-01 | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X ⁴ | |
| Ohio | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Oklahoma | 74 Sec. 1001 | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X |
| Oregon | Sec. 190.003 | X | X | X | X | X | | | | X | |
| Pennsylvania | 53 Sec. 481 | X | X | X | X | X | | X ¹⁰ | | | |
| Rhode Island | | | | | | | | | | | |
| South Carolina | Sec. 1-75 | X | | | | | | X | | | |
| South Dakota | 1-24-1 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | | X |
| Tennessee | 12-801 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| Texas | Art.4413 (32c) | X | X | | X | | | X | X | | |
| Utah | Sec. 11-13-1 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| Vermont | 24 Sec. 34901 | X | X | | | | | X ⁸ | X | | |
| Virginia | Sec. 15.1-21 | X | | | | | | X | | X | X |
| Washington | 39.34.010 | X | X | X | X | X | | X | | X | X |
| West Virginia | Sec. 8-23-3 | X | X | | | | | X | X | X | X |
| Wisconsin | 66.30 | X | X | X | X | | | X | | | |
| Wyoming | Ch.239 S.L. 1971 | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | X ⁴ | |

*Power to undertake joint or cooperative provision of services.

**Power of one unit to provide services for another.

¹The functions are limited—seems to include everything but general government.

²Cities and counties only.

³Only for contracting.

⁴May be provided for, but is not mandated.

⁵May be perpetual

⁶One year renewable—if more, it must be approved by concurrent voter majorities.

⁷Binding for specified time.

⁸Requires concurrent voter majorities.

⁹Requires approval of governor when State money is used. When State, U.S., another State or subdivision, Canada or subdivision are party to the agreement.

¹⁰Requires approval of local government commission if agreement is with any unit except Pennsylvania municipality.

gan, New York, and Ohio provide for revocation while Pennsylvania requires the transfer action to cite its duration. In none of the constitutions or statutes examined was there a stipulation making transfers permanent.

Three States—Alaska, California, and Michigan—do not require voter approval of a transfer and provide for revocation of the transfer, also without voter approval. Alaska simply states that the municipality may revoke a transfer, and California and Michigan both provide for revocation by joint action of the involved units or by separate action of either with one year's notice. Thus, it would seem to be relatively easy in these States to effect a transfer

of function and also to retract it. New York and Ohio have more lengthy and difficult procedures for the revocation of a transfer. New York requires voter approval of the revocation while Ohio permits a referendum on the question.

Contract vs. Transfer.

What, then, is the essential difference between a service contract and a voluntary transfer of functions? It is not the permanence of the situation, since five of the States considered provide for revocation, three by a very simple process.

Another criterion is fiscal responsibility. Unlike functional transfers, when a government buys a serv-

Table III-2

Constitutional and Statutory Authority for Transfer of Functions: 1971-1972

| Citation | Approval of Governing Body of Transferor | Approval of Governing Body of Transferee | Concurrent Voter Majorities | Revocation |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|------------|
| CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS | | | | |
| Art. X, Sec. 13 | Alaska ¹ (city) | | | Alaska |
| Art. XI, Sec. 8(a) | California ¹ (municipality) | California ¹ (county) | | |
| Art. VIII, Sec. 4 | Florida | Florida | Florida | |
| Art. VII, Sec. 10 | Illinois ¹ | Illinois ¹ | | |
| Art. VII, Sec. 28 | Michigan | Michigan | | |
| Art. IX, Sec. 1(h) | | New York ² (County) | New York | |
| Art. X, Sec. 1 | Ohio ¹ (municipality or township) | Ohio (county) | Ohio (referendum) | Ohio |
| Art. IX, Sec. 5 | Pennsylvania | Pennsylvania | Pennsylvania | |
| Art. VII, Sec. 3 | Virginia ¹ | Virginia ¹ (regional government) | | |
| STATUTORY PROVISIONS | | | | |
| Sec. 07.20.080 | Alaska ¹ | Alaska (borough) | | |
| Gov. Sec. 25204 | California ¹ | California | | California |
| Gov. Sec. 51330 | (municipality) | (county) | | |
| Sec. 5.4087 | Michigan | Michigan | | Michigan |
| Municipal Home Rule Law Sec. 33-a | | New York ² (county) | New York | New York |
| 53 Sec. 481 | Pennsylvania | Pennsylvania ¹ | | |
| 24 Sec. 4902(b) | Vermont ² | Vermont ¹ | Vermont ³ | |

¹The necessity of the consent of the governing body is implied, not explicitly stated.

²The county begins the act of transfer by local law or ordinance, but is not necessarily the body the function is transferred to—it may transfer functions between and among the political subdivisions within it.

³The transfer must also be recommended by a joint survey committee from the municipalities and approved by the attorney general.

ice from another in a contract situation, it pays for the service—in money or other services. This distinction is blurred, however, in California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. These States require that reimbursement be made for a transfer.

The third criterion—policy control—is not useful when dealing with the legislation since it is not mentioned at all. Yet it is interesting to note that the cooperation statutes of 19 States contain clauses stating that the responsibility for a particular function remains with the original government. Presumably, this responsibility would be shifted in a functional transfer.¹¹

INTERGOVERNMENTAL SERVICE AGREEMENT ACTIVITY

Data on the scope and nature of agreements for 76 services were obtained by means of a 20-page questionnaire sent to 5,900 incorporated municipalities—cities, villages, boroughs, incorporated towns—over 2,500 population. Returns from 40 percent of these units were received in time for inclusion in this chapter. The returns have been classified by population categories, geographic region, form of government, and central city, suburban, and non-metropolitan types.

This chapter also draws upon a 1971 survey of 3,047 county governments conducted jointly by ACIR, the International City Management Association (ICMA), and the National Association of Counties (NACO). Responses were received from 24.2 percent of the counties (848). These returns have been classified by population group, services provided by counties on contract basis to other local governments within the county, and services jointly provided with other counties.

The collection of data on service agreements by means of a mail questionnaire, particularly a long one, results in an under-reporting of the number of agreements for two major reasons.¹² First, most local governments do not maintain accurate records of service agreements, especially unwritten ones. A Massachusetts city clerk reported that his city has "intergovernmental working agreements," but most are informal and "generally worked out through the departments involved." An administrative assistant in a Minnesota city responded that "there is a real lack of records on the services performed by or for the city. . . . Verbal information or personal recollection is a most unreliable source for answering a survey of this nature."

A second reason why this report understates the number of agreements stems from the fact that several respondents indicated they did not have time to complete the questionnaire and returned it blank. It is reasonable to assume that some of these municipi-

palities, as well as some which did not return the questionnaire, are parties to service agreements.

Services Received

Of the 2,375 responding municipalities, 1,491 or 63 percent have entered into formal and informal agreements for the provision of services to their citizens by other governmental units or private firms. Formal and informal agreements can involve any service. However, formal agreements tend to relate more to the supply of water, sewage treatment, and joint facilities. Informal agreements, based on a verbal understanding, relate chiefly to mutual aid and maintenance of highways and bridges. The mutual aid pacts, of course, are standby agreements and do not call for the provision of a service on a regular basis. It must be pointed out that a local government may enter into an agreement to receive a partial service. For example, one government may handle tax billing for another government which performs the tax collection itself.

The tendency to enter into agreements is related directly to population size. Table III-3 reveals that larger units of government generally have a greater propensity to enter into service agreements than smaller units. However, units in the 50,000 to 100,000 population category enter into agreements somewhat more commonly than larger units, and units in the 25,000 to 50,000 population category enter into agreements more frequently than units in the 100,000 to 250,000 category. Eighty percent of the reporting cities in each of the over-500,000 population class and the 250,000 to 500,000 population class are parties to agreements for services. In contrast, 58 percent of the local governments in the 5,000 to 10,000 category and 55 percent of the units in the 2,500 to 5,000 category receive services under agreements with another unit.

Central cities and suburban communities enter into agreements with other governments for the receipt of services with about the same degree of frequency—75 percent and 72 percent respectively. Non-metropolitan municipalities have a lesser tendency to enter into service agreements (53 percent). This finding was to be expected in view of the fact that urban governmental problems tend to be more acute and there are more suppliers in metropolitan areas.

Service agreements are most common in the West (79 percent) and least common in the South (54 percent). Only 14 respondents report agreements with a local government in an adjoining State for the provision of services. However, we know that 16 Rhode Island cities and towns have joined with two Massachusetts local governments—Attleboro and Seekonk—in a police communication network.¹³

Classification of the units by form of government

Table III-3

Municipalities with Agreements for Receipt of Services

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Have Agreement for Services | | With Municipality | | With County | | With School District | | With Other Special Districts | | With Public Authority | | With State | | With Other Units | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----|-------------------|----|-------------|----|----------------------|----|------------------------------|----|-----------------------|----|------------|----|------------------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2375 | 1491 | 63 | 600 | 40 | 919 | 62 | 380 | 25 | 412 | 28 | 249 | 17 | 429 | 29 | 217 | 15 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 10 | 8 | 80 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 38 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 38 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 8 | 80 | 3 | 38 | 7 | 88 | 6 | 75 | 7 | 88 | 5 | 63 | 7 | 88 | 6 | 75 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 50 | 36 | 72 | 18 | 50 | 27 | 75 | 15 | 42 | 18 | 50 | 14 | 39 | 22 | 61 | 12 | 33 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 110 | 89 | 81 | 42 | 47 | 67 | 73 | 36 | 41 | 35 | 39 | 31 | 35 | 39 | 44 | 21 | 24 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 236 | 180 | 76 | 81 | 45 | 118 | 66 | 60 | 33 | 60 | 33 | 46 | 46 | 64 | 36 | 31 | 17 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 532 | 357 | 67 | 156 | 44 | 225 | 63 | 114 | 32 | 106 | 30 | 51 | 14 | 93 | 26 | 41 | 11 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 618 | 360 | 58 | 141 | 39 | 217 | 60 | 77 | 21 | 86 | 24 | 52 | 14 | 98 | 27 | 41 | 11 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 812 | 446 | 55 | 154 | 35 | 251 | 56 | 69 | 15 | 96 | 22 | 49 | 11 | 104 | 23 | 62 | 14 |
| Under 2,500 | 17 | 7 | 41 | 1 | 8 | 4 | 37 | 2 | 29 | 2 | 29 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 502 | 275 | 55 | 149 | 54 | 83 | 30 | 72 | 26 | 55 | 20 | 67 | 24 | 79 | 29 | 37 | 13 |
| North Central | 791 | 513 | 65 | 224 | 44 | 317 | 62 | 126 | 25 | 142 | 28 | 58 | 11 | 122 | 24 | 73 | 14 |
| South | 706 | 380 | 54 | 118 | 31 | 253 | 67 | 66 | 17 | 81 | 21 | 81 | 21 | 123 | 32 | 66 | 17 |
| West | 398 | 313 | 79 | 109 | 35 | 266 | 86 | 116 | 37 | 134 | 43 | 43 | 14 | 105 | 34 | 41 | 13 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 1148 | 645 | 56 | 257 | 40 | 357 | 55 | 136 | 21 | 152 | 24 | 91 | 14 | 167 | 26 | 88 | 14 |
| Council-Manager | 1098 | 762 | 69 | 315 | 41 | 519 | 68 | 249 | 33 | 238 | 31 | 157 | 21 | 233 | 31 | 118 | 15 |
| Commission | 78 | 46 | 59 | 11 | 24 | 34 | 74 | 8 | 17 | 9 | 20 | 5 | 11 | 16 | 35 | 4 | 9 |
| Town Meeting | 57 | 30 | 53 | 12 | 40 | 6 | 20 | 15 | 50 | 9 | 30 | 6 | 20 | 11 | 37 | 4 | 13 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 14 | 8 | 59 | 5 | 63 | 3 | 38 | 2 | 25 | 2 | 25 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 25 | 2 | 25 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 155 | 117 | 75 | 43 | 37 | 81 | 69 | 41 | 35 | 46 | 39 | 37 | 32 | 53 | 45 | 39 | 33 |
| Suburban | 1076 | 762 | 71 | 426 | 56 | 458 | 60 | 201 | 26 | 241 | 29 | 142 | 19 | 201 | 26 | 112 | 13 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 1164 | 612 | 53 | 131 | 21 | 380 | 62 | 128 | 21 | 127 | 21 | 70 | 11 | 176 | 29 | 76 | 12 |

reveals that at least one-half of the units in each class receive services by means of agreements with other units. Not surprisingly, a higher percentage of council-manager governments (69 percent) have entered into agreements for the receipt of services. One would anticipate that a professional manager would be more likely than any other chief executive to explore the possibility of lowering the cost of services by obtaining them by means of an agreement with another unit of government or private firm. This finding agrees with Vincent L. Marando's finding in the Detroit area "that council-manager municipalities participate in joint cooperative agreements to a markedly greater degree than do mayor-council municipalities."¹⁴

Local governments most commonly enter into service agreements with counties (62 percent) and other municipalities (40 percent). Agreements with counties as vendors of services are related to population size. Eighty-eight percent of the cities in the 250,000 to 500,000 population class report they are

receiving services from county governments, in contrast to 56 percent of the municipalities in the 2,500 to 5,000 class.

Twenty-nine percent of the respondents receive services from the State and 17 percent receive services from public authorities. State governments most commonly provide police training, criminal identification, police patrol, fireman training, traffic control, and water pollution abatement services.

Package of Services. Data contained in Table III-4 make clear that few intergovernmental service agreements involve a package of services. The vast majority of the agreements relate to only one service and only two governments—the provider and the recipient of the service. Furthermore, most binary agreements deal with relatively non-controversial functions such as jails, water supply, civil defense, fire, and police mutual aid.

Only 13 percent of the reporting municipalities over 2,500 population have entered into agreements

Table III-4

Municipalities Receiving and Providing a Package of Services

| | Number of Cities Reporting | Receive Package of Services | | Number of Cities Reporting | Package of Services to Other Units | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----|----------------------------------|--|----|
| | | # | % | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 1394 | 188 | 13 | 2135 | 239 | 11 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 4 | 1 | 25 | 6 | 3 | 50 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 8 | 2 | 25 | 10 | 4 | 40 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 31 | 8 | 26 | 43 | 8 | 19 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 82 | 18 | 22 | 97 | 24 | 25 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 167 | 32 | 19 | 216 | 31 | 14 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 341 | 46 | 13 | 482 | 61 | 13 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 338 | 31 | 9 | 542 | 59 | 11 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 418 | 49 | 12 | 726 | 47 | 6 |
| Under 2,500 | 5 | 1 | 20 | 13 | 2 | 15 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 256 | 34 | 13 | 451 | 55 | 12 |
| North Central | 492 | 52 | 11 | 699 | 86 | 12 |
| South | 352 | 44 | 13 | 619 | 56 | 9 |
| West | 294 | 58 | 20 | 366 | 42 | 11 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 599 | 61 | 10 | 997 | 86 | 9 |
| Council-Manager | 721 | 114 | 16 | 1014 | 145 | 14 |
| Commission | 40 | 10 | 25 | 64 | 6 | 9 |
| Town Meeting | 27 | 2 | 7 | 47 | 1 | 2 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 7 | 1 | 14 | 13 | 1 | 8 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | |
| Central | 100 | 22 | 22 | 133 | 31 | 23 |
| Suburban | 724 | 116 | 16 | 977 | 111 | 11 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 570 | 50 | 9 | 1025 | 97 | 9 |

to have another governmental unit provide a package of services to their citizens. In other words, 87 percent of the reporting units enter into individual service agreements. Many units, of course, enter into several individual agreements. On a percentage basis, non-metropolitan municipalities receive the fewest packages of services. In part, this finding results from the fact that there is less likely to be a governmental unit in a non-metropolitan area capable of providing a package of services to other units.

With one exception — the 2,500 to 5,000 category — the number of agreements for a package of services decreases with a drop in population. The West, home of the Lakewood Plan, is the region where agreements for a package of services are most common.

Not to be overlooked here is the fact that 239 out of the 2,135 reporting units provide a package of services to other local governments. The largest cities and council-manager cities, as indicated by Table III-4, provide more packaging arrangements to other

units than smaller cities and mayor-council or commission cities.

Although a number of local governments had received more than one service from another local government on a contract basis prior to 1954, the concept of a contract providing for a package of services did not originate until 1954 when the newly incorporated City of Lakewood contracted to have all municipal-type services provided by Los Angeles County.¹⁵ All 32 cities incorporated in the county since 1954 followed Lakewood's lead by being chiefly consumers rather than producers of services. In other words, Lakewood Plan cities contract to have all or most services provided by the county.

A typical service package includes animal regulation, election services, emergency ambulance services, enforcement of city health ordinances, engineering services, fire and police protection, library, planning and zoning, street construction and maintenance, and street lighting. Some of the services, such as animal regulation, are financed by fees, including

license fees. A second group of services—fire protection, library, sewer maintenance, street lighting—are provided by means of special districts administered by the county. All other services provided by the county are financed by direct reimbursement of costs by the recipient cities.

Prior to the incorporation of Lakewood in 1954, Los Angeles County had entered into over 400 agreements with the existing 45 cities. In 1972, 77 cities in the county were parties to contracts with the county for the receipt of services. Most agreements are for a five-year term. Lakewood currently receives 41 services from the county. All 77 cities receive election services under contracts, and all cities except Vernon contract with the county for State health law enforcement. In addition, all cities but Santa Monica have contracted for the maintenance of city prisoners in the county jail.

Some Lakewood Plan cities, however, have discontinued their contracts with the county. The City of LaVerne, according to its manager, terminated

the contract with the county for recreation services "because of public pressure to have our own program." He added that "citizens felt local personnel would have a better 'feel' for community, etc." Also in California, the City of Tiburon upon incorporation in 1964 contracted with Marin County for police services. The contract terminated on June 30, 1972, and the city organized its own police department.

Our finding that only a small number of agreements involve a package of services was to be expected because few local governments have the capacity and the desire to provide a package of services. Also, most recipients of services are interested only in a service which they cannot provide economically themselves or in a commodity, such as water, which they cannot produce themselves.

Why Use Agreements? The survey questionnaire requested each respondent to "check the reason that best explains your decision to use an intergovernmental service agreement for the provision of the

Table III-5
Negotiation of Agreements

| | Number of Cities Reporting | | Mayor | | Council or Commission | | Mayor & Council or Commission | | Manager or Administrator | | Manager or Administrator and Council or Commission | | Manager's Staff | | Other | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|-------|----|-----------------------|----|-------------------------------|----|--------------------------|----|--|----|-----------------|----|-------|----|--|
| | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 1300 | | 149 | 11 | 148 | 11 | 472 | 36 | 437 | 34 | 343 | 26 | 113 | 9 | 96 | 7 | |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 6 | | 1 | 17 | 1 | 17 | 4 | 67 | 1 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 33 | |
| 250,000-500,000 | 9 | | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 55 | 4 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 33 | 3 | 33 | |
| 100,000-250,000 | 34 | | 8 | 24 | 3 | 9 | 13 | 38 | 15 | 44 | 4 | 12 | 13 | 38 | 8 | 24 | |
| 50,000-100,000 | 74 | | 11 | 15 | 7 | 9 | 13 | 18 | 44 | 59 | 23 | 31 | 16 | 22 | 8 | 11 | |
| 25,000-50,000 | 171 | | 15 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 42 | 25 | 93 | 54 | 51 | 30 | 36 | 21 | 10 | 6 | |
| 10,000-25,000 | 322 | | 33 | 10 | 26 | 8 | 76 | 24 | 134 | 42 | 117 | 36 | 30 | 9 | 25 | 8 | |
| 5,000-10,000 | 306 | | 29 | 9 | 36 | 12 | 131 | 43 | 83 | 27 | 75 | 25 | 8 | 3 | 18 | 6 | |
| 2,500-5,000 | 374 | | 49 | 13 | 64 | 17 | 186 | 49 | 63 | 17 | 73 | 20 | 7 | 2 | 20 | 5 | |
| Under 2,500 | 4 | | 2 | 50 | 1 | 25 | 2 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 50 | |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 225 | | 24 | 11 | 37 | 16 | 70 | 31 | 59 | 26 | 55 | 24 | 10 | 4 | 32 | 14 | |
| North Central | 462 | | 66 | 14 | 53 | 11 | 195 | 42 | 138 | 30 | 99 | 21 | 35 | 8 | 28 | 6 | |
| South | 330 | | 30 | 9 | 39 | 12 | 127 | 38 | 93 | 28 | 110 | 33 | 20 | 6 | 16 | 5 | |
| West | 283 | | 29 | 10 | 19 | 7 | 79 | 28 | 147 | 52 | 79 | 28 | 48 | 17 | 20 | 7 | |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 553 | | 105 | 19 | 80 | 14 | 348 | 63 | 54 | 10 | 63 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 8 | |
| Council-Manager | 684 | | 35 | 5 | 53 | 8 | 97 | 14 | 379 | 55 | 273 | 40 | 106 | 15 | 33 | 5 | |
| Commission | 40 | | 5 | 13 | 9 | 23 | 22 | 55 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | |
| Town Meeting | 19 | | 3 | 16 | 4 | 21 | 2 | 11 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 68 | |
| Representative Town Meeting | 6 | | 1 | 17 | 2 | 33 | 1 | 17 | 1 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 50 | |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 105 | | 21 | 20 | 9 | 9 | 34 | 32 | 49 | 47 | 24 | 23 | 26 | 25 | 18 | 17 | |
| Suburban | 683 | | 88 | 13 | 95 | 14 | 209 | 31 | 269 | 39 | 177 | 26 | 67 | 10 | 55 | 8 | |
| Non-Metropolitan | 512 | | 40 | 8 | 64 | 13 | 229 | 45 | 119 | 23 | 142 | 28 | 20 | 4 | 24 | 4 | |

Table III-6

Evaluation of Services

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Periodic Inspection | | Cost Benefit Analysis | | Levels of Citizen Satisfaction | | Performance Measures | | Other | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|----|-----------------------|----|--------------------------------|----|----------------------|----|-------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 1383 | 670 | 48 | 512 | 37 | 754 | 55 | 768 | 56 | 56 | 4 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 7 | 6 | 86 | 5 | 71 | 5 | 71 | 6 | 86 | 1 | 14 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 9 | 7 | 78 | 4 | 44 | 4 | 44 | 4 | 44 | 6 | 67 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 36 | 24 | 67 | 10 | 27 | 25 | 70 | 24 | 67 | 2 | 5 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 84 | 60 | 71 | 43 | 51 | 47 | 56 | 52 | 62 | 5 | 6 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 176 | 111 | 63 | 78 | 45 | 114 | 65 | 99 | 56 | 10 | 6 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 335 | 272 | 51 | 144 | 43 | 195 | 58 | 181 | 54 | 13 | 4 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 328 | 145 | 44 | 110 | 34 | 163 | 50 | 165 | 50 | 12 | 4 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 401 | 145 | 36 | 117 | 29 | 198 | 49 | 232 | 58 | 12 | 3 |
| Under 2,500 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 29 | 3 | 43 | 5 | 71 | 1 | 14 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 249 | 105 | 42 | 80 | 32 | 138 | 55 | 144 | 58 | 7 | 3 |
| North Central | 494 | 231 | 47 | 172 | 35 | 260 | 53 | 266 | 54 | 21 | 4 |
| South | 346 | 165 | 48 | 123 | 36 | 180 | 52 | 182 | 52 | 14 | 4 |
| West | 294 | 169 | 57 | 137 | 47 | 174 | 59 | 176 | 60 | 14 | 5 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 587 | 240 | 41 | 186 | 32 | 286 | 49 | 352 | 60 | 21 | 4 |
| Council-Manager | 722 | 407 | 56 | 309 | 43 | 431 | 60 | 384 | 53 | 33 | 5 |
| Commission | 43 | 12 | 28 | 11 | 26 | 18 | 39 | 19 | 44 | 1 | 2 |
| Town Meeting | 23 | 9 | 39 | 3 | 13 | 14 | 61 | 8 | 34 | 1 | 4 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 8 | 2 | 25 | 3 | 38 | 5 | 63 | 5 | 63 | 0 | 0 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 113 | 74 | 65 | 52 | 46 | 69 | 61 | 64 | 57 | 7 | 6 |
| Suburban | 725 | 377 | 52 | 293 | 40 | 423 | 58 | 411 | 57 | 29 | 4 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 545 | 219 | 40 | 167 | 31 | 262 | 48 | 293 | 54 | 20 | 4 |

service." In addition to "other," seven reasons were listed—(1) take advantage of economies of scale, (2) lack of facilities, (3) lack of qualified personnel, (4) meet an urgent problem, (5) citizen demand for service agreement, (6) take the service out of politics, and (7) civil service avoidance.

With near unanimity, the reason checked for entering into an agreement was to take advantage of economies of scale. All 241 local governments with agreements for the provision of financial services—assessing, payroll, tax collection, treasury functions, utility billing—report that they entered into agreements to take advantage of economies of scale. All 138 units with agreements for general government services—legal, microfilm, record maintenance, etc.—were motivated by the same reason, as were 345 units with agreements for health and welfare services. The same reason was checked for all 304 police agreements, all 162 corrections agreements, all 106 civil defense agreements, all 454 public works and utilities agreements, and all 187 library, museum, and school agreements.

With the exception of one unit motivated by the lack of qualified personnel, all 106 reporting units indicated that economy of scale was the chief reason for entering into parks and recreation services agreements. Only three out of 40 units with agreements for transportation services checked a reason other than economies of scale—in this case, civil service avoidance.

Negotiation and Evaluation of Agreements. Thirty-six percent of the municipalities, according to Table III-5, report that agreements are negotiated by the mayor and council, and 34 percent report that the manager or administrator enters into the agreements. Twenty-six percent of the agreements are negotiated by the manager and council.

In cities over 250,000, the mayor and council most commonly negotiate the agreements whereas the manager or administrator negotiates the agreements in cities in the 25,000 to 100,000 population category. This finding is in general accord with the prevalence of these two forms of administration for municipali-

ties in these population categories.

Sixty-three percent of the mayor-council cities report that the mayor and council negotiates the agreements and 55 percent of the manager cities report that the manager is the negotiator. In 40 percent of the other council-manager municipalities, the manager and the council assume this role.

In 93 percent of the reporting units, agreements must be approved by the local governing body. Formal agreements seldom require voter approval except in parts of New England where the open town meeting is the local governing body.

The performance of the supplier of services is evaluated in 56 percent of the local governments by performance measures established in the agreements (see Table III-6). Six of the seven cities over 500,000 use this method of evaluation; it is least used (50 percent) by cities in the 5,000 to 10,000 category. This method is used most often in the West (60 percent) and in mayor-council (60 percent) units, and least often in the South (52 percent).

Central cities (65 percent) rely more heavily upon periodic inspection by their personnel than suburban

communities (52 percent) or non-metropolitan communities (40 percent) in assessment of the quality of service provided. Levels of citizen satisfaction, as measured by the number of citizen complaints, also are used by 61 percent of the central cities, 58 percent of the suburban communities, and 48 percent of the non-metropolitan communities to evaluate the performance of the suppliers of services.

Satisfaction With Agreements. Table III-7 clearly indicates that most recipients of services are satisfied with the service agreements since only 137, or 6 percent, of the 2,367 responding local governments have discontinued agreements. Classifying discontinuances by region, we find that 13 percent of the responding units in the West compared to only 3 percent in the Northeast have discontinued agreements. Nine percent of the council-manager municipalities and 3 percent of the mayor-council cities have ended agreements. These data may suggest that professional managers evaluate the performance of the providers of services more critically and terminate more readily the agreements with providers failing to live up to their respective terms.

Table III-7
Discontinuance of Services

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Discontinued Services by Another Government | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|----|
| | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2367 | 137 | 6 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 9 | 1 | 11 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 11 | 4 | 36 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 48 | 3 | 6 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 109 | 14 | 13 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 232 | 20 | 9 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 521 | 49 | 9 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 609 | 21 | 3 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 812 | 25 | 3 |
| Under 2,500 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | |
| Northeast | 495 | 16 | 3 |
| North Central | 779 | 40 | 5 |
| South | 697 | 31 | 4 |
| West | 396 | 50 | 13 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 1135 | 35 | 3 |
| Council-Manager | 1089 | 97 | 9 |
| Commission | 76 | 4 | 5 |
| Town Meeting | 54 | 1 | 2 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 152 | 18 | 12 |
| Suburban | 1768 | 87 | 5 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 1147 | 32 | 3 |

Central cities (12 percent) terminated agreements with greater frequency than suburban governments (5 percent) or municipalities in non-metropolitan areas (3 percent). The small percentage in the latter type of municipality undoubtedly is due to the fact that these units have few if any alternative methods of providing or obtaining the services.

Joint Agreements

Agreements for joint provision of services and joint construction and operation of facilities are relatively common. Joint agreements differ from standard service agreements in that two or more governmental units join forces to provide the service or to construct the facility. Moreover, a joint body usually is established to administer the program, and each participant typically is a co-equal partner. In the opinion of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "joint agreements seem to be better adapted to providing services that require program development and policy decision, e.g., recreation, planning, and urban renewal."¹⁶

Table III-8

Joint Service Agreements

| Reporting | Number of Agreements | Have Joint Service | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----|
| | | Cities # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2061 | 726 | 35 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 6 | 3 | 50 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 8 | 80 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 41 | 25 | 61 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 98 | 60 | 61 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 205 | 97 | 47 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 466 | 193 | 41 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 518 | 149 | 29 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 704 | 188 | 27 |
| Under 2,500 | 13 | 2 | 15 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | |
| Northeast | 440 | 144 | 33 |
| North Central | 673 | 239 | 36 |
| South | 596 | 170 | 29 |
| West | 352 | 173 | 49 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 954 | 278 | 29 |
| Council-Manager | 989 | 422 | 43 |
| Commission | 62 | 19 | 31 |
| Town Meeting | 44 | 6 | 14 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 12 | 1 | 8 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 130 | 80 | 62 |
| Suburban | 897 | 348 | 39 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 959 | 298 | 31 |

Joint Service Provision. Thirty-five percent, or 726, of the 2,061 reporting municipalities have entered into agreements to provide services jointly (see Table III-8). The services most commonly listed were sewage disposal (96), fire service (89), recreation (81), libraries (72), solid waste disposal (66), planning (57), public health (50), ambulance (48), police (47), and water supply (43).

In general, larger units enter into these agreements most often—80 percent of the units in the 250,000 to 500,000 population category compared to only 27 percent of the units in the 2,500 to 5,000 category. Agreements for the joint provision of services are most common in the West (49 percent) and least common in the South (28 percent). Council-manager governments participate in joint agreements most frequently—43 percent of these units compared to 31 percent of the commission cities and 29 percent of the mayor-council cities. Not unexpectedly, central cities (62 percent) enter into such agreements with greater frequency than suburban communities (39 percent) or non-metropolitan municipalities (31 percent). In part, this finding is a reflection of the fact that the central city generally has more opportunities to enter into joint agreements, particularly with the county.

Agreements providing for the joint construction or joint leasing of a facility were reported by 440, or 21 percent, of the 2,120 responding municipalities (see Table III-9). Once again, larger units have the greatest proclivity for participating in such agreements—60 percent of the units in the 250,000 to 500,000 population category compared to 14 percent of the units in the 2,500 to 5,000 category. Table III-9 confirms the fact that council-manager governments are nearly twice as likely to be parties to such agreements as are mayor-council cities—28 percent to 15 percent. And more central cities (40 percent) sign these agreements than suburban governments (22 percent) or non-metropolitan municipalities (18 percent).

Joint facility agreements are particularly common with respect to the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills. In New Hampshire, for example, Lebanon and Hanover are operating a landfill; Greenland, North Hampton, and Portsmouth are operating a second landfill; and Keene, Marlborough, Swanzey, and Troy in October 1972 signed an agreement establishing the Ashuelot Valley Sewage Agency.

Thirteen cities, towns, and villages in Oneida County, New York, are developing jointly a sanitary landfill which will be operated by the newly created Southwest Oneida Sanitary Landfill District. In a number of metropolitan areas, the council of governments (COG) has provided the leadership in developing joint sanitary landfills. The first multi-

Table III-9

Joint Construction and Leasing Agreements

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Have Agreement for Joint Construction or Leasing | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--|----|
| | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2120 | 440 | 21 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 6 | 2 | 33 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 6 | 60 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 43 | 19 | 44 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 100 | 43 | 43 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 212 | 65 | 31 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 479 | 121 | 25 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 540 | 87 | 16 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 718 | 97 | 14 |
| Under 2,500 | 12 | 0 | 6 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | |
| Northeast | 444 | 57 | 13 |
| North Central | 695 | 146 | 21 |
| South | 616 | 107 | 17 |
| West | 365 | 130 | 36 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 988 | 144 | 15 |
| Council-Manager | 1009 | 280 | 28 |
| Commission | 66 | 9 | 14 |
| Town Meeting | 44 | 6 | 14 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 13 | 1 | 8 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 134 | 53 | 40 |
| Suburban | 969 | 209 | 22 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 1017 | 178 | 18 |

jurisdictional landfill in the Washington, D.C., area commenced operations in August 1972 under an agreement developed by the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, District of Columbia, the City of Alexandria, and Arlington and Fairfax Counties in Virginia.

In some metropolitan areas, the central city and the county have incrementally consolidated functions over the years to the extent that many services are provided on a unified basis. The City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County in North Carolina have entered into agreements under which the county has assumed full responsibility for funding and administering health services (1964), hospitals (1968), jails (1970), libraries (1940), and public schools (1960). The city and county jointly fund the following programs which are administered either by the city or the county: civil defense (1953), community relations (1969), intergovernmental programs (1969), manpower area planning council (1970), planning (1954), purchasing (1969), tax collection (1958), water and sewers (1972), and veterans services (1949). In Georgia, the City of Albany and Dougherty County jointly provide 21 services.

This activity is not confined to the South. In New York, the City of Rochester and Monroe County jointly provide 11 services, while five other municipal services were transferred to the county. And in Oregon, over a five-year period, Portland and Multnomah County entered into joint agreements for a city-county annex, combined duplication and reproduction facilities, combined mail and distribution service, central data processing, a metropolitan human relations commission, a metropolitan youth commission, a council on aging, a city-county civil service study, an Office of Economic Opportunity metropolitan steering committee, and a city-county detoxification center. This cooperative city-county action may be a prelude to complete city-county consolidation. The Oregon Legislature in 1971 created a city-county charter commission, which is preparing a plan for the total amalgamation of the two units for submission to the voters in 1974.

Joint leasing of equipment is relatively uncommon. Only 55 out of 1,993 reporting units are signatories to such agreements. Agreements for the loan of personnel or equipment are more common—325 (15 percent) out of 2,109 reporting units are parties to

agreements of this nature. Table III-10 confirms that the existence of such agreements is positively correlated with the increasing population size of units. In the 250,000 to 500,000 population class, three-fifths of the units have signed such agreements compared to less than one-tenth of the units in the 2,500 to 5,000 population range. Slightly over one-fifth of the council-manager governments report the existence of loan agreements, but only one-tenth of the mayor-council cities have signed such agreements. The West (25 percent) again has the greatest percentage and the South (11 percent) the fewest. Central cities (30 percent) loan personnel and equipment more commonly than suburban governments (18 percent) and non-metropolitan units (13 percent).

One of the most difficult problems associated with the joint provision of a service and joint construction and operation of a facility is the equitable allocation of the costs involved. A significant number of joint agreements have been terminated because of disputes over the apportionment of costs.

Providers of Services

The largest number of intergovernmental service agreements, as Appendix Table III-A reveals, involves jails and detention homes (472), followed by police training (423), street lighting (392), refuse collection (385), libraries (348), solid waste disposal (328), water supply (323), crime laboratory (323), animal control services (322), planning (317), electricity supply (316), public health services (314), and engineering services (293). Fire services are well down on the list in sixteenth place, although Professor John E. Stoner discovered that these services were the most popular in the five States he studied.¹⁷

As one would anticipate, most agreements involve local governments only. However, a significant number of services are provided to local governments by State governments and private firms. One-half of the incorporated municipalities obtaining personnel services by means of agreements receive the services from State governments. The percentage is 48 for police training, 44 for water pollution abate-

Table III-10

Loan of Personnel and Equipment Agreements

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Have Agreement for Loan of Personnel and Equipment | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--|----|
| | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2109 | 325 | 15 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 6 | 2 | 33 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 6 | 60 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 42 | 13 | 31 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 97 | 27 | 28 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 214 | 54 | 25 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 478 | 85 | 18 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 534 | 70 | 13 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 716 | 66 | 9 |
| Under 2,500 | 12 | 2 | 25 |
| GEOGRAPHIC | | | |
| Northeast | 446 | 61 | 14 |
| North Central | 690 | 109 | 16 |
| South | 613 | 66 | 11 |
| West | 360 | 89 | 25 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 926 | 90 | 10 |
| Council-Manager | 960 | 212 | 22 |
| Commission | 64 | 4 | 6 |
| Town Meeting | 43 | 5 | 12 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 12 | 4 | 33 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 125 | 37 | 30 |
| Suburban | 910 | 161 | 18 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 970 | 127 | 13 |

ment services, 41 for crime laboratory services, 40 for training of firemen, and 40 for criminal identification services.

Private firms play a major role in providing certain services to local governments. Of the 385 municipalities obtaining refuse collection service under agreements, 339, or 88 percent, received the service from private firms. Eighty-six percent of the 253 agreements relative to engineering services involve the private sector. The percentage is 84 for legal services, 79 for street lighting, 67 for public relations services, and 64 for microfilm services.

School districts, other special districts, councils of governments, and other regional units are parties to a relatively small number of agreements to provide services to incorporated municipalities. As one would expect, school districts do provide a significant number of school crossing guards (47 percent). Other special districts are involved with the provision of a small number of services—chiefly fire services (27 percent), sewage disposal (29 percent), irrigation (26 percent), and parks (15 percent).

Data relative to police training agreements are contained in Appendix Table III-B. The bulk of the agreements, 48 percent, are with State governments. Only one out of four agreements involves other local governments. Smaller municipalities—those under 25,000 population—most often obtain police training services from other local governmental units by means of agreements. Thirty percent of the total number of such agreements are entered into by units in the 2,500 and 5,000 population range. As with most other services, council-manager units (217) enter into agreements for the receipt of police training services more frequently than any of the other forms of local administration. Such agreements also are more common in the North Central region (142) than in any of the other three regions.

Refuse collection services, as one can see by examining Appendix Table III-C, present a different pattern. The greatest number of agreements involve private firms—339 out of a total of 385 agreements. Local governments provide refuse collection services to only 32 other municipalities, or 8 percent of the units receiving such services under agreements. Council-manager governments again utilize agreements for refuse collection services with the greatest frequency. These agreements, as in the case of police training agreements, are most common in the North Central region (150 municipalities).

Solid waste disposal agreements (see Appendix Table III-D) present still another pattern. Forty-eight percent of the agreements are with local governments and 42 percent are with private firms. Council-manager governments (51 percent) have a greater tendency than mayor-council (43 percent) to enter into agreements for the provision of this

service by other local governments. Of particular significance is the fact that 73 percent of the reporting cities in the South are parties to such agreements compared to only 31 percent of the cities in the North Central region. The latter cities (60 percent) rely heavily upon private firms for the service.

Although 30 percent of the planning services are provided by other local governments (see Appendix Table III-E), private firms provide such services nearly as often (25 percent), and more often (45 percent) in the Northeast. Councils of governments (24 percent) also are major suppliers of planning services.

The greatest number of agreements for sewage disposal (see Appendix Table III-F) involve other municipalities—165 out of 307. However, special districts are parties to a relatively large number of such agreements (28 percent of the total). There are significantly more sewage disposal agreements in the North Central region (95) than in any of the other regions.

Of the 2,316 reporting cities, 1,000, or 43 percent, provide some types of service by agreement to other local governments. All cities over 500,000 provide services, but the percentage decreases as population size falls (see Table III-11). This means, of course, that central cities tend to be major suppliers of services to other local governments. One-half of the local governments in the North Central region and one-half of the council-manager governments provide services to other units. Moreover, incorporated municipalities in non-metropolitan areas (43 percent) enter into agreements to provide services to other governments more frequently than suburban municipalities (39 percent) in metropolitan areas. This finding may be a reflection of the fact that a municipality in a non-metropolitan area may be the only unit with the capability of providing a service to other local governments in contrast to metropolitan areas where suburban governments often can obtain services from the central city or the county as well as from private firms.

In 1971, ACIR, the International City Management Association, and the National Association of Counties cooperatively surveyed 3,047 county governments relative to services provided for individual local governments within each county on a contract basis, provided on a joint basis with local governments in each county, and jointly provided or under contract with another county.

As Table III-12 reveals, 281 (33.3 percent) of the 848 reporting counties provide services on a contract basis to local governments located within the county. Although 73 percent of the reporting counties with a population over 500,000 provide contract services, these counties account for only 5.7 percent of the total number of service agreements. Interestingly,

Table III-11

Municipalities Providing Services to Other Municipalities

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Provide Services to Another Government | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----|
| | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2316 | 1000 | 43 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 7 | 7 | 100 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 9 | 90 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 42 | 34 | 81 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 101 | 62 | 61 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 225 | 118 | 52 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 504 | 237 | 47 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 606 | 257 | 42 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 804 | 272 | 34 |
| Under 2,500 | 16 | 4 | 25 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | |
| Northeast | 487 | 196 | 40 |
| North Central | 766 | 389 | 51 |
| South | 683 | 253 | 37 |
| West | 379 | 162 | 43 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 1119 | 424 | 38 |
| Council-Manager | 1056 | 532 | 50 |
| Commission | 72 | 32 | 44 |
| Town Meeting | 54 | 10 | 19 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 14 | 2 | 14 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 138 | 108 | 78 |
| Suburban | 1049 | 405 | 39 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 1128 | 487 | 43 |

slightly more than one-quarter of the reporting counties providing services are in the 10,000 to 25,000 population class. This finding in part is a reflection of the greater number (998) of counties in this population class.

Jails and detention centers (82) are the subject of the largest number of agreements followed by police protection (72), roads and highways (65), planning (44), libraries (39), public welfare (38), fire protection (30), education (29), hospitals (25), parks and recreation (22), and refuse collection (22).

The largest number of agreements involving counties was reported by Texas (68), followed by Georgia (36), Iowa (36), Nebraska (36), Minnesota (35), Virginia (34), Kansas (33), and North Carolina (31).

Two hundred and fourteen, or 76.2 percent, of the reporting counties are in non-metropolitan areas and 67, or 23.8 percent, are in metropolitan areas. This finding was to be expected since 2,589 counties are located in non-metropolitan areas.

Only 80 (28.5 percent) of the counties providing services on a contract basis have a professional administrator. One would anticipate this finding

since only a small number of counties have a professional administrator.

More than one-third (37.5 percent) of the responding counties (see Table III-13) provide services jointly with other local governments. As in the case of contract services, joint service agreements are most common among counties in the 10,000 to 25,000 population class. Most joint service agreements (75.5 percent) involve non-metropolitan counties, and only 30 percent of the counties providing joint services with a local government have a professional administrator.

The most popular joint county-local agreements are police protection (58), libraries (56), jails and detention homes (52), fire protection (38), planning (37), roads and highways (37), refuse collection (29), public welfare (23), and education (22). This list differs from the list of services provided directly to local government by counties in that police protection is number one in terms of joint provision whereas it is number two on the list of services provided by the county directly to local governments.

The largest number of joint agreements with an-

Table III-12

Counties Supplying Services on a Contract Basis: 1971

| Population Group | Number of Counties | Number of Responding Counties | Provide Services | | Do not Provide Services | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|
| | | | # | % | # | % |
| Over 500,000 | 58 | 22 | 16 | 5.7 | 6 | 1.1 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 70 | 39 | 16 | 5.7 | 13 | 2.3 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 185 | 62 | 32 | 11.4 | 30 | 5.5 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 326 | 94 | 40 | 14.2 | 54 | 9.0 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 566 | 153 | 48 | 17.1 | 105 | 18.8 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 998 | 258 | 73 | 26.0 | 185 | 32.6 |
| Under 10,000 | 844 | 230 | 56 | 19.9 | 174 | 30.7 |
| Total | 3,047 | 848 | 281 | 100.0 | 567 | 100.0 |

Source: 1971 survey of county governments by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, International City Management Association, and National Association of Counties.

Table III-13

Services Provided by Counties on a Joint Basis With Other Local Governments: 1971

| Population Group | Number of Counties | Number of Responding Counties | Provide Joint Services | | Do not Provide Joint Services | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
| | | | # | % | # | % |
| Over 500,000 | 58 | 18 | 13 | 4.5 | 5 | 1.0 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 70 | 30 | 17 | 5.9 | 13 | 2.7 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 185 | 59 | 33 | 11.3 | 26 | 5.4 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 326 | 80 | 43 | 14.8 | 37 | 7.8 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 566 | 138 | 53 | 18.3 | 85 | 17.7 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 998 | 234 | 74 | 25.5 | 160 | 33.2 |
| Under 10,000 | 844 | 213 | 57 | 19.7 | 156 | 32.2 |
| Total | 3,047 | 772 | 290 | 100.0 | 482 | 100.0 |

Source: 1971 survey of county governments by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, International City Management Association, and National Association of Counties.

Table III-14

Services Provided Jointly With Another County: 1971

| Population Group | Number of Counties | Number of Responding Counties | Provide Joint Services | | Do not Provide Joint Services | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
| | | | # | % | # | % |
| Over 500,000 | 58 | 18 | 10 | 4.4 | 8 | 1.5 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 70 | 27 | 7 | 3.1 | 20 | 3.9 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 185 | 55 | 19 | 8.4 | 36 | 7.1 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 326 | 76 | 29 | 12.8 | 47 | 9.1 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 566 | 133 | 45 | 19.9 | 88 | 17.0 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 998 | 226 | 67 | 29.7 | 159 | 30.7 |
| Under 10,000 | 844 | 209 | 49 | 21.7 | 160 | 30.7 |
| Total | 3,047 | 744 | 226 | 100.0 | 518 | 100.0 |

Source: 1971 survey of county governments by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, International City Management Association, and National Association of Counties.

other unit in the county was reported by Texas (65), followed by Georgia (35), Nebraska (34), Virginia (34), Iowa (33), and Kansas (32).

Joint agreements with another county for the provision of services are relatively widespread—226 out of 744 reporting counties have such agreements (see Table III-14). Once again, these agreements are most common in the 10,000 to 25,000 population class and in non-metropolitan areas (82.7 percent). Only 28.3 percent of the counties jointly providing a service with another county have a professional administrator.

The most popular joint functions are planning (37), jails and detention homes (29), libraries (27), education (16), roads and highways (14), and fire protection (11).

Texas counties report 58 joint service agreements with other counties. There are 37 such agreements in Minnesota, 34 in Nebraska, and 32 in each of three States—Georgia, Kansas, and Virginia.

Adverse Factors

Table III-15 summarizes the principal factors which have the most adverse effect on the willingness of local governments to enter into an agreement with another governmental unit to obtain services. A political reason, "Limitations placed on independence of action by the agreement," was checked by 718, or 49 percent, of the 1,463 reporting incorporated municipalities.

The intensity of the opposition to entering into service agreements is reflected in the comments of a significant number of local government officials. A New Jersey local official wrote that "many municipalities are hesitant to cooperate because of the fear of loss of home rule." A Mississippi mayor wrote, "I think until we start doing things for ourselves and quit leaning on the Federal government and others we will continue to get deeper and deeper into trouble." A Virginia city manager wrote that "intergovernmental service agreements serve to complicate government and make it less responsive to citizens." A California city manager believes "that greater intergovernmental cooperation in the provision of services is inhibited by local pride and vanity under the guise of more 'local control.'" A Michigan city manager wrote, "We find a real reluctance on the part of townships to relinquish any area or to be receptive to coordinated efforts to solve problems." And, in Ohio, a mayor is of the opinion that use of agreements is limited because "people are afraid of the big city."

"Inequitable apportionment of the cost of the service" was cited by 339, or 23 percent, of the municipalities as a reason for not entering into an agreement. A local official in New York State wrote,

"I feel the cost of services are determined on a political rather than a financial basis." And a village manager in Michigan stated, "Our biggest problem is that township and rural areas want city service but don't want to pay what the service costs."

The only other factor checked by a significant number of officials (9 percent) was "adverse public reaction to services presently being provided by another unit." Responses did not vary much by region, form of government, and central city, sub-urban, or non-metropolitan type.

Concern about the ability of the county to provide services was mentioned by a few respondents. Although one city manager indicated he felt that many services should be provided by the county, he wrote, "I assume the county government set-up will be changed by statutes before they take over and perform all these services. Presently they could not function effectively in Michigan." A second city manager wrote, "Until we get the nineteenth century representatives out of the county courthouse, cooperation between cities and counties will remain limited." And a third city manager reported that "the county fights any move to join forces."

The New Jersey County and Municipal Government Study Commission found "great hope in the fact that the overwhelming majority of officials in over 400 municipalities polled and interviewed are willing and anxious to enter into joint service agreements in a wide variety of areas."¹⁸ Our national survey did not yield as optimistic a finding—478, or 20 percent, of the 2,383 reporting incorporated municipalities are contemplating entering into agreements with other units for the provision of services (see Table III-16). More than one-third of the cities over 250,000 population are contemplating entering into such agreements, but only 17 percent of the units in the 2,500 to 5,000 population category are considering taking this action. At the same time, 41 percent of the units in the 25,000 to 50,000 population category are weighing new agreement possibilities. This finding appears to be a reflection of the prevalence of council-manager units in this population category.

Geographically, there is little difference in the distribution of units of local governments contemplating entering into new agreements. Relative to forms of government, one-quarter of the council-manager units are pondering such agreements compared to only 16 percent of the mayor-council cities. Twenty-eight percent of the central cities are considering new agreements, as against only 20 percent of the suburban communities and 19 percent of the units in non-metropolitan areas. The relative lack of interest in entering into new agreements by non-metropolitan municipalities undoubtedly is related to their smaller size *and the lack of opportunity to*

Table III-15

Factors Inhibiting Agreements

| | Number of Cities Reporting | Limitations on Independence of Action | | Inequitable Apportionment of Cost | | Adverse Public Reaction | | Restriction on Terminating Agreements | | Other | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|----|---|----|-------------------------------|----|--|---|-------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 1463 | 718 | 49 | 339 | 23 | 137 | 9 | 29 | 2 | 247 | 17 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 3 | 1 | 33 | 2 | 67 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 4 | 40 | 3 | 30 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 30 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 35 | 14 | 40 | 8 | 23 | 3 | 9 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 23 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 77 | 37 | 48 | 17 | 22 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 21 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 162 | 80 | 49 | 43 | 27 | 13 | 8 | | 2 | 22 | 14 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 349 | 174 | 50 | 83 | 24 | 30 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 55 | 16 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 368 | 190 | 52 | 69 | 19 | 39 | 11 | 10 | 3 | 64 | 17 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 452 | 215 | 48 | 110 | 24 | 44 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 79 | 17 |
| Under 2,500 | 7 | 3 | 43 | 4 | 57 | 1 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 309 | 168 | 54 | 58 | 19 | 24 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 56 | 18 |
| North Central | 478 | 225 | 47 | 110 | 23 | 54 | 11 | 10 | 2 | 81 | 17 |
| South | 409 | 180 | 44 | 115 | 28 | 40 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 69 | 17 |
| West | 267 | 145 | 54 | 56 | 21 | 19 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 41 | 15 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 624 | 318 | 51 | 132 | 21 | 64 | 10 | 11 | 2 | 105 | 17 |
| Council-Manager | 758 | 355 | 47 | 194 | 26 | 66 | 9 | 15 | 2 | 129 | 17 |
| Commission | 44 | 20 | 45 | 9 | 20 | 5 | 11 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 18 |
| Town Meeting | 26 | 16 | 62 | 3 | 12 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 15 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 11 | 9 | 82 | 2 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 107 | 50 | 47 | 27 | 25 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 21 |
| Suburban | 684 | 363 | 53 | 147 | 21 | 64 | 9 | 14 | 2 | 100 | 15 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 672 | 305 | 45 | 165 | 25 | 67 | 10 | 13 | 2 | 124 | 18 |

enter into agreements, partially stemming from their geographic isolation.

State and Federal Encouragement

State and Federal governments clearly can take a number of actions, principally by incentive grants-in-aid, to encourage local governments to enter into cooperative service agreements.

Only 44 (2 percent) of the 1,765 reporting municipalities indicate that the State constitution prohibits them from entering into agreements for the receipt of services or inhibits their ability to enter into such agreements. Six percent, or 109 out of 1,808 municipalities, report that State statutes inhibit their ability to enter into service agreements.

On the other hand, 1,440 (76 percent) of the 1,904 responding units indicate that their State governments actively encourage the intergovernmental provision of services (see Table III-17). Forty-eight percent of the municipalities report State incentives via grants-in-aid, 42 percent mention financial assist-

ance for studies, and 56 percent report that the State provides technical assistance.

Only 28 out of 1,859 local governments felt that Federal statutes and regulations restricted their ability to enter into agreements for services with another governmental unit. In contrast, Table III-18 reveals that 701 (49 percent) of the 1,445 units replied affirmatively to the question "Do Federal statutes and regulations encourage intergovernmental contracting and cooperation?" Most comments mentioned incentive Federal grants-in-aid for cooperative and regional water and sewer projects.

Who Should Provide the Services?

Municipal officials were requested to indicate the services which they believe should be provided by county governments, regional special districts, councils of governments, or the Federal or State governments. An examination of Appendix Table III-G leads directly to the conclusion that a significant number of mayors, managers, and other municipal

executives are convinced that county governments should play a greater role in providing services. At the same time, many municipal officials advancing this view came from States where counties already provide a range of services. Nevertheless, the survey data strongly suggest a widespread consensus among municipal officials that responsibility for certain specified functions should be shifted upwards to the county level in most of the States having organized county governments. A number of respondents qualified their answers by stipulating that responsibility for additional functions should not be transferred to county governments until the latter are modernized.

Municipal officials displayed the greatest willingness to assign the following services to the county: all public health services (692), jails and detention homes (680), tax assessing (608), tax collection (557), probation and parole (554), juvenile delinquency programs (507), election administration (505), welfare (503), and all civil defense services (481).

They were most unwilling to assign counties the following service responsibilities: utility billing (22), public relations (31), personnel services (33), street

lighting (45), treasury functions (45), records storage and maintenance (60), water distribution (67), snow removal (70), legal services (72), water supply (79), recreational facilities (83), sewer lines (87), and irrigation (93). Four of these services—utility billing, public relations, street lighting, and legal services—often are performed by private firms, and a fifth service—snow removal—in many municipalities is partially provided by private firms.

Regional special districts, according to these municipal respondents, should be responsible primarily for environmental and public protection services—air pollution abatement (392), flood control (359), water pollution abatement (356), crime laboratory (322), police training (311), sewage disposal (291), solid waste disposal (282), civil defense communication (272), criminal identification (264), noise pollution abatement (261), and training of firemen (255).

In general, municipal officials were reluctant to assign responsibility to regional special districts for the same services they were reluctant to assign to counties—treasury functions (21), election administration (22), licensing (23), voter registration (29), public relations (31), records maintenance and stor-

Table III-16

Municipalities Contemplating Agreements

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Contemplating Entering Agreements | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|----|
| | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 2383 | 478 | 20 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 9 | 3 | 33 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 11 | 4 | 36 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 49 | 13 | 27 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 110 | 33 | 30 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 232 | 96 | 41 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 521 | 120 | 23 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 616 | 108 | 18 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 819 | 139 | 17 |
| Under 2,500 | 16 | 2 | 13 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | |
| Northeast | 500 | 99 | 20 |
| North Central | 783 | 172 | 22 |
| South | 701 | 122 | 17 |
| West | 399 | 85 | 21 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 1142 | 183 | 16 |
| Council-Manager | 1094 | 270 | 25 |
| Commission | 77 | 18 | 23 |
| Town Meeting | 56 | 5 | 9 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 14 | 2 | 14 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 153 | 43 | 28 |
| Suburban | 1074 | 217 | 20 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 1156 | 218 | 19 |

Table III-17

State Encouragement of Agreements

| | Number of Cities Reporting | State Government Encourages Agreements | | Incentive Grants- In-Aid | | Financial Assistance For Studies | | Technical Assistance | | Other | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-----|--------------------------------|----|---|----|-------------------------|----|-------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 1904 | 1440 | 76 | 685 | 48 | 601 | 42 | 812 | 56 | 160 | 11 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 6 | 4 | 67 | 0 | 1 | 25 | 2 | 50 | 1 | 1 | 25 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 9 | 8 | 88 | 4 | 50 | 4 | 50 | 5 | 63 | 3 | 38 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 41 | 33 | 80 | 13 | 39 | 10 | 30 | 17 | 52 | 12 | 36 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 88 | 71 | 81 | 31 | 44 | 26 | 37 | 43 | 61 | 13 | 18 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 197 | 158 | 80 | 74 | 47 | 71 | 45 | 96 | 61 | 25 | 16 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 442 | 342 | 77 | 152 | 44 | 145 | 43 | 185 | 54 | 43 | 13 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 491 | 373 | 76 | 184 | 49 | 165 | 44 | 220 | 59 | 32 | 9 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 621 | 443 | 71 | 224 | 51 | 187 | 42 | 242 | 55 | 31 | 7 |
| Under 2,500 | 9 | 9 | 100 | 3 | 33 | 2 | 22 | 2 | 22 | 2 | 22 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 412 | 343 | 83 | 185 | 54 | 164 | 48 | 195 | 57 | 21 | 6 |
| North Central | 626 | 458 | 73 | 201 | 44 | 183 | 40 | 261 | 57 | 58 | 13 |
| South | 535 | 384 | 72 | 187 | 49 | 165 | 43 | 237 | 62 | 32 | 8 |
| West | 331 | 254 | 77 | 112 | 44 | 99 | 39 | 119 | 47 | 47 | 19 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 851 | 621 | 73 | 318 | 51 | 280 | 45 | 358 | 58 | 46 | 7 |
| Council-Manager | 939 | 731 | 78 | 318 | 44 | 291 | 40 | 407 | 56 | 107 | 15 |
| Commission | 64 | 50 | 78 | 26 | 52 | 20 | 40 | 24 | 48 | 4 | 8 |
| Town Meeting | 37 | 28 | 76 | 15 | 54 | 15 | 54 | 19 | 68 | 1 | 4 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 13 | 10 | 77 | 8 | 80 | 5 | 50 | 4 | 40 | 2 | 20 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 125 | 100 | 80 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 63 | 63 | 19 | 19 |
| Suburban | 870 | 678 | 78 | 307 | 45 | 282 | 42 | 356 | 53 | 88 | 13 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 911 | 662 | 73 | 339 | 51 | 286 | 43 | 397 | 60 | 53 | 8 |

age (37), personnel services (42), street lighting (50), and recreational facilities (58). Municipal officials were more willing to assign responsibility for sewer lines (140) and water supply (224) to regional special districts than they were to counties.

Data in Appendix Table III-G support the conclusion that a substantial number of officials are willing to assign responsibility for many important functions to regional units. The comments of two local officials highlight some of the reasons. The chairman of the board of selectmen in a Massachusetts town wrote, "A change from town services to regional services, while an explosive emotional issue, is necessary if we are to serve greater numbers of people at less cost." An Ohio mayor wrote, "Township and small political subdivisions are inefficient and today should be abolished in favor of a regional approach."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, 42 States have enacted some form of general intergovernmental contracting and agreements legislation; in 32 it applies only if both local governments are granted authority; and in 13, the general statute may not override any individual act covering a specific functional area. At least four States have no active policy of promoting interlocal contracting via the use of such permissive legislation, and in an indeterminate number of others the rulings of State attorneys general have had the practical effect of curbing the use of contracts and agreements.

The distinction between a service agreement and a transfer of functions is blurred. Half of ten States that authorized general transfers allowed for revocation, and only half required voter approval of a

transfer. Three of the States made explicit provision for reimbursement in a functional transfer, as is done in an agreement.

The ACIR-ICMA national survey of nearly 6,000 incorporated municipalities reveals that they receive a significant number and a large variety of services from other governmental units by means of informal and formal agreement. Although more than three-fifths of the responding units obtain services from other units, most agreements are limited in scope and involve only a single service. Our data support the finding of Vincent L. Marando that in the Detroit area "cooperative agreements entered into by a municipality were generally confined to one functional area. It did not appear that such agreements were encouraging municipalities to cooperate with one another on a large number of varied functions."¹⁹

Jails and detention homes, police training, street lighting, refuse collection, libraries, solid waste disposal, water supply, and crime laboratory services

are the most popular agreements. State governments are major providers of police training, water pollution abatement, crime laboratories, training of firemen, and criminal identification. Private firms are major providers of refuse collection, engineering, legal, street lighting, public relations, and micro-film services.

One principal survey finding is that the tendency of a local government to enter into service agreements is positively correlated with population size. Generally, the larger the unit, the more agreements it enters into. That council-manager governments have the greatest proclivity to enter into agreements and that the dominant motive for entering into agreements is to benefit from economies of scale are two other major findings. The factor most inhibiting the willingness of local governments to enter into service agreements is the fear that their independence of action will be limited by such actions. In addition, some central cities in metropolitan areas have been hesitant to extend utilities—such as water supply and sewer lines—to suburban communities for fear that the exodus of citizens and business firms to the suburbs will be accelerated as they acquire additional municipal services. In some instances, intensive bargaining occurs between a central city and a suburban town, resulting in a trade-off, *i.e.*, the central city agrees to supply water to the town in exchange for a solid waste disposal site.

This survey made no attempt to correlate the propensity to enter into service agreements with the rate of population growth or decline of municipalities. It is not unreasonable to postulate that smaller municipalities experiencing a sharp rate of population increase or decrease have a greater tendency to enter into service agreements. In addition, no attempt was made in the survey to relate the socio-economic characteristics of municipalities to their rate of participation in service agreements. Marando, for example, reports that in the Detroit area "socially similar municipalities cooperate with one another for services which have social implications."²⁰ This subject merits further study.

Some observers believe that the use of a large number of agreements is a desultory approach to the solution of service problems, that it complicates the local governmental system, and that it may make the system less responsive to the needs and wishes of citizens. At the same time, others have stressed the economy of scale benefits that can be derived from this approach and the fact that it can serve as a curb on the proliferation of multi-jurisdictional special districts and authorities. Moreover, there are those who contend that without the practical experience of engaging in interlocal service agreements, local officials will never arrive at the level of interlocal

Table III-18

Federal Encouragement of Agreements

| | Number of Reporting Cities | Federal Statutes Encourage Agreements | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|----|
| | | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 1445 | 701 | 49 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 5 | 3 | 60 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 10 | 7 | 70 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 38 | 25 | 66 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 78 | 50 | 64 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 171 | 84 | 49 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 335 | 176 | 53 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 357 | 164 | 46 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 444 | 169 | 38 |
| Under 2,500 | 7 | 3 | 43 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | |
| Northeast | 297 | 156 | 53 |
| North Central | 465 | 224 | 48 |
| South | 420 | 185 | 44 |
| West | 263 | 136 | 52 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 631 | 287 | 45 |
| Council-Manager | 738 | 380 | 51 |
| Commission | 45 | 19 | 42 |
| Town Meeting | 22 | 11 | 50 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 9 | 4 | 44 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | |
| Central | 112 | 73 | 65 |
| Suburban | 657 | 324 | 49 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 676 | 304 | 45 |

comity which will permit a more fundamental type of collaborative endeavor.

The use of agreements for the provision of services appears to be a limited and rather temporary form of functional consolidation based upon a partnership approach in which administration is centralized and policy-making is decentralized. Although the survey data used in this chapter did not probe the extent to which the service agreement approach has led to more permanent transfers or consolidations of functions, this question also deserves further study.²¹

In essence, then, procedural arrangements are part and parcel of the voluntary or ecumenical approach to the solution of servicing problems at the

interlocal and substate regional levels. This approach has been most popular because it is pragmatic, piecemeal, permissive, and has a minimal disruptive impact on the structure of local governments. It is not unreasonable to forecast that most State governments will expand their efforts to encourage local governments to enter into service provision agreements and in special cases may order one unit to provide a service to one or more contiguous units.

To conclude, the record suggests that not all governmental service problems lend themselves to solution by means of service agreements. The potential of intergovernmental cooperation here is limited principally to the solution of relatively minor and fairly non-controversial difficulties.

Footnotes

¹John E. Stoner, *Interlocal Governmental Cooperation: A Study of Five States*. Agriculture Economic Report No. 118 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, July 1967), p. 5.

²*A Handbook for Interlocal Agreements and Contracts* (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, March 1967), p. 13.

³Sho Sato and Arvo VanAlstyne, *State and Local Government Law* (Boston: Little Brown, & Co., 1970), p. 387.

⁴*Alternative Approaches to Governmental Structure, Organization, and Planning in Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, March 1967), p. 13.

⁵*Constitution of the State of New York*, Art. IX, sec. 1(c).

⁶Leigh Grosenick, *A Manual for Interlocal Cooperation in Minnesota* (St. Paul: Office of Local and Urban Affairs, State Planning Agency, May 1969), p. 113.

⁷*Rhode Island General Laws Annotated*, 54-43-3.

⁸Wendell E. Koerner, Jr., "Interlocal Cooperation: The Missouri Approach," *Missouri Law Review* 1968, p. 450.

⁹*Joint Services—A Local Response to Areawide Problems* (Trenton: County and Municipal Government Study Commission, 1970), p. 38.

¹⁰Of course, there may be many statutes in these as well as the other 40 States which authorize the transfer of a particular function.

¹¹At one time, Idaho had statutory authority for local governments to transfer functions. This section was repealed and replaced by an interlocal cooperation act, which provides for joint services and contracting, but does not mention transferring func-

tions. The implication seems to be that explicit provisions for the transfer of functions are unnecessary under the cooperation act.

¹²For a more complete description of the problems encountered in gathering data on service agreements, see J. Paul Friesema, *Metropolitan Political Structure: Intergovernmental Relations and Political Integration in the Quad-Cities* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1971), pp. 37-42.

¹³Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Solving Areawide Problems in Rhode Island," *Newsletter* (Kingston: Bureau of Government Research, University of Rhode Island, September 1972), p. 2.

¹⁴Vincent L. Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area: Detroit," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, December 1968, p. 193.

¹⁵See the *California Government Code*, § 51301, and *Los Angeles County Charter*, § 56 1/2. Also see Chapter V.

¹⁶ACIR, *A Handbook for Interlocal Agreements and Contracts*, p. 14.

¹⁷Stoner, *Interlocal Governmental Cooperation*, p. 15.

¹⁸*Joint Services: A Local Response to Area Wide Problems*, p. iv.


¹⁹Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area: Detroit," p. 199.

²⁰Marando, "Inter-Local Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area: Detroit," p. 199. For a further discussion of the socio-economic factors of cooperation see also: Oliver P. Williams, *et al.*, *Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965); Vincent Ostrom, *et al.*, "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas," *The American Political Science Review*, December 1961, p. 831; and Thomas Dye, *et al.*, "Differentiation and Cooperation in a Metropolitan Area," *Midwest Journal of Politics*, May 1963, p. 145.

²¹For a brief discussion of the impact of functional consolidation on city-county consolidation, see Chapter VI. ACIR also plans to undertake a survey of functional transfers and consolidations in the near future.

Chapter IV

THE METROPOLITAN COUNTY



The persisting functional and jurisdictional problems generated by rapid urbanization and technological change have rekindled interest in the role of counties in the governance of the Nation's metropolitan areas.¹ A number of reformers have become disenchanted with councils of governments, areawide planning and development districts, and other recent regional approaches because of their limited capacity to deal authoritatively with certain conditions found in the metropolis. These include the flight of higher income residents and industries to suburbia, the proliferation of special districts, the inability of many municipalities to expand their boundaries through annexation to encompass urbanizing areas, and the inequities and diseconomies involved in central-city financing of regional services. As a result of its geographic scope, political base for party organization, administrative responsibilities as an arm of State government, fiscal powers, and functional capacity, reform proposals are increasingly focusing upon the county as a unit of areawide government.²

To some observers, the county-oriented approach to metropolitan governmental reorganization is the most politically feasible way to meet public service needs since it would not drastically alter the jurisdictional landscape.³ It would involve a gradual change in the county's role as an administrative agent of the State to a full-scale urban government capable of performing a range of regional and municipal functions.⁴ As early as 1942, for example, it was noted, "A fruitful course of action (for metropolitan reorganization) might be, first to reorganize the urban county, to give it a municipal structure, and, then, to consolidate it with its municipalities or to enlarge its functions and transform it into an effective unit of metropolitan government."⁵

To others, the county does not represent an across-the-board approach to solving structural or service delivery problems. Rather, it embraces a variety of institutional and program practices, combinations of which are used in varying degrees by counties in metropolitan areas across the country to meet the changing needs of their citizenry.⁶ These observers see a piecemeal, gradual, and unsystematic future development of the Nation's metropolitan counties. In certain instances, the county would be the governmental unit responsible for performing areawide functions, while local functions (single jurisdiction in scope) would continue to be handled by municipalities.⁷ In other instances, the county would assume responsibility for delivering certain services in unincorporated areas, and would continue to do so even after incorporation. In still others, the county would be authorized or mandated by the State to undertake new functions on an areawide basis not provided before by constituent municipal governments.⁸

In sum, a range of servicing options is available to metropolitan counties: (1) delivery of services to unincorporated areas; (2) assumption of responsibility for functions transferred from cities under State law and provision of these new or additional functions on a countywide basis; (3) expansion of old functions or assumption of new ones voluntarily on a countywide basis; (4) involvement in cooperative arrangements with other units of government within its area for the provision of services; and (5) comprehensive governmental reorganization, simultaneously reallocating certain urban-type functions from the municipal to the county levels.⁹

Most authorities, then, agree that the county is pivotal in any functional rearrangement of the metropolitan governance system. They acknowledge that in many instances the county has the requisite geographic scope and can be endowed with the necessary fiscal, structural, and organizational powers to become a unit of areawide government. Moreover, they recognize that every successful major metropolitan government reorganization, except in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, has involved a single restructured county.¹⁰ However, there is less consensus on the types of functional and institutional approaches most appropriate for single-county and multicounty SMSA's.

In unicity metropolitan areas, the county is usually the prime target of reorganization efforts. Here the county government is in a strategic position to perform areawide functions by itself or in combination with constituent cities and to implement long-range policies that will guide metropolitan development. Its actions will affect *all* the governments within the area. But the extent to which the county assumes responsibilities will depend on such factors as State constraints and support, the number of activities of general purpose local governments and special districts in the area, county and municipal fiscal conditions, and citizen demands for public services.

In sharp contrast, restructuring of the county alone cannot produce a vehicle for areawide governance in multicounty metropolitan areas. This is particularly the case where a considerable portion of the metropolitan population resides outside of the central county. In these areas, variations of the regional council and special district approaches have been considered and occasionally implemented.¹¹ Consequently, county reorganization has been proposed mainly where all or the preponderant majority of the metropolitan population resides within a single county. In many of these areas, suburban counties serve as the major building block in a metropolitan governance system.

This chapter focuses upon the areas for which counties are potentially the most suitable units of

areawide government—single county Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Although the 127 unicounty SMSA's include only 4 percent of all county units in the United States, they comprise almost half of the SMSA total and govern 38.2 million people. Some comparative analysis will also be undertaken in connection with multicounty SMSA's and their central and suburban-fringe counties. Of particular interest are (1) the characteristics of unicounty metropolitan areas; and (2) the extent to which single-county SMSA's are performing and financing areawide functions, engaging in interlocal cooperation, and serving as organizational units for Federal and State substate programs.

For purposes of this chapter, the term "metropolitan county" will be used in connection with both single-county and multi-county SMSA's. The term "urban county" will be used in reference to certain jurisdictions that provide a wide range of municipal-type services on a countywide basis—such as police and fire protection, water and sewer systems, waste disposal, transportation, and libraries—as a result of transfers from subcounty governments or the assumption of new functional responsibilities.

POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

Defining a metropolitan county as a by-product of population density and of economic and social integration presents more difficulties than considering it as a vehicle for metropolitan governance. Since 1958, the Bureau of the Census has used a set of criteria established by the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) with the advice of the Federal Committee on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,¹² for the purpose of defining and designating SMSA's. These criteria build upon the Census' definition of an urbanized area. The concept holds that a metropolitan area is an integrated economic and social unit with a recognized large population nucleus located within and including a county (often referred to as the central county) or town (as in New England) or involving more than one county.¹³

In addition to criteria of population size and density, SMSA's are also characterized by a considerable amount of social and economic interaction. In multicounty areas, for example, outlying counties are considered to be socially and economically integrated with the central SMSA county if 15 percent or more of its population works in the central city, or if 25 percent of its labor force resides in the central county.¹⁴

Given this backdrop, a metropolitan county may be: (1) a single-county SMSA jurisdiction, urbanized, having either a central city or twin cities which satisfy the population, social, and economic criteria

for an SMSA and which exhibit social and economic links with their surrounding suburbs; or (2) one of two or more contiguous counties that constitute a multicounty SMSA and exhibit intercounty and county-central city (and other civil division) interaction and interdependency. Viewed as a single entity, and discounting the contiguity factor, each county with a central city in a multicounty SMSA would usually constitute a single-county SMSA by itself if there were no interdependencies among the counties.¹⁵

Potential Unicounty SMSA's

A number of county areas have size and density characteristics similar to some smaller unicounty SMSA's. In 10 States, there are 20 counties that have a population equal to or greater than the State's smallest SMSA (see Table IV-1). Most of these jurisdictions are located in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. The major difference between

Table IV-1
Counties With Overall Population Equal to or Greater than Smallest Designated SMSA, by State: 1971

| County | State | Population per Square Mile | Land Area Square Miles | Urbanized Area Pop. | Other Urban Area Population |
|-------------|-------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| Calhoun | Ala. | 168.1 | 611 | — | 66,130 |
| Tulare | Cal. | 39.1 | 4812 | — | 101,629 |
| *LaSalle | Ill. | 96.9 | 1150 | — | 72,178 |
| *Madison | Ill. | 342.3 | 733 | 89,429 | 90,940 |
| *Elkhart | Ind. | 270.4 | 468 | 57,941 | 21,282 |
| *Berrien | Mich. | 282.5 | 589 | 21,091 | 24,921 |
| St. Clair | Mich. | 163.7 | 734 | — | 55,320 |
| Stearns | Minn. | 71.1 | 1342 | — | 38,167 |
| *Ocean | N.J. | 324.7 | 642 | 52,192 | 40,196 |
| *Somerset | N.J. | 646.2 | 307 | — | 151,762 |
| Ulster | N.Y. | 123.8 | 1141 | — | 53,247 |
| *Butler | Pa. | 161.1 | 794 | — | 38,651 |
| *Fayette | Pa. | 192.9 | 802 | — | 50,750 |
| *Mercer | Pa. | 189.8 | 670 | — | 63,368 |
| *Schuylkill | Pa. | 204.2 | 784 | — | 83,127 |
| Fond du Lac | Wis. | 116.6 | 725 | — | 48,319 |
| Manitowac | Wis. | 139.5 | 590 | — | 49,533 |
| Marathon | Wis. | 61.4 | 1586 | — | 48,357 |
| *Rock | Wis. | 183.0 | 721 | — | 98,876 |
| *Sheboygan | Wis. | 191.4 | 505 | — | 59,065 |

*Counties in which the population density per square mile exceeds the population density of smallest SMSA.

these units and designated metropolitan counties lies in their absence of an urban center. While non-designated counties have urbanized areas, they do not have single or contiguous urban centers of over 50,000 population.

The existence of these potential SMSA's has brought about a revision in the OMB criteria for metropolitan area designation. In a November 1971 action, the Office of Management and Budget indicated that a metropolitan area must contain one city with 50,000 or more inhabitants, or a city with a minimum population of 25,000 with contiguous incorporated and unincorporated places having a density of at least 1,000 persons per square mile and a population of at least 25,000.¹⁶ Under these new criteria expanding the definition of an urban center, potential unicounty SMSA's may achieve metropolitan designation in the near future.

Unicounty and Multicounty SMSA Contrasts

The 127 single-county SMSA's that comprise 48 percent of all SMSA's are distributed across the United States.¹⁷ With the exception of Massachusetts, Maine, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Vermont, and North Dakota, every State that has organized county government or its equivalent has at least one unicounty metropolitan area.

The States with the largest number of single-county SMSA's are Texas (14), California (13), and Florida (11). Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia have only one such SMSA within their boundaries. Only Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, and South Dakota do not con-

Table IV-2

Distribution of Single-County and Multicounty Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, by State: 1971

| State | Number Single-County SMSA's | Number Multi-County SMSA's | Total SMSA's | State | Number Single-County SMSA's | Number Multi-County SMSA's | Total SMSA's |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| Alabama | 2 | 5 | 7 | Missouri | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Alaska (a) | 1 | 0 | 1 | Montana | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Arizona | 2 | 0 | 2 | Nebraska | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Arkansas | 1 | 3 | 4 | Nevada | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| California | 13 | 4 | 17 | New Hampshire | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Colorado | 2 | 1 | 3 | New Jersey | 6 | 1 | 7 |
| Connecticut (b) | 0 | 11 | 11 | New Mexico | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Delaware | 0 | 1 | 1 | New York | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| District of Columbia | 0 | 1 | 1 | North Carolina | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Florida | 11 | 1 | 12 | North Dakota | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Georgia | 2 | 4 | 6 | Ohio | 5 | 8 | 13 |
| Hawaii | 1 | 0 | 1 | Oklahoma | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Idaho | 1 | 0 | 1 | Oregon | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Illinois | 4 | 4 | 8 | Pennsylvania | 7 | 6 | 13 |
| Indiana | 4 | 5 | 9 | Rhode Island | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Iowa | 4 | 1 | 5 | South Carolina | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Kansas | 1 | 2 | 3 | South Dakota | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Kentucky | 2 | 1 | 3 | Tennessee | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| Louisiana | 5 | 2 | 7 | Texas | 14 | 10 | 24 |
| Maine | 0 | 2 | 2 | Utah | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Maryland | 0 | 1 | 1 | Vermont | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Massachusetts | 0 | 10 | 10 | Virginia (c) | 1 | 5 | 6 |
| Michigan | 7 | 4 | 11 | Washington | 5 | 2 | 7 |
| Minnesota | 1 | 3 | 4 | West Virginia | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| Mississippi | 1 | 1 | 2 | Wisconsin | 5 | 2 | 7 |
| | | | | Wyoming | 0 | 0 | 0 |

(a) The single-county SMSA in Alaska refers to the Anchorage Census Division that the Bureau of the Census considers equivalent to an organized county.

(b) Connecticut has no organized county governments.

(c) Unicounty SMSA's in Virginia contain independent cities and therefore actually have two county areas in one county.

Table IV-3
Size of Unicounty and Multicounty SMSA's: 1960 and 1970

| Population Size | 1960 | | | | 1970 | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| | Unicounty SMSA | | Multicounty SMSA | | Unicounty SMSA | | Multicounty SMSA | |
| | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| Over 1 Million | 2 | 1.5 | 22 | 38.2 | 5 | 3.9 | 28 | 24.6 |
| 900,000-999,999 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 1.3 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.9 |
| 800,000-899,999 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 5.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 6 | 5.3 |
| 700,000-799,999 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 1.3 | 1 | 0.8 | 3 | 2.6 |
| 600,000-699,999 | 8 | 6.0 | 2 | 2.5 | 3 | 2.3 | 8 | 7.0 |
| 500,000-599,999 | 4 | 3.0 | 7 | 8.9 | 2 | 1.6 | 7 | 6.1 |
| 400,000-499,999 | 2 | 1.5 | 5 | 6.4 | 3 | 2.3 | 6 | 5.3 |
| 300,000-399,999 | 14 | 10.6 | 7 | 8.9 | 10 | 7.8 | 16 | 14.0 |
| 200,000-299,999 | 28 | 21.2 | 13 | 16.5 | 27 | 20.9 | 21 | 18.5 |
| 100,000-199,999 | 51 | 38.9 | 15 | 8.4 | 58 | 44.9 | 11 | 9.6 |
| Under 100,000 | 22 | 16.7 | 2 | 2.5 | 19 | 14.7 | 7 | 6.1 |
| TOTAL | 133 | 100.00 | 79 | 100.0 | 129 | 100.0 | 114 | 100.0 |
| TOTAL ALL SMSA'S | | | 212 | | | | 243 | |

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population* PC (1) 1A, Table 31; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population* PC (1) 1A, Table 32.

tain more than one metropolitan area. Table IV-2 shows the distribution of single and multicounty SMSA's by State.

Unicounty SMSA's cover a broad population range—from just under 60,000 in Brazos County, Texas, to over 7 million in Los Angeles County, California. Five such SMSA's have populations of one million or more; 19 have populations of less than 100,000. The largest single-county metropolitan areas are found in California and Florida; the smallest are dispersed throughout several States in the South, Southwest, and Midwest. As shown in Table IV-3, the bulk of the single-county SMSA's in 1970 as well as in 1960 fell in the 100,000-400,000 population range. Less than 15 percent of these SMSA's were in the over-400,000 population class in both 1960 and 1970, compared to over half of all multicounty metropolitan areas in both years.

Multicounty SMSA's also have widely varying populations, from the 11.6 million inhabitants of the sprawling New York megalopolis to the 56,000 of Meriden County, Connecticut—the newest and smallest entry. Table IV-3 reveals that the number of multicounty SMSA's increased by 9 percent during the past decade. This expansion occurred in all but three of the population categories. One-quarter of all multicounty SMSA's are located in population centers in excess of one million people. At the other end of the spectrum, however, 48 percent exist in smaller population concentrations (fewer than 400,000). The proportion of multicounty SMSA's with more than 400,000 people declined 12 percent

from 1960 to 1970. Hence, it is only partly correct to perceive the multicounty SMSA as a highly urbanized megalopolitan area.

Unicounty metropolitan areas exhibit other population characteristics that differentiate them from most multicounty SMSA's. First, their overall rate of population growth has surpassed that of metropolitan areas as a whole. White total metropolitan population expansion between 1960 and 1970 averaged 17 percent, in unicounty SMSA's the central-city figures exceeded the national averages. Central-city growth rates in all metropolitan areas and in unicounty SMSA's were 5 percent and 22 percent, respectively. At the same time, suburbs in unicounty SMSA's grew more slowly than suburban areas as a whole; the rates were 23 percent in unicounty SMSA's and 28 percent in all SMSA's.

Not only are most unicounty SMSA's of small size (under 400,000), but they also tend to have large central cities. As Table IV-4 indicates, central cities in a majority of single-county metropolitan areas usually contain the major proportion of the metropolitan population. Central-city growth rates did not lag appreciably behind those of their suburban areas mainly because of the aggressive annexation policies that were followed during the 1960's, when well over 60 percent of central-city population increases resulted from annexation. Central city governments in most single-county SMSA's, then, exhibit rather dynamic growth characteristics, unlike the central cities of most larger, multicounty SMSA's.

This metropolitan central city contrast becomes

Table IV-4
**Selected Population Characteristics of
 Unicity and Multicity SMSA's, by Size Class: 1970**

| Population Characteristics | SMSA Size Class | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|------|-----------------|------|-----------------|------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|------|-----------------|------|---------------|------|--|--|
| | 1,000,000+ | | 800,000-999,999 | | 600,000-799,999 | | 500,000-599,999 | | 400,000-499,999 | | 300,000-399,999 | | 200,000-299,999 | | 100,000-199,999 | | under 100,000 | | | |
| | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | MC | | |
| CC Pop. Growth (% change 1960-70) | 44.0 | .75 | 32.4 | 3.7 | 37.3 | 14.1 | 157.7 | 6.2 | 14.2 | 12.1 | 14.5 | 4.0 | 22.1 | 2.7 | 20.1 | 15.2 | 13.3 | 32.2 | | |
| OCC Pop. Growth (% change 1960-70) | 57.1 | 38.5 | 72.0 | 37.2 | 41.8 | 34.1 | 95.8 | 26.8 | 27.1 | 23.4 | 32.5 | 16.5 | 36.7 | 30.9 | 14.2 | 14.7 | 13.6 | 13.9 | | |
| % CC Growth due to Annexation, 1960-70 | 31.4 | 86.0 | 45.4 | 38.0 | 45.4 | 59.0 | 100.0 | 145.8 | 73.2 | 80.1 | 79.3 | 114.6 | 65.6 | 64.1 | 90.5 | 85.9 | 73.7 | 83.9 | | |
| % CC Pop. in areas Annexed 1960-70 | 5.8 | 15.4 | 11.1 | 4.9 | 7.4 | 12.4 | 68.9 | 24.9 | 8.4 | 14.1 | 7.7 | 11.8 | 7.6 | 11.0 | 13.6 | 14.4 | 9.7 | 21.0 | | |
| % SMSA Pop. in CC | 39.1 | 40.4 | 60.1 | 46.5 | 44.7 | 48.6 | 98.0 | 54.6 | 38.9 | 37.7 | 42.1 | 40.5 | 46.2 | 48.7 | 58.7 | 56.0 | 75.0 | 76.1 | | |
| % SMSA Pop. in other Urban areas | 58.2 | 48.2 | 33.3 | 41.3 | 52.6 | 41.8 | — | 33.2 | 39.8 | 37.4 | 40.8 | 35.1 | 31.7 | 29.2 | 19.0 | 21.3 | 5.7 | 7.2 | | |
| % Pop. in Rural areas | 2.7 | 9.1 | 6.6 | 13.6 | 2.7 | 12.6 | 2.0 | 13.9 | 21.3 | 23.7 | 17.1 | 24.2 | 22.1 | 22.4 | 22.3 | 23.2 | 19.3 | 16.6 | | |
| % OCC Pop. in Rural areas | 4.4 | 14.3 | 16.5 | 24.0 | 4.9 | 24.9 | — | 36.9 | 34.9 | 41.3 | 29.5 | 38.8 | 41.1 | 44.9 | 54.0 | 56.3 | 77.2 | 73.0 | | |
| CC Land area as % of SMSA, 1970 | 8.7 | 5.8 | 2.7 | 5.0 | 8.2 | 9.3 | 100.0 | 17.3 | 1.2 | 3.1 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 5.9 | 2.7 | 11.7 | | |
| Total SMSA's (N) | (5) | (29) | (1) | (7) | (3) | (11) | (1) | (9) | (2) | (9) | (10) | (18) | (25) | (43) | (44) | (69) | (21) | (24) | | |
| CC=Central City OCC=Outside Central City UC=Unicity MC=Multicity | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

even more apparent when other demographic factors are considered. As Table IV-5 notes, central cities of unicity SMSA's still experience considerable increases in white population, exhibit substantial population in-migration, and are about 10 percent non-white. These trends stand in contrast with central cities nationwide, many of which are undergoing precipitous declines in white population, heavy net out-migration of population, and rapidly increasing concentrations of non-whites.

The growth and demographic patterns of central cities in unicity SMSA's differ, then, from those of multicounty metropolitan areas. Not to be overlooked are the contrasts in the nature of their respective suburban areas. As both Tables IV-4 and IV-5 show, the "outside central city" (OCC) portions of most unicity metropolitan areas tend to be of a lightly urbanized or rural nature. In the smaller unicity metropolitan areas, one-half to three-quarters of the OCC population is of a rural character. Moreover, in the 112 unicity SMSA's for which population data are available, 46 suburban areas experienced lower population growth rates than central cities, 17 had actual population declines between 1960 and 1970, and 37 showed net out-migration during the same period.

The suburban portions of most multicounty SMSA's are more urbanized than those of unicity metropolitan areas. In the large SMSA's, less than 30 percent of the suburban population resides in rural areas. In the smaller multicounty areas, however, one-third to three-fourths of the OCC population is rural. Thus, smaller SMSA's tend to have similar rural population characteristics regardless of whether they are of a single-county or multicounty nature.

In summary, most single-county metropolitan areas tend to have relatively small populations; growth rates above the national average; central cities which continue to be predominantly white; and suburban portions more frequently rural than urban. In short, unicity SMSA's are apt to be more central-city dominated and to exhibit urban-rural rather than urban-suburban population differentiations, though this varies with population size and geographic location.

GOVERNMENTAL PROFILE

Thirty-nine percent of the 127 single-county SMSA's have county boards with an appointed administrator or a county manager, and 8 percent have elected chief executives. Fifty-four percent have a commission form of government with no recognized administrator. In 13 States all of the single-county SMSA's operate under the commission system.¹⁸

Modernized county government structures are

found in larger population areas. Of the 38.2 million people residing in unicity SMSA's, 57 percent are governed under a council-administrator plan and 9 percent under an elected county executive system. Thus, even though 54 percent of the single-county SMSA's have a traditional commission form of government, they serve only 34 percent of the unicity metropolitan area population.

Use of the county administrator form of government is confined to a few States. Twenty-three of the 49 counties having this system are located in seven States, including 12 of the 13 counties in California, both of Georgia's unicity SMSA's, and one each in Ohio, Oregon, Minnesota, Virginia, and North Carolina. The county manager plan is more dispersed geographically, appearing in California, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Florida.¹⁹

The form of government and its legal basis in single-county SMSA's differ sharply from those of counties in general. A 1970 ACIR-NACO-ICMA mail survey of all counties revealed that of the 993 responding (about 34 percent) 80 percent reported having the plural executive or commission form of government, compared to 45 percent of the single-county SMSA's. Only 20 percent of the participating jurisdictions used the county administrator or county executive plan, in contrast to 46 percent of the single-county SMSA's.

A follow-up to the 1970 survey aimed exclusively at unicity SMSA's revealed some additional aspects of their legal basis.²⁰ Table IV-6 shows that the State constitution provided the basis for the form of government in 19 of the 39 counties without a recognized administrator, and for eight of the 34 county commissions with an appointed administrator. State enabling legislation was the legal basis for county organization in all forms except the county executive, which usually is a result of a county charter. The low degree of reliance on charter provisions reflects the fact that home rule is still not a widespread phenomenon in county governments; according to the National Association of Counties, 15 States currently have charter counties, although others authorize varying degrees of county home rule in structural, functional, or fiscal matters.²¹

Central and fringe county governments in multicounty SMSA's also derive their legal basis from State constitution or statute. Like unicity SMSA's, their infrequent use of charter provisions or county ordinances reflects the limited application of home rule.

Governmental Density

Single-county SMSA's exhibit somewhat less governmental fragmentation than the average metropolitan area. As of 1967, the average uni-

Table IV-5
**Selected Demographic Characteristics of
 Unicity and Multicity SMSA's, by Size Class: 1970**

| Population Characteristics | SMSA Size Class | | | | | | | | | | | | | | all | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|--|
| | 1,000,000+ | 800,000-999,999 | 600,000-799,999 | 500,000-599,999 | 400,000-499,999 | 300,000-399,999 | 200,000-299,999 | 100,000-199,999 | under 100,000 | UC | MC | UC | MC | UC | | MC | UC | MC | | |
| 1960-70 % increase | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CC white population | 19.3 | -10.5 | 31.2 | 4.4 | 50.0 | -1.6 | 16.8 | -2.3 | 9.6 | 8.5 | 11.5 | 5.1 | 20.0 | 11.3 | 20.0 | 11.9 | 13.4 | 18.3 | -1.2 | |
| 1960-70 % increase | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CC Negro population | 173.2 | 42.8 | 33.4 | 44.1 | 47.6 | 38.9 | 11.8 | 49.1 | 63.5 | 34.8 | 43.5 | 37.7 | 60.3 | 64.5 | 40.6 | 44.0 | 66.7 | 49.0 | 20.0 | |
| % Negro in CC, 1970 | 10.2 | 27.4 | 4.8 | 12.3 | 10.5 | 16.4 | 22.3 | 11.1 | 8.2 | 23.5 | 11.0 | 13.5 | 8.6 | 12.9 | 11.6 | 12.7 | 9.1 | 6.8 | 20.6 | |
| 1960-70 % increase | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCC white population | 53.9 | 33.8 | 74.2 | 43.6 | 43.4 | 38.4 | — | 27.2 | 25.9 | 20.7 | 33.8 | 16.6 | 36.4 | 27.3 | 15.2 | 18.6 | 13.9 | 17.2 | 27.4 | |
| 1960-70 % increase | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OCC Negro population | 119.9 | 78.3 | 18.5 | 49.2 | 46.9 | 28.8 | — | 121.0 | 20.7 | 22.6 | 35.4 | 43.3 | 114.2 | 75.0 | 56.8 | 129.0 | 24.6 | 37.9 | 29.1 | |
| % Negro in OCC, 1970 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 5.9 | 3.0 | — | .5 | 2.5 | 7.6 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 4.8 | |
| % CC population | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| increase, net migration | 21.2 | -9.9 | 17.5 | .9 | 25.1 | -8.0 | .3 | -8.3 | 3.5 | -3.6 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 5.3 | 10.1 | 5.4 | -5.0 | -0.9 | -1.1 | -4 | |
| % OCC population | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| increase, net migration | 40.6 | 18.7 | 49.3 | 29.0 | 29.0 | 22.0 | — | 12.1 | 10.0 | 3.7 | 20.8 | 9.3 | 20.4 | 11.1 | -5 | 2.9 | 2.6 | -6 | 10.1 | |

CC=Central City
 OCC=Outside Central City
 UC=Unicity
 MC=Multicity

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, *General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960-70* PHC (2) -1

county SMSA had 10 municipalities, 6 townships, 14 school districts, and 19 special districts. This compares with an average of 22 municipalities, 14 townships, 31 school districts, and 22 special districts in the typical metropolitan area.²²

Governmental fragmentation in unicity SMSA's follows established regional patterns. It is most pronounced in California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania and least evident in several southern States—Georgia, Louisiana, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia—where the local governmental structure is relatively simple.

Reforms such as alternative executive forms of government have apparently had no relationship with the amount of governmental proliferation. As Table IV-7 indicates, even those States that have experienced the greatest success in adopting the county executive and manager forms of government (California) still face a jurisdictionally fragmented environment exceeding that of States where there has been more reliance on traditional forms of county government (Texas). Of course, State law is often a prime factor in this situation.

Performance of Functions

One basic test of a metropolitan county as an areawide government is the extent to which it performs urban and regional services. Another yardstick is whether such services are provided only in unincorporated areas or on a countywide basis.

Urban or municipal-type services include fire protection, refuse and garbage collection, libraries, parks and recreation, hospitals, and parking. Regional services include mass transit, airports, junior colleges, solid waste disposal, and air and water pollution abatement. Traditional county services include the coroner, jails and detention homes, public welfare, natural resources, conservation, licensing, tax assessment and collection, administration of courts and prosecution, election administration and record keeping, and public works and road and highway maintenance.

Types of County Services. Data on the functional responsibilities of the metropolitan counties surveyed indicate that as of 1970 upwards of 60 percent of all responding single-county SMSA governments performed the following traditional county services.²³

- Public Safety
 - Police Protection
 - Coroner's Office
- Corrections
 - Jails and Detention Homes
 - Probation and Parole Services
- Public Welfare
 - General Assistance
 - Medical Assistance
- Transportation
 - Maintenance of Roads and Highways
- Health
 - Public Health

Table IV-6
Uni-County SMSA's
Forms of Government and Means of Establishment:
1970

| Forms of Government | Number Counties Reporting | Percent Total Reported | Legal Basis | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|------------------------|--------------|-------|-----------|-------|---------------|-------|---------------|-------|
| | | | State Const. | % (A) | State Law | % (A) | County Ordin. | % (A) | Charter Prov. | % (A) |
| County Board with no Recognized Administrator | 39 | 45 | 19 | 22 | 18 | 21 | 2 | 2 | — | — |
| County Board with Appointed Administrator | 34 | 40 | 8 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 9 | 10 | 5 | 6 |
| County Manager | 8 | 9 | — | — | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| County Executive | 5 | 6 | 2 | 2 | — | — | — | — | 3 | 3 |
| Total All Counties Responding* | 86 | 100 | 29 | 34 | 34 | 40 | 12 | 14 | 11 | 13 |

*Percentages may not equal 100 when summed, due to rounding.

Table IV-7

**General and Special Purpose Local Governments
Within Unicounty SMSA's in Selected States^a
1967**

| State | Municipalities | | School Districts | | Special Districts | | Total | |
|------------|----------------|------|------------------|------|-------------------|------|-------|------|
| | No. | Avg. | No. | Avg. | No. | Avg. | No. | Avg. |
| California | 205 | 16 | 551 | 42 | 804 | 62 | 1560 | 120 |
| Florida | 161 | 15 | 11 | 1 | 124 | 11 | 296 | 27 |
| Texas | 87 | 6 | 139 | 10 | 162 | 12 | 388 | 28 |

^aThe number of unicounty SMSA's in California, Florida, and Texas is 13, 11, and 14, respectively.

Mental Health
Financial Administration
Tax Assessment and Collection
General Court Administration
Courts
Prosecution
Public Defender

Other, less traditional responsibilities assumed by under two-fifths of the reporting unicounty jurisdictions included junior colleges, special educational programs, mosquito abatement, ambulance service, cemeteries, central purchasing, and data processing.

A number of unicounty SMSA's also performed regional services. At least two-fifths, for example, were responsible for solid waste disposal and air and water pollution control.

Turning to urban services, more than half the single-county metropolitan areas played a role in libraries, crippled children care, and parks and recreation. However, fewer than 40 percent administered fire protection, airport, sewers, or sewage disposal programs. Moreover, one-fifth or less were responsible for mass transit, parking, refuse collection, public housing, urban renewal, and industrial development.

A randomly selected sample of 166 ACIR-NACO-ICMA survey respondents from unicounty SMSA's and the central and suburban fringe jurisdictions in multicounty metropolitan areas provides a basis for comparing their involvement in the performance of urban, regional, and traditional functions. Clearly, in 1970 the service delivery systems in the bulk of the counties sampled were heavily oriented to traditional functions.

As shown in Table IV-8, libraries and parks and recreation were the urban services typically found in both single-county and multicounty areas. Fire protection also was often furnished by counties in both kinds of metropolitan area, particularly unicounty jurisdictions. Hospitals tended to be provided more by county governments in multicounty SMSA's, especially suburban counties.

Solid waste disposal was the most common

regional service delivered in single- and multicounty SMSA's. Counties in the former also were involved in air pollution abatement. With respect to the latter, central counties were active in sewers and sewage disposal and in water pollution abatement, while suburban jurisdictions were responsible for airport development.

Law enforcement and criminal justice administration (jails, courts, coroner's office, probation, and police) predominated among the traditional services offered by unicounty SMSA governments, although central counties in multicounty SMSA's also were heavily involved in jails and detention homes; suburban jurisdictions were active in the probation, police, and coroner areas. In addition, health care appears to be a common county function in multicounty metropolitan areas.

Area of Service. Turning to the areal dimension of service delivery, Table IV-8 illustrates that most functions were performed by unicounty, central, and suburban county governments on a countywide basis. Three in particular, however, tended to be provided by several of each type of jurisdiction only in unincorporated areas—police, fire protection, and road and highway maintenance.

Table IV-9 gives a clearer picture of the range of services provided by counties. Based on a random sample of 162 survey respondents, it reveals few significant differences among metropolitan counties in the degree to which they furnish services on a countywide or less than countywide basis.

In terms of countywide services, 16 percent of the unicounty area governments provided more than 33 distinct county services, compared to 13 percent of the central counties and 9 percent of the suburban fringe jurisdictions. On the other hand, 42 percent of the single-county SMSA's provided 18 or fewer countywide services, compared to 31 percent of the central and 35 percent of the suburban counties. Multicounty SMSA county governments also were much more likely to furnish from 22 to 32 services than were unicounty jurisdictions.

With regard to county service delivery solely in unincorporated areas, 26 percent of the central counties sampled, 30 percent of the unicity SMSA's, and 13 percent of the suburban counties provided six or more services.

Merely 7 to 8 percent of all types of metropolitan counties dispensed more than one type of county service only to incorporated areas. Hence, multiple or "package" service contracting arrangements involving counties still have not been used in most metropolitan areas.

To summarize, counties continue to be heavily involved in a wide array of traditional functions. Yet the data suggest that county governments in both single- and multicounty metropolitan areas have been reluctant or unable to assume responsibility for the delivery of various urban or regional services. While some of these jurisdictions appear to be becoming more active in such regional functions

as solid waste disposal and air and water pollution abatement, as well as in certain specialized activities (special education programs, crippled children care, and ambulance service), this has not been the case in connection with urban development. In some areas, of course, there may be no need for county assumption of urban services because of effective municipal performance. Few major differences exist among unicity, central, or suburban county governments in the degree to which they administer functions on a countywide basis, or solely in unincorporated or in incorporated territory. In light of their performance record as reflected in the survey data, it would appear that a relatively small number of these jurisdictions have become urban counties.

Land-Use Controls

The fairly limited role of unicity SMSA governments in major urban and regional functions is

Table IV-8
Performance of Selected Urban, Regional, and Traditional Services by Unicity and Multicity SMSA Governments: 1970

| SERVICES | Unicity SMSA ¹ | | | | | | Multicity SMSA | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|----|----------------------------------|----|--------------------------------|---|----------------------|----|----------------------------------|----|--------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|----|----------------------------------|----|--------------------------------|----|
| | County-wide N % | | Unincorporated areas only N % | | Incorporated areas only N % | | Central ² | | | | | | Large Suburban Fringe ³ | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | County-wide N % | | Unincorporated areas only N % | | Incorporated areas only N % | | County-wide N % | | Unincorporated areas only N % | | Incorporated areas only N % | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| URBAN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Fire | 5 | 8 | 11 | 19 | 0 | — | 7 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 2 | 6 | 0 | — |
| Refuse and Garbage Collection | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 0 | — | 3 | 10 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 3 |
| Libraries | 14 | 24 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 24 | 32 | 4 | 5 | 0 | — | 7 | 23 | 6 | 19 | 0 | — |
| Parks and Recreation | 13 | 22 | 6 | 10 | 0 | — | 20 | 26 | 6 | 8 | 0 | — | 5 | 16 | 3 | 10 | 6 | 19 |
| Hospitals | 8 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 17 | 22 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 13 | 42 | 0 | — | 1 | 3 |
| Urban Renewal | 2 | 3 | 0 | — | 1 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | — | 2 | 6 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| REGIONAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mass Transit | 0 | — | 0 | — | 0 | — | 2 | 3 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 0 | — | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Airports | 9 | 15 | 0 | — | 1 | 2 | 13 | 17 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 9 | 29 | 2 | 6 | 0 | — |
| Junior Colleges | 2 | 3 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 13 | 17 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 4 | 13 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Solid Waste Disposal | 9 | 15 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 21 | 28 | 2 | 3 | 0 | — | 4 | 13 | 5 | 16 | 0 | — |
| Sewers and Sewage Disposal | 4 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 14 | 9 | 12 | 0 | — | 1 | 3 | 4 | 13 | 1 | 3 |
| Air Pollution | 11 | 19 | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 17 | 22 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 3 | 10 | 1 | 3 | 0 | — |
| Water Pollution | 8 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 19 | 25 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | — |
| Water Supply | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 1 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 3 | 4 | 0 | — | 1 | 3 | 5 | 16 | 1 | 3 |
| TRADITIONAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Police Protection | 26 | 44 | 17 | 29 | 0 | — | 22 | 29 | 25 | 33 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 45 | 6 | 19 | 0 | — |
| Coroner's Office | 45 | 76 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 56 | 74 | 3 | 4 | 0 | — | 21 | 68 | 1 | 3 | 0 | — |
| Jails and Detention Homes | 47 | 80 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 69 | 91 | 1 | 1 | 0 | — | 20 | 64 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Probation and Parole | 44 | 75 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 54 | 71 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 21 | 68 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| General Assistance | 40 | 68 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 57 | 75 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 20 | 64 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Medical Assistance | 36 | 61 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 49 | 64 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 18 | 58 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Road & Highway Maintenance | 23 | 39 | 11 | 19 | 0 | — | 39 | 51 | 16 | 21 | 0 | — | 13 | 42 | 6 | 19 | 0 | — |
| Public Health | 40 | 68 | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 53 | 70 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 21 | 68 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Mental Health | 43 | 73 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 53 | 70 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 15 | 48 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Tax Assessment & Collection | 38 | 64 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 58 | 76 | 1 | 1 | 0 | — | 19 | 61 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Courts | 44 | 75 | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 50 | 66 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 19 | 61 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Prosecution | 35 | 59 | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 56 | 74 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 18 | 58 | 0 | — | 0 | — |
| Public Defender | 35 | 59 | 1 | 2 | 0 | — | 54 | 71 | 0 | — | 0 | — | 13 | 42 | 0 | — | 0 | — |

¹59 counties ²76 counties ³31 counties

Table IV-9

Area of Service Delivery in Unicity and Multicity SMSA's

| | Unicity SMSA | | Multicity SMSA | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|----|----------------|----|------------------------------|----|
| | N | % | Central County | | Large Suburban Fringe County | |
| Number of Services Provided | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| High | | | | | | |
| Countywide (33+) | 8 | 16 | 7 | 13 | 5 | 9 |
| Unincorporated areas (10+) | 5 | 10 | 6 | 11 | 6 | 11 |
| Incorporated areas (3+) | 3 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Medium | | | | | | |
| Countywide (22-32) | 21 | 42 | 31 | 56 | 32 | 56 |
| Unincorporated areas (6-9) | 10 | 20 | 8 | 15 | 1 | 2 |
| Incorporated areas (1-2) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| Low | | | | | | |
| Countywide (0-18) | 21 | 42 | 17 | 31 | 20 | 35 |
| Unincorporated areas (0-5) | 35 | 70 | 31 | 56 | 50 | 88 |
| Incorporated areas (0) | 46 | 92 | 51 | 93 | 53 | 93 |
| Total | 50 | | 55 | | 57 | |

further underscored by their partial involvement in areawide land-use controls. As Table IV-10 notes, most county zoning and subdivision control activity occurred in the unincorporated portions of their territory. Less than 30 percent of the single-county SMSA jurisdictions replying to the survey had adopted either zoning ordinances or subdivision regulations for incorporated areas, and under 40 percent had exercised any review and comment role vis-a-vis land-use controls in these areas. Only a handful had reviewed and commented on land-use controls outside of the county. In short, these metropolitan counties, when they performed land-use control functions, most frequently exercised them in their unincorporated areas. And due to their own unwillingness or to State-imposed legal restrictions, over one-third of them failed to assume this responsibility.

While 69 percent of the responding counties had adopted a comprehensive land-use plan for their jurisdiction, these units did not fare appreciably better than non-planning counties in terms of the adoption of related land-use control measures. As Table IV-11 shows, only a slightly larger proportion of counties with plans had adopted zoning and subdivision controls in both incorporated and unincorporated areas, or had a review and comment role in land-use control activities in incorporated areas. Comprehensive planning counties also were not apt to exercise extraterritorial review and comment powers over land-use controls in surrounding counties.

Municipalities, then, are the main actors in urban land-use controls in unicity SMSA's. For the

most part, counties in these metropolitan areas have not adopted controls or assumed a review and comment position with respect to land-use activities in incorporated areas. In many cases, they have also not adopted a comprehensive county land-use plan nor exercised related land-use controls after adoption of such a plan.

Finances

Revenues. The two most important sources of metropolitan county revenue are the property tax and intergovernmental aid. Together these sources usually account for 75 to 80 percent of total county revenues. Non-tax revenues and non-property taxes account for the remainder (see Table IV-12). Among 90 randomly sampled metropolitan counties, there was relatively minor variation in their revenue sources, with the exception that unicity SMSA governments tended to rely more heavily on the property tax and less on non-property taxes than did central and suburban-fringe counties in multicounty metropolitan areas. On the other hand, large central counties exhibited the greatest dependence on the property tax.

Municipalities presently have a more diversified revenue structure than most metropolitan counties. The over 18,000 municipalities in the country raise 17 percent of their revenues from non-property tax sources, and only 34 percent of their general revenue comes from the property tax. Data for the 90 sampled metropolitan counties indicate that 48 percent of their total general revenue is derived from the property tax and only 9 percent from non-property tax sources. Thus, metropolitan county reliance on

non-property taxes is about half that of city governments while, with respect to property taxes, it is over 40 percent greater than that of municipalities.²⁴ Even though these counties, because of their larger geographic area, are in a better position to utilize non-property taxes and to move away from dependence on the property tax, they have not done so. Presumably, lack of county home rule and sufficient State enabling legislation has kept them from further diversifying their revenue sources.

Expenditures. Nearly 75 percent of all metropolitan county expenditures is made for traditional county activities—corrections, welfare, roads, health and hospitals, natural resource development, financial administration, and general control (see Table IV-13). Ten percent of total outlays is allocated for police, library, and parks and recreation functions. Another 16 percent goes for functions that are urban

or regional in nature—education, fire protection, sewers, and refuse collection and disposal.

Considering the expenditure responsibilities of different types of metropolitan counties, it appears that unicity SMSA's exhibit a greater concentration of outlays on traditional county functions than do central or suburban-fringe counties. Some of the larger fringe counties—particularly those in Maryland, New York, California, and Florida—appear to have assumed considerable fiscal responsibility for urban and regional expenditures. Most other metropolitan counties, however, do not reflect that trend as yet.

As with revenues, municipalities tend to have greater responsibility for shared and non-traditional urban-regional expenditures than do counties. Comparing all municipalities and the 90 sampled metropolitan counties, the former allocated over 51 percent of their direct general expenditure for mixed

Table IV-10

**Unicity SMSA Involvement in Zoning and Land-Use Control:
1970**

| (A) = 86 Total Number SMSA's Responding | Unincorporated Areas | | | | | | Incorporated Areas | | | | | | Jurisdictions Outside of County | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|--------------------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|------------------------------------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| | Yes | | No | | NR | | Yes | | No | | NR | | Yes | | No | | NR | |
| | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) |
| Adopted zoning Ordinance for: | 51 | 59 | 23 | 27 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 43 | 50 | 28 | 33 | | | | | | |
| Adopted Subdivision Regulation for: | 54 | 63 | 18 | 21 | 14 | 16 | 23 | 27 | 39 | 45 | 24 | 28 | | | | | | |
| Adopted Both Subdivision Regulation and Zoning Ordinance for: | 44 | 51 | 33 | 38 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 57 | 66 | 19 | 22 | | | | | | |
| Reviews and Comments on Zoning Ordinances and Amendments proposed by: | | | | | | | 30 | 35 | 46 | 53 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 9 | 69 | 80 | 9 | 10 |
| Reviews and Comments on Subdivision Ordinances & Amendments Proposed by: | | | | | | | 30 | 35 | 46 | 53 | 10 | 12 | | | | | | |
| Reviews and Comments on Subdivision Plats Proposed by: | | | | | | | 39 | 45 | 39 | 45 | 8 | 9 | | | | | | |
| Reviews and Comments on Subdivision Plats and Ordinances Proposed by: | | | | | | | | | | | | | 10 | 10 | 68 | 80 | 9 | 10 |

NR. No Response.

and urban-regional outlays. The 90 metropolitan counties allotted 26 percent for such purposes. On the other hand, the counties spent 53 percent of their outlays for traditional functional responsibilities, some of which were areawide in nature, such as welfare and health and hospitals. At the same time, municipalities spent only 25 percent of their revenues on traditional functions.²⁵ This expenditure pattern would be expected in light of the earlier findings regarding county performance of functions.

A further analysis of financial responsibilities in unicity SMSA's reveals a rather clear-cut division between county and non-county units. As Table IV-14 shows, counties almost invariably find them-

selves supporting nearly all metropolitan health and welfare expenditures. At the other end of the spectrum, they rarely account for a significant portion of fire, sewer, sanitation, and education outlays. A mixed pattern occurs in the police, parks and recreation, and highways functions. Counties, then, are frequently confined to the performance of traditional State-assigned functions and have only recently and gradually begun to assume responsibilities for non-State-assigned urban and regional services. California, Florida, Maryland, and New York counties appear to be the major exceptions in this respect.

To sum up, the survey results reveal that metro-

Table IV-11
**Unicity SMSA's with Comprehensive Land-Use Plans
Involvement in Zoning and Land-Use Control:
1970**

| (A) = 59 Total Number SMSA's Responding ¹ | Unincorporated Areas | | | | | | Incorporated Areas | | | | | | Jurisdictions Outside of County | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|--------------------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|------------------------------------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| | Yes | | No | | NR | | Yes | | No | | NR | | Yes | | No | | NR | |
| | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) | no. | % (A) |
| Adopted zoning Ordinance for: | 41 | 69 | 12 | 20 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 19 | 27 | 46 | 21 | 36 | | | | | | |
| Adopted Subdivision Regulation for: | 41 | 69 | 8 | 14 | 10 | 17 | 18 | 31 | 25 | 42 | 16 | 27 | | | | | | |
| Adopted Both Subdivision Regulation and Zoning Ordinance for: | 37 | 63 | 18 | 31 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 15 | 36 | 61 | 14 | 10 | | | | | | |
| Reviews and Comments on Zoning Ordinances and Amendments Proposed by: | | | | | | | 25 | 42 | 30 | 51 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 14 | 47 | 80 | 4 | 7 |
| Reviews and Comments on Subdivision Ordinances & Amendments Proposed by: | | | | | | | 25 | 42 | 29 | 49 | 5 | 8 | | | | | | |
| Reviews and Comments on Subdivision Plats Proposed by: | | | | | | | 30 | 51 | 26 | 44 | 3 | 5 | | | | | | |
| Reviews and Comments on Subdivision Plats and Ordinances Proposed by: | | | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | 14 | 47 | 80 | 4 | 7 |

¹The 59 single-county SMSA's reporting the existence of a comprehensive land use plan constitutes 69 percent of the responding 86 counties and about 47 percent of all such counties.

NR. No Response.

politan county governments still have not markedly diversified their revenue and expenditure responsibilities.²⁶ State legislation has not empowered many of these jurisdictions to utilize extensive non-property taxation. Even where the county does levy such taxes, it frequently must share revenues with constituent municipalities.²⁷ Moreover, most metropolitan counties have not broadened their expenditure responsibilities beyond their traditional assignments as an arm of State government. Indeed, only about 16 percent of their revenues are expended for locally initiated urban and regional services.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

In the absence of functional reorganization under a home rule charter or special State legislation, unicounty SMSA governments interested in assuming an urban county role must make other arrangements for the provision of municipal or regional services. The procedures typically used to achieve this end are interlocal agreements and the transfer or consolidation of functions.

Of the 86 single-county metropolitan area jurisdictions responding to the ACIR-NACO-ICMA survey, over 65 percent reported some intergovern-

Table IV-12
County Revenue Sources by County Type: 1970

| County Type | Percent Distribution of Revenue Sources | | | | |
|------------------|---|----------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| | Total | Property Taxes | Non-Property Taxes | Non-Tax Revenues | Intergovernmental Aid |
| Unicounty SMSA's | 100% (100) | 51% (40) | 4% (3) | 14% (18) | 32% (39) |
| Central Counties | 100 (100) | 41 (61) | 7 (10) | 14 (21) | 38 (8) |
| Fringe Counties | 100 (100) | 44 (43) | 7 (13) | 17 (11) | 32 (33) |
| Total Counties | 100 (100) | 45 (48) | 6 (9) | 15 (17) | 34 (26) |

() contains weighted averages

Source: ACIR tabulation

Table IV-13
County Expenditures by County Type: 1970

| County Type | Total | Traditional ^a Functions | Mixed ^b Expenditures | Urban/Regional ^c Expenditures | Other ^d |
|------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|
| Unicounty SMSA's | 100 (100) | 60% (62) | 10% (8) | 5% (6) | 25% (24) |
| Central Counties | 100 (100) | 56 (56) | 6 (6) | 17 (17) | 21 (21) |
| Fringe Counties | 100 (100) | 51 (38) | 9 (17) | 18 (32) | 22 (13) |
| Total Counties | 100 (100) | 56 (53) | 8 (10) | 13 (16) | 23 (21) |

() contains size-weighted averages

^aExpenditures for corrections, welfare, health and hospitals, highways, and natural resources

^bExpenditures for police, libraries, parks and recreation

^cExpenditures for fire protection, education, sewers, and refuse collection and disposal

^dAll other unallocated expenditures, mainly for financial administration and general control

Source: ACIR tabulation

Table IV-14

Unicounty SMSA Share of Metropolitan Expenditures by Selected Category: 1970

| County Share of SMSA Expenditure | Expenditure Category | | | | | | | | Health & Hosp. |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|------|---------|-----------|-------|--------|--------|-----|----------------------|
| | Police | Fire | Welfare | Education | Roads | Sewers | Refuse | Pks | |
| -10% | 7 | 23 | 0 | 27 | 2 | 19 | 21 | 12 | 1 |
| 10-19.9% | 5 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 1 |
| 20-29.9% | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 30-39.9% | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| 40-49.9% | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| 50-59.9% | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 60-69.9% | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 70-79.9% | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 80-89.9% | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 90-100% | 1 | 1 | 27 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 18 |
| TOTAL | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |

Source: ACIR Tabulation.

mental cooperation with their constituent municipalities or surrounding counties. Fourteen percent engaged in all three forms of cooperation—transfer of functions, consolidation of functions, and interlocal agreements—while another 22 percent mentioned two forms, and 31 percent indicated at least one form. Thirty percent reported not having been involved in any of the three cooperative approaches.

County cooperation with constituent local governments occurred most frequently in the planning, health, corrections, police, libraries, and roads functions (see Table IV-15). It was least often found in the welfare, hospitals, natural resources, housing and urban development, water supply, transportation, and public power areas. Several of these latter functions have been traditionally countywide (welfare, hospitals, and natural resources), and others have been areas of fairly minor county involvement (housing and urban development) due to municipal programs.

The survey data also indicate that some services cluster around particular forms of cooperation. Collaboration in police protection, for example, is usually achieved through interlocal service agreement, while cooperation in the library and health functions generally takes the form of functional transfers. Cooperation in the sewerage and transportation areas, on the other hand, is usually through functional consolidation.

Cooperative Approaches

Turning again to the sample of 166 respondents to the 1970 survey, it is possible to compare the means of service delivery by unicounty and multicounty SMSA governments. Of particular concern are the

extent of functional transfers between the subcounty and county levels and of intercounty contracts and joint service agreements.

With respect to the transfer of functional responsibilities from subcounty to countywide jurisdiction, 34 percent of the single-county and multicounty metropolitan areas in the sample reported that such shifts had taken place (see Table IV-16). For the most part, the services transferred were those traditionally associated with county governments, including the coroner's office, jails and detention centers, probation and parole, medical assistance and public health, courts, prosecution, and veteran's affairs.

On the other side of the servicing coin, few counties were involved in the decentralization of functions to suburban fringe areas. Only 7 percent of the sample unicounty SMSA governments reported that such transfers had taken place, compared with 5 percent of the multicounty jurisdictions.

To obtain a clearer picture of the functional activities of the various counties within a multicounty metropolitan area, the responses from the 166 sampled jurisdictions were divided into two categories: the central county or counties and the large suburban and rural fringe area units. In all instances, a reluctance to make changes in functional assignments was shown. Thirty percent of the fringe counties reported that an upward shift of functions had occurred, while 37 percent of the central counties indicated similar activity. With respect to the transfer of functions to municipalities, merely 4 percent of the central counties and 7 percent of the fringe counties reported engaging in such decentralization efforts.

A pattern of local unwillingness or inability to relinquish functional responsibilities emerged from the responses of the counties sampled concerning their participation in the joint delivery of services or in intercounty contracts and agreements. Twenty-two percent of the unicity SMSA counties and 19 percent of the multicounty SMSA counties reported joint agreements with local governments within their boundaries. On an intercounty basis, only 14 percent of the unicity and 12 percent of the multicounty metropolitan areas had engaged in such cooperative efforts. Judging from the instances reported in this section, basically the same amount of functional transfers and intergovernmental cooperation occurs in unicity SMSA's as in multicounty areas.

The Lakewood Plan

One of the most comprehensive intergovernmental contracting arrangements is the so-called Lakewood Plan in Los Angeles County, California. This service contract plan began in 1954 with the incorporation of the City of Lakewood. The new city of some 60,000 people was immediately faced with the problem of furnishing numerous local services.

Rather than establish its own delivery system, it requested Los Angeles County to provide a package of municipal services to Lakewood residents. This package included a number of new services under contract and the continuation of some already provided by the county because of the city's location within a county-administered special district and an unincorporated area. Under the service contract, the Lakewood city council retained the legislative, budgetary, and planning coordination responsibilities of the city, but the county operated the new services. Although more than 400 agreements between the county and 45 other cities existed prior to Lakewood's incorporation, none of these was for as complete a package of municipal services. Since the 1950's, the plan has been expanded to include more types of services.

The basic enabling legislation for these service agreements is contained in the State of California Government Code, Sections 51301 and 51302, which provide that county boards of supervisors may contract with cities within their boundaries for the provision of municipal services requested by the cities, and that contract terms may continue for, but not exceed, five years unless discontinued by each

Table IV-15
**Intergovernmental Cooperation in Selected Functional Areas, by Type of Cooperation:
1970**

| Function | Type of Cooperation | | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Total Instances of Cooperation | Interlocal Agreement | Transfer of Function | Consolidation of Function | Intercounty Cooperation |
| Police | 19 | 11 | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| Corrections | 20 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 4 |
| Fire | 8 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| Welfare | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Education | 7 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 |
| Libraries | 19 | 2 | 8 | 7 | 2 |
| Roads | 13 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| Sewers & Sewerage | 7 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| Refuse Collection | 6 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Parks & Recreation | 8 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| Hospitals | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Health | 21 | 2 | 11 | 5 | 3 |
| Natural Resources | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Housing & Urban Devel. | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Water Supply | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Transportation | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Power | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Planning | 25 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 4 |
| Other | 33 | 11 | 6 | 9 | 7 |
| Not Specified | 21 | 7 | 3 | 8 | 3 |
| Total | 129 | 35 | 29 | 42 | 23 |
| No Cooperation | 153 | 38 | 48 | 26 | 41 |
| No Reply | 62 | 13 | 9 | 18 | 22 |
| TOTAL | 344 | 86 | 86 | 86 | 86 |

Table IV-16

Functional Reassignments in Unicounty and Multicounty Areas

| | Functional Transfers | | | | | | Intergovernmental Cooperation | | | | | |
|------------------|------------------------|----|----|------------------------|---|---|---|----|----|-------------------------|----|----|
| | From Subunit to County | | | From County to Subunit | | | Joint action with governments within county | | | Intercounty cooperation | | |
| | NR* | N | % | NR | N | % | NR | N | % | NR | N | % |
| Total | 154 | 52 | 34 | 154 | 9 | 6 | 166 | 33 | 20 | 152 | 19 | 13 |
| Unicounty SMSA | 44 | 15 | 34 | 44 | 3 | 7 | 50 | 11 | 22 | 50 | 7 | 14 |
| Multicounty SMSA | 110 | 37 | 34 | 110 | 6 | 5 | 116 | 22 | 19 | 102 | 12 | 12 |
| Central County | 54 | 20 | 37 | 54 | 2 | 4 | 55 | 10 | 18 | 54 | 8 | 15 |
| Fringe County | 56 | 17 | 30 | 56 | 4 | 7 | 61 | 12 | 20 | 61 | 5 | 8 |

*NR=number responding.

party. Subsequently, the contract must be renewed. The specific legal authority for Los Angeles County to furnish contract services to requesting cities is found in the county's charter.²⁸ An additional legal requirement that must be satisfied prior to effecting contract services is that each city must adopt or amend its ordinances to bring its level of service up to that required by the county.

Municipal services provided by the county to cities under contract may be financed under one of three plans:

- 1) *Self-Financing of Contract Services.* Under this arrangement, services furnished by the county are financed entirely by fees collected from the user (resident, company, corporation, etc.) and no direct charge is made to the city.
- 2) *Special Taxing or Assessment District Service Continuation.* Services provided to cities located in a county-administered special taxing or assessment district—such as library, fire, street lighting, and sewer maintenance—that have elected to continue these services after incorporation or have joined an existing district, are financed by a special tax in the district for the particular services.
- 3) *Direct City Billing Contract.* This plan requires that the county be reimbursed by the city on a rate basis established by the county auditor-controller for all services provided—such as law enforcement, engineering and planning, prison incarceration, street maintenance and construction, park maintenance, recreation, and election services. Cities are not billed directly for any services provided under either the self-financing or special district financing arrangement.

As of 1972, there were at least 13 major standard form agreements in effect in the county's contract services program. The functions covered by these agreements and the number of cities contracting for them are listed in Table IV-17. Thirty-one other cities have incorporated in Los Angeles County since Lakewood, encompassing a total of 891,169 inhabitants and covering over 210 square miles. Only two of these jurisdictions furnish all their own basic municipal services. The others contract for from 21 (Rolling Hills) to 41 services (Lakewood). Since 1954, over 1,500 service contracts or agreements and resolutions have been effected between the County of Los Angeles and nearly 80 cities.

The proliferation of contract services suggests that the Lakewood Plan offers some fiscal advantages and is apparently effective in service delivery. Some of its assets appear to be:

- the voluntary nature of city-county contracting, with initiative resting with the cities;
- the opportunities for an urban county to provide municipal services to constituent units of local government, and for the latter to purchase either a package of or specific municipal services;
- the assurance of an adequate minimum level of service from the county and the ability of the city to influence continued or increased levels through the city's choice to discontinue contract services if dissatisfied;
- the elimination of the need of newly incorporated or older cities to make huge capital outlays, through the use of standard service agreements and the availability of alternative financing plans that do not rely solely on the already over-burdened property tax;

—the opportunity for and encouragement of constant county evaluation of its service operation, efficiency, and costs; and

—the availability of functional consolidation as an alternative to structural reorganization for the provision of municipal services areawide.

The Lakewood Plan is not without its liabilities. At least two analyses have found that the county plays an overriding part in determining the nature and type of contractual services, that cities frequently find it expensive to withdraw from contracts and sometimes impossible to supplement county services, that defensive incorporations occur as a result of the plan's existence, and that the county has offered its contract services to participating areas below cost and then financed the deficit through countywide taxation.²⁹ Moreover, some municipalities have terminated services under the Lakewood Plan due to their desire to provide independent services to their citizenry. As contract communities grow in size, these occurrences may become more common.

Special District Relationships

In addition to their ongoing interaction with municipalities, metropolitan counties also exhibit a variety of relationships with such limited-purpose

governmental mechanisms as special districts; councils of governments, regional planning commissions, and A-95 clearinghouses; and Federal- and State-supported substate planning and development districts. The nature of these relationships is an important factor in determining the organizational role and functional responsibilities of the county in a reorganized metropolitan governance system.

Some observers contend that a unicity SMSA government in particular should possess sufficient authority to control the operations of special districts within its jurisdiction. Indeed, some even argue that the mere presence of special districts and public authorities is evidence that the county has not been sufficiently aggressive in guiding urban development. Two critical questions, then, involve the degree to which special districts have proliferated within unicity SMSA's and the extent to which such counties exercise control over these bodies.

An examination of the governmental structure data developed by the Bureau of the Census dealing with the 98 unicity SMSA's for which information was available in 1967 indicates that most special districts were of a subcounty character. Of the over 1,800 special districts reported in these SMSA's, 81 percent had boundaries that were less than countywide, 4 percent were coterminous with the county, and 15 percent crossed county lines. The vast majority of non-coterminous special districts served at least portions of the unincorporated county areas.

The most prevalent kinds of special districts found in unicity SMSA's were responsible for water supply, soil conservation, fire protection, and sewerage. The least common types were for highways, housing and urban development, and solid waste disposal. Most of the natural resource development districts, especially soil conservation, were countywide, while the special districts performing urban functions—fire protection, housing and urban renewal, and solid waste disposal—tended to have less than countywide jurisdiction.

Like most other units of general-purpose local government, single-county SMSA's have not assumed or been authorized to exercise a wide variety of controls over special districts within their jurisdiction. Although many counties reported that they could exercise some control over special district formation (see Table IV-18), less than a majority stated that they could abolish or consolidate them once created. In addition, most unicity SMSA's do not exercise financial leverage over special districts through provision of financial aid, approval of budgets, or authorization of tax rates.

The extent of county controls varies in accordance with the type of special district. Irrigation, flood control, water supply, housing and urban renewal, sewerage, and hospital districts are least apt to be

Table IV-17

**Lakewood's Contract Services Program:
Functions and Recipients:
1972**

| Standard Form Agreement | Number of Cities Contracting ¹ |
|--|---|
| General Services Agreement | 65 |
| Emergency Ambulance Program | 67 |
| Hospitalization of City Prisoners | 37 |
| Building Inspection | 30 |
| Industrial Waste | 31 |
| Maintenance of City Prisoners in County Jail | 76 |
| Subdivision Final Map Checking | 70 |
| Parcel Map Checking | 14 |
| City Health Ordinance Enforcement | 74 |
| Animal Control Services | 38 |
| Street Maintenance and Construction | 28 |
| Tree Planting and Maintenance | 5 |
| Law Enforcement Services | 29 |

¹The totals here and most of the data on the Lakewood Plan were taken from "The Lakewood Plan," a descriptive and analytical paper prepared by L.S. Hollinger, former Chief Administrative Officer, County of Los Angeles, 1972.

Table IV-18

**Selected Powers of Unicity SMSA's over Special Districts:
1970**

| Type of Special District | Approve Formation | | Consolidate | | Abolish | | Provide Financial Aid | | Approve Budget | | Approve tax rate & method of taxation | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------|-------------|----------|---------|----------|-----------------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|---|----------|
| | No. | % (N) | No. | % (N) | No. | % (N) | No. | % (N) | No. | % (N) | No. | % (N) |
| Soil Conservation N=41 | 23 | 56 | 10 | 24 | 14 | 34 | 19 | 46 | 10 | 24 | 13 | 32 |
| Drainage N=29 | 21 | 72 | 11 | 38 | 13 | 44 | 13 | 44 | 12 | 41 | 14 | 48 |
| Irrigation N=21 | 12 | 57 | 6 | 29 | 6 | 29 | 5 | 24 | 6 | 29 | 8 | 38 |
| Flood Control N=28 | 16 | 57 | 9 | 32 | 11 | 39 | 11 | 39 | 11 | 39 | 10 | 36 |
| Air Pollution N=19 | 12 | 63 | 4 | 21 | 5 | 26 | 8 | 42 | 10 | 53 | 9 | 47 |
| Solid Waste N=17 | 17 | 100 | 6 | 35 | 9 | 52 | 10 | 58 | 9 | 52 | 10 | 58 |
| Fire Protection N=40 | 21 | 51 | 8 | 20 | 10 | 24 | 11 | 27 | 11 | 27 | 11 | 27 |
| Water Supply N=30 | 18 | 60 | 7 | 23 | 9 | 30 | 6 | 20 | 6 | 20 | 11 | 37 |
| Housing & Renewal N=16 | 14 | 88 | 3 | 19 | 6 | 38 | 7 | 44 | 4 | 25 | 3 | 19 |
| Cemeteries N=21 | 15 | 71 | 7 | 33 | 10 | 48 | 7 | 33 | 7 | 33 | 9 | 43 |
| Sewerage N=35 | 24 | 69 | 12 | 34 | 10 | 29 | 10 | 29 | 9 | 26 | 9 | 26 |
| Highways N=15 | 15 | 100 | 7 | 47 | 10 | 67 | 13 | 87 | 12 | 80 | 13 | 67 |
| Parks & Recreation N=22 | 17 | 77 | 10 | 45 | 11 | 50 | 8 | 36 | 8 | 36 | 11 | 50 |
| Hospitals N=23 | 16 | 70 | 7 | 30 | 8 | 35 | 9 | 39 | 6 | 26 | 8 | 35 |
| Libraries N=23 | 16 | 70 | 8 | 35 | 7 | 30 | 12 | 52 | 10 | 43 | 10 | 43 |

under some form of county supervision. On the other hand, air pollution, highways, and parks and recreation districts are more likely to receive closer county oversight. Moreover, while over 30 unicity SMSA's reported having subordinate taxing areas, these same jurisdictions also noted the presence of considerable numbers of special districts, most of which served unincorporated areas. Clearly, the mere presence of subordinate taxing areas has not halted the formation of special districts in unicity SMSA's.

The central and suburban counties in a number of multicounty SMSA's also are confronted by an array of special districts. The functions typically performed by these bodies include soil conservation, sewerage, fire protection, water supply, parks and recreation, and libraries. Table IV-19 suggests that, like single-county SMSA governments, central and suburban fringe counties in multicounty metropolitan areas have not exercised much control over special districts. County supervision appears to be greatest in the water supply and solid waste disposal areas. Although the data presented deal with a random sample of only 71 counties, it appears that central counties are somewhat better equipped to exercise oversight vis-a-vis special district growth and activities through approval of their formation and budgets, and apparently gain some additional leverage through provision of financial aid and approval of tax methods and rates. Yet central and

suburban county jurisdictions seem to be generally unable to bring about the consolidation or abolition of these bodies.

Most metropolitan counties, then, are faced with the problem of exercising effective controls over special district operations within their jurisdiction. Although recently some States have attempted to bring special districts into a closer working relationship with general-purpose local governments, a number of unicity SMSA governments which confine their functional responsibilities to unincorporated territory still report having several special districts in such areas.³⁰

Substate Districts

As noted in other volumes of this report, the Federal and State governments are increasingly using substate instrumentalities for regional program planning, development, and administration. These devices serve a variety of purposes. Almost all have planning responsibilities; some are responsible for the distribution of Federal and State funds; and still others review and comment on grant applications and the functional plans of constituent counties, cities, and special districts. They play an important part in conditioning the reorganization of local governments in metropolitan areas.³¹

Metropolitan county governments relate to these substate mechanisms in two main ways: (1) the county can be the geographic base upon which

Table IV-19

Selected Powers of Multicounty SMSA's Over Special Districts*: 1970

| Type of Special District | Number of Counties with Special Districts | | | | | Provide Financial Aid | | | | Approve Budget | | | | Approve Tax Rate & Method of Taxation | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|------------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----------------------|---|---------|----|-----------------------|---|----------------|----|---------------------------------------|---|----|----|---|---|----|----|----|---|-----|----|
| | Central County (a) | Large Suburban Fringe (b) | Approve Formation | | | Consolidation | | Abolish | | Provide Financial Aid | | Approve Budget | | Approve Tax Rate & Method of Taxation | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | N | % | | a | b | a | b | a | b | a | b | a | b | | | | | | | | | | |
| Soil Conservation | 17 | 18 | 66 | 35 | 33 | 2 | — | 12 | — | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 35 | 33 | 4 | 4 | 24 | 22 | 6 | 1 | 35 | 6 |
| Drainage | 10 | 7 | 32 | 30 | 29 | 3 | — | 30 | — | 2 | — | 20 | — | 4 | 2 | 40 | 29 | 2 | 1 | 20 | 14 | 4 | 2 | 40 | 29 |
| Irrigation | 4 | 3 | 41 | 100 | 33 | 3 | — | 75 | — | 2 | — | 50 | — | 3 | 1 | 75 | 33 | 2 | 1 | 50 | 33 | 3 | 1 | 75 | 33 |
| Flood Control | 10 | 7 | 51 | 50 | 14 | 4 | — | 40 | — | 2 | — | 20 | — | 5 | 2 | 50 | 29 | 2 | 1 | 20 | 14 | 3 | 2 | 30 | 29 |
| Air Pollution | 6 | 8 | 53 | 83 | 38 | 4 | — | 50 | — | 2 | — | 25 | — | 5 | 2 | 83 | 25 | 2 | 2 | 25 | 25 | 3 | 1 | 38 | 13 |
| Solid Waste | 6 | 3 | 62 | 100 | 67 | 3 | — | 50 | — | 2 | — | 33 | — | 3 | 2 | 50 | 67 | 3 | 2 | 50 | 67 | 3 | 1 | 50 | 33 |
| Fire Protection | 15 | 11 | 53 | 33 | 27 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 9 | 2 | — | 13 | — | 5 | 2 | 33 | 18 | 6 | 2 | 40 | 18 | 6 | 4 | 40 | 36 |
| Water Supply | 11 | 11 | 106 | 91 | 55 | 5 | 2 | 45 | 18 | 4 | 1 | 36 | 9 | 6 | 1 | 54 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 54 | 27 | 6 | 2 | 54 | 18 |
| Housing & Renewal | 8 | 5 | 41 | 50 | 20 | 2 | — | 25 | — | 1 | — | 13 | — | 3 | 1 | 38 | 20 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 20 | 2 | 1 | 25 | 20 |
| Cemeteries | 8 | 6 | 64 | 75 | 67 | 4 | — | 50 | — | 3 | — | 38 | — | 3 | 1 | 38 | 17 | 3 | 1 | 38 | 17 | 4 | 2 | 50 | 34 |
| Sewerage | 18 | 11 | 118 | 61 | 73 | 5 | 3 | 28 | 27 | 4 | 3 | 22 | 27 | 7 | 4 | 39 | 36 | 7 | 5 | 39 | 45 | 8 | 4 | 44 | 36 |
| Highways | 6 | 3 | 43 | 67 | 100 | 2 | — | 33 | — | 3 | — | 50 | — | 5 | 1 | 83 | 33 | 4 | 1 | 67 | 33 | 6 | 1 | 100 | 33 |
| Parks & Recreation | 16 | 9 | 124 | 75 | 44 | 6 | — | 38 | — | 6 | — | 38 | — | 9 | 1 | 56 | 11 | 9 | 1 | 56 | 11 | 12 | 2 | 75 | 22 |
| Hospitals | 7 | 7 | 72 | 100 | 29 | 4 | — | 57 | — | 4 | — | 57 | — | 6 | 1 | 86 | 14 | 4 | 1 | 57 | 14 | 5 | 2 | 71 | 29 |
| Libraries | 16 | 5 | 94 | 56 | 80 | 4 | — | 25 | — | 5 | — | 31 | — | 11 | 1 | 69 | 20 | 9 | 2 | 56 | 40 | 10 | 3 | 63 | 60 |

*N=71

regional programs are designed; and (2) it can be the organizational module for these Federal and State districting efforts. Insofar as Federal and State substate programs involve either larger areas than or alternative organizations to the single-county metropolitan areas, the county's jurisdiction diminishes somewhat in importance as a basis for metropolitan governance. When the county—whether a single-county SMSA or the suburban “building block” in a multicounty metropolitan area—is used as both the area and the jurisdiction to implement districting objectives, its importance as an areawide government is enhanced.

A-95 clearinghouses. Less than half of the A-95 clearinghouses in the unicounty SMSA's for which 1973 information was available were coterminous with county boundaries. Fifty-four of these clearinghouses were coterminous with a single county and eight metropolitan clearinghouses were coterminous with a multicounty SMSA. On the other hand, 52 A-95 clearinghouses had larger jurisdictions than their respective unicounty metropolitan area, while six were larger than their multicounty SMSA.³² Six unicounty SMSA areas were not covered by a clearinghouse.

Counties in Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Michigan were more frequently coterminous with metropolitan clearinghouses. All of the unicounty SMSA's in Texas and most of those in New Jersey were parts of multicounty clearinghouses. Table IV-20 summarizes the extent of geographic overlapping of A-95 agencies in the 34 States having single-county SMSA's.

Other Federal substate programs. While there has been mixed success in conforming A-95 clearinghouse jurisdiction to county government boundaries, the experience with most other Federally supported programs that operate through regional organizations has been even less promising. Only two of nine major Federal programs using substate districts (see Table IV-21)—the HUD “701” planning assistance program³³ and the OEO Community Action Agencies—rely on counties for their own functional jurisdictions. In four other regional programs—Resource Conservation and Development Districts, Economic Development Districts, Air Quality Control Regions, and Local Development Districts—no unicounty SMSA is the basic organizational module.³⁴ In three programs—Comprehensive Health Planning Regions, Law Enforcement Planning Districts, or Cooperative Area Manpower Planning Councils—single counties are utilized as planning areas less than 20 percent of the time.

The cumulative effect of this geographic overlapping means that only a handful of single-county SMSA's serve as a foundation for most of the Fed-

Table IV-20
Patterns of A-95 Clearinghouse and Unicounty SMSA Boundary Overlapping: 1970

| Predominantly Coterminous | Predominantly Non-Coterminous | Mixed |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| Arizona | Alabama | California |
| Arkansas | Minnesota | Colorado |
| Florida | Mississippi | Kentucky |
| Hawaii | Missouri | Louisiana |
| Idaho | New Jersey | Nevada |
| Illinois | New York | North Carolina |
| Indiana | South Carolina | Washington |
| Iowa | South Dakota | Wisconsin |
| Kansas | Texas | |
| Michigan | Utah | |
| Montana | Virginia | |
| Ohio | West Virginia | |
| Oregon | | |
| Pennsylvania | | |

erally encouraged substate districting efforts. Only 11 of the 127 unicounty SMSA governments surveyed were the basic jurisdiction for as many as four Federal programs. Moreover, 58 of them exhibited geographic coterminality with none or only one of all 10 of the major districting programs. In short, the single-county SMSA has been used only sparingly by the Federal and State governments as the areawide administrative and planning unit.

Substate Planning and Development Districts. Unicounty SMSA governments play a limited role in substate planning and development districts established by State governments. Only five of the 127 single-county metropolitan areas are coterminous with substate district boundaries, and four of those five jurisdictions have exceedingly large areas and could be truly considered as geographic regions.

While there is only infrequent geographic coterminality between unicounty SMSA's and substate planning and development districts, occasionally States have provided for county representation on these bodies. Arkansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia require that at least a majority of the governing board be public officials. Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia specifically provide for county representation of these bodies. In these States, then, unicounty SMSA governments have direct access to substate district decision-making processes. However, most States have not used single-county SMSA's as geographical or organizational building blocks for regional planning and development efforts.

Organizational Coterminality

Where the unicounty metropolitan area serves as the geographical basis for a State or Federal sub-

state program, almost invariably the county itself is not the administrative agency. Instead, either an independent, single-function areawide body or a multifunctional regional council performs this role. In only 17 of the 142 possible interfaces examined was a single-county SMSA government the vehicle for the administration of one or more Federal substate programs.

Even where a council of governments or metropolitan planning commission is responsible for administering substate programs in a unicounty area, the influence of the county government tends to be indirect. As Table IV-22 shows, in the 29 single-county SMSA's for which information was available,³⁵ metropolitan planning agencies were frequently confederal in nature, dominated by city and municipal representatives or their appointees, funded mainly from non-local sources, and staffed by a small number of planners and administrators.

These 29 unicounty metropolitan planning agencies were usually responsible for less than half of the 10 major Federal regional programs. The bulk of them handled two to four Federal programs, usually including A-95, "701", and transportation planning. On the other hand, unicounty metropolitan planning agencies rarely, if ever, administered substate community action, comprehensive health, or manpower planning programs (see Table IV-23). In only two instances was the metropolitan planning agency a subordinate unit of the county government (Atlantic and Cumberland Counties, New Jersey); in 11 other cases, the county rather than the regional planning body was responsible for the substate program. Direct county administration was most prominent in the community action and air quality control areas.

The relative absence of district piggybacking on unicounty SMSA governments, at least in the jurisdictions surveyed, seems to impair the usefulness of single-county metropolitan planning organizations. Among the obstacles to effectiveness most frequently cited by the directors of these bodies were participation in Federal programs, tenuous relationships with substate districts, and insufficient financial support.³⁶

SUMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter deals with the unicounty SMSA, in which counties are potentially the most readily adaptable form of areawide government, and with the central county or large suburban fringe county in a multicounty SMSA, which is the most suitable building block for a metropolitan, governance system. Before arriving at some conclusions regarding the prospects of these counties assuming such pivotal positions, it is desirable to summarize the major findings in connection with the present role and responsibilities of metropolitan county governments, particularly those in unicounty areas.

It should be kept in mind that much of the supportive data is derived from a 1970 mail survey of all counties and a 1972 follow-up questionnaire to unicounty SMSA's. The response rates were 34 percent for the former and 68 percent for the latter. Hence, the data base for parts of this chapter is a sample of the single-county SMSA universe. A second caution in interpreting the information on county structural, functional, and fiscal characteristics involves the degree to which counties may be unable to take certain actions due to restrictions imposed by State constitutions or statutes. As indi-

Table IV-21

Overlapping of Federal Substate Districts and Unicounty SMSA Boundaries: 1971

| Federal Program | Number In Urban Counties | Number of Districts Coterminous | Percent Coterminous |
|---|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Resource Conservation and Development | 7 | 0 | 0% |
| Economic Development District | 25 | 0 | 0 |
| HUD "701" | 95 | 50 | 53 |
| Comprehensive Health Planning | 47 | 6 | 13 |
| Law Enforcement | 129 | 19 | 15 |
| Community Action | 111 | 81 | 73 |
| Air Quality Control | 120 | 0 | 0 |
| Cooperative Areawide Manpower Planning | 126 | 23 | 18 |
| Local Development District | 11 | 0 | 11 |
| Total | 660 | 179 | 27 |
| Districts Per Urban County | 5.2 | 1.4 | 27 |

Source: Maps developed by the Office of Policy Coordination, Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1971.

cated earlier, only 15 States have charter counties, although others have authorized limited forms of home rule. Thus, even if a particular public service is needed and the county is willing to assume responsibility for delivery, the State may make this difficult or impossible.

—There are 127 single-county metropolitan areas in the United States, comprising nearly half of the SMSA total. Texas, California, and Florida all have 10 such metropolitan areas and about 20 percent are concentrated in the States of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Ohio.

—38.2 million people reside in unicity SMSA's. These areas have a population range from 60,000 to 7 million persons. Yet 88 percent of all such metropolitan areas are under 400,000 population, compared with 48 percent of all multicounty SMSA's.

—Unicity metropolitan population growth was greater between 1960 and 1970 than for SMSA's as a whole. Unlike most multicounty metropolitan areas, however, central cities in a large number of single-county areas have been able, through immigration and annexation, to hold on to a large proportion of the SMSA population. Moreover, in many unicity SMSA's the outside-central-city areas tend to be rural rather than suburban.

—Fifteen States currently have home rule charter counties.

—Fifty-four percent of the unicity SMSA's function under a county commission form of government, as do many central and suburban counties in multicounty SMSA's. In 13 States, all single-county SMSA's operate under a commission form.

—Thirty-nine percent of the single-county SMSA's have a council-administrator form of government, and 8 percent have elected county executives. Unicity SMSA's with such modernized structures govern 25.1 people, or two-thirds of the total population living in single-county metropolitan areas.

—Close to 40 percent of the unicity SMSA jurisdictions surveyed administered library, specialized health care, parks and recreation, solid waste disposal, and water and air pollution services. Less than 25 percent had assumed responsibility for fire protection, airports, mass transit, refuse collection and sewage disposal, public housing, urban renewal, and industrial development. The urban service delivery activities of central and suburban multicounty SMSA counties have been confined largely to hospitals, libraries, and parks and recreation.

—Less than a third of all single-county SMSA's surveyed have adopted zoning or subdivision regula-

Table IV-22
Unicity Metropolitan Planning Bodies
Selected Characteristics:
1971-72

| Characteristic | Mean | Low | High | Range |
|---|-------------|------------|-------------|--------------|
| # Jurisdictions in membership | 14 | 1 | 83 | 82 |
| # Jurisdictions eligible for membership | 34 | 1 | 172 | 171 |
| # Representatives on policy body | 18 | 3 | 84 | 81 |
| # Full-Time Professionals | 4 | 0 | 16 | 16 |
| Total Budget (\$000) 70-71 | 171 | 59 | 642 | 583 |
| Total Personnel Expenditure (\$000) | 71 | 0 | 349 | 349 |
| Personnel Expenditure as % of Total | 42 | 0 | 89 | 89 |

tions for incorporated areas, and less than 40 percent have reviewed or commented on land-use controls in incorporated areas. Between 20 and 30 percent have exercised no land-use controls in any portion of their jurisdiction.

—Single-county SMSA governments, and to a lesser degree central and suburban fringe counties in multicounty areas, have not markedly diversified their expenditure and revenue responsibilities. With a few major exceptions (urban counties in California, Florida, Maryland, and New York), they rarely utilize non-property taxation and only infrequently incur significant expenditures for functions that are not traditionally State-assigned.

—Unicity, central, and suburban county governments have exercised supervision over special districts through the power to approve their formation, budgets, and tax methods and rates, as well as the leverage gained by provision of financial aid. For the most part, however, they have rarely attempted to control special districts through consolidation or abolition.

—Over 65 percent of all unicity SMSA governments surveyed exhibited some form of functional intergovernmental cooperation with their constituent local units, most often in planning, health, corrections, police, and highways. Welfare, hospitals, natural resources, housing and urban development, and water supply were less likely to be areas of collaboration.

—Thirty-four percent of the unicity and multi-

Table IV-23

Federal Program Responsibilities of Unicounty Metropolitan Planning Agencies: 1972

| Characteristics | Number of Cases | Percent Distribution |
|--|-----------------|----------------------|
| Total Federal Programs in Unicounty Area (N=29) | 142 | 100.0 |
| Total Assigned to Metropolitan Planning Agency | 80 | 56.3 |
| <hr/> | | |
| Unicounty Metropolitan Planning Agencies (Total) | 29 | 100.0 |
| Metropolitan Planning Agencies Having: | | |
| 5 or more functions | 3 | 10.3 |
| 2-4 functions | 21 | 72.4 |
| 1 function | 4 | 13.8 |
| 0 functions | 1 | 3.4 |

| Federal Program | Percent backed on RPC | Assigned to RPC | Assigned to Other Organization | Assigned to County Total |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| (N=29) | (N) | | | |
| A-95 | 93 | 27* | 2 | — 29 |
| 701 | 100 | 23* | — | — 23 |
| EDD | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 3 |
| CAA | 0 | 0 | 7 | 4 11 |
| CHP | 0 | 0 | 10 | — 10 |
| LEAA | 40 | 6* | 9 | — 15 |
| RCD | 0 | 0 | 4 | — 4 |
| AQC | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 9 |
| (N=29) | (N) | | | |
| TRANS | 76 | 16 | 4 | 1 21 |
| CAMPS | 18 | 2 | 8 | 1 11 |
| Other | 100 | 6 | 0 | 0 6 |
| | | 80 | 51 | 11 142 |

*Two RPC's are county-based.

county SMSA counties surveyed had assumed functions as a result of transfers from subordinate units.

—Fifty percent or more of all single-county SMSA's are coterminous with A-95 clearinghouses, HUD "701" metropolitan planning agencies, and OEO community action agencies. On the other hand, they are not used by Federal agencies as the basic jurisdictional foundation for Resource Conservation and Development Districts, Economic Development Districts, Air Quality Control Regions, or Local Development Districts. And they are infrequently used for areawide planning for compre-

hensive health, law enforcement, or manpower.

—Unicounty SMSA involvement in State-established substate planning and development districts has been more limited than in the case of Federally encouraged districting efforts. Only five such counties are coterminous with substate planning and development districts, and fewer than 10 States provide for county representation on the governing boards of their substate organizations.

—At the local level, only 29 of the 127 single-county SMSA jurisdictions have locally sponsored metropolitan planning organizations that are coterminous with county boundaries. In these cases, however, the metropolitan planning organization has generally been accorded administrative responsibility for two to four Federally funded programs using substate districts.

To sum up, the available evidence on the structure and functions of single- and multicounty metropolitan areas suggests a number of conclusions regarding their willingness and capacity to serve as areawide governments. Despite several successful modernization efforts during the 1960's, over half of the unicounty SMSA jurisdictions have not yet responded to the need for county reorganization, due to State-imposed constraints on home rule or to county reluctance to take advantage of permissive statutes. While many metropolitan counties have been heavily involved in the performance of traditional responsibilities and are becoming more active in regional functions, they have not generally extended their services on a countywide basis. There has been limited unicounty and multicounty SMSA cooperation with constituent suburban and central city jurisdictions in the provision of public services through transfers of functions, interlocal contracts and joint service agreements, or other approaches. As a result, special districts often perform what might otherwise be county services in unincorporated territory, although sometimes they are supervised but not controlled by the county. The Federal and State governments have bypassed many metropolitan counties as the geographical or organizational foundation for some substate regional planning, development, and administrative efforts.

In short, the performance record to date is mixed. On balance, for a variety of reasons—including State restrictions, municipal programs, and county reluctance—the majority of unicounty SMSA jurisdictions have only occasionally acted as general purpose areawide governments. At the same time, in New York, California, Florida, and Maryland, urban counties have assumed this role. Central and suburban county governments have not usually served as effective urban building blocks for a metropolitan governance system.

Footnotes

¹The structure and functions of counties in rural areas will be considered in Chapter XIII.

²See: President's Commission on Urban Problems, *Building the American City* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 237; Committee for Economic Development, *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas* (New York: The Committee, 1970), p. 45; Council of State Governments, *The States and the Metropolitan Problem* (Chicago: The Council, 1956), pp. 132-136; Robert Warren, *Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Reappraisal of Fractionated Political Organization* (Davis, California: Institute of Government, 1966); Herbert Sydney Duncombe, *County Government in America* (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties Research Foundation, 1966).

³John J. Baker, *Urban Problems in America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 95.

⁴Thomas P. Murphy, *Metropolitics and the Urban County* (Washington, D.C.: Washington National Press, 1970), p. 26.

⁵Victor Jones, *Metropolitan Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 185.

⁶John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, *The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 358.

⁷Baker, *Urban Problems in America*, p. 95.

⁸Baker, *Urban Problems in America*, p. 95.

⁹Bollens and Schmandt, *The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life*, p. 359.

¹⁰The elements of county reorganization are detailed in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *County Reform* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

¹¹For example, in Minneapolis-St. Paul an "umbrella" regional council covering seven counties is the vehicle for metropolitan planning and indirect service delivery. A recent proposal for a national approach to metropolitan governance has centered on the metropolitan authority rather than the restructured county as the instrument for metropolitan reorganization. See Donald Canty, "Metropolity," in *City* (April 1972), pp. 29-44.

¹²The Federal Committee on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas is composed of representatives of the major Federal statistical agencies. In conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, it determines the names and publishes periodic lists of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. SMSA designations were developed to make it possible for all Federal statistical agencies to utilize the same boundaries in publishing statistical data useful for analyzing metropolitan problems. The term "Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area" replaces the term "Standard Metropolitan Areas," established in 1949 to standardize four different sets of definitions for urban areas then used for statistical purposes.

¹³Until November 1971, each SMSA included at least one city with 50,000 population or more, or two cities with contiguous boundaries constituting for general economic and social purposes a single community. The combined population of the two cities (often referred to as twin cities) had to be at least 50,000, with the minimum population of the smaller being 15,000. When two or more adjacent counties meet this population criterion of 50,000 or more inhabitants in its central city or twin cities, and the cities are within 20 miles of each other (city limit to city limit), the twin cities and counties were included in the same SMSA, constituting what is really a multicounty SMSA unless there is evidence that the two cities are not economically and socially integrated. See Office of Management and Budget, *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, 1967), p. 1.

¹⁴Office of Management and Budget, *Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas*, p. 1.

¹⁵Thus the Tampa-St. Petersburg SMSA might be two distinct metropolitan areas if there were no significant interaction between Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties. At the same time, the Battle Creek and Kalamazoo SMSA's might be one multicounty SMSA instead of two adjacent unicounty SMSA's if there were interaction between the two counties.

¹⁶U.S. Office of Management and Budget, "Criteria Followed in Establishing Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas," *Special Announcement*, November 1971.

¹⁷The 127 single-county SMSA's reported here do not include the four municipios of Puerto Rico that are designated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas by the Bureau of the Census and the Office of Management and Budget. Throughout this chapter, they will not be included in the discussion of single-county SMSA's. As of June 1972, there were 267 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas designated by OMB.

¹⁸States in which all the single-county SMSA's have commission forms of government are Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas.

¹⁹Appendix IV-A contains a complete listing of single-county SMSA forms of government. See also: New County U.S.A. Center, *From America's Counties Today 1973* (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties, 1973), pp. 11-26; and New County U.S.A. Center, *National Survey of the Appointed Administrator in County Government* (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties, 1973).

²⁰Between May and July 1972, a mail questionnaire follow-up of the single-county SMSA's not responding to the 1970 survey was conducted. Eighty-six such counties in all answered the questionnaire, a 68 percent response rate.

²¹See Murphy, *Metropolitics and the Urban County*, pp. 36-44; New County, U.S.A., *From America's Counties Today 1973*, p. 53; and State of New York, Joint Legislative Committee on Metropolitan and Regional Areas Study, *Coordinating Governments Through Regionalism and Reform*, Volume III, "The Urban County: Vehicle for Coordination" (Albany: State of New York, 1971).

²²U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Governmental Organization* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). Most recent Census data by county for general and special-purpose local governments were not available at the time this chapter was prepared.

²³Eighty-six of the 127 single-county SMSA's replied to the survey. The number performing the above services exceeded 50 percent or more for the respondents in each of these functional categories. Appendix Table IV-B contains the detailed information on this point.

²⁴U.S. Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances, 1969-1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), Table 3.

²⁵Bureau of the Census, *City Government Finances*, Table 3.

²⁶These findings are corroborated by data on the fiscal activities of counties in the 72 largest SMSA's. See Volume IV.

²⁷See, for example, New York State, Department of Audit and Control, *Annual Report-1970* (Albany: The Department, 1971).

²⁸Section 56.5 of the Charter of the County of Los Angeles provides that the county shall have powers and authority to provide for the assumption and discharge of municipal functions when requested to do so by a city within the county.

²⁹See Richard M. Cion, "Accommodation Par Excellence:

The Lakewood Plan" in Michael Danielson, ed., *Metropolitan Politics* (Boston: Little-Brown, 1966), pp. 272-280; Donald C. Shoup and Arthur Z. Hirsch, *et al.*, *Fiscal Pressures on the Central City* (New York: Praeger Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 241-301.

³⁰See John Goldbach, *Boundary Change in California: The Local Agency Formation Commissions* (Davis: Institute of Government, 1970).

³¹See Chapters VI and VII of Volume I for an examination of these mechanisms.

³²U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Directory of State, Metropolitan and Regional Clearinghouses* (Washington, D.C.,

September 1972). Mimeo.

³³It should be noted, however, that a number of Federal programs are funded through HUD "701" agencies.


³⁴Three of these four programs are predominantly non-metropolitan in their impact.

³⁵It should be noted that most of these counties do not have the full range of substate districting programs operating in their jurisdiction, the typical being five.

³⁶Opinion data taken from the 1972 ACIR-NARC study of substate regional agencies. See Chapter III of Volume I for background information on these instrumentalities.

Chapter V

**ANNEXATION,
CONSOLIDATION,
AND FEDERATION**



For many decades, observers of metropolitan affairs have recognized a mismatch between governing areas and problem areas, and have prescribed a greater congruence between the two. Most reformers have focused their prescriptions on enlarging the scope of operations. Reform efforts during the past decade have continued to emphasize the prospective benefits of larger-scale government, in spite of a resurgent realization of the importance of small groups and neighborhoods in meeting individual needs.

This chapter focuses on three traditional major proposals for regionalizing policy making or public services. Each of the three—annexation, federation, and consolidation—is at least in theory a mechanism for basic change in the size and authority of jurisdictions for policy formulation and delivery of services. However, since there have been substantial obstacles and resistance to such basic changes, there has been less than general use of annexation for developing areawide governance systems, and little acceptance of the consolidation and federation models in metropolitan areas of the United States. In a majority of the instances where consolidated or federated schemes were adopted, there has been substantial and effective resistance to full utilization of the expanded legal authority of the new government.

ANNEXATION

Annexation has been the obvious method of adjusting boundaries of both large and small cities. America's cities achieved almost all of their present size through annexation. Of the 42 most populous cities in 1958, only nine covered more than ten square miles at the time of incorporation. However, by 1958, 32 encompassed more than 50 square miles, and 14 included more than 100.¹ In 1950, nine cities in the United States covered 100 square miles each; in 1972 there were 33. At least two-thirds of the latter achieved that size through annexation of unincorporated territory (as opposed to consolidation or merger).²

No really large cities existed in the United States prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Post-Civil War industrialization and immigration brought dramatic growth to eastern and midwestern urban centers. Annexation of large areas to central cities became widespread and the momentum continued until almost the end of the century when a significant braking process began. Of the nation's ten most populous cities today, five had achieved 90 percent of their 1970 area by 1900.³ In the 19th century, annexation was commonly accomplished through unilateral action by the State legislature or the city council, or by approval of a simple majority of the

combined vote of the city and of the territory to be annexed.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the pace of annexation slackened. More restrictive annexation laws were passed, which reflected increasing fringe-area resistance to being incorporated with older cities. A number of legislatures gave up their prerogatives of passing special annexation legislation. Many States gave fringe-area residents a greater voice in the annexation process by granting them the exclusive authority to initiate annexation proceedings, and by requiring separate favorable ratification votes inside the annexing city and in the area proposed for inclusion. Further, State constitutions increasingly limited cities to annexing only unincorporated territory. The latter, together with the increasing number of suburban incorporations, substantially reduced the urbanized land area available for annexation by central cities.⁴

Since the end of the Second World War, and with but little change in the statutes, annexation again has found somewhat increasing use. Economic and population growth was rapid during the period, and a complex set of factors accelerated the process of concentrating Americans in large urban areas.

During the 1950's, 8.8 million people became residents of municipalities because the area in which they were living was annexed; during the 1960's 6.6 million people were added.⁵ The almost two-thirds (63.2 percent) of all United States municipalities of 2,500 or more persons which engaged in some annexation during the past decade rises to three-quarters if the New England and the Middle Atlantic States are excluded.⁶

The number of municipalities of 5,000 or more population which add territory annually is increasing. During the five-year period 1935-39, the annual average was 49; for the 1948-57 decade, 410; and for the 1958-67 period, 691. In 1967, the number of municipalities annexing land reached a new high of 787, and apparently the number is continuing to increase.⁷ Of all cities with more than 2,500 population, approximately 29 percent annexed land in 1971.⁸

In contrast to the large number of annexations, the average size of individual annexations is small. In most years, those cities annexing territory average less than one square mile, and even this average is misleading because a few larger cities which annex large parcels skew the average upwards. Less than a quarter of the total number of annexing cities of over 5,000 population, for example, add more than one-half square mile yearly.

Although the size of annexations is usually small, the total area is significant. The territory annexed during the five-year period 1958-63 was greater than the area of the States of Delaware and Rhode

Island combined.⁹ During 1970 and 1971, municipalities annexed a total of 1,517 square miles.¹⁰

Throughout this century annexation has not provided the means by which central cities can encompass their urban areas or even maintain their proportion of the total metropolitan area population. The situation found in the Texas cities of Amarillo, Midland, Laredo, and San Angelo, where 90 percent of the metropolitan area population is located within their city limits, is unique, and is attributed to the State's historically liberal annexation statutes. At the other extreme, the central city of Wilmington, Delaware, contains but one-sixth of the population of its metropolitan area.¹¹

Each decade suburban areas claim an increasing percentage of the total population of SMSA's, from 48.9 percent in 1960, to 53.6 percent in 1970, to 54.8 percent in 1973. During the 1960's, metropolitan central city populations increased by 3.9 million people, which equals the population added by annexation.

Although during the two most recent census periods a few central cities made a significant number of very large individual annexations, the numbers experiencing a 200 percent increase in area decreased from 21 during the 1950's to 11 in the 1960's.¹² At the same time, one-half of the urban areas which became SMSA's during the 1960's did so because their central cities engaged in annexation during the decade.¹³ The 59 cities of the 153 with more than 100,000 population which lost population during the 1960's would have increased by 26 without annexation.¹⁴

Factors in Use of Annexation

Size of City. In recent decades the largest cities used annexation least. From 1950 to 1970, cities of more than a quarter million grew in area by 83 percent, while those in the 100,000-250,000 bracket increased by 169.6 percent. Part of the slower growth of large cities may reflect the fact that some are completely surrounded by other municipalities; it may also stem from mutual suspicions and antagonisms resulting from social, racial, and economic contrasts found in many large central cities and their suburbs.

Regional Variations. The use of annexation varies strikingly from region to region. Excluding the New England and the Middle and South Atlantic States, 70 percent of the incorporated places (of 2,500 or more population) engaged in annexation during the 1960's, in each of the regions of the United States.¹⁵

The larger cities in much of the East (New England, the Middle Atlantic States, Maryland, and Delaware) grew by less than 20 percent during the

period from 1950 to 1970, and that area's cities of 250,000 or more made no significant annexations during the period. At the other extreme, cities of all population groupings above 100,000 in the Southeast, Oklahoma, Texas, and the mountain States increased in area by over 100 percent. Cities below 250,000 population in the South Central and Pacific States, and central cities below 100,000 in the Great Plains States also doubled in size. In each of the two most recent decades, 11 of the 15 cities which added at least 50 square miles were southern.¹⁶

A number of hypotheses are offered to explain regional differences. The New England States, and a number of other northern and east central States are largely blanketed with towns and townships. In New England particularly, the towns are municipalities with traditions and powers which render them virtually immune from annexation. Only to a slightly lesser degree are towns and townships in a number of other northern States afforded protection from annexation. Where townships may not have legal immunity from annexation, they may nevertheless be politically active and are likely to resist annexation, because, among other reasons, it usually results in the withdrawal of property from the township tax rolls. The South and the West are virtually without township government. Thus, regional differences in population growth stage of urban development, and permissiveness of annexation and incorporation statutes may affect differences in annexation activity.

Socio-Economic Factors. Annexation is most likely to occur when the residents of the central city and the fringe areas resemble each other closely in educational levels, race, occupation, and income.¹⁷ When central cities are the homes of large proportions of the middle class, they are more successful in extending their boundaries. As social and economic differentials increase in favor of the suburbs, annexation activity by the central city declines. The greatly reduced ability of poor central cities to annex affluent, well educated, suburban areas importantly reflects the efforts of the latter to protect their styles of living from those whose patterns differ. As one authority put it,

People who have striven to place physical distance between themselves and those with different status attributes are unlikely to look with favor upon attempts to remove identifiable boundaries between their communities and a socially dissimilar central city.¹⁸

Within central cities, black residents not uncommonly resist annexation for fear that it would dilute

their strength at a time when they are becoming majorities in a number of cities and influential minorities in others. Political leaders of older central cities may also perceive less "political hay" to be made in annexation campaigns than in the more elemental issues of housing, welfare, and safety.

Age of Settlement of the City. Annexation to central cities is less likely to occur in older urbanized areas than it is in the younger ones.¹⁹ Age often brings inertia. It may also bring greater geographic segregation of socio-economic groups, which stems at least partially from the sharply differentiated quality of housing and public services in the older metropolitan areas.

Form of Government. Central cities operating under the manager form of government are more likely to annex territory than are non-manager cities. This may reflect a greater willingness of middle-class suburban areas to be annexed by manager cities, reputed to be honest and efficient, or a greater annexation effort made by dominantly middle-class manager cities.

Rationale

In simpler times, reformers looked upon annexation as a means of coordinating public services over an entire urban area, as a way of achieving economies of scale, and as a method of allowing more citizens a formal voice in developing and ratifying decisions for an entire urban area.

Today the objectives of establishing areawide government through the annexation process stand little chance of being realized except in small or medium-sized cities. If at one time the dream had a base in reality for large urban places, today it is gone. On the one hand, urban concentrations have grown too rapidly, and thanks to the automobile, have sprawled too widely. On the other hand, deep-rooted beliefs in the legitimacy of local controls, reflected in statutory guarantees of popular determination, have generally precluded its use as a tool for superimposing municipal boundaries over an entire metropolitan area. Additionally, the many new cities and towns which were spawned by easy incorporation statutes became roadblocks to political integration.

Annexation, then, has come to play a useful, if less than comprehensive, role in local government boundary change. Perhaps its chief use today is to meet, on a piecemeal basis, previously unmet service needs of an urban fringe. When limited service jurisdictions are inadequate to suburban requirements for domestic water, sewage treatment, and other urban amenities, and the adjoining city is unwilling or un-

able to provide them on an extramural basis, fringe residents often petition municipalities to grant them residency through annexation.

From the standpoint of the municipality, motivations for annexation are often economic and psychological. In their continued financial straits, cities often seek to annex industrial property, commercial developments, and those residential areas that are likely to provide higher revenues than costs. A growth psychology of "bigger is better," which goes beyond economic considerations, occasionally fuels campaigns of city expansion. In conjunction with permissive annexation laws, these factors lead to competitive and defensive annexations to thwart imperialistic designs of other municipalities.

Annexation Methods

The general legislative power granted legislatures by all State constitutions is interpreted by the courts to include the authority to modify the boundaries of its local governments.²⁰ In New England, particularly, the legislatures have retained this power. However, in most States, they have delegated the basic power of boundary adjustment to a variety of groups and jurisdictions. Direct citizen participation, through petitions and voting, is the single most dominant approach. In many States, local elected officials play prime roles. The judiciary is dominant in at least one State, and in recent years, a number of States have given increasing attention to administrative commissions to guide and review local boundary adjustments.

This review of annexation methods will follow the categories established by Sengstock²¹ and the National League of Cities.²²

1. Legislative determination: Municipal boundary changes are made by special acts of the State legislature.
2. Popular determination: The people use their political power to determine if a proposed municipal boundary change will take place.
3. Municipal determination: A unit of local government is authorized to extend its boundaries by unilateral action of its governing body.
4. Judicial determination: The court determines if a proposed boundary change shall take place.
5. Quasi-legislative determination: An independent non-judicial tribunal or board is empowered to determine if a proposed annexation shall take place.

Typically, a State's annexation laws will encompass a variety of methods and employ a number of groups in boundary change.

Legislative Determination. In this century, State legislatures which have retained full authority over boundary adjustment have used their powers sparingly, and have moved no further than States with other types of annexation systems in planning and ordering the outlines of the governmental systems within their own urban areas. From 1950 to 1970, while the average large city in this country doubled in area, those in New England, where legislative determination is the dominant annexation method, increased by only 5.3 percent. In Florida and in Georgia, which have no New England-type towns to stymie annexation, optional legislative determination of boundaries occasionally has been the means of circumventing other restrictive annexation provisions. Legislative determination, then, occasionally allows action where none otherwise could take place, and on other occasions it has been a means to supersede an unpopular decision made by another method.

Legislative determination of boundaries usually carries with it problems traditionally associated with special legislation—lack of knowledge or interest in annexation matters by legislators whose districts are not involved, and a dependence upon and a willingness to go along with district delegations with strong local interests in particular annexation proceedings. As with other special legislation, annexation by statute diverts legislative energies which might more properly be directed toward higher-priority policy questions.

Popular Determination. A deep-rooted American belief that the citizen should have a vote on matters directly affecting his interests is well illustrated in State annexation laws. Citizens play a critical role in the process in about three-fifths of the States.²³ Persons most commonly involved are the voters or property holders in the area proposed for annexation. A number of State laws provide for voting participation by voters in the annexing city,²⁴ and less commonly, by the voters of the entire jurisdiction faced with prospective loss of land. In some instances, action by only one group is required; in others, there is joint initiation of annexation proceedings by petition; and ratification of a proposed action in a referendum may be involved.

Popular determination has powerful support in the argument that it is the democratic way of boundary adjustment. Critics maintain that democracy exists only within a community, and that, measured by social "spillovers" and "spill-ins," areas in which the electorate votes on annexation matters are not

ordinarily inclusive enough to qualify as communities. In systems of popular determination, particularly when the residents of outlying areas have exclusive authority to initiate annexation proceedings and to veto proposals, legitimate metropolitan-wide interests are under-represented.

Unilateral Municipal Annexation. Statutes in more than half the States grant municipalities complete or substantial power to change boundaries on their own motion without the consent of the area being annexed. Municipal annexation decisions under unilateral procedures are made by the council or the electorate of the city. However, this power is commonly restricted to a very limited number of cities or to selected types of annexations.

In a few States, municipal authority to annex is broad. In Texas, at least 75 home-rule cities have taken advantage of State laws to write charters allowing them to annex unilaterally; in Missouri, the power accrues to all cities with home-rule status. In North Carolina, cities are allowed to annex territory without referenda if they can demonstrate that the proposed annexation meets statutory standards of development and that the cities will provide necessary urban services within a certain time period.²⁵

Municipal self-determination procedures may stimulate annexation activity. In 1970, of the five cities to have added the largest areas by annexation, four were armed with the power to annex unilaterally. Oklahoma City has taken advantage of its State's unilateral annexation laws to encompass the third largest land area of any American city, growing from 51 to 648 square miles from 1950 to 1970.²⁶

Home rule cities in Texas have used this power most intensively. Before 1963, the almost complete freedom of councils to annex provided some central cities in Texas the opportunity to expand their boundaries as their metropolitan areas expanded. Large annexations were commonplace, although in most places they did not result in consolidated metropolitan government.

This freedom of action allowed cities to select those areas for annexation which would strengthen their tax bases, and to reject those areas which promised to cost heavily and to provide little tax revenue. Needs of the fringe generally and of the total metropolitan area could be ignored. This freedom also stimulated "land-grabbing" competitive annexation, and defensive incorporation of small cities to prevent annexation by their neighbors. In numerous instances, cities annexed large areas which could not be furnished basic municipal services such as streets, sidewalks, and sewage disposal.

To curb a number of these abuses, in 1963 the

Texas legislature passed legislation which limited the amount of territory a city may annex annually, established a time limitation for the completion of individual annexation proceedings, and attempted to assure that municipal services are provided newly annexed territory. This law may be partly responsible for a slightly slackened pace of annexation in Texas during the past decade, and for the decline in the number of cities in that State which increased their proportion of their metropolitan areas. During the 1950's, 19 hiked their shares; during the 1960's, only 11 did.²⁷

In 1963 North Carolina established certain requirements to be met before annexation could take place. To prevent the addition of territory which either did not need or could not be given urban services, the statute directed that areas to be annexed must meet explicit standards of urbanization; in addition, the annexing city must prepare a statement describing its plans for providing municipal services to the area.²⁸

Judicial Determination. Under a system of judicial determination, courts decide whether a proposed annexation shall take place and in certain cases modify or attach conditions to the proposal. This is distinguished from judicial review which involves considerations of technical requirements of the annexation law.²⁹

Virginia claims the most extensive experience with judicial annexation. There the courts have been the primary instruments for adjusting municipal boundaries since 1902. Requests for boundary change originate from fringe areas, a county board, or city or town council. The petition goes to an *ad hoc* annexation court composed of the circuit court judge of the county in which the annexation is proposed, and two judges from outlying counties. The court orders the annexation if it meets statutory and judicial standards and may set it aside if it does not. It may also redefine proposed boundaries, and establish financial terms for the annexation.

The annexing city must convince the court that it is more capable of providing urban services than the county from which it wishes to take territory. On this principle, the city of Alexandria, Virginia, was denied a request to annex a part of suburban Fairfax County, which provides the range of municipal services.

With judicial annexation, Virginia cities have been able to annex territory systematically as urbanization requires, while avoiding the excesses associated with unguided unilateral municipal annexation. It may be at least partially credited with the relatively small number of municipal incorporations in Virginia's metropolitan areas. It is not known whether these conclusions could also be drawn in a

State lacking Virginia's local government and political culture. That it is fundamentally acceptable to the people in Virginia is evidenced by the almost three-quarters of a century that they have lived with it, and that on at least three occasions study groups of the State legislature have found it a sound approach.

The leading student of the Virginia system, Professor Chester Bain, has also assessed it favorably, but has suggested that the process could be improved by adding a permanent advisory commission to do research and to provide continuing expertise in boundary determinations.³⁰ Another approach to applying objective, continuing expertise to boundary determinations is through the use of the administrative commission, to which we now turn.

Administrative Determination. For at least a century, administrative agencies have increasingly exercised "quasi-legislative" discretion, but it has been only recently that the use of such bodies for local boundary adjustment has been given much attention. In about a half-dozen States, legislatures (and the constitution in Alaska) have designated agencies to play discretionary roles in such matters as reviewing petitions, initiating proposals, offering advice, and making determinations relating to boundary adjustments. This experience is limited to the Pacific Coast States of Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington, and to the upper Midwest States of Michigan and Minnesota. The latter pioneered the experiment in 1959.

In a few States, administrative power relating to boundary matters has been assigned on a completely *ad hoc* or *ex officio* basis; in others, agencies have been established which have never functioned; in still others, they have been given only advisory powers, or ministerial powers with authority only to determine facts and then to issue orders on the basis of their determinations. These will not be considered here.³¹ Operating boundary adjustment boards with determinative powers are considered in the following section.

Boundary Adjustment Boards

Permanent local boundary adjustment boards are presently operating in six States. In Alaska, Minnesota, and Michigan a single commission is given statewide responsibilities. In California, Oregon, and Washington, legislation mandated or authorized continuing boundary adjustment boards at the county or metropolitan-area levels.

In each of the six States, the boards are given power to approve or disapprove proposals for annexation or incorporation, and to alter proposals before them. Statutes in four of the six States grant

limited authority to initiate boundary adjustment proceedings.

The State legislation provides an incomplete picture of actual initiative exercised by these boards. Historically, a low level of funding and staffing has dampened commission initiative in boundary adjustment matters in Alaska and Minnesota. Further, the energy and commitment with which a board pursues its assignment depends importantly on the level of support it senses it has in the community and in the legislature. If the legislature acts as a grievance board for localities which feel their rights are violated, the leverage the boundary commission is able to impose will be lessened.

On the other hand, where administrative staff and legislative and executive support are adequate, boundary commissions may utilize statutory authority more effectively. In California, for example, where there is no direct authority to initiate boundary actions, a number of commissions with strong leadership have assumed initiative in shaping local boundary patterns.

The boundary adjustment process utilized by the commissions have generally been superimposed upon existing procedures of local initiation and referendum, and do not supplant them. In the exceptional case of Alaska, it was the intent of the constitution that Local Boundary Commission procedures would supersede the pre-existing statutes of local petition and approval. As it developed, the latter have been widely used. In most boundary board States, local boundary commissions approve, modify, or veto actions which were initiated and voted upon in local communities.

Appeals from the decisions of boundary review boards are most commonly made to the courts and to the local electorate. In Alaska, decisions of the Local Boundary Commission are subject to veto by the legislature.

Commission Membership. Permanent membership of boundary review boards ranges from three in Minnesota and Michigan to 11 on the Portland area and the King County (Seattle) commissions. Terms range from three to six years. In Minnesota and Michigan, two officers of the county in which a boundary change is proposed sit as members of the commission. With two exceptions, all permanent members of local boundary boards are appointed by their respective governors. In California, on each five-man Local Agency Formation Commission two are city officials chosen by their fellows, two are county supervisors chosen by the board, and one representative of the general public is chosen by the other four.

The governor of Washington is required to choose a number of local boundary commissioners from lists

of nominees supplied him by county commissioners, city mayors, and special district officers within the county in which the board is to work. Washington is the sole State in which positions on the boundary boards are earmarked for representatives of special districts. At the other extreme, Oregon law stipulates that *no* local elective or appointive official shall serve as a member of a commission, presumably on the theory that local officials would be too sensitive to parochial pressures.³²

Staff. In most cases, States and counties have given their boundary commissions minimum resources with which to do their work. The Portland area commission has three full-time staff; the Seattle area and the Michigan commissions have two. The Alaska Boundary Commission is staffed by a small Local Affairs Agency. The Minnesota Municipal Commission employs two-and-a-half full-time staff and solicits supplementary expertise from other State agencies.

The most adequately staffed boundary adjustment bodies are found in certain of the larger California counties, where the county administrator or his assistant is also the administrative head of the unit. Without separate staff, the administrator in those counties takes advantage of his strategic position to utilize the county's manpower resources in boundary work.

Boundary Commissions with Statewide Jurisdiction. The first boundary commissions were established by Alaska and Minnesota in 1959 and were the only bodies with statewide authority until the Michigan legislature established its own board in 1969 to act on incorporation and consolidation issues. Only in 1971 was the latter given authority to review annexation proposals involving Michigan municipalities.

In their early years, the Alaska and Minnesota bodies experienced the suspicion and antagonism of their legislatures, and less than complete support. The Alaska Local Boundary Commission early assumed an activist role in organizing borough government, and in the process lost public support in the State, especially in the cities. Since then "local boundary problems—concerning annexation in particular—have been dealt with cautiously, if at all."³³ An ex-director of the Local Affairs Agency holds that if the agency had not been established in the constitution, it might have been abolished.³⁴ For the most part, boundary adjustments today follow restrictive procedures involving local initiation and approval provided for in territorial and State law.³⁵

In its early years the Municipal Commission in Minnesota also lacked complete legislative support. Although it was established primarily to control the

incorporation of small municipalities, a few successful end-runs for incorporation were made to the legislature by township officials after requests by the latter had been denied by the commission.³⁶

A major study of the first decade of Minnesota's experience assessed the influence of the Municipal Commission upon local government boundary and incorporation patterns and arrived at these basic findings:

First, the pre-commission wave of small incorporations was stopped. During the 1950-59 period, 41 suburban municipalities in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area were incorporated with a mean size of 13.6 square miles. During the period of commission participation from 1960-68 only eight municipalities were created in the rapidly-growing metropolitan area. These eight cities averaged 27.5 square miles. Twelve incorporations were denied in the latter period. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that a number of prospective incorporators were discouraged from submitting proposals to a commission which was biased toward fewer and larger municipalities.

Second, the historic pattern of routine, piecemeal, owner-initiated annexations continued in the first decade of the commission's work. From 1959-68, it granted 1,103 of 1,257 annexation petitions submitted. The median size of annexation was about nine acres. The commission's attempts to stimulate the annexation of large parcels generally resulted in defeat at the hands of local voters.³⁷

Third, the authority to review each decade the status of townships of 2,000 or more population, and to start proceedings for incorporation or annexation was viewed as an opportunity for commission initiative in planning local political structures. Two problems prevented full implementation of this power: The existing referendum requirement doomed proposals for large-scale annexations; and appropriations were inadequate to review thoroughly the status of townships.³⁸

In summary, since 1959 the commission has drastically reduced the pre-commission rate of increase of new municipal incorporations in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area; it has also succeeded in doubling their average size. A 1967 survey of town-

ship, municipal, and county officials and Minnesota attorneys revealed that each group thought the Commission had done an "adequate job." A majority of municipal officials, however, felt its power should be broadened.³⁹

Local Boards for Boundary Adjustment. Boundary adjustment boards were established in the 1960's in the West Coast States of California, Oregon, and Washington. California, which organized local boundary commissions in 1963, has had the longest and most extensive experience with them. Boundary commissions in Washington and Oregon were inaugurated in 1967 and 1969 respectively.

Each of the contiguous Pacific States relies on county or metropolitan area boards for boundary adjustment. Boundary commissions are organized in 47 of the 48 California counties (in all but San Francisco), but are found in only the largest urban areas in Washington and Oregon. In Washington, they are mandatory in the eight Class AA and Class A counties, and optional in all others. In Oregon, boundary agencies are mandatory in the Portland, Salem, and Eugene metropolitan areas, and may be organized in other areas of the State on a single or multiple county basis. They are variously called "Local Agency Formation Commissions" (LAFCO's) in California, "Boundary Review Boards" in Washington, and "Local Government Boundary Commissions" in Oregon.

In addition to reviewing petitions for municipal annexations and incorporations, the commissions in each of the three States consider proposals relating to the dissolution, annexation, and consolidation of non-school special districts.

In terms of numbers of actions, annexation proposals dominate the work of the commissions in these Pacific Coast States. Of the cases over which the Salem area board (officially the Lane County Local Government Boundary Commission) took jurisdiction in 1971-1972, all but two dealt with annexation. One hundred ten of the 118 cases before the Portland Commission concerned annexation. It is reported that of all proposals studied by California's LAFCO's about 94 percent are either proposals for annexation of uninhabited lands to municipalities, or annexations to special districts. All other kinds of actions, including annexation of inhabited lands to municipalities, account for the remaining 6 percent.⁴⁰

Most petitions for annexation are approved. Boundary commissions generally look with favor upon annexations of fringe areas as opposed to separate municipal incorporation or special district formation. In California, about one percent of the proposals to add land to existing cities are denied. In 1971-72, the Salem area commission denied four of

34; and Portland's, in the calendar year 1971, denied seven of 71 petitions.

This does not mean that annexation actions are routinely approved. In the Portland and Salem metropolitan areas approximately one in four annexation proposals is modified by the boundary commissions. In California, close to 10 percent of proposed annexations are approved with conditions attached.⁴¹ Typically, when annexation areas are enlarged, reduced, or reshaped, the commission has attempted to make them easier to service, to provide a more equitable tax distribution, or to allow for more effective area planning.

The contribution local boundary commissions make to annexation cannot be judged completely by the number of annexation proposals denied or approved, with or without modification. A number of weak or frivolous annexation proposals inevitably remain unfiled because the would-be introducer recognizes that such action would be futile, and other proposals are withdrawn from consideration in the face of pending disapproval by the commission.⁴²

Similarly, incorporations of municipalities are reviewed by these local boundary commissions. One analysis of California cities subjected to pre-incorporation LAFCO review concluded that the commissions had virtually eliminated special interest and defensive incorporations, and new incorporations generally appeared to be slowing.⁴³ In the limited period during which commissions have been operating in Washington and Oregon, no new municipal incorporations have been approved.

Boundary commissions are apparently having some impact upon the growth of special districts in California and Oregon, where the State legislatures have directed the commissions to give special districts close scrutiny.⁴⁴ The growth of special districts in California is slowing down. Whereas special districts increased by 572 in the 1952-62 period, in the decade 1962-72 the number came to only 342. The decline in new special districts by 230 during the latter decade may be partially explained by LAFCO activities. Since its organization in 1969, the Portland commission has reduced the number of governmental units in that area from 303 to 198 by merging such units as highway lighting districts with county service districts. During 1971, a slow-down appeared in this reduction, when the commission began proposing simplification of stronger special districts, which possess greater resources for resisting reorganization.

Spheres of Influence

From their authority to *review* proposals, boundary commissions have been cast in a basically negative role. Initially, the authority to study and

recommend changes, and to initiate proposals, were uncommon powers.

Either by statutory direction, or on the basis of a commission position, boundary agencies are increasingly embarking on a policy of guiding local government growth by encouraging or requiring cities to describe their "spheres of influence" or expansion zones. A "sphere of influence" is the area which a municipality is expected eventually to annex. A number of rationales have been extended in support of the development of spheres of influence plans:⁴⁵

- (1) when such plans have been developed, competitive, preemptive, and defensive annexations are eliminated;
- (2) decisions relating to special district formation and change are greatly simplified if plans for municipal assumption of urban functions are known and scheduled;
- (3) knowing the eventual limits of its jurisdiction, the annexing city will be better able to plan physical facilities and land-use control; and
- (4) fringe areas will have advance knowledge of zoning and subdivision standards, thus facilitating private and public planning in the outlying areas.

Boundary commissions are increasingly becoming catalysts in the development of spheres of influence plans for cities. In 1971, the California legislature directed all LAFCO's to prepare with the cities within their jurisdictions spheres of influence plans for all municipalities. This usually involves joint negotiations between the LAFCO and the cities which consider an unincorporated area to be within their individual expansion zone.

Local boundary commissions in Oregon are also participating in the development of spheres of influence. The Eugene and Portland area commissions have established policies of denying annexation petitions until the petitioning city's eventual boundaries and the uses proposed for the areas to be annexed have been determined. These plans are formulated by the concerned city and county and the regional planning organization. A sphere of influence plan and a land-use plan for the prospective annexation must be formulated before the Portland commission will consider a proposed boundary change. In 1972, the Eugene commission also stipulated that it would not approve:

. . . the expansion of the boundaries of any city in Lane County until such city

Table V-1
Amount of Functional Consolidation Prior to City-County Consolidation Attempt

| | None¹ | Minor (1-8 instances) | Major (more than 8 instances) |
|------------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Successful Consolidations | Jacksonville, Florida Lexington, Kentucky Nashville, Tennessee | Columbus, Georgia Juneau, Alaska | |
| Unsuccessful Consolidations | | Anchorage, Alaska Ft. Pierce, Florida Macon, Georgia Pensacola, Florida Tallahassee, Florida Tampa, Florida | Albuquerque, New Mexico Augusta, Georgia Charlotte, North Carolina |

¹There may have been some functional consolidation in these areas, but no study of these consolidation efforts mentioned any mergers at all. If they did exist, they did not affect the outcome.

Table V-2
**City-County Consolidations:
1945-72**

| Consolidations | Consolidated Government Name | Year of Adoption | Population of Consolidated Government (1970) | Population in SMSA (1970) |
|--|--|-------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| Small-Population | | | | |
| Carson City-Ormsby Co., Nev. | Carson City | 1969 | 15,468 | non-SMSA |
| Juneau-Greater Juneau Borough, Alaska | City and Borough of Juneau | 1969 | 13,556 | non-SMSA |
| Sitka-Greater Sitka Borough, Alaska | Greater Sitka Borough | 1971 | 6,109 | non-SMSA |
| Virginia | | | | |
| Hampton-Elizabeth City Co. | Hampton | 1952 | 120,779 | 292,159 |
| Virginia Beach-Princess Anne Co. | Virginia Beach | 1962 | 172,106 | 680,600 |
| South Norfolk-Norfolk Co. | Chesapeake | 1962 | 89,580 | 680,600 |
| Whaleyville and Holland-Nansemond Co. | Nansemond* | 1971 | 35,166 | non-SMSA |
| Central City-County in SMSA's | | | | |
| Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, La. | Parish of East Baton Rouge and the City of Baton Rouge | 1947 | 285,167 | 185,167 |
| Nashville-Davidson Co., Tenn. | The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County | 1962 | 447,877 | 541,108 |
| Jacksonville-Duval Co., Fla. | Jacksonville | 1967 | 528,865 | 528,865 |
| Indianapolis-Marion Co., Ind. | Indianapolis | 1969 | 792,229 | 1,109,882 |
| Columbus-Muscogee Co., Ga. | Columbus | 1970 | 167,377 | 238,584 |
| Lexington-Fayette Co., Ky. | Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government | 1972 | 792,229 | 174,323 |

*In November 1972, Nansemond and Suffolk voted to become the consolidated City of Suffolk in January, 1974.

furnishes the boundary commission with a plan identifying its spheres of influence or urban boundary and its priorities for annexation. Such boundary plan shall consider the logical and timely ability of the city to serve its influence area.⁴⁶

In Minnesota, the Municipal Commission has begun to play an arbitrator-negotiator role in the development of spheres of influence plans. A 1969 act in that State stipulates that township boards and city councils under the leadership of the boundary commission must agree upon the eventual annexation limits of Minnesota municipalities.

Initially, most local boundary commissions were given an essentially negative role of considering proposals made at the local level, with only limited discretion in initiating boundary policy. Even this power was given grudgingly. In a few instances legislatures directly intervened in boundary cases, and generally they funded boundary commission work meagerly.

Apparently this attitude is changing and legislative support for administrative determination of boundaries is increasing. No State that has actually launched a local boundary commission has later terminated the experiment. Increasing support is not evidenced so much by the increasing size of boundary work budgets as it is by legislative directives adding to commission workloads relating to annexation, special district consolidation, and coordination of development of city spheres of influence. The latter role can conceivably provide not only a set of lower-tier governments for urban areas, but a framework for planning the range of governmental services in the areas eventually to be incorporated in a municipality.

CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION

City-county consolidation is broadly defined as the merger of a county with one or more of its municipalities within its borders into a single unit of government.⁴⁷ These consolidations often extend to special purpose districts. Each merger differs in the extent to which city and county offices are integrated, and in the numbers of autonomous and semi-autonomous policy sub-systems which remain after unification has taken place.

The concept of city-county consolidation as an approach to areawide problems is not a recent development. The idea was first implemented in 1805, when New Orleans and Orleans Parish merged. Between that date and 1907, four additional consolidations took place.⁴⁸ All were effected by legislative mandate, without local referenda. During the next four decades, no new consolidations took place.

In contrast with the scattered mergers of the nineteenth century, and the hiatus in consolidation action during most of the first half of the twentieth, American experience during the past decade with this one-government approach appears relatively significant. The 11 city-county consolidations approved since 1962 represent more adoptions than occurred during the previous century and a half. But from another perspective, the number of city-county consolidations in the United States is unimpressive. In 1970, of the 127 single-county SMSA's in the United States, only three were city-county consolidations.

The effect of functional consolidation on ultimate city-county consolidation is a subject of debate. Many feel that the former is a step toward the latter, while others find it a hindrance. Some have held that improved services resulting from functional consolidations may inhibit comprehensive change by lessening public demand for more extensive reform.⁴⁹

An analysis of five of the seven consolidation attempts that have succeeded since 1962 and nine of the 13 which have failed in the same period⁵⁰ shows that functional consolidation is not a necessary step in total consolidation (See Table V-1). In the successful consolidations there is no evidence of prior functional consolidation in three instances and only minor consolidation in the other two. In the unsuccessful attempts, three had a significant number of functions consolidated and seven had a few.

This data does not conclusively show that functional consolidation impedes total consolidation. Information was not available for all consolidations and attempts. Where functional consolidation did occur it was often in low-visibility services of which citizens would be only peripherally aware. And, finally, each consolidation effort contained unique factors which could have independently counteracted any effect of functional consolidation.

Post-World-War-II consolidations fall into three groupings: sparsely populated counties in the West, counties in Virginia, and the medium-sized metropolitan counties, which are of chief concern in this analysis. Curiously, of the 13 post-World-War-II consolidations, five involved State capital cities.

The Small-Population and the Virginia Consolidations

Three consolidations were completed in Western, basically rural, settings: Carson City-Ormsby County, Nevada (1969); Juneau-Greater Juneau Borough, Alaska (1969); and Sitka-Greater Sitka Borough, Alaska (1971). Although the land areas of these consolidations are sizeable (indeed the Juneau consolidation resulted in the largest land

area of any municipality in the United States), none of these unified governments can claim more than 20,000 people.

Virginia has had four successful city-county consolidations, all in the Tidewater area. They are Hampton-Elizabeth City County (1952); Virginia Beach-Princess Anne County (1962); South Norfolk-Norfolk County (1962); and Whaleyville and Holland-Nansemond (1971). In addition, voters in five other areas in Virginia have rejected proposals for unification within the past quarter-century.

In no other State have there been so many city-county consolidation campaigns, or as many as four completed mergers. One student suggests that a unique set of factors in Virginia combined to make the mergers possible.⁵¹ These include the absence of constitutional or statutory barriers to consolidation, substantial previous experience with functional consolidation, and the linkage of respected conservative State and local political leadership to each other and to the consolidation proposals. Finally, the combination in Virginia of a system of city-county separation and a workable annexation system can lead to the depletion of a county's tax base, its population, and its political influence. The resulting threats of annexation of urbanized areas by cities triggered consolidation moves by counties fearful of being "nibbled to death."

None of the Virginia consolidations encompassed as much as one-half of the SMSA's of which they are a part. The successful merger proposals in Virginia were not intended to solve metropolitan problems; rather they were promoted "to minimize future governmental change and to preserve the status quo by abolishing the existing local governments and creating consolidated city governments."⁵² David Temple comments:

(F)rom the viewpoint of the traditional metropolitan area reformer, the Tidewater mergers probably were undertaken for the wrong reasons and involved the wrong governments. The significant issues of the mergers did not include the overlap or duplication of functions or services, the establishment of uniform levels of service, or any other aspect of economy or efficiency. Little or no concern was given to promoting the unity of the metropolitan area. In fact, none of the traditional reasons offered by reformers on behalf of local government consolidation since 1900 were factors in the Tidewater mergers except on an individual basis.⁵³

The Central City Consolidations in SMSA's

During the past quarter century, six city-county consolidations encompassed most of the population

in their respective SMSA's, and resulted from campaigns undertaken with the intent of creating metropolitan area governments. In each of three—Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, Jacksonville-Duval County, and Lexington-Fayette County—the consolidated area was coterminous with the SMSA. Each of the other three consolidations—Nashville-Davidson County, Indianapolis-Marion County, and Columbus-Muscogee County—encompassed at least 70 percent of the population of their respective metropolitan areas. These consolidations were of medium-sized SMSA's with 1970 populations ranging from 167,000 to 792,000. Successful consolidations thus occurred in neither very large nor very small metropolitan areas.

Five of the six consolidations occurred in the South, where State politics was historically of the one-party variety, and where the typical pattern of local government is less complex than it is in most places in the country. Fayette County contained but the one municipality of Lexington; Davidson County had seven incorporations. Special districts were also not numerous in the southern consolidated counties, and most of these districts possessed limited independence.

The Indianapolis-Marion County consolidation is the only metropolitan city-county merger outside the South during the twentieth century, and the only one to have been mandated by a State legislature. It occurred at a point in time when the county legislative delegation, the central city mayor, and the State governor were all of the same political persuasion, as were majorities of the central city council, the county council, and both houses of the State legislature.

This consolidation is also distinguished by the large number of local governments within the merging county—nine townships, 11 school districts, 16 non-school special districts, and 23 cities and towns. Of the numerous suburban municipalities, only three had more than 10,000 inhabitants, and none had as many as 20,000.⁵⁴

Representation. The legislative authority of each of the six jurisdictions is vested in a unicameral council. In Baton Rouge, where the city remained a legal entity to take advantage of State tax laws, the seven councilmen from within the city serve as the policymaking body for strictly city matters, and constitute seven-elevenths of the consolidated council. Council sizes range from 10 to 19, except for Unigov with its 29 members, and Nashville-Davidson with its 40. The latter was considered oversized by leadership there, but local traditions of large legislative bodies made the number seem politically necessary.⁵⁵

The single-member district system dominates four of six representation systems, reflecting a conscious

attempt to inject local points-of-view into the councils. From one-eighth to one-third of four of the new legislative bodies are elected at large. On the other hand, six of 10 of the Columbus-Muscogee council members are elected on an areawide basis. In the Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish consolidation, seven councilmen are elected at large within Ward I (the area within the city) and the two other wards each serve as two-member districts.

In Indianapolis, a system of community councils is authorized to bring highly local viewpoints to bear upon policy matters. The Indiana legislature in 1972 directed Unigov to prepare a plan for the subdivision of the consolidated government into communities, which are to hold referenda to determine whether or not each wishes to organize its community council. Apparently the community councils are intended to serve as formally authorized neighborhood associations with review, but not determinative, powers over matters affecting their areas.⁵⁶

Each of the six consolidated governments is headed by a popularly elected mayor chosen for a four-year term. An administrative officer is provided by charter in three jurisdictions to free the mayor for his political and policy roles.

How Much Consolidation? City-county consolidation has rarely meant the merger of all local government units within the county. During the past quarter century, each metropolitan consolidation has been in fact a partial consolidation, possessing certain characteristics of a federated government. By excluding certain small municipalities and functional special districts from the consolidated government, a certain amount of dissonance in a merger campaign can be muted. In Jacksonville, four municipalities remain; under the Baton Rouge plan, two; in Nashville-Davidson County, six; in Columbus-Muscogee County, one. As was noted above, Lexington was the sole pre-merger municipality in Fayette County.

In the Indianapolis area, the four suburban cities of more than 5,000 population were excluded from the territorial jurisdiction and tax base of the consolidated city, although they still remain a part of the county. In that somewhat complex consolidated government, both the City of Indianapolis and the County of Marion continue as legal entities.

In four of the six consolidations the school function was excluded. The number of non-school districts was reduced but not eliminated in most cases. The proponents of Unigov decided early that an attempt to consolidate the 11 separate school systems in Marion County would threaten and likely kill the consolidation proposal. Similarly, Unigov strategists left the nine townships untouched, although their functions are very limited.⁵⁷

Consolidated city-counties bring substantial but

not necessarily complete integration of the executive function. County offices are often established as elective positions by the State constitution, and the incumbents in these offices often have personal political followings of their own. In each of the six mergers, a number of elective constitutional county officers exercise substantial independence. The sheriff, for example, remains popularly elected in each of the unified governments. Other county officials such as assessor, district attorney, auditor, and clerk of the court are similarly insulated by their constitutional status and are immune from drastic local redefinition of their roles.

To a limited extent, however, the consolidated government may restrict the independence of even constitutional officers. In Jacksonville, for example, constitutional county officers are subjected to executive budget controls, and to the requirement that they must operate through the consolidated Department of Central Services in matters of purchasing, personnel, and legal services.⁵⁸

Although local semi-independent boards and commissions are not usually mandated by State constitutions in the way county officers are, they are not consistently absorbed in the new departments of the consolidated government. Existing multi-member policy bodies commonly retain their positions with little change in their independence. The Unigov bill, for example, specifically preserved the pre-existing Airport Authority, the County Board of Public Welfare, the City-County Building Authority, and the Capital Improvement Board.

Service Districts. A key feature of most city-county consolidations is the service district. Needs for public goods and services vary widely within the boundaries of a consolidated government; service districts allow their financing on a differential basis.

The charters of four of the six consolidation⁵⁹ provide for "general services districts." Each of these districts encompasses an entire consolidated area; throughout each a uniform taxing rate and service level applies. Each charter also calls for "urban services districts" ("full urban services district" in Lexington-Fayette County) for, at a minimum, the "old" central city.

The urban services districts for the old cities of Lexington and Nashville are expandable, and in the Columbus-Muscogee and Jacksonville consolidations separate urban services districts may be established to provide varying levels of benefits to various urbanized areas. Distinct from "full urban" and "general services" districts, the Lexington-Fayette County charter provides for a third category—the "partial urban services district."⁶⁰

The small, independent municipalities in Nash-

ville-Davidson continue to function, but can contract with the consolidated government for urban-type services. The four small cities in Jacksonville, technically urban services districts, also continue to function. Since they now have no power of municipal taxation, the consolidated government has provided them with limited "in lieu" funds.⁶¹

In 1947, before the term "service district" came into use, the Baton Rouge Plan of Government established an "urban area," an "industrial area," and a "rural area." Municipal tax rates were and are applied to the urban area, which encompasses the greatly expanded "old" city of Baton Rouge. The parish tax rate is imposed in the rural and industrial areas. Industries were allowed the rural rate on the condition they provide their own municipal services.⁶²

Consolidated government has had limited effect upon financing and providing public services in Indianapolis-Marion County. The pattern remains complex since townships, small municipalities, and special districts continue to participate in meeting urban and rural needs. Also, special service districts (controlled by the mayor and council) are provided for such basic urban services as fire, police, and sanitation. The single most significant functional consolidation relates to the road construction and maintenance. This function, which in pre-consolidation days was provided by the city, the county, the park district, and the transportation authority, is now the responsibility of a single Department of Transportation.⁶³

Federal and State Districting. Few Federal programs at the areawide level are today "piggy-backed" on discrete city-county consolidated government. Apparently, no more Federal areawide planning, review, or delivery programs are directly and formally attached to Jacksonville, Nashville-Davidson, and Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge than to the unreconstructed county. However, in Unigov the mayor has direct formal influence over the funding of numerous Federally assisted projects under his selection for chief executive review and comment in the Planned Variations Program.

Individually, none of the four is formally an A-95 review and comment clearinghouse. Since mid-1972, when Unigov became a part of the new six-county Indiana Heartland Coordinating Commission, each merged government is a part of a multi-county grouping for A-95 review. The consolidated government is one of a four-county metropolitan clearinghouse in the Baton Rouge area, one of five in Jacksonville, and one of 13 in the Nashville-Davidson area. This poses the possibility that as A-95 review becomes the province of a larger region, the single city-county consolidation foregoes the benefits that accrue from direct management of A-95 reviews and is weakened to some extent in its ability to control independent policy sub-systems within it.

Yet this possibility can be overdrawn. City-county mergers have in this century taken place in medium-sized metropolitan areas, where the consolidating city and county have typically dominated the region. It is unlikely that the interests of such a consoli-

Table V-3

**Numbers of Counties in Regional Units Located
in Areas which Encompass City-County Consolidations:
1970**

| | State Plan- ning & Develop. District | A-95 Clearing House (metro) | Economic Develop. District | HUD Metro- politan Planning | Resource Conserv. & Develop. District | Comp. Health Plan- ning | LEAA | Com- munity Action Agency | Air Quality Control Region | CAMPS |
|--|---|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------|
| Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Parish | 11 | 4 | 9 | 4 | None | 10 | 12 | 1 | 39 | 16 |
| Indianapolis | 8 | | None | 6 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 8 | 8 |
| Jacksonville | 6 | 5 | None | 5 | None | 6 | 8 | 1 | 39 | 2 |
| | | (for Jack- sonville alone) | | | | | | | | |
| Nashville- Davidson County | 12 | 13 | 13 (funded but not designated) | 13 | None | 13 | 13 | 1 | 20 | 13 |

dated government will be neglected in a metropolitan clearinghouse made up of several or even numerous counties. The Jacksonville Area Planning Board, ostensibly a five-county group, to date has dealt exclusively with consolidated Jacksonville matters. Nashville-Davidson inevitably plays a leading role in the mid-Cumberland Council of Governments, which exercises A-95 review for the area, both through its political leadership and through a wide variety of assistance provided the COG by a knowledgeable bureaucracy.⁶⁴

In negotiations leading up to the organization of the Indiana Heartland Coordinating Commission, Unigov agreed to pay its proportional share of the costs (about 70 percent) in return for a similar proportion of the voting power in matters affecting it, and has provided the initial staffing for the commission.⁶⁵

The major Federal programs organized for policy development or execution at the substate level have virtually no areal coterminality with the consolidated city-counties. On the average, each unified city-county was one of five counties in its economic development grouping, one of eight in resource conservation and development, one of nine in comprehensive health planning, one of ten in criminal justice planning, one of 29 in air quality control, and one of ten in manpower planning. Community action agencies, which are frequently quite autonomous from local governments in any case, were the only Federal groups with boundaries coterminous with the four city-counties which were operational in 1970.

The utility of piggybacking Federal programs upon areawide governments generally will be analyzed elsewhere in this report; suffice it here to comment that the consolidated city-county fails by a large margin to satisfy present standards of size for most Federal areawide planning, review, and operating programs.

Similarly, State planning and development districts encompass much larger areas than the consolidated city-counties. The number of counties with which the six metropolitan consolidations are associated in State development districts ranges from six in the Jacksonville area to a high of 16 in the Lexington-Fayette County region.

METROPOLITAN FEDERATION

In a general sense, metropolitan federation can be defined as a process of systematic sharing of public functions by jurisdictions at more than one level within a large urban area. An areawide government is concerned with activities calling for central policymaking or administration, and jurisdictions encompassing smaller areas deal with activities amenable to local decision-making and operations.

Federated processes depend upon patterned relationships between the upper and lower tiers. The second level in the system exercises controls over the first-tier governments or upon citizens throughout its jurisdiction. Typically, controls over first-tier units initially have been applied gingerly. In certain instances, as in Toronto, the second tier is governed by representatives of the first-tier government; in other cases, second-tier legislative bodies are elected directly.

The spectrum of federative processes is wide, but as a whole it represents a middle course between the one-government approach and the highly polycentric governmental arrangements so characteristic of metropolitan areas in the United States. Those favoring federative approaches assume the desirability of centralizing at least certain functions or portions of functions on an areawide basis, but consider it either unwise or politically infeasible to consolidate all of them into a single metropolitan government.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to review every approach to metropolitan federation in the United States. Urban counties in a variety of States have increasingly acquired federative characteristics as their authority and activities have increased within as well as outside municipalities within county boundaries. In other chapters such highly incremental and continual federative adjustments as transfer of functions and the gradual growth in urban county powers are considered; here attention will be focused upon attempts at more systematic delineation of public functions between upper- and lower-tier governments.

William H. Riker has observed that it is not surprising that federalism is popular, since it is one way of solving the problem of government in a technological age which generates ever increasing relationships among ever larger numbers of people.⁶⁶ However true this may be at the nation-State level, very few proposals for carefully structured metropolitan federations have become a reality in this country. Moreover, the more comprehensive the federation proposal, the less likely it is that it will survive the approval process. The failure of federation proposals for metropolitan areas may be traced partially to the lack of an authoritative constituent body at the metropolitan level which can both plan and assign areas of responsibility for the lower and upper tiers.⁶⁷ The States, which also could logically fill this role, have largely been inactive.

At least four structural arrangements for metropolitan governance employ the federative principle. These are the metropolitan multi-purpose district, the State-supported "umbrella" regional council, the urban county, and the "Toronto-type" federation.

The Forms of Federation

Toronto-Type Metropolitan Federation. The most comprehensive approach to the federative process and the reformer's prototype of two-tier government is represented in the widely publicized Toronto arrangement.⁶⁸ However, it has yet to be utilized in any metropolitan area in the United States.

In 1954, the Toronto federation was inaugurated, and in 1967 underwent major structural changes. The areawide government, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, was devised to encompass and to be controlled by the City of Toronto and 12 immediately surrounding municipalities. The entire area was blanketed with first-tier jurisdictions.

A number of areawide powers were delegated exclusively to the metropolitan government, but most of its responsibilities were shared with the 13 lower-level units. In the 1967 reorganization, the 13 constituent municipalities were consolidated to six. The size of the metro council has been enlarged by one-fourth, but its members continue to represent lower-tier constituencies.

In 1960, the provincial legislature of Manitoba established a Toronto-type federation with fewer second-tier powers in the Winnipeg area. In 1972, however, the legislature centralized authority at the second level. At the first level, cities were abolished and community districts took their place.

Virtually no Toronto-type metropolitan federations have been proposed in the United States. Most proposals for federation have more closely represented the comprehensive urban county federation type.

The Comprehensive Urban County. Comprehensive urban county government assumed municipal-type functions over incorporated as well as unincorporated areas within its jurisdiction. In such States as California, Maryland, and New York, county powers grew incrementally over many decades nurtured by constitutions which encouraged counties to assume municipal functions. This federative development is considered in Chapter IV, "The Metropolitan County." Attention here will be focused on a prototype of a federated approach by which the county is allocated a substantial number of urban powers simultaneously by county charter, but in which municipalities retain their corporate status.

A full half-dozen serious proposals for a comprehensive urban county have been broached, but Dade County represents the sole success. The others have failed to clear a variety of formidable hurdles. In most instances, the State constitution must be amended to enable a county to become a second-tier government with a wide-ranging battery of urban functions. Usually the comprehensive county approach calls for a locally drafted charter, as well

as a popular referendum with dual majorities within as well as outside the central city or the incorporated places within the county.

The State-Supported Umbrella Regional Council. The State-supported umbrella regional council, a second-tier jurisdiction for metropolitan decision making, also applies the federative principle to urban areas. It is a policy body by virtue of the number and scope of planning development and review and approval powers it exercises over special purpose regional bodies, local governments, and quasi-public bodies in the region. A chief distinguishing feature of the umbrella regional system is the separation of areawide policy determination at the second tier from service delivery functions.

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council and the Atlanta Regional Commission are examples of this approach. The former was established in 1967, and is more highly developed than the latter, organized in 1971. Both represent the comprehensive expansion of regional planning programs or programs of regional policy making.

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council was superimposed on the seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul region by the legislature as an instrument for metropolitan decision making and for coordinating the work of existing local and regional agencies in the area. In a certain sense, the council is as much an instrumentality of the State as it is of the region, although whose it *should* be has been a matter of lively debate since its inception. The council is responsible to the legislature, and its members are appointed by the governor from districts in the area. It has important responsibilities in planning, coordinating, and making areawide decisions, particularly regarding sewage and waste disposal, pollution control, comprehensive transportation planning, and regional parks and open space. It does not directly produce services itself, but controls their development through (1) its review and veto powers, (2) membership on all areawide special districts, and (3) its authority to review comprehensive plans for local governments and to sell bonds for capital construction by metropolitan special districts.

The Atlanta Regional Commission was also established by legislative fiat, but has a more local orientation. Approximately half of the membership is made up of county and city officials, and the lay members are chosen by the public membership. Under a "holding company" structure for the five-county metropolitan region, this body incorporates the responsibility for preparing comprehensive guides for planning and developing highways, transit lines, parks, sewers, and the location of various public facilities. It also possesses power to re-

view all area plans of municipalities, counties, public boards, and utilities for conformity with commission guidelines.⁶⁹

The Metropolitan Multi-Purpose District. A metropolitan multi-purpose district is a special authority established to perform a number of services over all or much of a metropolitan area. A few States, notably California, Oregon, Washington, and Colorado, have legislation which enables metropolitan areas to establish multi-purpose districts. Where legislation exists, the range of functions allowed is usually limited. Where legislation has been utilized, metropolitan areas have failed to use fully the available powers. For 15 years, the widely known Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle remained in effect a special district, exercising but one of six legislatively authorized powers.

Problem Areas

In this analysis of federative problem areas prototypes of the four federative approaches in the Toronto, Dade County, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Seattle areas will generally be used as illustrations.

The Division of Powers. The ways in which power is divided local and areawide is a crucial consideration in the analysis of federated approaches. Federative charters differ widely in the degree to which they reflect a deliberate consideration of metropolitan area problems, agreement as to what should be done about them, and the preciseness in which roles are subsequently defined.

Reformers have given greater consideration and emphasis to rationalizing upper-tier structures than to those of the lower tier. Historically, it was widely perceived that the metropolitan area was in greater need of institutions adaptable to larger- rather than smaller-scale operations, and that better coordination of programs was an important goal. Some second-tier functions were assumed from the first-tier governments and given a large dimension; others were new functions performed for the first time in the metropolitan area.

In recent years urban unrest has stimulated greatly increased discussion of the needs of small groups and of individuals, and the need for humanizing large organizations. This has not, however, resulted in a general demand for breaking up existing lower-level incorporations into smaller municipalities.⁷⁰ Rather, most proposals for neighborhood government have taken the form of small area advisory councils and decentralized administration to which the citizen may have greater access, and which may be established with less than constitutional change.⁷¹

In three of the four examples, the upper-tier jurisdiction was a new one and the lower-tier units

were already established jurisdictions. Only in Dade County was an existing government utilized as the upper-level unit and only in Toronto have the lower-tier units been drastically restructured. The latter restructuring occurred 13 years after the federation was first established.

Although establishing the Twin Cities umbrella regional council did not upset the existing structures and operational responsibilities of existing governments in the metropolitan area, it did result in a sharp upward shift in the location of basic policy decisions affecting it. The launching of Seattle Metro had little effect on the operation of its first-tier governments, except insofar as relationships were established in the cooperative handling of the area's sewage.

Continued Centralization. The division of powers in most of the federative examples has not remained static. The overall direction of the Toronto federation has been one of placing increasing responsibility on the upper-tier government.⁷² Over its nearly two decades of life, the Toronto Metro Council has assumed a number of functions (such as policing and licensing of trades and services) in areas not originally specified in its establishing act. Moreover, already existing areas of second-tier responsibility were broadened by the major reorganization act of 1967. In one sense lower-level jurisdictions have also centralized, inasmuch as the 12 constituent municipalities existing during the first 13 years of metro have now been consolidated into six. To a lesser degree, Dade County has also experienced an accretion of responsibilities for services, particularly in its unincorporated areas.⁷³

During the first five years of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council operation, the legislature cautiously but gradually expanded its authority in policy and planning matters and in budget controls. The council has not been reluctant to accept new policy responsibilities, but for the most part preferred to use special purpose metropolitan districts for this purpose rather than to get into operations itself. Meanwhile, council policy controls grow greater. In the case of the Metropolitan Sewer Board, for example, the metropolitan council appoints the members, reviews its operating and capital budgets and programs, and serves as the borrowing agent for construction of sewerage facilities.

Alone of the federative types, the multi-purpose metropolitan special district has shown little ability to attract to itself additional functions. As noted above, in the limited number of instances where metropolitan multi-purpose special districts have been employed, they have not fully employed their powers, and exist basically to provide one or two functions.

The East Bay (San Francisco) Municipal Utility District was in effect a single-purpose water district from 1923 to the late 1940's, when sewage disposal was added to its responsibilities. The new multi-service district in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area is charged with developing and operating a solid waste disposal system and a regional stream drainage system.⁷⁴

In 1957, the Washington legislature approved a statute which allowed the organization of multi-purpose districts for the performance of one or more of six areawide functions: sewage disposal, transportation, comprehensive planning, water, parks, and solid waste disposal. One year later, voters in the Seattle metropolitan area centering on Lake Washington turned down a proposal for establishing a metro providing the three first listed functions. After the number of functions was reduced to one and the geographic area was trimmed to assure a greater proportion of "Yes" votes, the "Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle" was approved and established to transport and treat sewage in the area surrounding Lake Washington. Its success in restoring high-quality water standards in that lake has been widely acclaimed. After unsuccessful attempts in 1962 and 1968, area voters in 1972 entrusted Seattle Metro with a second function, that of providing public transportation in the metropolitan area. King County did not choose to compete with Metro for the responsibility of providing mass transportation.

The requirement of separate popular majorities in the City of Seattle and in the area outside for many years worked against expansion of metro activities. The Portland area multi-service district was prevented from assuming the areawide water supply function because the City of Portland was reluctant to relinquish its own extensive water supply responsibilities.⁷⁵

Second-Tier Controls. Although all second-tier federative approaches maintain systematic relationships with first-tier governments, the intensity of these relationships varies substantially.

At one extreme is the Twin City Council, whose relationships are almost exclusively with other jurisdictions and not with citizens directly. The council is a policy board and its decisions are made operational largely through other public jurisdictions within the metropolitan area. In establishing the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council as a "coordinating" agency, the legislature assumed that existing agencies were carrying out their operating tasks satisfactorily. These included a variety of regional structures for areawide as well as local purposes.

The council's policy-making function takes

several forms: recommendations to the legislature for use in developing legislation; policy guidelines for public and quasi-public jurisdictions in the council's development guide; the review of local comprehensive plans; and, as the A-95 clearinghouse, the review of applications for Federal assistance. The council has its strongest policy controls over the areawide special districts since it can suspend any district plan or program. The capital budgets and capital improvement programs of the Metropolitan Transit Commission and the Metropolitan Sewer Board are subject to approval by the council. The council appoints the members of the Sewer Board, reviews its operating budget, and sells bonds for its capital construction programs. The council reviews and approves municipal sewer plans.

The council's official relationships with semi-official jurisdictions include review of plans developed by private hospital boards; on a *de facto* basis, it exercises the State's authority to issue certificates of need for new hospital facilities. Communications between the council and the Sewer Board, the Transit Commission, and the Health Board are facilitated by their common location within the same building. Finally, the council has the power to review and delay for 60 days, municipal and county plans which are in conflict with one another, or with the development guide.⁷⁶

In Toronto, the metro council has extensive control and service relationships with both first-level governments and with citizens directly. Certain controls are imposed upon and some services are provided directly to citizens; in other functional areas, controls are exercised indirectly through the lower-tier governments or through associations of local officials.

The Dade County upper-tier government has extensive direct relationships with its citizenry. Unlike the situation in Toronto where metro is completely blanketed by its six municipalities, 43 percent of the population of Dade County resides in the rapidly growing incorporated areas. Upper-lower tier relationships and areawide problems are complicated by the fact that the Dade County Metro Council must allocate a substantial amount of its energies and resources to providing citizen services directly.⁷⁷

The multi-purpose district has the narrowest range of policy controls over first-tier governments generally, although it may have close operating relationships with municipalities and special districts. For example, Seattle Metro's basic purpose has been to wholesale sewage treatment under contracts with local jurisdictions, with whose lines it connects. It transports the raw sewage, treats it, and discharges the effluent. Seattle Metro has historically had few direct relationships with the citizens it serves, but

this is being changed as it begins public transit operations.

Municipalities are given representation in the Toronto and Seattle federative types. In the latter, King County also has official delegates. Except for sewer district representation on the Seattle Metro Council, special districts have no representation on the four areawide legislative bodies.

Federations A-95, and Piggybacking. To what extent have federative forms served as vehicles for the coordination of areawide programs of the National and State governments?

Federal A-95 review and comment work is an integral part of the Dade County and Twin Cities areawide operations. In the Seattle area, the four-county Puget Sound Governmental Conference serves this function. The Canadian national government has imposed no A-95 type reviews, and has generally been less concerned than the United States government with metropolitan programs.⁷⁸

A-95 review in Dade County is the function of the county planning agency under the county manager. Apart from its unused authority to pass ordinances to take over city functions, the A-95 process is Dade Metro's chief formal means of influencing first-tier governments.⁷⁹ This ability of Dade Metro to control its lower-level jurisdictions might be reduced if A-95 responsibility were shifted to the four-county substate district of which it is a part or to the recently formed Southern Florida six-county regional planning council.

In the Twin Cities area, the A-95 review is but one additional tool for bringing areawide special districts under the development guidance of the metropolitan council. Although A-95 gives the council clearinghouse responsibilities over general purpose local governments as well, it has to date cautiously employed the power to comment negatively on their requests for Federal funds. Moguloff suggests that this may change:

... if the metro council continues to move ahead with its "development guides" as the basis for reviewing areawide planning in other agencies, it is difficult to see how it can refrain from using these development guides as part of the A-95 clearinghouse process.⁸⁰

Of the federative prototypes, only one serves as a substate district. When the substate district system first was established in Minnesota in 1969, the existing Twin Cities Council was designated the substate district for the metropolitan area.

Dade County is but one of four counties in a developing substate district system in Florida; Seattle

Metro is located entirely within King County, one of four counties in the Puget Sound Governmental Conference which make up a substate district in Washington.

Both the Twin Cities and Dade County systems have been piggybacked with a number of Federal programs. In Dade County certain programs such as OEO and law enforcement planning have gravitated to the metro government from their original locations elsewhere. Manpower area planning and comprehensive health planning are either administered or controlled by the Dade Metro government.

In such Federally encouraged programs as resource conservation and development, Dade Metro is but a part of a larger regional effort. In other programs for which metro has substantial responsibility, such as transportation planning and pollution control, centralization at the regional and State levels is planned or is being seriously discussed.

Similarly, the Twin Cities Council has important responsibilities in Federally initiated or supported regional activities in comprehensive health, law enforcement, and transportation planning. The larger geographical area of the Twin Cities umbrella council makes it less susceptible than Dade County to having its functions removed to a larger jurisdiction. Because it is not an operating agency, the council's energies are not diverted so much from matters of policy and coordination. A potential problem for the Twin Cities arrangement is the possible "slippage" between the actions of the council and those of the numerous operating agencies responsible for bringing services and controls to the metropolitan citizen.⁸¹

Federations and Single-Function Jurisdictions.

The close relationships which the Minnesota legislature established between the Twin Cities Council and the area's metropolitan districts have been outlined above. To a less significant degree and with more limited statutory support, Toronto has developed substantial controls over its area's major "independent" sub-systems: the Toronto Transit Commission, the Metro Police Commission, and the Metro Licensing Commission.⁸² Dade County has little leverage over the two important authorities concerned with mass transit and with ports. However, with Federal prodding, the Miami Sewer and Water Board became, in 1972, a countywide agency under the control of Dade County government.

The characteristic American practice of insulating school systems from other local jurisdictions is found not only in Dade County and in the Twin Cities, but also in Toronto Metro, which exercises but few controls over school organization and policies.

Until 1972 Seattle Metro remained a single-pur-

pose district itself. It provided more a wholesale "service" rather than a "control" function for sewer districts and municipalities, as it completed the operation of treating their sewage and transporting the effluent.

Geographic Area of the Second-Tier Government.

The size of the second-level jurisdiction is of significance in the effectiveness of federative types. Spillover problems are obvious when the second-tier encompasses only part of the problem area. Dade County is now but one of the three counties of the South Florida urban region. The urban area adjacent to Toronto Metro continues to grow. Initially, Seattle Metro encompassed the City of Seattle and the suburban area surrounding Lake Washington; in 1971 the Washington legislature made metro boundaries coterminous with King County, one of two counties in the Seattle SMSA.

Of the four examples, the Twin Cities Council most fully blankets its metropolitan area, and is the most likely to encompass the area's suburban growth within the foreseeable future. It also is possible that council boundaries in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area may be more malleable than those of Dade

County Metro. In the latter instance a referendum was necessary to adopt the federation plan; the process involved drafting a metropolitan county charter, which requires amendment for enlargement of the metro area. Since the Twin Cities umbrella council was established by legislative fiat and remains closely tied to its parent body, presumably the legislature could modify the metro boundaries with less local resistance than would be the case where referenda are required.

But even where the State legislature has complete authority to contour the boundaries of the federation to include the area's entire urban population, it may not choose to do so. Legislators may perceive that unlimited metro growth would pose a threat to the State's or the province's dominant position, and may wish to prevent such a development.⁸³ Ontario has blocked the expansion of Toronto Metro by establishing regional agencies immediately adjacent to it. If the threat of a super-metro were not thought of by the legislature when it enacted the metro enabling legislation for the State of Washington, it was in the minds of the residents of Snohomish County, who established their own metro primarily to prevent a "march to the north" by the Seattle areawide organization.

Table V-4
Metropolitan Councils and Executives

| | Councils | | | | | Chief Executive | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------------|---|----------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| | Popular Election | | Appointment by | | | Chosen by | Term-Years |
| | Single-member district (except as noted) | At-large | Representatives of first-tier governments | Governor | County Board | | |
| City-County Consolidations | | | | | | | |
| Jacksonville | 14 | 5 | | | | 19 | Electorate 4 |
| Columbus | 4 | 6 | | | | 10 | Electorate 4 |
| Indianapolis | 25 | 4 | | | | 29 | Electorate 4 |
| Lexington-Fayette | 12 | 3 | | | | 15 | Electorate 4 |
| Nashville-Davidson | 35 | 5 | | | | 40 | Electorate 4 |
| Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge | 11 ^a | | | | | 11 | Electorate 4 |
| Federated Types | | | | | | | |
| Toronto Metro | | | 32 | | | 1 ^b | 32 or 33 Council 2 |
| Dade County Metro | | 9 ^c | | | | 9 | Council w/o term |
| Seattle Metro | | | 29 | | 6 ^d | 1 ^e | 36 Council w/o term |
| Twin Cities Council | | | | 15 | | 15 | Council w/o term |

- a. From three wards: seven members from Ward 1 (City of Baton Rouge), and two members from each of the two remaining wards.
- b. The chairman is chosen from outside the membership of the first-tier representatives.
- c. Eight councilmen reside in a single-member district but are elected at large. The presiding officer ("mayor") may be elected from any part of the county.
- d. Representing unincorporated areas of King County.
- e. The Metro Council chairman.

Representation and Controls. The principle of representation by districts is at least minimally employed in each of the areawide councils. Although the Dade Metro Council is elected at large, candidates are nominated by districts in primary elections. The members of the Twin Cities Council are appointed by the State governor from districts of the metropolitan area. Although the Dade County and the Twin Cities Council members are chosen as public members and not as delegates of local jurisdictions, the governing bodies of the Toronto and Seattle Metros represent the constituent local governments and are basically composed of officers of the lower-tier municipalities.

A general unsettledness has characterized the representation systems of the federative types. The original methods of selecting the membership of the Toronto and Dade Metro Councils have been substantially changed. The changes—proposed and adopted—reflect egalitarian pressures. Originally, one-half of the Dade County council represented first-tier governments; now all members are nominated by equal-population districts and elected at large. Representation on Toronto's Metro Council was initially divided between the City of Toronto and the suburban municipalities with little regard given to the relative population of each jurisdiction. With the 1967 amendments, representation of the six jurisdictions on the metro council has reflected the relative population of each municipality. The executive committee, however, continues to allow the City of Toronto greater representation than its population alone would justify.

In the Twin Cities the question of making the appointive council elective has been a lively topic since the council was established. Strong support, including that of the governor⁸⁴ and the Metropolitan League of Municipalities, has developed for making its members elective, which would make the council less a State agency and more an areawide government. Some support also exists for the direct election of citizen members of the Atlanta Regional Commission, who are presently selected by the public members from equal population districts which cross boundary lines of local governments.⁸⁵

Like special districts, Seattle Metro gives only limited recognition to the principle of representation on the basis of population in allocating council seats to political jurisdictions. Because it is not considered to possess general governmental powers, this system has not been obliged to adopt the "one man, one vote" principle by the judiciary.⁸⁶

"Umpiring" Upper-Lower Tier Jurisdictional Disputes. The task of dividing power and reconciling conflicting power claims in a federated system is an unending one, since charters are incapable of

anticipating the precise roles each jurisdiction should assume in a constantly shifting political, social, and technological milieu. Since governments at any level rarely suffer the loss of power gladly, jurisdictional conflicts are common in federated systems. "Umpiring" and arbitrating these disputes may fall to (1) the State legislature, in modifying and clarifying pertinent statutes; (2) the courts, in their interpretation of constitutional, statutory, and administrative law; (3) the local electorate, in amending charters; and (4) administrators, in negotiating settlements.

Although important, the courts' role in the delineation of authority between upper and lower tiers has been less dominant at the metropolitan level than at the national level. This is partly because of the short period of time courts have had to develop a body of precedent regarding the metropolitan level, but also because charters at the metropolitan level outline upper-tier duties in more specific terms.

A legislature has played a highly significant role in the adjustment of power positions between the Twin Cities Council and functional jurisdictions in the area, as it did in the major shifts occurring in Toronto Metro in 1967. In Dade County, the electorate assumed part of the umpire function in voting frequently on initiative measures which dealt with the county's authority; power adjustments also have resulted from negotiations between administrators from the cities and Dade County. One observer suggests that the important role played by professional public administrators follows naturally from the widespread use of manager government in Dade County.⁸⁷

URBAN BLACKS AND REORGANIZATION

The attitudes of most urban black residents concerning metropolitan reorganization have usually been negative. The general lack of consolidated metropolitan governments in the United States testifies to the fact that whites also generally share this negative bias toward jurisdictional change. Although generally blacks register a greater percentage of "No" votes than whites in opposition to reorganization plans, perhaps a more dramatic distinction may be drawn from the reasons offered by the two groups in opposing governmental consolidation.

Blacks commonly hold the view that their growing populations are now large enough to influence substantially, if not to control, a number of central cities. Washington, Gary, Newark, Atlanta, and 13 smaller American cities presently have black majorities, and Detroit, St. Louis, Baltimore, Birmingham, Richmond, and New Orleans are now more than 40

percent black.⁸⁸ To extend the boundaries of the central city to encompass a suburban white population dilutes black influence in local government, and precludes the possibility of black majority control of central cities. This dilution of the black vote in elections could result from large-scale annexation or de-annexation, consolidation, or the establishment of a strong second-tier government.

In an analysis referred to earlier,⁸⁹ Dye concluded from aggregate annexation data that annexation is less likely to happen when central cities and suburban populations differ sharply in, among other factors, race. He concluded that the middle class seeks to preserve its own ways of living.⁹⁰ The added assumption here is that blacks, too, prefer to "go it alone" to maximize their political power. Whatever the cause, and with two exceptions, metropolitan reorganization proposals have failed to secure the support of a majority of black voters.

As long ago as the 1950's, reorganization attempts in St. Louis and Cleveland brought strong black negative reactions.⁹¹ One study of ten reorganization proposals in Cleveland extending back a quarter of a century revealed that, as the black population grew, its support for reorganization lessened with each succeeding election. One analyst hypothesizes:

When Negro voting strength in Cleveland was small, Negroes supported reorganization more positively than whites. This indicates that the Negro community felt it had no stake in the political *status quo* and that it might even benefit from change. However, as Negro strength increased it was accompanied by a decline in support for metropolitan reform.⁹²

In the Nashville consolidation election of 1962 where the racial control issue surfaced extensively, black leadership was divided. Black leaders who played roles in charter drafting and campaigning were convinced that a "guaranteed" larger representation in the new consolidated council, largely elected by districts, would be of greater benefit to blacks than an eventually stronger influence within the old City of Nashville would be. In the election, central city blacks and whites each opposed the proposal by about 56 percent, although probably for different reasons.⁹³

In 1967, Tampa's white population also rejected by 56 percent the proposal to combine the city with Hillsborough County, while about 90 percent of the city's black electorate voted against it. This overwhelming rejection may be partially explained by an aspect of reorganization proposals other than boundary extension—its representation system. The Tampa plan called for a 13-man council elected at

large (albeit eight members would have to meet district residency requirements).⁹⁴

In other reorganization campaigns, racial control emerged as a dominant issue for both blacks and whites. The 1956 referendum on a proposed merger of the central City of Newport News with Hampton and Warwick in Tidewater Virginia is illustrative. Predominantly white precincts in Newport News supported consolidation by margins of from 10-to-one to 18-to-one, while black precincts rejected the proposals by from two-to-one to four-to-one majorities.⁹⁵ The only mergers receiving the approval of a majority of black voters were those of Jacksonville-Duval County and of Lexington-Fayette County.

In the old City of Jacksonville, where black citizens constitute more than 40 percent of the population, they voted in favor of merger by 59 percent, about 5 percentage points below the overall area-wide majority. A variety of factors have been suggested to explain this level of black support. Black leadership participated in the charter campaign from the beginning. The "old city" council was elected at large, while the consolidated government plan provided for district elections for 14 of the 19 council members, with district lines drawn to virtually guarantee the election of three black members. Blacks also perceived that if consolidation failed, the State legislature might dilute their strength in the city by statutory annexation. Others saw economic benefits such as greater tax resources to tap, and new employment opportunities which a deteriorating central city could not offer.⁹⁶ One black leader commented that without consolidation, "I might have been the black mayor, but I would have been only a referee in bankruptcy."⁹⁷

Scandals within the "old" Jacksonville city government provided additional black support for change. A second leader commented, "The city has suffered from political boondoggling, financial irresponsibility, and a high crime rate, and when the city suffers, the black man suffers the most." The charter proposed protection of the job rights of Jacksonville civil servants, a matter of special concern to the black city work force.⁹⁸

In November 1972, the black electorate of Lexington gave the Lexington-Fayette County consolidation more than 70 percent of its votes, equalling the support the merger had throughout the county. This strong black backing is attributed to a variety of factors. A pre-referendum survey revealed that the question of representation was important to all voters, but particularly to the black electorate. Under existing political arrangements, city councilmen were elected at large, and in 1972 none of the incumbents was black. If consolidation were rejected, Lexington would continue to have an at-large council (12 members) under its newly achieved first-class

city status. Under the merger plan, 12 of the 15 council seats were to be filled on a district basis; in two or three of these, black majorities would dominate.

In voting for consolidation, Lexington's black population was not sacrificing an early opportunity to become a majority. In 1970, blacks constituted but 22 percent of the city's population. If consolidation were rejected, the built-up areas adjacent to Lexington were scheduled for annexation under a court-ordered plan. On the other hand, approval of the charter would not drastically reduce black voting strength in the consolidated government, inasmuch as blacks represented 19 percent of the overall population of the entire county. Finally, as in Jacksonville, black leaders were members of the charter commission and played important campaign roles.⁹⁹

In the Indianapolis reorganization, the black population was consulted, but to no greater extent than was the local Democratic party with which it is closely tied. Most black leaders in Indianapolis opposed consolidation, "but the black political community in Indianapolis has not been cohesive, militant, or strongly led, and its opposition did not deter Republican majorities in the assembly."¹⁰⁰

Since the Indianapolis merger came in the form of a legislative mandate, no referendum provided a measure of rank-and-file reaction. Most black spokesmen continue to react unfavorably to the merger, and a feeling exists that Unigov reduced black political power without changing the resource base for center city blacks.¹⁰¹

Formally, black citizens are not grossly under-

represented in the umbrella regional councils. Eighteen percent of the membership of the Atlanta Regional Commission is black, as compared with 23 percent of the region.¹⁰² One black serves on the 14-man regional council in the Twin Cities area, where blacks constitute less than 2 percent of the population.¹⁰³ However, the general question remains whether formal representation equals effective representation when black representatives are appointed or are chosen indirectly by dominantly white first-tier governments.¹⁰⁴

Consolidated governments almost invariably reduce the percentages of the black populations to total population within the new government. In spite of this, the black electorate has in most cases increased its formal representation on new area-wide councils. In the consolidations of the past decade, with one exception, there is greater overall black representation today than existed on the central city councils prior to merger, whether the yardstick be numbers of black members, proportion of total members, or proportion in relation to total blacks in the jurisdiction.¹⁰⁵

Although black representation on centralized metropolitan governments' legislative bodies is less than the numbers of black residents warrant, some evidence suggests that the new arrangements provide greater citizen access than before. Except for the councils of the Twin Cities and Atlanta, and of Seattle Metro, they are directly elected. A high percentage of the elected legislators are selected on a high-access district basis (see Table V-5). In addition, blacks hold at-large council positions in

Table V-5
Black Population and Council Representation
in Major City-County Consolidations:
1962-1972

| | Population Percentage Black | | Council Membership On Terminal "Old" City Council | | Council Membership on Consolidated Government Council | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---|-------|---|-------|
| | "Old" Central City | Consolidated Government | No. Black | Total | No. Black | Total |
| Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida | 44% | 25% | 2 ^a | 9 | 3 | 19 |
| Columbus-Muscogee County, Georgia | 30 | 30 (est.) | 0 | 12 | 2 | 10 |
| Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana | 27 | 17 | 1 | 9 | 5 | 29 |
| Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky | 22 | 19 | 0 | 8 | 2 or 3 ^b | 19 |
| Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee | 38 | 20 | 2 | 31 | 7 | 40 |

a. This was the first black representation on the Jacksonville City Council in the twentieth century.

b. The Lexington-Fayette consolidated government takes effect January 1, 1974. This estimate is made on the basis of present racial composition of council districts.

Columbus (Georgia), Indianapolis, and Jacksonville. In Nashville-Davidson County two seats are held by blacks from districts with white majorities.

In Indianapolis, black residents are a major portion of the local Democratic party, which traditionally dominated the "old" city. In two-party Unigov, the Democrats currently play a minority role. In this sense, a dilution of black strength has occurred with consolidation. However, Willbern points out that under Unigov, black council members elected by district may more faithfully reflect their constituents' views than under the earlier system when black candidates were often chosen in a pre-primary slating process by a primarily white leadership. Significant numbers of blacks have been incorporated into the current Republican administration.¹⁰⁶

In Jacksonville and Nashville at least, evidence exists that the professional leadership of consolidated governments may be better attuned to minority aspirations and more successful in responding to minority needs than the earlier governments had been. This response includes more black appointments to civil service positions.

STRUCTURAL REFORM AND FISCAL EQUITY

Students have often commented on the mismatch between fiscal resources and fiscal needs among local jurisdictions in metropolitan areas. It is commonly assumed that areawide government would bring about greater fiscal equity through greater tax equalization and by providing lower income groups benefits which are disproportionate to the taxes they pay. In the case of federated governments, opportunities exist for distributing benefits to low-income lower-tier jurisdictions.

The scanty evidence available indicates a less-than-major redistributive thrust by consolidations and federations to date. As Willbern observes with respect to Unigov, a new governmental structure may make a redistributive thrust easier legally, but the present contours of political power do not allow a strong movement in this direction.¹⁰⁷

A number of factors contribute to less than comprehensive change in the collection and distribution of resources by reform governments. Certain important functions may be assigned to authorities, districts, and constitutional officers which are at least partially beyond control of the new jurisdiction. About two-thirds of the total local spending in Jacksonville, for example, is in the hands of independent agencies.¹⁰⁸

The property tax remains the dominant source of revenue for most reorganized governments, as it was prior to change. Although the charters generally

provided the new governments with little more discretion regarding tax rates, they did allow for two changes which have affected the property tax systems. First, the general tax base has been enlarged to the boundary limits of the county, which, potentially at least, makes resource redistribution possible.

In Nashville-Davidson and in Toronto Metro, for example, a common areawide property tax rate established a measure of equity in funding the public schools. Certain areawide activities, which previously had been financed by the central city, have become services of the consolidated government. For example, the Tennessee consolidation assumed responsibility for parks, an airport, and an auditorium whose costs were formerly borne by the "old" Nashville. Second, the new government has often provided an impetus for a more efficient system of assessment and collection of property taxes. In Dade County, tax assessment and collection activities previously performed by the county and the municipalities within it are now centralized at the second-tier level.

Although total revenues have increased under reorganization, property tax rates have tended to stabilize. Property tax expenditures in Marion County rose four percent from the last year before Unigov to the second year after it was established. During that period total expenditures rose 30 percent.¹⁰⁹ In Nashville-Davidson, the property tax rate was stabilized during the first eight years of the new government; in Jacksonville, the rate declines each of the first three years of the consolidated government's operations.¹¹⁰

Through its history, Dade Metro has been restricted in the property tax millage it may impose under the general county law. This legal constraint has been reinforced by the Dade County council's natural reluctance to extend property tax rates because homeowners within municipalities are forced to pay property taxes for services outside as well as inside city boundaries.

User charges have been adopted by almost all metropolitan city-county consolidations, as well as by Dade Metro. Including hospital receipts and bus fares, Dade collects substantial revenue from garbage collections, water and sewage charges, and a utilities tax in the unincorporated areas of the county. In 1967 one-third of the locally raised revenues in the Miami SMSA came from user charges; nationally SMSA's raised one-fifth of their locally raised funds in this manner. Since consolidation, Nashville-Davidson has increased user charges for water, sewers, hospitals, and other services. Jacksonville imposed a number of new user charges after merger.¹¹¹

The principle of taxing according to benefits received has taken a popular and systematic form in

service districts in city-county consolidations. The principle has widespread support, and is employed in consolidation campaigns to win affirmative votes. One pre-election newspaper article relating to the proposed merger of Lexington and Fayette County held out the prospect that "(m)erging city and county governments would eliminate the problem of paying for services we don't receive."¹¹²

Service districts were provided for in all post-World-War-II central city-county consolidations save Unigov, where many political subdivisions continued after the merger. But even here, the majority leader of the Unigov council underlined the support of the basic principle in commenting that a pending local taxation study rested on "an effort to have the user pay the cost of the services."¹¹³

A counter-redistributive principle appears to be illustrated in the Baton Rouge Plan of Government, which provides for an industrial services district. In that area, the maximum tax rate is established at the rural level of four mills, conditional upon the industries providing their own "municipal services."¹¹⁴

Encompassing 27 municipalities with variable tax rates, the Dade County federation does not provide for service districts as such. However, a system of service districts has often been proposed for the unincorporated areas of the county; as recently as 1971 the Dade County Metropolitan Study Commission made such a recommendation.¹¹⁵

In a number of respects, the federative principle further complicates the application of the principle of fiscal equity. First, the lower-tier jurisdictions have widely varying tax bases upon which to provide services of equal quality. Second, an upper-tier jurisdiction such as Dade County may have major responsibilities as a first-tier government in unincorporated areas. Services provided such areas may be financed in part by municipalities which may be hard-pressed financially.

Third, such upper-tier jurisdictions as the Twin Cities Council and Seattle Metro have no direct power to pursue fiscal equity through reforms in tax assessment, administration, or redistribution of tax resources. Seattle Metro's revenue is derived from the sale of services; the Twin-Cities Council is allowed by statute seven-tenths of a mill.

Finally, federative tax systems leave many financial decisions to the lower tier, where fiscal equity may not be vigorously pursued. Most lower-tier units have their own taxes to spend for local purposes, although certain upper-tier jurisdictions may have the opportunity to pursue equity considerations in performing tax assessment and collection functions for the cities in the federation. Dade County performs both of these functions for its cities; the

Province of Ontario assesses property in the Toronto area, where the six municipalities collect their own taxes.

Reform jurisdictions such as Unigov, Nashville-Davidson, Jacksonville, and Dade County have been successful in securing vastly more intergovernmental revenue than were the pre-merger governments in their areas. The first consolidated Nashville-Davidson budget in 1963 provided about \$20 million in intergovernmental revenues; in 1970 these revenues amounted to approximately \$37 million.¹¹⁶ In its second year of operation, Unigov expenditures from intergovernmental revenues were 110 percent greater than the amount the "old city" spent the year before consolidation; for general county government purposes, the increase was almost 80 percent.¹¹⁷

In Jacksonville, the consolidated budget in its third year was \$24 million larger than the last combined budgets of the old city and county. Of this, almost \$8 million of the increase took place in new programs, most of which were Federally financed.¹¹⁸ A Federal programs coordinator vigorously sought funds "in such areas as housing, urban renewal, and recreation, in sharp contrast to the indifference or hostility toward Federal help that characterized the old government."¹¹⁹

This may be not only because the political leaders and the professional administrators of the new governments are more knowledgeable of Federal grants, and of ways of securing them, but also that certain Federal agencies are sympathetic to the development of areawide governments, and favor grant requests from such units.

ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS

Campaigns for annexation, consolidation, and federation are regularly fueled by assertions that greater administrative efficiency, economy, and effectiveness will result from adoption of the proposals. Although generalizations on this subject cannot be drawn with confidence, a few relevant observations can be made concerning the extent to which centralized governments embody these cost-related virtues:¹²⁰

1. Centralization almost always leads to a total dollar increase in public service costs. Post-consolidation decreases in tax rates, such as have occurred in the Jacksonville and Indianapolis areas, do not necessarily reflect budget decreases stemming primarily from greater efficiency, although this may have occurred. Rather, the reduction in tax rates is fundamentally explained by a larger property tax base.

2. Centralized governments almost invariably strengthen such overhead services as personnel,

budgeting and finance, and management. Although this is perhaps most dramatically illustrated in annexations of unincorporated territory by a municipality, it is also apparent in consolidations and annexations. More adequately staffed, professionalized, overhead services may result in more effective policy planning and in delivery of services than was previously the case, but it is not likely that improved staff services reduce overall administrative costs. Improved administrative staff capabilities may have the effect of stimulating demand for a further extension of public services.

3. Reorganized governments in urban areas have generally been more active in construction and physical development activities than in the areas of social services and human development programs. This is, of course, often true of local governments generally; States and the Federal government have in recent decades taken the initiative in the provision of social services.

The federated jurisdictions have records of accomplishment in public works programs. One student calls Toronto Metro "... a magnificent development machine."¹²¹ Like certain metropolitan special districts to which it bears a resemblance, Seattle Metro has been cited for its administrative effectiveness. Through a large sewage transport and treatment program, Seattle Metro restored Lake Washington to earlier standards of purity. Since its organization in 1968, the Twin Cities Council has played an important policy and fiscal role in the development of facilities for sewage and solid waste disposal. On the other hand, Dade County has been unable to exert an equivalent control role in the development of water and sewage facilities throughout its area in the face of municipal opposition and because of restricted tax resources.

Most consolidated city-counties have also pursued physical development in a vigorous fashion. The construction of streets and highways and of sewage and water facilities are the most significant of their public works undertakings.

The State of Florida, by assuming welfare costs formerly borne at the local level, indirectly aided Jacksonville's capital construction program. The financing of capital projects has been eased in a number of jurisdictions by the lower interest rates accorded bonds issued by consolidated and federated governments.

Finally, in annexation actions new public works, particularly water and sewer facilities, are dominant goals of fringe-area residents seeking inclusion in municipalities.

4. Reorganized governments have spotty to weak records in effecting change in matters touching im-

portantly the life-styles of metropolitan area residents. To date, few consolidations have had much direct impact upon existing patterns of minority housing and education. Apart from Nashville-Davidson County, which has importantly conditioned education policies in the area, the traditionally well-insulated school function has remained largely independent of consolidations and federations. However, the consolidated governments have participated much more actively in Federal programs, some of which (model cities and manpower, for example) have had an impact on social needs and problems.

CONCLUSIONS

The past decade of American experience with annexation, city-county consolidation, and federation experience may be highlighted as follows:

—The three approaches to reform outlined in this chapter aspire to comprehensive change. Comprehensive change is atypical in urban political systems where local policy inputs are numerous and diverse in nature, where there are many veto groups, and where no breakdown in social order has occurred.

—Other than in the East and in the largest cities, annexation is extensively used to enlarge municipal boundaries. Most individual annexations are small, but the total area added by this method is significant (during 1970 and 1971, 1,517 square miles were annexed). Although annexation continues to be a useful method in bringing urban services to fringe areas, it has not been an effective tool for achieving metropolitan government in this century.

—Within the past decade legislatures in seven States established discretionary boundary review boards at the State and local levels. Three States have a single statewide board; in three States systems of county or areawide boards are employed; and a seventh State has established a statewide agency which will be in full operation in 1974. A number of the presently operating commissions are making constructive contributions to the orderly and logical expansion of municipal boundaries, and to a slower growth rate in the numbers of new special districts and municipalities within States.

—Eleven city-county consolidations took place in the United States during the 1962-72 decade. Of the five which involved consolidation of the central cities of the metropolitan areas, four occurred in the South. Each of the four took place in counties where few municipalities existed and where previous annexations impinged on consolidation decisions. Each resulted in less than complete consolidation and in

strong mayor-council governments, with unicameral bodies chosen largely on a single-member district basis. Unigov in Indianapolis represented the first consolidation in the North and the first mandated by a State legislature in the twentieth century.

—Although they have been successful in securing Federal grants, metropolitan city-county consolidations have served as the focus for very few Federal substate and regional districting efforts.

—Few federative approaches have been utilized in American metropolitan areas. The Toronto-type federation has remained untried, and Dade County represents the sole example of a deliberate chartering of a federated urban county. Few States allow the incorporation of metropolitan multi-purpose special districts, and no more than two or three such districts are presently functioning.

—The State supported umbrella regional council represents the chief innovation in federative forms during the past decade. This is a general purpose policy-making body, which has the responsibility for developing areawide plans, for coordinating the major independent functional agencies within the region, and controlling the development of the metropolitan area. It is illustrated by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council.

—To an even greater extent than whites, blacks

resist metropolitan reform efforts largely because of fear that their central city voting strength would be diluted by the adoption of areawide government. In the two campaigns where black majorities supported consolidation efforts, influential black leaders participated from the beginning, "black" single-member districts were delineated, and a possibility existed that the central city would annex the urban fringe if the reform attempt failed. To date, formal black representation on consolidated city-county councils has generally equalled or exceeded the proportions held on pre-reform central city councils.

—Although metropolitan federations or consolidations might make redistributions easier legally, no fundamental shifts have yet been made in the collection and distribution of local tax revenues in favor of those at the lower end of the economic scale. Evidence exists, however, that reform governments have been more successful than their predecessors in securing Federal aid for the administration of programs that are redistributive in nature.

—Less than conclusive data suggests that although consolidated and federated governments result in higher total costs for local government, they do not always result in higher tax rates. Further, reform governments are likely to bring strengthened overhead management, more effective use of tax money, and a higher level of public services, especially in those programs which depend heavily upon major physical facilities.

Footnotes

¹Robert G. Dixon, Jr., and John R. Kerstetter, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries: Law and Practice in 48 States* (American Municipal Association, Chicago, 1959), pp. 4-5, 87.

²Richard L. Forstall, "Changes in Land Area for Larger Cities, 1960-1970," *Municipal Year Book: 1972* (Washington: International City Management Association, 1972), p.87.

³Dixon and Kerstetter, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries*. . . , pp. 4-5; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp.1-120.

⁴Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962) p.59.

⁵U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Municipal Annexation: Its Extent and Effects on Government," unpublished paper, 1972, p. 1. The 1950's number relates to annexing incorporated places of 2,500 or more population in 1950; the figure for the 1960's is for places of 2,000 or more population in 1960.

⁶Bureau of the Census, "Municipal Annexation," p.1.

⁷Forstall, "Changes in Land Area. . ." p. 87.

⁸U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "1972 Boundary and Annexation Survey Report," (Prepared by the Geography Division, 1973), p.2.

⁹Douglas W. Ayres and Leonard L. Whorton, "Annexation-The Forgotten Answer to Metropolitan Services," *Public Management*, (August 1965), p.195.

¹⁰Bureau of the Census, "1972 Boundary and Annexation Survey Report," p.2.

¹¹Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Part A, Table 34, pp.1-180.

¹²Forstall, "Changes in Land Area. . . , p. 86.

¹³Bureau of the Census, "Municipal Annexation," p. 3. This statement is based upon the 1970 Bureau of Census definition of an SMSA, which generally required a central city or cities of at least 50,000 persons. In 1971 the definition of an SMSA was amended to include central cities of 25,000 population with dense urban fringes containing another 25,000 or more people. Under the new definition most of these urban areas would have qualified as SMSA's without annexation.

¹⁴Bureau of the Census, "Proportion of United States Population Living in Cities of 100,000 or more Declined, 1960-70, Census Shows," Press Release CB 71-71 (May 3, 1971).

¹⁵Bureau of the Census, "Municipal Annexation," p.39.

¹⁶Bureau of the Census, "Municipal Annexation," p.86.

¹⁷These conclusions, as well as those relating to forms of government and age of settlement, are based upon an analysis of 1960 census data by Thomas A. Dye in "Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated with Annexation in American Cities," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (November 1964), pp. 430-66.

¹⁸Dye, "Urban Political Integration," pp. 445-446.

¹⁹Age is determined by Dye by decades passed since the central city of the metropolitan area first attained a population of 50,000.

²⁰*Voluntary Municipal Merger Procedures* (Advance draft), Massachusetts Legislative Research Council Report, March 11, 1970, p. 17a.

²¹Frank S. Sengstock, *Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem*, Michigan Legal Publications (Ann Arbor Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law School, 1960).

²²National League of Cities, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries: Law and Practice* (Washington, D.C.: The League, 1966), p.4.

²³National League of Cities, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries*. . . , pp. 77-354 *passim*.

²⁴Fifteen States allow the electorate of the annexing municipality to determine independently of other groups whether territory should be added. Sengstock, *Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem*, p.18.

²⁵National League of Cities, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries*. . . , p. 198. Regarding practices in Texas, see Stuart A. McCorkle, *Municipal Annexation in Texas* (Austin: Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1965).

²⁶Forstall, "Changes in Land Area. . .", p. 87.

²⁷McCorkle, *op. cit.*, p.28-30, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Number of Inhabitants, U.S. Summary* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 171-178.

²⁸National League of Cities, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries*. . . , p.15.

²⁹National League of Cities, *Adjusting Municipal Boundaries*. . . , p.16.

³⁰Chester W. Bain, *Annexation in Virginia* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1966), pp. 234-36.

³¹Local *ad hoc* annexation bodies have been authorized or utilized in Washington and New Mexico. Annexation boards in New Mexico have never functioned. In Ohio, county boards of supervisors sit as discretionary boundary adjustment review boards. The Iowa legislature has provided for a statewide City Development Board with discretionary boundary review powers, which will become operational in 1974. See M. G. Woodruff III, "Systems and Standards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative Analysis," *Georgetown Law Journal* 58 (March-May 1970) pp. 743-775.

Nevada employs local advisory commissions in annexation actions in most counties.

The State of Wisconsin provides an advisory administrative review of certain annexation proposals. All municipalities in Wisconsin counties over 50,000 are required to submit any proposed annexations to the head of the Bureau of Planning in the Department of Local Affairs and Development. Cities in counties of under 50,000 may do so if they wish. Although the statute charges the administrator to consider whether the proposed boundary change is in "the public interest," in practice review has been limited to the statutory guidelines of whether the territory to be annexed will receive better governmental services and whether the configuration of the area to be annexed and its location in relation to the annexing jurisdiction are satisfactory. The

agency gives advisory opinions in about 5 percent of the 200-plus annexation proposals submitted to it each year.

³²Oregon Revised Statutes, 199.440. See Ronald C. Cease, *A Report on State and Provincial Boundary Review Board* (Portland: The Portland Metropolitan Study Commission, 1968), p. 4.

³³Thomas A. Morehouse and Victor Fischer, *Borough Government in Alaska* (Fairbanks: Institute of Social, Economic and Government Research, University of Alaska, 1971), p. 130.

³⁴Cease, *A Report on State and Provincial Boundary Review Board*, p. 33.

³⁵Morehouse and Fischer, *Borough Government in Alaska*, p. 131.

³⁶*Boundary Change by Administrative Commission: The Minnesota Experience, Part I, II*, (Municipal Reference Bureau, Extension Service, University of Minnesota, 1969), pp. 11-13. The material on Minnesota boundary adjustment is based largely on this valuable study.

³⁷*Boundary Change by Administrative Commission*, pp.III-4, III-11.

³⁸*Boundary Change by Administrative Commission*, pp. III-30.

³⁹*Boundary Change by Administrative Commission*, Chap. IV, pp. 5, 8.

⁴⁰Richard T. LeCates, *California Local Agency Formation Commissions* (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1970), p. 36.

⁴¹LeCates, *California Local Agency Formation Commissions*, pp. 42, 56.

⁴²LeCates, *California Local Agency Formation Commissions*, p. 42.

⁴³LeCates, *California Local Agency Formation Commissions*, pp. 48, 58.

⁴⁴In the 1970-71 appropriation bill the Oregon legislature directed its boundary commissions ". . .to begin to investigate such special districts as soon as possible and to initiate proceedings to consolidate, or eliminate such districts and transfer their functions to other units of government, i.e., cities, county service districts, or multiple service metropolitan service districts. . . ." Lane County Local Government Boundary Commission, *1971-72 Summary of Activities* (Eugene, Oregon, 1972), pp. 3-4.

In 1965, the California legislature passed a District Reorganization Act which attempted to enhance the ability of LAF-CO's to control special district incorporation and growth.

⁴⁵John Goldbach, *Boundary Changes in California: The Local Agency Formation Commissions* (Davis, California: Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California), pp. 88-90; Intergovernmental Council on Urban Growth, *Local Agency Formation Commissions*, (Sacramento, 1966), pp. 26-27; John A. Rehfuss, "Boundary Agreements—A Solution to the Annexation Struggle," *Public Affairs Report*, VIII, No. 3, June 1967.

⁴⁶Lane County Local Government Boundary Commission, *1971-72 Summary of Activities*, p. 4.

⁴⁷Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "Summary of City-County Consolidation Developments" (Information Bulletin No. 69-26, 1969), p. 1.

⁴⁸Boston-Suffolk County (part) (1822), Philadelphia-Philadelphia County (1854), New York City consolidation (1898), and Honolulu-Honolulu County (1907).

⁴⁹Vincent L. Marando and Carl Reggie Whitley, "City-County Consolidation: An Overview of Voter Response," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, December 1972, p. 181.

⁵⁰These numbers exclude the Virginia consolidations since the

cities and counties were separate entities and had no history of cooperation. Indianapolis is also excluded since it was consolidated by the State legislature rather than by referendum.

⁵¹David G. Temple, *Merger Politics: Local Government Consolidation in Tidewater Virginia* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972), pp. 175-183. His generalizations were based on the first three city-county consolidations in that State and on the consolidation of the cities of Newport News and Warwick. Earlier (in 1952), Warwick County had become the City of Warwick.

⁵²Temple, *Merger Politics*. . . p. 5.

⁵³Temple, *Merger Politics*. . . pp. 171-172. Although this was written before the Suffolk-Nansemond County consolidation, it is applicable to that merger also.

⁵⁴York Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System II, Ch. 2* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming).

⁵⁵"New County, U.S.A. Report: City-County Consolidation Seminar" (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties Research Foundation, 1972), p. 4.

⁵⁶Willbern "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," p. 63.

⁵⁷Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," pp. 30-31.

⁵⁸John DeGrove (ed.), "Southern Regionalism," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System II, Ch. 1* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming).

⁵⁹Columbus-Muscogee, Lexington-Fayette, Nashville-Davidson, and Jacksonville-Duval.

⁶⁰"Charter of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government," Article 2.04.

⁶¹DeGrove, "The City of Jacksonville: Consolidation in Action," p.3.

⁶²William C. Havard and Floyd L. Corty, *Rural-Urban Consolidation: The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), ch. 1., pp. 32-36.

⁶³Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," p. 50.

⁶⁴John DeGrove (ed.) "Southern Regionalism," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System II, Ch. 1* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming).

⁶⁵Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," p. 61.

⁶⁶"Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance," in Aaron Wildavsky, ed. *American Federalism in Perspective* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p.51.

⁶⁷See John G. Wofford, "Transportation and Metropolitan Governance," in Lowden Wingo, ed., *Metropolitanization and Public Services* (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1972), pp. 23-27. Charles M. Haar, "A Federal Role in Metropolitanism," in Lowden Wingo, ed., *Reform of Metropolitan Governments* (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1972), pp. 87-88.

⁶⁸Committee for Economic Development, *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas* (New York, 1970).

⁶⁹Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Crisis Continues* (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 18.

⁷⁰The Committee for Economic Development, in *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas* (New York, 1970), p. 20,

calls for a federated government in which the lower tier would be "a community-level government system comprised of 'community districts.' These units might consist of existing local governments with functions readjusted to the two-level system, together with new districts in areas where no local unit exists."

⁷¹See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The New Grass Roots Government? Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Urban Areas* (Washington, D.C., 1972) and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, 1*, (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp. XXI-XXII.

⁷²Melvin B. Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Counties*, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972), p. 78.

⁷³John DeGrove, "Metropolitan Dade County," ACIR Unpublished manuscript, 1972, Mogulof, *op.cit.*, pp. 82-83.

⁷⁴Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972) p. 12.

⁷⁵Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 67.

⁷⁶Ted Kolderie, "Governance in the Twin Cities Area of Minnesota," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System II, Ch. 4* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming).

⁷⁷Dade County Metropolitan Study Commission, *Final Report and Recommendations* (Coral Gables, Florida, June 1971), p. 46.

⁷⁸Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 114.

⁷⁹Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 109.

⁸⁰Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 110.

⁸¹See Council on Environmental Quality, *The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 136-155.

⁸²Harold Kaplan, *Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis* (New York: Columbia Press, 1967), pp. 129-156.

⁸³Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, pp. 102-103.

⁸⁴Governor Wendell Anderson, in his 1972 "State of the State" message called for direct election of the members of the Council.

⁸⁵John DeGrove (ed.) "Southern Regionalism," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System II Ch. 1*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming).

⁸⁶John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, *The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life* (2nd ed.), (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 320.

⁸⁷DeGrove, "Metropolitan Dade County," p. 16.

⁸⁸U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1971* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 124.

⁸⁹Ibid

⁹⁰One student observes that the school busing issue could lead to more restrictive annexation laws stipulating voter approval in some States, and could cloud the future for city-county consolidation. Letter, Robert E. McArthur, February 16, 1973.

⁹¹Richard A. Watson and John H. Romani, "Metropolitan Government for Metropolitan Cleveland: An Analysis of the Voting Record," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, November 1961, pp. 365-390. Henry J. Schmandt, Paul G. Steinbicker and George D. Wendel, *Metropolitan Reform in St. Louis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961).

⁹²Vincent Marando, "Local Governmental Reorganization:

An Overview" (National Academy for Public Administration, unpublished manuscript, 1972), p. 39.

⁹³Brett W. Hawkins, *Nashville Metro: The Politics of City County Consolidation* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), pp. 132-133.

⁹⁴Bollens and Schmandt, *The Metropolis, op. cit.*, pp. 382-383; Parris N. Glendening and J. W. White, "Local Government Reorganization Referenda in Florida: An Acceptance and a Rejection," Florida State University, *Governmental Research Bulletin*, (March, 1968).

⁹⁵Temple, *Merger Politics*. . . , p. 50.

⁹⁶Richard A. Martin, *Consolidation: Jacksonville-Duval County* (Jacksonville: Crawford Publishing Company, 1968), p. 224.

⁹⁷Quoted in DeGrove, "The City of Jacksonville: Consolidation in Action," p. 17.

⁹⁸Lee Sloan and Robert M. French, "Black Rule in the Urban South," in *Blacks and Metro-Politics*, I, No. 1 (Washington, D. C.: Joint Center for Political Studies), p. 18.

⁹⁹Telephone interview, William Lyon, Lexington, Kentucky, December 13, 1972.

¹⁰⁰Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," p. 35.

¹⁰¹Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," p. 35.

¹⁰²Tobe Johnson, "Metropolitan Government, A Black Analytical Perspective" (Washington: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1972), p. 14.

¹⁰³Ted Kolderie, "Regional Arrangements in the Twin Cities Area of Minnesota," ACIR unpublished manuscript, 1972. p. 53.

¹⁰⁴Johnson, "Metropolitan Government. . .," pp. 14-15.

¹⁰⁵The old City of Jacksonville was 42 percent black, the consolidated government—25 percent; the City of Indianapolis—25 percent, Unigov—17 percent; Old Nashville—38 percent, Nashville-Davidson County—20 percent; in the Lexington area the black population's percentage dropped only three percentage points, from 22 to 19 percent. The black percentages of both the old and new government of Columbus, Georgia, stand at about 30 percent. The old city, much expanded by annexation, contained about 95 percent of the total areas population prior to consolidation. The exceptional consolidation is Jacksonville, where the black population at the time of merger had two of nine members; today the 19-member merged Jacksonville council has three black members. The two black representatives serving immedi-

ately before consolidation were the first of their race to serve on the council in this century.

¹⁰⁶Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," pp. 76-78.

¹⁰⁷Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," pp. 69-70.

¹⁰⁸DeGrove, "The City of Jacksonville: Consolidation in Action," p.8.

¹⁰⁹League of Women Voters in Indianapolis, *Unigov: What It Is-What It Isn't* (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1972), p. 15.

¹¹⁰McArthur, "The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County," p. 15; DeGrove, "The City of Jacksonville," p. 9.

¹¹¹DeGrove, "Metropolitan Dade County," p. 9, McArthur, "The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County," p. 14; Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 46.

¹¹²*Lexington Herald*, November 2, 1972.

¹¹³Quoted in Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," p. 89.

¹¹⁴Gordon Kean, Jr., "The Baton Rouge Plan," (mimeographed), p. 4.

¹¹⁵The Commission, *Report and Recommendations* (Coral Gables, Florida, June 1971), pp. 43-67.

¹¹⁶McArthur, *The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County*, p. 19.

¹¹⁷League of Women Voters of Indianapolis, *Unigov: What It Is-What It Isn't* (Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, 1972), p. 25.

¹¹⁸DeGrove "The City of Jacksonville: Consolidation in Action," p. 10.


¹¹⁹DeGrove, "The City of Jacksonville: Consolidation in Action," p. 19.

¹²⁰William H. Wilken, "Metropolitan Service Centralization: Its Impact and Future," (monographed, mimeographed), December 1972, pp. 40-81; DeGrove, "The City of Jacksonville: Consolidation in Action," pp. 9-13; Kolderie, "Regional Arrangements in the Twin Cities Area of Minnesota"; Kean, "The Baton Rouge Plan"; Willbern, "Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis," pp. 65-72; Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, pp. 56-80.

¹²¹Mogulof, *Five Metropolitan Governments*, p. 56.

Chapter VI

THE NON-METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTAL PATTERN



Census Bureau figures for 1970 show that approximately 30 percent (63.8 million) of the American people live outside the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's), in non-metropolitan areas covering more than 95 percent of the Nation's total land area. So talking about the urban majority without taking rural America into account does not give the full picture.

These non-metropolitan areas contain 85 percent of the Nation's county governments, 80 percent of the townships, and 70 percent of the municipalities, in addition to 67 percent of all local special districts and authorities, and 45 percent of the new-style substate districts described in Volume I of this report.

This chapter briefly examines the characteristics of the Nation's non-metropolitan local governments and focuses primarily on those features which distinguish them from metropolitan local governments. In addition to describing counties, municipalities, and townships, this chapter probes the use of inter-governmental agreements for the joint performance of local functions.

The term "non-metropolitan" is used here as a general adjective to describe local governments located outside of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Unless otherwise indicated the statistics used represent an SMSA/non-SMSA breakdown. For example, the number of non-metropolitan counties was obtained by subtracting the number associated with SMSA's from the U.S. total.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN NON-METROPOLITAN AMERICA

One of the major problems in non-metropolitan areas is local governments. Their sheer number is staggering. Of the 78,218 units of local government reported in 1972 by the Bureau of the Census, 56,033 were outside of SMSA's.¹ Such a figure might be viewed more favorably if the majority of those governments were operating at maximum effectiveness and efficiency, but that is not the case. In a 1968 report, ACIR found:

Rural governmental institutions are frequently unable to provide the type of public services needed. They were originally designed with less acute problems in an age of greater self-sufficiency. They can adjust only with difficulty to declining population. Local government expenditures per person in such areas are disproportionately high for what frequently are inadequate levels of service. Furthermore, the small

local governments are frequently ill-equipped to undertake the planning and development activities necessary to overcome their handicaps.²

Several tables in this section underscore the large percentage of non-metropolitan local governments which serve small, highly dispersed populations. In looking at them, the question of economies or diseconomies of scale inevitably arises. There is no consensus at this time as to precisely what population size or density is most nearly ideal for minimizing per capita expenses in providing governmental services, or what the upper and lower population levels are at which costs go up.³ Nevertheless, it is generally conceded that very small governmental units, particularly tiny general-purpose local governments, almost always suffer diseconomies of scale (higher per capita costs) in their servicing activities.

Table VI-1 reveals that 70 percent of all non-SMSA counties have populations under 25,000; 71 percent of all non-SMSA townships have populations under 1,000; and 62 percent of all non-SMSA municipalities have populations under 1,000. A large number of these governments have a difficult time providing adequate services to their citizens. Subsequent sections of this chapter on counties, townships, municipalities, and intergovernmental agreements will probe this issue more thoroughly.

To discover the sources of many of the problems facing non-metropolitan local governments, one must turn to the technological revolution that has occurred in the production and processing of natural resource commodities. The drop in employment in these and related industries, with the concomitant decline in local businesses and severe outmigration, has frequently left non-metropolitan counties, townships, and municipalities with diminishing tax bases and thinly spread-out populations. The cost of providing even traditional services has risen enormously, while the money to pay for them has dwindled. Moreover, the demand for new services has grown rapidly while the money for providing them has not. Professor Eber Eldridge, writing in the 1971 *Yearbook of Agriculture*, sums up this situation:

Three of the four applications of technology—farming, manufacturing, and transportation—essentially are reducing the economic base in the rural community. The fourth application—services and institutions—is pressing for a constantly larger base.⁴

Compounding the governmental and economic problems in non-metropolitan areas is a shortage of qualified professionals. In a governmental context,

Table VI-1

**Selected Characteristics of Non-SMSA Local Governments—Counties, Townships, Municipalities, and Special Districts, by Geographic Region:
1972**

| | U.S. Total | Northeast | North Central | South | West |
|---|------------|-----------|---------------|-------|-------|
| Counties | | | | | |
| Total Number | 3,044 | 196 | 1,051 | 1,378 | 419 |
| Percent of Total That are Outside SMSA's | 85 | 67 | 86 | 87 | 86 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Counties With Less Than 50,000 Population | 90 | 49 | 93 | 92 | 90 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Counties With Less Than 25,000 Population | 70 | 21 | 74 | 72 | 75 |
| Townships | | | | | |
| Total Number | 16,991 | 4,140 | 12,812 | 0 | 39 |
| Percent of Total That are Outside SMSA's | 80 | 64 | 85 | 0 | 0 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Townships With Less Than 2,500 Population | 90 | 76 | 93 | 0 | 0 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Townships With Less Than 1,000 Population | 71 | 43 | 77.5 | 0 | 0 |
| Municipalities | | | | | |
| Total Number | 18,517 | 2,142 | 8,379 | 5,926 | 2,070 |
| Percent of Total That are Outside SMSA's | 70 | 40 | 75 | 75 | 70 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Municipalities With Less Than 25,000 Population | 99 | 98 | 99 | 99 | 98 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Municipalities With Less Than 1,000 Population | 62 | 44 | 70 | 55 | 59 |
| Special Districts* | | | | | |
| Total Number | 23,886 | 3,937 | 8,024 | 5,525 | 6,400 |
| Percent of Total That are Outside SMSA's | 67 | 47 | 75 | 75 | 63 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Special Districts Having Power of Taxation | 46 | 42 | 48 | 20 | 70 |
| Percent of Non-SMSA Special Districts That are Uni-Functional | 98 | 95 | 99.7 | 98 | 96 |

*Special district data is based on preliminary figures from the 1972 Census of Governments.

Source: Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Governments, I, and preliminary data for 1972 Census of Governments.

this frequently shows up in the proportion of part-time employees. Table VI-2 shows that local governments outside SMSA's account for only one-third of all local public servants, but 44 percent of the part-time ones.

To sum up, the problems of non-metropolitan local governments are many. There are too many governments for too few people. The governments are faced with serious diseconomies of scale. While they perform many needed services, their offerings are less complete than those of most urban governments, and they usually have small, often part-time staffs.

Counties.⁵

According to the 1972 *Census of Governments*, 2,600, or 85 percent of the Nation's 3,044⁶ counties, are outside SMSA's. Seventy percent of these non-metropolitan counties have fewer than 25,000 residents, and the typical one has a much lower population density than its metropolitan counterpart—62 persons per square mile versus 1,114.⁷

Most county governments in non-metropolitan areas have not changed or updated their operations much over the years. In many States, they still serve primarily as administrative arms of the State government, performing few truly local functions. Tax assessment and collection, election and judicial administration, public record keeping, license issuing, sheriff's office, health and welfare services, roads and highways—these are the State-mandated types of services that have come to be called "traditional" county functions. Table VI-3 shows that the activities of the smaller (mostly non-metropolitan) counties have clustered around these traditional functions more than those of the larger (mostly metropolitan) counties.

The two categories of the smallest counties—those with less than 10,000 inhabitants and those with a 10,000 to 24,999 population—are the most typical in non-metropolitan areas. The 1967 figures (latest available) show that these two sizes have the highest average per capita expenditures for the total

of all functions—\$106.94 and \$75.11, respectively.⁸ This may well suggest that the counties having the greatest problem with diseconomies of scale are those with populations under 25,000. Based on 1972 data, 99 percent of this group of counties are non-metropolitan; they account for 78 percent of all counties located outside SMSA's. Because of this major overlap, they are used here as the best available proxy for certain information about non-metropolitan counties.

Table VI-3 also shows that the average per capita expenditures of the very smallest counties—the less-than-10,000-population category—are significantly higher than those of other counties in the areas of education, highways, financial administration, and general control. The figures for education and highways underscore the high concentration of the small counties' limited finances in two traditional service areas. But, just as significantly, the per capita expenditures for the other two functions—financial administration and general control—are indicative of the high overhead costs of running small county governments.

Comparing the general expenditures of counties, it is found that those with populations under 25,000 (99 percent metropolitan) spend about 30 percent for highways, while those with populations over 50,000—largely in metropolitan areas—spend about half (11 to 17 percent) that proportion for this purpose. The figures are reversed for health and welfare expenditures, where the larger, mostly metropolitan counties allocate proportionately twice the figure of the smaller, chiefly non-metropolitan counties. The latter also spend significantly smaller proportions of their budgets for police, corrections, parks and recreation, public buildings, and debt interest.

The forms of county government organization in non-metropolitan America have changed little in recent years. Eighty-four percent of them still have the plural executive or commission form (see Table VI-4). This contrasts markedly with metropolitan counties, where structures have been altered to

Table VI-2

**Government Employment Within and Outside SMSA's:
1967**

| | Total (A) | Within SMSA | Percent of (A) | Outside SMSA | Percent of (A) |
|------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| Total Employment | 6,538,909 | 4,367,015 | 66% | 2,171,894 | 33% |
| Full Time | 5,227,777 | 3,634,629 | 69 | 1,593,148 | 30 |
| Part Time | 1,311,132 | 732,386 | 55 | 578,746 | 44 |

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Compendium of Public Employment, III, 2*, (Washington, D.C.: 1967), p. 25.

Table VI-3

**Selected Items of County Government Finance for Population-Size Groups of Counties:
1966 - 1967**

Counties With a 1966 Population of—

| | All Counties | 100,000 or more | 50,000- 99,999 | 25,000- 49,999 | 10,000- 24,999 | Less than 10,000 |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Number of Counties | 3,049 | 306 | 329 | 568 | 1,033 | 815 |
| Population, 1966 | 173,717,614 | 109,820,112 | 22,258,500 | 19,809,383 | 16,990,924 | 4,839,325 |
| General Expenditure, all Functions (\$000's) | 12,628,923 | 8,054,980 | 1,429,641 | 1,350,646 | 1,276,138 | 517,518 |
| Average per capita | 72.70 | 73.35 | 64.23 | 68.18 | 75.11 | 106.94 |
| Education (\$000's) | 2,260,834 | 1,095,321 | 417,437 | 357,039 | 277,208 | 113,828 |
| Percent of total* | 17.9 | 13.6 | 29.2 | 26.4 | 21.7 | 22.0 |
| Average per capita | 13.01 | 9.97 | 18.75 | 18.02 | 16.32 | 23.52 |
| Highways (\$000's) | 1,985,735 | 900,448 | 243,737 | 307,260 | 373,642 | 160,647 |
| Percent of total | 15.7 | 11.2 | 17.0 | 22.7 | 29.3 | 31.0 |
| Average per capita | 11.43 | 8.20 | 10.95 | 15.51 | 21.99 | 33.20 |
| Public Welfare (\$000's) | 2,702,590 | 2,047,158 | 234,428 | 188,801 | 172,938 | 59,266 |
| Percent of total | 21.4 | 25.4 | 16.4 | 14.0 | 13.5 | 11.5 |
| Average per capita | 15.56 | 18.64 | 10.53 | 9.53 | 10.18 | 12.25 |
| Hospitals (\$000's) | 1,292,179 | 812,537 | 130,032 | 155,779 | 143,462 | 50,369 |
| Percent of total | 10.2 | 10.1 | 9.1 | 11.5 | 11.2 | 9.7 |
| Average per capita | 7.44 | 7.40 | 5.84 | 7.86 | 8.44 | 10.41 |
| Health (\$000's) | 310,882 | 224,470 | 36,108 | 23,567 | 19,902 | 6,835 |
| Percent of total | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
| Average per capita | 1.79 | 2.04 | 1.62 | 1.19 | 1.17 | 1.41 |
| Police Protection | 453,267 | 319,577 | 45,927 | 40,024 | 33,460 | 14,279 |
| Percent of total | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
| Average per capita | 2.61 | 2.91 | 2.06 | 2.02 | 1.97 | 2.95 |
| Parks and Recreation (\$000's) | 203,120 | 185,271 | 6,823 | 5,778 | 3,943 | 1,305 |
| Percent of total | 1.6 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Average per capita | 1.17 | 1.69 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.23 | 0.27 |
| Natural Resources (\$000's) | 280,988 | 197,942 | 23,362 | 21,638 | 26,023 | 12,023 |
| Percent of total | 2.2 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 |
| Average per capita | 1.62 | 1.80 | 1.05 | 1.09 | 1.53 | 2.48 |
| Corrections (\$000's) | 294,580 | 251,856 | 16,452 | 13,585 | 9,861 | 2,826 |
| Percent of total | 2.3 | 3.1 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| Average per capita | 1.70 | 2.29 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.58 | 0.58 |
| Financial Administration (\$000's) | 351,705 | 211,916 | 40,281 | 37,261 | 41,546 | 20,701 |
| Percent of total | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 4.0 |
| Average per capita | 2.02 | 1.93 | 1.81 | 1.88 | 2.45 | 4.28 |
| General Control (\$000's) | 762,710 | 514,797 | 77,870 | 69,699 | 68,613 | 31,731 |
| Percent of total | 6.0 | 6.4 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 6.1 |
| Average per capita | 4.39 | 4.69 | 3.50 | 3.52 | 4.04 | 6.56 |
| General Public Buildings (\$000's) | 340,220 | 239,193 | 35,238 | 28,838 | 26,221 | 10,684 |
| Percent of total | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Average per capita | 1.96 | 2.18 | 1.59 | 1.46 | 1.54 | 2.21 |
| Interest on Public Debt (\$000's) | 239,926 | 173,011 | 25,400 | 21,832 | 14,882 | 4,800 |
| Percent of total | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 0.9 |
| Average per capita | 1.38 | 1.58 | 1.14 | 1.10 | 0.88 | 0.99 |
| Other and Unallocable (\$000's) | 1,150,187 | 881,482 | 96,501 | 79,544 | 64,437 | 28,224 |
| Percent of total | 9.1 | 10.9 | 6.7 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 5.4 |
| Average per capita | 6.62 | 8.03 | 4.34 | 4.02 | 3.79 | 5.83 |

*The percentages in each vertical column will not necessarily total exactly 100, due to rounding of figures.

Source: Bureau of the Census, 1967 *Census of Governments, IV*.

Table VI-4
Forms of County Government: Metro and Non-Metro:
May 1971

| County Form | Counties Reporting | | Metropolitan Counties | | | Non-Metropolitan Counties | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | No. | Percent of (A) | No. | Percent of (A) | Percent of (B) | No. | Percent of (A) | Percent of (C) |
| Plural Executive or Commission Form | 793 | 80% | 87 | 9% | 59% | 706 | 71% | 84% |
| County Administrator | 184 | 18 | 52 | 5 | 35 | 132 | 13 | 15 |
| Weak Variation | (147) | (15) | (43) | (4) | (29) | (104) | (10) | (12) |
| County Manager Plan | (37) | (3) | (9) | (1) | (6) | (28) | (3) | (3) |
| County Executive Plan | 16 | 2 | 9 | (1) | 6 | 7 | (1) | 1 |
| TOTAL | 993 (A) | 100 | 148 (B) | (15) | 100 | 845 (C) | (85) | 100 |

Source: Derived from Table 1, International City Management Association, "County Government Organization and Services," *Urban Data Service Reports* (Washington, D.C.: May 1971), p. 2.

allow for more centralized and coordinated administration and policy making in 41 percent of the cases. About 6 percent of the metropolitan counties have adopted strong, elected executive reforms; only 1 percent of the metropolitan counties have undertaken this type of change. Thus, despite the fact that complexities of government are certainly not limited to large urban areas, the large majority of non-metropolitan counties are still operating under the traditional commission-type organization with no professional administrator or executive.

Municipalities

There are 18,517 incorporated municipalities in the United States,⁹ and over 70 percent of them are

located in non-metropolitan areas. Moreover, 63 percent of all municipalities are non-SMSA communities with populations under 5,000. Only 18 percent of all municipalities with populations of 25,000 or more are located in these areas.

The most common forms of municipal government organization are the mayor-council and council-manager forms. The International City Management Association (ICMA) conducted a survey of municipalities for its 1972 *Municipal Year Book*,¹⁰ and of the responding municipalities with populations over 5,000, 47 percent operate under the council-manager form and 44 percent under the mayor-council form (see Table VI-5). In this table, the central city and suburban municipality cate-

Table VI-5
Form of Government:
1971

| | Number of Cities Reporting | Mayor-Council | | Council-Manager | | Other | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|----------------|
| | | No. | Percent of (A) | No. | Percent of (A) | No. | Percent of (A) |
| Total, all Cities | 1,875 | 825 | 44% | 886 | 47% | 164 | 9% |
| Independent | 775 | 336 | 43 | 360 | 46 | 79 | 10 |
| Central | 206 | 89 | 43 | 96 | 47 | 21 | 10 |
| Suburban | 894 | 400 | 45 | 430 | 48 | 64 | 7 |

Source: International City Management Association, *The Municipal Year Book 1972* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1972), p. 16.

Table VI-6

Summary of Municipal Finance Items by Population-Size Groups Percent of Total General Expenditures: 1966-1967

| | Total, All Municipalities | Municipalities With a 1960 Population of— | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|---|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | | 1,000,000 or more | 500,000-999,999 | 300,000-499,999 | 100,000-299,999 | 50,000-99,999 | 25,000-49,999 | 10,000-24,999 | 5,000-9,999 | 2,500-4,999 | Less than 2,500 |
| General Expenditure, all functions | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Education | 16.6 | 21.1 | 15.3 | 20.3 | 17.2 | 18.8 | 16.8 | 9.4 | 5.5 | 2.9 | 0.7 |
| Highways | 10.5 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 10.0 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 16.9 | 19.3 | 23.7 | 22.2 |
| Public Welfare | 6.6 | 13.5 | 9.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| Hospitals | 5.4 | 8.7 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 2.9 | 1.4 |
| Health | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Police Protection | 10.6 | 10.5 | 10.3 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 9.7 | 12.3 | 12.9 | 14.5 | 11.1 |
| Fire Protection | 6.8 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 7.6 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 6.0 | 5.1 | 4.3 |
| Sewerage | 5.8 | 2.0 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 9.9 | 12.1 | 12.5 | 12.2 |
| Sanitation Other Than Sewerage | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 3.8 |
| Parks and Recreation | 4.7 | 2.7 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 3.0 |
| Housing and Urban Renewal | 4.2 | 5.0 | 6.1 | 3.0 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Libraries | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| Financial Administration | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
| General Control | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 5.7 |
| General Public Buildings | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.6 |
| Interest on General Debt | 3.9 | 4.3 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 5.0 |
| Other General Expenditure | 11.7 | 10.7 | 10.8 | 11.5 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 13.9 | 12.2 | 11.6 | 9.7 | 22.2 |

Source: Bureau of the Census, 1967 Census of Governments, IV.

gories are metropolitan, while the independent municipalities are non-metropolitan. The breakdown shows that the council-manager and mayor-council forms are almost as common in non-metropolitan as metropolitan areas.

ICMA also found “an important trend toward the introduction of professional administration in mayor-council cities.”¹¹ Overall, more than half of the mayor-council cities responding to the survey have a designated administrator. However, a larger percentage of the central cities (27 percent) and suburban municipalities (27 percent) operate under the mayor-council form with a designated administrator than do non-metropolitan respondents (20 percent). On the other hand, a larger percentage of the non-metropolitan municipalities (23 percent) operate under the mayor-council form with an administrator than either the central cities (17 percent) or suburban municipalities (18 percent). These figures are characteristic of the overall governmental scene, in which non-metropolitan local governments usually show up as having less professional administration.

Census data reveal that 90 percent of all municipalities have populations under 10,000 and 75 percent of these are non-metropolitan. These municipalities account for nearly 22 percent of all municipi-

pal population, but less than 10 percent of all municipal expenditures.¹²

Table VI-6 shows the distribution among functional categories of the general expenditures of each population-size group of municipalities for 1966-67. While municipalities overall spent 16.6 percent of their total outlays on education, the very small municipalities—those with populations under 2,500—spent less than 1 percent of their expenditures on education. This is due largely to the fact that counties or school districts are more likely to have primary responsibility for education in non-metropolitan areas—where most of the small municipalities are located.

Overall, municipalities spent about 10.5 percent of their outlays on highways. The largest municipalities (all of which are metropolitan) spent only 4.9 percent of their expenditures on that function, while the three lowest population-groups, which are chiefly non-metropolitan, spent close to 20 percent of their outlays on highways.

The very large municipalities spent a much larger proportion of their total expenditures on public welfare, hospitals, and health than did the smaller ones. In non-metropolitan areas health and welfare services are provided less frequently, and where

provided they are more the responsibility of counties rather than municipalities.

All population-groups of municipalities show expenditures of between 10 and 15 percent of total outlays going to police protection and between 4 and 9 percent for fire protection. Moreover, municipalities in the population-group of fewer than 2,500 spent just about the same percentage (4.3 percent) of their outlays on fire protection as the municipalities in the largest population-group (4.7 percent).

The mostly non-metropolitan municipalities with populations under 10,000 spend considerably greater percentages of their outlays on sewerage than the larger municipalities. The high costs of sewerage services—more than 12 percent of total expenditures—appear to be particularly characteristic of small non-metropolitan governments with their small, comparatively dispersed populations.

As with counties and townships, there are definite indications that diseconomies of scale enter into the administrative expense of operating small non-metropolitan municipalities. The smallest municipalities, over 83 percent of which are non-metropolitan, spend a larger share of total expenditures on general control and financial administration than municipalities in any other population group. The marked increase in proportionate outlays for these functions begins with municipalities in the 10,000 to 24,999 population group and the percentage increases with each smaller population-group.

Townships

There were 16,991 township governments in 1972, including units officially designated as “towns” in the six New England States, New York, and Wisconsin, and units known as “plantations” in Maine and “locations” in New Hampshire.¹³ This figure represents a decrease of 114 townships since 1967 and of 151 since 1962.¹⁴ Of the total number, 13,529, or 80 percent, are located outside SMSA’s (see Table VI-7).

Townships generally are very small units of government; they are found in only 21 States. Sixty percent of them have populations of fewer than 1,000, while only 27 townships—less than 0.5 percent—had populations greater than 100,000. Even SMSA townships are predominantly small, nearly half of them having populations of fewer than 2,500. However, non-metropolitan townships are clearly smaller overall than their metropolitan counterparts. About 90 percent of the non-SMSA townships have fewer than 2,500 residents. And while 21 percent of the SMSA townships have populations of 10,000 or more, only about 1 percent of non-SMSA townships are that large.

The tables in this section provide data for two classes of townships, those within SMSA’s and those

outside SMSA’s. The Bureau of the Census, however, describes townships on the basis of two different classifications, with some grouped in “strong-township States” and others in “weak-township States.” The basis for the census designations is primarily functional, but it also has historical dimensions.

The New England “towns” have existed almost from the genesis of formal government in that region, and this basic form of government was successfully extended to New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The major characteristic setting these towns apart from the majority of other townships, for practical purposes, is that they were actually formed to serve existing communities. That cannot be said of many of the townships in what are now called the North Central States.

Under the Ordinance of 1785 for the survey of public lands in the Northwest Territory, the Confederation Congress established the “congressional township,” a 36-mile square, as the survey plot.

Table VI-7

Number of Township Governments Within and Outside SMSA’s, by Population Size: 1972

| | Total | Within SMSA’s | Outside SMSA’s |
|-----------------------------|--------|---------------|----------------|
| Township Governments, total | 16,991 | 3,462 | 13,529 |
| With a 1970 Population of | | | |
| 50,000 or more | 94 | 92 | 2 |
| 25,000 to 49,999 | 185 | 161 | 24 |
| 10,000 to 24,999 | 621 | 459 | 162 |
| 5,000 to 9,999 | 816 | 472 | 344 |
| 2,500 to 4,999 | 1,454 | 627 | 827 |
| 1,000 to 2,499 | 3,575 | 977 | 2,598 |
| less than 1,000 | 10,246 | 674 | 9,572 |

Source: Bureau of the Census, *1972 Census of Governments, I*.

Although the congressional township was nothing more than a survey measurement, it had a definite effect on the drawing of township boundaries. A number of States, by law, used the congressional township as the basis for the civil township, and Clyde F. Snider has pointed out that “even in the absence of such a statutory requirement, the disposition toward conformity (to congressional township boundaries) is frequently evident.”¹⁵ The civil township boundaries in many States were drawn without concern for either geographic features or actual population patterns, which in most cases had not even emerged when the boundaries were set. In 1937, Professor Lane W. Lancaster described the difficulties of the predetermined township:

its boundaries did not correspond either to the social groupings of the people or to the methods of land cultivation. For this reason it seldom embodied a real community. Settlements of human beings are not likely to go up hill and down dale and across rivers to please the government surveyor.¹⁶

Nevertheless, this should not be construed as meaning that New England towns and townships in the Mid-Atlantic States are necessarily ideal units of government either. Townships in general face similar problems no matter where they are located, and the greatest is size. In many cases, the township has proved to be either too large or too

small to serve the needs of its people efficiently. In some States, many townships have been abolished altogether or their functions transferred to counties or municipalities. In other States, part of the township has been incorporated as a municipality, while the remainder has been left as a rural township surrounding the incorporated area but performing almost no functions. In still other States, especially in New England, steps have been taken to have the towns function as municipalities.

As a general rule, the towns in New England and townships in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania perform services that are comparable to those of municipalities. Michigan and Wisconsin have been able to bring about at least a semblance of that type of township government in their unincorporated

Table VI-8
Township Expenditures: 1966-1967
(in millions of dollars)

| Type of Expenditure | All Townships | In SMSA's | | Outside SMSA's | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| | | Amount | Percent of Total | Amount | Percent of Total |
| Direct General Expenditures | \$2,206.6 | \$1,431.7 | 64.9% | \$774.9 | 35.1% |
| Education | 749.3 | 510.6 | 68.1 | 238.7 | 38.9 |
| Highways | 501.3 | 247.2 | 49.3 | 254.1 | 50.7 |
| Public Welfare | 97.0 | 61.4 | 63.3 | 35.6 | 36.7 |
| Hospitals | 11.0 | 6.1 | 55.5 | 4.9 | 44.5 |
| Health | 13.7 | 9.2 | 67.2 | 4.5 | 32.8 |
| Police Protection | 117.5 | 92.3 | 78.6 | 25.2 | 21.4 |
| Fire Protection | 75.7 | 54.7 | 72.3 | 21.0 | 27.7 |
| Sewerage | 100.4 | 77.1 | 76.8 | 23.3 | 23.2 |
| Sanitation (Other Than Sewerage) | 52.7 | 44.5 | 84.4 | 8.2 | 15.6 |
| Parks and Recreation | 62.7 | 50.3 | 80.2 | 12.4 | 19.8 |
| Natural Resources | * | 0.0* | — | * | — |
| Housing & Urban Renewal | * | 5.1* | — | * | — |
| Airports | * | 2.2* | — | * | — |
| Water Transport & Terminals | * | 0.4* | — | * | — |
| Parking Facilities | * | 3.8* | — | * | — |
| Correction | * | 0.0* | — | * | — |
| Libraries | * | 22.9* | — | * | — |
| Financial Administration | 53.6 | 33.8 | 63.1 | 19.8 | 36.9 |
| General Control | 93.9 | 56.1 | 59.7 | 37.8 | 40.3 |
| General Public Buildings | 34.2 | 23.2 | 67.8 | 11.0 | 32.2 |
| Interest on General Debt | 51.0 | 39.3 | 77.1 | 11.7 | 22.9 |
| Other & Unallocable | 192.5* | 91.6* | 47.6 | 66.5* | |
| Utility Expenditures | 114.5 | 89.0 | 77.7 | 25.5 | 22.3 |
| Employee Retirement Expenditures | 8.5 | 7.4 | 87.1 | 1.1 | 12.9 |
| TOTALS | \$2,329.5 | \$1,528.1 | | \$801.5 | |

* Figures available only for SMSA's. Any amounts outside SMSA's are included in "Other and Unallocable" category. The comparable SMSA figure for "Other and Unallocable" is 126.0.

Source: Bureau of the Census, *1967 Census of Governments, IV and V.*

non-metropolitan areas. Townships in the other States, excluding Washington,¹⁷ are functionally in a different category. Nearly all of them are very small, and they perform limited functions, spending over half their outlays on highways alone.

Table VI-8 highlights the latest available (1967) data on township expenditures. In that year, there were 13,850 non-SMSA townships (as opposed to 13,529 in 1972) and they accounted for about 81 percent of all townships (80 percent in 1972). The non-SMSA townships, however, accounted for only \$774.9 million in total expenditures, while the SMSA townships had general expenditures totaling \$1,431.7 million. In other words, 81 percent of all townships—the non-SMSA townships—spent only 35 percent of all township outlays, indicating both the smallness and the limited activities of these units. And even these figures might be considered somewhat optimistic, since they include the finances of non-SMSA townships in the strong-township States, which generally provide a much broader range of services than the average non-metropolitan township.

In only one function—highways—do non-metropolitan townships spend more than metropolitan townships. The largest expenditures for both non-SMSA and SMSA townships go for education and highways. However, these two functions make up a larger share of the non-metropolitan townships' total outlays (64 percent as against 54 percent). Actually, education and highways are about the only functions that many non-metropolitan townships perform.

In at least two other functional areas—financial administration and general control—the expenditures of non-SMSA townships appear not to be much smaller than those of SMSA townships. While the total general expenditures of non-SMSA townships are only about half as large as those of SMSA townships, their combined financial administration and general control expenditures are nearly two-thirds as large. As is the case with rural counties and municipalities, this feature is indicative of the high overhead costs of running small non-metropolitan governments.

Table VI-9 describes some of the basic differences in the size of non-metropolitan and metropolitan townships. Non-SMSA townships existing in 1967 had a combined population of 15,712,385 (using 1960 census data), or 40 percent of the total township population. The average population of the typical non-SMSA township was 1,134, while the counterpart figure for an SMSA township was 7,266, nearly six and one-half times as great. The average general expenditures of a non-SMSA township amounted to only \$55,949, compared to an SMSA

township outlay of \$439,846—about eight times larger.

The main feature that sets townships apart from other local governments—probably their most attractive feature—has been the town (or township) meeting. This traditional form of direct democracy was established so that every citizen would have the right to voice an opinion about any issues in the township's affairs and to vote on every decision. By now, however, many townships have instituted the limited, or representative, form of town meeting, in which representatives elected from the township's precincts speak and vote for their constituents. This form of organization came about basically for two reasons: the physical limitations on the number of citizens that most township halls would hold, and the cumbersome nature of the larger meeting.

Usually, townships also have a group of elected officials, frequently called the board of selectmen, who oversee the administration of the township government. They are responsible for executing the decisions of the town meeting and generally have authority over all township employees. A more recent development in township organization has been the position of chief administrative officer. He or she is usually appointed by the board of selectmen as a full-time, professional administrator of the township government but seldom has executive authority. This form of organization is found in about half of the States having townships, primarily in the larger townships that perform municipal-type functions.

These organizational developments notwithstanding, township government in the United States has been slow to change. About the biggest change has been the decrease, over a long period of time, in the number of townships. Those that remain do not exist without controversy. Dvorin and Misner have noted recently that the township "is still rooted in values of another day and age."¹⁹

Calls for the abolition of township governments usually cite their similarity to municipalities, counties, or special districts, and suggest that there is no apparent functional reason that they could not be replaced by one or another of these more common units. Professor Lancaster argued as far back as 1937 for doing away with townships, addressing himself principally to the non-metropolitan townships:

... it may be argued that the township represents the last remaining area in which the population can "run things" to suite themselves. It must be remembered, however, that 25 of our States never had townships and that 11 others never gave them

Table VI-9

Average Size of Township Governments:
1967

| Measure of Size | All Townships | SMSA Townships | Non-SMSA Townships |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Number Townships | 17,105 | 3,255 | 13,850 |
| 1960 Population | 39,363,189 | 23,650,804 | 15,712,385 |
| Average Population/ Township | 2,310 | 7,266 | 1,134 |
| General Expenditures Average General | \$2,206,600,000 | \$1,431,700,000 | \$774,900,000 |
| Expenditures/Township | \$129,003 | \$439,846 | \$55,949 |
| Number Employees (Full-time equivalent) | 175,395 | N/A | N/A |
| Average Number Employees/ Township | 10 | N/A | N/A |
| Number Employees/10,000 Population (Full-time equivalent) | 45 | N/A | N/A |

Source: Bureau of the Census, *1967 Census of Governments, I and III*.

any important powers. This is pretty good evidence that they are not indispensable units of government even in the States where they now exist. What we are doing is keeping alive mere shells of government, staffed by do-nothing officials whose titles are empty ones and whose salaries are gifts. If, as seems clear, the most hopeful way of attacking the problem of administrative inadequacy of local areas is through the reallocation of functions, the persistence of the township as a legal entity simply delays this attack or compels illogical subterfuges. The elimination of this area, either through its outright abolition or through the process of attrition, might be expected to reduce the overhead cost of local government, make possible a larger and more efficient area of government, bring about greater uniformity in the quality of governmental services and equalize the burden of taxation.²⁰

The conclusions to be drawn about townships are simple. First, they are the least widespread units of general purpose government. And even in the 21 States where they do appear, townships are far from uniform. In some States they are located only in unincorporated rural areas, while in the State of Washington, they are located only in urban areas. In several States they appear within counties; in two others (Connecticut and Rhode Island) they exist in the absence of counties. In the "strong-township

States" they frequently perform municipal-type functions. In the "weak-township States" they usually perform very limited functions, much like small, very weak counties.

Annexation and City-County Consolidation

The *1970 Census of Population* shows that of the 6,639,107 people annexed to municipalities with 1960 population of 2,000 or more during the decade of 1960 to 1970, 2,785,240 (or 42 percent) were located in non-metropolitan areas (outside SMSA's).²¹ Chapter V of this volume also points out that four of the 13 post-World-War-II city-county consolidations have occurred in non-metropolitan areas (see Table V-1). These findings suggest that annexation and city-county consolidation are applicable in non-metropolitan areas, but not to the same extent as in urban America.

Intergovernmental Agreements

Many local governments have been able to solve some of their service problems through intergovernmental cooperation agreements.²² However, non-metropolitan local governments appear to participate in such agreements far less frequently than metropolitan governments.

An interlocal service contract allows a local government to receive from or provide to another local government a desired product or service. In addition to agreements for the receipt and provision of services, agreements for the joint construction or leasing of facilities and joint provision of services are also relatively common. Usually, two or more

Table VI-10

**Municipalities With Service Agreements:
1972**

| | Total | | | Central City | | | Suburban | | | Non-Metropolitan | | |
|---|------------------|----------------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|---------|------------------|----------------------|---------|
| | Number Reporting | Affirmative Response | Percent | Number Reporting | Affirmative Response | Percent | Number Reporting | Affirmative Response | Percent | Number Reporting | Affirmative Response | Percent |
| Municipalities Receiving Services from Others | 2,375 | 1,491 | 63% | 155 | 117 | 75% | 1,076 | 762 | 71% | 1,164 | 612 | 53% |
| Municipalities Providing Services to Others | 2,316 | 1,000 | 43 | 138 | 108 | 78 | 1,049 | 405 | 39 | 1,128 | 487 | 43 |
| Municipalities Receiving a Package | 1,394 | 188 | 13 | 100 | 22 | 22 | 724 | 116 | 16 | 570 | 50 | 9 |
| Municipalities Having Joint Service Agreements | 2,061 | 726 | 35 | 130 | 80 | 62 | 897 | 348 | 39 | 959 | 298 | 31 |
| Municipalities Having Joint Construction and Leasing Agreements | 2,120 | 440 | 21 | 134 | 53 | 40 | 969 | 209 | 22 | 1,017 | 178 | 18 |
| Municipalities Discontinuing Services by Another Government | 2,367 | 137 | 6 | 152 | 18 | 12 | 1,768 | 87 | 5 | 1,147 | 32 | 3 |

Source: ACIR-ICMA survey on Intergovernmental Service Agreements, 1972.

governments are coequal partners in such joint agreements, and they establish a joint body to administer the program.

A recent ACIR-ICMA survey²³ reveals that the reason given most frequently for entering intergovernmental service agreements is achieving economies of scale. This is certainly an appropriate reason for their use in non-metropolitan areas.

Of the municipalities responding to the ACIR survey, 75 percent of the central cities and 71 percent of the suburban governments receive services from another government under interlocal agree-

ments, but only 53 percent of the non-metropolitan municipalities do so (see Table VI-10). Major reasons for the less frequent participation by non-metropolitan municipalities are the fewer suppliers of services in non-metropolitan areas and the smaller demand for services.

Most services received under interlocal service agreements are specific separate services, but 13 percent of all the municipalities responding to the survey receive packages of services. Only 9 percent of the non-metropolitan municipalities receive packages of services, as opposed to 22 percent of the

Table VI-11

**Municipalities With Agreements for Receipt of Services:
1972**

| | Non-Metropolitan N=1164 | Central City N=155 | Suburban N=1076 |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Number Having Agreements | 612 | 117 | 762 |
| Percent of Agreement With: | | | |
| County | 62 | 69 | 60 |
| State | 29 | 45 | 26 |
| Special Districts | 21 | 39 | 29 |
| Municipality | 21 | 37 | 56 |
| School District | 21 | 35 | 26 |
| Public Authority | 11 | 32 | 19 |
| Other | 12 | 33 | 13 |

Source: ACIR-ICMA survey on Intergovernmental Service Agreements, 1972.

central cities and 16 percent of the suburban municipalities. The lower percentage for non-metropolitan governments is again due primarily to the much smaller number of available sources of service packages and the smaller demand for services.

Central cities, suburban communities, and non-metropolitan municipalities all reported more agreements for receipt of services from counties than from any other unit of government (see Table VI-11). The next most frequent provider of services to both central cities and non-metropolitan governments was State government; for suburban communities, it was another municipality, probably a central city in most cases. Of the non-metropolitan municipalities that reported having agreements for the receipt of services, 62 percent had agreements with counties, 29 percent with State governments, 21 percent with other municipalities, 21 percent with school districts, 21 percent with special districts, and 11 percent with public authorities. However, in each case the percentage of non-metropolitan municipalities having such agreements was smaller than that of either suburban municipalities or central cities. Here is more evidence of the limited participation of non-metropolitan municipalities in intergovernmental agreements.

Non-metropolitan municipalities are slightly more likely to provide services to other governments under contract than are suburban municipalities, but they provide services much less frequently than central cities do. In a non-metropolitan area, one municipality may be the only unit of government with the capability, albeit limited, of providing services to other governments; whereas in metropolitan areas, there are likely to be a number of capable providers of services, including central cities, counties, and private firms, so that suburban municipalities are less likely to be called upon to provide services to other governments.

Although only a small percentage of the survey respondents reported having terminated agreements, central cities terminated agreements with greater frequency (12 percent) than suburban (5 percent) or non-metropolitan (3 percent) municipalities (see Table VI-11). This may be partly due to more careful evaluation of agreements by central cities, since data also show that cities with council-manager organizations (more of which are central cities) are most likely to terminate agreements. That non-metropolitan governments terminate agreements least often is probably due mainly to their having few if any alternative sources of services. It may also be affected by the fact that fewer of the non-metropolitan municipalities have professional managers who can evaluate agreements closely.

Large municipalities are more likely to enter into agreements for joint provision of services or for

joint construction or leasing of facilities than small ones (see Table VI-10). Non-metropolitan municipalities, most of which are small, enter such agreements with less frequency than either central cities or suburban governments. The data show that, of the responding municipalities, 31 percent of the non-metropolitan governments entered agreements for joint provision of services, as opposed to 39 percent of the suburban and 62 percent of the central city governments. With respect to agreements for joint construction or leasing of facilities, only 18 percent of the responding non-metropolitan municipalities participated while 40 percent of the central cities and 22 percent of the suburban municipalities did.

As part of a 1971 ACIR-NACO-ICMA survey of county governments, counties were asked to answer several questions dealing with intergovernmental agreements. Agreements were categorized according to three types: county-to-local services agreements, joint county-local agreements, and joint county-county agreements. Of the counties responding to the pertinent question, about one-third indicated that they provided services to local governments under contract. About 75 percent of these were non-metropolitan counties. About 38 percent of the responding counties indicated that they provide services on a joint basis with other local governments, and again, 75 percent of them were non-metropolitan. With regard to providing services jointly with other county governments, 30 percent of the responding counties indicated that they are parties to such agreements; 83 percent of the affirmative answers came from counties in non-metropolitan areas.

Thus, it is clear that many metropolitan counties are acquainted with the interlocal agreement mechanism. However, remembering that 85 percent of all counties are non-metropolitan, it should not be implied from this limited survey that there is necessarily a greater incidence of county agreements in non-metropolitan areas. The data do not adequately address this question, but it is likely that the proportion of all non-metropolitan counties involved is actually lower than in metropolitan areas, thus paralleling municipal patterns.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

—The majority of local governments in the United States are in non-metropolitan areas:

- 70 percent of the municipalities,
- 85 percent of the counties,
- 80 percent of the townships, and
- 67 percent of the special districts.

This might be expected, since over 95 percent of the Nation's land area is non-metropolitan, but only about 30 percent of the Nation's population lives in

these areas. Non-metropolitan governments, then, serve fewer people, on the average, than do governments in metropolitan areas.

—Compared to local governments in metropolitan areas, the non-metropolitan governments provide fewer services, possess less executive or administrative leadership capacity, exhibit diseconomies of scale, have weaker financial bases, and use inter-governmental cooperation agreements less frequently.

—Non-metropolitan municipalities concentrate their expenditures on highways, sewerage, general control, and financial administration much more than large metropolitan municipalities (about 47 percent versus approximately 22 percent). However, they use the mayor-council form of government with a designated administrator less frequently than metropolitan municipalities (20 vs. 27 percent); and their expenditures account for less than 10 percent of all municipal general expenditures although their populations represent nearly 22 percent of the total for all municipalities.

—Non-metropolitan counties have smaller populations than their metropolitan counterparts (70 percent have fewer than 25,000 residents); they concentrate more heavily on the traditional administrative functions assigned by the States (tax assessment, election and judicial administration, health and welfare services, and highways); they have the highest per capita expenditures of all counties (\$106.94 for those under 10,000 people and \$75.11 for those with 10,000 to 24,999); and non-metropolitan counties are organized to provide executive

or administrative leadership much less frequently than metropolitan counties (16 vs. 41 percent).

—Non-metropolitan townships have an average population only one-seventh as great as metropolitan townships (1,134 people vs. 7,266); their average budget is only one-eighth as large (\$55,949 vs. \$439,846); their average staff is only ten people; the bulk of their expenditures are for highways and education; they spend disproportionate amounts on financial administration and general control; and in only half the States with townships has the chief administrator form of organization been used.

—Local governments in non-metropolitan areas use inter-local cooperation agreements for the performance of their functions much less frequently than those in metropolitan areas (43 vs. 75 percent).

—Municipal annexation in non-metropolitan areas accounts for 42 percent of the Nation's citizens who were annexed in the decade of the 1960's, while four of the 13 post-World-War-II city-county consolidations occurred in non-metropolitan areas.

Clearly, local governments in non-metropolitan America find it difficult on their own, as presently constituted, to provide efficient and effective services for their people. There are three basic ways to remedy this situation: (1) greater and more coordinated use of intergovernmental service agreements—a partial solution at best, (2) greater use of umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations—as discussed in Volume I of this report, and (3) reorganization of existing units. This last option, of course, is the primary subject of this volume.

Footnotes

¹Bureau of the Census, *1972 Census of Governments*, I.

²Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1968), p. 59.

³For a full discussion of this point see Chapters I and IV in Volume IV of this report.

⁴Eber Eldridge, *The Yearbook of Agriculture* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 245.

⁵For a more comprehensive discussion of counties, see ACIR, *Profile of County Government* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1971).

⁶The ACIR's *Profile* noted 3,049 organized county governments, counting four more of Alaska's boroughs than did the Bureau of the Census, and counting Richmond County, Georgia, which has been consolidated with the City of Augusta.

⁷Bureau of the Census, *City-County Data Book, 1967*. Ex-

cludes Rhode Island, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Includes independent cities in Maryland and Virginia; also Denver, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco, and the five boroughs of New York City.

⁸The financial volumes of the *1972 Census of Governments* were not yet published when this chapter was prepared.

⁹Bureau of the Census, *1972 Census of Governments*, I.

¹⁰International City Management Association, *The Municipal Year Book 1972* (Washington, D.C.: The Association, 1972), p.15.

¹¹ICMA, *The Municipal Year Book 1972*, p. 15.

¹²Bureau of the Census, *Finances of Municipalities and Townships, 1967 Census of Government*, IV.

¹³Bureau of the Census, *1972 Census of Governments*, I.

¹⁴Bureau of the Census, *1962 Census of Governments*, I, and *1967 Census of Governments*, I.

¹⁵Clyde F. Snider, *Local Government in Rural America* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), p. 238.

¹⁶Lane W. Lancaster, *Government in Rural America* (New

York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1937), p. 72.

¹⁷The 39 townships in Washington are found only in urban areas and serve primarily as limited-purpose, special urban governmental units.

¹⁸County governments were also shown to spend large sums on highways in non-metropolitan areas.

¹⁹Eugene P. Dvorin and Arthur J. Misner, *Government Within the States* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1971), p. 142.

²⁰Lane W. Lancaster, *Government in Rural America*, pp. 78-79.


²¹Bureau of the Census, *Number of Inhabitants: United States Summary*, PC(1)-A1, Tables 30 and 38 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1971). The total figures of over six million treated as annexation the governmental consolidations involving Indianapolis, Jacksonville, and Nashville.

²²For a more comprehensive discussion of intergovernmental agreements, see Chapter III of this volume.

²³1972 survey of 5,900 incorporated municipalities undertaken jointly by ACIR and the International City Management Association. Response rate was about 40 percent.

Chapter VII

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES



The first volume of this report underscored the absence of a clear and consistent substate districting policy to guide Federal, State, and local responses to the challenges of population growth and technological change. During the 1960's the substate regional ambivalence of these governments—in terms of their wavering reliance on special districts and general-purpose local units, and on single- and multi-purpose areawide bodies—became apparent as numerous intergovernmental policies were adopted to meet diverse areawide needs. These actions were in part a product of earlier failures to achieve a major overhauling of local governmental structure. Jurisdictional fragmentation in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas encouraged different Federal, State, and local agencies to pursue separate strategies to fill the institutional void at the areawide level.

Beginning in the mid-1960's and continuing through the early 1970's, the Federal government assumed a major regional leadership role. Twenty-four Federal programs embodied an areawide approach, in the form of requirements and incentives for multi-jurisdictional planning, grant-in-aid application review and comment, and administrative districting. Nineteen of these had multicounty institution-building components, and 10 gave preference to single-purpose organizations designed specifically to handle planning, administrative, and funding relationships under the program.

The regional organizations inspired and sustained by Federal legislation and funds are a mixed lot. They include approximately 1,800 single-or multi-function planning districts responsible for a wide range of regional activities, such as air quality control, health, manpower, law enforcement, and anti-poverty, and 450 clearinghouses responsible for conducting reviews of applications for over 100 different Federal grant programs pursuant to OMB Circular A-95.

For the most part, the Federally encouraged areawide functional planning and administrative bodies have been established with State acquiescence. At the same time, 40 States themselves have carved out substate district systems for State planning, developmental, of administrative purposes involving 488 separate areas. Many of the 273 regional organizations established thus far to serve these areas are multifunctional.

At the local level, the availability of Federal financial support for comprehensive planning by areawide bodies composed of general-purpose local government elected officials or their appointed representatives nurtured the growth of over 600 regional councils between 1965 and 1973. In addition to comprehensive and functional planning, these organizations attempt to develop through

their professional staffs intergovernmental and interdisciplinary approaches to dealing with multicounty problems, and to facilitate communications and coordination among local elected officials and functionaries. Many regional councils also serve as A-95 clearinghouses.

These Federal, State, and local areawide actions have occasionally coincided to produce a single multicounty body responsible for several functions. More often, however, a regional council has been used as the organizational unit (or "piggybacked") for some areawide programs, while separate bodies have been created for other functions. For example, on the average A-95 clearinghouses have been piggybacked by about two-fifths of the Federal areawide programs operating in their respective areas. The boundaries of one-third of the Federally supported substate districts in 10 major program areas conform to those of State districts, but only one-sixth have both geographical and organizational conformance. If air pollution and anti-poverty are excluded, half of the Federally encouraged districts are geographically coterminous with State districts, and one-third are both geographically and organizationally coterminous. While some linkages do exist between the various mechanisms used by Federal, State, and local agencies, nevertheless in many urban and rural areas single-purpose areawide planning and development bodies have contributed to further fragmentation of governance structure.

Recent substate districting developments, then, have resulted in a myriad of multicounty bodies. Their prime functions are planning, communications, coordination, and grant administration. Their activities may be confined to a single function or involve several areas. These organizations are not able to bind their membership to decisions they make, to implement the plans they prepare, to deliver the public services they believe necessary, or to levy the taxes they need to avoid heavy dependence on Federal funds. Moreover, their policy board members are neither directly elected by nor accountable to the public. Clearly, regional councils and areawide planning and development districts are not governments.

Although a general consensus exists regarding what these recently established regional bodies are not, there is relatively little agreement concerning their proper place in the American political system. Some observers consider them to be a new breed of special district which, putting aside the accountability question, may be a politically desirable and economically feasible way to handle certain areawide planning and servicing problems. Others view these multicounty organizations as unresponsive and well-insulated regional bureaucracies, which tend to divert resources away from communities having the

greatest needs and impede progress toward large-scale local institutional reorganization. Still others believe that more authoritative regional councils in particular represent a desirable result of the meshing of intergovernmental areawide policies and programs, which could offset the diseconomies and ineffectiveness inherent in a fragmented local government structure that is unlikely to change. At the same time, a number of people see the regional council as a transitional device or an institutional catalyst that will eventually lead to an effective areawide governance system. A few consider these bodies the forerunners of metropolitan governments, which would eventually swallow up smaller localities or impose a new tier over such units.

Mounting concern on the part of local officials over the nature and direction of their regional relationships and responsibilities has paralleled the rapid growth of substate districts. What roles should city and county governments play vis-a-vis regional councils and areawide districts? Is the strengthening of these bodies through increased funding, program assignments, and grant administration responsibilities contrary to the interests of general purpose local governments? What will be the short- and long-term effects of recent substate regional policies on traditional methods of interlocal cooperation as well as on the prospects for achieving institutional restructuring at the local level? And what steps should be taken by the State and Federal governments to achieve areawide goals?

Before examining these and other governmental reorganization issues, certain criteria need to be explained briefly. While the following four factors are by no means exhaustive, they do provide a basis for considering the more salient regional issues and alternatives:¹

(1) *authority*—the unit responsible for areawide functions should have the legal and administrative capacity to perform services it is assigned or assumes;

(2) *efficiency*—the unit responsible for areawide functions should have a geographic area of jurisdiction adequate for effective performance and the realization of economies of scale;

(3) *equity*—the unit should provide citizens with equal access to areawide services, reduce economic externalities or spillovers in the performance of functions, and achieve interpersonal and inter-jurisdictional equalization in financing a public service; and

(4) *accountability*—the performance of

areawide functions by the unit should be accessible to and controllable by the public, and maximize opportunities for direct citizen participation in service delivery.

LOCAL STRATEGIES

Many metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas in the Nation have a polycentric political system, featuring multiple decision-making centers and service delivery mechanisms. The typical SMSA, for example, contains 91 local governments, while nine States each have more than 3,000 such units. During 1962-1972 this condition was reinforced by a 24 percent increase in the number of special districts in SMSA's and a 45 percent rise outside SMSA's, as well as by the incorporation of 516 municipalities.

Meanwhile, the proliferation of areawide planning and development bodies since the mid-1960's has heightened polycentricity in some areas and produced a confederal system in others, depending on the degree of piggybacking. Each metropolitan area now contains a generalist-oriented regional council or A-95 clearinghouse, in addition to a number of specialist-oriented single-purpose districts which may have separate policy boards and staffs. About three-fifths of the metropolitan areas have weak confederal systems (0-2 Federal programs piggybacked), featuring a multifunctional voluntary regional council with planning, grant review, and coordination responsibilities but lacking direct implementation, fiscal, or servicing authority.

Despite the amount of attention given to recent Federal, State, and local actions on the regional council and substate districting fronts, certain traditional methods of areawide cooperation should not be overlooked. The major local strategies used to deal with problems crossing the boundaries of single jurisdictions include intergovernmental service agreements, functional transfers, the urban county, areawide special districts, annexation, city-county consolidation, and federation.² A fuller appreciation of these approaches is particularly important since most are an integral part of a patchwork response to the heavy demands placed on public service delivery systems by urbanization, which to date has been successful in preventing the collapse of the fragmented local governmental system. Depending upon one's assessment of the past performance record and considerations of political feasibility and effectiveness, some of these older devices may be viewed either as alternatives or supplements to newer ones or as ultimate objectives. In the remainder of this section an attempt will be made to evaluate the pros and cons of these traditional local strategies, especially in light of the four criteria discussed earlier.

Intergovernmental Service Agreements

Formal and informal intergovernmental service agreements are one of the oldest types of procedural adaptation to meet areawide needs. They also are perhaps the most popular approach, with nearly two-thirds of the 2,372 municipalities over 2,500 population reporting in 1972 that another unit, usually a county or city, had furnished services to their citizens through this arrangement. Three-tenths indicated receiving certain services from the State—police and fire training, criminal identification, police patrol, traffic control, and water pollution abatement.

Most agreements involve relatively non-controversial functions. Formal written contracts are typically used for water supply and sewage disposal, while informal verbal understandings are common for police and fire mutual aid. A related but less utilized type of agreement involves the joint provision by two or more governmental units of a service or construction and operation of a facility, such as a jail or sanitary landfill.

Supporters of intergovernmental service agreements point out that their major advantage is flexibility. They facilitate the solution of local and areawide problems without requiring basic structural reorganization, and in most cases do not need voter approval. Local governments enter into agreements on a voluntary basis, although on occasion a State may mandate that certain counties or cities provide a service to neighboring jurisdictions. In some States, for example, counties are required to assess property, collect taxes, and administer elections, while in other States municipalities perform these functions.

As a result of generally permissive State legislation, a city or county can readily enter into an agreement to obtain needed services or commodities that it could not deliver itself or could produce only at an excessively high cost, such as water or sewage disposal. Both the provider and the receiver can take advantage of economies of scale. At the same time, contracts usually can be terminated on short notice, so the freedom of action and autonomy of the recipient jurisdiction are not unduly restricted. Because service agreements potentially can cover either a wide or narrow range of services and involve a temporary functional consolidation, proponents believe that they maximize economy and efficiency and minimize disruption of the local political system.

Critics argue that intergovernmental service agreements are only a short-term, piecemeal way for cities and counties to solve their servicing problems. These expedients, in the long run, may well complicate the local governmental system, make it less responsive and accessible to citizens, and less amenable to re-

organization. They note that most agreements are limited to two localities and involve a single service rather than a comprehensive package of services offered to a large number of jurisdictions, like the Lakewood Plan. Hence a plethora of two-party contracts tends to fragment local government operations.

Skeptics contend that many critical service needs cannot be readily met through intergovernmental service agreements, particularly in controversial problem areas—such as housing, transportation, and health care—which require broad multi-jurisdictional action. They also point out that this approach is not an effective way to tackle interstate problems. Some also question whether these agreements are really as temporary, efficient, and non-threatening as some local officials believe. After all, many contracts are multi-year; there frequently are no guarantees that either the provider or recipient jurisdiction will benefit from economies of scale given the limited jurisdictional scope and narrow range of services covered by agreements. Also, a demonstrated service delivery capacity on the part of larger jurisdictions could lead to a further reduction of the recipient jurisdiction's functional responsibilities.

In summary, intergovernmental service agreements for the most part meet the criteria of authority and efficiency, at least in terms of responding to intrastate problems. This type of procedural adaptation, however, does not provide a significant amount of equity or accountability in service delivery.

Transfer of Functions

A more permanent type of adaptive, piecemeal response to areawide problems is the transfer of functional responsibilities between higher and lower units. The most common transfers have been from municipality to county, usually involving such functions as airports, fire and police protection, jails, sewage disposal, water supply, libraries, and health. Of course, the regional special district also is a popular mechanism for delivering health and hospitals, sewerage, and utility services. Recently, however, there has been growing interest in the transfer of certain local functions to regional councils (such as supportive police services) or to the State government (especially in public welfare and education).

At the same time, some transfers have involved the decentralization rather than the centralization of functions. In California, for example, State mental health and corrections programs are being shifted to the county level, while in New York certain State transportation responsibilities are being handled by regional authorities. Some decentralization of county and city functions to neighborhoods is also taking place, largely due to the influence of the

Model Cities and Community Action programs. Services often provided through neighborhood city halls or multiservice centers include street maintenance, sanitation, recreation, welfare, health care, vocational education, and housing rehabilitation.

Proponents of functional transfers, particularly those from the municipal to county levels, point to recent surveys and stress that, contrary to conventional wisdom, municipal officials tend to be the initiators of instead of the resisters to such reassignments. The transfer arrangement, then, is a politically feasible way to provide efficiently and economically particular services having areawide implications, they contend, since it avoids the obstacles inherent in approaches that call for consolidation of the local governmental structure or creation of a metropolitan government. Moreover, unlike intergovernmental service agreements, a transfer is a permanent reassignment of responsibility and does not necessarily contribute to local fragmentation since most upward shifts are to existing county governments rather than to newly formed areawide districts or special districts and public authorities. Supporters also assert that the fiscal and servicing benefits resulting from a functional transfer from the local to State levels should not be overlooked. Compared with intergovernmental service agreements, then, the transfer of functions offers the same flexibility, more permanence, and less fragmentation at only a slightly higher local political cost.

While agreeing with some of the advantages provided relative to service agreements, some observers recognize a number of basic problems in upward functional transfers. To begin with, they argue, there is little justification for assuming that shifting functional assignments to a county will result in efficient, economical, or effective service delivery. Most county governments, after all, have not modernized their structure or demonstrated a capacity or interest in furnishing services beyond those they have performed traditionally as an arm of State government. Furthermore, the boundaries of many counties may be too small to administer certain functions effectively on an areawide basis, to harness spillover costs and benefits, and to achieve economies of scale. Truly areawide functions, these observers argue, probably would be transferred from municipalities to special districts, further fragmenting local government structure. And, they emphasize that the record to date provides only slight assurance that the States would be willing to assume fully fiscal responsibility for either welfare or schools.

These skeptics also cite the legal roadblocks that must be overcome. Only nine States have specific constitutional provisions authorizing transfers from the municipal to the county levels; the functional transfer approach obviously encounters legal ob-

stacles in dealing with interstate problems. In addition, critics note, some States require referenda to be conducted in the local jurisdiction involved in a proposed shift. Hence this arrangement may not be as flexible or viable as its supporters believe.

Functional transfers, on balance, have the potential of achieving some scale economies. In the interstate context they also appear consistent with the authority criterion. The degree to which they meet the equity and accountability standards, however, depends in large part on the type of unit assigned the responsibility for performing a particular service.

The Urban County

The 1960's witnessed growing interest in the role of counties in the governance of the Nation's metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. This concern has continued during the early 1970's, largely due to the limitations of the patchwork response to rising public service demands inherent in intergovernmental service agreements and functional transfers. It also reflects some disenchantment with regional councils, areawide districts, and other recent substate approaches because of their inability to respond authoritatively to problems crossing jurisdictional lines. The county, after all, contains the requisite geographical and fiscal capacity to tackle certain areawide functions, it exists in all but three States and serves as the political base for party organization, and it has a long history of involvement with State government. Moreover, 127 of the Nation's metropolitan areas encompass a single county, while the population of several multicounty SMSA's is concentrated in the central county.

Spokesmen for county government point out that the most politically feasible way to address regional problems on more than a temporary, function-by-function basis is to gradually transform this unit from an administrative arm of the State into a full-scale urban government capable of performing a range of regional and municipal-type services. They point out that this incremental process is already underway, particularly in single-county SMSA's, which govern 38.2 million people. Forty-seven percent of these jurisdictions have a council-administrator or an elected county executive form of government, and they serve two-thirds of the unicounty metropolitan area population. Proponents also note that a growing number of counties have assumed new or expanded servicing responsibilities as a result of functional transfers from municipalities, or have contracted with constituent jurisdictions for the provision of services. And, they contend, counties have been the building blocks in past attempts to reform the fragmented local governmental system; every successful major metropolitan reorganization

except the Twin Cities, for example, has involved a single restructured county.

Other observers have a less sanguine and more differentiated view of the county's potential role as an areawide government. They feel that the county does not represent an across-the-board approach to solving structural or service delivery problems. Rather, in some cases the county would be responsible for performing areawide services in both unincorporated and incorporated areas, while in others county operations would be confined to the former. The demands placed upon the county and the approaches taken to meet these needs may well differ depending on whether the unit serves a predominantly rural or urban area.

The prospects for achieving metropolitan governance through a restructured county also are affected by whether the county's boundaries are coterminous with or smaller than those of the SMSA. Particularly in the latter case, competition for functional responsibilities occurring between the central city and suburban counties or between the county and its constituent cities complicates reorganization of the service delivery system.

In addition to geographic and boundary variations, the past performance of counties has led to some misgivings about the ability of these units to undertake increased service responsibilities. Critics point out, for example, that with respect to non-metropolitan counties—which constitute 85 percent of the Nation's total—the assumption of an areawide servicing capacity would be extremely difficult in light of the fact that only 15 percent have modernized their structure by adopting a county-administrator or elected executive form of government. Moreover, the argument runs, with the exception of urban counties in California, Florida, Maryland, New York, and Virginia, most county governments do not utilize non-property taxes or incur significant expenditures for functions that are not traditionally State-assigned. Regional and municipal-type services provided at the county level are generally confined to health and hospitals, parks and recreation, solid waste disposal, and air and water pollution abatement. Only a handful of the Nation's 3,044 counties, it is asserted, are active in countywide police and fire protection, mass transit, housing and urban renewal, and other urban development areas. As a result, special districts often perform what otherwise would be county responsibilities, although counties exercise some supervision over them through approval of their formation, budgets, and tax methods and rates. To date, however, special district abolition or consolidation is mostly a dream. Others claim that even if county governments were willing to perform urban and regional functions, in many cases the "prob-

lem shed" would exceed their jurisdictional boundaries.

Another line of criticism is directed to the State. The less than glowing overall county performance record in the structural, fiscal, and servicing areas, some contend, is due more to State constitutional and statutory restrictions than to county reluctance. Only 15 States, after all, have home rule charter counties, while some others have granted counties limited home rule powers. Unless State-imposed shackles are removed, it is argued, it is highly unlikely that counties will be able to achieve a sufficient degree of modernization to become areawide governments.

To sum up, then, in many parts of the Nation counties offer a politically feasible way within the intrastate framework to achieve areawide governance and comprehensive service delivery in both urban and rural areas, without creating new regional units or consolidating existing municipalities. The potential for meeting the accountability and equity criteria is quite high. In at least two-thirds of the States, however, the absence of significant home rule powers runs contrary to the authority standard, while the relatively small size of some counties is not conducive to the efficiency criterion.

Areawide Special Districts

The fragmenting effects of intergovernmental service agreements, the reluctance to transfer functions from the municipal to the county or State levels, the sluggish response by county governments to urban and regional service needs, and the failure of most major local governmental reorganization proposals to gain voter approval have revived interest in areawide special districts. Although traditionally these bodies have been assigned responsibility for a particular service or facility, increasing attention is being given to multifunctional, multi-jurisdictional districts.

Single-Function Areawide Special Districts. In both urban and rural areas local and areawide special districts commonly perform fire protection, soil conservation, water supply, housing, and drainage functions. Their establishment has been occasionally encouraged by Federal grants-in-aid, often required by State statute, and usually strongly supported by county and city officials. Special districts are particularly popular in rural America; in 1972, 67 percent of the national total of 23,886 such bodies were found outside of metropolitan areas.

For several years, however, areawide special districts have been a key component of metropolitan service delivery systems. Currently 900 metropolitan special districts exist, but only 10 percent of these are located in the 72 largest SMSA's. The vast

majority are unfunctional, and are typically responsible for airports, bridges, housing, tunnels, terminals, sewage disposal, public transportation, water supply, and parks and recreation.

Special district supporters point out that compared with intergovernmental service agreements, functional transfers, and the urban county, this approach offers substantially greater territorial flexibility, fiscal self-sufficiency, authoritative action, and political feasibility. They note that since special districts are able to cross State as well as local lines, they are probably the most adaptable and acceptable response to the steadily growing number of problems that spill over borders. Hence, unlike the general purpose local government experience, the jurisdiction of the service delivery unit is not normally eclipsed by the "problem shed," since territorial boundaries can be redefined in accordance with changing functional and areal relationships. For example, 14 interstate special districts are already in operation and more are in the offing in the 33 interstate SMSA's.

Fiscal self-sufficiency is another major advantage of the special district. Since they usually obtain the bulk of their revenues from user charges or special assessments, districts do not place a burden on the already strained local property tax nor are they subjected to constitutional and statutory tax limits. In general, proponents assert, only those who benefit from a service must pay for it.

Special districts can be readily established through local initiative or State mandate to respond directly and authoritatively to urgent needs. They are one of the most politically feasible institutional alternatives since they do not seriously disrupt the local government status quo and are part of a well established tradition in American politics.

Supporters also claim that because these bodies are relatively free from local government personnel restrictions, a higher calibre of public servant can be recruited. Coupled with this increased technical competency is greater operational efficiency, which is a product of scale economies and functional specialization.

On the other hand, for several years reformers have contended that the continuing popularity of special districts cripples efforts to achieve much-needed local government structural reorganization. A typical metropolitan area, for instance, contains 16 non-school special districts, which may have differing geographical boundaries as well as organizational structures.

Many observers feel that these bodies are basically unaccountable to citizens and local public officials within their jurisdiction and despite claims to the contrary, that they may be far less democratic than a general purpose metropolitan government. Such

districts often may be formed rather easily due to State laws requiring only a single areawide majority; in many cases a popular vote is not necessary at all. Moreover, only a small minority of their governing boards are popularly elected. Sometimes bonds may be issued without voter approval.

The unfunctional focus of most areawide special districts is a major weakness in the view of some observers. Whatever gains in efficiency result from their territorial flexibility, specialized services, and professional competency, so the argument runs, are compromised by the inability of a single-purpose body to coordinate effectively and set priorities among related programs and activities administered by other areawide units, including special districts, and general purpose local governments. For example, the independent activities of a special district—such as the bridge and tunnel construction programs of interstate transportation bodies—may well create additional mass transit headaches for general purpose local governments. As a result, the problems of overlapping, waste, and confusion stemming from jurisdictional and functional fragmentation are exacerbated.

Multifunctional Areawide Special Districts. While recognizing some of the limitations in this approach, in light of the persisting inability of some cities and counties to solve areawide problems and the stubborn resistance on the part of many local officials and large segments of the general public to major structural reorganization, some reformers have recommended the creation of multifunctional areawide special districts. Certain western States—including California, Oregon, Colorado, and Washington—now authorize the organization of such bodies. Very few have been set up under these laws, however, and the operations of those which have been established have scarcely surpassed those of traditional areawide special districts. Under Washington law, for example, Seattle Metro is authorized to undertake six functions. Yet for 15 years it handled just one—sewage; in 1973 bus transit operations were added. The Portland Multi-Service District has to date performed only solid waste disposal. The East Bay (San Francisco) Municipal Utility District was a single-purpose special district from 1923 to the late 1940's, when sewage disposal was added to its responsibilities. In 1972, Colorado enacted legislation allowing the creation of regional service authorities for performing one or more of 16 statutorily specified functions. While none has been set up so far, efforts are underway in the Denver metropolitan area, but specific functional assignments have not been determined.

Those who support the multipurpose areawide district approach emphasize the benefits—both direct and indirect—flowing from the increased

jurisdictional and functional coverage. These include the ability to achieve economies of scale, to retain a more highly qualified staff at the technical and managerial levels, and to plan over a larger geographical area. As opposed to a general local government, proponents argue, a multipurpose district can focus on a limited number of areawide functions, and deal with them in a more effective manner on a multi-jurisdictional basis. As an illustration of what can be done, they point to the success of Seattle Metro in dramatically improving the quality of the waters of Lake Washington and to the efficient management of East Bay Municipal District operations. They also indicate that the Portland Multi-Service District experience shows that this approach works well in interstate areas.

Although supporters concede that there has been little accretion of servicing responsibilities to date, they believe that areawide districts could become truly multifunctional as a result of a greater State role in overseeing the delineation of districts. They also foresee increased State initiative in making these districts more viable areawide instruments by mandating them to perform certain functional assignments. In all this, they see the same political feasibility advantages that accrue to single-purpose districts.

On the other hand, critics of multifunctional areawide districts hold that State legislatures probably will continue to be reluctant to approve enabling laws for these bodies, and will persist in restricting the powers of any that are approved. Consequently, the range of activities undertaken by districts will be so narrow as to preclude a coordinated or comprehensive approach to regional problems. Because their policy boards focus on but one or two specific problem areas, decisions will be made without giving full consideration to the externalities they create.

Skeptics also contend that both multipurpose and unipurpose areawide special districts are less accountable to the public than general units of local government. Their accountability is particularly restricted by a system of governing board representation to which the one man-one vote principle does not apply. Members of the Portland Multi-Service District and Seattle Metro Council, for instance, are chosen from constituent local governments. Direct election from single-member districts, however, is required in the East Bay Municipal Utility District, and will be the method used in any regional service authorities established in Colorado.

Other opponents point out that the existing multifunctional areawide districts have made no significant attempts to redistribute resources. In support of this contention, they note that the service charge, which is not easily adapted to redistributive purposes, dominates the financing practices of Seattle

Metro and the East Bay Municipal Utility District, as it will the operations of the Portland Multi-Service District and the Colorado regional service districts. A minor accommodation to the equity principle is found in Seattle Metro, which provides for a reduced bus fare for persons 65 years of age or over. Lacking general taxing powers, then, districts tend to undertake activities which can be financed on a break-even or better basis, and this virtually precludes programs which are significantly redistributive.

Critics also charge that the multifunctional areawide districts have acted without adequate advance planning and that their relationships with regional councils and substate planning districts are limited, if not hostile. No operating district encompasses the entire area of a regional council's jurisdiction. Seattle Metro covers only one of the four counties in the Puget Sound Governmental Conference. Similarly, the East Bay district includes but a fraction of the area of the Association of Bay Area Governments, as does the Portland Multi-Service District in relation to the Columbia Region Association of Governments. To date, the few existing multifunctional district-regional council relationships involve only planning, an activity in which some consider the former bodies especially weak.

To summarize, both unifunctional and multifunctional areawide special districts fall substantially short of the equity and accountability criteria. They do possess adequate authority to administer functions effectively and sufficient territorial flexibility to perform their tasks efficiently on an interstate as well as intrastate basis. The coordination problems inherent in their single- or limited-purpose orientation, however, in some cases may create difficulties in the efficiency area.

Annexation

Unlike areawide special districts, the annexation approach to linking problem areas with public service delivery instruments relies upon general purpose local governments. Historically, many American cities—particularly the largest ones—achieved the bulk of their current size as a result of successful annexation attempts during the early years of the 20th century. More recently, the number of municipalities that have annexed unincorporated territory in response to the rapid urbanization following World War II has steadily increased, with nearly three-tenths of all cities over 2,500 population having expanded their boundaries through this means in 1971 alone.

Proponents point out that half of the urban areas that became SMSA's during the 1960's did so because their central cities had engaged in annexation. This approach, then, can serve as a catalyst in de-

veloping a sense of regionality, while providing a multifunctional service delivery mechanism in the form of the city government to handle fringe and certain areawide problems. In light of the fact that larger and older cities are typically ringed by incorporated suburban communities, reformers feel that annexation is particularly well suited for small and moderate-sized municipalities and for smaller metropolitan areas having a dominant municipality.

In addition to the advantages annexation offers in terms of an authoritative, general purpose service delivery system, some observers note that economies of scale and greater administrative effectiveness could well result from the provision and coordination of services over an entire urban area. Encompassing unincorporated territory also could be financially beneficial to a central city since industrial property, commercial developments, and certain types of residential areas which might be slated for such an area are likely to generate higher revenues than costs.

Supporters emphasize that unlike the special district situation, in about three-fifths of the States annexation proceedings directly involve the affected public through petitions and referenda in determining whether local boundary expansion will take place. Furthermore, citizens are able periodically to exercise some degree of influence over operations in the annexed territory as well as in the annexing jurisdiction through the ballot box. Annexation, then, is a "democratic" way of boundary adjustment.

Cognizant of the potential problems involved in unbridled annexations and defensive incorporations, proponents contend that annexation is increasingly becoming a more systematic and rational device for tackling fringe area problems due to the emergence of permanent local boundary adjustment boards. Three States—Alaska, Minnesota, and Michigan—have a single commission charged with statewide responsibilities, while in three others—California, Oregon, and Washington—boards have been established at the county or areawide levels by State mandatory or permissive legislation. These bodies all possess power to approve or disapprove petitions for annexation or incorporation, and thus play a significant role in monitoring boundary changes.

On the other side of the coin, some reformers are skeptical that annexation is a viable response to public service needs. While conceding the substantial amount of activity that has taken place in recent years, they note that the average size of individual annexations is quite small—often less than one square mile. As a result, they ask how annexation can deal with problems that cover large amounts of territory, both unincorporated and incorporated. How can any scale economies be realized through small-scale boundary adjustments? Critics also main-

tain that annexation will do little to help the fiscal and servicing plight of many larger central cities since throughout this century it has not generally enabled them to encompass their urban areas or even to maintain their proportion of the total metropolitan population, let alone tap the resources of more affluent suburbs. Nor will annexation come to grips with the problems stemming from the fragmentation of incorporated localities and separation in interstate areas. Hence, at best annexation is a useful tool for dealing in a piecemeal fashion with the needs of an unincorporated urban fringe area for water, sewage treatment, or other services that have not been provided by adjacent local units on an extraterritorial basis.

Although on the surface annexation may appear to be a relatively simple way to adjust boundaries, some observers note tough procedural obstacles that must be overcome. The outlying unincorporated area usually must initiate an annexation action or approve a proposition, or both. For a host of reasons, such residents view annexation with fear. Concerns about the application of city subdivision and zoning regulations, higher taxes, domination by city politicians, loss of direct citizen participation in local affairs, and satisfaction with existing service levels have led to the defeat of many proposed annexations. They also have encouraged residents of unincorporated fringe areas to take advantage of fairly liberal incorporation processes and become separate municipalities. In these cases, the mere availability of the annexation device may generate defensive incorporations—and further fragmentation.

Another target of criticism is the boundary adjustment board. These bodies, it is pointed out, exist in merely a half dozen States and only three have statewide jurisdiction. Most boards have received low levels of funding and staff support. Their performance record to date suggests that, while they have had some impact on curbing special district growth and new incorporations, they tend to rubber stamp proposed annexations, since nearly all petitions are approved. At the same time, critics assert, most boundary adjustment boards have not played a sufficiently aggressive role in guiding urban development by encouraging or requiring cities to indicate their "spheres of influence," or areas which will eventually be annexed.

On balance annexation represents a popular, but restricted approach to solving areawide problems through existing general purpose local government machinery. While it meets the accountability standard, limitations on both the areal coverage of most annexations and the jurisdictional applicability of this device raise serious doubts about whether the authority, efficiency, or equity criteria can be attained.

City-County Consolidation

Compared with annexation, city-county consolidation offers a jurisdictionally and geographically broader but less politically acceptable approach to areawide servicing and governance using an existing general purpose local unit. Like annexation, consolidation activity can be traced to the early years of the 19th century. Just as the pace of annexation slackened during the first half of the 20th century only to resurge in the post-war period, after a barren period between 1907 and 1962 a dramatic rekindling of interest in consolidation occurred during the last decade.

City-county consolidation basically involves the merger of a county with one or more of the municipalities within its borders into a single unit of government. Often special districts are included in the merger. Consolidations have occurred in 19 areas, 11 since 1962. Twelve have involved an SMSA central city and five the State capitol. During the last 25 years, six consolidations resulted from campaigns for the creation of a metropolitan area government; in three of these—Baton Rouge-East Baton Rouge Parish, Jacksonville-Duval County, and Lexington-Fayette County—the merged area was coterminous with the SMSA boundaries, while in the others—Nashville-Davidson County, Indianapolis-Marion County, and Columbus-Muscogee County—it encompassed at least 70 percent of the metropolitan population.

In support of this approach, reformers point out that because it produces a single areawide general purpose government, jurisdictional fragmentation is reduced and nonviable local units are eliminated. Consolidation can deter the creation of independent special districts, as well as provide an authoritative organizational unit for the piggybacking of Federal and State substate planning and development programs. Even if some special districts are not folded into the merger, they assert, the consolidated government would still be able to exercise a considerable amount of supervision and leverage over their activities.

Proponents also note that unlike other multi-jurisdictional approaches—particularly service agreements and special districts—a responsive and responsible areawide governing mechanism results from consolidation. The public would not only be able to vote on the desirability of a proposed merger, but also could consider periodically the performance of the consolidated government in the course of campaigns for local office. In response to expressions of concern over minority group opposition, exemplified by the failure of all but two mergers—Jacksonville and Lexington—to win approval of a majority of black voters, they indicate that blacks have in most cases increased their formal representa-

tion on the newly formed governing bodies despite a reduction in their proportion of the total population within the consolidated area.

Consolidation also offers numerous economic advantages in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Supporters contend that reducing overlapping basic local services and furnishing them throughout the consolidated area on a uniform level and tax rate through a general services district would produce significant economies of scale. In addition, since certain service needs or preferences may exist in some parts of the county but not in others, the use of urban service districts would allow for their provision and financing on a differential basis. The total size of the local bureaucracy also would be diminished, and administrative streamlining would have a positive impact on performance. Hence, both the level and quality of public services and the flexibility of the delivery system would be improved. Furthermore, some proponents claim that due to merger, taxes would be reduced, while others assert that if nothing else it would help hold the line of rate hikes and make the assessment and collection of property taxes more efficient.

Critics are quick to point out that for various reasons the public is likely to continue to resist consolidation. Minority groups, for example, fear dilution of their recently acquired political power in the central city, taxpayers' associations are concerned about the escalating costs of governmental services, while many citizens are wary of a potentially unresponsive and inaccessible "metro" government. As a result of these and other factors, of the more than 30 consolidation proposals that have been subjected to referenda since World War II, only 12 were approved. And four of these were in one State.

A related concern voiced by some observers is that city consolidation as a dramatic way of tackling tough multi-jurisdictional problems has been excessively compromised to gain political support. They note that the term "consolidation" itself is a misnomer, since despite the claims of reformers that a single government will be created, each metropolitan consolidation during the last quarter century has been a partial merger, producing a mix of a federated and a unitary system. With respect to small municipalities, for instance, four escaped merger in Jacksonville, two in Baton Rouge, six in Nashville, and one in Columbus. In four of the six major metropolitan consolidations, schools were left out. While excluding certain municipalities, townships, or special districts from a proposed consolidation may be politically astute in the short run, in the long run the semi-fragmented subcounty system may impair the performance of functions on an areawide basis.

For similar reasons, city-county consolidation has

not achieved a complete integration of executive branch offices. In each of the six mergers, for instance, a number of elective "constitutional" county officers—such as the sheriff, assessor, district attorney, and auditor—have substantial independence. Thus, skeptics assert, only a limited amount of administrative streamlining has been achieved.

Another bone of contention is whether consolidation provides sufficient areal scope to deal effectively with a problem. Successful mergers have occurred mainly in medium-sized SMSA's; only seven of the referenda approved since 1945 have involved areas over 100,000 population. And no consolidation, of course, has crossed State lines. Hence, the argument runs, in some areas consolidation may well result in diseconomies of scale. The limitations of county boundaries for certain areawide activities are underscored by the fact that only a handful of Federally supported substate regional programs and State planning and development districts have been piggy-backed on merged units. Further evidence is provided by the experience of four of the major consolidated governments—Nashville, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, and Baton Rouge—which have been encompassed by multicounty regional councils and must share A-95 review and comment responsibilities with their neighboring unconsolidated jurisdictions.

Finance is another battleground for the proponents and opponents of merger. The former state that consolidated governments have been successful in securing vastly more intergovernmental revenue than were pre-merger jurisdictions and in stabilizing tax rates. The latter cite studies showing that despite expansion of the property tax base consolidation usually has not reduced tax rates, nor has it had any significant redistributive effects due to the heavy reliance on user charges. They also question the claim made by supporters that taxes under the consolidated government are lower than they would have been if the merger had not been accomplished.

To summarize, then, the city-county consolidation approach would meet all four of the criteria posited earlier in this chapter, but to differing degrees. It is fully consistent with the accountability standard. In most cases, the consolidated unit possesses the legal and administrative capacity to perform functions, although in some areas authority is shared with or held exclusively by a special district, constituent municipality, or independent official. Efficiency depends largely on the areal and population size and the service involved, and consolidation does not automatically produce economies of scale. Finally, while citizens have equal access to basic services, little redistribution of wealth is likely to result initially from merger.

Federation

Federation is a middle ground between "one government" areawide approaches like city-county consolidation and the polycentric governmental system found in many of the Nation's metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Federation may be defined as a process for systematically dividing public functions between upper- and lower-tier jurisdictions. The former are responsible for areawide activities requiring central policy making or administration, while the latter deal with local functions amenable to decision making and operation on a uni-jurisdictional basis. With respect to power relationships in a two-tiered system, the policy making process of the newly created areawide government is controlled by representatives of constituent local units or by the public.

The distinctions between the functional and legal interpretations of federation must be kept in mind in discussing the desirability and feasibility of this local strategy. As was noted earlier, the functional performance record of urban counties reveals that they have increasingly acquired federative characteristics as the scope of their authority and municipal-type services in incorporated as well as unincorporated territory have expanded. Due to the exclusion of certain municipalities or special districts, some city-county consolidations have reflected the federated principle in their operations. The upward transfer of functions may be considered an incremental federative adjustment; the areawide multi-purpose district is another form federated arrangements might take. Finally, while not governments in a strict sense, the State-supported umbrella regional councils in the Twin Cities area and Atlanta serve as second-tier policy bodies controlled by State and/or local governments, while the first-tier local units perform service delivery functions.

For purposes of this discussion, the focus will be upon upper-lower tier relationships that are more akin to the legalistic view of federation. The prototype of a comprehensive federated system in which first-tier governments make policy for the second tier is the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. In the United States, only Dade County, Florida, at one time partially met this criterion—through a provision that cities over a certain size would select half of the representatives on the county governing body—but this system was later replaced by direct election. Early and unsuccessful attempts to establish federated systems, however, were made in Boston (1896 and 1931); Alameda County, California (1921); Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (1929); and St. Louis (1930).

Proponents of federation argue that this approach provides a means of systematically tailoring the pub-

lic service delivery system to maximize efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of certain functions, depending on the degree to which they involve externalities. In comparison with the districting experience of consolidated governments, the division of functional responsibilities can be more easily adjusted as conditions change without having to create new local or areawide service delivery machinery.

Supporters also contend that the federative principle recognizes that even though it is economically desirable to centralize certain functions or components thereof and to decentralize others, it generally is politically unfeasible to consolidate all of them into a single metropolitan government. Witness the less than glowing city-county consolidation adoption record to date. Hence, areawide and local servicing needs can be met without further fragmenting local governmental structure, while at the same time not producing serious disruptions by eliminating lower-tier governing bodies.

Critics counter these claims by pointing out that the theoretical division of powers and responsibilities in federated systems is less precise in actual practice. They note that in both Toronto and Dade County the trend has been for the upper tier to assume increasing operational roles, many of which were not specified in the original enabling act. Thus, rather than a well-balanced and neatly ordered two-tier arrangement, a unitary functional relationship appears to be evolving despite the policy controls exercised by constituent units. Furthermore, in both areas adjustments have been made in policy board representation. Hence, some observers believe that the tasks of dividing powers and functions and reconciling conflicting claims will be unending and controversial, leading to governmental instability and ineffective service delivery. The need to umpire these disputes may place a heavy burden on State legislatures and the courts.

Another limitation of the federated arrangement, it is argued, involves boundaries. Like the experience of consolidated governments and urban counties, a particular problem may well spill over the boundaries of the areawide unit. In Toronto, for instance, adjacent urban areas and their problems continue to grow, while Dade County is now part of a three-county urban region. A federation also cannot cross State lines without an interstate compact or similar enabling action. As a result of these factors, the extent to which economies of scale exist may be limited.

Federation also would require State constitutional authorization, a step that proved to be the downfall of the St. Louis and initial Miami efforts. An additional hurdle is the requirement for federation plans to be submitted to the voters for approval,

and multiple majorities may be necessary. This would be especially troublesome if the proposed charter calls for replacement of existing county governments or their merger into a new areawide unit.

Fiscal equity is difficult to attain under the federated arrangement, skeptics state, since lower-tier jurisdictions have widely varying tax bases and many key financial decisions are left at the local level. In addition, although the areawide unit may bring about some redistribution of wealth through tax assessment and collection on behalf of lower-tier jurisdictions, this may be limited by the upper tier's having heavy service delivery responsibilities but inadequate resources.

Federated systems, then, in theory are consistent with all four criteria. In practice, however, while the authority and accountability standards are achieved, efficiency in the delivery of certain areawide services and equity in the distribution of resources may be more difficult to realize.

* * * * *

The preceding discussion of the pros and cons of certain local strategies for dealing with substate regional problems reveals that, at least in terms of the authority, efficiency, equity, and accountability criteria, comprehensive reforms involving general purpose local governments appear to offer the most promising approach. Federation, city-county consolidation, and the urban county all score high on the accountability, equity, and authority measures and moderately well on efficiency. In comparison, the patchwork responses—intergovernmental service agreements, functional transfers, and multipurpose areawide districts—fare well on both authority and efficiency but poorly on equity and accountability.

At the same time, however, it must be recognized that while major local structural reforms may be the most desirable, they are also the most difficult to achieve, especially on a nationwide scale. As was pointed out, the applicability of some of these strategies is limited. City-county consolidation, for example, seems most appropriate for small and medium-sized metropolitan areas. On the other hand, the most fertile ground for federation is an urban or rural area having weak county government and few special districts. The urban county, while perhaps the most applicable approach, will encounter stiff resistance in areas having large and powerful suburban or central city governments. None of these institutional alternatives can readily cross State lines. In short, no one local strategy appears to be viable across the country.

Local official opposition, voter apathy and ignorance, and State constitutional and statutory restrictions have smothered most major efforts to restruc-

ture and redirect the local governmental system. As a result, areawide needs have been met largely through a patchwork arrangement designed to respond to problems crossing jurisdictional boundaries through procedural adaptations—intergovernmental service agreements and upward functional transfers—and the creation of new mechanisms—special districts—without seriously disrupting the local government institutional and political status quo. Regional councils and areawide planning and development districts also reflect this patchwork approach.

STATE STRATEGIES

A common feature of the local strategies examined in the previous section is their reliance on specific or general State enabling action. Moving from the patchwork to various institutional strategies—the urban county, annexation, consolidation, and federation—greater State constitutional hurdles and stiffer legislative resistance are encountered. Yet many reformers believe that the State role is pivotal in future attempts to overcome city and county official and public opposition and to achieve areawide governance through reshaping the local political system.

The purpose of this section is to analyze the strategies that State governments can employ to deal with substate regional problems and local reorganization needs. Before turning to this discussion, however, it is necessary to review certain legal aspects of State-local relationships as well as trends that may be suggestive of a changing State position vis-a-vis local governmental structure.

Local Is as Local Does?

The polycentric nature of the local political system implies that city and county governments have a substantial degree of independence and leeway in terms of their form of government, financial authority, and methods for responding to problems spilling over their borders. These assumptions, coupled with beliefs that local units are closer to the public than either the Federal or State governments, create the impression that, concerning their planning, service delivery, and fiscal activities in a regional setting, "local is as local does."

These views are more a product of State ambivalence than of local autonomy. In fact, most States still follow "Dillion's rule," under which cities and counties cannot perform particular functions for their citizens in the absence of an express or clearly implied authorization from the State legislature. Since local units are "creatures" of State government, only the States can expand or contract the powers of their political subdivisions.

The States' key position in areawide governance is an outgrowth of these legal relationships with

localities, which essentially are those of a unitary system. Their specific powers include the following:

- They have life-and-death legal authority over local units and determine their boundaries.
- They are the sole source of authority enabling local governments to tackle their problems.
- They alone possess legal power to intervene and to direct localities to act in certain ways or to end interlocal impasses.
- They serve as mediators between local units and the Federal government and between their local jurisdictions and other States.
- They enjoy far greater taxable resources than localities, and have the authority to equalize resources and services effectively among these units.
- They have the requisite geographic scope to provide directly or to establish machinery for furnishing services in urban and rural areas which cannot be administered adequately by individual jurisdictions.
- They traditionally have handled major programs of vital concern to the social and economic well-being of their residents, including education, highways, public assistance, health, and hospitals.
- They have the administrative structure and personnel to offer technical assistance to local governments.
- They have the opportunity to play a negative role through using their powers to obstruct, undermine, and even veto various intergovernmental programs.

Many observers believe that the States have exercised these powers in a predominantly negative rather than positive manner. Local fiscal operations, for example, have traditionally been major objects of State restraints. Practically all States have imposed limitations on property taxes, the principal source of local revenues, usually in the form of a restriction on the maximum tax rate to a certain percentage of assessed valuation. But little aggressive State action has been taken on the property tax reform front.

A second type of State fiscal control over local governments involves the power of localities to borrow funds to finance needed public services. Many States have limited the total amount of both the debt that local units may incur and the taxes which may be levied in order to make principal and interest payments on their bonds. Some States also have required voter approval, often by a wide margin, of any sizable local bond offering.

These limits on local taxation and borrowing powers have been opposed by those who believe that States should "unshackle" their local governments, since restrictions on revenue sources force local officials to turn to higher levels of government for financial assistance. Fiscal unshackling, it is also contended, should be accompanied by removal of State-imposed limitations on such devices as municipal annexation of unincorporated territory, multipurpose areawide special districts, and city-county consolidation, which would enable local units to deal more effectively with areawide problems.

Because the States continue to set the ground rules for local structural, functional, and fiscal transactions, a large share of the responsibility for unsolved areawide problems and ungovernable metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas falls upon their doorstep. Critics assert that most State governments have been reluctant either to give their localities sufficient autonomy and resources to deal effectively with regional needs or to assume the burden of areawide programming and related structural and procedural modifications. Many observers conclude that the initial establishment and the growing number of direct relationships between Federal agencies and local units in grant-in-aid programs and the Federal government's assumption of a major leadership role in substate regionalism highlight the continuing failure of the States to shoulder their responsibilities and to serve as viable members of the inter-governmental partnership.

While conceding that some of the above charges have historical validity, spokesmen on behalf of State governments point out a number of recent developments which indicate that the States are moving to unshackle their local governments and to provide positive direction to regional efforts. As of 1972, for instance, 42 States had enacted some form of legislation authorizing interlocal cooperation in planning and service delivery. Fifteen States have granted general home rule powers to their political subdivisions, and others have authorized more limited home rule in structural, functional, or fiscal matters. And since 1968, 17 States have established local government study commissions; three are currently active.

Supporters also note certain steps that the States

have taken to put their own houses in order. Constitutional modernization efforts, for example, have proceeded at a rapid pace. At the November 7, 1972, general election, voters in 37 States were offered constitutional revision proposals ranging from practically complete overhaul to relatively minor changes. In the last three years, 11 States have achieved major reorganization of their executive branches. And in 1972 alone, 17 States passed measures to improve legislative operations or to remove constitutional restraints upon their law-making bodies.

Also noteworthy are specific State efforts to equip themselves to deal effectively with critical problem areas that often spill over local jurisdictional boundaries. As of early 1973, for instance, nearly all States had a department or agency responsible for local or community affairs. Nineteen States had set up departments of transportation, eight had established new environmental protection agencies, and 44 had created consumer protection units. These developments, many observers feel, coupled with the actions taken by 44 States to delineate areawide districts, demonstrate that most States have the interest and the capability to handle substate regional policy-making and problem solving.

Not to be overlooked, according to State spokesmen, are the fiscal dimensions of State regional and urban activities. Most States have made significant revenue raising efforts. At the close of 1972, 40 States had a full-fledged personal income tax, 45 had a broad-based sales tax, and 36 had tax systems that included both. State tax collections increased by more than 225 percent between 1959 and 1971; 521 new taxes or higher rates were enacted over this period. Moreover, it is pointed out, State aid to local governments nearly tripled during the 1960's. By 1970-71, States were allocating \$31.1 billion to their local units, \$8.3 billion of which came from State sources. In addition, 24 States now provide some type of State-financed property tax relief for low-income and elderly homeowners, 15 have State-mandated, locally-financed programs, and six have State-authorized, locally-financed programs.

Although there have been overall increases in recent years, some local officials—particularly big city mayors—have contended that State financial assistance has not kept pace with mounting local and areawide problems. They point out that over 75 percent of all State aid to local units is earmarked for public education and welfare, and that almost one-half of such funds is provided to school districts while municipalities receive only a little more than one-fifth of the remainder. Moreover, although a few States—such as Arizona, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin—have made significant allocations for general local

government support, and others—such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington—have State agencies for community affairs which administer substantial financial assistance programs, many States still provide grossly inadequate amounts of funds to assist various local public services. With respect to “buying into” direct Federal-local urban development grant programs, for example, 34 States in 1969 provided on \$230 million in matching funds for 12 programs—low-rent public housing, urban renewal, urban planning assistance, model cities, urban mass transportation, airport development, community action, waste treatment facilities, air pollution control, juvenile delinquency prevention, solid waste disposal, and aid for educationally deprived children. New York alone accounted for more than half of the total amount of “buying in.” In view of these facts, many local officials have urged their States to expand existing aid greatly and to undertake new aid programs. When confronted by unwillingness or inability at the State level, they have turned unhesitatingly to the Federal government for remedial action.

Cooperation or Coercion?

On balance, most observers agree that within the last decade many State governments have sufficiently modernized their executive and legislative branches and tax systems to enable them to deal effectively with regional and urban problems. At the same time, increasingly the States are unshackling their local governments and providing them with the capacity to respond to citizen needs.

Despite these favorable trends, in light of the persistence of certain problems stemming from fragmentation of local governmental structure and service delivery systems, some reformers believe that the States should move beyond permissive and supportive actions vis-a-vis local units. They assert that the time has come for States to adopt a more directive and supervisory substate regional policy.

Proponents of aggressive State action on the area-wide front argue that where counties and cities have been hesitant to take advantage of permissive home rule legislation, the States should step in and mandate the performance of functions as well as necessary structural, administrative, and fiscal adjustments. In some cases, the establishment of subordinate State agencies may be justified. These units would perform regional functions—such as transportation in Massachusetts and New York—in certain parts of the State.

Another dimension of this authoritative State role involves coming to grips with local governmental fragmentation. Possible remedial steps that could be taken include establishment of boundary adjustment boards with power to approve or disapprove

proposals for annexation or incorporation; liberalization of procedures relating to city-county consolidations, or, if conditions warrant, achieving such mergers through State law, like the Indianapolis experience; and enactment of legislation setting forth specific criteria for assessing the political and economic viability of local governments to avoid further propping up of ineffective local units with State aid.

A third line of attack is State establishment of umbrella regional councils, as in the Twin Cities area and Atlanta. These bodies would have a wide range of areawide planning and program responsibilities and authority to coordinate and control special district operations within their boundaries.

Critics of these strategies contend that for sound political reasons most States are unwilling or unable to go beyond permissive legislation in dealing with their local governments. They note that only recently has much unshackling occurred, and even so 35 States still have not approved general home rule powers for local units. Furthermore, merely a handful of States have taken aggressive action on area-wide and local institutional matters. For example, there are only six boundary review commissions, only one State has brought about a city-county consolidation, and only two have set up umbrella regional councils. Moreover, a majority of the substate districting efforts reveal no clear purpose as to how these districts will meet local, regional, or State purposes. Hence, it is asserted, political feasibility dictates a State approach to substate regional problems that will continue to be structurally and functionally permissive and fiscally supportive, but not authoritative.

FEDERAL STRATEGIES

During the second half of the 1960's and continuing throughout the early part of the 1970's, the Federal government exercised a major regional leadership role, partially in response to an institutional void at the multicounty level created by local and State inaction. The areawide efforts of Federal agencies were directed primarily at multifunctional regional councils and single-purpose districts. However, Federal incentives or requirements for regional planning, grant application review, and program development had major implications for general purpose local governments as well.

Some critics point out that the by-passing of city and county governments in favor of multicounty bodies resulted in a growth of regional bureaucracies that were unresponsive to local needs and priorities, a siphoning off of Federal funds that otherwise would have been available for local purposes, and a preoccupation with areawide planning programs that were divorced from city and county implementation activities. These developments in turn, they

claim, provided few compelling reasons for local governments to reorganize and regionalize, particularly when the bulk of the Federal substate categorical grants were still being allocated to existing local governments. Other observers, however, look at these same trends and conclude that the Federal areawide programs have provided the only strong stimulus for local units to begin to make the institutional and operational adjustments necessary to be able to respond better to multi-jurisdictional problems and to fill the governmental vacuum at the multicounty level.

While there is disagreement over whether recent substate regional developments under Federal auspices generally increased or impeded the pace of reforms in city hall and county courthouse, it is clear that the Federal government has a keen interest in the shape and substance of local governmental organization. Most agree that the ultimate success of revenue sharing, block grants, and categorical assistance—not to mention a national growth policy—rests heavily on the resolution of this issue. It is equally apparent that Federal grants-in-aid can have profound effect upon structures and functions at both the substate regional and local levels.

Some reformers, particularly those who are skeptical about the prospects for authoritative State action on local governmental reform matters, contend that certain modifications in Federal aid policies could give real impetus to local and areawide reorganization efforts. They recall the decisive impact upon the States of requirements attached to Federal conditional grants for education and social services, calling for a single State agency to be established to handle intergovernmental program relationships and mandating certain qualifications for State administrators. If States are willing to make major adjustments in their executive branch organization and personnel systems in return for Federal grants, they ask, why can't this approach work at the local and areawide levels?

These observers favor "strings" on Federal assistance to induce this restructuring. Several different triggering devices have been discussed. In project and formula grant programs, for example, bonus grants could be made available for projects submitted by combinations of local units, as was authorized in the Clean Water Act of 1966. To take another approach, building upon the provision of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 that gave general purpose local governments priority over special districts in Federal grant decisions, preference in awarding grants could be given to applications submitted by local consortia and by general purpose governments performing a variety—not a handful—of local functions. A more hard-nosed approach advocated by some is simply to include a

population or limited-purpose government cut-off in Federal aid legislation. As a result, smaller and presumably less viable units would be ineligible for funds unless they combined with larger jurisdictions. In addition to more effective utilization of available Federal dollars, proponents contend that these approaches would expedite the A-95 and grant application processes, since clearinghouses and Federal agencies would have to deal with fewer potential applicants.

For several years prior to the enactment of the State and Local Government Financial Assistance Act of 1972, reformers debated the desirability and feasibility of limiting eligibility for revenue sharing funds to general purpose local governments over 10,000, 25,000, or 50,000 population. A restriction of this type, it was believed, would make available proportionately more funds for larger jurisdictions having the greatest needs, as well as avoid propping up inefficient local units. This approach was recommended by both ACIR and the National Commission on Urban Problems (the Douglas Commission), and was embodied in the revenue sharing proposal introduced in 1969 by Senators Muskie and Goodell.

The 1971 Humphrey-Reuss revenue sharing bill contained a different approach to subnational reform. Instead of a population cut-off as a condition of eligibility for revenue sharing, localities as well as States were required to prepare comprehensive modernization plans, periodically report on progress in their implementation efforts, and make necessary revisions from time to time.

In addition to strings that might be attached to categorical grants and revenue sharing, some advocate greater direct Federal support for on-going local and areawide reform efforts. This might include, for example, financial aid to local government boundary commissions and to State or metropolitan/regional study commissions on local and areawide governmental reorganization. Technical assistance also might be provided to these organizations.

Besides the Federal financial "carrot," supporters of more consistent and aggressive Federal action on substate regional and local matters point out certain administrative "sticks" that could be employed to achieve this objective. A major weapon is OMB Circular A-95, which some believe should be revised to require Federal funding agencies to rely exclusively on existing regional governments—such as city-county consolidations—where they encompass most of a substate district's area and are capable of performing areawide functions. On a related front, the Office of Management and Budget and the Bureau of the Census, it is argued, should cooperate in developing metropolitan area designations that clarify rather than confuse reorganization and dis-

tricting endeavors. Moreover, these agencies should develop operational definitions of general purpose local government, including viability criteria, and ensure that they are used in administering Federal assistance programs, including revenue sharing.

On the other side of the coin, opponents charge that conditions attached to Federal categorical grants requiring or encouraging local reorganization represent an unwarranted intrusion into city and county as well as State affairs, and run counter to recent trends toward decentralization of greater decision making responsibility to the State and local levels. After all, they contend, there is no proof that smaller localities are non-viable or even inefficient. Indeed, the opposite may well be the case, since these local units are closer to the sources of problems and more accountable to the public for the effectiveness of remedial actions. A population cut-off or requirements and incentives favoring consortia of local applicants, then, are arbitrary provisions reflecting more of a reformer's penchant for jurisdictional neatness and order than the results of a systematic analysis of the requisites for efficient and effective grant administration.

Particularly with regard to revenue sharing, it is asserted, smaller local units are just as deserving of their share of available funds as larger jurisdictions — after all, residents of both pay taxes and have public service demands that need to be met. Moreover, such provisions are a clear contradiction of the “no strings” thrust of revenue sharing.

LINGERING QUESTIONS

This chapter has attempted to put in analytical perspective the wide range of critical problems and issues involved in substate regional developments, and to examine the pros and cons of various strategies that have been employed traditionally to achieve areawide governance. Basic questions have been raised concerning the present status and future directions of local governmental reorganization in the substate regional framework, including:

- Are recent Federal and State substate regional districting policies and programs a help or a hinderance to local and area-wide reform?
- Are restructured regional councils a reform goal in and of themselves or a half-

way point for complete governmental reorganization in metropolitan and/or non-metropolitan areas?

- Can the patchwork approach to area-wide problems continue to keep the local political system from collapsing?
- Are areawide general purpose local units such as city-county consolidations or urban counties a desirable end result of reform or a feasible building block in a regional governance system?
- Should the State adopt a permissive or authoritative position vis-a-vis local governmental reorganization?
- Should the Federal government through grants-in-aid and revenue sharing encourage or require basic structural and operational changes at the local and area-wide levels?
- Should criteria relating to the economic and social viability of local governmental units be developed and applied in State and Federal grant programs?
- How can the unique problems of interstate areas be handled through general purpose local government machinery?
- Is there a single intergovernmental strategy for substate regional reform that public officials and citizens will support?

The following chapter focuses on the State and Federal roles in local and areawide governmental reorganization and considers these and other questions in terms of several recommended actions to achieve a more effective regional governance process.

Footnotes

¹For an in-depth treatment of criteria for the performance of urban functions, see Volume IV.

²Two other areawide alternatives will not be considered because of their limited applicability: extraterritorial powers and city-county separation.

Chapter VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This volume of the Commission's study of *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System* has focused on the more traditional means of promoting interlocal cooperation and of achieving local as well as areawide governmental reorganization. In this second phase of the study, we have moved beyond the districting issues and recommendations detailed in Volume I¹ and confronted the long range, more elemental questions subsumed under the general heading of modernizing local government.

In the Commission's view, no analysis of the complexities and challenge of recent substate regional developments would be complete without full consideration of this basic issue. Federally supported districts, State established substate districts, special districts and public authorities, regional councils and coordinative areawide procedures and devices are, after all, a sad commentary on the fact that the present jurisdictional and functional assignment pattern at the substate level, in all but a few cases, is markedly dysfunctional and increasingly undemocratic.

Efficiency, equity, and political accountability are basic goals that are difficult to approximate in any free governmental system, given the tension and conflict between and among them. But, at the substate regional level, again with some notable exceptions, no formal arena or familiar political process exists to even grapple with these issues and the countless specific policy questions—all of an areawide nature—that relate to them. This pushes many of these issues and policies to the Federal and State levels and prompts these levels to sustain or mandate a variety of substate regional bodies and mechanisms. Legitimate and directly accountable authority, then, is the missing piece in the metropolitan and non-metropolitan regional mosaics. Moreover, the jurisdictional fragmentation and structural and fiscal weakness of many governmental units at the local level have compounded the problem of coping with servicing challenges.

This in no way denigrates the constructive role that can be assumed by the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations (UMJO's) which emerge from the recommendations advanced in Volume I of this series.

As we view them, there is full compatibility between our UMJO proposals and the agenda for general local governmental reform set forth in this chapter. An overall effort in both areas must be mounted to bring the structure, functions, and personnel units below the State level to a point where they can cope with the electorate's current and future servicing needs and in a more efficient, effective, and accountable fashion than now generally prevails.

In some large substate regions, the UMJO would be the only politically feasible regional alternative—either now or in the future—yet, local government modernization would still be possible and needed to facilitate many of the UMJO's difficult assignments.² In other, smaller, less complicated areas, the UMJO might be only a short range response to the immediate problems of mushrooming districts, and here areawide governmental reorganization efforts might be strengthened by the umbrella organization—to the point that some form of regional government eventually would supersede it. In a handful of substate regions, a regional government already is in place and no UMJO would be necessary. Quite clearly, the differences among all these regions as to size, jurisdictional complexity, political attitudes, and servicing problems preclude any across-the-board generalizations about the specific relationship between our UMJO and general local governmental modernization proposals.

But despite this diversity, four facts stand out:

- All substate regions require an authoritative, areawide decisionmaker, whether an UMJO or a government;
- All but a handful of these areas require a strengthening of their local units;
- Certainly a majority of them face major hurdles in achieving areawide governmental reform in the near future; and
- All of the interstate metropolitan areas confront insurmountable regional reorganization hurdles, save perhaps for the UMJO option.

These are the factors that explain the linkages between the UMJO and local governmental modernization components of our substate regional strategy. The third element in this strategy is provided by the pair of recommendations in Volume IV of this series, relating to the need for more systematic functional assignment processes.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The following constitutes a summary of this volume's findings relating to the assignment of substate functions, county reform, other local government restructuring efforts, and the pattern of government in non-metropolitan areas. These findings, in turn, provide a background for the reorganization recommendations that complete this volume and this second phase of our report on *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System*.

Assignment of Functions: Local and Areawide³

- Two distinct levels of functional assignment affect substate regions nationally: one between Federal, State, and local governments, and the

other among different kinds of local government. The Federal government tends to be the foremost direct provider of natural resource development and air and water transportation services. State governments are the major providers of higher education, highways, welfare, and correctional services. At the interlocal level, counties provide the bulk of welfare, health, and hospital functions while municipal governments remain the major providers of primary and secondary education, police, fire protection, sewerage, parks and recreation, and water supply functions.

- Intergovernmental service agreements are among the most popular means of changing substate functional assignments. As of 1972, 42 States had general interlocal cooperation statutes, with 32 permitting cooperation across State lines and one authorizing agreements with Canadian subnational governments. The two chief impediments to the fullest use of these statutes are (1) both of the governments involved in 31 States must possess the power separately in order to exercise it jointly, and (2) the general law in 13 States does not supersede a separately enacted contracting statute in a specific functional area.

- Intergovernmental service agreements are among the most popular means of changing substate functional assignments. As of 1972, 42 States had general interlocal cooperation statutes, with 32 permitting cooperation across State lines and one authorizing agreements with Canadian subnational governments. The two chief impediments to the fullest use of these statutes are (1) both of the governments involved in 31 States must possess the power separately in order to exercise it jointly, and (2) the general law in 13 States does not supersede a separately enacted contracting statute in a specific functional area.

- The most popular functions and activities covered by service agreements include technical components of the police function (such as training, crime laboratories, and communication), planning, engineering services, sewage and solid waste disposal, water supply, jails, libraries, street lighting, refuse collection, and animal control. Functions or activities that are rarely the subject of intergovernmental service agreements include record maintenance, zoning, urban renewal, basic police services, and building inspection.

- Transfers and consolidations of functions are less used means of changing substate functional assignments. Only 8 percent of all intergovernmental servicing agreements covered in the 1972 ACIR/ICMA survey involved the shared or consolidated provision of a service. The ACIR/ICMA/NACO survey of county government (1971, 1972) indicated that service transfers and consolidations were most prevalent in the functions of libraries, planning, health, and corrections, and were least practiced in the areas of power supply, natural resources, transportation and housing.

- Service agreements are considered distinct from functional transfers, with a transfer being more permanent and constituting a major shift in fiscal responsibility and policy control. This distinction, however, is often blurred. Of the ten States allowing general functional transfers, five provide for revocation, five require voter approval, and three require payment to the government assuming the function.

- Of the 2,316 incorporated municipalities responding to the ACIR-ICMA survey, 63 percent enter into servicing agreements with other governments. The larger the government, the greater its tendency to enter into agreements. Council-manager cities were more prone to servicing cooperation than other municipal types, and central and suburban cities entered into more agreements than non-metropolitan units. The dominant motive behind these efforts was to benefit from economies of scale, and the main inhibiting factor was the fear that local independence would be limited.

- Recently established substate agencies and procedures have added a new functional dimension to the substate performance of functions. State substate districts and regional councils have performed useful auxiliary tasks. They have raised the level of comprehensive planning in substate regions, provided a forum for interlocal communication on pressing functional matters, and better identified the goals and objectives of various regional functions. They occasionally have encouraged establishment of new areawide servicing organizations and sometimes have directly provided controversial substate functions.

- Federally encouraged substate districts have played several distinct roles in the performance of functions. All such agencies prepare com-

prehensive or functional plans in order to formulate project funding priorities within their jurisdiction. Some mobilize funds for their program purposes, and a few implement their programs. In addition, most have supplied significant functional technical assistance to local governments in their jurisdictions.

- Regional special purpose districts remain important service providers in many metropolitan areas. Over half of all such districts in the 72 largest metropolitan areas were responsible for more than 40 percent of all metropolitan expenditures in their particular area of functional responsibility. Health and hospital, sewerage, and utility districts were most important in this regard.

- Most counties continue to perform mainly the traditional State assigned functions, namely, various types of correctional, police, health and welfare services. They are less important providers of such urban and regional services as parks and recreation, urban renewal, solid waste disposal, sewerage, airports and air pollution control. Strong urban counties in California, Maryland, New York, and Florida are major exceptions to this generalization.

- Assignment or reassignment of governmental functions through comprehensive structural change is rare. Where it has occurred, centralized functions have improved in their scope and quality and the financing of these functions has been broadened as reorganized governments have received more intergovernmental aid and utilized more non-property revenue sources. On the other hand, in most metropolitan reorganizations, pressures for lower tier units to provide a variety of human resource functions also have developed.

- Four main guides to functional assignment emerge as pivotal substate regional considerations: fiscal equity, economic efficiency, administrative effectiveness, and political accountability. The specific components of economic efficiency include the conditions of economies of scale, public sector competition, and public service pricing. Fiscal equity is concerned with reduction of economic spillovers and implementation of interpersonal and interjurisdictional fiscal equalization policies. The main facets of political accountability subsume citizen access to, control of, and sometimes participation in the performance of a function. Administrative effectiveness centers on the legal authority and

geographic reach a government possesses in meeting its functional responsibilities, as well as on the management capability and degree of intergovernmental cooperation it exhibits.

- A functional assignment policy frequently hinges on procedural conditioners, as well as structural means of allocating functions. Procedural mechanisms include the A-95 process, the intergovernmental service contract, and transfer and consolidation of functions. All these measures have permitted voluntary and *ad hoc* changes in functional assignments. Structural means of changing functional assignments include State substate and Federally encouraged substate districts, regional councils, regional special districts, metropolitan counties, and full-scale areawide governmental reorganizations.

- Analysis of individual services is vital to a functional assignment policy. Functions, in actuality, are composed of numerous subfunctions and activities, all or part of which may be assigned to one or another level of government. While it is difficult to describe fully the characteristics of a local or areawide function, local services tend to focus on the individual or his immediate neighborhood, or to have minor impact on surrounding communities or on the performance of other functions. Areawide functions tend to have the opposite characteristics. In more general terms, areawide functions generally have a redistributive or regulatory dimension, while local ones are those where social control and program choice are more significant.

County Reform

- While county governments began as administrative units of the States, with responsibilities limited to courts, welfare, and public health, some have now added an array of urban functions. Where city-county consolidation has taken place, the full set of municipal functions have been undertaken by restructured governments having strong, unified executive or administrative leadership. Some suburban counties in metropolitan areas also have taken on municipal-type functions and forms.

- In single-county SMSAs, county reorganization has been looked upon as a potential means of providing a two-tier approach to regional reform. The 127 unicounty SMSAs have a population range of between 60,000 and 7 million

persons, but 80 percent are under 400,000 population, compared with 48 percent of all multi-county metropolitan areas.

- Forty-five percent of the unicity SMSAs function under a county commission form of government, while the remainder have county manager or administrator systems. In 13 States, all single-county SMSAs operate under a commission form of government; while in 15, one or more are home rule charter counties.

- Nearly 75 percent of all metropolitan county expenditures are made for traditional county functions—corrections, welfare, roads, health and hospitals, natural resource development, financial administration, and general control—but unicity SMSA jurisdictions concentrate more of their outlays on these services than counties in multicounty SMSAs.

- Two-thirds of the single-county SMSA units have adopted zoning or subdivision regulations for their unincorporated areas, but less than two-fifths review or comment on land-use controls in incorporated areas.

- With a few exceptions, metropolitan county governments have been unable to utilize non-property taxes or to incur major expenditures for functions that are not traditionally State assigned.

- Most metropolitan counties have some formal controls over special districts through approval of their formation, budgets, and/or tax systems, but special district consolidation or abolition has been attempted infrequently.

- Over two-thirds of the single-county SMSA jurisdictions have been involved in inter-governmental cooperation in the provision of certain services, particularly planning, health, corrections, police and highways.

- Half of the unicity SMSA governments are coterminous with A-95 clearinghouse, HUD “701” metropolitan planning agency, and OEO Community Action Agency boundaries. Rarely, if ever, however, does the Federal government use such jurisdictions as the basis for Resource Conservation and Development Districts, Economic Development Districts, Air Quality Control Regions, or Local Development Districts.

- Only five unicity SMSAs are coterminous

with State planning and development districts, and less than ten States provide for county representation on the policy boards of such organizations.

- Only 20 of the unicity SMSA governments have locally sponsored metropolitan planning organizations that are coterminous with county boundaries.

Local Government Restructuring

- The recent record shows that annexation has been employed extensively to enlarge municipal boundaries. During the 1960’s, 63.2 percent of all urban municipalities annexed territory, but most individual annexations were small. Nevertheless, the aggregate population and total area added are significant. More than 6 million persons became residents of municipalities through annexation during the decade of the 1960’s and during the two-year period of 1970 and 1971, 1,517 square miles were annexed. Annexation was least used in the East and by the largest cities.

- Since 1959, six States have established broad-gauged local boundary review boards. Three States have single statewide commissions; in three others, systems of county or areawide boards are employed; and a seventh State has established a statewide agency which will be in full operation in 1974. A number of the existing commissions are contributing to the orderly and logical expansion of municipal boundaries, and to a slower growth rate in the numbers of special districts and municipalities within their jurisdictions.

- More city-county consolidations (11) took place in the United States during the 1962-72 decade than occurred during the previous century and a half. Of the five which involved consolidations with metropolitan central cities, four occurred in the South. The exception, Unigov in Indianapolis, was the first in the North and the first mandated by a State legislature without a referendum in the twentieth century. City-county consolidations have served as the focus for very few Federally aided areawide programs and State districting efforts.

- The two and three-tier approaches to local and areawide governmental reorganization are beginning to command attention in the United States. Dade County represents the sole ex-

ample of a deliberate chartering of a federated urban county. A few States now allow the incorporation of metropolitan multifunctional servicing districts, and a handful are presently functioning. The State-supported umbrella regional council, best represented in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, is the past decade's chief three-tier innovation. This general purpose policy making body has responsibility for developing areawide plans, for coordinating the major independent functional agencies within the region, and controlling the physical development of the metropolitan area.

- The enlarged jurisdictions created by second-tier governments and metropolitan consolidations make fiscal equity easier to accomplish, although no fundamental shifts have been made yet in the collection and distribution of local resources in favor of those at the lower end of the economic scale. Yet, these restructured governments, especially the city-county consolidations, have apparently been more successful than their predecessors in securing Federal aid for the administration of programs that are redistributive in nature.

- Although evidence exists that consolidated and second-tier governments, but not State supported regional councils, result in higher total expenditures for local government, they do not always result in higher tax rates. Further, such reform governments have generally produced strengthened executive management and coordination, more effective use of tax money, and a higher level of public services.

The Non-Metropolitan Governmental Pattern

- The majority of local governments in the United States are in non-metropolitan areas, including 70 percent of the municipalities, 85 percent of the counties, 80 percent of the townships, and 67 percent of the special districts. This should be expected, since over 95 percent of the nation's land area is non-metropolitan. Yet, only about 30 percent of the nation's population lives in these areas and non-metropolitan governments as a result generally serve fewer people than do the governments in metropolitan areas.

- Compared to local governments in metropolitan areas, the non-metropolitan units provide fewer services, exhibit less executive or administrative leadership capacity, suffer from more diseconomies of scale, have weaker financial

bases, and use intergovernmental cooperation agreements less frequently.

- The non-metropolitan municipalities concentrate their expenditures on highways, sewerage, general control, and financial administration to a much greater extent than the larger metropolitan municipalities; their expenditures account for less than 10 percent of all municipal general expenditures, although their populations account for nearly 22 percent of the city total.

- Non-metropolitan counties, not unexpectedly, are smaller in population than their metropolitan counterparts (70 percent have fewer than 25,000 residents); they concentrate more heavily on the traditional administrative functions assigned by the States (tax assessment, election and judicial administration, health and welfare services, and highways); they have the highest per capita expenditures of all counties (\$106.94 for those under 10,000 people and \$75.11 for those with 10,000 to 24,999); and they are less likely to have modernized structures (only 16 percent of the non-metropolitan counties surveyed had reorganized their executive branches, compared to 41 percent of the metropolitan counties).

- Non-metropolitan townships have an average population which is one-seventh that of metropolitan townships (1,134 people vs. 7,266); their average budget is one-eighth as large (\$55,949 vs. \$439,846); their average staff numbers ten people; the bulk of their expenditures goes for highways and education; they spend disproportionate amounts on financial administration and general control; and in only half of the States having townships is the chief administrator form of township organization used.

- Non-metropolitan special districts account for two-thirds of all the independent special districts in the nation; they average only about six per county, however, as opposed to about 18 per county in metropolitan areas; and they are countywide more often than their metropolitan counterparts (14 vs. 6 percent), but slightly less citywide or townshipwide (7 vs. 10 percent and 5 vs. 7 percent, respectively).

- In marked contrast to those in metropolitan areas, only a little over two-fifths of the local governments in non-metropolitan areas use

interlocal cooperation agreements for the performance of their functions.

• Because of the sparseness and small size of the non-metropolitan governments' populations and the limited nature of their functions, resources and capabilities, regional interest and institutions have emerged in non-metropolitan America. But, the setting is somewhat different than that in metropolitan areas, and the regional concerns are somewhat dissimilar. Achieving economies of scale, promoting economic development, and protecting natural resources are the prime goals in these areas, whereas interagency coordination of conflicting governmental programs, the provision of areawide services, and equity considerations tend to dominate in the urban regional scene.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With the following pair of recommendations, the Commission seeks to chart a sensible course toward local and areawide governmental reorganization in light of the continuing intergovernmental challenge at the substate regional level. The focus here is chiefly on the States and localities, given the former's prime constitutional role and responsibilities *vis-a-vis* local governments and the latter's vital concern with actions that are taken on this front. The Federal government's assignment is largely a complementary one.

Over the past dozen years in eight different reports, this Commission has urged State adoption of more than 25 separate non-fiscal recommendations relating to the strengthening and restructuring of the nation's counties and cities. The proposals advanced here build on this foundation.

In urging this agenda for reform, the Commission is fully cognizant of the wide variations in local governmental forms, functions, and finances within and among the States. The Commission also recognizes that no single reform option could possibly apply to all substate regions and all local governments, that effective umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations may be the most suitable and feasible option in many instances, that local reorganization efforts may be as crucial as areawide ones, that the timing of implementation of reform options will vary, and that no across-the-board formula can or should be devised to cover all the ways the States can assume a positive role in this vital process. Hence, this agenda incorporates considerable flexibility while providing a clear direction and consistent basic purposes. Specific proposals will require State-by-State adaptations. But the prime goal of a more responsive system of local and areawide gov-

ernance should not be lost sight of in this adaptive process.

The State Role

Recommendation 1. A Comprehensive State Policy and Process

The Commission concludes that the time has come for all States to adopt a comprehensive, long range policy with respect to the structure and functions of their local governments and the relationships of such governments to one another, the State, and official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations established pursuant to substate districting statutes. It notes that existing State policies in this pivotal area for the most part have been piecemeal, partial, and out-dated. It finds that continuing urbanization and technological change have strained the capacity of most local governments within substate regions to effectively plan, administer, and finance needed public services.

At this point then, the Commission believes that the States in conjunction with their localities must devise a strategy designed to help local governments meet the structural, functional, and fiscal challenges of substate regionalism. This policy should be developed in a systematic, comprehensive fashion, considering distinctive State, non-metropolitan, and metropolitan jurisdictional problems. Hence . . .

The Commission recommends that States through statutory, and, where necessary, constitutional action adopt a comprehensive local government structure and functions policy involving immediate goals as well as an on-going process for their implementation and updating. This policy should be geared (a) to structuring the system of local governments so as to make it more responsive and adaptable to the areawide as well as local needs of individual communities, (b) to interrelating substate regional districting and related activities with local governmental reform efforts, and (c) to striking a balance between State initiative and local as well as areawide self-determination in achieving the above two goals.

The Commission recommends that, at a minimum, such State legislation and, where necessary, constitutional enactments should . . .

A. Set specific standards for—

(1) assessing the structural, functional, fiscal, and geographic viability of all existing and proposed local governments—special districts and school districts as well as units of general government—using such factors as (a) their capacity to raise revenues adequately and equitably, (b) their mix of residential, industrial or other tax base components, (c) their

population and geographic size, and socio-economic and racial composition, and (d) the assignment of areawide and local governmental functions, including components thereof, to appropriate and accountable units of government.

(2) governing the orderly and equitable extension of municipal boundaries to embrace unincorporated territory, including procedures for—(a) assignment of initiating authority to municipal governing bodies as well as to residents in an unincorporated area seeking to be annexed; and (b) elimination of any absolute power on the part of inhabitants of outlying unincorporated areas, which are proposed to be annexed, to veto a proposed annexation meeting statutory standards, including the provision of urban services.⁴

B. Establish a broadly representative local government boundary commission at the State and/or local level(s). In addition to exercising those powers regulating municipal incorporations, non-viable units of general local government, special districts, and interlocal servicing agreements that were recommended in previous Commission reports,⁵ the boundary commission(s) should be authorized to . . .

- (1) oversee the implementation of the statutory standards, cited above, and apply them, where pertinent, to individual boundary decision cases that come before it;
- (2) recommend modification of substate district boundaries, subject to action by the appropriate State authority;
- (3) recommend modification of individual county boundaries in light of changing settlement and servicing patterns;
- (4) monitor, recommend, and, where appropriate, facilitate municipal annexations of adjacent unincorporated areas;
- (5) develop in conjunction with affected local jurisdictions, including counties, "spheres of influence" or "staged expansion limits" that delimit the ultimate boundaries of existing individual municipalities and help identify areas of potential municipal incorporation;
- (6) make annual reports with recommendations to the governor and legislature on efforts to strengthen the basic pattern of local government.

C. Provide for a complete package of county structural reform options and initiatives that, in addition to an optional forms authorization,⁶ includes at a minimum:

- (1) the requirement that any county embracing the predominant portion of a metropolitan area's population shall have a full-time executive officer, either appointed by the county board or popularly elected;
- (2) placing county officers on a statutory rather than a constitutional basis;
- (3) empowering the governing bodies of contiguous counties within substate regions to consolidate identical or comparable county offices and functions;
- (4) authorizing the governing bodies of contiguous counties within substate regions to execute a multicounty consolidation, subject to a simple concurrent majority of the votes in a referendum in each of the counties encompassed in the proposed merger.

D. Clarify and systematize the functional responsibilities and relationships of counties and municipalities, by establishing the county as the basic service provider for its unincorporated areas,⁷ in addition to performing basic county functions, and by . . .

- (1) authorizing counties to perform urban functions⁸ in order to eliminate situations where they are barred from providing such services when (a) the service is being provided by a countywide or less than countywide special district, (b) a constituent municipality requests the county to perform the service, or (c) the public expresses through a popular referendum a preference for the county to perform the service on a countywide basis, and requiring that such functions when undertaken in incorporated areas meet performance standards developed by the county and affected municipalities and be set forth in a county ordinance;
- (2) requiring that in instances where counties undertake to perform functions already provided by their constituent municipalities, such counties either enhance the quality or scope of such services or make proportionate payments to their municipalities in lieu thereof pursuant to a joint agreement;
- (3) delineating uniform procedures for transferring functions between and among municipalities, counties, and multi-county regional bodies including officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations; at a minimum, such procedures should (a) involve the repeal of State constitutional and statutory provisions requiring voter approval

of proposed transfers,* (b) authorize revocation of a transfer when its performance falls below standards initially agreed to in the transfer, and (c) empower a jointly agreed upon body to determine whether a transferred function has not met such performance standards.**

E. Strengthen the State's supportive role in the functional assignment area by:

(1) requiring counties having unincorporated territory or municipalities contiguous to such areas to develop within a specified period effective planning, zoning, and subdivision regulations for such areas, where such do not now exist, provided that where such regulations have not been adopted within the time span stipulated an appropriate State agency would assume the responsibility; and

(2) establishing a program of State technical and fiscal assistance to counties and municipalities for (a) management feasibility studies on transferring and consolidating functions and (b) extraordinary initial costs incurred in actual transfers or consolidations.

F. Permit, where the electorate by referendum chooses, the establishment of governmental units capable of providing areawide services. The Commission does not necessarily recommend affirmative action with respect to any of the following options in any specific situation, but believes the people should have available to them a range of choices, which would include:

(1) Multi-county consolidation and assignment to it of all areawide functions and—where its geographic scope is adequate—of all umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizational functions;

(2) City-county consolidation wherein all areawide and local functions are assigned to the new government and special districts are either merged with or are subordinated to it;

(3) The modernized county, possessing all of the structural, functional, and fiscal powers detailed in Components C and D, with such powers embodied in a new county charter;

(4) The possibility of converting a substate region's officially designated umbrella multi-

jurisdictional organization into a general purpose government with a directly elected council or a bicameral council, one chamber popularly elected and the other composed of representatives of constituent units of general government;

(5) The right to create a regional service corporation (a) subsuming all existing and proposed areawide special districts, (b) having responsibility for certain areawide functions including, but not limited to, areawide comprehensive planning and land use, transportation, waste disposal, and water supply, which heretofore may or may not have been performed on a regional basis, and (c) with popular election of its policy body.

Such enabling legislation should require that all of the above options would involve approval in a popular referendum by simple concurrent majorities in the central city or cities and in the outlying area or areas in metropolitan areas, by a simple concurrent majority in each of the counties involved in non-metropolitan areas or districts, or by a simple areawide majority.

Such legislation also should stipulate that such referenda could be initiated by any of the following within a substate region:

(1) a single or concurrent resolution of one or more units of general local government comprising a certain percentage of the region's population;

(2) petition of a certain percentage of the eligible voters in the area proposed for inclusion within a new regional unit; or

(3) direct action by the State legislature.

G. Provide for a broadly representative, permanent Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to be constituted with adequate staff and funding and charged with studying and reporting on:

(1) the current pattern of local governmental structure and substate regional organization and their viability;

(2) the powers and functions of local governments and substate regional bodies, including their fiscal powers;

(3) the existing, necessary, and desirable relationships between and among local governments and substate regional organizations, including official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations;

(4) the existing, necessary, and desirable allocation of State-local fiscal resources;

(5) the existing, necessary, and desirable roles of the State as the creator of the local

*Congressman Brown dissented from the decision to include this provision in this subcomponent.

**County Executive Michaelian favored inclusion of an additional provision requiring full State financing of newly mandated or of major expansions of existing State mandated programs.

governmental and substate regional governance systems;

(6) the special problems in interstate areas facing their general local governments, intrastate regional units, and areawide bodies, such studies where possible to be conducted in conjunction with those of a pertinent sister State commission(s); and

(7) any constitutional amendments and statutory enactments required to implement appropriate commission recommendations.

Such commission shall render separate reports on individual topics covered under one or more of these broad subject areas, including whatever recommendations might be agreed upon, with specific bills and proposed constitutional amendments, where needed, being appended to them; in addition, it shall submit an annual report to the governor, legislature, local governments, substate regional units, and the citizenry.

This omnibus State recommendation, with its seven major components and nearly two dozen significant subcomponents, is designed to achieve five broad and interrelated objectives.

First, it seeks to place the full force of State statutory authority behind a set of enforceable standards relating to new incorporations, local governmental viability, and municipal annexation.

Second, it urges establishment by the States of local governmental boundary commissions to apply these standards in specific cases and to assume an on-going responsibility with reference to such other matters as the dissolution or consolidation of special districts and non-viable general governmental units, adjustments of county and substate regional boundaries, and annexation developments.

Third, it provides a packet of nine reform proposals designed to revitalize the structure of counties, to reconcile and rationalize county and municipal functional responsibilities, and to carve out a supportive State role in some of these undertakings.

Fourth, it sets forth a range of five basic areawide governmental reorganization options—each with special features and suitable for specific regional circumstances—with a variety of initiating moves provided, but popular approval required in all cases.

Finally, this multi-faceted, State-oriented recommendation calls for the formation, where lacking, of broadly representative State advis-

ory commissions on intergovernmental relations to probe on a continuing basis the structure, functions, finances, and relationships of lower-tier, middle-tier, and State governments. These commissions would publish reports on specific topics, make recommendations for solving interlevel problems, and submit an annual report to their respective governors, legislatures, local and regional units, and electorates.

All these efforts are geared to facilitating the modernization of local and areawide governmental institutions, so that they may discharge their servicing responsibilities to their respective communities in a more effective, equitable, efficient, and accountable manner. The primary burden for leadership in this matter is placed on the States. This is as it should be. States no longer can assume the role of the passive bystander in this vital matter. Given the plethora of programs, mechanisms, and special purpose bodies that have by-passed or superseded general local governments, it does not overstate the case to claim that the existence of such local governments, as we have known them, is very much at stake. At this juncture, the State, as the legal parents of the localities and of many of the institutions that compete with them, must assume an active stance, as some States recently have done. The localities obviously have a role here, and a complementary Federal role could be of critical help. In the final analysis, however, the electorate has the final word on all major reforms advanced here. But, the initiating thrust must come from the States and such is the basic assumption undergirding this recommendation.

* * * * *

The first component (A) of this recommended comprehensive State policy on local government centers on the development of specific statutory standards or criteria for assessing the structural, functional, and fiscal viability of existing and proposed local governments and for guiding municipal annexations. Such criteria have been previously endorsed by this Commission. Here, they are reaffirmed, but in simplified and somewhat more specific terms. In practice, standards relating to proposed new governments mean more restrictive municipal and special district incorporation statutes. Those relating to existing units, on the other hand, involve specifying fiscal, socio-economic, and servicing criteria that can be converted into guides for practical implementation.

The Commission, in its 1961 report *Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas*, recommended that States enact legislation providing for rigorous statutory standards for

establishing new municipal incorporations in metropolitan areas. Over the last five years, municipal incorporations have increased by over 450, the bulk of these occurring in urban areas. Metropolitan municipal incorporations now stand at 5,400 and the average metropolitan area contains about 21 municipalities.

Forty-one States have standards for municipal incorporations. Yet, most such standards are confined to such matters as minimum population, area, and property-value concentrations. Only a handful of States go beyond these standards and require specific services to be supplied by the incorporating municipality. The need for more comprehensive and rigorous State incorporation standards obviously is as strong as ever.

The character and purpose of some, but not all, proposed municipal incorporations underscore this need. Many involve exceedingly small areas and tiny populations. A substantial portion of all municipal incorporations since 1970 fall into the 5,000 or less population category or encompass a very small amount of territory, frequently less than five square miles. As of 1967, two-thirds of all metropolitan municipalities had less than 5,000 population and 60 percent possessed a land area of less than two square miles.

Incorporations sometimes occur for defensive or exclusionary purposes. Over 30 percent of all municipal incorporations between 1967 and 1972, for example, occurred in Texas and Oklahoma, where municipal annexation activities were on the rise. Other incorporations have been prompted for reasons of racial or social exclusion, while still others have been induced by programs of State tax sharing with municipalities. The foregoing highlights some of the negative practices that could be curbed by more rigorous incorporation standards.

Controlling special district formation has been a Commission concern for a decade. The basic thrust of its earlier recommendation was that new districts should be established only where no better alternative is available. State legislation then should specify a procedure to ascertain whether there is a need for the proposed service and whether any unit or combination of units of existing general government or even an existing special district is willing and able to provide it, subject to adequate provision for political accountability to the citizens affected.⁹

Some States have acted to establish an on-going process for administering and applying comprehensive standards for municipal and special district incorporation. Six States now have statewide, metropolitan, or countywide boundary commissions that have the power to review and/or approve new incorporations. Experience in at least two of these States—Minnesota and California—suggests that

rigorous incorporation standards enforced by strong boundary commissions can aid in controlling defensive and premature incorporations and curb special district growth. In these areas, planned and deliberate, rather than *ad hoc* and unsystematic, incorporation tends to occur. Such was the intent of the Commission's earlier recommendations, and it constitutes a basic goal of the proposal urged here.

Not only should State criteria extend to municipal and special district incorporation procedures, but they should embrace standards for assessing the fiscal, socio-economic, and functional viability of existing local governments as well. In both its 1967 report on *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, and its 1969 report on *State Aid to Local Government*, the Commission recommended that States enact local government viability criteria and take steps to restructure State aid and interlocal contracting policies that fracture metropolitan tax bases, exacerbate fiscal and socio-economic disparities, and prompt the proliferation of excessively small, functionally limited, fiscally unbalanced local governments.

In statutory terms, this means that standards should be specified which assure that existing local governments have the requisite population, economic, social, and fiscal bases necessary for effective administration of local services. Non-viable governments usually produce only a limited number and range of public services and frequently can not even provide minimum basic local services. Other governments, whether of a general or special purpose nature, frequently fill this servicing gap—either directly or through interlocal contracts and agreements. All this tends to undermine the entire concept of service accountability, and to make a myth of small units' claim to being general purpose governments. Such units in urban areas frequently compound the problems associated with metropolitan social, economic, and fiscal disparities.

Regarding existing special districts, the Commission has long urged enactment of State legislation authorizing simple procedures for merging special districts performing the same or similar functions, and permitting an appropriate unit of general government to assume a special district's function.¹⁰ These still stand as vital means of eliminating non-viable districts and merging those with overlapping functions. At this point, however, States also should adopt specific criteria relating to their financing, servicing capacity, linkage with general governments and accountability to the electorate—all with a view toward determining whether a district is unnecessary, unaccountable, duplicative of another local government's function, or unwanted.

In this proposal on standards, the Commission also urges expansion of the local government via-

bility criteria to cover questions relating to the assignment of functions to areawide and local governments. Functional assignment, we believe, is a basic dimension of local government viability. Many functions and components thereof are more effectively performed by areawide or local governmental units. Functions such as transportation, water pollution control, and solid waste disposal, for example, are ones that might be better performed by larger units of government, since they involve economies of scale and public service spillovers. Other services, however, like basic police and fire protection, refuse collection, and education are ones where political accountability and program control are of critical significance. Hence, a local assignment formula should prevail in most instances.

The Commission recognizes that a clear-cut and precise allocation of functional responsibilities is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at. It recognizes the diverse functional assignment patterns among and within the States. Yet, the fiscal, functional, and structural viability of local government directly relates to the servicing responsibilities a local government is assigned or expected to perform. Localities that are to provide essentially regional functions and areawide units that are given the responsibility for administering essentially local functions run the risk of being functionally non-viable.

Under either of these circumstances, the level in question would be administering inefficiently and ineffectively services for which another would be more suited. Moreover, in instances where the localities realistically do not attempt to assume an essentially areawide function and where no regional general purpose unit exists, either a special district, a State agency, or no unit takes on the servicing assignment—and this raises the broader question of the viability of the substate regional governance system as a whole. For all these reasons, the Commission endorses the assignment of functions component in a set of State standards for local governmental viability.

Opponents of viability standards argue that it is impossible and unnecessary to devise such criteria. They note the wide diversity of local governmental structures and of divisions of functional responsibility within the 50 State-local governmental systems. They argue that viability standards would not be practicable in most situations, given the severe political controversies they would engender. Some contend that where non-viable governments exist, State governments can always adopt measures to insure that the existence of these units will not compound substate functional problems. States, they contend, could mandate specific functional, personnel, or fiscal measures that would improve the service performance of such units.

Notwithstanding these objections, the Commission sanctions enactment of such standards.¹¹ The State is the principal architect of the local governmental structure and has the legal authority and duty to concern itself with matters of local governmental viability. Moreover, it is evident that problems of substate social, economic, and fiscal disparities are made increasingly more complex and sometimes almost insoluble by governmental fragmentation and *ad hoc* responses to functional assignment crises, largely in the form of new special districts. At the same time, non-viable governments which exacerbate disparity and districting problems are often a key factor prompting arbitrary State intervention in substate functional matters. A more viable system of local government would reduce the need for such State action.

The Commission believes that non-viable localities are a contributing factor to other substate problems. Such units generate, directly or indirectly, pressures for increased State aid or the transfer of essentially local functions to regional or State agencies. These actions, in turn, may result in an ineffective division of functions among the governmental levels, unnecessary State fiscal assistance to some units, and the propping of ineffective and only partially accountable units of local government.

The Commission is convinced that viability criteria are not a barrier to, but a buttress for, effective local government operations. In essence, they would simply seek to assure that local governments within a State, at a minimum, are able to discharge effectively those governmental responsibilities which are commensurate with their particular local governmental status. Such status should enable that unit to be ready, willing, and able to discharge its service responsibilities in an efficient, effective, equitable, and accountable fashion. Viability standards are one of the weapons in a State's arsenal that can and should be used to achieve this end.

The second feature of this component reaffirms and clarifies the Commission's earlier recommendation for standards governing municipal annexation. In its 1961 report, *Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas*, the Commission endorsed the principle of State criteria or standards for promoting more equitable and facilitative annexation policies. It also recommended granting municipalities the power to initiate annexation procedures and urged States to consider not permitting inhabitants of unincorporated areas to exercise a unilateral veto over annexation procedures. The Commission now reaffirms its 1961 recommendation and goes further to recommend outright prohibition of unincorporated area vetoes over annexations.

The Commission recognizes the important part that annexation has played and will continue to play in American local government viability. Our largest cities have largely grown through municipal annexation, and two-thirds of all municipalities over 2,500 population in 1970 engaged in annexation actions between 1960 and 1970. Over 6.6 million people resided in such annexed areas, as of 1970. Annexation, particularly in the South and West, has contributed to the growth of dominant central cities and helped to curb the inter-jurisdictional local disparities found in much of the northeast and midwest.

The Commission believes that annexation can offer benefits both to municipalities and unincorporated areas alike. Annexing municipalities can gain the land area and economic base needed for continued economic growth and social stability, while fringe areas can receive a wider range of local services.

Yet, specific statutory criteria or standards should govern annexation actions. In some cases, annexations have been resisted for patently racial or fiscal reasons and, in other instances, they have been a product more of local economic boosterism rather than of a planned policy of municipal growth. In still other cases, fringe areas have been annexed and not supplied with adequate municipal services. Under any of these circumstances, annexation becomes nothing more than a form of jurisdictional gerrymandering, unrelated to a planned and staged policy of municipal service expansion.

State standards and criteria for annexation should require municipalities to justify their actions and meet certain statutory requirements, especially servicing requirements, before annexation could occur. With such standards, annexation could be better related to various substate growth policies, something which has long been a concern of this Commission.

The Commission notes that a number of States already have enacted general standards relating to the geography, extent of urbanization, and servicing standards to be maintained in annexed areas. In the six boundary commission States, fairly elaborate administrative review systems govern such annexation actions.

At a minimum, the Commission advocates State enactments granting municipalities the right to initiate annexation procedures and prohibiting unilateral vetos of annexations by inhabitants of the unincorporated areas involved. Twenty-five States already grant municipalities the power to initiate such annexations, and most of these prohibit fringe areas from exercising a unilateral veto. These procedural improvements should be extended to all States.

* * * * *

Component (B) recommends establishment of local government boundary commissions at the State and/or local levels. Members might be appointed by the governor and confirmed by the State senate, and could include a mix of officials of general local governments and appropriate State agencies, as well as representatives of the general public, as some States have done, or solely the latter, as others have required.

The Commission believes that a boundary commission should be empowered by State legislation to:

- (1) serve as the on-going implementing agent of the statutory standards sanctioned in component (A);
- (2) approve new municipal incorporations;
- (3) dissolve or consolidate non-viable local governments;
- (4) limit the creation of new special districts;
- (5) consolidate or dissolve special districts;
- (6) prevent the use of certain interlocal contracts;
- (7) recommend modifications of county boundaries;
- (8) propose adjustments of substate district boundaries;
- (9) oversee municipal annexations; and
- (10) develop "spheres of municipal influence."

The first assignment is largely a matter of providing an administrative focal point of State statutory standards relating to incorporation, annexation and local governmental viability. Frequently, States have enacted standards in the first two areas, but have failed to establish a permanent unit to oversee and apply them systematically on a case-by-case basis. The assignment of this implementing authority would fill this basic administrative gap.

The next five powers (2-6) have all been recommended by this Commission in earlier reports. The ACIR first recognized the need to deal with the fragmentation and overlap of local governments in 1961, when it urged that certain limitations be placed upon home rule within metropolitan areas. It recommended at that time that the States "reserve sufficient authority in the legislature to enable legislative action, where necessary, to modify responsibility of and relationships among local units of government located within metropolitan areas in the best interests of the people of the area as a whole."¹² That same report called for rigorous statutory standards for the establishment of new municipal corporations within metropolitan areas

and provided “for the administrative review and approval of such proposed new incorporations by the unit of State government concerned. . . .”¹³ This, of course, is one of the basic functions now being proposed for assignment to local government boundary commissions.

In 1964, ACIR recommended city and/or county approval prior to the creation of any new special districts.¹⁴ This would be done by these local jurisdictions acting through a “designated agency.” The report also urged that such an agency be authorized to require “the dissolution or consolidation of special districts. . . .”¹⁵ Now, the Commission believes that local government boundary commissions are the proper units to assume the role and powers of this “designated agency.”

In its 1967 report on *Fiscal Balance*, ACIR recommended that a State agency or a “local agency formation commission” be empowered to dissolve or consolidate non-viable local units of government within metropolitan areas and to enjoin the use of certain undesirable interlocal contracts.¹⁶ Two of the powers urged here are simply restatements of this earlier Commission position.

Clearly, many of the powers assigned to the local government boundary commissions in this component are not new ones for the Commission. In some instances, the implementing agent has been changed or clarified. But this, in turn, reflects the noteworthy record of existing boundary commissions in these areas. The additional authority called for in this component, however, goes beyond ACIR’s earlier recommendations in three basic ways:

1. The previous recommendations dealt primarily with control over municipalities and special districts, and were concerned very largely with metropolitan areas. This component broadens this control to include counties and substate districts explicitly, and would apply it on a statewide basis—covering non-metropolitan as well as metropolitan areas. These extensions are based on certain findings developed in some of the background chapters. Chapters IV and VII reveal that counties are key governments in many areas, and the latter chapter shows that non-metropolitan areas have just as great, though perhaps different, reasons for governmental reform as do the metropolitan areas. Volume I of this report makes it clear that statewide systems of substate districts are now quite extensive and are beginning to set new jurisdictional boundaries of major significance—above the county level in most cases, but still below the State level. Generally, these States have provided ways of adjusting the boundaries

of these substate districts. But unless these modifications are made in concert with adjustments involving units of local government, they could well add to the complexity of the local and areawide scene rather than simplify it.

2. Boundary commission functions in previous recommendations stressed negative limits which the commission would place on boundary changes. The new recommendations provide the basis for certain initiatives by the boundary commission itself.

3. Whereas previous recommendations stressed a reactive case-by-case approach, this proposal stresses a continuing and comprehensive approach to the boundary and functional assignment problems, encompassing all units of local government. This approach includes such things as coverage of the whole State by a commission or commissions, the development of long-range plans for future boundary changes through the “spheres of municipal influence” mechanism, and periodic reporting of progress toward these long range goals.

This component and the role it assigns to local government boundary commissions are rooted in reality. Boundary commissions are not theoretical, they have been tried and tested. They are being used now in six States—Alaska, Minnesota, Michigan, California, Oregon, and Washington—and a new statewide boundary commission will begin operation in Iowa in 1974.

Like Iowa’s new boundary commission, those in Alaska, Minnesota, and Michigan are statewide. In California, Oregon, and Washington the boundary commissions have been established at the local level. Each California Local Agency Formation Commission has jurisdiction over one county and is organized in all counties save one. In Oregon and Washington, the boundary commissions have been mandated for the major urban areas and are permitted in other areas of these States. But none except the mandated ones, have been formed.

A variety of precedents clearly are available to follow. There are statewide boundary commissions and local boundary commissions, and the local ones have been organized on the basis of either an individual county or a multi-county metropolitan region. So far, this has been an “either-or” situation. No State has adopted a combination of the two, whereby a statewide commission would oversee the operations of a subordinate set of locally organized boundary commissions.

Both the statewide and local approaches have advantages. The local units could not very well oversee

such actions as multi-county mergers or the revision of substate district boundaries. They also would be unable to achieve substantial uniformity in the approach to local government changes throughout the State. A statewide boundary agency could accomplish these objectives, and be far enough removed from local politics to avoid being caught up in parochial concerns which might act against the most appropriate application of statutory standards relating to local government boundaries and viability. On the other hand, a single State boundary commission, in the more populous States, might find itself overwhelmed by the need to act simultaneously in a number of different areas of the State. Moreover, it would not have immediate access to local governments involved in a needed reform.

A system headed by a single State boundary commission, but fleshed out with a subordinate local government boundary commission in each region of the State, or in each of the major regions, might well be able to take advantage of both types of operations. In less populated States, the State commission itself might be adequate to handle most of the local details in non-metropolitan areas, while being relieved of the local detail by a local level commission in the most populated part of the State.

Where subordinate local level commissions are adopted, substate district areas, rather than single counties, might well be used as the geographic base. One of the major purposes of such boundary commissions, after all, would be to rationalize the local governmental system beneath the umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations serving many such regions. In most cases, the substate districts are multi-county, and therefore, could not be served effectively by single county boundary commissions. At the same time, some substate districts are single county, and in those cases a single county boundary commission would be appropriate to deal with regional matters.

The experience in Oregon and Washington suggests that simply authorizing local boundary commissions, rather than mandating them, may not be an effective way to move on this front. The areas in these two States where such commissions were not mandated have simply not chosen to establish their own boundary commissions.

Actual practice with regard to the membership of boundary commissions varies a great deal from State to State. The number of members range from three to 11, and the governor often plays a major role in appointing the members, sometimes at his own initiative, and sometimes from a list of nominees supplied by affected governments at the local level. In some cases, positions are earmarked for representatives of particular governments. In California, the four governmental members of each

Local Agency Formation Commission choose a fifth member who is a representative of the general public. On the other hand, in Oregon no local elected or appointive official may serve as a member of a local boundary commission, because he might have a conflict of interest. This Commission believes that the membership issue should be handled by each State in light of its own needs and traditions.

In addition to assuming new responsibilities relating to the boundaries of counties and substate districts, the local government boundary commissions would be assigned a new role in establishing long-range plans and spheres of local governmental influence as well as maximum expansion limits to guide the annexations, incorporations, and future development. Existing commissions initially lacked authority to develop and initiate boundary changes themselves, and could only approve or disapprove proposals initiated by others. However, in 1970 the California legislature directed its county boundary commissions to prepare with the cities, sphere of influence plans for all municipalities—something that was assigned to the statewide boundary commission in Minnesota in 1969. Although lacking specific legislative authorization, the local boundary commissions in Eugene and Portland, Oregon, also are participating in the development of spheres of influence plans. These activities are a logical and practical necessity, if local government boundary commissions are to operate effective reform programs on their own initiative.

Basic reasons for developing such long-range plans include:

- Competitive, pre-emptive, and defensive annexations can be more easily curbed when such plans have been developed;
- Decisions relating to special district formation and expansion are greatly simplified if plans for municipal assumption of urban functions are known and scheduled;
- An annexing city will be better able to plan physical facilities and land-use control when it knows the eventual limits of its jurisdiction; and fringe areas will have advance knowledge of zoning and subdivision standards, thus facilitating private and public planning in such areas.

Various factors must be considered when judging the effectiveness of the boundary commission approach to date. With only six States involved, it cannot be said that this has been a nationwide effort. At the same time, some boundary controls have been established in States without official commissions, either by State legislatures themselves or

through State agencies. In addition, even in those States which have adopted the boundary commission approach, experience has been rather brief. The first two boundary commissions were established in Alaska and Minnesota in 1959, California launched its local commissions in 1963, and the State of Washington followed in 1967. Michigan and Oregon were not added to the list until 1969.

Despite their short history, fairly significant achievements have been chalked up by these boundary commissions. The Minnesota commission's first decade of experience showed a drastically reduced rate of new municipal corporations and a doubling of their size. With respect to annexation, the local boundary commissions in California and Oregon have turned down only a very small percentage of the proposals coming before them. But in this process, the Portland and Salem commissions have modified about 25 percent of their approved proposals, and nearly 10 percent of those approved in California have been modified. There also is evidence that a number of proposals have not been submitted or have been withdrawn, because they were likely to be disapproved by the commissions.

The California commissions have virtually eliminated special interest and defensive incorporations of new municipalities, and slowed new incorporations generally. During the limited period of time that commissions have been operating in Washington and Oregon, no new municipal incorporations have been approved. The California and Oregon commissions also have slowed the growth of special districts. In California, the 1952-62 period saw an increase of 572 special districts, while the decade from 1962 to 1972 produced only 342. Since its organization in 1969, the Portland boundary commission has reduced the number of governmental units in that area from 303 to 198 by merging such units as highway lighting districts with county service districts.

No evaluation of these commissions should ignore the fact that several of them have been given added power since they were originally formed. Moreover, no State that has actually launched local boundary commissions has later terminated them.

At the same time, the local government boundary commission has never been employed as the sole device in any State for achieving boundary reforms, but always in conjunction with other procedures and governmental institutions. Such is the strategy embodied in this recommendation. Witness the State ACIR's proposed Component (G) and the local initiatives sanctioned in Components (C), (D) and (F).

Boundary commissions, then, are not the sole means of guiding and initiating local governmental

reform and change, but they can be a key mechanism in these efforts. Moreover, they can make contributions that others can not match. As permanent, relatively impartial units with adequate authority, they are in a unique position to reconcile competing proposed local and areawide governmental changes, to promote new actions where they otherwise might not occur, and to apprise the executive and legislative branches of the State government of those more basic reforms requiring statutory enactment. For these and other reasons, the Commission assigns these units a basic role in a comprehensive State policy and process regarding the structure, functions, and intergovernmental relationships of their local jurisdictions.

* * * * *

The third basic component (C) of this omnibus State-directed recommendation sets forth a packet of five county reform measures that combine to cover most of the structural and areal needs of rural as well as metropolitan counties. These new county initiatives complement the purposes of the local government boundary commission(s) and are closely linked to the pair of components (D and E) that follow.

By confronting the boundary and structural problems, this component raises the possibility of a reformed county assuming the role of an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization in certain substate regions. This especially is the case for those urban areas that lie entirely, or mostly, within a single county. And if the merger of counties in rural areas is now considered more feasible politically, as the Commission does, then these proposals certainly have application in certain non-metropolitan areas as well. At the same time, even without a match of county and substate regional boundaries, the reformed county still stands as a major, middle-tier, building block government with significant servicing, coordinative, and fiscal roles to play in those interstate and intrastate multi-county regions where boundary adaptations face insurmountable legal and political hurdles.

The ability to choose among alternative governmental structures is vital in providing the kind of county government which answers the needs of its citizens. The Commission recognized this and urged appropriate State implementing action in 1962 in its report on *State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions Upon the Structural, Functional, and Personnel Powers of Local Government*. While recognizing that much has transpired on this front over the past dozen years, the Commission believes it is appropriate at this point to strongly reaffirm its earlier stand.

In 1962, only eight States allowed counties to

choose their form of government. Ten years later that number had nearly tripled. There has been major progress, then, in allowing counties to modernize themselves structurally, but there is still much work to be done. According to ACIR/ICMA/NACO (1972) survey results, 80 percent of the over 1,000 reporting counties still have a commission or plural executive form of government, 18 percent operate under the council-administrator structure, and 2 percent have an elected executive. Many counties now using the commission form are prohibited by State law from opting for another.

In view of the fact that over half of the States still have not authorized optional forms of county government, the Commission feels that it is still relevant to include this proposal in any complete county reform packet. Urban, suburban, and rural counties have different demands made on them, and they should be able to choose the structure that is most suitable for their different needs, if they are to be effective, middle-tier units of government.

The first new plank in this county reform component (C.1) calls for State action requiring the adoption of a council-appointed administrator or council and popularly elected executive form of government in those counties that encompass the bulk of a metropolitan area. As has been demonstrated throughout this report, the local governance system in the vast majority of metropolitan areas is highly fragmented. In those 191 situations where a county takes in all or most of a metropolitan area, it has a unique opportunity to undertake regional problem solving. To be as effective as possible, however, county government needs the strong leadership, accountability, and professionalism provided by a full-time executive officer either appointed by the county board or popularly elected. The popularity of these structures is shown in 47 percent of the nation's unicity SMSAs which operate under them. These already include 38.2 million people—66 percent of the total population found in unicity metropolitan areas.

A commission government has no single executive, either appointed or elected, and responsibility for running the various departments is spread out among the commissioners and several other elected officials. More times than not this makes for a headless government, with little citizen ability to pinpoint responsibility for overall governmental actions.

Both the administrator and elected executive forms provide a single focus for daily administration. The county legislative board is then free to set policy goals for the county, and the voters are better able to hold officials responsible for their actions.

It can be argued that, desirable though the administrator or elected executive forms may be for pro-

viding strong county government, the decision should be that of the localities, not the State government. Yet to a greater degree than any other local governmental unit, counties traditionally have been shaped by the States. Moreover, the alternatives to weak counties in these metropolitan areas are fast becoming apparent and, in the long run, will work to the detriment of State as well as county and city interests. The draft bill on county administration prepared by Florida's Commission on Local Government incorporates the mandatory feature proposed here and applies it to all counties over 100,000 in population. The Commission then believes that ample grounds exist for positive State action in this area now.

Turning to the second reform in this county component (C.2), in many States a sizable number of elected county officials are enumerated in the constitution. These generally include some or most of the following: sheriff, coroner, clerk, recorder, tax collector, treasurer, attorney, assessor, auditor, and judicial officials as well as the board of commissioners. Because of their constitutional status, these elected officials with their separate constituencies tend to make county administrative reform a difficult matter. Moreover, they confront the voters with a long list of offices and candidates from which to choose, with the attendant problems of the "laundry list" ballot.

Placing all county officers on a statutory rather than constitutional basis is a basic way of providing flexibility in county government. With proper State authorizing action, each county would be able to ascertain what officials should be retained and what the mode of selection should be, thus giving more substance to the home rule doctrine. County reform efforts also would be strengthened. Replacing a commission form with a council-elected executive or administrator structure would not greatly enhance centralized decision making if a large number of independent elected officials with control over various departments were constitutionally exempted.

Some people contend that this diffusion of authority is desirable. By electing officers responsible for a particular function, the voters are able to control the operations of specific departments. Hence, they argue, the constitutional status of these offices is necessary in order to guarantee that they will not be abolished by the State or by the county under home rule authority. Others raise serious political feasibility questions regarding any effort to place these offices on a statutory basis.

But does the proliferation of posts increase public accountability? With many executive officers in a relatively independent position and having interrelated functional responsibilities, it becomes possible

for these officials to blame others for governmental action or inaction. By placing county offices on a statutory—rather than a constitutional basis—some positions admittedly would run the risk of abolition or consolidation. Yet, what does county structural home rule amount to, if these jurisdictions and their electorates are saddled with a parcel of State mandated positions? The risks then must be weighed against the need for greater flexibility and free choice in these structural matters. Given the climate of current public opinion and the vital nature of most of these offices it is difficult to contemplate their wholesale scrapping. Finally, regarding the question of political feasibility, the Commission can only pose another question: How long can counties survive with a mandated hydra-headed form of government?

The third plank in this structural program (C.3) supports State legislation permitting the intercounty merger of offices and functions. In previous reports, the Commission has recommended State constitutional and statutory action to allow for cooperation among local jurisdictions. This proposal would expand those recommendations by allowing adjacent counties to consolidate like functions and offices, including elected ones. Only two States—Montana and Nebraska—provide such authorization at this time. Yet, the fiscal and functional benefits from county consolidation of offices—especially in rural areas—can be significant.

In 1970, there were 24 counties in the United States, all located in western States, which had less than 1,000 population. The ability to consolidate county offices in these and other sparsely settled rural areas could lead to more economical government and better services. The ACIR-ICMA survey of intergovernmental service agreements showed that nearly every government entering a cooperative venture did so to achieve economies of scale. It is reasonable to assume that similar economies might be accomplished through consolidation of elected county offices.

The fusion of county offices may go far in bringing better, more efficient services to sparsely settled rural areas. In some cases, however, consolidation of the entire county governments would produce even more desirable results. Hence, in the final sub-component (D.4) of this reform packet, State authorizing action in this critical area is sanctioned.

Currently, 19 States permit county-county consolidation. Almost all require a referendum with a majority in each county favoring the merger. Thus, a county is protected from being swallowed up by its neighbors against its will.

The advantages of county consolidation are obvious. The new county would have an expanded tax base from which to raise revenues, while supporting

only one government instead of two or more. Funds would be freed up to provide a higher level of services. Not to be ignored is the fact that in some cases the consolidated county would have a more authoritative control over problems of a regional nature and be in a position to assume the UMJO role for Federal and State substate districting efforts.

Some argue that there could be disadvantages to such consolidations. A merger could produce a government too large, especially in geography, to provide the kind of personal government people need. Yet, no merger could be accomplished without the approval of the people in each county, and the voters should be the best judges of the size and effectiveness of the proposed new government. Moreover, though county-municipal, county-town, and county-unincorporated area relationships might be affected by the merger, the new system would still be two-tier with all the opportunities for areawide and local assignment of functions that this reorganization approach affords.

* * * * *

The fourth component (D) of this recommendation focuses primarily on the need to clarify and standardize the servicing responsibilities of counties and to eliminate conflict and confusion in county-municipal functional relationships. Included in this cluster of functional assignment proposals is a reaffirmation of the Commission's earlier position that counties should be empowered to serve as the dominant service provider in unincorporated areas.¹⁷ As Chapter IV of this volume and the Commission's *Profile of County Government* note, counties frequently provide a variety of services solely to unincorporated areas. Such services generally include police and fire protection, highways, sewers, water supply, and land-use controls. Yet, these functions often are of uneven quality and sometimes are financed in an unfair fashion.

The Commission urges that States authorize counties to improve and expand their services in unincorporated areas by providing such functions through a combination of service agreements, contracts, subcounty multiservice corporations, and/or subordinate multipurpose taxing-servicing districts. Moreover, services provided by these means should not be subsidized by the taxes of incorporated areas, nor should they be performed by independent special districts.

This proposal is rooted in recommendations advanced in two earlier Commission reports, *State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions Upon the Structural, Functional, and Personnel Powers of Local Government* and *The Problem of Special Districts in American Government*. In these studies,

the subcounty service corporation and subordinate taxing area approaches were sanctioned.

By 1973, 20 States had acted to permit the establishment of county subordinate taxing districts. Yet, the mere authorization of subordinate taxing districts has not solved all the servicing problems of unincorporated areas. In some States where these subordinate districts have been authorized, independent special districts have continued to proliferate. California, which contains about 25 percent of all subordinate servicing-taxing districts, still ranks second in the nation in the number of independent special districts, many of which serve unincorporated areas. The record elsewhere also suggests that counties having the authority often do not use subordinate districts for the provision of all unincorporated area services. When this lapse occurs, either a special district is formed or incorporated area taxpayers, in effect, are called upon to subsidize county services that are provided solely to unincorporated areas.

Hence, the Commission recommends that counties follow a program that utilizes service agreements, or contracts with private parties, or non-profit community associations, or that relies on multiservice corporations or subordinate multiservice districts for delivery of unincorporated area services. The Commission also believes that the financing of these mechanisms should come from unincorporated areas and that the use of independent special districts in these areas should be abandoned.

This strategy has a number of advantages. It would encourage various multiservicing devices, all of which provide a stronger and more complete service base in unincorporated areas. It would ease the way for eventual planned incorporation of populated unincorporated areas. It would curb the growth of independent special districts in these areas and help terminate a situation where over 65 percent of all special districts are non-coterminous subcounty districts, and where many of them serve unincorporated areas. Finally, it would help to end the fiscal inequities that occur when unincorporated areas' services are needlessly subsidized by taxes from incorporated areas.

The first new proposal (D.1) in this functional assignment component endorses State action authorizing counties to provide municipal-type services in incorporated areas under certain circumstances, and requiring that such services, when assumed, must meet performance standards embodied in a county ordinance that is agreed to by the county and its constituent municipalities. This plank is significant for three basic reasons. First, it begins to provide a meaningful functional dimension to the concept of county home rule; second, it is geared to eliminating situations wherein counties

are barred legally from assuming an urban servicing role even when their cities and/or citizenry clearly desire it; and third, it seeks to reduce conflict between counties performing urban-style functions and their incorporated localities.

Functional home rule is still the exception, not the rule at the county level. Nearly three-quarters of all urban county expenditures still are made for traditional county functions. Moreover, while libraries, parks, recreation, fire protection and solid waste disposal are assuming a larger role in some of these counties' budgets, a majority of these jurisdictions are not involved significantly in these and other municipal-type services. Some of this is due to a lack of proper authority, and some of it is due to a basic reluctance on the part of some counties to take on this assignment. No reliable surveys presently exist that indicate which of these two shackles is most responsible for this condition. But action on the authorizing front would eliminate the argument that the State is to blame, and it would place the issue squarely before the counties.

The Commission therefore recommends that those States, that have not yet done so, authorize their counties to perform a range of urban and municipal-type functions. Such action is of the utmost importance, because many counties are prohibited from taking on an additional servicing responsibility, even when their cities and citizenry call for it.

The Commission firmly believes that counties should be in a legal position to respond affirmatively to such initiatives and to assume functions previously assigned to multi-jurisdictional special districts.

This component cites three specific servicing situations where counties should be able to act and not abstain from assuming a new servicing assignment. The first is where a special district of countywide or even less than countywide dimensions already provides an areawide service. The Commission's purposes here are to eliminate legal barriers to a merger of such districts with counties, and to undermine one of the basic reasons for the proliferation of multi-jurisdictional special districts within counties—all with a view toward converting the latter into more viable regional and subregional governmental units in functional terms.

A second situation arises when a municipality requests a county to undertake a new servicing role. Here, the permissive authority endorsed in this component would enable a county legally to take on a functional assignment that had become too arduous or too areawide for a municipality—or even a combination of municipalities—to continue to provide. In effect, then, the Commission's goal here is to facilitate the voluntary transfer of functions between these two governmental levels.

A third context in which counties should assume a municipal-type servicing role is where the public approves a referendum calling for the county to perform a specific function on a countywide basis. In this instance, the enabling authority would permit counties to respond positively to a legitimate re-assignment of functions decision of their respective electorates.

In recommending the establishment of performance standards for such new or reassigned urban services—standards that the county and cities agree upon—the Commission is mindful of the fact that various urban functions, especially in the human resources and public safety areas, are more complex and frequently require more differentiated implementation than other types of services. Moreover, these standards are significant in light of the fact that over half of the local governments in the 1972 ACIR-ICMA survey on interlocal service agreements indicated that they evaluated such agreements on the basis of objective performance standards. Without such standards, effective and fully accountable provision of the county services involved might be undermined. Since these standards would touch on cost apportionments, they also would remove another source of interlevel tension.

The second proposal (D.2) in this functional assignment component is designed to help eliminate the service overlap and duplication problems which arise when cities and counties share the responsibility for providing a function. Police protection, roads and highways, and parks and recreation are the most prominent existing examples of this. Frequently, subcounty governments provide the basic elements of a service, while counties provide supplementary or supportive services that a municipality is unable to provide.

Such sharing of responsibilities are especially needed when a service has both regional and local dimensions. Where there is concurrent provision of such services, the Commission is convinced that divisions of labor can and should be worked out, with service offerings coordinated between counties and municipalities in a manner that meets with the basic approval of the constituent cities involved.

In instances where a municipality believes that its performance of the function requires no additional county assistance, in-lieu payments to the locality should take place. Otherwise, the county would supplement the service in question with auxiliary or supportive functional components. Such a policy would go a long way towards easing city-county functional conflict.

The third subcomponent (D.3) urges the States to enact broad legislation that authorizes and clarifies the process of functional transfers between and among local jurisdictions and areawide bodies. The

Commission believes that such legislation, at a minimum, should facilitate the transfer process, distinguish a transfer from a service contract, and make revocation of a transfer hinge on inadequate performance of the service.

As of 1971, only ten States had general authorization for the transfer of functions. Five of these required voter approval and concurrent majorities in the jurisdictions involved, and five provided for revocation of the transfer. The first stipulation makes transfers difficult to accomplish, while the second renders them less than permanent, and more like a simple service contract.

The Commission has long held that the reallocation of service responsibilities through functional transfers is a basic way to meet shifting service demands.¹⁸ To utilize this mechanism to its fullest potential, however, more States should enact broad permissive legislation as they have done for intergovernmental cooperation. Such legislation should leave the decision making authority regarding the transfer up to the governing bodies of the governments involved. Voter approval provisions, especially when coupled with the concurrent majority requirement, more times than not, serve minority interests, given the usual low level of turn-out in such referenda. Moreover, the judgement, knowledge and political accountability of the people's elected representatives deserve greater weight in matters of this sort.

The Commission believes that the proposed State legislation also should deal with the performance of a transferred service and the conditions under which it might be returned to its original government or governments. Allowing a government to revoke a transfer at will, or stipulating a specific time period in the original transfer agreement, makes a transfer little more than a service contract.

The Commission recognizes that the government transferring a function should have some assurance that the service will be performed in a satisfactory manner. It therefore recommends adoption of requirements that the jurisdictions involved should set service standards at the time of the transfer and that revocation should occur only when the performance of the service falls below these standards. The Commission further recommends that an impartial instrumentality, such as a local government boundary commission, be designated during the process of transfer as the body to determine whether the service meets the agreed-upon performance standards. The purpose here is to provide a disinterested agency to resolve possible later controversies relating to the provision of the service.

To sum up, this functional assignment component addresses four basic problems that continue to confuse—hence, impede—a sensible sorting out of

servicing roles at the city and county levels. The county as the dominant service-provider for its unincorporated areas is one obvious—but not always applied—article in this servicing agenda. The county as the partial provider of certain, chiefly areawide, urban services to its incorporated areas is another. A sensible formula for achieving greater interlevel cooperation and less conflict, when a county attempts to assume components of a function already performed by its cities, is a third essential element. The fourth and final feature of this component involves a less rigid procedural, but a more rigorous definitional, statutory authorization for the transfer of functions. The recommendations advanced in Volume IV of this series build upon this component.¹⁹ But the proposals advanced here provide basic input into the process sanctioned in this subsequent study.

* * * * *

In the fifth component (E) of this recommendation, the Commission urges State enactment of a pair of programs that would begin to carve out a stronger State role in the functional assignment process.

The first proposed statute (E.1) focuses on planning, zoning, and subdivision regulations for unincorporated areas. Here, the Commission recommends increased county involvement with these regulations in unincorporated areas. Where such involvement is not forthcoming, the Commission further recommends that an appropriate State agency assume responsibility for such controls.

Many counties now provide land-use planning, zoning, and subdivision control services in unincorporated areas. About 40 percent of the 1,000 counties surveyed in the 1971 ACIR/ICMA/NACO county survey had assumed this role and over 65 percent of the 45 largest metropolitan counties had adopted both zoning and subdivision control regulations for their unincorporated areas, as of that year. Clearly then, a substantial number of urban and rural counties presently are performing these land-use control tasks. The Commission welcomes this trend and hopes that it will continue.

Legally, all 50 States now authorize zoning of unincorporated areas. Yet, a few—notably the six New England States, New York, and New Jersey—still do not vest such powers with counties, and rely instead on extraterritorial zoning by subcounty units of government. The remaining 42 States, however do give counties the power to enact land-use controls in these areas. ACIR's contention is that where counties have this legal authority, they should exercise it.

County land-use controls in unincorporated areas can be a key factor in guiding urban growth, promoting balanced economic development, and plan-

ning for more efficient and effective public services. Moreover, county controls in unincorporated areas can be the base for more constructive community development when these areas decide to incorporate and have to exercise their own land-use controls. The county, then, must undertake these responsibilities in order to insure planned and systematic development of unincorporated areas.

If counties do not choose to exercise these powers, the Commission recommends that an appropriate State agency should be empowered to assume these responsibilities. Presently, about 14 States confer certain land-use control powers on selected State agencies. Most of these exercise general supervisory controls over local land-use policies. While State involvement in zoning chiefly centers on the protection of environmentally valuable lands or the regulation of large-scale development, a few States have assumed local zoning powers when they are not exercised by the pertinent local governments. Thus, Wisconsin permits State zoning of flood-plain areas, and Oregon authorizes State assumption of county zoning controls when local land-use controls have not been utilized.

Clearly, the State involvement called for in this proposal is neither novel nor drastic. Moreover, it is somewhat comparable to what the Commission has called for in other service matters, notably the assurance of basic police services in metropolitan areas.²⁰ The kind of State involvement sanctioned here, in the Commission's opinion, would provide an incentive for counties to meet this basic service responsibility, a task that a substantial number of counties already have assumed.

In (E.2), the Commission urges greater State technical and fiscal assistance for interlocal transfer and consolidation of functions. Such State support is warranted in light of the infrequent use of functional transfers and consolidations, the lack of local understanding about how these actions might be effectuated, and the high costs that are sometimes initially involved in such actions.

Functional consolidations comprised only about 8 percent of the over 11,000 intergovernmental service agreements identified in the 1972 ACIR-ICMA survey, and involved the same percent of the over 1,000 counties responding to the 1971 ACIR/ICMA/NACO survey. Functional transfers and consolidations clearly are not a common means of changing substate functional assignments.

The barriers to increased use of functional transfers and consolidations are numerous, and some require State assistance of the type suggested here. State incentives, as the recent New Jersey local government study commission (Musto Commission) report points out, could be a basic factor in facilitating these actions.

Chapter III of this volume indicated some of these barriers. Many States have conflicting and complicated provisions for transfer and consolidation, often with separate legal authorizations for different functions. Localities frequently avoid transfers or consolidations that involve cooperation in sensitive services or with economically or socially dissimilar communities. A range of 30 to 60 percent of all New Jersey municipalities surveyed by the Musto Commission in 1970 indicated that differences in local financial resources or social composition were the two most prominent barriers to interlocal functional cooperation. Other studies in Philadelphia and Detroit confirm these findings.

State assistance of the type urged here would help reduce the technical and fiscal restraints on interlocal functional transfers and consolidations. Management feasibility studies could indicate the best legal means of effectuating such actions and suggest which one—transfer or consolidation—would be more appropriate in changing a local functional assignment. Temporary fiscal assistance would defray extraordinary financial burdens incurred at the outset, particularly costs connected with interlocal fiscal equalization or debt maintenance. State assistance of both types would decrease pressure on the State governments to directly assume the operation of the service itself, as has occurred in the fields of corrections, health, and hospitals in many States.

Opponents of this action contend that management feasibility studies and extraordinary costs of transfers and consolidations are integral parts of such actions and are not deserving of special State assistance. They point out that, when barriers to transfers and consolidations are prominent, States can mandate such changes. After all, they argue county assumption of welfare, health, and hospital functions in many States has occurred as a result of such mandating. In addition, States could channel their categorical aid to particular local governments in a way that encourages functional transfers or consolidations. These actions, opponents contend, would suffice to bring about the transfers and consolidations that are really needed.

The Commission notes these objections, but is convinced that State encouragement of transfers and consolidation is both necessary and desirable. Similar types of incentives have been used to help bring about school district consolidation, and they could well be as successful in non-educational areas. Moreover, the fiscal and political barriers to certain transfers and consolidations are so deep-seated that concerted State technical and fiscal assistance is necessary to promote these interlocal, rather than State mandated, approaches to changing substate functional assignments.

* * * * *

The sixth major component (F) in this proposed omnibus State policy on local governmental reform recommends State authorization of various forms of general purpose areawide governments at the substate regional level. In essence, this component would give the citizens of each substate region the opportunity to select their own best regional home rule option by statutorily providing five different regional governmental forms from which to choose.

Each type would be headed by a directly elected governing body and each would be empowered to act as a full-fledged local government at least for the purpose of performing areawide functions. But each signifies that there are great differences in the population and geographic size of such regions, and that the existing governmental make-up and political traditions in these areas differ widely. Hence, these five quite different structural options are offered to provide a local electorate with some real choices if support for some kind of areawide restructuring arose. The five options include:

1. multi-county consolidation,
2. a reformed county,
3. conversion of an umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization into a multi-purpose areawide government,
4. a regional service corporation, or
5. city-county consolidation.

The first two options, multi-county consolidation and the reformed county, would create strong two-tier governmental arrangements whereby the merged or reformed county would perform all needed areawide functions, while leaving local services to municipalities, towns, subordinate county service areas or dependent special districts. The reformed county would be somewhat easier to establish, since it could be achieved by adopting the basic structural and functional reforms, including the transfer of some functions, that are advocated by the "new county" movement in many States. Components (C) and (D) of this recommendation, of course, spell out the basic structural and functional features of this program. The reformed county option, however, would be practical only in a single county region. The multi-county merger would be more appropriate where the region encompasses several counties but where their collective population is adequate to support the merged county government. This alternative would have special relevance in numerous rural and mixed urban-rural substate regions.

The more complex options and the more suitable for large, diverse, usually highly urbanized areas, are the converted umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization and the regional service corporation. When applied to such areas, these two approaches could

create three-tier governmental structures, involving a new areawide organization, plus two or more counties at the sub-regional level, and municipalities as well as other local governments at the most local level. These options, then, would be especially suitable in areas where a single areawide government would be too large and too remote to provide any but the most highly regional types of services. In this situation, the traditional county functions such as courts, public welfare, public health, public safety and corrections would be left to county administration, as well as those that might be assumed as a result of functional home rule reforms. Local services, of course, would be left to the municipalities, subordinate county service areas or dependent special districts. Not to be overlooked with this pair of alternatives is their potential application to smaller substate regions, where other proposed options might prove unfeasible. County-county mergers may prove impossible in some rural areas, and city-county consolidations or the reformed county formula may be unworkable in some smaller urban areas.

The final option, city-county consolidation, is probably the simplest in form and theory, but one of the more difficult to achieve. This approach, after all, would merge the existing governments in a county region into a single government. At the same time, this reform would be especially suitable for small or medium size substate regions involving only a single county with a single dominant municipality. Other smaller municipalities and special districts could be merged at the same time as the predominant city and county are consolidated. Alternatively, they could be left as local units with the new county serving as their areawide government—an approach that has been applied in some recent consolidations. Where several major cities are involved, this reform could prove difficult—if not impossible—to achieve. The size of the county area, then, should be small enough so that a single government encompassing it would not be too remote from its residents. Once the consolidation takes place, subordinate service districts or limited purpose neighborhood units of government might be established.

This regional home rule component provides that the selection process in any given substate region could be initiated in a number of different ways—all with a view toward providing a statutory means of covering a range of conditions and concerns—including metropolitan and non-metropolitan, city and suburb, State and local, and citizens as well as their existing governments. Yet, any initiative—regardless of its source—would be subject to a popular referendum involving a simple areawide or a concurrent majority vote, thus placing the ultimate decision on fundamental areawide reorganization in the hands of the citizenry.

This component systematizes and builds upon a number of previous Commission recommendations appearing chiefly in three of its earliest studies: *Governmental Structure Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas* (1961), *Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas* (1962), and *State Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions Upon the Structural, Functional, and Personnel Powers of Local Government* (1962). Out of these reports emerged ten alternative approaches to governmental reorganization in metropolitan areas: extraterritorial powers, interlocal agreements, voluntary councils of government, the urban county, transfer of functions (including to States), metropolitan servicing districts, annexation, city-county separation, city-county consolidation, and federation.

In these earlier volumes, the Commission adopted recommendations specifically endorsing all of the first seven, yet with the admonition that “there is no best single approach to governmental reorganization applicable to all conditions and times.”²¹ The final trio was not really rejected. City-county consolidation and city-county separation, however, were found to “have shown limited recent potential as methods of governmental reorganization,” while the full-fledged federation plan was deemed at that time to lack “political and public acceptance.”²²

All of these ten approaches—with the exception of extra-territorial powers—have been probed again in this study of substate regionalism with entire background chapters, either in the first or this third volume, given over to bringing their respective records up-to-date. Moreover, this research has not covered merely metropolitan, but non-metropolitan areas as well. Out of it comes the general finding that the less drastic of these approaches—intergovernmental agreements, voluntary councils of government, transfers of functions and annexation have been used fairly extensively since 1962. But with only a few exceptions, none of them have provided an effective means of achieving a greater regional governing capability. On the other hand, another of our general findings suggests that those approaches that do lay claim to this promise have been much less frequently tried, though more so in the last decade than prior to 1960.

The recent record of these more fundamental approaches to areawide reform indicates spotty application and only a few cases of new units encompassing a whole urban area or large region. Yet, examples of practically all of the basic restructuring options do, in fact, now exist. Multipurpose districts have been authorized by some States and a few are functioning. A new general purpose areawide unit with real authority has been created outside of existing units of government with the Metropolitan Coun-

cil of the Twin Cities area in Minnesota.²³ This Council was established by direct action of the State legislature, and it overlays the existing county and city governments, forming a third tier. Another body with somewhat similar powers and functions is emerging in the Atlanta area. All other areawide governments with real authority have been city-county consolidations, or the reformed county where areawide functions were transferred to the county while the cities and towns remained intact. The most dramatic instance of this latter form, of course, is the Miami-Dade County federation.

The 11 city-county consolidations approved since 1962 represent more adoptions than occurred during the previous century and a half. While these 11 cases obviously are significant, the overall record of city-county consolidation is not so impressive. Of the 127 single county SMSAs in the United States, only three contain city-county consolidations. Except for Indianapolis, all of the metropolitan city-county consolidations have been in the South. Again, with the exception of Indianapolis, where the State legislature mandated the consolidation, all recent city-county consolidations have involved local initiatives and referenda. Moreover, the referenda have required concurrent majorities in each of the city and county units to be consolidated. With most of the consolidation proposals, this obstacle has been insuperable. All told, the successful consolidations represent about one-third of those formally proposed to the voters.

Six of the city-county consolidations achieved during the past quarter century encompassed most of the population in their respective SMSAs and resulted from campaigns designed to launch metropolitan area governments. Yet, only three have actually been coterminous with their SMSA boundaries, while three others encompassed at least 70 percent of their SMSA population. All of these city-county consolidations have been limited to medium size metropolitan areas with 1970 populations ranging from 167,000 to 792,000.

Summarizing actual experience to date, we now have actual examples of city-county consolidation, the regional service corporation, the reformed county, and a partial example of a converted umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization.²⁴ Only the multi-county merger model stands apart as a theoretical option, not yet tried in contemporary real life. For the most part, then, we are dealing with actual reorganization approaches that have been put into practice largely during the past decade. Moreover, if the late nineteenth century history of county government is considered, even the county-county consolidation option can not be described in academic terms. Finally, if we merely glance northward toward Canada, as Volume V in this series does, then

still other real world applications of a number of reorganizational reforms can be found.

In adopting this proposal now, the Commission clearly is conscious of the march of time. It by no means intends to denigrate the other, less fundamental approaches to regional and subregional reorganization by this action. Other components in this very recommendation relating to annexation procedures, county reform, and functional transfers provide ample evidence that such is not our intent. But the Commission strongly believes that the time has come to give the citizenry and their governments a chance to change their substate governance system should future developments demonstrate the need. Given the rapid pace of institutional and servicing change at this level, no other position is tenable—assuming, of course, that the electorate under our system should retain the ultimate right to shape the governmental system. In this component, the Commission gives paramount recognition to this right. Yet, it makes no claim as to the merit of one reform option as against another in any given situation. Nor does it necessarily assert that any of them is necessary in any particular substate region. The Commission is profoundly aware of the nearly unending variety of individual regions and the foolishness of assuming such unbending positions.

This component then merely urges State enactment of permissive legislation that would allow the several areawide electorates and their local governments to reorganize regionally, if and when substantial sentiment for such reform develops. At the same time, it deals with several fundamental questions that must be faced whenever this point may be reached. First is the issue of whether a given substate region should have a one-tier, two-tier, or three-tier governmental structure. As has been indicated, this is a question that is determined largely by the size and complexity of the area, the number of forms of local governments within it, and whether the area crosses state lines. The approach reflected in this recommendation is to provide all three of these general options, with alternatives in two of them, and to rely upon the citizenry and local governments concerned to make the final choice for a given area.

Another issue is whether the governing body of the upper-tier (areawide) government should be separately elected, rather than ex-officio representatives of the lower-tier localities. This is really not an issue where the chosen form of areawide government is the multi-county merger, city-county consolidation or reformed county. In each of these cases, the upper-tier government is a bona fide county government in the traditional sense, and these are always headed by directly elected officials. The question does become important, however, with regard to the con-

verted umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization and the regional service corporation, both of which exist at a third-tier level with the counties and municipalities operating below. In this situation, a directly elected governing body would be the third substate level body to be chosen by the same electors. There are precedents for this, in that a number of special districts and school boards are elected independently of city and county governments. Nevertheless, a separately elected body at this level, exercising area-wide responsibilities, undoubtedly would be a sensitive point with local governmental officials. A possible compromise here is a bicameral formula with one chamber popularly chosen and the other composed of representatives of the constituent governmental units. Variations of this approach have been embodied in some of the proposals advanced in the California Legislature to strengthen the Association of Bay Area Governments. Another possibility is to appoint area-wide governing body members during a start-up period and then provide for popular election of the members.

In adhering basically to the elective principle here, the Commission emphasizes that both the converted umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization and regional service corporation would have governmental authority of their own which could be independently exercised with respect to those area-wide functions assigned to them. With this independent authority, we believe there is every reason to elect an independent governing body. Candidates would be forced to run on regional policies and would seek re-election only within the context of their performance as regional statesmen. This is completely consistent with the basic maxim that governmental responsibility should be placed where governmental authority exists.

Regarding the three initiating options, the Commission is convinced that most of the drives for regional home rule would emanate from local governments and local electorates. Yet, with the exception of boundary changes in some States, State legislatures have always reserved to themselves the right to establish, dissolve, and consolidate units of local government. The Commission fully expects that this situation will continue, and recommends further that wherever State constitutions prohibit legislative or home rule efforts to merge counties, that such prohibitions be removed. Direct action should be available to the legislature in every State as another fully legitimate means of achieving any of the reorganizations proposed in this subcomponent for area-wide service organizations.

The final issue raised here is what kind of referendum should the State require for approval of locally initiated regional home rule proposals. The basic alternatives are to call for simple concurrent

majorities in each affected major jurisdiction or area, or a simple areawide majority of those voting in the whole area affected. A provision for concurrent majorities would give added protection to the separate electorates in the central city and the suburbs when a metropolitan reorganization is proposed, and in the individual counties when a non-metropolitan restructuring effort is mounted. It would allow jurisdictional as well as numerical factors to condition the outcome. This kind of referendum, it should be pointed out, frequently has proven to be a major obstacle to achieving area-wide reorganizations. If the objective then is to accentuate the force of the overall regional vote, a simple majority of all those voting in the area affected should be stipulated.

To sum up, what is proposed in this regional reform component is State authorization of a number of approaches to area-wide governmental reorganization. The intent is to open as many avenues as is reasonable for this type of reform action. No power play nor preferred restructuring proposal is implied here, but a major unshackling effort is clearly contemplated. Legal obstacles, after all, should not overcome the desire of a substate region's governments and/or its citizens to achieve their own area-wide objectives. The range of options is necessary in light of the very diverse needs of the different substate areas and the rather slim record of actual area-wide reform in recent years.

* * * * *

In the final component (G) of this proposed State policy on local and area-wide government, the Commission urges the creation, where lacking, of permanent State advisory commissions on intergovernmental relations, empowered to study problems and relationships of governmental structure, finances, and functional performance at the local, area-wide and State levels, including the impact of Federal actions and assistance programs on these levels. Implementation of this recommendation would provide the States, their political subdivisions, and citizens with an institutional mechanism most of them sorely need. Ample evidence now exists to indicate that the States and their localities could and would make good use of a permanent, bipartisan instrumentality with multi-level representation to probe, ponder, and propose solutions to intergovernmental problems within and, in some instances, between the States.

Several States now have units that perform some of the functions that a State ACIR would assume. Over four-fifths have a Federal-State coordinating unit. All States but one have commissions or other units on interstate cooperation, and at least 42 have departments or offices of community affairs. Yet, the absence of local representation, their predominantly operational thrust, and/or relatively narrow

focus make most of these instrumentalities unsuitable for the broad-gauge research and recommending role contemplated here. At the same time, all of them are indicators of growing State awareness of interlevel relationships, and all are performing useful functions.

To meet the need for a broader and more balanced focus on State-local problems, at least 17 States since 1968 have created broadly representative commissions to study a number of pressing State-local and local governmental problems. While their reports generally have been dispassionate, wide ranging, and of immense assistance to this Commission in this study, these commissions have been temporary, and once they completed their studies their recommendations were left to others for explanation and attempted implementation.

This component then is geared to overcoming the various shortcomings of these more limited approaches. It looks especially to the experience of California, Texas, Kansas, and Arizona, all of which have full-fledged State ACIR's. It underscores the need in such an instrumentality for representativeness, permanence, professionalism, non-partisanship, a plenary research mandate, the right to recommend, and permission to persuade.

—Representativeness can be achieved by providing statutorily for a balanced mix of members coming from all the basic governmental categories within a State. Whether special authorities, school districts, areawide bodies, minor political subdivisions, and Federal spokesmen are included—are policy questions each State must decide in light of its own pattern of local government, its view of the Federal role, and its goals for the commission.

—Permanence can be achieved by assigning the commission an on-going mandate, by providing a means of easily filling vacancies that might arise, and by stipulating no termination date in the enabling legislation.

—Professionalism can be assured by making adequate fiscal provision for regular staff, and by proper—but not inflexible—procedures for their selection.

—Non-partisanship can be injected into the commission's operations by requiring an even or near even balancing of party representation in each of the governmental categories and by giving careful attention to the appointment process. Frequently, however, divisions within such bodies more often turn on jurisdictional and institutional considerations than on party concerns.

—A free and full study agenda for the commission can be assigned by adapting this component's topical listing in a specific provision of the enabling act. The special needs of a State and its subdivisions obviously must be considered. Yet, the full agenda cited here provides a good point of departure for those seeking to stipulate a fairly broad but pertinent program of commission study. Every basic division of State-local relations is covered.

—The power to recommend, of course, should be stipulated statutorily, but in a way that leaves ample room for information reports having no policy proposals. At the same time, the legislature might want to consider in specific terms those State and local policy-making bodies to whom commission recommendations might be directed. Whether Federal officials should be included—as the Texas statute does—is another issue to be dealt with in this context.

—Finally, a right to persuade can be achieved by authorizing the commission to print, publicize, and argue for its recommendations. Press conferences, speeches, lectures, hearing statements and testimony are among the legitimate activities that a commission should be in a position to pursue—if its power to persuade is to extend beyond the mere adoption of recommendations.

With these traits, a State ACIR can serve as a much needed neutral forum for State, local and areawide spokesmen. It can help fill the communications gap between these levels. It can produce a series of authoritative studies on topics of intergovernmental concern. It can help develop needed proposals that are politically viable. It also can serve as a focal point for implementation efforts.

In one sense, the States and localities have needed such an instrumentality for at least a generation. The States and their localities after all are linked fiscally, functionally, jurisdictionally, constitutionally, and politically. But these linkages, derived from the prime legal position accorded to the States by the U.S. Constitution, have produced as much conflict as collaboration.

At this point, the need to treat systematically the tension points in State-local relations is more urgent than ever before. The shifting pattern of servicing assignments, the greater discretion accorded to States and their localities by general revenue sharing and block grants, the stronger fiscal position of most States, the growing State initiatives in a number of current and controversial program areas, as well as the challenge that both of these traditional

governments confront at the substate regional level— are but a few of the more recent developments that argue strongly for establishing State advisory commissions on intergovernmental relations. Finally, the national Commission's difficult assignment would be easier to discharge, if counterpart commissions existed in all of the States.

The Federal Role

Recommendation 2. A Supportive Role

The Commission notes that actions of the Federal government directly affect local governmental institutions and the development of effective substate regional systems. Hence, *the Commission recommends that the Executive Branch of the Federal government and the Congress adopt policies which accommodate State and local actions to reorganize governments at the substate regional and local levels.*

For a number of political, legal, and common sense reasons, the Commission believes that it is inappropriate at this time for the Federal government to assume a lead role in efforts to achieve local governmental modernization and areawide reorganization. Yet, other reasons dictate that the Federal government can not assume a hands-off policy in this matter. Too many existing Federal programs and policies affect the pattern of local government and of substate regional governance systems. Too many Federally encouraged programs and too many Federal categorical, block grant, and revenue sharing dollars one way or another already are involved. Too many national purposes ultimately are involved to sanction such a laissez faire course.

The underlying thrust of this final recommendation is to put the Federal government into a positive accommodating role with respect to State and local efforts geared to local and areawide governmental reform. Some of the possible approaches to fleshing out this Federal role include certain changes in administrative rules, specialized research, technical assistance, and a built-in awareness of institutional changes at the State, substate, regional and local levels. All are modest. But they could begin the carving out of a Federal role in this vital intergovernmental area which is complementary, not in conflict, with State and local efforts.

One possible plank in this agenda for accommodation would be clear-cut recognition in OMB Circular A-95 that categorical and block grants having a basic areawide thrust would rely exclusively for such purposes on a regional government where and when one emerges. Such a jurisdiction should encompass all, or most, of its substate district and be certified by the State to be a government with areawide powers.

In determining its character, a State might consider whether the areawide unit exists as an organized legal entity, whether it includes popularly elected officials, whether it enjoys a high degree of fiscal and administrative independence, and whether it is empowered to and does perform functions of a regional nature.

This State certification process is suggested in order to eliminate the possibility of a Federal instrumentality exercising significant discretion in such a sensitive subject area. Another reason for including it, of course, is to provide a means of resolving conflicts between cities and reorganized counties over whether the latter are, in fact, regional governments.

Under this proposal, a regional government would assume the privileges conferred on umbrella organizations in Recommendation 1 of Volume I once such a unit has been certified by its State. In that recommendation, it is to be recalled, a combination of Federal executive branch and Congressional nations were sanctioned which would complement State-local efforts to establish effective umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations in State established substate districts. These actions would confer the power to review and approve or disapprove grant applications covered by the A-95 process emanating from multi-jurisdictional special districts and to review and resolve inconsistencies between regional plans and proposed State agency and local government projects within the government's region that are funded through A-95 applications.

This proposal, then, would clarify the status of a regional government in light of the earlier substate districting recommendations. It would put the Federal government in a neutral position *vis-a-vis* instrumentalities that would perform the UMJO functions. It would leave the initiative wholly with State and local governments, but require Federal conformance when such initiatives are successful. No Federal effort to foster regional governments is contemplated then. But, if and when the Congress and the Federal Executive Branch move to assist States and localities in establishing UMJO's, these actions should not be so institutionally prescriptive as to exclude the regional governmental option, especially when this option already has been chosen by substate regional electorates. In the Commission's view, this would be a minimal accommodating move.

Another means of rounding out this Federal complementary role would be a supportive, technical assistance program for local governmental modernization. The Federal government has encouraged creation of and helped fund new operating authorities and districts, and, in some cases, it has helped finance reorganization studies requested by State and local governments. But it has not provided direct technical assistance to local government boundary

commissions, State ACIR's, or metropolitan study commissions.

Federal agencies, such as the Bureau of the Census, the Office of Management and Budget, and the General Services Administration, have information, expertise, and responsibilities which could be of significant technical assistance to such commissions. These Federal agencies control demographic and governmental census data, the designation of SMSA boundaries, the designation of A-95 clearinghouse organizations, Federal-aid program coordination procedures, Federal office space and facility planning, and other matters directly affecting State-local, local boundary, and metropolitan concerns. But, to date, there has been no easy way for a boundary commission or a State ACIR to obtain all the Federal assistance it should have. Nor has there been a well versed Federal government representative to work with them to save time and to explain relevant Federal resources. The program suggested here would provide a coordinated Federal technical assistance program to meet these objectives.

Still another possible plank in a Federal program of complementary action would be a joint effort on the part of pertinent Federal agencies, such as the Bureau of the Census, OMB, and GSA, and interested State and local bodies, such as their respective national associations, individual State ACIR's, and boundary commissions, to develop an operational definition of general purpose governments. Such definitions then could be used to facilitate implementation of State policies on local government viability, and to better target Federal aid programs designed to support units of general local government.

This proposal is in accord with this Commission's longstanding support of general purpose governments as the prime governmental actors in substate affairs. In numerous past reports, as well as in this study, the Commission has sought to broaden the functional responsibilities of local government, limit the use of independent special purpose units, and provide for greater local governmental control over special purpose and quasi-governmental bodies.

The Commission's stance in this matter has been endorsed in various Federal and State policies. Section 402 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act directs that preference be shown to general-purpose units of government in the disbursement of Federal aid. Similarly, the present general revenue sharing bill and some of the proposed special revenue sharing measures do not authorize aid disbursements to special purpose units of government.

State governments also underscore the general purpose character of local government in different areas and in different ways. Some States do not permit establishment of special districts in certain functions—public safety being the prime example—

thereby leaving these functional responsibilities to general purpose units. At least seven States have laws that consider the ability of a local government to provide a full range of public services as one of the prerequisites for incorporation. Six States have State or local boundary commissions that have acted to curtail the incorporation of very small municipalities that often do not provide a full range of public services. These Federal and State actions, then, are indicative of higher level concern for viable, general purpose local governments.

The proposal suggested here stresses the importance of such governments. It confronts the urgent need to document the characteristics of truly general purpose local jurisdictions. As we move to more discretionary forms of intergovernmental fiscal transfers at both the Federal and State levels, the essential character of local units becomes an overriding question. Yet, for the most part, definitions that make much sense fiscally or functionally are lacking. Many supposedly general purpose jurisdictions, after all, are really limited purpose units.

Townships, particularly rural ones, are a case in point. Illinois townships in 1971, for example, spent 63 percent of all their monies for highways, while 54 percent of all Indiana township expenditures went for welfare purposes. Moreover, the small size of these types of local jurisdictions—over 60 percent of all townships were under 1,000 population in 1972—make it highly unlikely that they can perform a full range of public services. Clearly, many, if not most, of these so-called general purpose bodies are actually limited purpose jurisdictions.

The presence of a large number of special districts provides one clue as to whether a general unit is basically multipurpose. Where a number of such districts operate independently within the jurisdiction of what presumably is a general government, questions can be raised concerning the unit's ostensibly multipurpose character. Moreover, even a cursory examination of a unit's revenue raising efforts from its own sources and pattern of expenditures can yield significant evidence as to whether it is a general or essentially limited purpose jurisdiction. The extent to which a unit depends on interlocal contracts and agreements for the rendering of services to its constituents is another indicator that could be considered.

Limited and special purpose governments are natural candidates for local government viability policies developed by local boundary commissions. Since they lack genuine general purpose character, they might also receive lower Federal funding priorities than other local governments that have broader functional responsibilities. This proposal, then, is designed to develop fiscal and functional indices that adequately differentiate between limited purpose and

non-viable units of local governments, on the one hand, and multipurpose and viable local jurisdictions, on the other. The results, in turn, might be applied to Federal assistance as well as State fiscal and servicing assignment policies.

A focusing of certain existing Federal intergovernmental efforts on State and local modernization efforts would provide still another way that a complementary Federal program could be developed. Numerous activities could be included in such a Federal venture. Among the more obvious would be the exchange program under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970; the discretionary research grant activities of HUD, HEW, and NSF—to cite only the more obvious of those Federal departments and agencies that have exhibited a keen interest in the State-local reorganization and reassignment efforts; the work of advisory committees to the Bureau of the Census, especially its Governments division; and the liaison and technical assistance functions of individual Federal Regional Councils. These and other Federal undertakings—too numerous and varied to describe—could provide valuable assistance to boundary commissions, State ACIR's, and other State-local bodies involved directly in monitoring, studying, and recommending changes in State-areawide-local relations and institutions.

In some instances, the basic problem here is a Federal unawareness that such commissions exist. In others, Federal fear of assisting bodies involved in policy proposing has been a factor—despite the record of HUD's Section 701 planning assistance program, the 1969 Presidential directive making State legislative committees and related bodies eligible for certain project grants, and examples of technical assistance to States and localities engaged in reorganization.

This proposal, then, would simply place boundary commissions, State ACIR's, and other comparable units in a preferred or at least recognized position in terms of certain Federal financial, technical, and personnel assistance programs. These programs already exist, already are involved directly in intergovernmental relations, and already affect one or another of the many facets of State-local modernization. Moreover, the commissions involved would all be duly established official bodies, in most instances with a broadly representative make-up and with a statutory mandate that would be fully protective of State-local concerns. The relationship between these bodies and the assisting Federal agencies, then, would be a cooperative one, based on mutual interests—with no possibility of Federal direction or dominance.

* * * * *

To sum up, the Commission believes that the Federal government should adopt policies that accommodate State and local actions to reorganize governments at the areawide and local levels. Such efforts should be complementary, not controlling; supportive, not supplanting; and responsive to State-local undertakings, not reactive to Federal program pressures. The specifics advanced here are merely suggestions. But they do point to ways and means launching at an early date a clear-cut Federal policy in this area. To get such an effort under way, however, will require full State and local support for it. It is the Commission's hope that this recommendation and its possible implementing components will help generate such support. Without it, the development of a genuinely accommodating Federal role will be difficult to achieve.

Footnotes

¹See ACIR, *Regional Decision-Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts*, Vol. 1, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System*, 1973.

²An UMJO would work largely through and with existing local governments. Hence, the fewer and more capable these units are, the earlier it will be for the umbrella unit and the fewer coordinative problems it will face.

³See ACIR, *Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide*, Vol. IV, *Substate Regionalism and the Federal System*, 1974, for a fuller treatment of the research material on which these findings are based.

⁴Combines, parallels and slightly modifies separate recommendations adopted in Commission Report Nos. A-5 and A-11, pp. 21 and 64, respectively.

⁵See Report No. A-22, pp. 75-76, 77 and 80, and Report No. A-31, Vol. II, p. 14.

⁶Recommended in Report No. A-12, p. 71.

⁷Recommended in Report Nos. A-12, pp. 67-68, and A-22, pp. 82-83, respectively.

⁸Urban functions may include: fire protection, basic police protection, parking, sewer constructions, refuse collection, animal control, parks and recreation, planning, zoning, code enforcement, subdivision control, public housing, urban renewal, industrial development, water supply, and manpower.

⁹See ACIR, *The Problems of Special Districts in American Government*, No. A-22, pp. 75 and 77.

¹⁰See ACIR, *The Problems of Special Districts in American Government*, No. A-22, p. 80.

¹¹A method of developing these standards is set forth in Recommendation I of Volume IV in this series; see Chapter 2 of *Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide*.

¹²ACIR, Report No. A-5, pp. 19-20.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁴ACIR, Report No. A-22, pp. 75-76.

¹⁵ACIR, Report No. A-22, p. 80.

¹⁶ACIR, Report No. A-51, Volume II, p. 14.

¹⁷See Report Nos. A-12, pp. 67-68, and A-22, pp. 82-83, respectively.

¹⁸See *Governmental Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas*, A-5, 1961, p. 30.

¹⁹See *Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Area-wide*, Chapter 2.

²⁰See ACIR, *State-Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System*, A-38, 1971, pp. 17-18.


²¹ACIR, "Alternative Approaches etc.", op. cit., p. 81.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 83.

²³In time, the Atlanta Regional Council may well prove to be a Georgia counterpart to the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council.

²⁴If the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council is made elective, as is proposed, then a complete case study of the converted umbrella organization will be provided.

APPENDIX TABLES



Appendix Table III-A

Services Classified by Providers*

| Service | Number of Units | Local Government | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Regional Unit | | State Government | | Federal Government | | Private Firm | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----|-----------------|----|------------------------|----|----------------------|----|------------------|----|--------------------|----|--------------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| | | Assessing | 232 | 167 | 71 | 16 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Payroll | 121 | 45 | 37 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 65 | 53 |
| Tax Collection | 220 | 136 | 61 | 17 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 13 | 5 | 19 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 10 |
| Treasury Functions | 54 | 31 | 57 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 26 |
| Utility Billing | 186 | 65 | 35 | 2 | 1 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 104 | 56 |
| Election Administration | 145 | 111 | 77 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5 |
| Legal Services | 223 | 27 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 187 | 84 |
| Licensing | 58 | 40 | 69 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 |
| Microfilm Services | 74 | 16 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 47 | 64 |
| Personnel Services | 82 | 26 | 32 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 41 | 50 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 7 |
| Public Relations | 45 | 12 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 67 |
| Records Maintenance | 42 | 27 | 64 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 21 |
| Registration of Voters | 113 | 99 | 88 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| All Public Health Services | 314 | 236 | 75 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 5 | 16 | 5 | 35 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 |
| Air Pollution Abatement | 191 | 99 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 19 | 10 | 50 | 26 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Alcoholic Rehabilitation | 124 | 67 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 27 | 22 | 4 | 3 | 9 | 7 |
| Ambulance Services | 304 | 115 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 169 | 56 |
| Animal Control | 322 | 204 | 63 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 99 | 31 |
| Cemetaries | 96 | 33 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 47 | 49 |
| Hospitals | 151 | 63 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 13 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 57 | 38 |
| Mental Health | 137 | 56 | 41 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 38 | 28 | 3 | 2 | 22 | 17 |
| Mosquito Control | 143 | 89 | 62 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 15 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 8 |
| Noise Abatement | 70 | 38 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 21 | 30 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Nursing Services | 123 | 66 | 54 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 28 |
| Water Pollution Abatement | 129 | 40 | 31 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 57 | 44 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 4 |
| Welfare | 119 | 68 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 31 | 26 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Flood Control | 146 | 37 | 25 | 1 | 0 | 23 | 16 | 8 | 5 | 23 | 16 | 42 | 29 | 0 | 0 |
| General Development | 57 | 19 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 13 | 23 | 6 | 11 | 4 | 7 | 10 | 18 |
| Housing | 129 | 43 | 33 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 14 | 11 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 41 | 32 | 7 | 5 |
| Industrial Development | 92 | 36 | 39 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 24 | 26 |
| Irrigation | 31 | 11 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 16 | 5 | 16 |
| Mapping | 143 | 37 | 39 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 13 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 74 | 52 |
| Planning | 317 | 96 | 30 | 1 | 0 | 12 | 4 | 78 | 25 | 30 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 92 | 29 |
| Soil Conservation | 111 | 28 | 25 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 23 | 21 | 36 | 32 | 4 | 4 |
| Urban Renewal | 78 | 16 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 9 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 33 | 42 | 6 | 8 |
| Zoning and Subdivision Control | 103 | 58 | 56 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 14 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 |
| Parks | 154 | 72 | 47 | 24 | 16 | 23 | 15 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 3 |
| Recreational Facilities | 190 | 50 | 26 | 95 | 50 | 16 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 13 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 4 |
| All Police Services | 157 | 122 | 78 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 22 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Crime Laboratory | 323 | 123 | 38 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 16 | 5 | 134 | 41 | 8 | 2 | 5 | 2 |

*With respect to several functions, summation of the number of agreements involving each type of provider will not equal the number of units because combination responses—local and State, local, State and Federal, and State and Federal—have been omitted.

Appendix Table III-A (Cont.)

| Service | Number of Units | Local Government | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Regional Unit | | State Government | | Federal Government | | Private Firm | |
|---|-----------------|------------------|----|-----------------|----|------------------------|----|----------------------|----|------------------|----|--------------------|---|--------------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| Criminal Identification | 236 | 68 | 29 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 94 | 40 | 16 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| Patrol Services | 93 | 66 | 71 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 17 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| Police Communications | 327 | 240 | 73 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 18 | 6 | 38 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 2 |
| Police Training | 423 | 104 | 25 | 20 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 44 | 10 | 204 | 48 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| School Crossing Guards | 97 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Traffic Control | 118 | 59 | 50 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 43 | 36 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 4 |
| Jails & Detention Homes | 472 | 433 | 92 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 14 | 3 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Juvenile Delinquency Program | 132 | 85 | 64 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 13 | 10 | 19 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 |
| Probation and Parole | 114 | 61 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 36 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Work Release | 46 | 25 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 16 | 35 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| All Fire Services | 266 | 169 | 64 | 2 | 0 | 72 | 27 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 5 |
| Fire Communications | 176 | 130 | 74 | 1 | 0 | 30 | 17 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 4 |
| Fire Prevention | 89 | 48 | 54 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 29 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Training of Firemen | 196 | 61 | 31 | 9 | 5 | 26 | 13 | 9 | 5 | 78 | 40 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| All Civil Defense | 255 | 188 | 73 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 4 | 37 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Civil Defense Communications | 106 | 68 | 64 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 20 | 19 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Civil Defense Training | 96 | 55 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 24 | 25 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Bridge Construction & Maintenance | 146 | 61 | 42 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 36 | 25 | 1 | 0 | 25 | 17 |
| Building & Mechanical Inspection | 79 | 56 | 71 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 11 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 9 |
| Electrical & Plumbing Inspection | 130 | 76 | 58 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 30 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 13 |
| Electricity Supply | 316 | 18 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 3 | 258 | 82 |
| Engineering Services | 293 | 29 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 253 | 86 |
| Refuse Collection | 385 | 32 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 339 | 88 |
| Sewage Disposal | 331 | 177 | 53 | 1 | 0 | 95 | 29 | 24 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 21 | 6 |
| Sewer Lines | 130 | 65 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 38 | 29 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 11 |
| Snow Removal | 75 | 32 | 43 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 28 |
| Solid Waste Disposal | 328 | 157 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 143 | 44 |
| Street Construction & Maintenance | 180 | 64 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 35 | 19 | 1 | 0 | 63 | 35 |
| Street Lighting | 392 | 46 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 309 | 79 |
| Water Supply | 323 | 149 | 46 | 1 | 0 | 69 | 21 | 8 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 84 | 26 |
| Water Distribution System | 178 | 65 | 37 | 1 | 0 | 36 | 20 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 67 | 38 |
| Special Transportation Service | 100 | 18 | 18 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 49 |
| Management Service for Publicly Owned Transit Service | 58 | 14 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 28 | 8 | 14 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 31 |
| Libraries | 348 | 233 | 67 | 15 | 4 | 42 | 12 | 23 | 6 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 17 | 5 |
| Museums | 63 | 35 | 56 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 12 | 19 |
| Schools | 273 | 49 | 18 | 191 | 70 | 20 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Appendix Table III-B

Police Training Agreements*

| | Number of Cities Reporting | Local Government | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Other Regional Unit | | State Government | | Federal Government | | Private Firm | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|----|-----------------|----|------------------------|----|----------------------------|----|------------------|-----|--------------------|---|--------------|---|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 423 | 104 | 25 | 19 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 44 | 10 | 204 | 48 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 30 | 2 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 26 | 9 | 35 | 3 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 7 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 45 | 10 | 22 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 17 | 38 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 109 | 34 | 31 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 13 | 12 | 47 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 104 | 19 | 18 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | 61 | 59 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 127 | 31 | 24 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 9 | 68 | 54 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Under 2,500 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 72 | 13 | 18 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 51 | 71 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| North Central | 142 | 34 | 24 | 6 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 7 | 71 | 50 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| South | 108 | 21 | 19 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 28 | 26 | 42 | 39 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| West | 101 | 36 | 36 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 40 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 186 | 43 | 23 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 7 | 104 | 56 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Council-Manager | 217 | 57 | 26 | 13 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 29 | 13 | 87 | 41 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Commission | 11 | 2 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 18 | 6 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Town Meeting | 8 | 2 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 23 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 17 | 8 | 35 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Suburban | 252 | 93 | 37 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 31 | 12 | 90 | 36 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 148 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 6 | 106 | 72 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

*Summation of the number of agreements involving each type of provider will not equal the number of cities reporting because combination responses—local and State, local, State, and Federal, and State and Federal—have been omitted.

Appendix Table III-C

Refuse Collection Agreements*

| | No. of Cities Reporting | Local Govt. | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Other Reg. Unit | | State Govt. | | Federal Govt. | | Private Firm | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----|--------------------|---|------------------------------|----|------------------------------|---|----------------|---|------------------|---|-----------------|-----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 385 | 32 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 339 | 88 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 50 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 100 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 90 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 27 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 88 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 45 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 91 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 88 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 | 93 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 83 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 76 | 91 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 128 | 19 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 104 | 81 |
| Under 2,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 69 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 63 | 91 |
| North Central | 150 | 13 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 133 | 89 |
| South | 50 | 11 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 72 |
| West | 116 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 107 | 92 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 178 | 22 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 84 |
| Council-Manager | 189 | 10 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 172 | 91 |
| Commission | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 89 |
| Town Meeting | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 100 |
| Representative Town Meeting | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 100 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 91 |
| Suburban | 253 | 21 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 225 | 89 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 105 | 11 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 93 | 89 |

*Summation of the number of agreements involving each type of provider will not equal the number of cities reporting because combination responses—local and State, local, State, and Federal, and State and Federal—have been omitted.

Appendix Table III-D

Solid Waste Disposal Agreements*

| | Number of Cities Reporting | Local Govern- ment | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Other Regional Unit | | State Govern- ment | | Federal Govern- ment | | Private Firm | |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----|--------------------|---|------------------------------|----|----------------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|-----------------|-----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 301 | 146 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 128 | 42 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 100 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 1 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 9 | 5 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 33 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 20 | 11 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 45 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 42 | 20 | 47 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 38 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 71 | 33 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 45 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 64 | 36 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 35 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 92 | 40 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 43 | 46 |
| Under 2,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 48 | 22 | 45 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 47 |
| North Central | 108 | 34 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65 | 60 |
| South | 79 | 58 | 73 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 16 |
| West | 66 | 32 | 48 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 40 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 126 | 55 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 56 | 44 |
| Council-Manager | 170 | 88 | 51 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 71 | 41 |
| Commission | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Town Meeting | 5 | 3 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| Rep. Town Meeting | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 29 | 15 | 51 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 44 |
| Suburban | 175 | 73 | 41 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 81 | 46 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 97 | 58 | 59 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 36 |

*Summation of the number of agreements involving each type of provider of the service will not equal the number of cities reporting because one combination response—local and State—was omitted from the table.

Appendix Table III-E

Planning Agreements*

| | No. of Cities Reporting | Local Govt. | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Other Reg. Unit | | State Govt. | | Federal Govt. | | Private Firm | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----|--------------------|---|------------------------------|----|------------------------------|-----|----------------|----|------------------|---|-----------------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 282 | 87 | 30 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 68 | 24 | 26 | 9 | 6 | 2 | 84 | 29 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 15 | 4 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 13 | 5 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 20 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 28 | 8 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 32 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 32 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 71 | 22 | 30 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 21 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 21 | 29 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 84 | 25 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 19 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 38 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 78 | 28 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 21 | 10 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 19 | 24 |
| Under 2,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 51 | 15 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 15 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 23 | 45 |
| North Central | 93 | 30 | 32 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 23 | 24 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 31 | 33 |
| South | 85 | 19 | 22 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 22 | 25 | 22 | 25 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 21 |
| West | 53 | 23 | 43 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 15 | 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 22 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 115 | 41 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 22 | 19 | 10 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 34 | 29 |
| Council-Manager | 156 | 45 | 28 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 44 | 28 | 15 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 43 | 27 |
| Commission | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 60 |
| Town Meeting | 6 | 1 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 66 |
| Rep. Town Meeting | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 23 | 5 | 21 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 12 | 52 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 17 |
| Central | 147 | 47 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 32 | 21 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 53 | 36 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 112 | 35 | 31 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 24 | 21 | 18 | 16 | 3 | 2 | 27 | 24 |

*Summation of the number of agreements involving each type of provider of the service will not equal the number of cities reporting because one combination response—State and Federal—had been omitted from the table.

Appendix Table III-F

Sewage Disposal Agreements*

| | No. of Cities Reporting | Local Govt. | | School District | | Other Special District | | COG or Other Reg. Unit | | State Govt. | | Federal Govt. | | Private Firm | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|-----|--------------------|---|------------------------------|----|------------------------------|----|----------------|----|------------------|---|-----------------|----|
| | | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % | # | % |
| TOTAL, ALL CITIES | 307 | 165 | 53 | 1 | 0 | 87 | 28 | 23 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 18 | 5 |
| POPULATION GROUP | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Over 500,000 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 66 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 33 |
| 250,000-500,000 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 100,000-250,000 | 10 | 5 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 40 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 50,000-100,000 | 26 | 13 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 34 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 |
| 25,000-50,000 | 48 | 28 | 58 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 25 | 5 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 10,000-25,000 | 81 | 41 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 35 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 5,000-10,000 | 67 | 41 | 61 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 22 | 6 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| 2,500-5,000 | 71 | 37 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 22 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 11 |
| Under 2,500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| GEOGRAPHIC REGION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Northeast | 68 | 25 | 36 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 38 | 8 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 10 |
| North Central | 55 | 54 | 56 | 1 | 1 | 25 | 26 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 |
| South | 65 | 45 | 69 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 16 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| West | 75 | 41 | 51 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 31 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| FORM OF GOVERNMENT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mayor-Council | 115 | 61 | 53 | 1 | 0 | 26 | 22 | 11 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 10 | 8 |
| Council-Manager | 181 | 102 | 56 | 0 | 0 | 58 | 32 | 11 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 3 |
| Commission | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 33 | 1 | 33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Town Meeting | 7 | 1 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 28 |
| Rep. Town Meeting | 1 | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| METRO/CITY TYPE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Central | 20 | 7 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 40 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 |
| Suburban | 247 | 139 | 56 | 1 | 0 | 70 | 28 | 21 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 10 | 4 |
| Non-Metropolitan | 40 | 19 | 47 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 22 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 15 |

*Summation of the number of agreements involving each type of provider will not equal the number of cities reporting because combination responses—local and State, and State and Federal—have been omitted.

Appendix Table III-G

Who Should Provide The Services?

| SERVICE | County Government | Regional Special District | Council of Governments | Federal or State Government |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Assessing | 608 | 59 | 21 | 31 |
| Payroll | 31 | 23 | 53 | 38 |
| Tax Collection | 557 | 44 | 26 | 38 |
| Treasury Functions | 48 | 21 | 39 | 24 |
| Utility Billing | 22 | 49 | 49 | 42 |
| Election Administration | 505 | 22 | 29 | 19 |
| Legal Services | 72 | 30 | 47 | 31 |
| Licensing | 104 | 23 | 31 | 28 |
| Microfilm Services | 125 | 70 | 32 | 27 |
| Personnel Services | 33 | 42 | 40 | 28 |
| Public Relations | 31 | 31 | 45 | 29 |
| Record Maintenance and Storage | 60 | 37 | 36 | 26 |
| Registration of Voters | 549 | 29 | 24 | 12 |
| All Public Health Services | 692 | 192 | 22 | 52 |
| Air Pollution Abatement | 327 | 392 | 33 | 86 |
| Alcoholic Rehabilitation | 337 | 243 | 17 | 76 |
| Ambulance Service | 342 | 144 | 33 | 51 |
| Animal Control Services | 423 | 90 | 23 | 21 |
| Cemeteries | 169 | 64 | 27 | 43 |
| Hospitals | 352 | 180 | 19 | 37 |
| Mental Health | 397 | 237 | 14 | 73 |
| Mosquito Control | 394 | 206 | 18 | 26 |
| Noise Pollution Abatement | 212 | 261 | 24 | 64 |
| Nursing Services | 314 | 133 | 13 | 29 |
| Water Pollution Abatement | 231 | 356 | 19 | 123 |
| Welfare | 503 | 149 | 7 | 166 |
| Flood Control | 238 | 359 | 29 | 114 |
| General Development Services | 85 | 163 | 55 | 27 |
| Housing | 124 | 152 | 52 | 61 |
| Industrial Development | 130 | 180 | 65 | 43 |
| Irrigation | 93 | 171 | 19 | 29 |
| Mapping | 312 | 184 | 47 | 28 |
| Planning | 186 | 239 | 109 | 43 |
| Soil Conservation | 221 | 234 | 30 | 64 |
| Urban Renewal | 108 | 106 | 47 | 64 |
| Zoning & Subdivision Control | 145 | 105 | 65 | 48 |
| Parks | 245 | 186 | 53 | 53 |
| Recreation Facilities | 83 | 58 | 19 | 26 |
| All Police Services | 150 | 117 | 56 | 53 |
| Crime Laboratory | 308 | 322 | 29 | 74 |
| Criminal Identification | 316 | 264 | 26 | 103 |
| Patrol Services | 127 | 93 | 41 | 69 |
| Police Communications | 248 | 219 | 44 | 45 |
| Police Training | 186 | 311 | 52 | 112 |
| School Crossing Guards | 115 | 52 | 44 | 71 |
| Traffic Control | 101 | 82 | 48 | 53 |
| Jails & Detention Homes | 680 | 189 | 20 | 34 |
| Juvenile Delinquency Programs | 507 | 207 | 27 | 46 |
| Probation & Parole | 554 | 206 | 19 | 68 |
| Work Release Programs | 401 | 148 | 21 | 55 |

Appendix Table III-G (Cont.)

| Service | County Govern- ment | Regional Special District | Council of Govern- ments | Federal or State Govern- ment |
|---|------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| All Fire Services | 148 | 139 | 63 | 46 |
| Fire Communications | 178 | 151 | 58 | 35 |
| Fire Prevention | 131 | 130 | 49 | 38 |
| Training of Firemen | 170 | 255 | 55 | 77 |
| All Civil Defense Services | 481 | 203 | 35 | 72 |
| Civil Defense Communications | 268 | 272 | 28 | 51 |
| Civil Defense Training | 257 | 184 | 27 | 59 |
| Bridge Construction & Maintenance | 269 | 73 | 31 | 66 |
| Building & Mechanical Inspection | 136 | 58 | 42 | 48 |
| Electrical & Plumbing Inspection | 120 | 64 | 45 | 52 |
| Electricity Supply | 57 | 99 | 25 | 72 |
| Engineering Services | 106 | 55 | 52 | 48 |
| Refuse Collection | 179 | 111 | 56 | 49 |
| Sewage Disposal | 143 | 291 | 49 | 33 |
| Sewer Lines | 87 | 140 | 49 | 47 |
| Snow Removal | 70 | 62 | 49 | 40 |
| Solid Waste Disposal | 325 | 282 | 48 | 37 |
| Street Construction & Maintenance | 89 | 47 | 52 | 56 |
| Street Lighting | 45 | 50 | 47 | 64 |
| Water Supply | 79 | 224 | 52 | 51 |
| Water Distribution | 67 | 167 | 46 | 49 |
| Special Transportation Services | 140 | 265 | 40 | 28 |
| Management Service for Publicly Owned Transit System | 74 | 195 | 36 | 21 |
| Library Services | 379 | 161 | 35 | 34 |
| Museums | 268 | 160 | 20 | 28 |
| Schools | 218 | 192 | 25 | 58 |

Appendix Table IV-A
Single County SMSA's by State

| State | Counties | SMSA Name | Population | | Central City & Population (1970) | Central City Population Change 1960-1970 | | |
|------------|----------------|------------------|------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|--|---------|--|
| | | | 1960 | 1970 | | 1960 | 1970 | |
| Alabama | Etowah | Gadsden | 96,980 | 94,144 | Gadsden | 53,928 | (-7.3) | |
| | Tuscaloosa | Tuscaloosa | 109,047 | 116,029 | Tuscaloosa | 65,773 | (3.8) | |
| Arizona | Maricopa | Phoenix | 663,510 | 967,522 | Phoenix | 581,562 | (32.4) | |
| | Pima | Tucson | 265,660 | 351,667 | Tucson | 262,933 | (23.5) | |
| Arkansas | Jefferson | Pine Bluff | 81,373 | 85,329 | Pine Bluff | 57,389 | (30.3) | |
| California | Fresno | Fresno | 365,945 | 413,053 | Fresno | 165,972 | (23.0) | |
| | Kern | Bakersfield | 291,984 | 329,162 | Bakersfield | 69,515 | (22.3) | |
| | | Salinas- | | | | | | |
| | Monterey | Monterey | 198,351 | 250,071 | Salinas | 58,892 | (103.4) | |
| | Los Angeles | Los Angeles- | | | | | | |
| | | Long Beach | 6,038,771 | 7,032,075 | Los Angeles | 2,816,061 | (13.6) | |
| | Orange | Anaheim- | | | | | | |
| | | Santa Ana- | | | Anaheim, | | (60.0, | |
| | Garden Grove | 703,925 | 1,420,386 | Santa Ana, | and | 56.1, | | |
| | | | | | Garden Grove | | 45.4) | |
| | San Diego | San Diego | 1,033,011 | 1,357,854 | San Diego | 696,769 | (21.6) | |
| | Santa Barbara | Santa Barbara | 186,962 | 264,324 | Santa Barbara | 70,215 | (19.5) | |
| | Santa Clara | San Jose | 642,315 | 1,064,714 | San Jose | 445,779 | (118.3) | |
| | San Joaquin | Stockton | 249,989 | 290,208 | Stockton | 107,644 | (24.7) | |
| Sonoma | Santa Rosa | 147,375 | 204,885 | Santa Rosa | 50,006 | (61.2) | | |
| Stanislaus | Modesto | 157,294 | 195,506 | Modesto | 61,712 | (68.7) | | |
| Ventura | Oxnard-Ventura | 199,138 | 376,430 | Oxnard | 71,225 | (76.9) | | |
| Colorado | El Paso | Colorado Springs | 143,742 | 235,972 | Colorado Springs | 135,060 | (92.4) | |
| | Pueblo | Pueblo | 118,707 | 118,235 | Pueblo | 97,453 | (6.9) | |
| Florida | Broward | Fort Lauderdale- | | | | | | |
| | | Hollywood | 333,946 | 620,100 | Fort Lauderdale | 139,590 | (66.9) | |
| | Alachua | Gainesville | 74,074 | 104,764 | Gainesville | 78,646 | (164.8) | |
| | Dade | Miami-Dade | 935,047 | 1,267,792 | Miami | 334,859 | (14.8) | |
| | Duval | Jacksonville | 455,411 | 528,865 | Jacksonville | 528,865 | (163.1) | |
| | Leon | Tallahassee | 74,225 | 103,047 | Tallahassee | 71,897 | (49.2) | |
| Palm Beach | West Palm | | | | | | | |
| | Beach | 228,106 | 348,753 | West Palm Beach | 85,249 | (51.7) | | |
| Georgia | Chatham | Savannah | 188,299 | 187,769 | Savannah | 118,347 | (20.7) | |
| | Dougherty | Albany | 75,680 | 89,639 | Albany | 72,623 | (29.9) | |
| Hawaii | Honolulu | Honolulu | 500,409 | 629,176 | Honolulu | 324,871 | (10.4) | |
| Idaho | Ada | Boise City | 93,460 | 112,230 | Boise City | 74,990 | (117.5) | |
| Illinois | Champaign | Champaign- | | | | | | |
| | | Urbana | 132,436 | 163,281 | Champaign | 56,532 | (14.0) | |
| | McLean | Bloomington- | | | | | | |
| | Normal | 83,877 | 104,389 | Bloomington | 39,992 | (10.3) | | |
| Macon | Decatur | 118,257 | 125,010 | Decatur | 90,397 | (15.9) | | |
| Sangamon | Springfield | 146,539 | 161,335 | Springfield | 91,753 | (10.2) | | |
| Indiana | Allen | Fort Wayne | 232,196 | 280,455 | Fort Wayne | 177,671 | (9.8) | |
| | Delaware | Muncie | 110,938 | 129,219 | Muncie | 69,080 | (0.7) | |
| | Madison | Anderson | 125,819 | 138,451 | Anderson | 70,787 | (44.3) | |
| | Tippecanoe | Lafayette | | | | | | |
| | W Lafayette | 89,122 | | Lafayette | | | | |

Appendix Table IV-A (cont.)

| State | Counties | SMSA Name | Population 1960/1970 | | Central City & Population (1970) | Central City Population Change 1960-1970 | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|---|--|---------|
| Iowa | Black Hawk | Waterloo | 122,482 | 132,916 | Waterloo | 75,533 | (5.3) |
| | Dubuque | Dubuque | 80,048 | 90,609 | Cedar Rapids | 110,642 | (20.2) |
| | Linn | Cedar Rapids | 136,899 | 163,213 | Cedar Rapids | 110,642 | (20.2) |
| | Polk | Des Moines | 266,315 | 286,101 | Des Moines | 200,587 | (-4.0) |
| Kansas | Shawnee | Topeka | 141,286 | 155,322 | Topeka | 125,011 | (4.6) |
| Kentucky | Davies | Owensboro | 70,588 | 79,486 | Owensboro | 50,329 | (18.5) |
| | Fayette | Lexington | 131,906 | 174,323 | Lexington | 108,137 | (72.2) |
| Louisiana | Calcasieu | Lake Charles | 145,475 | 145,415 | Lake Charles | 77,998 | (23.0) |
| | East Baton Rouge | Baton Rouge | 230,058 | 285,167 | Baton Rouge | 165,963 | (8.9) |
| | Lafayette | Lafayette | 84,656 | 109,716 | Lafayette | 68,908 | (70.6) |
| | Ouachita | Monroe | 101,663 | 115,387 | Monroe | 56,374 | (8.0) |
| Michigan | Bay | Bay City | 107,042 | 117,339 | Bay City | 49,449 | (-7.8) |
| | Jackson | Jackson | 131,994 | 143,274 | Jackson | 45,484 | (-10.3) |
| | Kalamazoo | Kalamazoo | 169,712 | 201,550 | Kalamazoo | 85,555 | (4.2) |
| | Muskegon | Muskegon- Muskegon Heights | 149,943 | 157,426 | Muskegon | 44,631 | (-4.0) |
| Minnesota | Olmsted | Rochester | 65,532 | 84,104 | Rochester | 53,766 | (32.2) |
| Mississippi | Harrison | Biloxi-Gulfport | 119,489 | 134,582 | Biloxi | 29,753 | (N/A) |
| Missouri | Boone | Columbia | 55,202 | 80,911 | Columbia | 32,976 | (210.9) |
| | Buchanan | St. Joseph | 90,581 | 86,915 | St. Joseph | 72,691 | (-8.8) |
| | Greene | Springfield | 126,276 | 152,929 | Springfield | 120,096 | (25.3) |
| Montana | Cascade | Great Falls | 73,418 | 81,804 | Great Falls | 60,091 | (8.8) |
| | Yellowstone | Billings | 79,016 | 87,367 | Billings | 74,848 | (41.5) |
| Nebraska | Lancaster | Lincoln | 155,272 | 167,972 | Lincoln | 149,518 | (16.3) |
| Nevada | Clark | Las Vegas | 127,016 | 273,288 | Las Vegas | 124,161 | (92.8) |
| | Washoe | Reno | 84,743 | 119,965 | Reno | 72,121 | (28.6) |
| New Jersey | Atlantic | Atlantic City | 160,880 | 175,043 | Atlantic City | 47,859 | (-19.6) |
| | Cumberland | Vineland- Millville- Bridgton | 106,850 | 121,374 | Vineland | 47,399 | (25.8) |
| | Mercer | Trenton | 266,392 | 303,968 | Trenton | 104,638 | (-8.3) |
| | Hudson | Jersey City | 610,734 | 609,266 | Jersey City | 260,545 | (-5.6) |
| New Mexico | Bernalillo | Albuquerque | 262,199 | 315,774 | Albuquerque | 243,751 | (21.2) |
| North Carolina | Buncombe | Asheville | 130,074 | 145,056 | Asheville | 57,681 | (-4.2) |
| | Cumberland | Fayetteville | 148,418 | 212,042 | Fayetteville | 53,510 | (13.6) |
| | Wake | Raleigh | 169,082 | 228,453 | Raleigh | 121,577 | (29.4) |
| Ohio | Butler | Hamilton- Middletown | 199,076 | 226,207 | Hamilton | 67,865 | (-6.2) |
| | Clark | Springfield | 131,440 | 157,115 | Springfield | 81,926 | (-1.0) |
| | Lorain | Lorian-Elyria | 217,500 | 256,843 | Lorain | 78,185 | (13.4) |
| | Richland | Mansfield | 117,761 | 129,997 | Mansfield | 55,047 | (16.3) |
| | Stark | Canton | 340,345 | 372,210 | Canton | 110,053 | (-3.1) |
| Oklahoma | Comanche | Lawton | 90,803 | 108,144 | Lawton | 74,470 | (20.7) |
| Oregon | Lane | Eugene | 162,890 | 213,358 | Eugene | 76,346 | (20.7) |
| Pennsylvania | Berks | Reading | 275,414 | 296,382 | Reading | 87,643 | (-10.7) |
| | Blair | Altoona | 137,270 | 135,356 | Altoona | 62,900 | (-9.4) |
| | Erie | Erie | 138,440 | 263,654 | Erie | 129,231 | (-6.7) |
| | Lackawanna | Scranton | 234,531 | 234,107 | Scranton | 103,564 | (-7.1) |
| Lancaster | Lancaster | 278,359 | 319,693 | Lancaster | 57,690 | (-5.5) | |

Appendix Table IV-A (cont.)

| State | Counties | SMSA Name | Population 1960/1970 | | Central City & Population (1970) | Central City Population Change 1960-1970 | |
|---------------|-----------|--|-------------------------|---------|---|--|---------|
| | Luzerne | Wilkes-Barre- Hazelton | 346,972 | 342,301 | Wilkes-Barre | 58,856 | (-7.4) |
| South Dakota | Minnehaha | Sioux Falls | 86,575 | | Sioux Falls | | |
| Texas | Brazos | Bryan-College Station | 44,895 | 57,978 | Bryan City | 33,719 | (22.4) |
| | Ector | Odessa | 90,995 | 91,805 | Odessa | 78,380 | (-2.4) |
| | Cameron | Brownsville- Harlingen- San Benito | 151,098 | 140,368 | Brownsville | 52,522 | (9.3) |
| | Galveston | Galveston- Texas City | 140,364 | 169,812 | Galveston | 61,809 | (-8.0) |
| | Grayson | Sherman- Dension | 73,043 | 83,225 | Sherman | 29,061 | (16.3) |
| | El Paso | El Paso | 314,070 | 359,291 | El Paso | 322,261 | (16.5) |
| | Hidalgo | McAllen-Pharr- Edinburg | 180,904 | 181,535 | McAllen | 37,636 | (15.0) |
| | McLennan | Waco | 150,091 | 147,553 | Waco | 95,326 | (-2.5) |
| | Midland | Midland | 67,717 | 65,433 | Midland | 59,463 | (-5.0) |
| | Lubbock | Lubbock | 156,271 | 179,295 | Lubbock | 149,101 | (15.9) |
| | Smith | Tyler | 86,350 | 97,096 | Tyler | 57,770 | (12.8) |
| | Tom Green | San Angelo | 64,630 | 71,047 | San Angelo | 63,884 | (8.6) |
| | Travis | Austin | 212,136 | 295,516 | Austin | 251,808 | (35.0) |
| | Webb | Laredo | 64,791 | 72,859 | Laredo | 69,024 | (13.8) |
| Utah | Weber | Ogden | 110,744 | 126,278 | Ogden | 69,478 | (-1.0) |
| | Utah | Provo-Orem | 106,991 | 137,776 | Provo | 53,131 | (47.4) |
| Washington | Pierce | Tacoma | 321,590 | 411,027 | Tacoma | 154,581 | (4.5) |
| | Spokane | Spokane | 278,333 | 287,487 | Spokane | 170,516 | (-6.1) |
| West Virginia | Kanawha | Charleston | 252,925 | 229,515 | Charleston | 71,505 | (-16.7) |
| Wisconsin | Brown | Green Bay | 125,080 | 158,244 | Green Bay | 87,809 | (39.6) |
| | Dane | Madison | 222,095 | 290,272 | Madison | 173,258 | (36.7) |
| | Kenosha | Kenosha | 100,615 | 117,917 | Kenosha | 78,805 | (16.1) |
| | Lacrosse | Lacrosse | 72,465 | 80,468 | Lacrosse City | 51,153 | (7.5) |
| | Racine | Racine | 141,781 | 170,838 | Racine | 95,162 | (6.8) |

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Profile of County Government* (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1972), pp. 144-146.

Appendix Table IV-B

Selected Characteristics of Responding Single-County SMSA's

| County | Number Incorporated | | Special Districts | Number Special Districts | Multi-School Districts | Number Transfer Purpose Districts | Authorized | | Transfers Required Procedure* | City-County | |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| | Places | Square Miles | | | | | Of Functions | Legal Basis | | Between 1960-1970 | Consolidation Studied |
| Tuscaloosa, Ala. | 2 | 1340 | Y | 0 | 1 | 0 | Y | B | CR-SM | Y | Y |
| Maricopa, Ariz. | 18 | 9253 | Y | 165 | 65 | 0 | Y | S | LO | N | N |
| Pinal, Ariz. | 6 | 5380 | Y | 36 | 1 | 0 | N | — | — | N | Y |
| Jefferson, Ariz. | 7 | 907 | Y | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | S | — | — | — |
| Fresno, Calif. | 15 | 5964 | Y | 142 | 56 | 27 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Kern, Calif. | 11 | 8172 | Y | 16 | 53 | 97 | Y | S | JPA | N | N |
| Monterey, Calif. | 11 | 3324 | Y | 73 | 31 | 19 | Y | S | JPA | N | N |
| Los Angeles, Calif. | 77 | 4083 | Y | 348 | 100 | 0 | Y | S | LO/LBC | Y | N |
| Orange, Calif. | 25 | 741 | Y | 104 | 35 | 14 | Y | S | CO/LO | N | N |
| San Diego, Calif. | 135 | 4225 | Y | 135 | 38 | 83 | Y | C | JPA | Y | N |
| Santa Clara, Calif. | 15 | 1312 | Y | 38 | 48 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| San Joaquin, Calif. | 6 | 1410 | Y | 146 | 27 | 30 | Y | S | CO | Y | N |
| Stanislaus, Calif. | 8 | 152 | Y | 77 | 29 | 6 | Y | S | CO/LO | N | N |
| El Paso, Col. | 8 | 2159 | Y | 36 | 16 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Pueblo, Col. | 2 | 2606 | Y | 8 | 5 | 0 | N | — | — | N | Y |
| Alachua, Fl. | 9 | 965 | N | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | B | CO/LO/R-SM | Y | Y |
| Broward, Fl. | 29 | 1218 | Y | 23 | 1 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Duval, Fl. | 1 | 827 | Y | 2 | 0 | 0 | N | — | — | Y | N |
| Palm Beach, Fla. | 0 | 2700 | Y | 22 | 0 | 0 | Y | C | CO | — | — |
| Chatham, Ga. | 7 | 440 | N | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | B | CO/LO | Y | Y |
| Ada, Idaho | 4 | 0 | Y | 29 | 5 | — | N | — | — | N | N |
| Champaign, Ill. | 25 | 1000 | — | 0 | 0 | 0 | N | — | — | N | — |
| Macon, Ill. | 7 | 0 | Y | 27 | 8 | 0 | Y | S | CR-SM | Y | N |
| Sangamon, Ill. | 25 | 880 | Y | 31 | 25 | 0 | Y | B | CO/CR-SM | N | N |
| Delaware, Ind. | 4 | 400 | Y | 1 | 4 | 0 | — | — | — | — | N |
| Allen, Indiana | 6 | 666 | — | — | — | — | N | — | — | N | Y |
| Linn, Iowa | 17 | 720 | Y | 21 | 0 | 0 | Y | S | CO/LO/CR-SM | Y | N |
| Polk, Iowa | 15 | 985 | Y | 54 | 13 | 0 | N | — | — | N | Y |
| Shawnee, Kansas | 5 | 545 | Y | 30 | 10 | 0 | N | — | — | N | Y |
| Ouachita, La. | 3 | 643 | Y | 10 | 0 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Saginaw, Mich. | 8 | — | N | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | — | Y | N |
| Washtenaw, Mich. | 7 | 720 | Y | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | S | — | — | Y |
| Olmsted, Minn. | 25 | 660 | Y | 0 | 12 | 0 | Y | S | CO/LO/CR-SM | Y | N |
| Cascade, Mont. | 2 | 2659 | Y | 13 | 0 | 0 | Y | B | CO | N | Y |
| Yellowstone, Mont. | 3 | 4656 | Y | 43 | 27 | 0 | Y | S | CR-SM | N | Y |
| Clark, Nevada | 4 | 7927 | Y | 19 | 1 | 0 | Y | S | CO/LO | N | Y |
| Washoe, Nevada | 2 | 8440 | Y | 2 | 1 | 4 | N | — | — | Y | N |
| Atlantic, N.J. | 23 | 565 | Y | 0 | 25 | 0 | Y | B | CO/LO | N | N |
| Cumberland, N.J. | 14 | 502 | Y | 14 | 8 | 0 | Y | S | LO | Y | N |
| Bernalillo, N.M. | 2 | — | Y | 2 | 1 | 0 | Y | S | CR-SM | N | N |
| Buncombe, N.C. | 6 | 646 | Y | 33 | 2 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Cumberland, N.C. | 8 | 661 | Y | 11 | 1 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Clark, Ohio | 11 | 402 | Y | 194 | 7 | 12 | N | — | — | N | N |

Appendix Table IV-B (cont.)

| County | Number Incorporated Places | Square Miles | Special Districts | Number Special Districts | Number School Districts | Number Multi-Purpose Districts | Authorized Transfer Of Functions | Legal Basis | Required Procedure* | Transfers Between 1960-1970 | City-County Consolidation Studied |
|----------------|----------------------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Lorain, Ohio | 16 | 495 | Y | 0 | 1 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Lane, Oregon | 11 | 4610 | Y | 57 | 17 | 0 | Y | S | LO | N | N |
| Berks, Penn. | 75 | 864 | Y | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | S | CO/LO/CR-SM | — | Y |
| Blair, Penn. | 8 | — | Y | 0 | 0 | 0 | N | — | — | Y | N |
| Erie, Penn. | 40 | 812 | N | 0 | 0 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Luzerne, Penn. | 74 | 894 | N | 25 | 8 | 0 | Y | S | CO/LO | Y | N |
| Cameron, Tex. | 10 | 1114 | Y | 0 | 3 | 24 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Grayson, Tex. | 14 | 927 | N | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | B | CO/LO/CR-SM | N | N |
| McLennan, Tex. | 12 | 1035 | Y | 6 | 21 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Midland, Tex. | 1 | 840 | Y | 0 | 0 | 0 | N | — | — | — | — |
| Lubbock, Tex. | 7 | 900 | Y | 5 | 8 | 0 | N | — | — | N | N |
| Weber, Utah | 16 | 2143 | Y | 19 | 3 | 0 | Y | B | CO | Y | Y |
| Pierce, Wyo. | 18 | 1789 | Y | 32 | 19 | 0 | Y | B | CO/LO | Y | N |
| Brown, Wis. | 6 | 538 | Y | 17 | 14 | 0 | N | — | — | Y | N |
| Kenosha, Wis. | 12 | 273 | Y | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | B | CO | — | — |
| Lacrosse, Wis. | 18 | — | Y | 28 | 6 | 0 | Y | S | CO | N | N |

*Key

JPA—Joint Powers Agreement

LO—Local Ordinance required

CO—County Ordinance required.

CR-SM—Countywide referendum with simple majority approval required.

LBC—Local Boundary Commission approval required.

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Profile of County Government*, pp. 147-148

commission members 1973

PRIVATE CITIZENS

Robert E. Merriam, Chairman, Chicago, Illinois

Robert H. Finch, Los Angeles, California¹

Vacancy²

MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina³

Edmund S. Muskie, Maine

Charles H. Percy, Illinois

MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

L. H. Fountain, North Carolina

Al Ullman, Oregon

Clarence J. Brown, Jr., Ohio⁴

OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., Executive Director, The Domestic Council

George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury

Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare⁵

GOVERNORS

Dale Bumpers, Arkansas

Richard F. Kneip, South Dakota

Daniel J. Evans, Washington⁶

Robert D. Ray, Iowa⁷

MAYORS

C. Beverly Briley, Nashville, Tennessee

Richard G. Lugar, Vice Chairman, Indianapolis, Indiana

Jack D. Maltester, San Leandro, California

John D. Driggs, Phoenix, Arizona

STATE LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

B. Mahlon Brown, Senator, Nevada

Robert P. Knowles, Senator, Wisconsin

Charles F. Kurfess, Minority Leader, Ohio House of Representatives⁸

ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS

Conrad M. Fowler, Shelby County, Alabama

Edwin G. Michaelian, Westchester County, New York

Lawrence K. Roos, St. Louis County, Missouri

¹ Appointed 5/29/73 to replace Edward C. Banfield, U. of Pennsylvania.

² Vacancy created by resignation of Howard H. Callaway, Pine Mountain, Georgia.

³ Appointed 2/20/73 to replace Senator Sam J. Ervin, North Carolina.

⁴ Replaced Congresswoman Florence P. Dwyer, New Jersey.

⁵ Replaced George H. Romney, former Secretary of HUD.

⁶ Replaced Ronald Reagan, Governor of California.

⁷ Replaced Richard B. Ogilvie, former Governor of Illinois.

⁸ Replaced Russell W. Arrington, former Governor of Illinois.

what is acir?

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) was created by Congress in 1959 to monitor the operation of the American federal system and to recommend improvements. ACIR is a permanent national bipartisan body representing the executive and legislative branches of Federal, State and local government and the public.

Of the 26 Commission members, nine represent the Federal government, 14 represent State and local governments and three represent the general public. Twenty members are appointed by the President. He names three private citizens and three Federal executive officials directly and selects four governors, three State legislators, four mayors and three elected county officials from slates nominated, respectively, by the National Governors' Conference, the Council of State Governments, the National League of Cities/U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Association of Counties. The other six are Members of Congress—three Senators appointed by the President of the Senate and three Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House. Commission members serve two-year terms and may be reappointed. The Commission names an Executive Director who heads the small professional staff.

After selecting specific intergovernmental issues for investigation, ACIR follows a multi-step procedure that assures review and comment by representatives of all points of view, all affected levels of government, technical experts and interested groups. The Commission then debates each issue and formulates its policy positions. Commission findings and recommendations are published and draft bills and executive orders are developed to assist in implementing ACIR policies.

